


# JOHN HENRY NEWMAN

*A View of Catholic Faith for the New Millennium*



JOHN R. CONNOLLY



# **John Henry Newman**



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## A View of Catholic Faith for the New Millennium

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*to*  
*Rosemary,*  
*Rachel, and Bill*



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# Abbreviations

<i>Apo.</i>	<i>Apologia pro Vita Sua</i>
<i>AW</i>	<i>John Henry Newman: Autobiographical Writings</i>
<i>B</i>	<i>Birmingham Oratory Archives</i>
<i>Dev.</i>	<i>An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine</i>
<i>Idea</i>	<i>The Idea of a University Defined and Illustrated</i>
<i>GA</i>	<i>An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent</i>
<i>LD</i>	<i>The Letters and Diaries of John Henry Newman</i>
<i>Mixed</i>	<i>Discourses Addressed to Mixed Congregations</i>
<i>Norfolk</i>	<i>Letter Addressed to His Grace the Duke of Norfolk</i>
<i>Prepos.</i>	<i>Lectures on the Present Position of Catholics in England</i>
<i>SN</i>	<i>Sermon Notes of John Henry Newman 1849–1878</i>
<i>US</i>	<i>Fifteen Sermons Preached before the University of Oxford (1826–1843)</i>
<i>VM</i>	<i>The Via Media of the Anglican Church</i> <i>Vol. 1: Lectures on the Prophetical Office of the Church</i> <i>Vol. 2: Occasional Letters and Tracts</i>



# Introduction

The major incentive for writing this book is to make John Henry Newman's theology more accessible to students, both undergraduate and graduate theology majors, and to educated Catholic laywomen and -men. Throughout my career, I have been somewhat schizophrenic in my approach to studying Newman. In my scholarly existence I have done research on Newman's thought, presented papers at professional conferences, and published articles in professional journals on Newman, particularly his theology of faith. Yet, seldom in my teaching have I presented any of Newman's theology in my classes. My constant concern was that Newman would be too difficult for the students. How could they possibly understand something like the *Grammar of Assent*?

At the same time, it was becoming more and more evident that we were in the midst of a Newman revival in Catholic theology. Since the Second Vatican Council, more and more theologians and Catholic laymen and -women have become attracted by the theological sophistication and spiritual depth that can be found in the writings of John Henry Newman. Recently, in an effort to overcome my schizophrenia and my fears, I have begun to introduce Newman's theology into some of my undergraduate and graduate courses for theology majors. The difficulties and challenges encountered in this endeavor have convinced me of the need for more introductory books on Newman's theology.

Admittedly, there are already a number of introductory books available on Newman. Many focus on his life and his spirituality. Some, like Avery Dulles's new book, *Newman: Outstanding Christian Thinkers*, present a general overview of some of the major aspects of his thought. Others focus on introducing the reader to different aspects of Newman's theology, such as revelation, the Church, Christology, or the development of doctrine. The

uniqueness of this book as an introductory text is that it presents a systematic analysis of Newman's mature notion of Catholic faith and attempts to show the significance of Newman's theology of faith for Catholic theology in the new millennium.

Many fine books written on Newman's notion of faith treat some of the topics that are covered in this book. John Elbert's *Evolution of Newman's Conception of Faith* and Sylvester Jergen's *Newman on the Psychology of Faith in the Individual* do an excellent job of tracing the development of Newman's notion of faith. William Fey's book, *Faith and Doubt*, is a classic on Newman's notion of the relationship between faith and doubt. M. Jamie Ferreira in her book, *Doubt and Religious Commitment*, presents a very scholarly treatment of the role of the will in Newman's thought on certitude. A. J. Boekraad's book, *The Personal Conquest of Truth According to John Henry Newman*, and David Pailin's book, *The Way to Faith: An Examination of Newman's Grammar of Assent as a Response to the Search for Certainty in Faith*, present a very convincing case for the personal nature of Newman's notion of faith. A more recent work, *Personal Catholicism* by Martin X. Moleski, also stresses the personal nature of Newman's notion of certitude in the *Grammar of Assent*. However, none of these works brings all of these elements together to present a systematic analysis of Newman's mature notion of Catholic faith. Also, these works do not address the significance of Newman's notion of faith for Catholic theology in the new millennium.

It is important to stress that the primary method of this book is that of systematic theology. The book is systematic in the sense that it attempts to bring together Newman's diverse writings on faith and to present an integrated view of his mature notion of Catholic faith. Both primary and secondary sources are used in this analysis. The approach of the book is also systematic in a second sense. Systematic theology attempts to demonstrate how past expressions of Christian faith are relevant for questions and problems facing contemporary Christians. Therefore, the second objective of the book is to point out the significance of Newman's views on Catholic faith for Catholic theology today. The overall approach of the book is academic and scholarly. The issues are explored in depth. When relevant, opposing interpretations of Newman's thought are discussed. The book is annotated and includes a comprehensive bibliography on Newman's notion of faith. It is not a popularization of Newman's view of Catholic faith. As a result, the book also should be of interest to scholars engaged in Newman studies.

Since the notion of faith is such a foundational concept in theology, it is particularly advantageous to introduce newcomers to Newman's theology through his theology of faith. One's understanding of faith influences one's understanding of other theological concepts, like Christology, the Church,

doctrine and dogma, the magisterium, Christian morality, Christian spirituality, conscience and freedom of thought, the relationship between faith and doubt, and theological dissent. In developing his mature notion of Catholic faith, Newman had to deal with all of these issues. His encounter with the intellectual Roman theology of faith and his endeavor to develop a more personalist definition of Catholic faith provide a dramatic illustration of how differing views of faith influence one's understanding of other theological concepts. Newman's personal encounters and struggles within the Catholic Church provide an exciting montage with which many Catholics today can identify.

Another element of Newman's theology of faith that might be attractive for contemporary Catholics is his focus on the certitude of the act of faith. For Catholics living in a world in which all positions are presented as equally true, certitude appears to be something that is obsolete. More liberal Catholics feel the pressure to suppress urges toward certitude in order to be open to and tolerant of other positions. On the other hand, conservative Catholics seem to feel that the confirmations of one's certitudes means absolutizing one's own position and setting up a fortress against all other views and beliefs.

Newman, however, offers a more balanced understanding of certitude. Certitude is a natural human response, and it is an essential element of faith. Without certitude, one does not really believe. Newman says that certitude is necessary for a living faith. Without it, the believer cannot make the conviction and take the risks that are necessary for a vital faith. According to Newman, without certitude there can be no habit of prayer, no devotion, no contact with God, no generosity or self-sacrifice. Certitude is necessary if faith is to overflow into a loving Christian praxis.

At the same time, certitude for Newman is a personal act. It flows from within the person and respects other persons. For Newman, certitude is not bias, prejudice, or dogmatism. Certitude is not infallibility, and it does not condone absolutizing one's own positions. It is compatible with various forms of rational criticism. Certitudes are rooted in a person's conscience and require freedom of thought in order to flourish and develop. Certitudes should not be used to put others down or inflict harm on them. Certitude can be open to and respectful of the views of others. Newman never says this, but perhaps certitude, like his gentleman, never inflicts harm on others.

In terms of the content of the book, one of the first things that needs to be clarified is the meaning of the term *Catholic faith*. In his writings, Newman distinguishes between human faith and divine faith. *Human faith* refers to that form of faith that Newman calls *fides humana* (human faith) or *fides acquisita* (acquired faith). It is an assent to truths that can be known without the assistance of grace, and it is often described as having a lesser degree of certitude

than divine faith. *Divine faith*, on the other hand, is the assent to revealed truths (the revelation of God in Jesus Christ) that requires grace and is frequently spoken of as having a higher degree of certitude than human faith. When discussing divine faith in the “Papers in Preparation for *A Grammar of Assent*, 1865–69,” Newman makes a further distinction between Divine Faith (*Fides Divina*) and Catholic Divine Faith (*Fides Divina Catholica*) (*Theological Papers*, 123–33). *Divine Faith* is the acceptance of private divine revelations on the basis of the authority of God, but not on the basis of the infallible authority of the Catholic Church. *Catholic Divine Faith* is the acceptance of the public Christian revelation (the revelation of God in Jesus Christ) on the basis of the authority of God revealing through the teachings of the infallible Catholic Church. Consequently, Catholic Divine Faith is the expression that Newman uses to describe his specifically Catholic understanding of faith. It is this notion of faith that is the focus of this book, and for purposes of brevity, from this point on in the book, it will be designated as Catholic faith.

Newman’s mature notion of Catholic faith is the result of a lifelong process of reflection on the meaning of divine faith. This process began in his Anglican years, was developed further in his early Catholic writings, and came to maturity in the *Grammar of Assent*. The purpose of the first chapter is to trace the major moments of this process in order to present a historical overview of Newman’s theology of faith. This will provide the historical context for understanding how Newman’s mature notion of Catholic faith developed.

Chapter 2 investigates Newman’s early attempts as a Catholic to correlate the notion of faith presented in the *University Sermons* with the theology of faith found in nineteenth-century Roman Catholic theology. This chapter will focus on Newman’s efforts to clarify the distinction between human faith and divine faith. As a result of these reflections Newman came to realize that the act of Catholic faith has its own distinctive processes that differentiate it from human faith. This realization enabled Newman to focus on the role that reason plays in the act of Catholic faith as distinct from the role that it plays in human faith. Also, these reflections enabled Newman to clearly delineate his specific Catholic understanding of faith, which he called Catholic Divine Faith.

In chapter 3, Newman’s understanding of human certitude is investigated in detail. This chapter analyzes the basic terms that are central to Newman’s understanding of human certitude and explains the relationship between the different terms. After an analysis of Newman’s terminology, this chapter examines Newman’s understanding of the process by which a person arrives at human certitude. The focus here is on the illative sense and the role of the will in the act of human certitude. This chapter is central to the book for it explains the human analogy that serves as the basis for Newman’s mature understanding of Catholic faith.

Chapter 4 presents a constructive and systematic summary of Newman's mature understanding of Catholic faith. It explains how Newman applies the analogy of human certitude to the act of Catholic faith. This chapter examines Newman's Catholic notion of faith from the point of view of both the act of faith and the object of faith. The analysis of the act of faith shows that faith, for Newman, is a real assent and an integrated act of the person. The act of faith is a centered act in which personal reasoning, the illative sense, the will, and the grace of God all converge in one total personal response. In describing the object of faith, Newman distinguishes between the propositional expression of God's revelation and the reality that is being revealed. This chapter also discusses the specific Catholic nature of Newman's understanding of faith. For Newman, the Catholic Church plays a special and unique role in communicating God's revelation, the object of faith.

Chapter 5 investigates Newman's understanding of the relationship between faith and reason in his mature Catholic notion of faith. The first part of this chapter discusses Newman's mature understanding of the role that reason plays in the process of coming to faith, the evidences of faith. This analysis reveals that, in his mature notion of Catholic faith, Newman settles on a personalist approach to the evidences of faith and moves away from the more rationalistic approach of Roman theology. In the second part of this chapter, the role that rational criticism plays within the actual assent of the act of Catholic faith is discussed. The objective here is to understand how Newman is able to balance the unconditional nature of the commitment of faith with the human mind's inquisitiveness and thirst for understanding and rational criticism. On the one hand, the commitment of faith is unconditional and immune to certain forms of criticism. Newman addresses this aspect of faith when he discusses certitude, indefectibility, infallibility, and the exclusion of doubt and inquiry. On the other hand, in order to be rational, the commitment of faith must be open to some forms of rational criticism. Newman addresses this aspect of faith when he discusses investigation, the limits of infallibility, theological reflection, historical criticism, and the freedom of conscience.

The final chapter discusses the significance of Newman's mature understanding of Catholic faith for Catholic theology in this new millennium. Newman's mature understanding of Catholic faith is significant today for Catholic theology because it is a notion of faith that emphasizes the personalist approach over the intellectual. Contemporary Catholic theology, following the lead of the Second Vatican Council, has made significant progress in defining the Catholic notion of faith according to the personalist model. When Newman's mature notion of Catholic faith is viewed from the perspective of the two main approaches to defining faith in Catholic theology today, the intellectual and the personalist, it is evident that Newman follows the personalist approach. In his descriptions of both the act of faith and the object of

faith, Newman stresses the personal nature of faith. The personal nature of Newman's notion of Catholic faith can be seen also in his understanding of the relationship between faith and praxis. Newman's mature notion of Catholic faith provides Catholic theologians today with a personalist epistemology that can well serve as the framework for the future development of the Catholic notion of faith.

Newman's notion of Catholic faith is also significant for contemporary Catholic theology because it is a personalist approach to faith that insists on the importance and necessity of doctrine and dogma. Equally essential to Newman's Catholic understanding of faith is his acceptance of the normative teaching role of the magisterium of the Church in the process of communicating God's personal revelation. Yet, just as Catholics today, particularly Catholic theologians, find themselves in conflict with the magisterium, so Newman, during his lifetime, experienced difficulties in his relationships with the magisterium. Three of Newman's encounters with the magisterium are investigated in this final chapter, and some suggestions are made about how Newman's methods of dealing with the magisterium might be helpful for Catholics today, particularly Catholic theologians.

Another aspect of Newman's notion of Catholic faith that is significant for Catholic faith today is his understanding of the role that rational criticism plays in the act of faith. Newman's respect for the magisterium and his acceptance of the necessity of doctrine and dogma did not mean that he saw Catholic faith as a blind act of obedience or an uncritical acceptance of the teachings of the Church. For Newman, the response of Catholic faith is compatible with many forms of rational criticism. The implications of Newman's understanding of the role of rational criticism in the act of faith for Catholic theology today are discussed in this final chapter. Newman's insistence on the priority of conscience and freedom of thought in the response of faith further demonstrate that Newman emphasized the personal over the intellectual approach to faith. What becomes evidently clear from this discussion is that Newman's vision of Catholic faith is not a form of uncritical dogmatism.

Toward the end of this final chapter, aspects of Newman's Catholic notion of faith that appear to be insufficiently developed from the point of view of contemporary Catholic theology are discussed. These include the relationship between faith and doubt, the dimension of social justice, cultural diversity, ecumenism, and interreligious dialogue. Suggestions are made as to how Newman's theology of faith might be further developed in the future in order to address these issues more effectively. Finally, when all of the elements of Newman's mature notion of Catholic faith are brought together, it seems that his view of Catholic faith can best be described as critical fidelity. Such a vision of faith can serve the Catholic Church well as it continues to address the needs of Catholics today and as it makes plans to meet the challenges that the Church will face in this new millennium.

# Biography of John Henry Newman

To fully understand and appreciate Newman's notion of faith, it is necessary to have some understanding of the man and his life. A brief biography can provide some understanding of the historical context in which Newman developed his notion of faith. Some of the critical moments in Newman's development of his understanding of faith are elaborated on in more detail at appropriate points in the book.

Born in London on February 21, 1801, John Henry Newman entered this world in rather comfortable and secure circumstances. His father, John Newman, was a successful London banker who provided a good existence for his wife and six children (three boys and three girls, of whom John Henry was the eldest). Jemima Foudrinier, his mother, was the daughter of a wealthy London paper manufacturer who was the descendant of French Protestant Huguenot refugees. Both of his parents were religious and were practicing members of the Anglican Church (the Church of England). Although John Henry was taught the Anglican catechism and learned to read the Bible, he did not consider himself to be devoutly religious in his childhood and early adolescent years. He himself states that, although he was brought up as a child "to take great delight in reading the Bible," he had "no formed religious convictions" until he was fifteen.<sup>1</sup>

Newman's formal schooling began when he was about seven and one-half years old. On May 1, 1808, John Henry, along with his brother Charles, was sent to a private boarding school at Ealing. Here the young John Henry distinguished himself in his studies. He soon emerged as a leader among his fellow students, editing a magazine and presiding over a club. Dr. George Nicholas, the owner and headmaster of the school, was accustomed to say that no student had gone through the school as rapidly as John Henry Newman.<sup>2</sup>

The year 1816, when Newman was a fifteen-year-old schoolboy, proved to be a critical year in the development of his own faith. It was both a year of crisis as well as a year of grace. On March 8, 1816, the bank at which Newman's father worked was forced to close, and his father lost his job. Although his partners found Newman's father a job managing a brewery, this crisis resulted in a severe decline in the family's financial fortunes. Newman's father never really recovered from this perceived failure. He died in September 1824 as a broken man and in disgrace. At the time his father's bank failed, Newman was at school at Ealing and suffered a crisis of his own. Newman became seriously ill and, as a result, was forced to remain at Ealing during the summer of 1816. It was in the midst of these two crises, his father's financial failure and his own illness, that Newman experienced a religious conversion.

Inspired by the books that one of his teachers, the Reverend Walter Meyers, gave him to read while he was convalescing at Ealing during the summer of 1816, Newman experienced an evangelical conversion that was influenced heavily by the theology of John Calvin. The transformation that occurred in Newman as a result of this conversion was radical. The boy who had no religion was now a committed and devout Christian with beliefs and doctrines to which he became strongly committed. Charles Stephen Dessain says that this was the "turning-point" that was to give the rest of Newman's life its unity.<sup>3</sup> Newman himself describes this conversion as the beginning of divine faith in him.<sup>4</sup> (The effects of this 1816 conversion on Newman's view of faith are treated more fully in chapter 1.)

Refreshed by this experience, Newman began his matriculation at Trinity College, Oxford, on December 14, 1816 (although he did not take up residency until the fall of 1817). Newman's days at Oxford were filled with both success and failure. His education at Oxford focused on the study of mathematics and the Greek and Latin classics. In 1818, he won an important scholarship at Trinity that gave him sixty pounds per year for nine years. As a student Newman, avoided the rowdy parties (the students at Trinity had a reputation for overindulging in alcohol) and spent his leisure time taking walks and playing the violin. Although a very good student, Newman suffered a setback when he took his final examinations for his undergraduate degree. He had expected to get a double-first (in mathematics and in classics). Instead, due to overwork and nerves, he broke down and had to retire from the examinations, after making sure that he had done enough to get an undergraduate degree. This was, of course, a bitter disappointment to the young scholar. Yet, Newman continued to read and decided to take the examinations for an Oriel College fellowship. Against all expectations, he passed and was appointed a Fellow of Oriel College, Oxford, on February 12, 1822. This meant that Newman would become a member of an elite society of scholars

at Oriel College and would receive an income for the rest of his life. Being elected a Fellow of Oriel was a privilege and an honor that more than compensated for his poor performances in his undergraduate examinations. His ability as a scholar had been proven and duly recognized.

It was at Oriel that Newman came under the influence of liberal thinkers such as Richard Whately, Edward Hawkins, and Thomas Arnold. These thinkers stressed reason, logic, and clear thinking over devotion and doctrine and played down the supernatural element in religion. Newman says that Whately opened his mind and taught him to think and use his reason. In June 1825, Newman began to read Bishop Joseph Butler's *Analogy of Religion* (1736). From this work Newman learned two principles that were to become the foundations of his understanding of faith. One was the principle of analogy that taught him that there are similarities between the works of God in nature and in divine revelation. The second was the principle that probability is the guide of life. From this Newman learned that faith is not based on logical reasoning but on the more informal reasoning that concludes on the basis of the accumulation of probable evidence.

Although Newman had originally entered Oxford with the intention of becoming a lawyer, he had decided in 1821 that he would become a clergyman in the Anglican Church. In 1824, he was ordained a deacon in the Anglican Church; and on May 19, 1825, he was ordained an Anglican priest. His first parish was St. Clement, a working-class parish just outside Oxford. In 1826, when Newman became a tutor at Oriel College, he had to resign his curacy at St. Clement. It was at this time (1826) that Newman came under the influence of a circle of High Church Anglicans that included John Keble, Edward Pusey, and Richard Hurrell Froude. The influence of these men, along with two tragic events, was to change the direction of his life as an Anglican. In October–November 1827, Newman, as a result of overwork, became seriously ill and was forced to leave Oxford on the orders of his doctor. Then, even more tragically, on January 5, 1828, his sister Mary died at the age of nineteen. She was his favorite, and her death was a tremendous blow to Newman. At this point in his life, Newman turned away from liberalism for good and aligned himself with the High Church Anglican party. It was also around this time that Newman began to read systematically the works of the Latin and Greek writers of the early church.

On March 14, 1828, Newman was appointed vicar of the University Church at St. Mary's, Oxford. In addition to a few parishioners at Oxford, his parish included the village of Littlemore, about three miles outside Oxford. At St. Mary's, Newman gained a reputation as an outstanding preacher. Some of his major sermons preached on faith at St. Mary's are collected in his work *Fifteen Sermons Preached before the University of Oxford between A.D. 1826*

and 1843. (Newman's analysis of faith in the *University Sermons* is discussed in more detail in chapter 1.) In addition to his work at St. Mary's, Newman continued his position as a tutor at Oriel College. It was at this time (1829–1830) that he found himself in disagreement with Edward Hawkins, the provost of Oriel College, over the proper role of tutors. Newman believed that tutors should be concerned with both the spiritual as well as the intellectual development of their students. Hawkins, however, regarded the office of tutor as a purely academic position, and so, eventually, he stopped assigning students to Newman. By 1831, Newman had no more students.

Beginning in December 1832, Newman, taking a break from his work at St. Mary's, went on a Mediterranean vacation. His travels brought him to Rome, where he met the future Cardinal Nicholas Wiseman, who was at that time the rector of the English College. While in Sicily in April 1833, he became seriously ill with typhoid fever and almost died. When he recovered, he renewed his dedication to be guided in his life by the providence of God. On his way home, in the strait between Corsica and Sardinia, Newman wrote his famous poem "Lead Kindly Light." On July 8, 1833, Newman returned to Oxford and was about to begin his most significant period in the Anglican Church, his involvement and leadership in the movement in the Anglican Church that became known as the Oxford movement. Newman traces the beginning of the Oxford movement to the Assize sermon on "National Apostasy," preached by John Keble at St. Mary's University Church on July 14, 1833. The movement began as an attempt to reassert the independence of the Anglican Church from the state, but it soon took on a wider agenda. It wanted to restore the Anglican Church to its more Catholic (universal/apostolic, not Roman Catholic) roots and to purge the church of some of its Protestant elements. John Keble, Edward Pusey, Hurrell Froude, and others were involved in the movement, but Newman soon became its main spokesman. The principal means used by the movement to communicate its message was through pamphlets, which became known as *Tracts for the Times*. Although the tracts were written by others, Newman himself wrote the first one on apostolic succession in September 1833, and they continued until the famous Tract 90 on the Thirty-nine Articles (the official statement of the beliefs of the Anglican Church), which was published on February 27, 1841.

In Tract 90, Newman attempted to demonstrate that the Thirty-nine Articles could be interpreted in a Catholic, as distinct from a Protestant, sense. Somewhat to Newman's surprise, Tract 90 was greeted with indignant protests from both the Anglican bishops and the heads of the Colleges at Oxford. In order to avoid an outright condemnation, Newman agreed to discontinue the tracts in March 1841. At this point, thinking that he had satisfied his critics in the Anglican Church, Newman thought that the matter was over.

However, in September 1841, a series of condemnations of Tract 90 by the Anglican bishops began. Bishop after bishop condemned Tract 90 over the course of the next three years. With the condemnation of Tract 90 by the Anglican bishops, Newman's position in the Anglican Church became untenable. He still intended to remain an Anglican, but he thought about the possibility of remaining as a member of the laity. In October 1842, Newman retired to Littlemore to reflect on things and to pray for divine guidance. Although his doubts about the apostolic basis of the Anglican Church began as early as 1839, the years at Littlemore between 1842 and 1845 gradually led him to the realization that the Roman Catholic Church, and not the Anglican Church, was the true Church of the Apostles. It was during this period that Newman wrote the book *An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine*, in 1845. At Littlemore on October 9, 1845 Father Dominic Barberi, an Italian Passionist priest, received Newman into the Roman Catholic Church. (A more comprehensive analysis of Newman's doubts and his reasons for becoming a Roman Catholic can be found in chapter 1.)

It is difficult today to realize what Newman's conversion to Roman Catholicism might have meant in the context of nineteenth-century England. Sheridan Gilley writes that to become a Roman Catholic was "sort of a living death." Catholics were excluded from many public employments and were, to a great extent, ostracized from decent society.<sup>5</sup> At this time in England, Catholics were a minority group and were considered educationally backward.<sup>6</sup> Even more painful was that many family members and friends cut Newman off for decades, and some, like his sister Harriett Mozley, did so for the rest of their lives. On the other hand, from the point of view of Roman Catholicism, Newman was considered a great prize, and Cardinal Nicholas Wiseman was more than happy to put him on display. Some Catholic leaders had expectations of a massive exodus of Anglicans to Roman Catholicism as a result of Newman's conversion. A number of Newman's followers at Littlemore did convert with him, and more would follow. But the numbers fell short of the expectations of the Catholic Church in England. Some Catholic leaders even criticized Newman for not being more actively involved in the conversion of Anglicans to Roman Catholicism.

After forty-four years as an Anglican, Newman was now faced with the task of finding a place for himself in the Catholic Church. On February 22, 1846, Newman left Littlemore and went to Old Oscott (later to be known as Maryvale), just outside Birmingham. After a brief time at Maryvale, Newman in September 1846 left England to go to Rome to study theology at the College of Propaganda, a school of theology presided over by the Jesuits. At this time, Newman was considering the idea of establishing a school of theology at Maryvale when he returned to England. However, his experience in Rome

led him to reconsider this plan. While in Rome, Newman discovered that some of the Roman theologians were suspicious of the orthodoxy of his theology. Realizing under those circumstances that the idea of a school of theology at Maryvale was not feasible, Newman decided that he would become an Oratorian and set up an Oratory congregation in England. The Oratorian congregation was founded originally by St. Philip Neri in the sixteenth century. Oratorians are a community of diocesan priests who live under a common rule but do not take the vows of poverty and obedience. Each community, or house, is independent and lives under its own democratic rule. Since Oratories are located in cities and each community is associated with a church, the life of an Oratorian particularly suited Newman. It offered him the opportunity to do pastoral work and provided him also with the independence and the means to continue to pursue scholarship and learning. (Newman's experience in Rome and his decision to become an Oratorian are treated in more detail in chapter 1.)

On May 30, 1847, Newman became a Catholic priest, and in December 1847, he returned to England. On February 1, 1848, he established the first Oratorian congregation in England at Maryvale. In 1849, this community was moved to Alcester Street in the middle of Birmingham; then, in 1850, it was moved to the Edgbaston section of Birmingham, where it still is today. A second house of the Oratory, with Frederick William Faber in charge, was founded in London in April 1849. Newman had now found a place in the Catholic Church. Working out his role and making his contribution to the church was to be a lifelong task that, as might be expected, was filled with both successes and setbacks.

On September 29, 1850, Pope Pius IX issued an apostolic letter restoring the Catholic hierarchy in England. Up to this point, the Catholic Church in England was a missionary church directly under the control of the Congregation of Propaganda in Rome. The leaders of the Catholic Church in England were called vicars apostolic. The Catholic Church in England had been without a hierarchy for 265 years. On October 3, 1850, Bishop Nicholas Wiseman was made a cardinal of the church and was appointed archbishop of the metropolitan diocese of Westminster. An event that was a blessing for Catholics occasioned a fiery and volatile anti-Catholic outburst from Protestants in England. Protestants commonly referred to the restoration as an act of papal aggression. Although Newman himself thought that the restoration of the hierarchy was premature, he came to the defense of his new religion. Between June 30 and September 1, 1851, Newman delivered a series of lectures at the Corn Exchange in Birmingham defending the Catholic Church against the anti-Catholicism of the English Protestants. These lectures, in which Newman says that he is addressing the reasons for the prejudice against Catholics

in England, were eventually published under the title *Lectures on the Present Position of Catholics in England*.

One of the unfortunate consequences of these lectures was that in one of them Newman attacked Dr. Giovanni Achilli, an ex-Dominican who was traveling around England spreading all kinds of lurid stories about the abuses of Catholicism. Achilli sued, and Newman was tried for libel in June 1852. Newman was convicted and sentenced to pay a fine of one hundred pounds. Enough money was raised through collections taken up throughout the world, including in the United States, to more than cover the fine and his trial expenses. Although Newman was convicted, the obvious prejudice against him at the trial, along with a relatively small fine, won him a moral victory.

While Newman was still engaged in the Achilli affair, Archbishop Paul Cullen of Armagh on April 15, 1852, wrote to ask him to give a series of lectures on education in Dublin in conjunction with the Irish bishops' plan to establish a Catholic University in Ireland. Not only did Newman deliver the lectures, but on November 12, 1852, he was appointed rector of the Catholic University in Ireland. The purpose of this new university was to provide higher education in a religious environment for the Catholic laity because the Irish bishops frowned on Catholics attending the newly formed Queen's Colleges that excluded religious teaching. The university opened, with Newman as rector, on November 3, 1854, and was successful for a few years. Because of a host of problems, which included conflicts among the Irish bishops, difficulties in recruiting faculty, a lack of a suitable student body in Ireland, and Archbishop Cullen's interference in the affairs of the university, the university did not meet its expectations. As a result of these problems, and because he was needed back at his Oratory in Birmingham, Newman resigned as rector on November 12, 1858. Although his efforts to establish a Catholic University in Ireland were not ultimately successful, his work in Ireland provided the occasion for one of his greatest books, *The Idea of a University*. In this work, Newman presents a masterful analysis of a Catholic liberal education. Even today it is regarded by many as a classic. There was also one other positive outcome of Newman's years in Ireland: Although the university he founded only survived until 1882, the medical school that he started at the university is still in existence today.

Newman's setbacks in Ireland were minor in comparison to the troubles he encountered in the *Rambler* affair in 1859. It is important to note that Newman got involved in the *Rambler* affair at the request of his own bishop, William Ullathorne. The *Rambler* was a Catholic literary journal in England founded by John M. Capes in 1848. In 1859, in order to prevent the journal from being censured by the English bishops because of some of the journal's liberal views, Newman convinced the editor, Richard Simpson, to resign, and,

reluctantly, he agreed to become the interim editor. Newman's troubles began in the May 1859 issue of the journal, his first as editor, in which he made a remark supporting the consultative role of the laity in the church. Matters got worse when in the July 1859 issue of the *Rambler* Newman published his article *On Consulting the Faithful in Matters of Doctrine*. In this article, Newman maintained that, during the Arian controversy in the fourth century, it was the laity who kept the true faith while many of the bishops, particularly in the Eastern church, supported Arianism, thus resulting in a suspension of the teaching function of the bishops. After a prominent theologian, John Gillow, denounced the article, Bishop Thomas Brown of Newport sent Newman's article to the Congregation of Propaganda in Rome and accused Newman of heresy. In Rome, Cardinal Barnabo, the prefect of Propaganda, was shocked by what Newman had written, and he wanted Newman to respond to a list of objections. But, because of a lack of communication, Newman never received the list of objections and so did not respond. As a result, it appeared to Rome that Newman was unwilling to reply. (A more detailed account of the events surrounding the *Rambler* affair can be found in chapter 6.) However, as a result of the *Rambler* incident, Newman was placed under a cloud of suspicion in Rome. Between 1859 and 1864, he was reluctant to write anything. These silent years were a period of sadness and disappointment for him.

Suddenly and unexpectedly in 1864, Charles Kingsley, a professor of modern history at Cambridge and a well-known novelist, provided Newman with the occasion to write again. In a review of James A. Froude's book *A History of England* in the January 1864 issue of *Macmillan's Magazine*, Kingsley accused Newman and the Catholic clergy in general of having no regard for the truth. After a brief correspondence between Newman and Kingsley, Newman decided to seize the moment and write a more formal reply to Kingsley's charges. It was the opportunity for which Newman had been waiting. For twenty years he had heard the charges against the validity of his conversion to Catholicism. Once and for all he decided to put the charges to rest. His answer to Kingsley and the defense of his truthfulness and that of the Catholic Church is found in his work *Apologia pro Vita Sua*. In the first four chapters, Newman traces his spiritual journey from Anglicanism to Catholicism. The fifth, and last, chapter is a defense of his grounds for holding the truth of the Catholic faith. The reaction to the *Apologia* was enthusiastic and positive. His voice, which had been silenced, was suddenly restored to him. Many Anglicans felt that Newman had successfully cleared his name, and some renewed their friendships with him. To Catholics, he was their champion, the defender of the clergy and the church. The Old Catholic clergy rallied to his support and sent him letters of congratulations. Only one group of Catholics, the conservative Ultramontanes, such as Henry Manning, Herbert Vaughan, and

William George Ward, were not impressed. The Ultramontanes emphasized the authority of the papacy in matters of doctrine and the governance of the church. Newman would encounter their opposition on both the issue of Catholics attending Oxford and the definition of papal infallibility.

The issue of Catholics attending Oxford reached a critical point in 1864. Since 1854, when the religious tests (submission to the Thirty-nine Articles) were abolished at Oxford and Cambridge, both universities had been open to Catholics. Many Catholic laity wanted their sons to take advantage of this opportunity, and some had already sent their sons to Oxford or Cambridge. Newman, who supported the right of Catholics to attend Oxford and Cambridge, was asked by Bishop Ullathorne in August 1864 to take over the Catholic parish at Oxford so that he could provide for the religious needs of Catholics at the university. Henry Manning, himself a convert from Anglicanism who would be made Archbishop of Westminster after Wiseman's death on February 15, 1865, was strongly opposed to Catholics going to Oxford and was even more opposed to Newman going there. Using his considerable influence in Rome, Manning tried to persuade the Congregation of Propaganda to support his position. However, Propaganda ordered the English bishops to meet and discuss the matter. At their meeting on December 18, 1864, the bishops decided that Catholics should be discouraged from attending Oxford, but no direct prohibition was issued. The bishops met again in March 1865 and reaffirmed the position taken at the first meeting, a warning but no prohibition. In the summer of 1866, Bishop Ullathorne once again asked Newman to take over the Catholic parish at Oxford. Newman agreed on the condition that Propaganda would approve the plan and give him formal permission to establish an Oratory at Oxford. Propaganda granted permission for the Oratory, but, through the urging of Archbishop Henry Manning, inserted a secret stipulation that Newman would not be allowed to live in Oxford. While Newman, unaware of the stipulation, began raising money for the Oratory at Oxford, Bishop Ullathorne worked behind the scenes, to no avail, to get the condition removed. Then, in March 1867, the secret condition was revealed in a letter from the Roman correspondent of the *Weekly Register*, and the reason given for not allowing Newman to go to Oxford was that Rome had suspicions about the orthodoxy of his theology. The Catholic laity, who strongly supported Newman's move to Oxford, wrote letters of protest against the stipulation, but to no avail. Archbishop Manning was adamant that Newman would not go to Oxford, and, on this matter, he prevailed. Newman sent Ambrose St. John, his close friend and colleague at the Birmingham Oratory, to Rome in 1867 to address the suspicions against Newman, which actually went back to the miscommunications over the 1859 article *On Consulting the Faithful on Matters of Doctrine*. However, Newman was under no illusions.

He did not expect Propaganda to remove the stipulation. The whole matter only confirmed his distrust of Propaganda and its methods. In the summer of 1867, the idea of establishing an Oratory at Oxford was abandoned.

It was also in 1867 that Pius IX first announced that he was going to convene the First Vatican Council. Newman was asked by Pius IX to help prepare for the council and to be an official theologian at the council. Newman declined primarily on the grounds of old age. On July 18, 1870, the First Vatican Council defined the dogma of the infallibility of the pope. Although Newman had opposed the definition on the grounds that it was inopportune, he was relieved that a moderate definition was approved, and he eventually supported the council's definition. Also in 1870, Newman published his major Catholic work on faith, the *Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent*. Since this work is the primary source for Newman's mature notion of Catholic faith and is discussed at length throughout the book, it is not necessary to comment on it any further at this point.

In 1874, the issue of infallibility once again engaged Newman's attention. Gladstone, the prime minister of England who was defeated as a result of the passage of the Irish University Bill and thus was forced to resign, wrote a pamphlet in November 1874 in which he claimed that, because of the definition of papal infallibility, Catholics in England could no longer be loyal citizens. Newman's friends urged him to reply, and he was willing. He had a problem, however, because answering Gladstone meant that he would have to attack the extreme Ultramontane interpretation of infallibility that was accepted by Catholics such as Archbishop Manning and William George Ward. Newman's solution to the problem was masterful. He decided to answer Gladstone in a letter addressed to his friend the Duke of Norfolk. The letter was published in January 1875 under the title *A Letter Addressed to His Grace the Duke of Norfolk on Occasion of Mr. Gladstone's Recent Expostulation*. In this letter, Newman defended the doctrine of papal infallibility and presented an accurate and balanced interpretation of the First Vatican Council's definition of infallibility. The *Letter to the Duke of Norfolk* was generally well received by Catholics in England, both bishops and laity. Rome, however, was not pleased and denounced the letter as censurable. The Ultramontanes were also not pleased but were reluctant to speak out publicly against Newman. (A more detailed description of the Gladstone controversy can be found in chapter 6.)

As he approached the age of seventy-three, Newman began to think about his legacy. He spent the years between 1874 and 1878 revising and republishing many of his earlier Anglican works. These years also brought Newman some long overdue recognition. In December 1877, he was invited by the president of Trinity College, Oxford, to become the college's first hon-

orary fellow. Newman accepted and received the award when he returned to Oxford in February 1878. After half a lifetime of exile from Oxford, Newman returned in triumph and was enthusiastically accepted by all at Oxford. An even greater honor came on May 12, 1879, when Newman was made a cardinal of the Catholic Church by Pope Leo XIII, who succeeded Pius IX when he died in February 1878. Although the tradition at the time was that cardinals who were not bishops were to reside in Rome, Newman received permission from the pope to continue to live at his Oratory in Birmingham. For Newman and his followers, his elevation meant that he had been vindicated. He would no longer be able to be considered only half a Catholic. However, when Newman was made a cardinal, his theological views did not change. He still had supporters and detractors in the church. But now he had received some official recognition for his lifelong service to the Catholic Church.

During the 1880s, Newman continued to remain active, guiding his Birmingham community, making public appearances, preaching, receiving visitors, and corresponding with his many friends. Although his energy gradually diminished and his literary output slowed down, he did manage to publish a significant article on the inspiration of Scripture in February 1884. In 1886, his physical powers began to fail him. Gradually he began to have trouble writing and had to have others write his letters. He was beginning to lose his hearing and his eyesight, and walking became a problem. However, he remained mentally sharp until the end. At the Birmingham Oratory on August 11, 1889, Newman died in peace as a Catholic who had remained loyal to the church in spite of all the trials he had to face. In his life, both as an Anglican and as a Catholic, he had experienced success and failure, joy and tribulation, and acceptance and rejection. He willingly accepted all the challenges, never despaired, and continued, to the moment of his death, to serve God and grow in faith.

Part of Newman's legacy to the Catholic Church in the United States can be seen in the Newman Centers that serve Catholic students at secular universities today. These centers have their origin in the early Newman Clubs that began in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The first Newman Club was formed at the University of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia in 1893. It was founded and organized by a medical student named Timothy L. Harrington. As an undergraduate at the University of Wisconsin in Madison, Harrington had belonged to a club for Catholic students known as the Melvin Club. When he came to the University of Pennsylvania and found no equivalent student organization, he decided to establish a club for the Catholic students in the medical and dental schools at the university. Harrington had read Newman's works, particularly *The Idea of a University*, and was impressed with his writings, and so he named the club the Newman Club. When

Harrington accepted the presidency of the first Newman Club, he noted that there could not be a more fitting name for an organization of Catholics seeking to improve themselves socially, intellectually, and religiously in a university setting.

Soon after, Newman Clubs began to appear at other major universities in the early twentieth century. From this humble beginning, the Newman Clubs have given rise to the Newman Centers that are found on the campuses of numerous secular universities in the United States today. In the early 1920s, Father John O'Brien began the first Newman Foundation, a separate center, at the University of Illinois. Since then, many more Newman Centers have begun at other secular universities.

The purpose of the Newman Centers is to meet the pastoral, intellectual, and social needs of Catholic students attending secular universities. They attempt to provide a friendly religious environment for Catholic university students. To a great extent, they originally were founded to help Catholic students deal with the difficulties that they faced in practicing their faith on secular campuses that were often anti-Catholic. It is interesting to note that in the early twentieth century, the Newman apostolate to secular universities met with significant opposition from some of the U.S. bishops and representatives of the Catholic colleges and universities, particularly the Jesuit universities, in the United States. The establishment of Catholic Newman Centers on secular universities was seen as a threat to the development of Catholic colleges and universities. Fortunately, this view did not prevail, and today the Newman apostolate continues to serve the intellectual, social, and spiritual needs of Catholic university students both on secular campuses as well as on the campuses of some Catholic universities.

## NOTES

1. John Henry Newman, *Apologia pro Vita Sua*, ed. A. Dwight Culler (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1956), 21. (Hereafter abbreviated *Apo.*)
2. Charles Stephen Dessain, *John Henry Newman* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1971), 2.
3. Dessain, *Newman*, 5.
4. *Apo.*, 24.
5. Sheridan Gilley, *Newman and His Age* (Westminster, MD: Christian Classics, 1991), 237.
6. Dessain, *Newman*, 89.

## *Chapter One*

# **A Historical Overview of Newman's Theology of Faith**

### **THE ANGLICAN YEARS, 1816–1845**

Although Newman was a member of the Anglican Church during these years, the notion of faith that he developed during this time should not, strictly speaking, be called an Anglican notion of faith. During these years, he was investigating the response of faith at its most fundamental level, before it diversified into specific and concrete formulations. In 1864, when reflecting on his earlier statements on faith in the *University Sermons*, Newman wrote that he was investigating “the ultimate basis of religious faith, prior to the distinction into Creeds.”<sup>1</sup> Consequently, it would be more accurate to view what is being presented in this chapter as an analysis of the notion of faith that Newman developed during his years as an Anglican.

#### **The 1816 Conversion**

One of the most significant influences on Newman's understanding of Christian faith during these early years was his 1816 evangelical conversion experience. During the summer of 1816, he stayed in school at Ealing and, while there, became seriously ill. While convalescing from his illness, Newman experienced a conversion. The initial experience was sudden and instantaneous, but, as Newman himself recounted, the full conversion took place over a period of five months, from August 1 to December 21, 1816.<sup>2</sup> There can be no doubt that, from his viewpoint, this conversion experience radically transformed him. Newman wrote, “I know perfectly well, and thankfully confess to Thee, O my God, that Thy wonderful grace turned me right round when I was more like a devil than a wicked boy, at the age of fifteen.”<sup>3</sup> Reflecting on

this conversion experience in a letter to Anne Mozley, dated February 19, 1885, he wrote, "I should say that it is difficult to realize or imagine the identity of the boy before and after 1816."<sup>4</sup>

The conversion was evangelical in the sense that it brought about a personal transformation in Newman's religious life. Indirectly, he refers to what was going on in his life at this time as the beginning of divine faith in him.<sup>5</sup> Through this experience he dedicated himself, in a renewed way, to place himself and his life in the service of God. He discerned the wisdom and goodness of God in the troubles that had come upon him.<sup>6</sup> Sheridan Gilley, in his biography of Newman, describes Newman's conversion as a transformation of the focus of Newman's life from self to God. Gilley also suggests that this experience gave Newman's religion "its profound individualist sense," instilling in him the realization that the ultimate realities are God and self and that everything in the world dwindles by comparison.<sup>7</sup> Consistent with this, Newman's conversion was also heavily influenced by evangelical other-worldliness.<sup>8</sup>

Yet there was also something different about Newman's evangelical conversion. It did not possess all the elements that are typical of a classical evangelical conversion. His conversion had not been "violent" in the prescribed evangelical sense, and it did not possess "those special Evangelical experiences."<sup>9</sup> The heavily emotional aspect of an evangelical conversion seemed to be lacking from Newman's experience. He did not seem to undergo the full evangelical process of conversion with its "stages of sin, terror, despair, news of the full and free salvation, joy and peace, and so on to final perseverance."<sup>10</sup> That his conversion was not evangelical in a full and complete sense is supported by Newman himself when he writes that, even though he owed much to evangelical teaching, he has never been a "genuine evangelical."<sup>11</sup>

Newman's conversion also had a distinctively Calvinistic tone. This was largely due to the influence of Walter Mayers, a devout evangelical and one of the masters at Ealing. There was a decidedly English flavor in the Calvinism Newman encountered, for it seems that Mayers had encouraged Newman to immerse himself in the works of English Calvinists rather than in Calvin himself.<sup>12</sup> At this time, Newman accepted Calvin's doctrine of final perseverance, which held that the elect would be given the grace to remain faithful to God throughout their lives, assuring their salvation. His understanding of the doctrines of the Trinity, Christology, atonement, and justification were influenced also by the theology of John Calvin.<sup>13</sup>

There is no doubt that this 1816 experience had a profound impact on Newman and brought about radical changes in him that were to remain with him for the rest of his life. Some of these changes are very important for understanding the direction that he will take in the development of his views on di-

vine faith. One of the changes that took place at this time was that Newman himself experienced a personal transformation. He made a radical change from a focus on self to a focus on God. In his conversion experience, he came to realize that faith was a personal and transforming experience. His faith became a real conviction and commitment to the God revealed in Jesus Christ. He saw that faith was rooted in a basic stance and attitude toward God that is relational and highly personal.

Also as a result of this evangelical conversion, Newman made a lifelong commitment to dogma and the role that it plays in the experience of divine faith. In the *Apologia*, Newman writes that as a result of his conversion, a great change took place in him and that he “fell under the influences of a definite Creed, and received into my intellect impressions of dogma, which, through God’s mercy, have never been effaced or obscured.”<sup>14</sup> Further on in the *Apologia* Newman states that, even though he has changed in many things, since the age of fifteen dogma has been the fundamental principle of his religion.<sup>15</sup> The permanent nature of this commitment to dogma is illustrated in Newman’s ongoing battle against liberalism, which he defines as the “anti-dogmatic principle.”<sup>16</sup>

Newman’s desire to hold the personal element of faith and the dogmatic principle together is essential to understanding his notion of divine faith. For him the act of faith includes both a personal religious commitment as well as an intellectual acceptance of the dogmas of faith. Gilley says that Newman so mingles these elements that there can be no easy separation between the two. In fact, Gilley goes on to point out that the essence of the change that took place in Newman as a result of this conversion lay in the interconnection of these two elements. For Newman, “the intellect assented to the dogmas which found their echo in his heart.”<sup>17</sup> What this shows is that, for Newman, the personal element of faith and the commitment to dogma are not opposed to one another but are interrelated and connected in the experience of divine faith.

Another attitude that Newman’s conversion instilled in him was the realization that change and growth are essential aspects of divine faith. One of the writers to whom Walter Mayers introduced Newman during the period of his conversion was Thomas Scott, an evangelical commentator on the Bible. Speaking of Scott’s influence on him, Newman writes that Scott was the writer “who made a deeper impression on my mind than any other, and to whom (humanly speaking) I almost owe my soul.”<sup>18</sup> He summarized the influence Scott had on him in the following two statements: “Holiness rather than Peace” and “Growth the only evidence of life.”<sup>19</sup> From this principle, Newman came to recognize the importance of growth in holiness after conversion. Sheridan Gilley states that Newman learned from the evangelical tradition the Catholic doctrine that faith means living a devout and holy life.<sup>20</sup> Summing up this

aspect of Newman's conversion, Gilley writes, "The Calvinist experience of conversion was the beginning of Newman's mature devotional life."<sup>21</sup>

Newman's acceptance of the principle of growth and change is one that endures throughout his entire religious life. This principle finds expression in his theory on the development of doctrine. In *Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine*, Newman expresses the principle this way: "here below, to live is to change, and to be perfect is to have changed often."<sup>22</sup> Gilley suggests that it was this principle, which Newman applied to his own life, that enabled him to accept "that Rome was the One True Church because she had within herself an inner power of development and growth, which is the only evidence of life."<sup>23</sup> In the *Apologia*, Newman wrote that for years he had "something of an habitual notion . . . of being on a journey."<sup>24</sup> This principle is also found in his major Catholic work on faith, the *Grammar of Assent*. Newman states that it is the capacity to change, to advance to the fullness of one's destiny, "to be the creator of his own sufficiency; and to be emphatically self-made,"<sup>25</sup> that distinguishes the human person from the animals.

### **The University Sermons, 1839–1843**

While the 1816 experience of conversion lays the foundation for his understanding of faith, the major written source for Newman's theology of faith during his Anglican years is found in his work *Fifteen Sermons Preached before the University of Oxford*.<sup>26</sup> Looking at these sermons as a whole, it is accurate to say that in them Newman presents a basically consistent notion of faith.<sup>27</sup> Yet, it must be realized that these sermons were written during different periods of his life over a period of seventeen years. The first sermon was written in 1826 during his evangelical youth. Sermons II through IX were written during 1830–1833 and represent his intellectually formative, more rationalist period, his tutor days at Oriel College. The last six sermons were written between the years 1839 and 1843 during Newman's later Anglo-Catholic period.<sup>28</sup> As a result, it is not surprising that the sermons do reflect some development in his ideas on faith.<sup>29</sup> John A. Elbert describes the *University Sermons* as progressive and evolutionary.<sup>30</sup>

It is also important for understanding the *University Sermons* to realize that they are initiated by Newman's desire to respond to the rationalism of thinkers like Richard Whately. Whately was a professor at Oriel College who befriended Newman after Newman was elected a Fellow of Oriel in 1822. Newman was significantly influenced by the thought of Whately during this period. Speaking of Whately's influence on him, Newman said that Whately taught him to think for himself.<sup>31</sup> But, gradually Newman came to reject the rationalism of Whately, because it subjected the truths of faith to the proof of

reason. Newman did not think that faith could be completely subjected to reason; to do so would reduce faith to a rational conclusion to a syllogism. In reacting to this type of rationalism, Newman's purpose in the *University Sermons* was to find a way of explaining how the response of faith can be an act that is compatible with reason without being reduced to a purely rational act. These sermons represent his effort to delineate the distinction between faith and reason, while, at the same time, demonstrating their proper relationship to one another.

The exploratory nature of the *University Sermons* is evident from the beginning. Newman does not start by giving a definition of either faith or of reason.<sup>32</sup> He begins with the experience of the act of faith as he finds it within himself and others. In the first stage of his reflection on faith, he focuses on the distinction, or contrast, between faith and reason. He describes faith as a moral quality that is opposed to reason—more specifically, secular reason. At the same time, Newman does think that reason has a role to play in faith. However, the role of reason is restricted to the analysis of the evidences for faith. He elaborates on the contrast between faith and reason by delineating the role that evidence plays in each.

In the 1831 sermon "The Usurpations of Reason," Newman begins by speaking of a form of reason that is opposed to faith. He calls this form of reason "secular reason," which he defines as "the wisdom of the world," reason exercising itself on secular principles in the matters of religion and morals.<sup>33</sup> This type of reason, Newman states, presents all kinds of objections to the truths of revelation. However, its objections are ill founded, because the truths of revelation are not addressed to this form of reason. Revelation does not even claim that it can be received according to this form of reason. For Newman, this type of reason seems irrelevant in matters of revelation. It can neither prove nor disprove the truths of revelation.<sup>34</sup>

Assuming this definition of reason, Newman proceeds to distance faith from it. As he further elaborates on secular reason and its relation to faith, he describes faith and reason as opposed to one another. Reason is identified with our intellectual powers and is opposed to faith, which is classified as a moral quality.<sup>35</sup> Describing the nature of this opposition Newman states, "there is no necessary connexion [*sic*] between the intellectual and moral principles of our nature."<sup>36</sup> He speaks of the history of revelation as a triumph of the moral powers over the intellectual.<sup>37</sup> Reason is "unequal to the contemplation of a moral revelation."<sup>38</sup> Reason "does not necessarily lead us in the direction of our moral instincts, or confirm them."<sup>39</sup> This opposition between faith and reason can occur in two ways. Sometimes faith encroaches on reason, as is the case when Scripture is used to answer questions about the physical universe. But reason also encroaches on the province of faith, as is

the case when reason attempts to judge the truths of revelation on the basis of the intellect alone without consideration of their moral nature.<sup>40</sup>

Even though we should not be surprised that secular reason is inadequate in evaluating matters of faith, this does not mean that reason has no role to play in faith. It would be extravagant, Newman states, to altogether deny the use of reason in matters of faith.<sup>41</sup> For Newman, the real place for reason in matters of faith is found in the evidences of Christian faith. He says that “we can reason about Religion, and we frame its evidences.”<sup>42</sup> While recognizing the validity of reason in evaluating the evidences for faith, he expresses some reservations about the value of this approach. He says that the evidences are better understood as answers to objections, rather than arguments for revelation.<sup>43</sup> They are more like “splendid philosophical investigations” than “practical arguments.”<sup>44</sup> He also wonders whether there really have been very many people who actually have come to faith as a result of the evidences.<sup>45</sup> Newman summarizes this role of reason in faith when he writes, “From considerations such as the forgoing, it appears that exercises of Reason are either external, or at least only ministrative, to religious inquiry and knowledge: accidental to them, not of their essence: useful in their place, but not necessary.”<sup>46</sup>

The evidence suggests that, in this sermon, Newman appears to be suspicious about the value of reason in matters of faith. His suspicion, however, is based on the incompatibility of faith with a particular form of reason—namely, secular reason. It is secular reason that he has in mind when he states that reason is an intellectual act and faith is a moral act. For Newman, there is no place for secular reason within the act of faith itself. The role of reason in this sense is relegated to the process of coming to faith and the external evidences for faith. Toward the end of the sermon, Newman states that reason (i.e., secular reason) can be employed in the service of faith, but it must be kept in its subordinate place.<sup>47</sup>

In the 1839 sermon “Faith and Reason, Contrasted as Habits of Mind,” Newman stresses that the point of this sermon is not to define reason or its relation to faith but merely to contrast the two.<sup>48</sup> In contrasting the two, he elaborates on the role of reason in faith. Faith does not evolve from reason, but the truths of faith are compatible with reason and the act of faith is seen as a reasonable act. For Newman, faith cannot be said to be grounded in reason, nor can reason be considered to be the origin or source of faith.<sup>49</sup> It is an error, Newman writes, to “teach that a process of Reason is the *sine qua non* for true religious faith.”<sup>50</sup> Yet, faith does have a responsibility to reason. The doctrines of faith must be, as he puts it, “approvable by Reason.”<sup>51</sup> Reason tests and verifies faith; it plays a critical, not a creative, role.<sup>52</sup> Faith must be “cognizable, and its acts [must] be justified, by Reason, without therefore being, in matter of fact, dependent upon it.”<sup>53</sup> Faith has its own domain and can op-

erate independently of reason, yet it must be able to meet the legitimate claims of truth and rationality.

Faith and reason can also be contrasted on the basis of the nature of the evidence. Newman analyzes what he calls the popular way of contrasting faith and reason—"that Reason requires strong evidence before it assents, and Faith is content with weaker evidence."<sup>54</sup> Reason will not assent unless the evidence demands it. Faith, on the other hand, can assent even if the evidence is not logically conclusive. How can this be? How can faith require less evidence than reason and still claim to be rational and conformable to reason? He poses this question himself and offers an answer. The answer is that faith is influenced by antecedent considerations, and, because of this, it requires less evidence than reason. "Faith, then, as I have said, does not demand evidence so strong as is necessary for what is commonly considered a rational conviction, or belief on the ground of Reason; and why? For this reason, because it is mainly swayed by antecedent considerations."<sup>55</sup> Newman further describes these antecedent considerations as "previous notices," "prepossessions," and (in a good sense of the word) "prejudices."<sup>56</sup> He also describes them as "previously-entertained principles, views, and wishes"<sup>57</sup> and as "antecedent probabilities."<sup>58</sup>

It is the influence of these antecedent considerations that enables faith to accept evidence that is weak and probable. This explains, for Newman, how faith is a moral principle. "It is created in the mind, not so much by facts, as by probabilities."<sup>59</sup> As a result, the disposition of the person becomes a determining factor in the response of faith. He writes, "A good and a bad man will think very different things probable. In the judgment of a rightly disposed mind, objects are desirable and attainable which irreligious men consider to be but fancies."<sup>60</sup> On the one hand, the influence of antecedent considerations emphasizes his understanding of the personal nature of the act of faith. On the other hand, they raise some cautions about the danger of making the act of faith too subjective.

Newman also thinks that the antecedent considerations help explain the role of grace. *Grace* is God's inspiration through the Holy Spirit that assists a person in making the act of faith. God initiates revelation and influences the believer's acceptance of revelation. Grace, therefore, refers to the supernatural element in the act of faith. It is grace that influences and inspires the believer to have those "feelings" that enable one to accept evidence that is probable. He describes some of these "feelings"—"love of the great Object of Faith," "readiness to believe Him near," "easiness to believe Him interposing in human affairs," "fear of the risk of slighting or missing what may really come from Him."<sup>61</sup> If faith were simply a rational decision based on logically conclusive evidence, there would be no need for grace, the supernatural element in faith.

As his thought develops in the *University Sermons*, Newman begins to focus more on the relationship between faith and reason, rather than how they are different. He speaks of faith as a form of reason, an exercise of reason. As an act of reason, faith is described as autonomous and complete in itself. It does not depend on or flow from a prior act of reason. A week after the sermon contrasting faith and reason, Newman preached another sermon on faith and reason entitled "The Nature of Faith in Relation to Reason." In this sermon, he begins by rejecting the view that holds that faith is a moral quality that follows directly from an act of reason.<sup>62</sup> According to this view, reason demonstrates that the Gospel comes from God; then the act of faith comes in and accepts it. This understanding tends to make faith the second step of a two-stage process. Rejecting this view, Newman maintains that faith has an autonomy of its own; it is "sole and elementary, and complete in itself."<sup>63</sup>

Therefore, faith is an autonomous and distinct act of reason in its own right. Faith is described as the "reasoning of a religious mind"<sup>64</sup> and as "an exercise of reason."<sup>65</sup> Behind these statements is the claim that faith is analogous to a certain type of reason. *Reason* is defined as the faculty of the mind "by which knowledge of things external to us, of beings, facts, and events, is attained beyond the range of sense."<sup>66</sup> It is the faculty that enables one to proceed from things that are perceived to things that are not perceived. This understanding of reason is different from the notion of secular reason that, in the earlier sermon, "The Usurpations of Reason," is described as opposed to faith. A believer exercises this form of reason in the act of faith when he or she accepts a doctrine of faith as true.<sup>67</sup>

This form of reason is a legitimate form of reason and is compatible with faith. In this sermon, Newman justifies the validity of faith as an exercise of reason and takes great pains to defend it against such charges as "illogical," "a faulty exercise of reason," and "the reasoning of a weak mind."<sup>68</sup> However, faith is an exercise of reason that is different from the formal logical process of reason that demonstrates conclusions solely on the basis of the evidence. Faith is a form of reason that is based more on presumption and less on evidence.<sup>69</sup> As an exercise of reason, faith is "distinct from what are called philosophical inquiries, intellectual systems, courses of argument and the like."<sup>70</sup> Here Newman is speaking about that informal mode of reasoning that is operative not only in faith but in many other areas of human knowledge. This form of reason is operative in decisions about political questions, economic policies, the choice of a religious party, tastes in literature, and judgments about the weather<sup>71</sup> and in mathematics.<sup>72</sup> All of these, including faith, are forms of reason in which "men advance forward on grounds which they do not, or cannot produce, or if they could, yet could not prove to be true, on latent or antecedent grounds which they had taken for granted."<sup>73</sup> It is in this

sense that Newman affirms in this sermon that faith is analogous to a legitimate exercise of human reason and, therefore, can be described as a form of reason and not just a moral quality.

At this point in the *University Sermons*, Newman has developed his basic understanding of faith. Faith is an exercise of reason that, through the influence of antecedent considerations, enables the person to give an assent to the truths of revelation even though the evidence remains probable. As such, faith is an act that proceeds more on the basis of antecedent considerations than on evidence. Yet, an important question remains. According to Newman's description of faith, different people can follow the same evidence and come to opposite conclusions, because their antecedent considerations are different. Does this mean that faith is merely a subjective opinion? Is there any way to distinguish between a true and false exercise of reason based on antecedent considerations?

This is the question that Newman addresses in his next sermon, "Love the Safeguard of Faith against Superstition," which was preached on May 21, 1839. In this sermon, Newman admits that there are certain dangers and limitations in his view of faith. This view of faith, he writes, "may be made an excuse for all manner of prejudice and bigotry, and leads directly to credulity and superstition."<sup>74</sup> Antecedent considerations are equally available to support a true or a false revelation. In themselves, antecedent considerations do not provide a clear rule or criterion for determining what is true and what is not. As a result faith needs a safeguard, "some corrective principle which will secure it from running (as it were) to seed, and becoming superstition or fanaticism."<sup>75</sup>

After considering the hypothesis that reason is the safeguard of faith, Newman rejects it, because, in his view, this position would destroy the autonomy of faith and make it an act that depends on a prior act of reason. No intellectual act is necessary for right faith besides faith itself.<sup>76</sup> Describing his own position as commonplace and paradoxical, Newman says that it is love, a right state of heart, that is the true safeguard of faith.<sup>77</sup> "We *believe*, because we *love*."<sup>78</sup> It is, however, important to understand what he means by *love* in this context. Love means trusting in Christ, believing on the testimony of God, believing in the power of God and on the basis of God's regenerating and renewing influences.<sup>79</sup> Newman describes love as the "eye of faith, the discriminating principle which keeps it from fastening on unworthy objects and degenerating into enthusiasm or superstition."<sup>80</sup> Right faith is an act of reason based on holy, devout, and enlightened presumptions. When these presumptions are lacking, faith degenerates and is perverted.<sup>81</sup> A faith informed by love establishes the proper grounds for faith, which, for Newman, includes such experiences as the awareness "that a Revelation is very needful for man;

that it is earnestly to be hoped for from a merciful God, that it is to be expected."<sup>82</sup> Summarizing his view of love as the safeguard of faith Newman writes:

Faith working by Love—suggests, the honest mind may, under ordinary circumstances, be led, and practically is led, into an acceptable, enlightened, and saving apprehension of Divine Truth without that formal intimacy and satisfaction with the special evidence existing for the facts believed, which is commonly called Reasoning.<sup>83</sup>

By proposing that love is the safeguard of faith, Newman appears to be suggesting that it is really the grace of God, God's motivating and inspiring love, that serves as the sanction for the truth of faith.

In the sermon entitled "Implicit and Explicit Reason," preached on St. Peter's Day in 1840, Newman returns to his thesis that faith is an exercise of reason. The distinction between implicit and explicit reason enables him to explain how faith can be an exercise of reason without depending on and following directly from a prior act of reason. Implicit reason is the reason within faith that provides faith with its own built-in rationality. Newman describes implicit reason as an unconscious form of reasoning.<sup>84</sup> It refers to the more simple faculties and operations of the mind; we feel and think and reason.<sup>85</sup> He also calls it the original process of reasoning.<sup>86</sup> On the other hand, *explicit reason* is defined as a conscious process of reasoning.<sup>87</sup> Explicit reason is the process of analyzing, describing, and reflecting on the operations of the mind. We know that we feel, and think, and reason.<sup>88</sup> It is the process of investigating our reasoning.<sup>89</sup> Explicit reason is helpful in evaluating the evidences for faith, but it is not operative in the act of itself faith. Newman also uses terms such as *science, method, analysis, criticism, proof, rules, and laws* to refer to this form of reason.<sup>90</sup>

What becomes clear in this sermon is that, when Newman speaks of faith as an exercise of reason, he means that it is an act of implicit reason. As an act of implicit reason faith has its own autonomy and is reasonable in its own right. He states that the reasoning processes that are involved in the act of faith are latent and implicit and that the act of faith is complete without the reflective faculty.<sup>91</sup> Therefore, the act of faith does not depend on explicit reason for its existence. Newman rejects the idea that faith can only exist if it is based on the evidence of explicit reason. Such a view would mean that every child, every peasant, must be a theologian.<sup>92</sup>

At the same time, Newman reluctantly admits that explicit reason does have a role to play in faith. For Newman, to separate faith completely from explicit reason would mean that the science of theology would have to be discarded. Explicit reason plays a necessary and important role in analyzing the

evidences for faith. In reflecting on the reasons for faith, the mind can investigate the grounds for faith in order to defend it, recommend it, or teach it to others.<sup>93</sup> By the evidences of faith Newman means “the systematic analysis of all the grounds on which we believe Christianity to be true.”<sup>94</sup> Explicit reason evaluates the cogency of miracles and the external evidence from the history of Christianity as grounds for faith.

Although he accepts the evidences of explicit reason, Newman stresses that the act of faith, as an exercise of implicit reason, does not absolutely depend on them. True faith admits, but does not require, the exercise of explicit reason.<sup>95</sup> In this sermon, he repeats the suspicion he expressed about the nature of external evidences in an earlier sermon, “The Usurpations of Reason,” by listing several of the limitations of this form of reason. Some of these follow here. The strength of these evidences is not found in the arguments themselves, but on the basis of the circumstances in which they are received.<sup>96</sup> Often those who cite such evidences overstate and exaggerate their case by arguing as if they were in a court of law, whereas, in actuality, what they are doing is simply “analyzing, as far as possible, certain existing reasons why the Gospel is true.”<sup>97</sup> Also, these forms of evidence do not work like mathematical proofs. Rather, they are hints and samples of true reasoning, and they demand “an active, ready, candid, and docile mind, which can throw itself into what is said, neglect verbal difficulties, and pursue and carry out principles.”<sup>98</sup> Finally, these types of evidences can only serve a critical, not a creative, function. They can raise objections that test and pull down faith, but they are not able to build up faith.<sup>99</sup>

Newman goes on to state that the evidences of explicit reason sometimes can interfere with faith and, therefore, they must be used with caution.<sup>100</sup> Throughout this sermon the impression is given that he prefers a different approach to the evidences of faith. Although he does not fully develop the point, Newman suggests that implicit reason can also provide evidences for faith. Examples of such evidences include things such as antecedent considerations, presumptions, and analogies.<sup>101</sup> Newman shows his preference for this approach to the evidences of faith when he states that these are “more truly the grounds on which religious men receive the Gospel.”<sup>102</sup>

Many of the elements that are present in Newman's notion of faith in the *University Sermons* will endure and be incorporated into his mature Catholic notion of faith. These include his definition of faith as a form of reason and the distinctiveness and autonomy of the act of faith. He will continue to hold and stress the personal, implicit nature of the form of reason that is operative in faith. Also, antecedent considerations will remain a necessary and important element in the process of faith and will continue to highlight the personal nature of Newman's understanding of faith. His recognition of and acceptance of the role of reason in analyzing the evidences of faith, as well as his

suspicion of the external evidences of explicit reason and his preference for the evidences of implicit reason, will remain an enduring element in his understanding of faith. Finally, Newman's insistence on the necessity of grace for the act of faith will also form an important element in his mature Catholic understanding of faith.

There are, however, some aspects of Newman's notion of faith in the *University Sermons* that are not fully developed, and some of these will form the basis for his further reflections on faith during his Catholic years. One of these is his understanding of the relationship between the act of credibility and the act of faith itself. William Fey points out that in the *University Sermons*, Newman does not clearly distinguish between the process of reason involved in coming to faith, the judgment of credibility, and the process of reason involved in the act of faith itself. According to Fey, it is Newman's encounter with Roman theology that will enable him to come to a clear distinction between the certitude of the motives of credibility and the certitude of the act of divine faith itself.<sup>103</sup>

Another area that will continue to occupy Newman is the question of the rational justification of the certitude of faith. Some of critics have pointed out that Newman, by basing faith on antecedent considerations and probable evidence, as he does in the *University Sermons*, is leaving faith open to the charge of being nothing more than an opinion.<sup>104</sup> William Fey admits that the ambiguity in Newman's language can lead one to make this charge, but he does not think that it is a valid one. Newman's intention, Fey suggests, was not to deny the certitude of the act of faith but to stress the personal nature of the response of faith.<sup>105</sup> Yet, even though the evidence suggests that Newman did not intend to reduce faith to an opinion, he does not adequately resolve this issue in the *University Sermons*. In the original version of the *University Sermons*, Newman never calls faith a certitude.<sup>106</sup> The closest he comes is a statement in the 1841 sermon entitled "Wisdom, as Contrasted with Faith and with Bigotry." Faith, Newman writes, is "the absolute acceptance of a certain message or doctrine as divine; that is, it starts from probabilities, yet it ends in peremptory statements. . . . It believes an informant amid doubt, yet accepts his information without doubt."<sup>107</sup>

Another element of Newman's notion of faith in the *University Sermons* that is not satisfactorily developed is his thesis that love is the sanction of the act of faith. The question is, Can love adequately perform this function—that is, can it rationally justify a certain assent based on probable evidence? His own suspicions about the insufficiency and incompleteness of the theory of love as the safeguard of faith will lead Newman to continue to reflect on the process of the rational justification of the certitude of faith during his Catholic years. Finally, although Newman does acknowledge the necessity of the role

of grace in the act of faith in the *University Sermons*, his encounter with the Catholic understanding of faith will require a deeper reflection on the role God's grace plays in the response of faith.

## NEWMAN'S CONVERSION TO ROMAN CATHOLICISM

On October 9, 1845, at Littlemore, Newman was received into the Catholic Church by Dominic Barberi, an Italian Passionist priest. The impact of this conversion cannot be overemphasized. It meant leaving the things he loved and losing lifelong friends in the Anglican Church. It even strained relationships with members of his family. As a leader of the Oxford movement, Newman was an important and significant figure in the Anglican Church of his day. With the failure of the Oxford movement, he found himself in a very precarious situation within the Anglican Church. Although there are practical, and even political, reasons for Newman's move to the Catholic Church, the primary theological reason for his conversion is rooted in his understanding of the church.<sup>108</sup> He converted to Roman Catholicism when his mind and heart became convinced that the Roman Catholic Church of his day, and not the Anglican Church, was the authentic continuation of the primitive apostolic and Catholic Church.<sup>109</sup>

It was a cornerstone of Newman's ecclesiology that the true church of Christ on earth must be a visible continuation of the primitive apostolic and Catholic Church. As long as the Anglican Church met this criterion in Newman's mind, he could and did remain an Anglican. But when his doubts about the adequacy of the Anglican Church to meet this criterion won out, he was eventually led to Rome. It was in 1839 that Newman experienced what he refers to as his "first doubt" about the "tenableness of Anglicanism."<sup>110</sup> From studying the Monophysite controversy, he came to the realization that the present Church of Rome was more in line with the primitive church than either the Anglican or the Protestant churches of his day.<sup>111</sup> "I saw my face in that mirror, and I was a Monophysite. The Church of the *Via Media* [the Anglican Church] was in the position of the Oriental Communion, Rome was where she now is; and the Protestants were the Eutychians."<sup>112</sup>

It must be stressed that Newman was presenting an analogy here. The Monophysites rejected the view that there are two natures united in one person in Jesus and, instead, held that there was only one nature in Jesus. There were two forms, one a moderate view like that of Serverus of Antioch, which Newman refers to here as the view of the Monophysites, and a second more radical view like that of the Eutychians, who held that after the union the human nature of Jesus was absorbed into the divine nature. The present-day

Anglicans were the Monophysites, and the Protestants were the Eutychians. Both groups found themselves in a struggle against Rome, which was, both then and now, the defender of the primitive and true doctrine, as it was eventually defined at Council of Chalcedon. Through the image provided in this analogy, Newman came to see that his support of the Anglican Church as the true church placed him on the side of those who opposed the ancient and apostolic church. In a letter to Mrs. William Froude on April 3, 1844, Newman wrote that he realized that the Anglican “theory was unproved or disproved by Antiquity.”<sup>113</sup>

Newman’s experience of his “first doubt” was crystallized by his reading of an article by Nicholas Wiseman entitled “Anglican Claim to Apostolical Succession” in August 1839. In this article, he was struck by the words of St. Augustine, “Securus judicat orbis terrarum.” The full English translation of the quote reads, “Untroubled the world passes its judgement, that those men [and women] cannot be good who, in any part of the world, cut themselves off from the rest of the world.”<sup>114</sup> Augustine had used this principle to demonstrate that the Donatists were in schism. Named after Donatus, a fourth-century bishop of Carthage, the Donatists taught that the value of the sacraments depended on the ecclesial position of the minister. As a result, they held that heretics and schismatics must be rebaptized if they returned to the church. Yet, since the apostolic church rejected their view, they actually had separated themselves from the unity of the Catholic Church. Newman extended his previous analogy. The Donatists were in the same place as the Monophysites, who were in the same place as the Anglican Church. Consequently, the Anglican Church, like the Donatists, was in schism and cut off from the unity of the Catholic Church. Now the catholicity of the Anglican Church was in doubt. As Sheridan Gilley points out, this experience left Newman deeply unsettled.<sup>115</sup> “I had seen the shadow of a hand upon the wall. . . . He who has seen a ghost, cannot be as if he had never seen it. . . . The thought for the moment had been, ‘The Church of Rome will be found right after all.’”<sup>116</sup> The seeds of doubt had been permanently sown.

In the summer of 1841, Newman experienced three more blows that he says eventually broke him.<sup>117</sup> The first blow came as a result of his renewed reading and writing on the history of Arianism. Arianism, a fourth-century heresy named after its leader Arius, taught that Jesus did not have a divine nature and therefore was not God. The Council of Nicaea, 325, which condemned Arius, taught that Jesus had the same nature as God. This is the view accepted by Rome. A compromise group known as the semi-Arians taught that Jesus had a nature that was similar to the divined nature but was not exactly the same. The ghost of the Monophysite analogy returned again, this time in the form of Arianism. As Newman expresses it, “I saw clearly, that in

the history of Arianism, the pure Arians were the Protestants, the semi-Arians were the Anglicans, and that Rome was now what it was then."<sup>118</sup> Once again, the Roman Catholic Church appeared to be more in line with the primitive apostolic and Catholic Church than did the present-day Church of England. His doubts about the apostolicity of the Anglican Church had returned with renewed force.

The next two blows were more political than theological in nature, but they both made it more difficult for Newman to hold onto his view that the present Anglican Church was the continuation of the apostolic and Catholic Church of antiquity. The second blow was the series of condemnations of Tract 90 by a number of Anglican bishops that began at this time.<sup>119</sup> By condemning Tract 90, the Anglican bishops made Newman's Catholic interpretation of the Thirty-nine Articles untenable for an Anglican. As a result, an overwhelming obstacle was placed in the way of those who wanted to see the Anglican Church as a continuation of the primitive apostolic and Catholic Church. In fact, these condemnations of Tract 90 had the ironic effect of leading many Anglo-Catholics into the Roman Catholic Church.<sup>120</sup>

The third blow, the establishment of the Jerusalem bishopric in October 1841,<sup>121</sup> placed but another obstacle in the way of Newman's vision of returning the Anglican Church to its primitive and Catholic roots. Since the Anglican bishop in Jerusalem would have many Protestants under his jurisdiction, Newman saw this act as another attempt to protestantize the Anglican Church and move it farther away from its Catholic roots. For those who had doubts about the Catholic nature of the Church of England, Newman wrote, "every act . . . such as this of coalescing with heretics weakens the proof, and in some case it may be the last straw that breaks the horse's back."<sup>122</sup> In the *Apologia*, he says that the establishment of the Jerusalem bishopric raised questions about the legitimacy of the Church of England as a branch of the Catholic Church.<sup>123</sup> Although the event does not seem to have been that momentous in the history of the Church of England,<sup>124</sup> Newman says that it had a devastating effect on him. "It brought me to the beginning of the end."<sup>125</sup> "I was on my death-bed, as regards my membership with the Anglican Church."<sup>126</sup> From this point on it seems clear that Newman's theological justification of the Anglican Church as a continuation of the true apostolic and Catholic Church was no longer viable.

Still, he remained in the Anglican Church. As Gilley states, "It took four years to move him to submit to Rome on the double certitude that Rome was exclusively the Church of Christ and that the Church of England was no part of it."<sup>127</sup> During those four years, Newman was "prey to every shade of doubt."<sup>128</sup> The one remaining theological issue that needed to be resolved was the Roman additions to the Creed, which he still viewed as corruptions of the

primitive apostolic and Catholic faith. He found the theological solution to this question in his theory of the development of doctrine. According to Gilley, one of the reasons Newman delayed his own move to Roman Catholicism was his desire to finish the *Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine*, which would provide a “reasoned apology” for his conversion.<sup>129</sup> Newman himself wrote, “So, at the end of 1844, I came to the resolution of writing an Essay on Doctrinal Development; and then, if, at the end of it, my conviction in favour of the Roman Church were not weakened, of taking the necessary steps for admission into the fold.”<sup>130</sup>

The theory of development answers the charge that Rome had corrupted early Christianity by adding new doctrines. It also explains the difference between the New Testament expressions of faith and the early christological and trinitarian dogmas.<sup>131</sup> Through his reflections on the theory of doctrinal development, Newman came to the position that the Roman Catholic additions were not corruptions but were authentic developments of the apostolic and Catholic faith. The conclusion of the *Development of Doctrine* is that the Roman Catholic Church is substantially identical with the apostolic church.<sup>132</sup> In the *Apologia*, Newman writes, “The fact of the operation from first to last of the principle of development in the truths of Revelation, is an argument in favour of the identity of Roman and Primitive Christianity.”<sup>133</sup> So successful was the work on the theory of development in resolving his final obstacle to Rome, that he decided to become a Roman Catholic before the work was finished.

I had begun my *Essay on the Development of Doctrine* in the beginning of 1845, and I was still hard at it all through the year till October. As I advanced, my difficulties so cleared away that I ceased to speak of “the Roman Catholics,” and boldly called them Catholics. Before I got to the end, I resolved to be received and the book remains in the state in which it was then, unfinished.<sup>134</sup>

His ecclesiological quest for the apostolic and Catholic Church on earth had led him to the Roman Catholic Church. It is interesting to note that Newman became a Roman Catholic not only because it had remained faithful to the apostolic and Catholic faith but also because it was the church that had been able to change throughout history without losing the essentials of the Gospel. As Gilley expresses it, the theory of development “converted the stock objection to Rome, that Rome had changed, into a presumptive argument in her favour.”<sup>135</sup> The significance of this realization for contemporary Catholic theology should not escape us. Newman was led to the Catholic Church not only because it had been faithful to the teachings of the apostolic church but also because it was open to change and development. For Newman, his conversion to Roman Catholicism meant the end of one chapter of his life and the beginning of a new one.

## EARLY CATHOLIC YEARS

### The Roman Reaction to Newman's *University Sermons*

After his reception into the Catholic Church, Newman was faced with the prospect of finding a place for himself in his new community of faith. On February 22, 1846, he left Littlemore for the last time and went to Oscott College, also known as Maryvale, where he spent his first several months as a Catholic. In October 1846, Newman went to Rome to study Catholic theology at the College of Propaganda. He remained in Rome until December 1847, when he returned to Oscott College. In reflecting on his future role in the Catholic Church during these early years, he thought that he and his followers might establish a school of theology at Oscott College.

The first discussion about the prospect of such a school appears in a letter that Newman wrote to Dalgairns on July 6, 1846. In this letter, he suggests that Nicholas Wiseman, the vicar apostolic of England, ought to make Maryvale a seminary and divinity school. Allowing his imagination free expression, Newman wonders if Maryvale might not become a school of theology for the whole of England.<sup>136</sup> His support for and excitement about establishing a school of theology at Maryvale is evident in this letter. He writes, "Then you see, I see nothing except that the notion of a theological school is a great idea."<sup>137</sup> Eventually, Wiseman himself becomes interested in the plan and expresses his support in a letter to Newman on January 27, 1847: "What you mention about Maryvale becoming a College and Seminary of the District accords most perfectly with many thoughts and many wishes that I had had."<sup>138</sup>

In spite of Newman's enthusiasm, he was not quite sure if his plan for a school of theology would win the approval of Rome. Before going to Rome, he wondered if he would be able to get the "authority and sanction at Rome" for a school of theology. Then, he adds, "But what would the Jesuits say to it [school of theology], with whom I should be so much thrown at Propaganda?"<sup>139</sup> When Newman arrived in Rome, his suspicions were confirmed. His book on the *Development of Doctrine* and his *University Sermons* both came under the sharp criticism of the Roman theologians. We shall focus on the reaction to the *University Sermons*.

In a letter written to W. G. Penny on December 13, 1846, Newman mentions that the Roman theologians had some problems with the *University Sermons*. He points out that the Roman theologians seemed to misunderstand his notion of antecedent probability. Some of the Roman theologians were interpreting his statement "that we could not get beyond a probable conclusion" as being a denial of the certitude of faith. Newman says they misunderstand him because he uses "probable as opposed to demonstrative, not to certainty."<sup>140</sup>

The plan to publish a French translation of the *University Sermons* also raised some concerns in Newman's mind about Rome's acceptance of his views on faith and reason. On January 12, 1847, he reflects on the difficulty of getting the book published in Rome, because of the delay that will be caused by the book being reviewed by three censors, one of whom is a Dominican who, Newman says, "may be severe with it."<sup>141</sup> By February 8, 1847, his concern about the reception of his book by Rome becomes so severe that he writes, "I am terribly frightened lest the book, like Rosmini's and others, should be brought before the Index."<sup>142</sup>

This initial Roman reaction to his theology seems to have left Newman disappointed and, perhaps, even a little resentful. He wanted to make a contribution to Catholic theology. In the February 8, 1847, letter to Dalgairns, when commenting on his Latin translations of Athanasius, Newman writes, "So it is you see I am *determined* to make a noise, if I can. It shan't be my fault, if people think small beer of me. Is not this ambitious?"<sup>143</sup> In the same letter, when discussing the *University Sermons*, he writes that sometimes he has the feeling "that I have not yet been done justice to."<sup>144</sup> He adds, "It seems hard, since nations now converse by printing not in the schools, that an English Catholic cannot investigate truth with one in France or Rome, without having the Inquisition upon him."<sup>145</sup> Newman wanted what did not seem possible at the time: an open dialogue with Roman theology so that he could find his place in Catholic theology. Again, in the same 1847 letter to Dalgairns, Newman writes, "What I say is, I am not maintaining what I say is all true, but I wish to *assist in investigating* and bringing to light *great principles* necessary for the day—and the only way to bring them out is *freely* to investigate."<sup>146</sup> To Newman, the Roman theologians appeared to be closed and not open to dialogue. They didn't seem to want to discuss; they wanted conformity.

Eventually, Newman accepted the inevitable. As long as Rome remained suspicious of his theology, it would not be feasible to establish a school of theology at Maryvale. In a letter written to Dalgairns on November 23, 1846, he writes, "From what I hear today I fear theology as such must for a time be laid on the shelf, at Maryvale, and we must take to printing practical sermons."<sup>147</sup> Writing to Wiseman on February 14, 1847, he underscores the burden that the Roman opposition to his theology is placing on his efforts to find his place in the Catholic Church. "I can do nothing without Rome on my side—there is so much discord, so much jealousy in England, that I *cannot* get on without this support to carry me on."<sup>148</sup> This letter to Wiseman appears to represent a critical moment in Newman's decision. He goes on to write, "Now the conviction has more and more come on me that it is very inexpedient for a person like me, a convert, and a writer (and so pledged in a way to certain opinions), to be a theological professor or the like."<sup>149</sup> He sums up his

situation in the following words: "I come to Rome, and find no support if I undertake theology. I am not blaming this—it is impossible that I should suddenly have support under my circumstances. . . . I cannot expect any support in taking up theology—there *must* be a suspicion against me."<sup>150</sup> The decision to give up the school of theology meant that Newman would now pursue the alternate plan that was being discussed at this time—that is, to become an Oratorian and establish an Oratory in England.

Newman's decision to become an Oratorian was finally worked out between February 14 and March 7, 1847.<sup>151</sup> As a religious community, founded by St. Philip Neri in the sixteenth century, the Oratorians follow a rule, but they do not take vows and are not formally a religious order. As such, it offered Newman a middle way between a religious order and the diocesan priesthood. The suggestion that Newman and his followers become Oratorians was originally made by Wiseman.<sup>152</sup> It was also the plan preferred by Rome.<sup>153</sup> In a papal brief, Newman was appointed the superior of the English Oratory and given permission to establish the first Oratory in England.<sup>154</sup> On February 1, 1848, the English Congregation of the Oratory was formally set up by Newman.<sup>155</sup> He began with nine members—five priests, one novice, and three lay brothers. Newman had found a place in the Catholic Church, but the suspicions about his theology presented him with the challenge to demonstrate that his theology was compatible with the faith of the Catholic Church.

### Newman's Early Catholic Writings on Faith

From this initial encounter with Roman theology up to approximately 1854, Newman's writings on faith primarily were motivated by the desire to show that his understanding of faith was compatible with the traditional Catholic view represented by the nineteenth-century Roman theology.<sup>156</sup> A list of his early writings on faith can be found in *Theological Papers on Faith and Certainty*.<sup>157</sup> Some of the unpublished works, which can be found in the Birmingham Oratory Archives, include "The Assent of Faith," June 17, 1846;<sup>158</sup> "On the Nature of Faith," 1847;<sup>159</sup> "Preface to the French Edition of the University Sermons," 1847;<sup>160</sup> "On the Certainty of Faith," 1848;<sup>161</sup> "Lectures on Faith," May 17–June 18, 1851;<sup>162</sup> and "On Faith," January 17, 1854.<sup>163</sup>

One of the most important writings for understanding his theology of faith during these early Catholic years is entitled the "Papers of 1853 on the Certainty of Faith."<sup>164</sup> Another important source for his early Catholic view of faith is found in the *Discourses Addressed to Mixed Congregations*, published in 1849.<sup>165</sup> This work is a collection of Catholic sermons, the first of which, "The Salvation of the Hearer the Motive of the Preacher," was preached at the opening of the Birmingham Oratory on February 2, 1849. Two sermons in

this work that are particularly significant for Newman's understanding of faith are "Faith and Private Judgement"<sup>166</sup> and "Faith and Doubt."<sup>167</sup>

In these early Catholic writings, Newman attempted to explain how his own view of faith was compatible with the reigning Catholic theology, the nineteenth-century Roman theology. This theology defined faith as an intellectual assent to divinely revealed truths as taught by the Roman Catholic Church. Faith was described as a supernatural act based on the motive of the authority of God, and, as such, it possessed a certitude that went beyond all human acts of certitude. As a supernatural act, grace was understood as giving a new inner structure to the faith-knowledge of the believer. At the same time, faith was held to be a reasonable act based on rational evidence. Reasoning to a judgment of credibility was a necessary condition for the reasonableness of faith. Roman theology spoke of faith in terms of material and formal objects and made clear distinctions between human reason, natural theology, motives of credibility (speculative and practical), divine revelation, and the act of divine faith.<sup>168</sup> In his efforts to demonstrate that his theology of faith was compatible with Roman theology, Newman incorporated some of the categories of Roman theology into his own writings.

One of the main topics that occupied Newman's attention during this period was the relationship between the role of reason in the process of coming to faith (the evidences) and the role of reason in the act of faith itself. He addresses this issue in his discussions of human faith, divine faith, and the relationship between the two. The process by which Newman comes to clearly distinguish among human faith, the rational attempt to arrive at the credibility of the fact of revelation, and divine faith, the personal acceptance of God's revelation, will be treated in the next chapter.

## NEWMAN'S MATURE CATHOLIC NOTION OF FAITH

### *The Grammar of Assent*

The major source for Newman's mature understanding of Catholic faith is found in the *Grammar of Assent*, published in 1870. In this work, he is no longer concerned with demonstrating the compatibility of his view of faith with Roman theology. He seems to think that he has accomplished this task in the December 16, 1853, paper "On the Certainty of Faith."<sup>169</sup> In the *Grammar of Assent*, his focus is placed on the certitude of the act of faith and the demonstration of its rationality.

Part of Newman's inspiration for writing the *Grammar of Assent* came from his correspondence with William Froude. Froude, a friend of Newman's, was a scientist and an agnostic. He was the brother of Hurrell Froude,

one of Newman's dearest friends from the Oxford days, who died prematurely. William's wife and children had converted to Catholicism largely through the influence of Newman. William Froude insisted that real certitude, in any realm of thought, was an invalid process of the mind and an immoral use of one's faculties. As a scientist, Froude held that scientific demonstration was the only principle of verification of the truth of a proposition. One's assent to a proposition was directly proportionate to the evidence available.<sup>170</sup> Since Froude maintained that all evidence, even that which seemed most convincing and conclusive, was wanting, it was invalid for the mind to give an unconditional assent of certitude to any proposition, whether in human matters or in the matter of divine faith.<sup>171</sup>

Newman realized that his earlier attempts to explain the rationality of the certitude of faith were inadequate. It has already been pointed out how he was not completely satisfied with the attempt he made in the *University Sermons*. Ian Ker has pointed out that Newman's attempts to work out the justification of the certitude of faith in his theological papers during the first half of 1860 came to nothing because he was simply too "overworked."<sup>172</sup> The correspondence with William Froude made Newman even more conscious of the inadequacy of his explanation of the certitude of faith. He clearly saw that Froude's position was erroneous, but, he admits, he really did not know how to answer it.<sup>173</sup> Newman never worked out a satisfactory justification of the certitude of faith in his correspondence with Froude. However, it was his desire to develop a satisfactory justification of certitude, in matters of both concrete human truths and Catholic faith, that served as his inspiration for writing the *Grammar of Assent*.

Newman's primary purpose in the *Grammar of Assent* is to show that the certitude of faith of ordinary Catholics is rational, even though it is not directly based on scientific demonstration.<sup>174</sup> He wanted to show that ordinary believers do rightly give unconditional assent to realities that they do not see and cannot fully prove.<sup>175</sup> However, Newman did not intend to isolate Catholic faith from the ordinary processes of human reason. He saw the certitude of Catholic faith and the process by which it was obtained as analogous to the process by which the mind arrives at certitude in matters of concrete human truths. As a result, in the *Grammar of Assent*, the justification of the certitude of Catholic Divine Faith merges into a more general justification of the ordinary processes of the human mind that lead to certitude in concrete matters of truth.

Before further developing Newman's mature notion of Catholic faith, it is necessary to examine more fully his early Catholic writings on faith. In these works, he attempts to demonstrate that the view of faith presented in the *University Sermons* is compatible with nineteenth-century Roman Catholic theology. The next chapter will describe these efforts by focusing on Newman's understanding of the relationship between human faith and divine faith.

## NOTES

1. Newman, *Apo.*, 87.
2. John Henry Newman, *John Henry Newman: Autobiographical Writings*, ed. Henry Tristram (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1956), 181. (Hereafter abbreviated *AW*.)
3. *AW*, 250.
4. John Henry Newman, *The Letters and Diaries of John Henry Newman* vol. XXXI, ed. by Charles Stephen Dessain (London: Nelson, 1961–1977), 31. (Hereafter abbreviated *LD*.)
5. *Apo.*, 24. Speaking of this conversion, Newman refers to Walter Mayers as the human means of this “beginning of divine faith in me.”
6. Ian Ker, *John Henry Newman: A Biography* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1988), 4. For an extensive review of Ker’s biography of Newman, see Edward Jeremy Miller’s review in *The Thomist* 55, no. 2 (April 1991): 337–41.
7. Gilley, *Newman and His Age*, 23.
8. Gilley, *Newman and His Age*, 16–17.
9. Ker, *Newman: A Biography*, 5.
10. Ker, *Newman: A Biography*, 5.
11. *AW*, 79.
12. Gilley, *Newman and His Age*, 18.
13. Gilley, *Newman and His Age*, 22–23.
14. *Apo.*, 24.
15. *Apo.*, 66.
16. *Apo.*, 66.
17. Gilley, *Newman and His Age*, 18.
18. *Apo.*, 25.
19. *Apo.*, 26.
20. Gilley, *Newman and His Age*, 22.
21. Gilley, *Newman and His Age*, 24.
22. John Henry Newman, *An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine*, foreword by Ian Ker (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1989), 40. (Hereafter abbreviated *Dev*.)
23. Gilley, *Newman and His Age*, 230.
24. *Apo.*, 125–26.
25. John Henry Newman, *An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent*, ed. Ian T. Ker (Oxford: Clarendon, 1985), 349. (Page numbers follow the 1889 edition; hereafter abbreviated *GA*.)
26. John Henry Newman, *Fifteen Sermons Preached before the University of Oxford between A.D. 1826 and 1843*, introduction by Mary Katherine Tillman (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1997). (Hereafter abbreviated *US*.)
27. Mary Katherine Tillman, “An Introduction,” in *US*, viii.
28. Tillman, “An Introduction,” vii.
29. Ian Ker, “Editor’s Introduction,” in *GA*. Ker speaks of a gradual development in the sermons that becomes more accurate and precise; see xxiii.
30. John A. Elbert, *Newman’s Conception of Faith prior to 1845: A Genetic Pre-*

*sentation and Synthesis* (Philadelphia: Dolphin, 1933), 38. Elbert sees this progression as a gradual lessening or decrease in Newman's opposition to reason. While it is true that Newman does emphasize the moral aspect of faith in the earlier sermons, he never separates faith completely from reason.

31. *AW*, 69–71.
32. Elbert, *Newman's Conception of Faith*, 37.
33. *US*, 54.
34. *US*, 55.
35. *US*, 58; Newman states that *reason* is defined as "synonymous with the intellectual powers, and as opposed as such to the moral qualities, and to Faith."
36. *US*, 55.
37. *US*, 57.
38. *US*, 61.
39. *US*, 61.
40. *US*, 59.
41. *US*, 63.
42. *US*, 63.
43. *US*, 65.
44. *US*, 65.
45. *US*, 66.
46. *US*, 67.
47. *US*, 73.
48. *US*, 200. Newman adds that his only intention is to ascertain the "sense in which the words Faith and Reason are used by Christian and Catholic writers."
49. *US*, 183.
50. *US*, 184.
51. *US*, 182.
52. *US*, 183.
53. *US*, 183.
54. *US*, 185.
55. *US*, 187.
56. *US*, 187.
57. *US*, 188.
58. *US*, 189.
59. *US*, 191.
60. *US*, 191.
61. *US*, 193.
62. *US*, 202 and 204.
63. *US*, 202.
64. *US*, 203.
65. *US*, 207.
66. *US*, 206.
67. *US*, 207–8.
68. *US*, 208.
69. *US*, 204.

70. *US*, 212.
71. *US*, 209.
72. *US*, 217.
73. *US*, 212–13.
74. *US*, 232.
75. *US*, 232–33.
76. *US*, 234.
77. *US*, 234.
78. *US*, 236.
79. *US*, 236–37.
80. *US*, 238.
81. *US*, 239.
82. *US*, 239.
83. *US*, 240.
84. *US*, 259.
85. *US*, 256.
86. *US*, 258.
87. *US*, 259.
88. *US*, 256.
89. *US*, 258.
90. *US*, 259.
91. *US*, 277.
92. *US*, 253–54.
93. *US*, 253.
94. *US*, 264.
95. *US*, 255.
96. *US*, 273.
97. *US*, 275.
98. *US*, 275.
99. *US*, 276.
100. *US*, 277.
101. *US*, 277.
102. *US*, 277.
103. William R. Fey, *Faith and Doubt: The Unfolding of Newman's Thought on Certainty*, preface by Charles Stephen Dessain (Shepherdstown, WV: Patmos, 1976), 38–41.
104. One such critic is John A. Elbert, *Newman's Conception of Faith*, 81.
105. Fey, *Faith and Doubt*, 35.
106. *US*, xvi, n. 12. In the preface to the third edition of the *University Sermons* published in 1872, Newman does refer to faith as a certitude.
107. *US*, 297–98.
108. Edward Jeremy Miller, *John Henry Newman on the Idea of Church* (Shepherdstown, WV: Patmos, 1987), 42–51. Miller presents an extended argument that supports the position that the primary theological idea for Newman's conversion to Catholicism is his understanding of the church. See also Terrence Merrigan, "New-

man's Progress towards Rome: A Psychological Consideration of His Conversion to Catholicism," *The Downside Review* 104 (April 1986): 99. Merrigan states, "The development of Newman's vision of the Church—his ecclesiology—is, it might be said, the history of his conversion to Catholicism."

109. Ker, *Newman: A Biography*, 310. Ker writes that "it was the recognition of the essential identity of contemporary Catholicism and early Christianity which was the cause of Newman's own conversion."

110. *Apo.*, 121.

111. *Apo.*, 122–23.

112. *Apo.*, 121.

113. Gordon Huntington Harper, *Cardinal Newman and William Froude: A Correspondence* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1933), 40.

114. *Apo.*, 124.

115. Gilley, *Newman and His Age*, 184.

116. *Apo.*, 125.

117. *Apo.*, 142.

118. *Apo.*, 143.

119. *Apo.*, 142–43.

120. Miller, *Newman on Church*, 45. Newman himself writes in the *Apologia*, "There were no converts to Rome, till after the condemnations of No. 90" (144).

121. *Apo.*, 144–49.

122. Anne Mozley, ed., *Letters and Correspondence of John Henry Newman during His Life in the English Church with a Brief Autobiography*, 2 vols. (London: Longmans, Green, 1891), II:354. The letter to S. F. Wood is dated October 10, 1841.

123. *Apo.*, 147–48.

124. *Apo.*, 149. Newman states here that he had never heard of any good or harm that it has ever done.

125. *Apo.*, 149.

126. *Apo.*, 151.

127. Gilley, *Newman and His Age*, 209.

128. Gilley, *Newman and His Age*, 209.

129. Gilley, *Newman and His Age*, 229.

130. *Apo.*, 217.

131. Gilley, *Newman and His Age*, 230.

132. *Dev.*, 169, 321–22.

133. *Apo.*, 193.

134. *Apo.*, 222.

135. Gilley, *Newman and His Age*, 230.

136. *LD*, XI:195.

137. *LD*, XI:196.

138. *LD*, XI:41, n. 1. Actually, this expression of support is a little late in coming for, by this time, Newman seems to be leaning toward establishing an Oratory in England. Wiseman adds that Vincent Pallotti had advised him that establishing a college for the propagation of the faith in England was the only way to be free from Propaganda in Rome.

139. *LD*, XI:196; letter to Dalgairns, July 6, 1846.
140. *LD*, XI:293.
141. *LD*, XII:8. Newman tells Dalgairns that it must be published by Dalgairns in France.
142. *LD*, XII:29; letter to Dalgairns, February 8, 1847.
143. *LD*, XII:32.
144. *LD*, XII:32.
145. *LD*, XII:29.
146. *LD*, XII:29.
147. *LD*, XI:280–81.
148. *LD*, XII:41–42. In this same letter, Newman cites some other reasons against setting up a school of theology at Maryvale. One problem, Newman writes, is that the Oratorian rule does not allow for forming a college. To form a college, Newman and his followers would have to become Jesuits or seculars, and Newman says that they do not plan on becoming either. Another problem is “the want of hands to work a College.” Another difficulty, which Newman mentions, is that it would not be easy to bring the other districts in England into harmony with the plan. In addition, Newman points out that establishing a college would require a long period of preparation and education and that all of this would take some time, whereas the Oratory plan could begin at once. See *LD*, XII:43–44.
149. *LD*, XII:42.
150. *LD*, XII:42.
151. After the February 14, 1847, letter to Wiseman, Newman’s attention focuses on the plan for his community to become Oratorians. In a letter to Mrs. Bowden on February 21, 1847, Newman writes that he is seeking permission from Rome to establish an Oratory in England. Newman seems pleased and resigned to the idea. At the end of the letter, he writes, “it is no secret we are to be Oratorians” (*LD*, XII:44–46). On February 23, 1847, Newman writes to James Hope informing him that the pope has approved the Oratory plan (*LD*, XII:49). In a letter to Wiseman on the same day, Newman explains the Oratory plan to him. On March 7, 1847, Newman writes to David Lewis, stating “that our destiny is quite fixed. . . . We are to be children of St. Philip Neri” (*LD*, XII:60).
152. Ker, *Newman: A Biography*, 328.
153. *LD*, XII:42–43.
154. Ker, *Newman: A Biography*, 331.
155. Ker, *Newman: A Biography*, 337.
156. John Henry Newman, *The Theological Papers of John Henry Newman on Faith and Certainty*, ed. Hugo M. de Achaval and J. Derek Holmes, introduction by Charles Stephen Dessain (Oxford: Clarendon, 1976), viii. In the introduction, Dessain writes that when Newman returned from Rome in 1847, he “lectured to the students at the Oratory and there are papers which show him describing his own views on faith and certainty in the language of traditional Catholic theology.”
157. Newman, *Theological Papers*, xi–xv. There is also a list of Newman’s unpublished early Catholic writings on faith in Fey, *Faith and Doubt*, 203–4.
158. Birmingham Oratory Archives, B 9.11. (Hereafter abbreviated as B.)

159. B 9.11.
160. B 7.5.
161. B 9.11.
162. B 7.4.
163. B 7.4.
164. Newman, *Theological Papers*, 3–38.
165. John Henry Newman, *Discourses Addressed to Mixed Congregations* (London: Longmans, Green, 1906). (Hereafter abbreviated as *Mixed*.) Ker points out that this was Newman's first work published under his own name as a Catholic. Ker, *Newman: A Biography*, 342.
166. *Mixed*, 192–213.
167. *Mixed*, 214–37.
168. Fey, *Faith and Doubt*, 43–44.
169. Fey, *Faith and Doubt*, 53. Fey states that with this paper, Newman seems satisfied with his position.
170. In the *Grammar of Assent*, Newman comments on John Locke's view precisely on this point. It is Newman's disagreement with Locke on this matter that is the basis for Newman's insistence that assent is unconditional. Newman, *GA*, 159–87.
171. Harper, *Newman and Froude*, 9.
172. Ker, *Newman: A Biography*, 619.
173. Harper, *Newman and Froude*, 127. "I think it is a fallacy—but I don't think it is easy to show it to be so." Also, in a letter dated January 2, 1860, Newman quite candidly admits that he finds it difficult to answer Froude and that he is dissatisfied with everything he has written on the matter so far. Harper, *Newman and Froude*, 127–28.
174. Charles Stephen Dessain, *John Henry Newman* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1971), 151–53.
175. Edward Jeremy Miller, "Newman's Grammar of Assent Put to Pastoral Usage," *Josephinum Journal of Theology* 9, no. 2 (Summer/Fall 2002): 230. Miller points out that the main thrust of the *Grammar of Assent* is pastoral.

## *Chapter Two*

# **Human Faith and Divine Faith**

The primary purpose of this chapter is to examine Newman's understanding of human faith and divine faith, and the relationship between the two. Newman clarifies his understanding of the relationship between the two as a result of his attempts, in his Catholic writings, to integrate his view of faith in the *University Sermons* with the Catholic notion of faith that was found in nineteenth-century Roman theology. Out of these reflections, Newman arrived at a clear distinction between human faith and divine faith and was able to more specifically delineate his Catholic understanding of faith. These reflections also enabled Newman to clearly distinguish between the question of the rational credibility of faith and the supernatural nature of the act of Catholic faith. Once this distinction was clarified, he was able to more effectively address the role that reason plays in each.

Newman's early Catholic writings on the relationship between human faith and divine faith are shrouded with ambiguities. The difficulties and ambiguities found in Newman's statements on human faith and divine faith have been pointed out by Newman scholars in the past.<sup>1</sup> Many of these works are papers that were not originally intended for publication. In these works, Newman often appears to be thinking out loud. He sometimes raises objections to the views presented, even his own, and, frequently, he leaves such objections unanswered. Newman also gives alternative readings and parenthetical citations. Consequently, there is a tentative nature to these writings; at times, he is so ambiguous, if not contradictory, that it is very difficult to find a consistent interpretation of his thought on the relationship between human faith and divine faith. This ambiguity shows the difficulties that Newman faced in trying to correlate the notion of faith in the *University Sermons* with the Catholic approach to faith found in Roman theology.

To understand Newman's distinction between human faith and divine faith, it is necessary to understand the distinction between the formal and the material objects of faith. This distinction is part of the language that Newman adopts from Roman theology. The *material object* refers to the *fides quae* (faith that), that which is believed in the act of faith, the content or the object of faith. The *formal object* refers to the *fides qua* (faith through which), why one believes, the motive or the reason on which one's belief in the object of faith is based. More precisely stated, this investigation will endeavor to determine whether Newman sees human and divine faith as having the same or different material objects and whether he sees them as having the same or different formal objects.

The writings of Newman that will be examined in this chapter are the "1847 Paper on the Certainty of Faith";<sup>2</sup> a letter to Edward Healy Thompson dated October 11, 1853;<sup>3</sup> the "Paper on the Certainty of Faith," dated December 16, 1853; the "Papers in Preparation for A *Grammar of Assent*, 1865–1869";<sup>4</sup> and the *Grammar of Assent*, published in 1870. These works will be examined in chronological order. This will enable us to view Newman's understanding of the relationship between human faith and divine faith in its context and to see how it developed.

The context of Newman's writings is particularly important for understanding his thought. He has been called an occasional writer, one whose writings are motivated by some external cause or event, rather than simply by some theoretical desire to clarify a point. Consequently, any attempt to interpret his writings on the distinction between human faith and divine faith must consider the context that occasioned them. The first three works to be discussed were occasioned by Newman's encounter with Roman theology. The last two works were written in the context of his dialogue with William Froude between 1860 and 1870. These two works also reflect his ongoing concern to find a way to justify the faith of ordinary Catholics.

## ENCOUNTER WITH ROMAN THEOLOGY

### "Paper on the Certainty of Faith," 1847

The first of Newman's writings to be examined will be the "Paper on the Certainty of Faith," which is dated Rome, 1847.<sup>5</sup> In this document Newman defines divine faith and distinguishes it from human faith. *Divine faith* is defined as a "firm assent to the Word of God *obscurely revealed*."<sup>6</sup> From the nature of the case, Newman asserts, the assent of divine faith is supernatural and a divine gift.<sup>7</sup> He goes on to define divine faith explicitly in terms of its

material and formal objects. The *material object* of divine faith is the “things revealed,” not truths that are held as “conclusions from premises.” The truths of divine faith are “independent of all previous knowledge except the veracity of God.”<sup>8</sup> The *formal object* of faith is God, but God understood in two ways. The formal object *quod* is God as that whom faith directly contemplates and whose presence gives revealed things their place and meaning. The formal object *quo* is also God, but God as the medium by which faith is able to contemplate God. The formal object *quo* is also the reason (*ratio formalis*, formal reason) for the certainty of divine faith; “faith [divine faith] is certain, because God speaks who cannot lie.”<sup>9</sup>

On the other hand, human faith, which Newman speaks of using various terms such as “*fides acquisita*” (acquired faith), “*humana, acquisita fides*” (human acquired faith), and “*acquisita fides*” (acquired faith), is not as precisely defined. Human faith is described as being “prior to the act of divine faith itself,” “resolvable into its premises and depends on them,” “discursive and doubtful.”<sup>10</sup> What seems to be clear is that human faith is an assent, without grace, to the credibility of revelation based on a rational analysis of the motives of credibility, *motiva credibilitatis*.<sup>11</sup> However, Newman does not explicitly define human faith in terms of its material and formal objects. In one place, he seems to suggest that the material object of human faith and divine faith are the same: “what divine faith receives as certain, *acquisita* or human faith has already received as not more than credible.”<sup>12</sup> In another place, the material object of human faith appears to be the fact of revelation, “that God has spoken.”<sup>13</sup> The formal object of human faith is more clearly defined, although, again, Newman does not use this language. From his description of human faith, the basis of one’s acceptance of the credibility of revelation is that this judgment is derived through a process of human reason based on an analysis of arguments. As Newman has said, human faith is discursive; it is resolvable into its premises and depends on them. Added to this, he goes on to state that human faith depends “on the truth of certain premises and the cogency of a certain logical process.”<sup>14</sup> The process of reasoning about which Newman is speaking here is not the logical syllogistic argumentation of formal reason but the more personal process of informal reason. The acceptance of the motives of credibility is based on a process of informal reasoning.<sup>15</sup>

In this work, Newman also discusses the relationship between divine faith and human faith in terms of the nature of the certitude that each possesses. Divine faith is described as being both *certus* (certain) and *inevidens* (not evident) at one and the same time. It is *certus*, because its assent is “without doubt or fear” and “inevidens, because its method of proof is imperfect.”<sup>16</sup> On the other hand, the assent of human faith is not described as being certain but as being “not more than credible.”<sup>17</sup> Newman gives the following definition of *credible*: “By ‘credible’ is not meant capable of belief, but morally certain

(or practically), though not without doubt and fear; or highly probable, or prudent to believe, or sufficient in itself but not sufficient considering the great importance of the subject.”<sup>18</sup> He clarifies his position by stating that although the reasons, or *motiva*, of faith cannot be more than credible, they must not be less.<sup>19</sup> Yet, still at this point, not seemingly fully satisfied with his explanation, he makes some remarks that appear to be inconsistent with his previous comments. He states that not only must the *motiva* of faith be credible, but they must be “evidently credible.” Then, he expresses reservations about the inclusion of fear in human faith by stating that even the illiterate must have *evidentia credibilitatis* (evidences of credibility); that is, “they must have clear reason without any fear, to think themselves right.”<sup>20</sup>

Part of the reason for Newman’s ambiguity on the nature of the certitude of human faith is his inability, at this stage of his development, to see clearly how human faith and divine faith are distinct acts, each possessing its own certitude. William Fey admits that Newman had this difficulty in his writings on faith before he became a Catholic and that it was his encounter with Roman theology that enabled him to make a clear distinction between the certitude of human faith and the certitude of divine faith. Fey suggests that Newman had arrived at this distinction in this work.<sup>21</sup> Fey seems to interpret Newman’s statements on the “credible” nature of the assent of human faith as an attribution of an independent certitude to human faith.<sup>22</sup> Yet, there is evidence in this work that Newman did not yet clearly see human faith and divine faith as two distinct acts with independent certitudes but that he saw them as two aspects of one complex act.

The act of divine faith, by which a man believes the word of God revealed through the Church is of course the immediate effect of divine grace, but it may be regarded in its human aspect—*fides humana*—[human faith] resulting from the *motiva credibilitatis* [motives of credibility]. When human reasonings have led to a moral certainty that God has spoken, and the will determines to accept [the] conclusion as absolutely true, the grace of God infuses a divine certainty—*fides divina* [divine faith]—which admits of no doubt at all. Thus the same complex act has two aspects.<sup>23</sup>

Although there are ambiguities, what Newman has done in this work is to outline the framework for his understanding of the distinction between human faith and divine faith. Human faith, which is prior to divine faith, is the rational process of arriving at the judgment of the credibility of revelation. On the other hand, divine faith is the act of accepting revealed truths as revealed through grace on the basis of the Word of God. Human faith and divine faith are also distinguished on the basis of the nature of the assent involved in each. The assent of human faith is described as being “not more than credible,” whereas the assent of divine faith is described as certain.

## Letter to Edward Healy Thompson

In a letter to Edward Healy Thompson dated October 11, 1853, Newman attempts to clarify what he means when he describes the assent of human faith as credible. The conversation was initiated by Thompson who, in a letter written to Newman on October 8, 1853, had interpreted Newman as saying that human faith was merely probable, “grounded on probability.” Newman was responding to Thompson to correct what he saw as Thompson’s misinterpretation of his thought.<sup>24</sup> Newman begins by stating that he would be surprised if he had called the conclusion to which human faith comes probable or even implied that it was. Clarifying his position, he states, “What I have said is that it was credible.”<sup>25</sup> *Credible* means “*dignum fide*” (worthy of belief) “more than *credendum*” (believable), “consistent with a practical certainty,” “that which has sufficient grounds [*motiva*, or reasons] to be thoroughly *believed*.” Yet, credible does not mean being “proved true,” for, according to Newman, the will “*does* bid and gain the intellect to give assent beyond the force of the *motiva*.”<sup>26</sup>

Newman next describes the process of faith but, as he states, does not discuss the role of divine grace, “where it comes in, or what it does.”<sup>27</sup> Yet, the very first point he makes is that the object of faith includes both its material and formal objects. He identifies the material object as the *res revelata* (the matter revealed), the revealed truths themselves, and the formal object as the *revelatio*, the truths as revealed. The combined object of faith he summarizes as the “Christian doctrines as revealed.”<sup>28</sup> Even though Newman says that he is not going to discuss the role of grace, when he brings in the formal object of faith, the acceptance of the truths because they are revealed, he is admitting that grace does play a role in the process of faith. But, since he doesn’t specifically discuss the operation of grace, his explanation of the process is ambiguous about what reason does and where grace comes in. As a result, the distinction between human faith and divine faith in terms of their formal objects is obscured.

In this work, the actual distinction between human faith and divine faith is based on how each responds to the combined object of faith. Through the use of arguments, the *motiva* (reasons), human faith proves “evidently, not that the revelation and the revealed doctrines are true, but are credible.” Consequently, the arguments for human faith are called “*motiva credibilitatis*” (motives of credibility), not “*veritatis*” (of truth).<sup>29</sup> On the other hand, divine faith, although Newman does not specifically use the expression *divine faith* here, assents to the revelation and the revealed doctrines, not as credible but as true. This seems to be the meaning of Newman’s description of the last stage of the process of faith.

Lastly when the mind is convinced that the Revelatio [truths as revealed] and the res revelata [the matter revealed] are digna fide [worthy of belief], credibilia [credible], the prudentia [prudent judgments] sees that the intellect must fittingly, naturally, conscientiously believe them, and the pia motio [devout movement of the will] draws the same way. Accordingly, the intellect *does* assent to that as *true*, which has been evidently proved to it to be credible. And, while it is about it (if I may use the term) it sees that if it believes at all, it cannot believe by halves—for to believe in *God's word*, which by the hypothesis it is doing, is to believe in that which claims the firmest and most *absolute assent*, or certainty in its highest form.<sup>30</sup>

Several other observations can be drawn from this statement. First, the language, although ambiguous, suggests that Newman sees the *revelatio* and the *res revelata* as the material object of both human faith and divine faith. The same suggestion was made in the “1847 Paper on Certainty,” although again somewhat ambiguously, for at one point in that work, Newman described the material object of human faith as the fact of revelation, without specifically mentioning the revealed truths themselves. Second, Newman appears to be maintaining that the assent of divine faith goes beyond the assent of human faith. What human faith accepts as credible, divine faith accepts as true. Furthermore, the certainty of divine faith is described as the firmest, most absolute assent, and the highest form of certitude. Third, this statement shows that, even though grace is not specifically discussed, it is evident that he sees the grace-inspired act of divine faith as the final step in the process of faith. As Newman states, faith is believing in God's Word. Finally, this statement does not support the conclusion that Newman saw the whole process of faith as the exclusive result of a process of informal reasoning. Since Newman discusses the process without mentioning where grace comes in, the impression might be given that he assumes that the whole process can be arrived at through informal reason. Such an assumption is disproved by his consistent insistence, both in the “1847 Paper on Certainty” and in his later works, that grace is absolutely essential for making the assent of the act of divine faith. William Fey supports this position when he concludes that “while Newman came to stress the possibility of informal reasoning to certainty about the credibility of revelation, he never meant to adopt an informal rationalism where divine faith is simply an assent to the conclusion of such reasoning.”<sup>31</sup>

Newman spent the next two months of 1853 expanding his reply to Edward Healy Thompson into a longer paper entitled “Papers of 1853 on the Certainty of Faith.” In this work, Newman does explicitly set out to explain the role that grace plays in the process of faith.<sup>32</sup>

### “Papers of 1853 on the Certainty of Faith”

The work entitled the “Papers of 1853 on the Certainty of Faith” is a series of separate papers written at various times during 1853. The particular paper with which we are concerned here is “On the Certainty of Faith,” written on December 16, 1853. Toward the end of this paper, Newman states that he is going to explain the process of supernatural [divine] faith and the portion of it, which is supernatural.<sup>33</sup> Newman explains the process according to three steps: (1) the speculative judgment of credibility, (2) human faith, and (3) the act of divine faith itself.

The speculative judgment of credibility, the first step of the process, is an assent of the mind to the credibility of revelation. It is described both as an assent that does not exclude fear and as an assent of certitude.<sup>34</sup> Newman describes this step of the process as being purely natural. It may be “mastered by a mind destitute of the grace of Christ.”<sup>35</sup> The whole of this process is “within the powers of natural reason.” As Newman says, “An infidel may get as far as this.”<sup>36</sup> It is clear that this step is part of the process of coming to faith and is, therefore, distinct from the act of divine faith. “A mind which gets as far as this does not yet believe. It only sees that Revelation is credible.”<sup>37</sup> What he is describing here is the process of informal reasoning (*evidentia credibilitatis*, evidences of credibility) by which the mind (through *prudencia*, the prudent judgments) arrives at the judgment of the credibility of revelation. The object of this assent is the credibility of revelation, the fact of revelation, that God has spoken, not both the *revelatio* (truths as revealed) and the *res revelata* (the matter revealed), as suggested in Newman’s earlier works. The formal object is informal reasoning; the assent to the credibility of revelation is made on the basis of the process of informal reasoning.<sup>38</sup> This speculative judgment of the credibility is what Newman called human faith, *fides humana/fides acquisita*, in his earlier works. So, it is rather puzzling when he calls the second step of this process human faith.

Human faith, the second step of the process, which is introduced almost as an afterthought, is not very precisely defined. Newman does, however, set the parameters for the human faith he is discussing here. It is an assent that goes further than the speculative judgment of the credibility of revelation, but it falls short of the assent of divine faith because it does not require grace. It is an act of the unaided mind. Also, human faith is described as an assent that does not exclude fear.<sup>39</sup> The material object of human faith is not specifically defined. In terms of its relationship to divine faith, human faith is described as differing from divine faith “not only in its quality” but also in that human faith “has something of vague sense” and “does not necessarily suppose a speaker.”<sup>40</sup> As such, human faith is said to be “applicable to belief in our experiential conclusions in science.”<sup>41</sup>

Divine faith, the third step of the process, is itself described according to three stages, all of which are said to be both supernatural, requiring grace, and rational, according to human reason.<sup>42</sup> The first stage is the practical judgment of credibility, which is an assent to the proposition “that it is right and fitting and excellent to believe what is credible.”<sup>43</sup> Since it is said to accompany the speculative judgment of credibility, it would be reasonable to assume that the practical judgment has the credibility of the fact of revelation as its material object. It is important to note that the practical judgment is an assent to the fitness of believing and does not, in itself, lead immediately to divine faith.<sup>44</sup> In the second stage of divine faith, the will determines and moves the intellect to believe. Newman calls this stage the “*pia affectio*” (holy disposition) or the “*voluntas credendi*” (will to believe). He also refers to this stage as the “wish to believe.”<sup>45</sup> According to Newman, in this stage, the will exerts an *imperium* (command) that obliges the mind to believe without doubt or fear.<sup>46</sup>

The third and final stage is the act of divine faith itself. In this stage, the intellect, commanded by the will, accepts (embraces and holds) the revelation and the *res revelata* as true. The material object of divine faith is both the revelation—namely, “that God has spoken” or “the fact of revelation”—and the *res revelata*, “that he has spoken thus” or “the things revealed.”<sup>47</sup> The formal object of divine faith is not explicitly defined, but it is implied in Newman’s statement that divine faith requires a speaker. This statement is compatible with his earlier descriptions of the formal object of divine faith as the Word of God revealing that, through grace, guarantees the truth of the revelation and the *res revelata*.

The main difficulty in this paper is Newman’s description of human faith. The speculative judgment of credibility, which was earlier called human faith, is distinguished from a human faith, which is said to go further than the speculative judgment. The nature of this “further” is not clearly specified. One possibility is that he is suggesting that the human mind, without grace, might be able to reach the practical judgment of credibility—namely, that it is fitting to believe a revelation that has been demonstrated (through informal reason) to be credible. If this is the case, then, he is saying that human reason, unaided by grace, can arrive at both the speculative judgment and the practical judgment of credibility. It is conceivable that what he intends is not to exclude the speculative judgment from human faith, since he has earlier called it human faith, but to extend the notion of human faith to include both the speculative and the practical judgments of credibility. Newman’s hesitation here seems to suggest that he is not certain if the practical judgment can be reached without grace. He appears to be saying that if the practical judgment can be reached without grace, then it is part of human faith. If it cannot, then it is part of divine faith.

Another problem here is that Newman seems to have reached a point where it is difficult for him to distinguish between nature and grace. Roman theology seemed to have been able, or at least thought that it could, more easily delineate where reason ends and grace takes over in the act of divine faith. Newman does not seem to be able, or even want, to make such a rigid distinction. For him, nature and grace more easily overlap. Grace is said to be a stimulus, which enables the intellect without superseding it.<sup>48</sup> Newman sees no difficulty in suggesting that, in many cases, grace is operative in the speculative judgment, even though it is possible to arrive at this judgment through reason alone.<sup>49</sup> At one point in this paper, he raises the possibility of a human faith aided by grace.<sup>50</sup>

Certainly, some of the ambiguity in Newman's treatment of the relationship between human faith and divine faith is due to his understanding of the relationship between the natural and the supernatural. His understanding of the relationship between the natural and the supernatural is partially grounded in his distinction between natural religion and revealed religion that he developed around 1830.<sup>51</sup> *Revealed religion* is the Judeo-Christian revelation, which finds its fulfillment in Jesus Christ. It is thoroughly supernatural and always requires grace for its acceptance. *Natural religion* refers to that knowledge of God and divine things that has been acquired outside the Judeo-Christian revelation. This knowledge of God is not the result of unaided reason but of reason aided by grace, and so Newman speaks of natural religion as containing a revelation, even though it is an incomplete revelation. As a result, Newman's distinction between the natural and the supernatural is not as precise as Roman theology, which speaks of the possibility of a purely natural rational knowledge of God distinct from a supernatural knowledge of God based on revelation. This explains why he is reluctant to set rigid boundaries between nature and grace in his discussion of human faith. Newman, however, is consistent on insisting that the act of divine faith cannot be made without the assistance of grace.

Yet, in spite of this ambiguity, Newman clearly sets forth the distinction between the material objects of human faith and divine faith in this paper. The material object of human faith, which includes the speculative judgment and perhaps the practical judgment, is the revelation, the fact of revelation, that God has spoken, and not the *res revelata*, the revealed truths as revealed. On the other hand, it is even clearer that the material object of divine faith is the revelation and the *res revelata*.<sup>52</sup> Human faith can assent to the credibility of the fact of revelation, but it cannot assent to the truth of the *revelation* (the truths as revealed) and the *res revelata* (the matter revealed). Such an assent goes beyond the scope of human faith.

## DIALOGUE WITH WILLIAM FROUDE

“Papers in Preparation for *A Grammar of Assent* 1865–1869”

Although the “Papers in Preparation for *A Grammar of Assent* 1865–1869” treat primarily the question of the nature of certitude, Newman does briefly discuss human faith and divine faith in this work, which, as the title suggests, is a series of papers.<sup>53</sup> In a paper dated July 7, 1867, Newman refines his understanding of divine faith by making a distinction between Divine Faith (*Fides Divina*) and Catholic Divine Faith (*Fides Divina Catholica*). Catholic Divine Faith is defined as the acceptance of public revelation (the revelation of Christ given to the apostles) on the basis of the authority of God revealing through the voice of the infallible Church. Divine Faith, on the other hand, is the acceptance of private divine revelations on the basis of the authority of God, but not on the basis of the infallible authority of the Catholic Church.<sup>54</sup> Newman says that Catholics can be secure that their faith meets the two conditions of divine faith: first, that its material object is true and, second, that its formal object is the authority of God revealing.<sup>55</sup> From this analysis it is clear that Catholic Divine Faith is the acceptance of revealed truths as revealed and that the act of Catholic Divine Faith depends on the grace of God.

In this paper, Newman makes perhaps his clearest statement on the distinction between human faith (the judgment of credibility) and divine faith in terms of their material objects.

Perhaps it is not a subtlety, to say, as Viva seems to do, that the conclusion drawn from the motiva or reasonings is the *fact* of the revelation or revelation as the *subject* of the proposition, “There is a revelation;” and the object of the assent of faith is not the mere fact that there is a revelation, [but] is the revelation itself with its contents.<sup>56</sup>

The material object of human faith is the *revelatio*, the fact of revelation. The material object of divine faith is the *revelatio*, the fact of revelation, and the *res revelata*, the revealed truths with their content. This is consistent with our interpretation of the “1853 Paper on the Certainty of Faith.”

Newman is quite right in suspecting that this distinction is more than just a subtlety, for what it asserts is that revealed truths can only be the object of divine faith and can never be the object of a human faith. “Papers in Preparation for *A Grammar of Assent* 1865–1869” offers further indirect evidence that this was, indeed, Newman’s position on this matter. He raises a question about whether the doctrines found in the Allocutions of the Popes or in the Decreta and the like (as distinct from the anathematizing canons) of

ecumenical councils are channels of revelation and, if they are, whether they are public or private revelations. Although he admits that some theologians see these doctrines as revealed truths, he himself does not think that they are. However, in reflecting on this question, Newman establishes a principle. If truths are truly revealed, then they can be objects of divine faith, either Divine Faith if private revelations, or Catholic Divine Faith if public revelations. If a truth is not revealed, then, it is an object of human faith, “*fides humana*.”<sup>57</sup>

### An Essay in Aid of *A Grammar of Assent*

In *A Grammar of Assent* Newman does not explicitly treat the distinction between human faith and divine faith. However, he does make a reference to the distinction between the material and formal objects of faith. In the first part of *A Grammar of Assent*, Newman applies the results of his discussion of the relationship between assent and apprehension to two revealed truths of Catholic Divine Faith, “He [God] is One” and He [God] is Three.”<sup>58</sup> He qualifies this statement by stating that he is going to discuss these two revealed doctrines exclusively from the point of view of the material object of faith and omit any discussion of the formal object, that they are accepted because they are revealed by God.<sup>59</sup>

However, nowhere in *A Grammar of Assent* does Newman explicitly treat human faith (*fides humana/acquisita*), the rational process of demonstrating the credibility of revelation or its relationship to divine faith in the way that he treated these topics in his earlier works.<sup>60</sup> Since what he has earlier defined as human faith is not even discussed in *A Grammar of Assent*, he does not attempt to distinguish human faith and divine faith in terms of their formal and material objects. If this interpretation is correct, and I believe it is, M. Jamie Ferreira’s reading of *A Grammar of Assent* on this matter will have to be reevaluated.

Ferreira maintains that in *A Grammar of Assent*, Newman distinguishes between what she calls a natural religious belief, which she identifies with Newman’s notion of human faith (*fides humana/acquisita*), and divine faith on the basis of their formal and material objects. According to Ferreira, both natural religious belief and divine faith have the same material object, namely, the religious doctrines and dogmas of Christian faith (i.e., the Trinity, the Incarnation, etc.). However, the two differ according to their formal objects. In natural religious belief, revealed doctrines are known and accepted on the basis of reason alone, and therefore, this adherence is purely natural. In divine faith, the same truths are accepted on the basis of the authority of God revealing, and, as such, this adherence is a gift of grace and therefore a supernatural act.<sup>61</sup>

Ferreira bases her position on a statement that Newman makes in Part I of *A Grammar of Assent*:

And secondly, I mean by belief, not precisely faith, because faith, in its theological sense, includes a belief, not only in the thing believed, but also in the ground of believing: that is, not only belief in certain doctrines, but belief in them expressly because God has revealed them; but here I am engaged only with what is called the material object of faith, with the thing believed, not with the formal.<sup>62</sup>

Ferreira maintains that in this passage, Newman is distinguishing between a natural religious belief and divine faith. From Newman's statement that he is only speaking of the material object of faith, she draws the conclusion that the material object of natural religious belief and divine faith are the same but that the two differ according to their formal objects. She also interprets this statement to mean that the discussion of divine faith is beyond the scope of *A Grammar of Assent*.<sup>63</sup>

There are, however, some problems with this interpretation. Newman never actually uses the expression "natural religious belief," and he never explicitly distinguishes between a natural religious belief and divine faith in *A Grammar of Assent*. Such an interpretation goes beyond the intent of the passage cited earlier. Newman simply makes a reference to the distinction between the material and formal objects of divine faith and states that in this section he is only concerned with the material object of divine faith. As for Ferreira's suggestion that divine faith is beyond the scope of *A Grammar of Assent*, what Newman really seems to be saying is not that he is not going to talk about divine faith but that he is not going to talk about the formal object of divine faith. What he really is saying is that in *A Grammar of Assent*, he is not going to explicitly discuss the supernatural aspect of divine faith, where grace comes in and what it does. Although he does not discourse on grace in *A Grammar of Assent*, there is an implicit recognition of its essential role in the response of faith. Also, it must be remembered that the whole book was written to justify the certitude of Catholic faith, which is clearly a form of divine faith.

Finally, Ferreira's interpretation is inconsistent with the position on the material and formal objects of human faith and divine faith that Newman arrived at in his earlier works. Ferreira's interpretation is understandable given the ambiguous nature of Newman's writings on this subject. In his earlier works, Newman does at times appear to identify the material and formal objects of human faith and divine faith. However, by 1853, he arrived at a position in which he saw human faith and divine faith as being distinguished in terms of both their material and formal objects. The material object of human faith is

the *revelatio*, the fact of revelation. The formal object of human faith is the acceptance of the credibility of the fact of revelation as a conclusion of a process of informal reasoning. On the other hand, the material object of divine faith is the revealed truths themselves. The formal object of divine faith is the acceptance of the revealed truths as true through grace on the authority of the Word of God revealing.

Consequently, through his reflection on the distinction between human faith and divine faith, Newman arrived at a position in which he saw a clear, although subtle, distinction between the material objects of human faith and divine faith. Although Newman might have wavered on the relationship between reason and grace in human faith, he never once maintained that the objects of revelation could be accepted on the basis of human faith alone. Human faith alone cannot obtain the material object of divine faith, the revealed truths of Christianity. Human faith can only grasp human truths (truths that are theoretically available through reason) either alone or with the assistance of grace. It is for this reason that it is significant to point out that Newman distinguishes human faith and divine faith according to both their material and formal objects. This view, it is suggested here, represents Newman's mature position. Although this interpretation does not remove all the ambiguities in his writings, it does help clarify his understanding of the distinction between human faith and divine faith in a way that, in this author's mind, is consistent with his writings on this matter.

As a result of these reflections on the relationship between human faith and divine faith, Newman came to realize that the act of Catholic faith had its own distinctive processes that were different from those involved in human faith. Also, these reflections enabled him to delineate his specific Catholic understanding of faith, which he called Catholic Divine Faith. As a result, he was able to focus on the act of Catholic faith and investigate the processes by which a person arrives at the certitude of the act of Catholic faith. The framework for Newman's mature understanding of Catholic faith is found in *A Grammar of Assent*. In this work, he defines human certitude and describes the process by which the human person arrives at certitude in concrete matters of truth. The next chapter examines Newman's understanding of human certitude.

## NOTES

1. Two notable examples are William R. Fey, *Faith and Doubt: The Unfolding of Newman's Thought on Certainty*, preface by Charles Stephen Dessain (Shepherdstown, WV: Patmos, 1976), 38–49, 174–76; and M. Jamie Ferreira, *Doubt and Religious Commitment: The Role of the Will in Newman's Thought* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1980), 131–38.

2. John Henry Newman, "1847 Paper on the Certainty of Faith," unpublished, B.9.11.

3. *LD*, XV:464–67.

4. The last two works are published in John Henry Newman, *The Theological Papers of John Henry Newman on Faith and Certainty*, ed. Hugh M. de Achaval and J. Derek Holmes, introduction by Charles Stephen Dessain (Oxford: Clarendon, 1976).

5. Newman, "1847 Paper on Certainty." This document includes a manuscript entitled "On the Nature of Faith," as well as a rough draft of the material for the preface to the French translation of the *University Sermons*. David A. Pailin, in his book *The Way to Faith: An Examination of Newman's Grammar of Assent as a Response to the Search for Certainty in Faith* (London: Epworth Press, 1969), 206–8, dates this manuscript 1848. Fey also dates this document as 1848 in *Faith and Doubt*, 49.

6. Newman, "1847 Paper on Certainty," 1.

7. Newman, "1847 Paper on Certainty," 1, 7.

8. Newman, "1847 Paper on Certainty," 1.

9. Newman, "1847 Paper on Certainty," 1.

10. Newman, "1847 Paper on Certainty," 1, 3.

11. Newman, "1847 Paper on Certainty," 3.

12. Newman, "1847 Paper on Certainty," 3.

13. Newman, "1847 Paper on Certainty," 5.

14. Newman, "1847 Paper on Certainty," 5.

15. Fey, *Faith and Doubt*, 38–39.

16. Newman, "1847 Paper on Certainty," 1.

17. Newman, "1847 Paper on Certainty," 3.

18. Newman, "1847 Paper on Certainty," 3.

19. Newman, "1847 Paper on Certainty," 3.

20. Newman, "1847 Paper on Certainty," 3.

21. Fey, *Faith and Doubt*, 38–41, 48–49.

22. Fey, *Faith and Doubt*, 49.

23. Newman, "1847 Paper on Certainty," 5.

24. *LD*, XV:464–67.

25. *LD*, XV:465.

26. *LD*, XV:465. Newman says that if he had not maintained this, he would have fallen into a condemned proposition, and he quotes as evidence for this a thesis of Innocent XI which can be found in Denzinger, *Enchiridion Symbolorum*, 30th ed., 1169.

27. *LD*, XV:467.

28. *LD*, XV:466. Here Newman uses the term *revelatio* to refer to the formal object of faith. In his later works, *revelatio* designates the fact of revelation.

29. *LD*, XV:466. Newman states that what is made evident in the process of faith is that the revelation and the revealed doctrines are credible. But, in themselves, both the revelation and the revealed doctrines remain obscure and inevident.

30. *LD*, XV:466–67.

31. Fey, *Faith and Doubt*, 53–54.

32. Fey, *Faith and Doubt*, 53.

33. Newman, *Theological Papers*, 36. While some steps of the process are described as natural only and some are described as being both natural and supernatural, it is clear that, for Newman, the whole process of faith is influenced by grace.

34. Newman, *Theological Papers*, 37.

35. Newman, *Theological Papers*, 36.

36. Newman, *Theological Papers*, 37.

37. Newman, *Theological Papers*, 37.

38. Newman, *Theological Papers*, 36. Newman states, “A body of proof exists for the credibilitas of Revelation which makes that credibilitas evidens. . . . This body of proof is the formal cause of the conclusion, or the shape in which the conclusion comes to us. It consists of all the facts and truths of the case, each in its right place as the prudentia [prudent judgments] sees and arranges them, conspiring to the conclusion of the credibilitas [credibility] of Revelation.” Fey supports this interpretation when he writes, “The judgment of credibility is an objective (certain) assent resulting from an informal reflection on experience, not a formal demonstration from premises.” *Faith and Doubt*, 174.

39. Newman, *Theological Papers*, 37.

40. Newman, *Theological Papers*, 38.

41. Newman, *Theological Papers*, 38. At this point, Newman adds a parenthetical remark that seems to raise questions about the nature of the assent of human faith, which on the previous page was described as not excluding fear: “(But question—is not all doubt and fear excluded in our faith of the laws of nature?).”

42. Newman, *Theological Papers*, 37.

43. Newman, *Theological Papers*, 37.

44. Newman, *Theological Papers*, 37–38.

45. Newman, *Theological Papers*, 37.

46. Newman, *Theological Papers*, 38.

47. Newman, *Theological Papers*, 37.

48. Newman, *Theological Papers*, 37.

49. Fey, *Faith and Doubt*, 179.

50. Newman, *Theological Papers*, 38. Newman adds, however, “it is difficult to understand this—for the *imperium voluntatis* [command of the will] goes before, and excludes doubt and fear.”

51. *US*, 16–36. Newman first mentions this distinction in his 1830 university sermon entitled “The Influence of Natural and Revealed Religion Respectively.” Newman developed this distinction as a result of his discovery of the doctrine of the “Dispensation of Paganism” through his reading of Justin Martyr around 1828.

52. Fey, *Faith and Doubt*, 175. Fey supports this interpretation. He writes, “The will, aided by grace, might command the intellect to believe (the second case) but the object of this human faith remains the credibility of revelation; while divine faith in the intellect (the third case) has as its object revelation and the revealed content—that is, it follows the logic of testimony.”

53. Newman, *Theological Papers*, 120–39. This document consists of a series of brief papers written by Newman between 1865 and 1869 as he was preparing to write *A Grammar of Assent*.

54. Newman, *Theological Papers*, 132–33. These private revelations come through what Newman calls the private channels of revealed truth. He mentions three channels of private revelation, *Visio* (vision), *Scriptura* (scripture), *Traditio divina* (divine tradition), and adds a possible fourth, the necessary conclusion from a defined premise. Although obligatory on the mind possessing them, the truths of Divine Faith cannot be imposed on others, and Catholics who do not accept them are not considered to be outside the Church.

55. Newman, *Theological Papers*, 132.

56. Newman, *Theological Papers*, 139. Newman does not use the term *human faith*, but it is clear from the context that this is what he means. This is the same judgment that he referred to as *human faith* in his earlier works. Also, here Newman does not specify whether he is speaking about Divine Faith or Catholic Divine Faith.

57. Newman, *Theological Papers*, 133–34.

58. *GA*, 99.

59. *GA*, 100.

60. Pailin, *The Way to Faith*, 266, n. 22.

61. Ferreira, *Doubt and Religious Commitment*, 131, 135.

62. *GA*, 99–100.

63. Ferreira, *Doubt and Religious Commitment*, 15, 131, 135.

## *Chapter Three*

# **Human Certitude in Concrete Matters of Truth**

The central element in Newman's mature Catholic notion of faith is certitude. Human certitude in concrete matters of truth serves as the basic analogy for Newman's mature understanding of Catholic faith. In *A Grammar of Assent*, Newman presents a systematic and clear, although challenging, justification of certitude, both human certitude and the certitude of Catholic faith. Through this analysis of the rational justification of certitude, he overcomes the limitations of his treatment of this question in the *University Sermons* and provides a framework for responding to the objections of William Froude. This chapter presents an analysis of the basic terms that are central to Newman's understanding of human certitude and explains the relationship between the different terms. In addition, a description of Newman's understanding of the process by which a person arrives at human certitude in concrete matters of truth is presented.

In *A Grammar of Assent*, Newman divides the analysis of the justification of certitude into two parts. The first part deals with the relation of assent to apprehension and seeks to show that it is legitimate to believe what one cannot fully understand. In the second part, he treats inference, assent, certitude, informal reasoning, and the illative sense in order to show how a person is justified in believing what one cannot prove. Edward Caswall, a fellow Oratorian of Newman, confirms this interpretation in a note that he wrote in his copy of *A Grammar of Assent* after a conversation with Newman: "Object of book twofold. In the first part shows that you can believe what you cannot understand. In the second part that you can believe what you cannot absolutely prove."<sup>1</sup>

## THE FIRST QUESTION: BELIEVE WHAT YOU CANNOT FULLY UNDERSTAND

In the first part of *A Grammar of Assent*, Newman sets out to explain what he means by assent, and the main forms of assent. He classifies assent as an assertion.<sup>2</sup> Assent is unconditional.<sup>3</sup> It is the absolute acceptance of the truth of a statement.<sup>4</sup> Assent admits of no degrees;<sup>5</sup> it is an either/or reality. Either you assent to a statement or you do not; there is no middle ground. He describes assent as “an adherence to a proposition without reserve or doubt.”<sup>6</sup> If a person unconditionally accepts the truth of such statements as “Great Britain is an island,” “I shall die one day,” or “George Washington was the first president of the United States,” then that person has given an assent.

### Apprehension

Newman reminds us that assent to the truth of these types of statements does not require a complete understanding of the particular statement. However, assent does require what he calls apprehension. Before one can assent to the truth of a statement, there must be some intelligent apprehension of it.<sup>7</sup> Newman states that by apprehension, he means “our imposition of a sense on the terms of which they are composed. Now what do the terms of a proposition, the subject and predicate stand for?”<sup>8</sup> Explaining it further, Newman states, “Apprehension then is simply an intelligent acceptance of the idea, or of the fact which a proposition enunciates.”<sup>9</sup> In the statement “Great Britain is an island,” one can easily grasp the sense of the subject and the predicate. The subject refers to “Great Britain” and the predicate to that characteristic which is attributed to it—namely, it is an “island.”

In discussing what measure of apprehension is necessary in order to give assent to a statement, Newman says that we must at least understand the predicate. A statement is apprehended when the predicate is apprehended. The subject need not be apprehended per se (in itself) in order to give assent, for it is the thing that the predicate has to elucidate and make known. But, obviously, the predicate cannot do this unless it is known itself. In the statement “Trade is the interchange of goods,” Newman says that this statement is apprehended when the predicate, “the interchange of goods,” is apprehended.<sup>10</sup> What becomes clear is that apprehending a statement is not the same as understanding it. Newman says that he is deliberately using the word *apprehension* and not *understanding* because the meaning of “understanding” is uncertain,

“standing sometimes for the faculty or act of conceiving a proposition, sometimes for that of comprehending it, neither of which come into the sense of *apprehension*.”<sup>11</sup> For Newman, it is possible to apprehend a statement without understanding it. The statement “John is Richard’s wife’s father’s aunt’s husband” can be apprehended even if its full meaning, “John is great-uncle-in-law to Richard,” is not understood.<sup>12</sup>

After explaining the meaning of apprehension, Newman distinguishes between two forms of apprehension, notional and real. The distinction between the two forms of apprehension is rooted in his understanding that propositions, statements of truth, are either real or notional. The apprehension of a notional proposition is called “notional.”<sup>13</sup> Notional propositions are common nouns that stand for abstract, general, and nonexistent entities. In notional apprehension, things are perceived not as they are in themselves, but as they stand in relation to each other.<sup>14</sup> A person is not an individual but a member of the human race who possesses a human nature. The person is “attenuated into an aspect, or relegated to his place in a classification.”<sup>15</sup> A person becomes a definition.<sup>16</sup> Things are “diluted or starved into abstract notions.”<sup>17</sup> Notional apprehension comes from abstraction, rather than from experience. The apprehension of the statement “Man is an animal” is an example of notional apprehension.

The apprehension of real propositions is called “real apprehension.”<sup>18</sup> Real propositions are composed of “singular nouns” and stand for things external to us that are unit, particular, and individual. Real apprehension is an experience or information about the concrete. It is the apprehension of experiences that we become aware of through our bodily senses or our mental sensations, such as when we say, “The sun is shining.”<sup>19</sup> Memory is also another medium that enables us to experience things. “Memory consists in a present imagination of things that are past.”<sup>20</sup> Real apprehension is available through all of the senses, the smell of a rose, the scent of clean, fresh air, the memory of a song, the flavor of a peach,<sup>21</sup> and, I might add, the feel of hitting a solid golf shot. Real apprehension is the apprehension of things based on experience. The apprehension of the statement “Great Britain is an island” is an example of a real proposition.

Newman goes on to say that some propositions may be apprehended with both notional and real apprehension. It is possible for one person to apprehend a proposition as a notion and for another person to apprehend it as real. He gives this example: A nurse who gives a child candy may say “notionally,” “Sugar is sweet,” while the child tasting it assents to the “real” experienced particular proposition, “This sugar is a sweet thing.”<sup>22</sup> It also is possible for the same person to simultaneously apprehend the same proposition as both notional and real.<sup>23</sup> In a classroom experiment, the students may have a real ap-

prehension of the proposition “fire burns paper,” and, at the same time, have a notional apprehension of the general law of nature that “fire burns paper.”

Comparing notional and real apprehension, Newman states that each has its own excellence and serviceableness, and each has its own imperfections. Notional apprehension provides a certain breadth of mind but, at the same time, includes an element of shallowness. It is the principle of the advancement of knowledge. Real apprehension is to be deep, but narrow-minded, and is the conservative principle of apprehension.<sup>24</sup> Newman does think that real apprehension takes precedence over notional apprehension. Real apprehension is the scope, end, and the test of notional apprehension. Although real apprehension does not impel to action any more than notional apprehension, it does excite and stimulate the affections and passions. As a result, real apprehension can indirectly affect action in a way that notional apprehension never could.<sup>25</sup>

Of the two forms of apprehension, Newman says that real is the stronger. By stronger, he means “the more vivid and forcible.”<sup>26</sup> Explaining further, Newman says that real apprehension is stronger than notional because the object is more powerful. The concrete reality makes an impression on the mind that nothing abstract can rival.<sup>27</sup> Real things are more impressive and affective than notions. He writes, “Experiences and their images strike and occupy the mind, as abstractions and their combinations do not.”<sup>28</sup> The variations in the mind’s apprehension of a statement of truth, Newman says, lead people to speak about strong and weak assents. This gives the impression that there can be degrees of assent. However, he rejects this, pointing out that even though apprehension can be more or less, assent is always unconditional and therefore admits of no degrees.<sup>29</sup>

## Assent

Assent, similar to apprehension, can also be either notional or real. *Notional assent* is the assent given to statements of truth that have been apprehended as notions, statements that are general and abstract. In notional assent, the mind contemplates its own creations rather than things.<sup>30</sup> An example would be I assent to the statement that “man is an animal.” In *A Grammar of Assent*, Newman discusses five types of notional assent: profession, credence, opinion, presumption, and speculation.<sup>31</sup> *Real assent*, on the other hand, is the assent given to statements of truth that have been apprehended as things, or real objects, through the imagination and experience. Real assent is directed toward things represented by the impressions that the object has left on the imagination. These images, when assented to, exercise an influence on both the individual and society that mere notions cannot exert.<sup>32</sup> Newman also refers to real assent as belief, conviction, and certitude.<sup>33</sup>

One important characteristic of real assent is that it is a highly personal response. Real assents are the specific assents of distinct and individual persons. They have this characteristic because they are based on personal experience, and, as Newman states, “the experience of one man is not the experience of another.”<sup>34</sup> Another important characteristic of real assent is its relationship to action. According to Newman, neither notional assent nor real assent in itself leads immediately and automatically to action. Nevertheless, real assent—or belief, as Newman calls it here—may indirectly lead to action. “The concrete images experienced through real assent have the power to move the affections and the passions and, thereby, indirectly to lead to action.”<sup>35</sup>

Through the discussion of apprehension and assent and the relationship between the two, Newman has given his answer to the first question raised in *A Grammar of Assent*, how can one assent to what one does not understand? In our everyday life, there are many concrete truths that we accept that we do not fully understand. For Newman, this process is not irrational or against our nature as long as we can apprehend the predicate of a statement of truth. The truths and beliefs that we accept have to make sense—that is, be intelligible—and we have to see how they make sense, but we do not have to have a complete understanding of them.

### THE SECOND QUESTION: BELIEVE WHAT YOU CANNOT ABSOLUTELY PROVE

Newman addresses the second question, how in concrete matters of truth one is justified in believing what one cannot prove, in chapter 6 of *A Grammar of Assent*. The context for his answer to this question is found in his understanding of the distinction between assent and inference. This insight came to Newman in 1866 when he was in Switzerland, and it provided the breakthrough that enabled him to complete *A Grammar of Assent*. Of this experience he writes, “At last, when I was up at Glion over the lake of Geneva, it struck me. You are wrong in beginning with certitude—certitude is only a kind of assent—you should begin with contrasting assent and inference.”<sup>36</sup> For Newman, the basis of this distinction lies in the fact that assent is unconditional, while inference is conditional. In developing this section of *A Grammar of Assent*, he states that he is going to consider three points: the act of assent, the act of inference, and the solution to the question of how a conditional verification of a proposition can result in an unconditional assent.<sup>37</sup> He begins this discussion by analyzing a particular form of assent: certitude.

## Certitude

As a form of assent, *certitude* is the unconditional acceptance of the truth of a proposition with the awareness that one consciously knows that the statement to which one assents is in fact true. An assent of certitude takes the following form: "I accept the statement that I shall die one day is true and I know that the statement is true." As such, the act of certitude for Newman includes two moments, the moment of simple assent and the moment of complex assent. Certitude occurs when both come together.

*Simple assent* is the unconscious acceptance of the truth of a statement.<sup>38</sup> In simple assent, a person accepts the truth of a statement without reflecting on what he or she is doing.<sup>39</sup> Simple assent is the nonreflex acceptance of a proposition. According to Newman, the overwhelming majority of the assents on which we base our everyday living fall into this category.<sup>40</sup> It is clear that, for Newman, simple assent is not certitude. He calls it "material certitude" or "interpretive certitude," meaning that all one has to do is raise a question about the truth of a simple object in order to elicit from the person a response that will fulfill the conditions of certitude.<sup>41</sup> Even though simple assent is not itself certitude, it is the basis and foundation of certitude.

*Complex assent* is an assent that is made consciously and deliberately. Newman calls this type of assent *reflex assent*.<sup>42</sup> A complex assent is an assent not only to a given statement but to the claim that the statement to which one assents is in fact true. Newman says it is an "assent to an assent, or what is commonly called conviction."<sup>43</sup> Complex assent is the characteristic element of certitude.<sup>44</sup>

However, certitude itself is a complex act that includes both simple assent and complex assent.<sup>45</sup> The assent of certitude always includes a simple assent, either real or notional, to the truth of a given statement. But an assent of certitude involves more than this because certitude is "the perception of a truth with the perception that it is a truth, or the consciousness of knowing as expressed in the phrase, 'I know that I know.'"<sup>46</sup> Certitude is therefore an assent to a truth with the awareness that what one is assenting to is true. It is always a reflex act. And it is this conscious reflex act, a complex assent, that distinguishes certitude from simple assent and is the essential element of certitude. To the extent that it is a reflex assent, certitude is an assent to a notional proposition. The predicate of a reflex assent is always the abstract term *true*. For example, the assent to the statement "that I shall die one day is true" has a general term, *true*, as its predicate and is therefore a notional assent.<sup>47</sup> Consequentially, certitude is always also a notional assent.

In certitude, the simple assent can be real or notional, but the complex reflex assent is always notional. For example, an assent of certitude to the proposition "Great Britain is an island" includes a real assent to the statement

as well as a complex notional assent that “I know that the statement ‘Great Britain is an island’ is true.” On the other hand, an assent of certitude to the statement “man is an animal” includes a notional simple assent as well as the complex notional assent that “I know that the statement ‘man is an animal’ is true.” Certitude combines the keenness of simple assent with the persistence of a reflex, complex assent.

### **Certitude and Doubt**

The assent of certitude excludes doubt. As an assent, certitude has the characteristic of all assents, which means, as Newman states in *A Grammar of Assent*, that it is the acceptance of a proposition without reserve or doubt.<sup>48</sup> In an earlier work in 1853, he describes the state of certitude as follows: “First by the very word [certainty] is implied the absence of doubt; if a person doubts ever so little, he is not certain; and if he does not doubt, he may be called, and is truly called, certain.”<sup>49</sup> In *A Grammar of Assent*, he describes the type of doubt that is incompatible with certitude as “suspense of mind.”<sup>50</sup> Defined in this sense, doubt is the state of withholding assent to the truth of a statement. It is a refusal to make a judgment. As such, it is neither a yes nor a no.

From this definition of doubt, it is clear that certitude and doubt are incompatible on the basis of their very definitions. You cannot have certitude about the proposition “Great Britain is an island,” that is assent to its truth, and at the same time withhold assent to this proposition. Logically and psychologically, it is impossible to hold the two states of mind toward the same statement at the same time. According to Ferreira, Newman understands doubt to include not only withholding assent to a proposition but also withholding assent to the alternative contradictory proposition. Doubt is the refusal to assent to both “*p*” and “not *p*.”<sup>51</sup> However, while the assent of certitude by definition is incapable of coexisting with doubt, the propositions to which we assent are not in themselves beyond doubt in an absolute sense. Therefore, while certitude excludes actual doubt at the moment of assent, it does not exclude the possibility of doubt.<sup>52</sup>

### **The Indefectibility of Certitude**

Certitude also has the characteristic that Newman calls “indefectibility.” This means that certitudes are persistent and never fail. The object of certitude is truth, and, therefore, for Newman, it has the quality of being correct. Truth, Newman states, cannot change; “what is once truth is always truth; and the human mind is made for truth, and so rests in truth, as it cannot rest in falsehood.”<sup>53</sup> Since it is the law of the mind to seek truth, when it finds it and takes

possession of it, it never lets it go. When the mind reaches certitude, it has found truth; therefore, it rests in that state.<sup>54</sup> Indefectibility is the characteristic of certitude that ensures its endurance. It also serves as a kind of test of certitude. If a certitude persists, it is true; if it does not persist, then it is false. It is also important to point out that, for Newman, indefectibility is the general rule to which there can be exceptions. He does not present it as an absolute.<sup>55</sup>

Although Newman insisted on indefectibility as a characteristic of certitude, he does not identify indefectibility with infallibility. Certitudes, for Newman, are not infallible. Certitude is a disposition, not a faculty, of the mind relative to a definite and particular proposition, while infallibility is a faculty and relates the mind to “all possible propositions in a given subject matter.”<sup>56</sup> Infallibility is a general gift applicable to every particular case that may arise, but certitude is directed to a definite concrete proposition. To say that a person possesses certitude is not to affirm that he or she possesses infallibility.<sup>57</sup>

That certitude is not infallibility is also evident from the fact that Newman holds that a person’s certitudes are often false and mistaken and can be changed.<sup>58</sup> Certitudes can be false, not because they are not real certitudes but because they are founded on faulty reasoning. As an assent, certitude is always preceded by a process of reasoning that presents truth to the mind. If there is any error in certitude, it is the reasoning process that is false and not the assent. Newman states that it is a law of nature to assent to what reasoning presents as true. We would be acting against our nature if we withheld assent from a statement that we considered as being proven true.<sup>59</sup> False certitudes do exist. However, to argue against the validity and reasonableness of certitude because of the existence of mistaken certitudes would be like arguing against the use of clocks because some of them go wrong from time to time.<sup>60</sup> When it comes to distinguishing true and false certitude, Newman admits that there is no interior, immediate test. However, he holds that indefectibility serves as a kind of negative test—if the certitude does not persist, then it is false.<sup>61</sup> But, perhaps the best safeguard against false certitude is the stipulation that certitude should be given only after careful examination and investigation.

### **Inference and Assent**

After examining the assent of certitude, Newman next sets out to further explain inference and its relation to assent. In general, inference is the process of reasoning, either implicit or explicit, in which the mind proceeds from premises and evidence to a conclusion. Inference focuses on the reasons and the evidence for and against assenting to the truth of a statement. It considers

the cogency of a proposition. To be rational, assent should have grounds and reasons; therefore, it needs to be preceded by inferential acts. However, assent does not automatically follow from inference. Even if the reasons are good, assent may be withheld, or, if given, it may be withdrawn.<sup>62</sup> Inference and assent are distinct acts of the mind, and they can be made independently of one another.<sup>63</sup>

What inference and assent hold in common is that each is the acceptance of a proposition, a statement of truth. However, inference holds a proposition conditionally, while assent is the unconditional acceptance of a proposition.<sup>64</sup> For Newman, this is the main quality that distinguishes inference and assent. Inference is conditional; assent is unconditional. The strength of an inference depends on the cogency of the evidence. This is not the case with assent. Assent is not given in proportion to the strength of the evidence. It is not given in degrees but, rather, is an unconditional acceptance of the truth of a statement. In assent, you either accept or you don't, and, if you do, your acceptance is unconditional.

Some interpreters of Newman find his explanation of the distinction between inference and assent to be a bit ambiguous. Commenting on this ambiguity, William Fey states that the inference/assent distinction "should not be taken merely as a distinction between 'thinking about an inference' and 'actually inferring,' or between an 'inclination' to accept the conclusion of an inference and actually accepting it."<sup>65</sup> Fey thinks that the inference/assent distinction is best expressed as a distinction between merely concluding and knowing. He gives the following example: An astronomer may *conclude* from his many calculations that there should be an unobserved planet. However, he *assents* (knows) through a complex intellectual activity that he is presently sitting on a chair.<sup>66</sup> Ian Ker reminds us that in the inference/assent distinction, Newman only intends to make a logical distinction "between two kinds of acts and the linguistic forms of proposition expressing them."<sup>67</sup> Ker goes on to point out that the distinction between inference and assent is not the difference between recognizing reasons for assenting and actually assenting. Conditional inferential propositions express conclusions and imply a dependence on other propositions, whereas assents accept propositions without any such implications. What the distinction really points out is that there are different kinds of intellectual and verbal acts involved in assent and inference.<sup>68</sup> Inference and assent are not two totally separate acts but distinct moments in the acceptance of the truth of a proposition.

### Forms of Inference

In developing his understanding of inference, Newman distinguishes between three forms, or phases, of inference: formal, informal, and natural. *Formal in-*

*ference* is logical and syllogistic reasoning. It is the conceptually clear and explicit passage from one assertion to the other. As such, the Aristotelian syllogism is its model; because *A* is *B* and *B* is *C*, *A* is *C*.<sup>69</sup> Formal inference is “verbal reasoning” of whatever kind as opposed to mental.<sup>70</sup> It is ratiocination “restricted and put into grooves.”<sup>71</sup> Formal inference is the type of inference used in mathematics.<sup>72</sup> This type of reasoning focuses on mental abstractions. It begins with the abstract and leads to the abstract.<sup>73</sup> Formal inference can only lead to an abstract notional assent that seems hypothetical as far as real existence is concerned.<sup>74</sup>

*Informal inference* is that form of reasoning that is concrete and can lead to real assent. In describing the characteristics of informal inference, Newman states that it is one and the same with formal inference, except that it, unlike formal inference, does not deal with abstraction, but is carried out in the realities of life.<sup>75</sup> Also, he states that the process of reasoning in informal inference is “more or less implicit, and without the direct and full advertence of the mind exercising it.”<sup>76</sup> Finally, he reminds us that informal inference, like all inference, is conditional and therefore dependent on its premises and evidence.<sup>77</sup>

The process of informal reasoning is best illustrated by what Newman calls “the cumulation of probabilities.”<sup>78</sup> Taking the example of the proposition “I shall die,” he describes the process that informal reasoning follows in arriving at conclusions in concrete matters. It is a fact, as certain as we are alive right now, Newman reminds us, that we shall die one day. But, he asks, on what evidence can we be certain of this concrete truth? There are no logical arguments that can demonstrate the truth of this statement. In fact, it is not possible to logically demonstrate a future event. So, what evidence do we have? We have been taught that there is a general law of death, “all humans shall die.” We sometimes actually see people die and attend their funerals. Also, we do not know of anyone who was born two hundred years ago who is alive today. All of these, and others not mentioned, are reasons that informal inference considers when reflecting on the proposition “I shall die.” However, none of these reasons in themselves prove the truth of the statement. Each represents probable evidence of the truth of the statement.<sup>79</sup> It is informal inference that enables the mind to move from the cumulation of probable evidence to the assent of certitude to the statement that “I shall die.”<sup>80</sup>

*Natural inference*, which Newman also calls *material inference*, is reason as a simple act, not as a process. It is, Newman says, our most natural mode of reasoning “from things to things, from concrete to concrete, from whole to wholes.”<sup>81</sup> It is not reasoning from proposition to proposition. This form of reason deals “with things directly, and as they stand, one by one, in the concrete, with an intrinsic and personal power.”<sup>82</sup> There is no conscious process involved in natural inference. Newman says that it proceeds without any

conscious media and without any conscious antecedents.<sup>83</sup> It can be called an instinctive process of reasoning if one means by instinct “a perception of facts without assignable media of perceiving.”<sup>84</sup> He also calls natural inference “spontaneous ratiocination (reasoning).”<sup>85</sup>

This type of reasoning is natural to all human persons, but interestingly enough, Newman says, it belongs more to women than to men.<sup>86</sup> To illustrate natural inference, he gives the example of a weather-wise peasant who knows what the weather will be tomorrow because “he feels at once and together the force of various combined phenomena, though he is not conscious of them.”<sup>87</sup> As an example of natural inference, Newman also mentions a physician who excels in the diagnosis of illnesses without being able to demonstrate his or her decision to another doctor. Newman also sees Newton’s perception of mathematics and Napoleon’s military genius as illustrations of natural inference.<sup>88</sup> These illustrations help highlight one of the main characteristics of natural inference. It is a type of reasoning that is attached to a given subject matter and varies from individual to individual. A person’s ability to exercise natural inference is restricted to a given area of knowledge. It is, as Newman states, departmental and cannot be exercised in all areas of knowledge. Some may have this faculty in mathematics, some in medicine, some in politics, and some in matters of religion, but not everyone has it equally in all areas of knowledge.<sup>89</sup>

### The Process of Arriving at Certitude

Having examined certitude and the various forms of inference, we now come to the main issue that occupies Newman in *A Grammar of Assent*, his explanation of the process of how the human mind reaches certitude in concrete matters of truth. At the beginning of this discussion, it is important to recall that certitude is an assent and, as such, is preceded by an act of inference. Also, certitude is both a real assent to a concrete reality and a notional assent recognizing that the proposition to which one assents is in fact true. The question being discussed here really is, Which type of inference, formal, informal, or natural, is best able to facilitate and prepare the person for the assent of certitude in matters of concrete truths such as “Great Britain is an island” or “I shall die”?

It is unambiguously clear that, for Newman, formal inference cannot lead to certitude in concrete matters of truth. For one thing, formal inference can only hold notional propositions and lead to notional assent. Certitude is at one level a real assent. Newman goes on to point out and demonstrate that in concrete matters of truth, formal inference can only conclude probabilities. He presents and analyzes two reasons in his discussion of this point: First, the premises of formal reason are assumed and not proved; second, the conclusion of formal inference can only lead to abstract truth, not concrete truths.

Informal inference through the cummulation of probabilities is the form of reasoning that facilitates a person's ability to arrive at certitude in matters of concrete truth.<sup>90</sup> As a form of reason that holds real propositions, informal inference can place the mind in contact with real things and, therefore, lead to a real assent. However, informal inference is always inference and is therefore always conditional. Informal inference in itself cannot lead to an unconditional assent of certitude. The mind requires another faculty to enable informal inference to move through its own conditionality to an unconditional assent of certitude. The specific nature of this faculty, the illative sense, will be examined after the discussion of natural inference.

The role that natural inference plays in this whole process is rather puzzling. Ferreira points out that, since the chapter on inference in *A Grammar of Assent* is divided into three sections—formal inference, informal inference, and natural inference—one is led to assume that natural inference is a third kind of inference, on the same level with formal and informal. However, in fact, she says, Newman seems to see the discussion of natural inference merely as a continuation of the section on informal inference.<sup>91</sup> If this is the case, then natural inference can be understood as an unconscious and spontaneous form of informal inference. Informal inference is the deliberate, conscious, mediated, and explicit form of reasoning that places the mind in touch with the concrete and the real. Natural inference is an unconscious, unmediated, implicit form of reasoning that also places the mind in contact with the concrete and the real. Natural inference means making a judgment in the concrete world by going from facts presented by what's out there to a conclusion driven by them, but without using any middle terms. One looks at the sky and says it will rain tomorrow.

Ferreira suggests that “natural inference may be the most immediate form of informal inference—differing in degree of conscious mediation.”<sup>92</sup> Adding to the difficulty of understanding natural inference is the fact that Newman himself calls it the illative faculty; “Sometimes, I say this illative faculty [natural inference] is nothing short of genius.”<sup>93</sup> Consequently, the precise role of natural inference in the process of reaching certitude in matters of concrete truth remains somewhat unclear. Yet, because of where Newman places his discussion of it, natural inference appears to be a bridge between informal inference and the illative sense, the crucial element in Newman's explanation of certitude in matters of concrete truth.

### The Illative Sense

One question still remains unanswered in Newman's attempt to explain how a person arrives at certitude: Does the mind have any criterion for determining the validity of its movement from informal inference, which presents

probable evidence and can lead only to conditional conclusions, to the unconditional assent of certitude? He states the question as follows: “[I]s there any criterion of the accuracy of an inference, such as may be our warrant that certitude is rightly elicited in favour of the proposition inferred, since our warrant cannot, as I have said, be scientific?”<sup>94</sup> For Newman, there is such a criterion, and he calls it the illative sense. In answering his own question, Newman writes, “I have already said that the sole and final judgment on the validity of an inference in concrete matters is committed to the personal action of the ratiocinative [reasoning] faculty, the perfection or virtue of which I have called the Illative Sense.”<sup>95</sup> Clarifying his answer, Newman states that he is using the word *sense* in a meaning parallel to how it is used in “good sense,” “common sense,” and a “sense of beauty.”<sup>96</sup> The illative sense is, as Newman puts it, “a grand word for a common thing.”<sup>97</sup> He calls it the “architectonic faculty”<sup>98</sup> and a “living organon.”<sup>99</sup> It is the power of “judging and concluding” in its perfection.<sup>100</sup> Newman states that the illative sense “has its function in the beginning, middle, and the end of all verbal discussion and inquiry, and in every step of the process.”<sup>101</sup> He compares it with the term *phronesis* (judgment), which Aristotle used to designate the faculty that guides the mind in matters of conduct.<sup>102</sup>

Newman summarizes his understanding of the illative sense in four points. First, the illative sense is exercised in one and the same way in all concrete matters. We do not reason in different ways in different areas of knowledge. Our reasoning is the same in chemistry or law as it is in morals and religion.<sup>103</sup> However, as the second point shows, the exercise of the illative sense by an individual person is restricted to a particular area of knowledge. One person may possess it in history, another in philosophy, and so forth. No one person possesses it in all branches of knowledge.<sup>104</sup> Third, in proceeding to its conclusion, the illative sense proceeds by that method of reasoning that is “the elementary principle of that mathematical calculus of modern times, which has so wonderfully extended the limits of abstract science.”<sup>105</sup> Finally, Newman states that the illative sense is its own sanction. In all areas of concrete reasoning, whether it be experimental science, historical research, or theology, the “trustworthiness” of the illative sense is the “ultimate test of all truth and error in our inferences.”<sup>106</sup> Elaborating on this aspect of the illative sense, he states that it is “a rule to itself” and it “appeals to no judgment beyond its own.”<sup>107</sup>

When it works in its perfection, the illative sense enables the mind to sift through probabilities to obtain the assent of certitude. It is the illative sense that accumulates the probable evidence, perceives the probabilities as a whole, recognizes that the conclusion toward which they converge cannot be other than true, and then judges the conclusion to be true. Philip Flanagan says that it is the power of reasoning correctly that enables the mind “to see how much the evidence contains and of judging correctly the point at which

it becomes sufficient to justify certitude.”<sup>108</sup> The illative sense needs evidence, but the evidence never gets beyond a tendency.

Newman uses the example of a polygon. A polygon inscribed in a circle tends to become that circle as its sides are diminished. However, the polygon vanishes before it coincides with the circle. It never gets beyond a tendency to become a circle.<sup>109</sup> Likewise, probable evidence never gets beyond a tendency to conclude to a truth. However, the illative sense can lead the mind beyond this tendency to a conclusion to a truth. In comprehending the premises, it perceives the legitimate conclusion in and through the premises. Newman says that “the practiced and experienced mind is able to make a sure divination that a conclusion is inevitable, of which his lines of reasoning do not actually put him in possession.”<sup>110</sup> Though the evidence does not provide logical proof, the judgment of the illative sense through informal reasoning can lead the mind to certitude because there is “genuine proof.”<sup>111</sup> Therefore, Newman can say that a proposition arrived at in this way is “as good as proved” and that the conclusion is undeniable “as if it were proved,” and the reasons for it amount to a proof.<sup>112</sup> At this moment, the assent of certitude becomes the only rational reaction. The mind makes a real assent to the truth of the proposition while acknowledging through a notional assent that “I know that I know” that this proposition is true.

It is clear that, for Newman, the illative sense is a faculty of the mind. He calls it a “ratiocinative (reasoning) faculty.”<sup>113</sup> However, the illative sense is not really a distinct faculty added to the normal operations of the mind in order to serve the special functions of certitude. Rather, it is part of the normal operation of the mind that the mind always follows in concrete matters of truth. The illative sense is not just a feeling or a moral quality, but it performs a valid intellectual function of the mind. It is a power of concluding that tells one that the evidence is sufficient to make a conclusion. Edward Jeremy Miller writes, “the illative sense leads a person to conclude that a particular insight is the upshot of it all, that no further evidence is needed, and that now is the moment to decide.”<sup>114</sup> As an intellectual faculty, its conclusions are not merely practical but judgments of truth. What Newman is really saying is that the illative sense is a rational operation of the mind, which is perfectly in accord with the normal and legitimate operations of the human mind. Our certitudes are not unfounded feelings or irrational guesses, but they are rationally justified assents.

## THE PERSONAL NATURE OF THE ASSENT OF CERTITUDE

The process of arriving at certitude through informal reasoning and the illative sense is not a rational process that automatically and logically forces a

person to accept the truth of a given concrete proposition. Certitude for Newman is a highly personal act. As such, it involves the response of the whole person, including such elements as antecedent considerations, rational reflection through informal inference, the operation of the individual's illative sense, the freedom of the will, and the element of personal commitment.

### **Antecedent Considerations**

For Newman, the process of arriving at certitude begins with elements that exist before one even begins to investigate the available evidence. Newman calls these "antecedent considerations." Perhaps the most basic of these antecedents is the individuality and the uniqueness of the person. Newman says that we must assume that we exist and that we exist in a certain way, with a particular mental constitution. We each have a particular standpoint that must be taken into consideration.<sup>115</sup> He writes:

I am what I am, or I am nothing. I cannot think, reflect or judge about my being, without starting from the very point which I am concluding. My ideas are all assumptions, and I am ever moving in a circle. I cannot avoid being sufficient for myself, for I cannot make myself anything else, and to change me is to destroy me.<sup>116</sup>

It is clear that what Newman means here is that, when we begin to reason and reflect on a truth, we must begin by acknowledging who we are and what we know at the moment. It is clear that he does not mean that a person cannot change and develop. He qualifies the previous statement when he states, "It is that, though man cannot change what he is born with, he is a being of progress with relation to his perfection and characteristic good."<sup>117</sup>

One of the elements that a person brings with him or her in the search for certitude is what Newman refers to as "assumptions." These include a person's first principles "on which the Illative Sense has to act, discovering them, following them out, defending or resisting them as the case may be."<sup>118</sup> Newman points out that the way in which we view things is often "intensely personal," that individuals abstract in a personal way, and that there are a variety of principles of interpretation.<sup>119</sup>

In addition to first principles, Newman states that we often begin our reasoning process with the "implicit assumption" of certain propositions and the "arbitrary exclusion" of others.<sup>120</sup> He objects to those who hold that we should not make any assumptions but should begin the reasoning process with a universal doubt. But, as Newman points out, the universal doubt is itself the greatest of all assumptions and so would have to be rejected on its own grounds.<sup>121</sup> Although he cautions us against arbitrarily making assump-

tions, he would prefer that we begin by accepting everything that is presented to us, rather than begin with the universal doubt. Following this approach, we would soon be able to see what is the truth and what is error. As we proceed through our reflection, the error would fall off from the mind, and the truth would be able to develop and occupy it.<sup>122</sup>

Even some of the reasons employed in the process of arriving at certitude are present at the beginning of the process. Newman calls these “antecedent reasons.” These reasons, Newman states, are “in great measure made by ourselves and belong to our personal character.”<sup>123</sup> Antecedent reasoning, according to Newman, is safer when it is negative. As an example of a negative antecedent reason, he cites Butler’s argument that objections against the divine origin of Christianity do not hold any force unless they also argue against the divine origin of nature.<sup>124</sup> As another example of “antecedent reasoning,” Newman mentions the argument from the order of nature that unbelievers use against a Christian’s belief in miracles. He admits that theological conclusions are often made on the basis of antecedent reasons. He also says that, even though it is not clear, it may be true that some conversions to Christianity have been made on the basis of antecedent reasons.<sup>125</sup>

### **The Personal Nature of the Illative Sense**

The personal nature of the assent of certitude is further supported by the fact that the illative sense is a personal form of reasoning. So personal is the judgment of the illative sense that it is unique to each individual. Newman writes, “It is seated in the mind of the individual, who is thus his own law, his own teacher, and his own judge in those special cases of duty which are personal to him.”<sup>126</sup> He goes on to state that the illative sense is “nothing else than a personal gift or acquisition.”<sup>127</sup> Philip Flanagan, commenting on the illative sense, states that Newman insisted on the personal nature of the operation of the illative sense.<sup>128</sup> A. J. Boekraad describes the illative sense as being emphatically personal.<sup>129</sup> In a recent book, Martin X. Moleski highlights the personal nature of the illative sense, calling it “the capacity of personal judgment.”<sup>130</sup> Describing its operation, Moleski notes that it is the illative sense that tacitly governs the personal reasoning of informal inference and secures personal certitude in matters of concrete truths.<sup>131</sup>

### **Certitude as a Free Response**

The personal nature of the assent of certitude can also be seen in the fact that, for Newman, certitude is a free response of the person. Describing the assent of certitude, Newman states that “it is a free act, a personal act for which the

doer is responsible.”<sup>132</sup> However, the freedom of certitude must be understood in the context of the reasoning process involved in arriving at certitude. In the authentic operation of informal reasoning and the illative sense, the mind sees the truth of the conclusion as evident and proved, even though it has not been logically demonstrated. Newman says that, on the basis of our personal reasoning, we are bound to accept the conclusion. We see that the conclusion could not be otherwise and recognize that it would be impossible to doubt it. In fact, Newman says, we would be idiots not to believe it.<sup>133</sup> Developing this point further, Newman states, “It is a law of my mind to seal up the conclusions to which ratiocination has brought me, by that formal assent which I have called certitude. I could have withheld my assent, but I should have acted against my nature, had I done so when there was what I considered a proof.”<sup>134</sup>

Reflecting on these statements, Ferreira holds that there is an element of personal constraint in the process of arriving at certitude, what she refers to as “the constraint of a rational evaluation.”<sup>135</sup> The significance of this insight, as Ferreira points out, is that, when Newman says that certitude is a free act, he does not mean that it is the result of a totally arbitrary choice.<sup>136</sup> The key to understanding the freedom of certitude is the realization that certitude is not impersonally compelled by the intrinsic force of the arguments. Certitude is not reached by a “scientific necessity” independent of the person. Certitude is not dictated by the “compulsion of logical deduction.”<sup>137</sup> For Ferreira, Newman’s understanding of the freedom of certitude resides in the person’s “active recognition” of the truth of the conclusion.<sup>138</sup> The person’s “active recognition” is free because, even though it is constrained by the rational evaluation, it is not compelled by it.<sup>139</sup> It is, therefore, legitimate to say that Newman views certitude as a free decision of the person as long as one does not see the act of certitude as a completely arbitrary choice, made independent of the constraint of the personal evaluation of the evidence.

### **The Role of the Will**

From what has been discussed so far, it is clear that Newman sees certitude as a personal act and a free decision. Since this is the case, it is evident that the will is involved in the act of certitude. Most interpreters of Newman seem to agree that the will does play a role in the act of certitude, but they disagree on his understanding of the precise nature of the role of the will in certitude. The discussion of the role of the will in the act of certitude centers on the question of whether or not there is a gap between conditional inference and unconditional assent that has to be bridged by an independent act of the will. Since the evidence arrived at through informal inference always remains

probable and cannot in itself lead to an unconditional assent, does the will not have to enter into the process and make a distinct decision in order to make up for insufficient evidence? This would mean that the evidence cannot rationally lead to certitude and so the will would decide and accept the proposition as true. The acceptance of its truth would be the result not of the illative sense's judgment of its credibility, but of the will's choice to intervene and accept it as true in spite of the intellect's inability to rationally demonstrate its truth. If this is the case, then this would mean that Newman ultimately views certitude as an arbitrary act of the will. Some authors interpret Newman as understanding the role of the will in certitude precisely in this way. Others reject this interpretation and suggest that he understood the role of the will in certitude in such a way that the operation of the will was compatible with the cogency of the rational evaluation of informal inference and the illative sense.

David A. Pailin is an example of an author who maintains that Newman views certitude as an arbitrary choice of the will. According to Pailin, Newman ultimately views assent as an act of the will. Pailin writes, "In the end, it is our will which determines whether or not assent is granted. The move from antecedent reasoning to assent is a logical type-jump which no degree of conclusiveness can ever entail."<sup>140</sup> Newman, Pailin maintains, does not see certitude as deriving from the process of informal reasoning and the illative sense. According to Pailin, "Not even the most convincing illative reasoning can logically entail assent or certitude."<sup>141</sup> Although Pailin admits that Newman sometimes seems to have wanted to place certitude in the logic of reasoning, he ultimately regarded it as a leap made by an act of the will.<sup>142</sup> Summarizing his interpretation of Newman, Pailin writes, "This means that for Newman assent is basically the willed state of accepting something as if it were unconditionally true rather than the unwillable state of accepting it without reservation."<sup>143</sup>

William Fey, on the other hand, is an example of an author who does not think that Newman views certitude as an arbitrary act of the will. Fey does think that Newman is ambiguous on the question. According to Fey, there are passages in Newman's works in which he sometimes speaks of the assent of certitude as if it were a decision of the will that makes up for insufficient evidence.<sup>144</sup> At the same time, Fey points out that in many other passages, Newman speaks of certitude as an act in which the intellect recognizes the truth of a proposition. Fey's own interpretation is that, even though Newman is ambiguous, he does not view certitude as a decision in which a person decides that one knows.<sup>145</sup> As Fey understands Newman, certitude is not the result of an arbitrary and independent act of the will but an intellectual recognition, which is both personal and free, that we have grasped that something is true and that we know that it is true.

Ferreira also rejects the notion that certitude for Newman is the result of an arbitrary act of the will, and, in so doing, she offers a very helpful and plausible explanation of how Newman does understand the role of the will in the act of certitude. Ferreira suggests that Newman's understanding of the role of the will in certitude might best be read in light of a distinction between two roles of the will. She distinguishes between the role of the will in reaching certitude and the role of the will in confirming certitude after it is experienced.<sup>146</sup> The role of the will in reaching certitude is described as being non-deliberate and nonintentional. The role of the will in confirming certitude is said to be deliberate.<sup>147</sup>

In explaining Newman's understanding of the role of the will in reaching certitude, Ferreira says that Newman does not view certitude as the result of an arbitrary act of the will. She states her position as follows: "Certitude is not reached through a choice distinct from the reasoning process, but is an active, uncompelled yet constrained recognition."<sup>148</sup> Ferreira also refers to this operation of the will as "active recognition." What this means is that the will is indeed involved in the personal process of reaching certitude through informal inference and the illative sense. As Ferreira says, "we do not assent or become certain *without* or *against* the will."<sup>149</sup>

Ferreira is attempting to find a way of understanding Newman's notion of certitude that avoids two extremes. One extreme would hold that certitude is a direct willing to believe. The other extreme maintains that certitude is an automatic, involuntary, reflex action involving no freedom and no act of the will.<sup>150</sup> Ferreira points out that Newman does see certitude as deriving from the rational evaluation. However, the rational evaluation does not compel certitude. The will, which is constrained but not compelled by the rational evaluation, actively recognizes the truth of the proposition and the person assents to it. What Ferreira seems to be saying is that the will is involved in an active personal way in the whole process of reaching certitude. It is not as if informal inference and the illative sense go so far, then the will jumps in, and certitude happens. The will is involved, but it does not force certitude.

However, according to Ferreira, the role of the will in certitude is not exhausted by the function it fulfills in the process of reaching certitude. The will has a second role to play after certitude is reached. Since certitudes can be stifled and given up, it is necessary for a person to deliberately affirm his or her certitudes.<sup>151</sup> After certitude is reached, a person, through an act of the will, affirms his or her commitment to the truth of the proposition accepted. Such a personal act of the will is necessary if our certitudes are to endure. Ferreira describes this second act of the will as the "deliberate act of intending to adhere."<sup>152</sup>

According to Ferreira, this second role of the will is also helpful for understanding Newman's statements on certitude. When Newman focuses on

the role of the will in certitude and speaks of certitude as a state that ultimately depends on the will, Ferreira thinks that he is more likely describing this second role of the will. In these instances, Newman, Ferreira maintains, is not referring to the role of the will in reaching certitude.<sup>153</sup> Also, when Newman speaks of certitude as a choice, Ferreira thinks that Newman is speaking more of the role that the will plays in this affirmation of certitude.<sup>154</sup> Again, here the will is involved not in the creation of certitude but in its affirmation after certitude is reached. In this second role, the act of the will is not a source of certitude but a consequence of it.<sup>155</sup>

Ferreira also thinks that the second role of the will in affirming certitude highlights Newman's understanding of certitude as a commitment.<sup>156</sup> Acceptance of truths in concrete matters not only involves acceptance of the truth of a proposition but also includes a living personal commitment to the reality it reveals. For Newman, certitudes are beliefs that are part of us and touch us as persons. They engage us in our everyday living. Since certitudes are fragile in the sense that they can be stifled or given up, at times it is necessary to affirm them and renew our commitments to them. This is especially true in moral and religious certitudes. As Ferreira points out, Newman thought that, in the face of intellectual and moral weakness, it was necessary to encourage confirmation of and commitment to our certitudes.<sup>157</sup> So, in the sense of this second operation of the will, we can understand how, for Newman, certitude is a free choice that engages the whole person in the totality of one's being.

Although Ferreira's distinction between the two roles of the will does not solve all the problems, it does offer a helpful framework and context for understanding Newman's complex notion of certitude. For Newman, the act of certitude is both a rational act as well as a free personal decision. The distinction between the two roles of the will enables one to visualize how Newman could maintain a balance between two seemingly incompatible elements. In the first role of the will as active recognition, it becomes understandable how certitude can be obtained as a result of the rational evaluation, which results from the process of informal inference and the operation of the illative sense, and still be free. The mind, through a valid reasoning process, is led to accept the truth of a proposition. The will does not force the person to assent, but it also does not, as it could, stifle the certitude. Rather, the will cooperates nondeliberately in actively recognizing the truth of the proposition. Through the second role of the will in the affirmation of certitude, one can understand how Newman can speak of the act of certitude as a free personal choice and how certitudes are commitments that engage us in the totality of our personal beings.

Also, perhaps, this twofold nature of the act of the will in certitude can help one understand more clearly the relationship between the two main dimensions of the assent of certitude. On one level, the act of certitude is a simple

real assent to the truth of a proposition. At this level, one can see how the acceptance of the truth of the proposition is reached through the convergence of the rational evaluation and the role of the will as active recognition. At the same time, certitude is a complex, reflex assent through which a person consciously affirms that what one knows is in fact true. It is through this second role of the will that a person reflects on the truth of one's certitude, affirms and confirms it, and appropriates it in a personal way. At this level, certitude can be understood as also being a free personal choice.

In the next chapter, Newman's understanding of human certitude and his analysis of the process of arriving at certitude in concrete matters of truth will be applied to his Catholic understanding of the notion of faith. Chapter 4 presents a systematic summary of Newman's mature notion of Catholic faith.

## NOTES

1. Charles Stephen Dessain, *John Henry Newman* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1961), 148. Dessain quotes Caswall's note without giving the original reference.

2. *GA*, 5 and 13.
3. *GA*, 8, 35, 172, and 259.
4. *GA*, 13.
5. *GA*, 174.
6. *GA*, 6 and 172.
7. *GA*, 8.
8. *GA*, 9.
9. *GA*, 20.
10. *GA*, 14.
11. *GA*, 19.
12. *GA*, 19–20.
13. *GA*, 9.
14. *GA*, 31.
15. *GA*, 31.
16. *GA*, 31.
17. *GA*, 31.
18. *GA*, 10.
19. *GA*, 23.
20. *GA*, 23.
21. *GA*, 24–25.
22. *GA*, 10–11.
23. *GA*, 11.
24. *GA*, 34.
25. *GA*, 34–35.
26. *GA*, 11.

27. *GA*, 36.
28. *GA*, 37.
29. *GA*, 35, 37–38.
30. *GA*, 42, 75.
31. *GA*, 42–74.
32. *GA*, 75.
33. *GA*, 87.
34. *GA*, 83.
35. *GA*, 90.
36. *AW*, 270.
37. *GA*, 158.
38. *GA*, 189.
39. *GA*, 211.
40. *GA*, 189.
41. *GA*, 211–12.
42. *GA*, 189.
43. *GA*, 195.
44. *GA*, 215.
45. *GA*, 216.
46. *GA*, 197.
47. *GA*, 214.
48. *GA*, 172.

49. Newman, “Papers in Preparation for *A Grammar of Assent*, 1865–1869,” *Theological Papers*, 4. Newman uses the word *certainty* here, but it is clear from the context that he is speaking about the state of certitude and not the objective certainty of a proposition.

50. *GA*, 7. Newman adds here that if the word *doubt* is taken to mean the deliberate recognition of a thesis as being uncertain, then it is actually an assent, “an assent to a proposition at variance with the thesis.” See *GA*, 7–8.

51. M. Jamie Ferreira, *Doubt and Religious Commitment: The Role of the Will in Newman’s Thought* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1980), 19.

52. Ferreira, *Doubt and Religious Commitment*, 108–9. Ferreira interprets Newman to be saying that certitude excludes all reasonable doubt, not the absence of the possibility of doubt.

53. *GA*, 221.
54. *GA*, 221.
55. *GA*, 221.
56. *GA*, 224.
57. *GA*, 224–25.

58. *GA*, 223: “It is a fact of daily occurrence that men change their certitudes, that is, what they consider to be such, and are as confident and well-established in their new opinions as they were once in their old.”

59. *GA*, 229.
60. *GA*, 223.
61. *GA*, 255–56.

62. GA, 171–72. Newman does say that there are times when inference seems to force assent. He writes, “Certainly, one cannot conceive a man having before him the senses of conditions and truths on which it depends that the three angles of a triangle are together equal to two right angles, and yet not assenting to that proposition” (GA, 170).

63. GA, 171.

64. GA, 172.

65. William R. Fey, *Faith and Doubt: The Unfolding of Newman’s Thought on Certainty* (Shepherdstown, WV: Patmos, 1976), 147.

66. Fey, *Faith and Doubt*, 148.

67. Ker, *Newman: A Biography*, 647.

68. Ker, *Newman: A Biography*, 647.

69. GA, 266–67.

70. GA, 263–64.

71. GA, 263. In the section on formal inference, Newman sometimes uses the terms *logic*, *inference*, and *formal inference* to mean the same thing.

72. GA, 265–66.

73. GA, 268.

74. Fey, *Faith and Doubt*, 150.

75. GA, 292.

76. GA, 292.

77. GA, 293.

78. GA, 288.

79. GA, 298–300.

80. GA, 300–301.

81. GA, 330–31.

82. GA, 331.

83. GA, 333.

84. GA, 334.

85. GA, 338.

86. GA, 331.

87. GA, 332.

88. GA, 332–34.

89. GA, 338–39.

90. GA, 288.

91. Ferreira, *Doubt and Religious Commitment*, 39.

92. Ferreira, *Doubt and Religious Commitment*, 40. Actually, Ferreira thinks that the matter is even more complicated. Since natural inference operates without either conscious antecedents or conscious mediation, Ferreira suggests that natural inference might be qualitatively different from informal inference. Speculating even further, she raises the hypothesis that perhaps natural inference is not really a form of inference at all. Ferreira, *Doubt and Religious Commitment*, 40–41.

93. GA, 333.

94. GA, 345.

95. GA, 345.

96. GA, 345.
97. LD, XXIV:375.
98. GA, 342.
99. GA, 316.
100. GA, 353.
101. GA, 361.
102. GA, 354–58.
103. GA, 358–59.
104. GA, 359.
105. GA, 359.
106. GA, 359.
107. GA, 361–62.
108. Philip Flanagan, *Newman, Faith and the Believer* (Westminster, MD: Newman Bookshop, 1946), 104.
109. GA, 320–21.
110. GA, 321.
111. Ferreira, *Doubt and Religious Commitment*, 35.
112. GA, 321.
113. GA, 345.
114. Edward Jeremy Miller, *John Henry Newman on the Idea of Church* (Shepherdstown, WV: Patmos, 1987), 28.
115. GA, 347.
116. GA, 347.
117. GA, 349.
118. GA, 371.
119. GA, 373–74.
120. GA, 375–376.
121. GA, 377.
122. GA, 376–77.
123. GA, 381.
124. GA, 382.
125. GA, 382–83.
126. GA, 354.
127. GA, 362.
128. Flanagan, *Newman, Faith and the Believer*, 105.
129. A. J. Boekraad, *The Personal Conquest of Truth According to J. H. Newman* (Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1955), 302.
130. Martin X. Moleski, *Personal Catholicism: The Theological Epistemologies of John Henry Newman and Michael Polanyi* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2000), 108.
131. Moleski, *Personal Catholicism*, 103.
132. GA, 232.
133. GA, 317.
134. GA, 239.
135. Ferreira, *Doubt and Religious Commitment*, 60.

136. Ferreira, *Doubt and Religious Commitment*, 60.
137. Ferreira, *Doubt and Religious Commitment*, 60.
138. Ferreira, *Doubt and Religious Commitment*, 60.
139. Ferreira, *Doubt and Religious Commitment*, 61–62. Ferreira holds that “active recognition” can be a free decision as long as it is not entailed or compelled.
140. David A. Pailin, *The Way to Faith: An Examination of Newman’s Grammar of Assent as a Response to the Search for Certainty in Faith* (London: Epworth, 1969), 131.
141. Pailin, *The Way to Faith*, 159.
142. Pailin, *The Way to Faith*, 177, 190.
143. Pailin, *The Way to Faith*, 191–92. Pailin interestingly enough goes on to criticize Newman’s understanding of certitude as an independent act of the will as being inadequate. It should be noted that in his discussion of the role of the will, Pailin does not always clearly distinguish between human certitude and the certitude of divine faith.
144. Fey, *Faith and Doubt*, 114, 140, 148.
145. Fey, *Faith and Doubt*, 117.
146. Ferreira, *Doubt and Religious Commitment*, 71.
147. Ferreira, *Doubt and Religious Commitment*, 75.
148. Ferreira, *Doubt and Religious Commitment*, 71.
149. Ferreira, *Doubt and Religious Commitment*, 72.
150. Ferreira, *Doubt and Religious Commitment*, 72–73.
151. Ferreira, *Doubt and Religious Commitment*, 73.
152. Ferreira, *Doubt and Religious Commitment*, 75.
153. Ferreira, *Doubt and Religious Commitment*, 73. She admits, however, that this is a possibility.
154. Ferreira, *Doubt and Religious Commitment*, 75.
155. Ferreira, *Doubt and Religious Commitment*, 75.
156. Ferreira, *Doubt and Religious Commitment*, 75.
157. Ferreira, *Doubt and Religious Commitment*, 74.

## *Chapter Four*

# **Newman's Mature Notion of Catholic Faith**

According to Newman, Catholic faith, and the process by which it is obtained, is analogous to the process by which the mind arrives at certitude in matters of concrete human truths. As an assent of certitude, the act of Catholic faith includes the same elements that are operative in the act of human certitude in concrete matters of truth. However, Newman is employing an analogy, and it is not legitimate to identify completely the act of human certitude with the act of Catholic faith. In arriving at human certitude, the person is engaged in a process that includes informal reasoning, the illative sense, and a free personal decision that involves the will. The act of Catholic faith also includes all of these elements. However, any explanation of the act of Catholic faith also has to include a discussion of God's Word and God's grace. This means that any attempt to describe how the elements of human certitude apply to the act of Catholic faith must take into consideration the differences as well as the similarities between the two.

Also, it must be kept in mind that in *A Grammar of Assent*, Newman himself did not explicitly apply all of the elements involved in the act of human certitude to the act of Catholic faith. As a result, the attempt to do so will, to some extent, go beyond Newman's explicit statements and will involve a certain amount of speculation. Drawing upon his applications of human certitude to Catholic faith in *A Grammar of Assent*, as well as his statements on faith in his other writings, this chapter will present a constructive and systematic analysis of Newman's mature understanding of Catholic faith.

Our starting point is *A Grammar of Assent*. Here Newman applies the results of his analysis of human certitude to the Catholic notion of faith in two instances. In chapter 5 of *A Grammar of Assent*, he applies the results of the first part of the book, the discussion of assent and apprehension, to two revealed truths of Catholic teaching: "He [God] is One" and "He [God] is

Three.”<sup>1</sup> The results of the second part of *A Grammar of Assent*, the discussion of inference, assent, certitude, informal inference, and the illative sense, are applied to Catholic faith in chapter 10, where Newman examines the evidences for Christianity.<sup>2</sup> This chapter will not discuss the evidences for faith but will focus on Newman’s understanding of the nature of Catholic faith.

In discussing the nature of Catholic faith in *A Grammar of Assent*, Newman makes a distinction between the act of faith and the object of faith. He says that he is going to talk about two elements. First, Newman says, he is going to talk about assent, the act of faith, “to investigate what it is to believe in the [doctrines], what the mind does, what it contemplates, when it makes an act of faith.”<sup>3</sup> Second, he states that he is going to discuss the material object of faith, “the thing believed,”<sup>4</sup> or the object of faith. Based on his analysis of the act of faith and the object of faith, one gets the impression that Newman views the two to be inseparable. He always speaks of the act of faith in relation to the object of faith. He does distinguish between the two, but he never seems to want to separate them. His approach seems similar to that of Paul Tillich, who holds that you cannot separate the objective and subjective poles of faith. However, Tillich does maintain that, for purposes of discussion, you can distinguish the two, even though each must be discussed in relationship to the other.<sup>5</sup>

With this distinction as a model, Newman’s notion of Catholic faith will be examined first from the point of view of the act of faith. Then we will analyze his understanding of the object of faith.

## THE ACT OF FAITH

### A Real Assent

For Newman, the act of Catholic faith at its deepest level is a real assent to the realities of revelation and not just a notional assent to the abstract propositional statements of the truths of revelation. In the act of faith, the believer assents to the truths of revelation with the reflex awareness that one knows that what one accepts is indeed true. The act of faith is expressed as follows: “I know that the truth that God is One is True,” “I know that the truth that God is Three is true,” and “I know that the Christian belief in the resurrection of Jesus is true.” As an act of certitude, Catholic faith includes a simple assent, accepting the revealed truth, as well as a complex, reflex assent that what one believes is indeed true. From the point of view of the reflex, complex assent, the act of Catholic faith is a notional assent, as are all certitudes. But from the point of view of simple assent, the act of Catholic faith is a real assent.

In *A Grammar of Assent*, Newman goes to great lengths to show that the dogmas of faith, which are notions, can be apprehended really and can be the objects of real assent. In demonstrating this point, he discusses two dogmas (revealed truths), "He [God] is One" and "He [God] is Three."<sup>6</sup> At the end of the discussion of the belief that God is One, Newman concludes that this dogma can indeed be the object of an act of real assent. He writes, "I have wished to trace the process by which the mind arrives, not only at a notional but at an imaginative or real assent to the doctrine that there is One God, that is, an assent made with an apprehension, not only of what the words of the proposition mean, but of the object denoted by them."<sup>7</sup>

In the actual demonstration of this conclusion, Newman focuses on the doctrine of the oneness of God as a natural truth rather than a revealed truth, although he admits that it is both.<sup>8</sup> He outlines his argument for the existence of God from conscience and shows how conscience can lead to an image of God that is vivid, concrete, real, and personal. On the basis of this image of God, one can have a real apprehension of God and make a real assent to God's existence and the oneness of God.<sup>9</sup> It is also clear that the real apprehension and real assent to the natural truth that God is One equally applies to the revealed truth that God is One. For Newman states that the revelation of God in Jesus Christ intensifies the personal realness of our image of the One God. The personal God who is revealed in the Scriptures and in the tradition of the church is even more vivid, concrete, and capable of being an object of real apprehension and real assent.<sup>10</sup>

Newman also thinks, with some qualifications, that the dogma of the Trinity can be the object of real apprehension and real assent. In explaining his position, he makes a distinction between the dogma of the Trinity as a whole and the dogma in its individual parts, its distinct propositions. According to Newman, the doctrine of the Trinity taken as a complex whole, as a mystery, cannot be the object of real apprehension or real assent. His reason is that he does not think that it is possible for the human person to imagine the doctrine as a whole, because the doctrine as a whole is a mystery that transcends our experience.<sup>11</sup> However, Newman states that the individual statements of the doctrine, taken one by one, can be the objects of real apprehension and of real assent.<sup>12</sup> Therefore, for Newman, it is possible to give a real assent to the individual propositions of the Trinity, such as "From the Father is, and ever has been, the Son," "The Father is the One Eternal Personal God," and "The Father is not the Son."<sup>13</sup> In this discussion, Newman seems to be intent on maintaining two principles. One is that the reality of God remains shrouded in mystery and beyond our ability to completely imagine and personally experience in a total way. Newman says that it is a general principle that we know God only in shadows and that we cannot bring those shadows together.<sup>14</sup> We

can, he states, combine the individual truths notionally, but we cannot hold them all together in the imagination.<sup>15</sup> The second principle that Newman wishes to maintain is that the doctrine of the Trinity can be an object of personal faith and devotion.<sup>16</sup> He states that this is demonstrated by the fact that the doctrine of the Trinity has been taught in the creeds and the liturgy throughout the history of the church.<sup>17</sup> The church, in its statements on the Holy Trinity, Newman adds, has fulfilled the maxim "*Lex orandi, lex credendi*" (the law of prayer [liturgy] is the law of belief).<sup>18</sup> His treatment of the doctrines of the "Oneness of God" and of the Trinity support the position that, in his view, the act of faith is a real assent, not simply a notional assent to abstract propositions.

This view that faith is a real assent for Newman is further confirmed by his distinction between religion and theology. When a person gives a real assent to a dogma that is apprehended by the imagination as a real thing, Newman calls this act religion. On the other hand, theology is the act of giving a notional assent to a dogma that is apprehended as an abstract truth of revelation.<sup>19</sup> It is clear that here he intends to distinguish between two modes of assent, a religious assent and a theological assent.<sup>20</sup> However, even though religion and theology are distinct, they are closely related to one another. Newman writes, "every religious man is to a certain extent a theologian, and no theology can start or thrive without the initiative and abiding presence of religion."<sup>21</sup> He adds that religion uses theology and theology uses religion.<sup>22</sup>

Based on Newman's description of this distinction, it becomes evident that the reality of Catholic faith lies at the level of the assent of religion. In the act of religious assent, the truths of revelation are apprehended by the imagination and accepted through a real assent. As has already been pointed out, the moment of the response of Catholic faith, for Newman, is the moment of real assent. Newman states that religion apprehends the realities of revelation for the purpose of devotion.<sup>23</sup> He describes the assent of religion as "vital religion," "believing in God," and "the true reception of the Gospel."<sup>24</sup> On the other hand, when the truths of revelation are apprehended and accepted as notions, they become the objects of theology. Theology, Newman states, apprehends propositions "for the purpose of proof, analysis, comparison, and the like intellectual exercises."<sup>25</sup> The assent of theology is notional, while the religious assent of Catholic faith is a real assent to the realities of divine revelation.

Newman goes on to show that there is no opposition between religion and theology, no antagonism between a personal, living faith and the notional acceptance of dogma. Any opposition that seems to exist between the two is the result of failing to recognize that dogmas can be accepted through a real assent as objects of faith and devotion, as well as being viewed as notions. It is when dogmas are viewed only as abstract notions that they present problems

for personal faith and devotion.<sup>26</sup> For Newman, dogmas serve a twofold purpose. Apprehended and accepted through real assent, they express the realities of revelation that are accepted in faith through the religious imagination, and they become the objects of devotion. Apprehended and accepted as notions, they ascertain and make clear for the believer “the truths on which the religious imagination has to rest.”<sup>27</sup> In light of this second purpose, he thinks that religion is more dependent on theology for its maintenance than theology is on religion. Theology, Newman states, can stand “as a substantive science, though it be without the life of religion.”<sup>28</sup> However, religion, he adds, “cannot maintain its ground at all without theology.”<sup>29</sup> Explaining his basis for this statement, Newman states that knowledge precedes the exercise of the affections,<sup>30</sup> and, in religion, “the imagination and affections should always be under the control of reason.”<sup>31</sup>

Although the distinction between religion and theology is helpful, it does present some problems. For one thing, calling theology an assent can be a little misleading. More properly speaking, theology is the moment of reflecting on that which is accepted through faith and not the moment of assenting to the truths of faith. Theology is reflection, not assent. By speaking of theology as notional assent, Newman's main point seems to be that he wants to show that theology arises out of the intellect. But why call theology an assent, since it really is the moment when the intellect reflects? In speaking of both a religious assent and a theological assent, it seems that Newman is really speaking about two types of faith, a personal faith based on real assent and an intellectual faith based on notional assent. Another problem is that theology appears to be reduced to an abstract science. Based on this distinction, theology is viewed only as reflection on abstract notions and not as reflection on the divine realities themselves. It would seem that theology, as reflection on faith, should be able to be elicited after a real assent as well as after a notional assent. Perhaps, in the context of this distinction, Newman is limiting the notion of theology to dogmatic theology in the Roman and neoscholastic senses. In any case, this analysis of theology does not represent Newman's complete view of this subject. In his book *Personal Catholicism*, Martin Moleski suggests that theology, for Newman, is also a personal form of reflection and reasoning and is not exclusively a notional and deductive science.<sup>32</sup>

### **The Role of Personal Reasoning**

Another consequence of the application of the analogy of human certitude to Catholic faith is the realization that a process of personal reasoning is one of the elements that constitutes the act of faith for Newman. The act of Catholic faith, like human certitude, is an assent that engages the operations of informal

reasoning and the illative sense. As in human certitude, informal reason and the illative sense demonstrate that it is rational for a person, in the act of faith, to accept things that one cannot fully understand and that go beyond the logical force of the available evidence. Also, similar to the assent of human certitude, the reasoning process in the act of faith includes such elements as presumptions, antecedent considerations, antecedent reasons, and the available evidence. This means that in the process of arriving at the certitude of faith in a Catholic sense, the person has to consider the concrete evidences of revelation, such as Scripture and the teaching of the Christian churches throughout history. Such factors as one's openness to revelation, one's moral dispositions, as well as God's revelatory Word and grace also have to be considered. All of these elements are influential factors in the illative sense's evaluation of the accumulation of probabilities and the process of arriving at certitude in the act of Catholic faith.

As a result of the personal and holistic reasoning process, the believer is led to assent to the realities and propositions of revelation. Through this personal reasoning, the mind concludes that the revelation of God in Jesus Christ is true. Confronted with the truth of revelation, the believer's personal reasoning processes are constrained by the evidence, but not logically forced to accept the conclusion. Similar to human certitude, the act of Catholic faith engages reasoning processes that are compatible with the normal operations of the human mind. It does not shut down our reasoning processes. However, the assent of certitude of Catholic faith, as is the case in human certitude, is not the conclusion of a syllogism or the result of a logical demonstration. Formal reasoning does not lead to the assent of faith. The certitude of Catholic faith goes beyond the evidence through the operations of informal reason and the illative sense. The intrinsic force of the evidence does not impersonally compel certitude. What this analysis demonstrates is that, for Newman, the act of faith is reasonable, even though it is not the conclusion of rational process. Faith is "reasonable," but not "reasoned to."

### **The Role of the Will**

According to Newman, the act of Catholic faith is a free act for which the person is responsible. From this it follows that the act of faith also involves the operation of the will. It would seem consistent with Newman's thought to suggest that the will operates in the act of Catholic faith in a way that is similar to the role that it plays in human certitude. Consequently, as in human certitude, the act of Catholic faith is not an arbitrary choice that results from an independent act of the will separate from the reasoning process. In the act of faith, it is not as if the believer, in encountering Christian revelation, comes up against a brick wall and is forced to decide either to accept it or reject it

through an act of the will. It is not as if the informal reasoning process can only go so far, then the will jumps in, and the act of Catholic faith happens. Such an interpretation is voluntarism and reduces faith to nothing more than an arbitrary choice. This is not Newman's understanding.

M. Jamie Ferreira's distinction between the two roles of the will provides a framework for explaining Newman's understanding of how the will operates in the act of Catholic faith. As in human certitude, the act of the will in arriving at the certitude of Catholic faith is distinct from the operation of the will in the affirmation of faith. In the process of arriving at the certitude of faith, the will operates through the dynamics of what Ferreira refers to as "active recognition." As in human certitude, the will in the act of Catholic faith is constrained by the personal rational evaluation of the evidence but is not compelled by it. Therefore, in the act of Catholic faith, the will, constrained but not compelled, actively recognizes the truth of the realities and propositions of the Christian revelation and moves the person to assent. The assent is not forced by the will, but the assent could not be given without or against the will. The will does not operate by adding an independent and arbitrary choice but is involved in an integral and active way in the whole personal process of arriving at the assent of certitude of Catholic faith.

As with human certitude, the will also performs a role in the affirmation of the certitude of Catholic faith. If human certitudes are fragile, this is even truer of the certitude of the act of Catholic faith. Like human certitude, the certitude of Catholic faith can be stifled and given up. As a result, it is necessary for the believer to affirm one's faith. After certitude is reached, the Christian believer, through an act of the will, affirms one's commitment to the acceptance of the truth of the realities and propositions of the Christian revelation. Such an affirmation is necessary if the certitude of the act of Catholic faith is to endure. In this affirmation, the believer personally appropriates the assent of faith and acknowledges that the revelation that is accepted in this act is in fact true. Here the will acts in a deliberate way, moving the person to consciously affirm the certitude of the act of Catholic faith. Following Ferreira's model, this second act of the will in the act of faith can be described as "the deliberate act of intending to believe."<sup>33</sup> When Newman speaks of faith as a free personal choice that involves a total personal commitment to the realities of revelation, he is referring to the role of the will in the affirmation of the certitude of faith.

### **The Role of God's Word: The Formal Object**

In his brief description of the formal object of faith in *A Grammar of Assent*, Newman describes it as the "ground of believing."<sup>34</sup> The believer accepts the realities and propositions of revelation on the basis of God's Word, "because

God has revealed them.”<sup>35</sup> Nothing more is said about the role of the formal object in *A Grammar of Assent*. However, it is clear that, for Newman, the act of Catholic faith cannot be adequately explained without including an analysis of the role of God’s Word, the formal object of faith.

Newman does discuss the formal object of faith in some of his other Catholic writings. In the “1847 Paper on the Certainty of Faith,” he distinguishes between the formal object *quod* (what) and the formal object *quo* (by which). The formal object *quod* is God as the object of faith’s contemplation and the source of revelation’s meaning. The formal object *quo* is God revealing. It is the reason (*ratio formalis*, formal reason) for the certainty of Catholic faith. Newman writes, “faith [Catholic Divine] is certain, because God speaks who cannot lie.”<sup>36</sup> He also discusses the role of the Word of God in the paper “On the Certainty of Faith,” written on December 16, 1853. Newman describes the final step in the act of Catholic faith as the assent of the intellect, being commanded by the will, to the truths of revelation because God has revealed these truths.<sup>37</sup> Here he describes the formal object of faith as the “authority of God revealing.”<sup>38</sup>

For Newman, the formal object of faith is a distinctive and essential element in both the formation and continuance of the act of Catholic faith. The act of faith depends on hearing and accepting the word of the Divine speaker who enables us to grasp in faith God testifying to God’s own revelation.<sup>39</sup>

### The Role of Grace

It is the grace of God that enables the believer to grasp that, in the Christian revelation, God is revealing God’s self and that one is actually encountering God’s Word. Without God’s grace, this realization would not be possible. The importance of the role of God’s Word and God’s grace in the act of Catholic faith cannot be underestimated. According to William Fey, Newman does not intend to say that grace merely lends a supernatural quality to an act that is basically natural. The act of faith is not simply the result of an act of informal inference and the illative sense that has been aided by grace. Fey points out that Newman does not intend to reduce faith to a form of rationalism, even an informal one.<sup>40</sup> The act of faith could not occur simply as a result of a reasoning process. It cannot be created by the will alone. Faith is not simply a human act. The whole process is informed by God’s grace. Since the act of faith cannot occur without the influence of God’s grace, grace, for Newman, is a distinctive element in the act of Catholic faith—distinctive, but not exclusive, for without the personal reasoning process and the act of the will, God’s Word and God’s grace could not produce the act of faith.

Because of his understanding of the relationship between the natural and the supernatural, Newman did not have any difficulty explaining the role of

grace in the act of Catholic faith. Grace permeated the whole process, both the elements that some call natural and those that some designate as supernatural. For Newman, all human relationships with God, including natural religion, are the result of the influence of God's grace. Newman did not think that it was necessary to make a rigid distinction between the moment of God's action and the moment of the human person's action. Grace and the human response could interpenetrate one another at every level. As a result, Newman found it very difficult to explain his understanding of Catholic faith in the categories of Roman theology that held for a more rigid distinction between the natural and the supernatural. In *A Grammar of Assent*, he seems to have decided not to adopt the Roman view of the relationship between the natural and the supernatural in his explanation of Catholic faith. For Newman, the act of faith is not a response in which a person goes so far rationally, and then God jumps in with grace and supernaturalizes the act. Rather, the act of Catholic faith is a total personal response, a form of personal knowledge including informal reasoning, the illative sense, and the operation of the will, which is permeated through and through with the grace of God.

The act of faith for Newman is one integrated act of the person and not a conglomeration of disparate elements. The act of Catholic faith is an act in which all of the elements converge into one total personal response. Although he never uses Paul Tillich's language of faith as a centered act,<sup>41</sup> Newman's understanding of the act of Catholic faith seems to embrace some of the features of this metaphor. The act of Catholic faith is that response from within the center of the person, which follows when all the elements converge together. If any one of the elements is omitted, or if the act of Catholic faith is reduced to any one of its elements, then this results in a distortion of the act of faith. To maintain that the act of faith is simply the result of the illative sense and/or an informal reasoning process is a distortion. To hold that the act of faith is merely an arbitrary act of the will forcing one to accept truths one cannot understand is a distortion. To reduce faith to an act of God imposed on the human person through God's Word and God's grace is also a distortion. To reduce faith to an act of God imposed on the human person through God's Word and God's grace is also a distortion. Since all of the elements form one holistic act, any examination of any one of the individual elements will necessarily include a discussion of its relationship to the other elements.

## THE OBJECT OF FAITH

### The Revelation of God in Jesus Christ

For Newman, the object of Catholic faith is God and the revelation of God in Jesus Christ as concretely expressed in Scripture and the beliefs and practices

of the Catholic Church. The object of Catholic faith is what Newman refers to as the material object of faith, the “*res revelata*,” the things that have been revealed. The object of Catholic faith is not “the fact of a revelation,” which is derived through an investigation of the motives of credibility. This is the object of what Newman calls human faith, “*fides acquisita*.” Also, the object of Catholic faith is not the truths of natural religion, even though these truths prepare the way for the Christian revelation. In Newman’s language of the natural religion/revealed religion distinction, it is the truths of revealed religion, the Judeo-Christian religion, that are the object of the act of Catholic faith. In *A Grammar of Assent*, Newman describes the object of faith in more concrete and personal terms. He writes, “They [the disciples] ‘preached Christ’; they called on men to believe, hope, and place their affections, in that Deliverer who had come and gone.”<sup>42</sup> The main content of this preaching was the “description of the life, character, mission, and power of that Deliverer.”<sup>43</sup> Newman adds that Jesus himself is the “center and fulness of the dispensation.”<sup>44</sup> He speaks of Jesus himself as the “central Image” of faith. It is the thought of Christ, not a corporate body of doctrine, that is the true object of Catholic faith.<sup>45</sup>

### **The Sources of Revelation**

The sources of God’s revelation for Newman are the Scriptures, the Old Testament/Hebrew Bible, and the New Testament, as well as Tradition, the teachings of the Christian churches throughout history. One major source for Newman was the history of Christianity, particularly the early councils of the Church and the writings of the early Greek and Latin fathers of the Church. One cannot fully understand Newman without realizing that his vision of Christian faith and his approach to theology are rooted in the history of Christianity. And, of course, for Newman, the Catholic Church through its teachings and practices plays a central role in transmitting God’s revelation, the object of Catholic faith.

### **Distinction between Realities and Propositions**

In his treatment of the object of faith, Newman makes a distinction between the realities of Christian revelation and the propositions of Christian revelation, which are the various ways in which the realities of revelation are concretely expressed. Although the two can never be separated and are both an integral part of the object of Catholic faith, Newman gives a certain priority to the reality, the thing revealed, over the proposition that expresses the revealed reality. This can be seen from the description of his understanding of

the act of certitude in Catholic faith. As we have seen, the act of Catholic faith at the level of simple assent is a real assent. This means that the actual object of faith is the reality of revelation and not its notional expression. The act of faith goes beyond the notional level of the propositions of revelation to find its true object, which is the experiential encounter with God and the realities of God's revelation. You cannot give a real assent to a notion unless the imagination penetrates the abstraction of the notion and encounters the reality (the thing) that it reveals.

Although Newman does not use this language, it does seem that he makes a distinction between a primary object of faith, the realities of revelation, and a secondary object, the propositional expressions of divine revelation. Such a distinction finds precedence in the Catholic tradition of the theology of faith. Thomas Aquinas distinguished between the primary object of faith, God as First Truth, and the secondary object of faith, those things related to God as First Truth, the propositions of revelation.<sup>46</sup> Some contemporary theologians, such as Avery Dulles, when discussing the object of faith, make a distinction between revelation as God's self-communication and the concrete expressions of revelation.<sup>47</sup> Newman's distinction between these two levels of the object of faith highlights the personalist nature of his understanding of Catholic faith. The act of faith is not simply an intellectual assent to doctrines and dogmas but is a personal and experiential encounter with God and the realities of God's revelation.

## The Role of the Catholic Church

The Catholic nature of the object of faith, for Newman, is grounded in his understanding of the role of the Catholic Church in transmitting the realities and propositions of Christian revelation. For the Catholic, God's Word, the realities of revelation and the concrete expressions of revelation, is encountered and known in and through the mediation of the teaching authority of the Catholic Church. At times, Newman is quite strong in his statements about the role of the Catholic Church in communicating God's revelation. In his work *Discourses Addressed to Mixed Congregations*, published in 1849, Newman states that what the Catholic Church declares is God's Word and is, therefore, true.<sup>48</sup> Newman often speaks of the Catholic Church as the "oracle of God."<sup>49</sup> Because of the gift of infallibility, he goes even further, calling the Catholic Church the "sure oracle of truth" and the "messenger of heaven."<sup>50</sup> His language is even stronger when he expresses his view of the role of the Catholic Church in revelation in *A Grammar of Assent*. "The Word of the Church is the word of revelation. That the [Catholic] Church is the infallible oracle of truth is the fundamental dogma of the Catholic religion."<sup>51</sup> These

statements demonstrate Newman's strong belief in the central role that the Catholic Church plays in the communication of God's revelation. However, as will be seen in the next chapter, they do not mean that Newman totally and completely identifies the Word of God and the teachings of the Catholic Church.

In *A Grammar of Assent*, Newman insists that the object of Catholic faith is the totality of Christian revelation as concretely expressed in the teachings of the Catholic Church. As a result, the Catholic Church expects all Catholics to profess the whole of revelation. This includes not only the concrete and practical propositions, "those bearing on moral content and character,"<sup>52</sup> but "all the canons of the Councils, and innumerable decisions of Popes."<sup>53</sup> Yet, as Newman points out, the propositions of revelation are so numerous and notional that most ordinary believers do not even know about them, much less are they capable of apprehending them.<sup>54</sup> Many of these propositions are known and apprehended only by "professed theologians."<sup>55</sup>

Because the Catholic Church expects all Catholics to accept all the propositions of revelation, even those not known or beyond one's apprehension, Newman says that the Catholic Church is often accused of imposing its teachings on uneducated believers.<sup>56</sup> He does not think that this accusation is valid. According to Newman, the Catholic Church does not really impose dogmatic statements on the interior assent of those who cannot apprehend them.<sup>57</sup> This difficulty, he writes, "is removed by the dogma of the church's infallibility, and of the consequent duty of 'implicit faith' in her word."<sup>58</sup> The first duty of the Catholic is to believe all that God has revealed, the whole deposit of revelation.<sup>59</sup> Even though it is true that one cannot consciously know all the propositions of revelation, a Catholic believer can achieve this acceptance of the whole of revelation through implicit faith. Newman describes the act of implicit faith of the Catholic believer this way: "whether he knows little or much, he has the intention of believing all that there is to believe whenever and as soon as it is brought home to him, if he believes in Revelation at all."<sup>60</sup> This intention, Newman states, is an act of faith, "a believing *implicitē*" (implicitly).<sup>61</sup> A Catholic, in accepting the deposit of revelation, does *implicitē* accept all the propositions of revelation.<sup>62</sup> What guarantees the validity of the act of implicit faith is the Catholic's belief that the church is infallible and, therefore, its teachings are true expressions of God's revelation.<sup>63</sup>

For Newman, this act of implicit faith in which the Catholic believer affirms, "I believe what the Church proposes to be believed," is an act of real assent.<sup>64</sup> This is so because, for Newman, the church is a concrete reality.<sup>65</sup> Through this implicit faith, the Catholic believer, Newman says, "supplements the shortcomings of his knowledge without blunting his real assent to what is elementary, and takes upon himself from the first the whole of reve-

lation.”<sup>66</sup> It is clear from the whole context of this discussion that Newman is not saying that Catholic faith is blind obedience to the magisterium and an uncritical acceptance of the teachings of the church. Newman's point is that, because of the implicit faith of the Catholic believer, the Catholic Church does not need to impose on individual believers those teachings in the deposit of faith that they do not know about and/or that they cannot apprehend. In fact, because of the Catholic believer's implicit faith in the whole of God's revelation, the church can patiently wait as believers, paraphrasing Newman, and progress from one apprehension of the whole truth of revelation to another according to one's opportunities for doing so.<sup>67</sup>

In light of today's tensions between some Catholic believers and the magisterium, Newman's notion of implicit faith and the gradual appropriation of the propositions of revelation offers a healthy balance. The attitude of the Catholic believer toward the teachings of the church is neither “picking and choosing” nor “writing a blank check.” A Catholic from the start commits to the whole of revelation but, throughout the life of faith, personally appropriates particular propositions of revelation as one becomes aware of them and can apprehend them in a personal way. The church does not force believers to accept teachings that they cannot personally apprehend. This appropriation is, of course, always done in relation to the church as the community of faith and the oracle of God's revelation.

This chapter demonstrates how Newman's analogy of human certitude serves as the basic analogy for his Catholic notion of faith. Its purpose has been to draw together the different strands of Newman's Catholic notion of faith in order to present a systematic analysis of his mature notion of Catholic faith. We have focused on his understanding of Catholic faith through an examination of the act of faith and the object of faith. His understanding of the relationship between faith and reason in his mature notion of Catholic faith remains to be discussed. This is the subject matter of the next chapter.

## NOTES

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3. *GA*, 99.
4. *GA*, 99.
5. Paul Tillich, *Dynamics of Faith* (New York: Harper, 1958) 10–11.
6. *GA*, 100.
7. *GA*, 119.

8. GA, 100.
9. GA, 105–18.
10. GA, 118–19.
11. GA, 129–30.
12. GA, 130–31.
13. GA, 135–36.
14. GA, 131.
15. GA, 131.
16. GA, 126–27, 140.
17. GA, 132–35.
18. GA, 135.
19. GA, 98.
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21. GA, 98.
22. GA, 99.
23. GA, 119.
24. GA, 120.
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32. Martin X. Moleski, *Personal Catholicism: The Theological Epistemologies of John Henry Newman and Michael Polanyi* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2000), 118, 134, 154–55.
33. M. Jamie Ferreira, *Doubt and Religious Commitment: The Role of the Will in Newman's Thought* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1980), 75.
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36. Newman, “1847 Paper on Certainty,” 1.
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42. GA, 464.
43. GA, 464.
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45. GA, 465.
46. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, II, II, Q. 1, A. 1 & 2, in *Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas*, ed. Anton C. Pegis (New York: Random House, 1945), Vol. II:1056–57.

47. Avery Dulles, *The Survival of Dogma* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1971), 173–82.
48. *Mixed*, 215.
49. *Mixed*, 215. See also *Apo.*, 228.
50. *Mixed*, 227.
51. *GA*, 153.
52. *GA*, 142.
53. *GA*, 146.
54. *GA*, 146.
55. *GA*, 142.
56. *GA*, 142.
57. *GA*, 150.
58. *GA*, 150.
59. *GA*, 151.
60. *GA*, 152.
61. *GA*, 152.
62. *GA*, 152.
63. *GA*, 153.
64. *GA*, 153.
65. Edward Jeremy Miller, “Review of *Doubt and Religious Commitment: The Role of The Will In Newman’s Thought*, by M. Jamie Ferreira,” *The Thomist* 48, no. 2 (April 1984): 313.
66. *GA*, 153.
67. *GA*, 153.

## *Chapter Five*

# **Faith and Reason in Newman's Mature Notion of Catholic Faith**

As has been seen, the question of the relationship between faith and reason is a major theme that runs through Newman's theology of faith throughout his whole life. In the *University Sermons*, his main concern is to find a way to explain the relationship between faith and reason that would, at one and the same time, preserve the autonomy and distinctiveness of faith as well as its basic compatibility with reason. The main objective of *A Grammar of Assent* is to present a rational justification for the certitude of Catholic faith. Consequently, a comprehensive understanding of Newman's Catholic notion of faith requires an examination of his understanding of the relationship between faith and reason in his mature notion of Catholic faith.

A close examination of Newman's treatment of the relationship between faith and reason reveals that there are three major moments in which faith and reason converge in the act of faith. The first moment is the moment of the process of coming to faith and the role that reason plays in this process, the discussion of the rational evidences for faith. Logically, this moment is before faith and is not yet faith. Yet, psychologically, this moment is the rational preparation for faith and is thereby an integral element in the total personal response of faith. The second moment focuses on the role that reason plays in the actual response of faith itself. This is the actual moment of faith when all the elements in the act of faith converge and the believer personally accepts the realities and truths of the Christian revelation. The third moment is the moment of the exercise of rational criticism within the actual response of faith. The focus of this moment is after faith and during faith and analyzes what forms of rational criticism are contemporaneously compatible with the actual response of faith.

For Newman the response of faith is an act of certitude that involves an unconditional assent to the realities and truths of revelation. At the same time,

the response of faith is compatible with various forms of rational criticism. The assent of faith is not a narrow, dogmatic assent that is closed to all forms of rational criticism. The relationship between faith and reason in the second moment, the role that reason plays in the actual response of faith, was discussed in chapter 4. This chapter focuses on the analysis of Newman's mature Catholic understanding of the relationship between faith and reason in the first moment, the evidences for faith, and the third moment, the role of rational criticism within the response of faith.

### THE EVIDENCES FOR FAITH

When Newman discusses the evidences for faith in the *University Sermons*, he expresses suspicions and raises reservations about the value of the rational scientific arguments for faith that are derived from explicit (formal) reason. In doing so, he expresses a preference for the more personal reasons that are based on implicit (informal) reason. In his early Catholic years, Newman adopted the language of Roman theology and made an effort to integrate some of the logical and scientific arguments of this school into his own approach to the evidences for faith. He made an effort to integrate terms such as *revelatio* (the truths as revealed), *res revelata* (the matter revealed), the speculative judgment of credibility, the practical judgment of credibility, *pia affectio* (holy disposition), and *voluntas credendi* (will to believe) into his theology of faith. Accepting the distinction between the rational investigation of the evidences (human faith) and divine faith, he tried to determine how far reason could go, when reason ended, and when the supernatural act of divine faith began. As we have seen, he encountered some difficulties in his endeavor to correlate his own views on faith and reason with those of Roman theology.

When Newman discusses the evidences for faith in *A Grammar of Assent*, he returns to the approach of the *University Sermons* and develops it more fully. Once again, he expresses suspicions about the scientific arguments of formal reason and indicates a preference for the more personal evidences for faith. In the process, he chooses not to adopt the approach of Roman theology and does not make an effort to integrate it into his treatment of the evidences in *A Grammar of Assent*.

In *A Grammar of Assent*, Newman begins his discussion of the evidences for Christian faith by clearly stating that what he is presenting is his own view on the subject. He does not claim that his approach has universal acceptance or any scientific approval. However, he adds that his view has added weight based on the testimony of those who agree with him.<sup>1</sup> Newman says that his purpose is to apply the principles set down in *A Grammar of Assent* to the

proof of the divine origin of Christianity.<sup>2</sup> More specifically, he states that his objective is to demonstrate the truth of the Christian revelation by showing that “the Gospel Revelation is divine, and that it carries with it the evidences of its divinity.”<sup>3</sup> Christianity, Newman states, is a religion in addition to nature, which means that it is “over and above nature, or supernatural.”<sup>4</sup> Since Christianity is a supernatural religion, it must have evidence that is capable of demonstrating its divine origin. Or, as Newman puts it, Christianity must “bring with it valid testimonials of its right to demand our homage.”<sup>5</sup>

At the outset, Newman indicates that he would prefer not to have his approach labeled as “scientific.” His approach to the evidences does not involve using rational demonstrations to prove logically and rationally the existence of God or attempting to scientifically (through formal reason) demonstrate the fact of revelation. At the same time, he does not altogether deny the validity of the scientific approaches. He says that we should let those who have a gift for scientific demonstrations do them.<sup>6</sup> However, he makes it clear that these scientific approaches are not the ones that he will choose in order to demonstrate the divine origin of Christianity.

An illustration of Newman’s suspicion of the scientific demonstrations can be found in his analysis of William Paley’s approach to the evidences of Christianity. Newman writes that he thinks that Paley’s argument “is clear, clever, and powerful; and there is something which looks like charity in going out into the highways and hedges, and compelling men to come in.”<sup>7</sup> But, as for himself, he states that he does not choose to follow Paley’s approach. Newman gives his reasons: “If I am asked to use Paley’s argument for my own conversion, I say plainly I do not want to be converted by a smart syllogism; if I am asked to convert others by it, I say plainly I do not care to overcome their reason without touching their hearts.”<sup>8</sup> Another reason Newman gives for not using this approach to convert people to Christianity is because he thinks that some exertion on the part of the person to be converted is a condition of true conversion.<sup>9</sup>

Newman’s approach also differs from Paley’s on the use of miracles in demonstrating the divine origin of Christianity. According to Newman, Paley argues that the evidences (credentials) of Christian revelation are “necessarily in their nature miraculous.”<sup>10</sup> While admitting that Christian revelation is attended “with the profession of miracles,”<sup>11</sup> Newman says that the evidences that he is going to draw upon in demonstrating the divine origin of Christianity are “not in themselves miraculous.”<sup>12</sup> Elaborating on his approach, he writes, “I think, then, that the circumstances under which a professed revelation comes to us, may be such as to impress both our reason and our imagination with a sense of its truth, even though no appeal be made to strictly miraculous intervention.”<sup>13</sup> Newman does not deny that there was miraculous intervention in the origin of Christianity. His point, however, seems to be that

he does not use miracles as scientific demonstrations of the truth of Christianity. According to Newman, this miraculous intervention addresses Christians today in the form of “coincidences,” which are indications to the illative sense that God has supernaturally presented God’s self to our apprehension.<sup>14</sup>

In his own approach to the evidences, Newman prefers to use the tools of informal reason and the illative sense. It is more congenial in his judgment to attempt to prove Christianity in the same informal way in which we can prove for certain that we have been born and that we will die someday.<sup>15</sup> According to Newman, certitude on the matter of the divine origin of Christianity can be reached through the accumulation of probabilities, informal reason, and the illative sense. In describing his approach, Newman says that the mind can construct legitimate proof for certitude through the accumulation of probabilities.<sup>16</sup> Also, he states that the validity of the proof is not determined by any scientific test but by the illative sense.<sup>17</sup>

We have already seen how the informal process of reasoning always involves the acceptance of certain assumptions. Therefore, it should not come as a surprise that Newman’s informal demonstration of the divine origin of Christianity requires that the inquirer accept certain presuppositions. To begin with, Newman says that his demonstration is addressed to a specific audience—namely, only to those who accept the principles and beliefs of natural religion. He states his position as follows:

Relying then on these authorities, human and Divine, I have no scruple in beginning the review I shall take of Christianity by professing to consult for those only whose minds are properly prepared for it; and by being prepared, I mean to denote those who are imbued with the religious opinions and sentiments which I have identified with Natural Religion.<sup>18</sup>

Putting it more simply, Newman states, “belief in revealed truths depends on belief in natural.”<sup>19</sup> This also means that those to whom Newman is addressing his argument have to accept some starting principles. In demonstrating the truth of Christianity, he states that everyone must start from the same principles, and those principles are of a personal nature.<sup>20</sup>

Newman mentions some of the principles that must be accepted before one can enter into a discussion of the evidences of Christianity. They include, among others, a belief and a perception of the Divine Presence, a recognition of God’s attributes, a conviction of the worth of the soul, an insight into our guilt and misery, and an eager hope of reconciliation.<sup>21</sup> Newman states that his argument is not addressed to those who hold principles that are contrary to the vision of natural religion. Again, he mentions some of these principles; examples include holding that sin is a bugbear, not a reality; that miracles are impossible; that prayer is a superstition; that fear of God is unmanly; that

sorrow for sin is slavish; that if we do our duties in this life, we may take our chances in the next.<sup>22</sup> These opinions, for Newman, are part of a “system of opinion” that is simply false. And, as he says, he will not argue about Christianity with those who hold these views, “because it is plainly absurd to attempt to prove a second proposition to those who do not admit the first.”<sup>23</sup> By his own admission, his arguments for the divine origin of Christianity would have no appeal to agnostics and unbelievers.

Newman’s demonstration of the evidences for faith is rooted in his understanding of the relationship between natural religion and revealed religion. By “natural religion” he means “the Knowledge of God, of His Will, and of our duties toward Him.”<sup>24</sup> Some of the truths of natural religion are the existence of God, the attributes of God, our responsibility to God, our dependence on God, the prospect of reward and punishment, the doctrine of atonement, and the doctrine of meritorious intercession.<sup>25</sup> Although the truths of natural religion come independently of revealed religion,<sup>26</sup> they are not solely the result of a rational analysis of the world. They are not the result of human effort alone. For Newman, the truths of natural religion are founded on some idea of an “express revelation” that comes from some “unseen religion.”<sup>27</sup> In answering the objection that Oriental religions are older than Christianity, he states that Christianity is only the continuation and conclusion of an earlier revelation, which “may be traced back into prehistoric times, till it is lost in the darkness that hangs over them.”<sup>28</sup> To this he adds, “As far as we know, there never was a time when that revelation was not, a revelation continuous and systematic, with distinct representatives and an orderly succession.”<sup>29</sup>

But the revelation of natural religion is limited and incomplete. For one thing, it is a revelation without credentials, which means that it does not come with adequate evidence of its divine origin.<sup>30</sup> Furthermore, by itself natural religion is a failure; it is deficient and incomplete. “The Religion of Nature is a mere inchoation, and needs a complement.”<sup>31</sup> It creates an anticipation of a further revelation.<sup>32</sup> Natural religion prepares the person to receive revealed religion by creating in the mind an “anticipation” that a further revelation will be given. The very desire for a revelation leads almost automatically to the expectation of a revelation. Once our attention is aroused and we begin to meditate on it, the more probable it becomes that a further revelation “has or will be given to us.”<sup>33</sup>

Since it is incomplete, natural religion needs fulfillment, and it finds that fulfillment in revealed religion. Revealed religion is the Judeo-Christian revelation, which is centered in Jesus Christ and finds its expression in the realities and truths of Catholic faith. In *The Arians of the Fourth Century*, Newman gives a fuller definition of revealed religion. There he defines it as “the doctrine taught in the Mosaic and Christian dispensations, and contained in

the holy Scriptures, and is from God in a sense in which no other doctrine can be said to be from Him.”<sup>34</sup> He states that natural religion can “have but one complement, and that very complement is Christianity.”<sup>35</sup> The remedy for the disease that afflicts humanity is found in the “central doctrine of Revelation, the Mediation of Christ.”<sup>36</sup> Summarizing this view, Newman states, “Revelation begins where Natural Religion fails.”<sup>37</sup> Christianity fulfills and completes natural religion by providing the revelation that natural religion anticipates. Since it finds its fulfillment in revealed religion, natural religion is also seen as a preparation for God’s revelation in Jesus Christ.<sup>38</sup>

A couple of examples of the evidences that Newman presents in *A Grammar of Assent* will illustrate his approach to demonstrating the divine origin of the Christian revelation. One of the strongest evidences for Newman is the fact that Christianity can be demonstrated to be the fulfillment of the prophecies that God made to the Hebrew people in the Old Testament. In his analysis, he discusses how the Christian revelation both fulfills and goes beyond the Jewish prophecies.<sup>39</sup> He points to the universality of the Christian revelation as another example of the evidence for the divine origin of Christianity. Jesus, Newman maintains, intended to found a universal religion “directed to the benefit of the whole human race,”<sup>40</sup> whereas other religions—Islam, for instance—do not.<sup>41</sup>

Another example of the evidence for Christianity is found in the historical rise and establishment of Christianity. Newman analyzes Gibbon’s five historical causes for the rise and establishment of Christianity and concludes by stating that none of these historical causes are sufficient to explain the rise of Christianity.<sup>42</sup> The only satisfactory explanation is a supernatural one—namely, the image of Jesus. Newman states that it is the image of Jesus Christ that creates faith.<sup>43</sup> The image of Christ is the principle of conversion and fellowship.<sup>44</sup> In his *Letters and Diaries*, he speaks of the extraordinary conversion of the Roman Empire as “the most supernatural event in the history of Christianity”<sup>45</sup> and as “our main proof of the divinity of the gospel now.”<sup>46</sup> He also cites the witness of the early Christian martyrs as evidence for Christianity. In a remarkable and expertly written treatment, Newman recounts the history of those early Christian women and men who suffered and died for the faith.<sup>47</sup>

For Newman, these are examples of the proofs that might be presented to demonstrate the divine origin of Christianity. As he puts it, they are “specimens, among the many which might be given, of the arguments adducible for Christianity.”<sup>48</sup> These types of evidence address the minds of persons both through the intellect and through the imagination, “creating a certitude of its truth by arguments too various for direct enumeration, too personal and deep for words, too powerful and concurrent for refutation.”<sup>49</sup> In this process, Newman says, reason does not have to come first and faith second, though,

he adds, this is the logical order.<sup>50</sup> Serving as both object and proof, the Christian revelation elicits one complex act of both inference and assent. The personal nature of this informal process of reasoning is evident. He states that the Christian revelation “speaks to us one by one, and is received by us one by one, as the counterpart, so to say, of ourselves, and is real as we are real.”<sup>51</sup> The examination of the evidences through the informal reasoning process elicits a personal act of certitude that accepts Christian revelation as (1) coming from God, (2) being divine in origin, but (3) being a divine revelation that brings with it the credentials of its divine origin.

Newman’s choice not to employ the scientific demonstrations and to present a more personal approach means that he decided in *A Grammar of Assent* not to adopt the approach of Roman theology as his own. The Roman School used miracles and other signs to scientifically demonstrate the fact of a divine revelation. It spoke about motives of credibility and motives of credendity. In the process of coming to faith, this approach attempted to determine precisely when reason ended and faith began. Newman no longer seems to be concerned with any of these things. He correctly recognizes that there can be more than one Catholic approach to the evidences for Christian faith. He does not reject the validity of the approach of the Roman School of theology. Rather, he prefers to present an approach to the evidences for Christianity that employs a more informal and personalist form of reasoning.

### THE ROLE OF RATIONAL CRITICISM

When Newman employs the language and dynamics of human certitude to describe the response of faith, it is important to remember that he is using an analogy. This means that, in some ways, the response of Catholic faith is similar to the act of human certitude, but it also means that, in other ways, the response of Catholic faith is different from that of human certitude. As a result, on the one hand, the commitment of the act of Catholic faith is immune to certain forms of rational criticism. The act of faith includes an unconditional acceptance of and commitment to the realities and truths of revelation. As a certitude, faith possesses the assurance that one knows that what one assents to is true. Furthermore, as a response based on the grace of God, the assent of Catholic faith involves an affirmation that is distinct from the assent of human certitude. On the other hand, the assent of Catholic faith is a rational act that operates according to the processes of evidence and informal reason. In order to be fully human and rational, the assent of faith must be open to certain forms of rational criticism. The focus of the question of the role of rational criticism in faith becomes one of delineating in what areas faith is immune to rational criticism and in what areas it is susceptible to rational criticism.

In describing the certitude of Catholic faith, Newman does, at times, speak about the preeminence of the assent of faith. He often describes the certitude of Catholic faith as greater and superior to all human certitudes. The assent of faith requires an affirmation over and above the affirmation involved in human certitude. In the discourse on "Faith and Doubt," he describes the certitude of Catholic faith as greater than any other certainty.<sup>52</sup> He says that the certitude of faith has the highest degree of certainty, one that excludes fear as well as doubt.<sup>53</sup> In the "Thesis de Fide," Newman describes the certitude of Catholic faith as an "absolute and perfect" certitude.<sup>54</sup>

Newman bases this position on the unique and distinctive role that grace plays in the certitude of Catholic faith. Although the certitude of Catholic faith follows the process of informal reason, it is not based exclusively on the results of the rational process. Ultimately, the certitude of Catholic faith is based "solely on the fact that God, the Eternal Truth who cannot deceive nor be deceived, has spoken."<sup>55</sup> What enables the believer to accept the realities and truths of revelation with absolute certitude is none other than the fact that they have the guarantee that they have been revealed by the infallible Word of God. It is evident that, for Newman, Catholic faith is supernatural and cannot exist without its formal object, the authority of the Word of God revealing.<sup>56</sup> The assent of Catholic faith is not a "mere act of our own which we are free to exert when we will," but it is "quite distinct from an exercise of reason" and is "wrought in the mind by the grace of God, and by it alone."<sup>57</sup>

Perhaps Newman's most definitive statement on the preeminence of the certitude of Catholic faith is found in *A Grammar of Assent*. Here he states that Catholic faith is superior to human faith not merely in degree of assent but in nature and kind, so that the two do not admit of being compared to one another.<sup>58</sup> To this he adds, "[I]n the assent which follows on a divine announcement, and is vivified by a divine grace, there is, from the nature of the case, a transcendent adhesion of mind, intellectual and moral, and a special self-protection, beyond the operation of the ordinary laws of thought."<sup>59</sup>

M. Jamie Ferreira rejects this analysis of Newman's position on the preeminence of the certitude of Catholic faith. She does not think that the affirmation of divine faith requires an affirmation over and above the affirmation of human certitude. According to Ferreira, the adherence involved in divine faith is basically the same ("not significantly different from,"<sup>60</sup> "significantly similar to in relevant aspects"<sup>61</sup>) as the adherence involved in human faith. She thinks that the distinctiveness of divine faith can be explained on the grounds that it is an affirmation made through grace, the Word of God revealing, and human faith is not. The operation of grace explains the distinctiveness of Catholic faith without maintaining that Catholic faith requires an affirmation over and above the affirmation of human faith.<sup>62</sup> Based on this interpretation, Ferreira maintains that the type of rational criticism involved in

human faith and divine faith are coextensive.<sup>63</sup> Ferreira's position is based on her interpretation of Newman's understanding of the relationship between human faith and divine faith. Ferreira maintains that human faith and divine faith have the same material object and are distinct only on the basis of their formal objects. However, the inadequacies of this view were pointed out in chapter 2, where it was demonstrated that Newman distinguishes human faith and divine faith on the basis of both their material and formal objects.

Ferreira's misinterpretation of Newman's understanding of the relationship between human faith and divine faith and his own strong statements on the preeminence of divine faith suggests that Newman did maintain that the affirmation of Catholic faith involved an affirmation over and above the affirmation of human certitude. Consequently, one cannot conclude that Newman thought that all the forms of rational criticism that are compatible with human certitude are also compatible with Catholic faith. According to Newman, some forms of rational criticism are incompatible with the assent of Catholic faith, and some forms are compatible with it.

## FORMS OF RATIONAL CRITICISM INCOMPATIBLE WITH FAITH

### Faith and Doubt

The assent of Catholic faith, like all certitudes, is incompatible with doubt. The doubt that is incompatible with faith is the doubt that Newman defines in *A Grammar of Assent* as the suspension of the mind. Again, as he states in *A Grammar of Assent*, he is not ruling out the possibility of doubt. His position is that an actual doubt is not compatible with the assent of Catholic faith. A believer cannot at one and the same time make an assent of certitude to the doctrine of the Trinity and doubt the truth of that doctrine.

In two of the discourses in the work *Discourses Addressed to Mixed Congregations*, Newman describes Catholic faith as an assent that excludes all doubt. In the discourse "Faith and Private Judgement," he asserts that in the assent of Catholic faith, a person "has no doubt at all."<sup>64</sup> The whole purpose of the second discourse, "Faith and Doubt," is to demonstrate that the assent of Catholic faith is incompatible with doubt.<sup>65</sup> It is clear that in this discourse he understands doubt as the suspension of assent and that doubt is excluded from the assent of Catholic faith on the same grounds that it is excluded in all human certitudes. However, the focus of his rejection of doubt is that he sees it as a form of disbelief. If a believer were allowed to doubt, that would be like allowing the believer to disbelieve what one holds to be an eternal truth. To have a doubt about a truth of faith is not to believe it, and, therefore, when

one is in the state of doubt, one does not have faith.<sup>66</sup> According to Newman, in this discourse, doubt is equivalent to the loss of faith.<sup>67</sup>

The exclusion of doubt in Catholic faith is also supported by the fact that the doctrines of Catholic faith are guaranteed to be true on the basis of the infallible teaching of the Catholic Church. Newman writes in the discourse "Faith and Private Judgement," "No one can doubt whether a word spoken by God is to be believed."<sup>68</sup> In the discourse "Faith and Doubt," Newman argues that, given the prerogatives stated earlier (the authority of the Word of God and the infallible church), there should be no wonder that the Catholic Church does not allow its believers to doubt.<sup>69</sup> The real wonder is how a Catholic could actually doubt. Newman states in this same discourse that faith for a Catholic is easy; the difficult thing is for a Catholic to doubt. This is because the Catholic has received a gift that makes faith easy; therefore, a Catholic does violence to one's mind not by believing but by withholding faith.<sup>70</sup>

Although Newman does exclude doubt from faith in his mature understanding of Catholic faith, as an Anglican he sometimes spoke as if he believed that faith and doubt could be compatible. In the 1837 edition of the *Via Media*, he writes that "doubt in some way or measure may even be said to be implied in a Christian's faith."<sup>71</sup> Again in the *Via Media*, he writes, "We, for our part, have been taught to consider that in its degree faith, as well as conduct, must be guided by probabilities, and that doubt is ever our portion in this life."<sup>72</sup> In the 1839 university sermon "The Nature of Faith in Relation to Reason," Newman states, "we are given absolute certainty in nothing,"<sup>73</sup> adding that "we must in all things choose between doubt and inactivity."<sup>74</sup>

Do such statements mean that Newman changed his mind on the relationship between faith and doubt when he became a Catholic? Philip Flanagan, who maintains that Newman as an Anglican during the *Via Media* period considered faith to be compatible with doubt, seems to think that he did.<sup>75</sup> M. Jamie Ferreira also seems to support this view when she writes that Newman "clearly saw a need at the later date for a different understanding, or at least a different formulation, of the relationship between faith and doubt."<sup>76</sup> However, Newman himself does not think that he changed his mind. When, as a Catholic, he published new editions of the *Via Media* (1877) and the *University Sermons* (1871), he added emendations with the purpose of demonstrating that his earlier Anglican statements on faith and doubt were really compatible with his mature Catholic understanding.<sup>77</sup>

Even though Newman says that he did not change his mind, his Anglican statements, when read without the later emendations, certainly have a different tone and emphasis than his Catholic statements on faith and doubt. As an Anglican, he is more willing to discuss the dark side of faith, its obscurity, its uncertainty, its need to venture. As a Catholic, he places more emphasis on the certitude of faith and the firmness and security of its assent. To some

extent, this is demonstrated in his own life. Newman's Anglican notion of faith did not prevent him from doubting the status of the Anglican Church. In the *Apologia*, he describes himself as being "in a state of doubt" during his last two years as an Anglican.<sup>78</sup> However, on becoming a Catholic, it appears that Newman saw himself as being released from doubts. Again in the *Apologia*, he states that since becoming a Catholic, "I never have had one doubt."<sup>79</sup>

In addition, there is evidence that Newman saw the exclusion of doubt and fear as a unique characteristic of Catholic faith. In "Papers of 1853 on the Certainty of Faith," Newman contrasts Catholic faith with Protestant faith. What distinguishes the two is that Catholic faith is an assent of certitude that excludes doubt and fear, whereas Protestants say "that no religious truth or fact can have a certainty of this kind."<sup>80</sup>

Whatever the final resolution of the issue on whether Newman changed his mind on his position on faith and doubt, it is clear that, as a Catholic, he placed much more emphasis on the certitude of faith and the steadfastness of faith in the face of doubts and fears. Sometimes Newman's Catholic protestations against doubt seem a little exaggerated. Perhaps some of this strong rhetoric is a reflection of his efforts to demonstrate that his view of faith is compatible with that of Roman theology.

## Inquiry

Another form of rational criticism that is incompatible with the assent of Catholic faith is what Newman calls inquiry. *Inquiry* is the reasoning process involved in the search for truth. It is the mental state of suspending assent to a given proposition, while one is engaged in the process of reasoning, in order to determine whether the proposition is true or false. Consequently, when one is inquiring, one has actually suspended assent and is in the state of doubt. "He who inquires has not found; he is in doubt where the truth lies, and wishes his present profession either proved or disproved."<sup>81</sup> As a state of doubt, inquiry is incompatible with both simple assent and the complex, reflex assent of certitude.

Since it is a certitude, the assent of Catholic faith is incompatible with inquiry. In *A Grammar of Assent*, Newman states that a Catholic cannot be allowed to inquire into the truth of the creed, for if one did, then one would no longer be a believer.<sup>82</sup> As soon as one begins to inquire, one has ceased to be a Catholic. Newman also discusses inquiry in the discourse on "Faith and Doubt." Here, he bases the Catholic Church's prohibition against inquiry on the church's claim to be infallible. In fact, only the Catholic Church can forbid its members further inquiry, since it alone makes the claim to be infallible. No other religious body has the right to make the demand of forbidding

inquiry because no other church claims to be infallible.<sup>83</sup> According to Newman, the sects even go so far as to call on their followers to inquire and doubt freely about the merits of their own religion.<sup>84</sup> From statements such as these, it appears that Newman also sees the prohibition against inquiry as one of the distinctive features of Catholic faith.

### **Indefectibility**

Catholic faith possesses the quality of indefectibility that provides the believer with the assurance that one's assent to the essential truths of faith will endure. This implies that faith is immune to those forms of rational criticism that weaken the permanency of the certitude of Catholic faith. That Newman wants to ascribe the characteristic of indefectibility to Catholic faith is clear. However, the precise meaning of this characteristic is complicated by the ambiguity of Newman's description of indefectibility. On the one hand, indefectibility guarantees that the certitudes (like faith) will persist and endure. It describes the permanent aspect of certitudes pointing out that they are irreversible and cannot fail or be lost. On the other hand, Newman states that indefectibility is a general rule, not an absolute. He goes on to admit that sometimes certitudes do fail and we change our beliefs.

In reflecting on this ambiguity, Ferreira offers four possible ways of resolving the apparent inconsistencies in Newman's analysis of indefectibility. One possibility would be to simply note the contradiction and leave it at that, claiming that it is impossible to decide between the two conflicting positions. Second, it is possible to argue that, in spite of his vacillation, Newman is for other reasons committed to the indefectibility of certitude. Third, one could argue that Newman's continual qualifications of indefectibility effectively dissolve the claim altogether.<sup>85</sup> Finally, Ferreira offers her own interpretation. She thinks that there are two conflicting strands in Newman's writings, one on the indefectibility of certitude and one on the defectibility of certitude.<sup>86</sup> According to Ferreira, the characteristic of indefectibility means that certitudes are beyond rational criticism. She believes that Newman's acceptance of the defectibility of certitudes is necessary if certitudes are to be subject to rational criticism.<sup>87</sup>

However, it is not necessary to postulate the existence of a defectibility strand in Newman's thought in order to admit that certitudes are subject to some forms of rational criticism. Although it is true that indefectibility does mean that certitudes are immune to certain forms of rational criticism, like inquiry, it does not mean that they are immune to all types of criticism, like investigation. If this is the case, it is possible to hold that, in spite of his vacillations, Newman remained committed to the indefectibility of certitude for

important reasons (a position similar to Ferreira's second possibility). According to his definition of certitude, all certitudes ought to be indefectible because they bring us knowledge that is objectively true. However, Newman was honest enough to admit that, since in matters of human knowledge we have no absolute criteria for determining objective truth, some human certitudes do fail. Yet, in spite of this admission, in *A Grammar of Assent*, Newman makes an effort to answer many of the objections that are raised against the indefectibility of certitude.<sup>88</sup> Newman himself seems to think that he adequately answers the objections to the indefectibility of certitude. He writes, "Still, I have gone a good way, as I think, to remove the objections to the doctrine of the indefectibility of certitude in matters of religion, though I cannot assign to it an infallible token."<sup>89</sup> Statements such as this confirm Newman's commitment to the indefectibility of certitude, particularly in matters of religion, such as the certitude of the assent of Catholic faith.

In spite of the limits of indefectibility in human certitude, Newman does intend to include it as one of the characteristics of Catholic faith. In fact, one of the reasons Newman wants to preserve the characteristic of indefectibility is because he views it as necessary and important for the religious certitude of Christian faith. "Certitude is then essential to the Christian; and if he is to persevere to the end, his certitude must include in it a principle of persistence."<sup>90</sup> According to Newman, indefectibility is a necessary condition for a vital Christian faith. If one is to lead a life totally devoted and committed to the truths of Christian faith, then one must have the assurance of knowing that the truths of revelation are true and the conviction that one's certitude will endure and last. If the believer feels that faith can be lost at any moment, then he or she will not be able to make the total commitment that is necessary for living Christian faith.<sup>91</sup> Newman goes on to state that the Christian believer has an indefectible certitude in primary truths and that these primary truths are found in the Catholic Church, even though its claim to possess them is not universally acknowledged.<sup>92</sup>

Because of the preeminence of the certitude of Catholic faith, it has even a stronger claim to indefectibility than human certitude. In human certitude, there is no objective test that enables one to distinguish between true and false certitudes. Catholic faith contains within itself the guarantee that the truths of faith are objectively true because they have been revealed by the Word of God in and through the infallible teaching authority of the Catholic Church. In Catholic faith, the believer has an absolute assurance that the truths of faith are objectively true. Therefore, for Newman the certitude of Catholic faith is analogous to those human certitudes that do not fail rather than to those that do fail. Yet, it still must be remembered that Newman does not equate indefectibility with infallibility. The indefectibility of certitude of Catholic faith does not mean that the believer possesses a personal infallibility.<sup>93</sup>

## FORMS OF RATIONAL CRITICISM COMPATIBLE WITH FAITH

Given the preeminence of the certitude of Catholic faith, its immunity to the forms of criticism included in doubt and inquiry, and its quality of indefectibility, it might appear that Catholic faith is actually beyond rational criticism and is a form of dogmatism that requires a rebellion against reason in order to maintain itself. One of the main elements that contributes to this impression is the Catholic belief that the church possesses an infallible teaching authority. If an infallible teaching authority that speaks the Word of God guarantees the truths of Catholic faith, then is there really any room for rational criticism in the assent of Catholic faith?

In the *Development of Doctrine*, Newman clearly affirms that infallibility does not destroy rational criticism, free will, or responsibility.<sup>94</sup> He also raises the question of whether infallibility destroys the independence of the mind or the energy of the Catholic intellect in the *Apologia*. In answering this question, he responds with an emphatic no and goes on to argue that his negative answer is supported by the whole history of theology, as well as by the whole history of the church.<sup>95</sup> Infallibility does not reduce Christianity to a form of religious absolutism but allows for private judgment so that authority and private judgment are held in balance, “alternately advancing and retreating as the ebb and flow of the tide.”<sup>96</sup> So, the doctrine of infallibility does not close off faith to all forms of rational criticism. A further examination of Newman’s understanding of infallibility will show that he does maintain that some forms of rational criticism are compatible with the certitude of Catholic faith.

### Infallibility

Although before the First Vatican Council Newman had opposed the definition of infallibility as unnecessary and inexpedient, in the *Letter to the Duke of Norfolk*, he supports the definition of infallibility that was promulgated at that council in 1870. In this letter, he discusses infallibility in terms of its context, conditions, and limitations. He also makes a distinction between the infallible and noninfallible teachings of the church and the nature of the assent commanded by each.

Newman begins his discussion of infallibility by pointing out that the pope has the same infallibility as the church.<sup>97</sup> This means that the infallibility of the pope must be understood as an exercise of the infallibility that is given to the church as a whole. As a result, there are certain limitations placed on the infallibility of the pope. Newman summarizes the four conditions that are necessary for the exercise of papal infallibility as set forth by the council: The pope must speak, first, as the “Universal Teacher”; second, in the name and with the authority of the apostles; third, on a point of faith and morals; and

fourth, with the purpose of binding every member of the church to accept and believe his decision.<sup>98</sup>

In discussing the limitations of infallibility Newman points out that infallibility, either that of the church as a whole or that of the pope, is exercised principally and solely in two channels—namely, in direct statements of truth and in the condemnation of error.<sup>99</sup> Quoting the Roman theologian Billuart, he says that the pope is not infallible in conversation, in discussion, in consulting, in interpreting Scripture or the early Christian writers, in giving reasons for the point that he has defined, in private deliberations, or in setting forth his own opinion.<sup>100</sup> In fact, Newman points out that exercises of infallibility, by either a pope or a council, are rare occurrences. “[A]nd this is confessed by all sober theologians,” he adds.<sup>101</sup> Newman also warns against extending infallibility to statements that are not infallible. He writes, “What is the use of dragging in the infallibility in connexion [*sic*] with Papal acts with which it has nothing to do.”<sup>102</sup>

Newman also cautions against identifying the teaching authority of the pope with the authority of those in the Roman Curia who assist the pope. In the *Letter to the Duke of Norfolk*, he maintains that the *Syllabus of Errors* was not an infallible document, because it did not come directly from the pope but was compiled by some unknown member of the Roman Curia.<sup>103</sup> Gladstone, in his expostulation, had connected the *Syllabus of Errors* with Pius IX’s encyclical *Quanta Cura* (How Much Care) and claimed that the errors listed in the *Syllabus of Errors* came under the infallible teaching authority of the pope. Newman responded by calling this an “untenable assertion” and pointed out that the *Syllabus* was simply an index of the pope’s condemnations.<sup>104</sup> Therefore, he states, “we can no more accept it as *de fide* [a matter of faith], as a dogmatic document, than other index or table of contents.”<sup>105</sup> He goes on to distinguish between the teaching authority of the pope and those around him. He says that he would accept the *Syllabus of Errors* if the pope bade him to do so, but the pope has not done so, “and he cannot delegate his *Magisterium* to another.”<sup>106</sup> To this he adds, “I assent to that which the Pope propounds in faith and morals, but it must be he speaking officially, personally, and immediately and not any one else, who has hold over me.”<sup>107</sup> Newman goes on to warn against the excessive claims about the teaching authority of the pope that are often made by “those near, or with access, to the Holy Father.”<sup>108</sup> As a result, the pope’s acts and his words on doctrinal subjects “must be carefully scrutinized and weighed, before we can be sure what really he has said.”<sup>109</sup> Claims of infallibility do not always turn out to be what they are said to be.<sup>110</sup>

Newman also realized that even though statements of religious truths, including infallible ones, were true, they were only partial expressions of a truth. Edward Jeremy Miller refers to this as Newman’s “principle of dispro-

portion.”<sup>111</sup> Infallibility only guarantees that the aspect of a religious truth that is explicitly defined is free from error. Newman says that infallibility extends only to the direct answer to the question that is being considered<sup>112</sup> and not to the prefaces or the introductions to the definitions.<sup>113</sup> In a letter to Alfred Plummer on April 3, 1871, he writes that a doctrine can be infallible even if “the grounds suggested for it in the definition, the texts, the patristic authorities, the historical passages, are all mistakes.”<sup>114</sup> As a result, there are many elements of an infallibly defined religious truth, which are open to debate and in which there is legitimate freedom for speculation.

Another aspect of Newman’s view of infallibility that is significant for the role of rational criticism in Catholic faith is that Newman holds that the exercise of infallibility, by either a council or the pope, must be subordinate to revelation as contained in the deposit of faith. In the *Apologia*, he insists that infallibility must be guided by Scripture and tradition.<sup>115</sup> When discussing the limitations of infallibility in the *Letter to the Duke of Norfolk*, he argues that an infallible proposition has no claim on the Catholic believer unless it is referable to the Apostolic *depositum* (deposit of faith), through the channel of either Scripture or tradition.<sup>116</sup> Toward the end of the *Letter to the Duke of Norfolk*, Newman cites a quotation from a pastoral letter of the Swiss bishops (a pastoral that has received the pope’s approbation, according to Newman) on the limitation of the power of the papacy.

He [the pope] is tied up and limited to the divine revelation, and to the truths which that revelation contains. He is tied up and limited by the Creeds, already in existence, and by preceding definitions of the Church. He is tied up and limited by the divine law, and by the constitution of the Church.<sup>117</sup>

What this statement suggests is that Newman made a distinction between revelation (the deposit of faith) and the church’s authoritative, even infallible, expressions of that revelation. The church is the infallible oracle of God’s revelation, but the church is not completely identified with the Word of God. The consequences of such a distinction for the place of rational criticism within Catholic faith is immensely significant. For if one makes such a distinction, it cannot be claimed that one owes the same type of assent to the teachings of the church, including infallible ones, that one owes to the Word of God. The distinction provides a whole range of areas in which rational criticism can be applied to the concrete teachings of the church, whether they are infallible or not.

### **Noninfallible Teachings**

In the *Letter to the Duke of Norfolk*, Newman also discusses the noninfallible teachings of the church. As a general rule, Newman says, Catholics do have

a responsibility to accept the noninfallible doctrines of the church, and he defends this statement on the grounds of the believer's duty to give obedience to the church.<sup>118</sup> However, he argues that this obedience does not make Catholics slaves to the pope.<sup>119</sup> When conflicts occur between the church and the state, Newman says that in some cases Catholics should obey the pope and disobey the state, but, in other cases, Catholics should obey the state, even if it means disobeying the pope.<sup>120</sup> Neither the pope nor the queen can demand absolute obedience. To do so, he states, would be a transgression of the laws of human nature and human society. "I give an absolute obedience to neither."<sup>121</sup>

In the next section of the *Letter to the Duke of Norfolk*, which contains a discussion on conscience, Newman draws out more clearly the implications of these remarks. He writes, "It seems, then, that there are extreme cases in which Conscience may come into collision with the word of a Pope, and is to be followed in spite of that word."<sup>122</sup> Newman makes it clear that he is applying this principle only to the noninfallible teachings of the pope. Conscience cannot come into direct conflict with the church's or the pope's infallibility.<sup>123</sup> If the pope were to speak against conscience, in the true sense of the word, Newman writes, he would be committing a suicidal act.<sup>124</sup> On the other hand, if a believer acts against his or her conscience, he or she is in danger of losing one's soul.<sup>125</sup> Newman concludes this discussion with his celebrated toast: "Certainly, if I am obliged to bring religion into after-dinner toasts, . . . I shall drink to the Pope, if you please, still, to Conscience first, and to the Pope afterwards."<sup>126</sup>

What this analysis shows is that, in his understanding of the Catholic believer's response to the statements of the teaching authority of the church, the magisterium, Newman combines the respectful obedience of faith with a critical consciousness. Infallible statements have a special role to play in the transmission of the Christian message. They are expressions of revealed truths that are guaranteed by the Word of God and the teaching authority of the Catholic Church. The believer also has a responsibility in faith to accept the noninfallible teachings of the church. Yet, if there is a conflict between conscience and a noninfallible teaching, Newman gives the priority to conscience.

However, for Newman, all statements of the magisterium, whether infallible or noninfallible, are open to various forms of rational criticism. He insists that it is within the competence of the *Schola Theologorum* (schools of theology) to determine the force of conciliar and papal statements, and the exact interpretation of such texts often takes time.<sup>127</sup> The study of magisterial texts demands willingness to make scientific distinctions and involves the application of the traditional canons of interpretation. Some of the tools of interpretation that Newman mentions include history, Scripture and tradition, the ecclesiastical sense, and a subtle ratiocinative power.<sup>128</sup> Arthur Burton Calkins

points out that in the development of the *Letter to the Duke of Norfolk*, Newman follows such a hermeneutic by first determining the principles to be used in specific cases and then applying them in a rigorous and nuanced manner.<sup>129</sup>

## Investigation

One of the specific forms of rational criticism that Newman explicitly maintains is compatible with the assent of Catholic faith is what he calls investigation. *Investigation* is the rational process of examining the grounds for the truth of a proposition to which we are giving assent. It is the rational act of trying to prove what we already hold to be true.<sup>130</sup> We are moved to do this for various reasons—to convince someone who disagrees with us on a given point, to ascertain the producible evidence in favor of a proposition, to fulfill what is due to ourselves and to the claims and responsibilities of our own education and social status.<sup>131</sup> What is distinctive about investigation is that throughout the whole process, the believer continues to assent to the proposition he or she is investigating and never doubts its truth.<sup>132</sup>

In *A Grammar of Assent*, Newman says that investigation can be compatible with faith, because investigation, unlike inquiry, does not imply doubt.<sup>133</sup> Since investigation does not include doubt, the believer can both assent to the realities and truths of revelation and raise questions about them. Catholics, Newman writes, may assent to a doctrine and “without inconsistency investigate its credibility, though they [Catholics] cannot literally inquire about its truth.”<sup>134</sup> Newman describes investigation as a trial of our intellect and a law of our nature that is necessary for a person’s growth from the childhood to adult stage and for one’s spiritual growth.<sup>135</sup> He adds that, for educated individuals, investigation into the “argumentative proof of things to which they have given assent, is an obligation, or rather a necessity.”<sup>136</sup> So, for Newman, investigation is an integral part of the structure of Catholic faith.

## Theology

Theology is a form of investigation for Newman. In the *Development of Doctrine*, he defines *theology* as the scientific analysis of revealed truth.<sup>137</sup> Theology is a form of questioning that is compatible with the “fullest and most absolute faith.”<sup>138</sup> In theology, reason serves faith by handling, examining, explaining, recording, cataloging, and defending the truths of faith. Reason also provides intellectual forms of expression for the truths of faith; elicits what is implicit; compares, measures, and connects revealed truths with one another, forming them into one theological system.<sup>139</sup> According to Newman, Scripture supports this form of investigation, and Mary provides us with a

model of this spirit of inquisitiveness in faith. She “kept these things and pondered them in her heart” (Luke 2:51). Newman adds that Jesus himself does not countenance a blind unthinking faith, what he calls “lightness of mind.”<sup>140</sup> Jesus called on his disciples to use reason and to submit to it.<sup>141</sup>

### Freedom of Thought

Finally, Newman was a strong supporter of one of those elements that is indispensable to the exercise of rational criticism within Catholic faith: freedom of thought. Miller presents a very convincing case for the thesis that Newman was a strong advocate of freedom of thought within the church.<sup>142</sup> One of the factors that enabled Newman to be such a strong advocate of freedom of thought within the church was his trust in the power of truth. He felt that essentially truth could never contradict itself and that, in the apparent conflicts of truth within history, truth would eventually win out.

Newman has a ready formula to handle the apparent conflicts between human truths and the revealed truths of faith. Speaking of the Catholic believer, he writes:

He [the Catholic believer] is sure that nothing shall make him doubt, that if anything seems to be proved by astronomer, or geologist, or chronologist, or antiquarian, or ethnologist, in contradiction to the dogmas of faith, that point will eventually turn out, first, *not* be *proved*, or secondly, not *contradictory*, or thirdly, not contradictory to any thing *really* revealed, but to something which has been confused with revelation.<sup>143</sup>

Newman’s belief in the power of truth is such that he believes that freedom to pursue the truth should be allowed even if it sometimes results in error. “Error may flourish for a time, but Truth will prevail in the end. The only effect of error ultimately is to promote truth.”<sup>144</sup> He also states that there “is no intellectual triumph of any truth of religion which has not been preceded by a full statement of what can be said against it.”<sup>145</sup> According to Newman, a true faith is secure and confident and does not fear what the other sciences present as truth.

I say, then, he who believes in Revelation which is the prerogative of a Catholic, is not the nervous creature who startles at every sudden sound, and is fluttered by every strange or novel appearance which meets his eyes. He has no sort of apprehension, he laughs at the idea that any thing can be discovered by any other scientific method, which can contradict any of the dogmas of religion.<sup>146</sup>

Newman’s faith in the power of truth is such that he can state that the church does not have to put down error by the “arm of force” or the “prohibition of

inquiry.”<sup>147</sup> His approach to freedom of thought can be summarized in the often quoted statement “Great minds need elbowroom. . . . And so indeed do lesser minds, and all minds.”<sup>148</sup>

## NOTES

1. *GA*, 385–86.
2. *GA*, 491.
3. *GA*, 386. Newman adds here that both attributes need to be united, because it is possible that a “revelation might have been really given, yet given without credentials.”
4. *GA*, 388.
5. *GA*, 388.
6. *GA*, 411.
7. *GA*, 425.
8. *GA*, 425.
9. *GA*, 425.
10. *GA*, 427.
11. *GA*, 427.
12. *GA*, 427.
13. *GA*, 429.
14. *GA*, 429.
15. *GA*, 411. Newman says that his approach is similar to that of Amort, who presented “a new modest, and easy way of demonstrating the Catholic Religion.”
16. *GA*, 411.
17. *GA*, 413.
18. *GA*, 415–16.
19. *GA*, 413. Later in *A Grammar of Assent*, Newman adds, “Christianity is addressed, both as regards its evidences and its contents, to minds which are in the normal condition of human nature, as believing in God and in a future judgment.” *GA*, 491–92.
20. *GA*, 413.
21. *GA*, 417–18.
22. *GA*, 416.
23. *GA*, 416.
24. *GA*, 389.
25. *GA*, 389–408.
26. *GA*, 408. In this passage, Newman contrasts the beliefs of natural religion with the term *Revelation* (capitalized). Here and in a couple of other places in *A Grammar of Assent*, Newman seems to be using the word *Revelation* to refer to revealed religion or Christianity. See also *GA*, 118, 487.
27. *GA*, 404.
28. *GA*, 431.
29. *GA*, 431.

30. GA, 386.
31. GA, 487.
32. GA, 423.
33. GA, 423.
34. John Henry Newman, *The Arians of the Fourth Century* (London: Rivington, 1833), 88.
35. GA, 487.
36. GA, 487.
37. GA, 487.
38. GA, 408, 422–23.
39. GA, 440–56.
40. GA, 440; see also 450–52.
41. GA, 440.
42. GA, 458–62. Newman discusses the five reasons and explains why each is insufficient.
43. GA, 464.
44. GA, 465.
45. LD, XXX:259. Letter to Ulric Charlton on October 2, 1883.
46. LD, XXX:207, n. 1. Letter to Lord Emlý on April 17, 1883.
47. GA, 476–86.
48. GA, 491.
49. GA, 492.
50. GA, 492.
51. GA, 492.
52. *Mixed*, 224. See also William R. Fey, *Faith and Doubt: The Unfolding of Newman's Thought on Certainty* (Shepherdstown, WV: Patmos, 1976), 185.
53. Newman, *Theological Papers*, 4–5.
54. John Henry Newman, “Cardinal Newman’s Thesis de Fide and His Proposed Introduction to the French Translation of the University Sermons” (1847), ed. Henry Tristram, in *Gregorianum*, vol. 18 (1927), Thesis #110, 236.
55. Newman, “Thesis de Fide,” #110, 236.
56. Newman, *Theological Papers*, 37–38, 139.
57. *Mixed*, 224–25.
58. GA, 186–87.
59. GA, 187.
60. M. Jamie Ferreira, *Doubt and Religious Commitment: The Role of the Will in Newman's Thought* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1980), 141.
61. Ferreira, *Doubt and Religious Commitment*, 144.
62. Ferreira, *Doubt and Religious Commitment*, 131–32, 134, and 136.
63. Ferreira, *Doubt and Religious Commitment*, 141–44.
64. *Mixed*, 195.
65. *Mixed*, 215–27.
66. *Mixed*, 216. In the same passage, Newman points out that even to accept the possibility of future doubts is incompatible with faith.

67. *Mixed*, 217.
68. *Mixed*, 201.
69. *Mixed*, 215, 220, and 227.
70. *Mixed*, 222.
71. John Henry Newman, *The Via Media of the Anglican Church, Illustrated in Lectures, Letters, and Tracts Written between 1830 and 1841*, 2 vols. (1837, 1883) (London: Longmans, Green, 1901), I:87. (Hereafter abbreviated *VM*.)
72. *VM*, I:108.
73. *US*, 215.
74. *US*, 215.
75. Philip Flanagan, *Newman, Faith and the Believer* (Westminster, MD: Newman Bookshop, 1946), 59.
76. Ferreira, *Doubt and Religious Commitment*, 8.
77. *VM*, I:87. In the 1877 edition of the *Via Media*, Newman amends the statement that doubt is an element of a Christian's faith by adding a footnote that states, "Faith may follow after doubt, and so far is consistent with it; but the two cannot co-exist." *VM*, I:87. In this same edition, Newman also adds a footnote to the statement that doubt is ever our portion in this life. The footnote reads, "Here as before, by doubt of a doctrine is meant a recognition of the logical incompleteness of its proof, not a refusal to pronounce it true. Both Catholics and Anglicans doubt more or less in the former sense, neither of them doubt in the later." *VM*, I:108. In the 1871 edition of the *University Sermons*, Newman amends his statement on doubt in a footnote by stating that by doubt he means "not formal doubt, but a state of mind which recognizes the possibility of doubting." *US*, 215.
78. *Apo.*, 181.
79. *Apo.*, 227.
80. Newman, *Theological Papers*, 6.
81. *GA*, 191.
82. *GA*, 191. "If seeking includes doubting, and doubting excludes believing, then the Catholic who sets about inquiring, thereby declares that he is not a Catholic. He has already lost faith."
83. *Mixed*, 229.
84. *Mixed*, 230.
85. Ferreira, *Doubt and Religious Commitment*, 105–6.
86. Ferreira, *Doubt and Religious Commitment*, 103.
87. Ferreira, *Doubt and Religious Commitment*, 103.
88. *GA*, 228–55.
89. *GA*, 255.
90. *GA*, 220.
91. *GA*, 237–39.
92. *GA*, 242.
93. *GA*, 227.
94. *Dev.*, 83.
95. *Apo.*, 251.

96. *Apo.*, 239.
97. John Henry Newman, *A Letter Addressed to His Grace the Duke of Norfolk on Occasion of Mr. Gladstone's Recent Expostulation*, in *Newman and Gladstone: The Vatican Decrees*, introduction by Alvan S. Ryan (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1962), 184.
98. Newman, *Norfolk*, 187.
99. Newman, *Norfolk*, 192.
100. Newman, *Norfolk*, 187.
101. Newman, *Norfolk*, 196.
102. Newman, *Norfolk*, 196–97.
103. Newman, *Norfolk*, 150–51.
104. Newman, *Norfolk*, 154.
105. Newman, *Norfolk*, 155.
106. Newman, *Norfolk*, 151.
107. Newman, *Norfolk*, 151.
108. Newman, *Norfolk*, 152–53.
109. Newman, *Norfolk*, 153.
110. Newman, *Norfolk*, 153.
111. Edward Jeremy Miller, *John Henry Newman on the Idea of Church* (Shepherdstown, WV: Patmos, 1987), 83–84.
112. Newman, *Norfolk*, 189.
113. Newman, *Norfolk*, 188.
114. *LD*, XXV:309.
115. *Apo.*, 240. “It [infallibility] must refer to the particular Apostolic truth which it is enforcing, or (what is called) defining.”
116. Newman, *Norfolk*, 190.
117. Newman, *Norfolk*, 197–98.
118. Newman, *Norfolk*, 111–12.
119. Newman, *Norfolk*, 112–17.
120. Newman, *Norfolk*, 120–23.
121. Newman, *Norfolk*, 125.
122. Newman, *Norfolk*, 127.
123. Newman, *Norfolk*, 134.
124. Newman, *Norfolk*, 132.
125. Newman, *Norfolk*, 136–37. Here Newman quotes Cardinal Gousset: “He who acts against his conscience loses his soul.”
126. Newman, *Norfolk*, 138.
127. Newman, *Norfolk*, 76.
128. Newman, *Norfolk*, 77, 153, and 177.
129. Arthur Burton Calkins, “John Henry Newman on Conscience and the Magisterium,” *Downside Review* 87 (October 1969): 360.
130. *GA*, 190.
131. *GA*, 190.
132. *GA*, 190. “Therefore to set about conducting a proposition is not *ipso facto* to doubt its truth; we may aim at inferring a proposition, while all the time we assent to it.”

133. *GA*, 191–92. See also *Mixed*, 226–27.
134. *GA*, 192.
135. *GA*, 192.
136. *GA*, 192.
137. *Dev.*, 336.
138. *Dev.*, 337.
139. *Dev.*, 336.
140. *Dev.*, 337.
141. *Dev.*, 337.
142. Miller, *Newman on Church*, 81–98.
143. John Henry Newman, *The Idea of a University Defined and Illustrated: I, in Nine Discourses Delivered to the Catholics of Dublin, II, in Occasional Lectures and Essays Addressed to the Members of the Catholic University*, edited with preface and introduction by Charles Frederick Harrold (London: Longmans, Green, 1947), 342. (Hereafter abbreviated *Idea*.)
144. *Idea*, 352–53.
145. *Idea*, 350.
146. *Idea*, 342.
147. *Idea*, 342. In his sense of the terms, Newman would have been more exact if he had used the term *investigation* here.
148. *Idea*, 350.

## *Chapter Six*

# **Significance of Newman's Notion of Faith for Catholic Theology Today**

An examination of Catholic theology today reveals that there are two main approaches to defining the notion of faith. One approach, the intellectual model, defines faith as an intellectual assent to divinely revealed truths as they are formulated in the teachings of the Catholic Church. The other approach, the personalist model, describes faith as a total personal commitment, made within the context of the Catholic community of faith, to the love of God revealed in Jesus Christ. Both approaches accept Scripture, tradition, and the magisterium, but they differ in emphasis. The intellectual model stresses the cognitive quality of revelation and faith. The personalist model highlights the more personal aspects of revelation and faith. The two approaches are not mutually exclusive. In fact, it is possible to combine both. Whether one views faith from the point of view of the intellectual model or the personalist model, the reality of faith is always defined according to its two main elements, the object of faith and the act of faith.

What distinguishes the intellectual and the personalist models is the way in which each describes both the object of faith and the act of faith. According to the intellectual model, the object of faith is described as the manifestation of divinely revealed truths, and the act of faith is described as the intellectual assent to those truths. In this approach, the goal of faith is the reception of a new and higher form of knowledge, a participation in the knowledge of God. In contrast, the personalist model describes the content of faith as God's personal manifestation of love in Jesus Christ, and the act of faith as a total personal acceptance of God's offer of love. In this approach, the goal of faith is to lead the believer to a personal self-transforming experience of God's unconditional love.

The classical Catholic formulation of the intellectual approach is found in the theology of Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274 A.D.).<sup>1</sup> The Roman theology of

the mid–nineteenth century, the theology that Newman encountered when he became a Catholic, defined faith according to the intellectual model. This is also the approach of Catholic neo-scholastic theology that is found in the theological manuals of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.<sup>2</sup> The First Vatican Council, in its document on faith, *Dei Filius* (Son of God), defines faith according to the intellectual model.<sup>3</sup>

The personalist model is the approach of Scripture. Although Scripture does not define faith in terms of the classical distinction between the object of faith and the act of faith, the Old Testament and the New Testament tend to describe faith in more concrete and personalist terms. The Second Vatican Council (1962–1965) also emphasizes the personalist approach in its descriptions of faith. In its document on revelation, *The Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation*, Vatican II defines revelation as God's self disclosure in the person of Jesus Christ.<sup>4</sup> The act of faith is described as a response of the whole person and not just an act of the intellect.<sup>5</sup>

Both models are still very much a part of the Catholic Church's living tradition today. However, Dermot Lane points out that there has been a shift in emphasis in Catholic theology between Vatican Council I and Vatican Council II. Vatican I emphasized the intellectual approach in its definition of faith; Vatican II has opted for a more personalist approach in its descriptions of the notion of faith.<sup>6</sup> Contemporary Catholic theology has taken up the challenge of Vatican II and has made significant progress toward defining the Catholic understanding of faith according to the personalist model.

## THE PERSONAL NATURE OF NEWMAN'S NOTION OF FAITH

Newman's mature understanding of Catholic faith is an example of the personalist model. He presents a description of faith that is personal in its emphasis but, at the same time, stresses the necessity and importance of the role of doctrines and dogmas in faith. The personalist nature of Newman's definition of faith is illustrated in his descriptions of both the act of faith and the object of faith.

According to Newman, the act of faith, at its deepest level, is a real assent to the realities of revelation and not just a notional assent to the abstract propositional statements of faith. The act of faith is a response that is derived through a highly personal process of reasoning that includes informal reason and the illative sense. It is a free response of the person in which the will is engaged in the process of both arriving at and confirming the act of Catholic faith. Personal elements, such as presumptions, antecedent considerations, antecedent reasons, and moral dispositions, are all operative in the response of faith. It is God's personal Word through grace that leads the believer to

respond in the act of faith. Newman's notion of "implicit faith" stresses the importance of allowing Catholics to personally appropriate the dogmas and doctrines of faith, rather than forcing them to notionally accept all the truths of faith at once. Finally, it has been suggested that Newman's mature notion of the act of faith can be described as a "centered act," a response in which all the elements that are operative in the act of faith converge in a total personal response.

Newman also describes the object of faith in personal terms. The ultimate object of faith for Newman is the personal God revealed in Jesus Christ, not the propositional statements of faith. Jesus, Newman says, is the central image of faith. In his book *Only Life Gives Life*, Thomas J. Norris maintains that Newman adopted a personalist understanding of revelation similar to that contained in the Second Vatican Council's document *The Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation*.<sup>7</sup> The personal God of the Trinity, Norris says, is the ultimate object of faith for Newman. As Norris puts it, Christianity, for Newman, is the "presence of persons."<sup>8</sup> Also, for Newman, this personal God always remains shrouded in mystery and beyond our ability to completely and personally experience in a total way. As Newman says, we only know God in shadows. One cannot have a real apprehension of the Trinity as a whole because of the mystery of God.

In his analysis of the object of faith, Newman insists on the importance and necessity of doctrine and dogma. His lifelong commitment to dogma goes back to his 1816 conversion experience as an Anglican. From this point on, he remained committed to the dogmatic principle. One of his main objectives throughout his life was the struggle against liberalism, which Newman defined as the antidogmatic principle. Equally essential to Newman's Catholic notion of faith was his acceptance of the normative teaching role of the magisterium of the church in the process of communicating God's personal revelation. Yet, his respect for dogma did not deteriorate into dogmatism. He gives a priority to the reality, the thing revealed, over the proposition that expresses the revealed reality. As such, Newman distinguishes between a primary object of faith, the personal God as the reality of revelation, and a secondary object, the doctrines and dogmas that express that revelation. Important as they are, the doctrinal and dogmatic teachings of the church are not ends in themselves. They are the means to an end. Their purpose is to lead the believer to a personal experience of the personal God (a real assent).

### **Faith and Praxis**

The personal nature of Newman's notion of faith can be seen also in his understanding of the relationship between faith and praxis. Faith, for Newman,

is by its very nature oriented toward praxis. Since the act of faith engages the whole person, Catholic faith includes in its very definition a commitment to live the life of faith. Part of the basis for this orientation toward praxis is found in the understanding of the act of faith as a real assent. According to Newman, the encounter with the object of faith through real assent awakens the imperative to act. In the act of real assent, the imagination presents the object of faith to the believer. As such, the concrete images experienced through real assent stimulate the affections and the passions and indirectly lead to action.<sup>9</sup> The imagination plays a key role in this process. Newman says that strictly speaking, it is not the imagination that causes action, but what it does for us is “to find a means of stimulating those motive powers; and it does so by providing a supply of objects strong enough to stimulate them.”<sup>10</sup> The imagination has the means of “stimulating those powers of the mind from which action proceeds.”<sup>11</sup> But, adding a caution, Newman states that the practical effect “is not invariable, nor to be relied on; for given images may have no tendency to affect given minds, or to excite them to action.”<sup>12</sup> Therefore, even though real assent can lead indirectly to action, it does not immediately and automatically result in action. Real assent is not “intrinsically operative.”<sup>13</sup>

Newman summarizes his position on the practical effect of both notional and real assent by stating that it would be wrong to say that “acts of Notional Assent . . . do not affect our conduct, and acts of . . . Real Assent do (not necessarily, but do) affect it.”<sup>14</sup> Real assent can lead to the imperative to act, but in the act of faith, the motivation to actually act includes the will and the influence of God’s grace. For Newman, both are integral parts of the personal response of the act of faith.

Newman also sees a mutual interdependence between faith as praxis and faith as knowledge. When distinguishing between religion and theology, he states that religion is more dependent on theology for its maintenance than is theology on religion. But, as it is clear from the context of this discussion, Newman is not supporting a separation between theology and religion. He is simply stating that such a separation is possible. His point is that appropriate Christian action should flow from an adequate understanding of the faith. This is an application of the dogmatic principle to the life of faith.

However, not only does praxis have to be based on an adequate understanding of the Christian revelation, but an adequate understanding of the Christian message also depends on a living praxis. To truly understand the dogmas of faith, one must be able to apprehend them through the imagination and give a real assent to the realities they manifest. The truths of faith are not fully understood if they are simply objects of notional assent. The believer does not fully understand them until one’s affections and passions are aroused

and one is brought to the imperative to act. Notional understanding brings clarity, but it does not produce profound religious understanding that commits one to act. It is this mutual interdependence between faith and praxis that leads Norris to comment on the pastoral nature of Newman's understanding of faith. Norris says that the pastoral concern for the appropriation of faith is "a subject that engages Newman's brilliance at great and laborious lengths."<sup>15</sup> In fact, Norris adds that concern for the pastoral implications of faith "guided Newman's work, directed his reading and writing, and stimulated some of his most original insights."<sup>16</sup>

One area in which Newman's personalist approach to faith might be further developed is in the relationship between faith and love. In developing his mature notion of Catholic faith, he does not explicitly discuss the role of love in the act of faith. *A Grammar of Assent* is surprisingly silent on the notion of love. In it Newman does not include any of the views on the role of love that are found in the *University Sermons*. It is true that in *A Grammar of Assent*, informal reason and the illative sense replace love as the sanctions of faith. However, some of his descriptions of the role of love in the *University Sermons* are relevant for his mature notion of Catholic faith. His description of love as the "eye of faith" and his insistence that faith be informed by love are ideas that would have been quite consistent with his mature definition of Catholic faith. The inclusion of some of these *University Sermons* insights on the role of love in faith would have not only been compatible with the personal notion of Catholic faith that he presents in *A Grammar of Assent* but would have greatly enhanced it.

## NEWMAN AND THE MAGISTERIUM

One aspect of Newman's efforts to live out his vision of Catholic faith that has particular significance for Catholics today, particularly Catholic theologians, is his ambiguous relationship with the magisterium. On the one hand, Newman always respected the magisterium and remained faithful to it. On the other hand, during his life as a Catholic, he all too often found himself involved in a struggle with the official teaching authority of the church. As a convert, he had to face the challenge of demonstrating that his theology was compatible with Roman theology, the official theology of the Catholic Church in the nineteenth century. Growing up in the Anglican tradition, he was not trained in scholastic philosophy and theology, so many of his philosophical presuppositions were different from those of Roman theology. His efforts to meet this challenge met with both successes and failures.

Catholic theologians today are faced with a similar challenge from Rome. Today, the official Catholic Church appears determined to erect a new Roman

theology. Based on an intellectual model, this theology presents a view of faith that insists that Catholics and Catholic theologians should hold and teach only the formulations of faith approved by the official church. This view of Catholic faith does not allow for dissent in any sense. Today the official church is demanding a faith of absolute obedience and is defending this position in its official documents, adding threats of punishment for those who disagree with the church. Two recent documents of the Catholic Church that illustrate this approach are the apostolic letter of John Paul II, *Ad Tuendam Fidem* (Toward Holding the Faith) and the *Doctrinal Commentary on the Concluding Formula of the Professio Fidei* (Profession of Faith), written by Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, prefect of the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. A more recent illustration can be found in the U.S. bishops' implementation of the Roman requirement that all Catholic university professors of theology receive a *mandatum* (mandate) from the local bishop to teach theology in a Catholic university.

Since Newman in the nineteenth century experienced similar pressures from the magisterium, perhaps it is possible for Catholic theologians today to learn from his struggles with the magisterium. Although Newman never wrote a systematic treatise on the magisterium, nevertheless, based on his own life experiences, he was aware of the problems that the magisterium can present for the theologian. In his private correspondence, he frequently commented on his encounters with the magisterium.

Our analysis of Newman's encounters with the magisterium will focus on three periods of his life. The first will be his early Catholic years, 1846–1847, when he was studying in Rome and attempting to find his place in the Catholic Church. The second will be the *Rambler* incident that occurred between the years 1858 and 1860, and the third will be the years from 1874 to 1875 when he wrote the *Letter to the Duke of Norfolk*. After a brief summary of these three encounters, some suggestions will be made regarding the significance of Newman's attitude toward the magisterium for contemporary Catholic theologians, as well as for all Catholics today.

### Newman's Encounters with the Magisterium

The negative reception that Newman's theology of faith received from Roman theology immediately after he became a Catholic has already been treated in chapter 1. As a result of the encounter with Roman theology, Newman was forced to give up his idea of establishing a school of theology in England.

The *Rambler* incident that occurred between 1859 and 1860 provides another illustration of Newman's struggles with the magisterium. The *Rambler*, a Catholic periodical founded by the Oxford convert J. M. Capes in 1848, was

established as a literary magazine for educated Catholics. In 1858, the journal came under the suspicion of the English bishops because of an article in it criticizing the bishops' educational policy. The bishops issued an ultimatum demanding that the editor, Richard Simpson, resign or they would censure the journal in their pastoral letters.<sup>17</sup> At the request of his bishop, William Ullathorne, Newman communicated the English bishops' dissatisfaction with the *Rambler* to Simpson, and Simpson agreed to resign. To meet the concerns of all involved, Newman reluctantly agreed to take over the editorship for a brief period.

In the very first issue of the *Rambler* published under Newman's editorship, the May 1859 issue, Newman made a remark that resulted in his theology being brought under suspicion once again. In a reference to the judgment of the English bishops on the Royal Commission on education, Newman made the following remark:

[W]e do unfeignedly believe . . . that their Lordships really desire to know the opinion of the laity on subjects in which the laity are especially concerned. *If even in the preparation of a dogmatic definition the faithful are consulted, as lately in the instance of the Immaculate Conception, it is at least as natural to anticipate such an act of kind feeling and sympathy in great practical questions.*<sup>18</sup>

John Gillow, a professor of theology at Ushaw, raised questions about the validity of this remark. Bishop Ullathorne was also not very pleased with Newman's statement. When Ullathorne and Newman met on May 22, 1859, both agreed that Newman would resign after the July issue.<sup>19</sup>

Still, Newman's troubles were not over. He decided that he must defend the doctrine that he held about the place of the laity in the church. As a result, he wrote his famous article "On Consulting the Faithful in Matters of Doctrine," which was published in the July issue of the *Rambler*. In this article, Newman maintains that the laity do have a right to be consulted in matters of doctrine, "because the body of the faithful is one of the witnesses to the fact of the tradition of revealed doctrine, and because their *consensus* (agreement) through Christendom is the voice of the infallible Church."<sup>20</sup> In attempting to illustrate this principle, he cites the Arian controversy in the fourth century. According to Newman, in the Arian crisis, the "divine tradition committed to the infallible Church was proclaimed and maintained far more by the faithful than by the Episcopate."<sup>21</sup> The Nicene dogma of the belief in the divinity of Jesus, Newman states, was maintained during the greater part of the fourth century,

1. not by the unswerving firmness of the Holy See, Councils, or Bishops, but 2. by the "consensus fidelium" [consent of the faithful]. I. On the one hand, then,

I say, that there was a temporary suspense of the functions of the "Ecclesia docens" [teaching authority of the Church]. The body of Bishops failed in their confession of the faith.<sup>22</sup>

But, once again, Newman's attempt to explain himself was met with suspicion and condemnation. On August 28, 1859, Gillow wrote to Newman and rejected Newman's claim that there could be a suspension of the functions of the *Ecclesia docens*.<sup>23</sup> But, more significantly, on October 3, 1859, Bishop Brown, the bishop of Newport, a Benedictine from Downside and an Old Catholic, delates Newman's article to Rome and urges Propaganda to condemn Newman's teaching in the article as heretical.<sup>24</sup> At the request of Cardinal Barnabo, the prefect of Propaganda, Bishop Ullathorne met with Newman on January 13, 1860, and informed him of Bishop Brown's delation. At that meeting, Newman responded by saying that he would comply with the requirements of Propaganda.<sup>25</sup> On January 19, 1860, Newman wrote to Cardinal Nicholas Wiseman, who was in Rome at the time, asking for a list of the objections made against him by Propaganda and indicating that he was willing to accept whatever dogmas he was supposed to have called into question.<sup>26</sup> Propaganda drew up a list of objections and sent them to Cardinal Wiseman, but Wiseman never sent the list to Newman,<sup>27</sup> nor did he send Newman's letter to Propaganda.<sup>28</sup> This incident was not finally resolved until 1867 when Ambrose St. John, meeting with Cardinal Barnabo on another matter, informed the cardinal that Newman had been willing to respond but never received Propaganda's objections. Cardinal Barnabo, unaware of this, had thought that Newman was unwilling to reply.<sup>29</sup> When all of these facts became known, the matter was settled to Rome's satisfaction.<sup>30</sup>

Another example of the magisterium's suspicions about Newman's orthodoxy can be found in the reaction of Propaganda to his 1875 *Letter to the Duke of Norfolk*. Although, as Ian Ker points out, Catholics in England received the letter with general enthusiasm,<sup>31</sup> Rome was not pleased and denounced the letter as censurable.<sup>32</sup> Cardinal Franchi, the prefect of Propaganda, wrote to Cardinal Manning on February 3, 1875, stating that the first part of the letter was triumphant and that the second part contained propositions calculated to do great harm to the minds of the faithful. In his reply to Propaganda, Manning supported Newman and pointed out that the letter had a wholesome effect on Catholics in England and that Newman had defended the prerogatives and infallible magisterium of the Roman pontiff. Manning goes on to warn that any censure of Newman's letter would have disastrous consequences.<sup>33</sup>

Cardinal Franchi also wrote to Bishop Ullathorne on October 22, 1875, and included in his letter a list of eleven censurable propositions. In his letter, Franchi urged Ullathorne to speak to Newman, as if he were speaking on his

own and not on instructions from Rome, and to point out how dangerous these propositions may be to others. One remark of Newman's that was particularly offensive was the following: "the Rock of St. Peter on its summit enjoys a pure and serene atmosphere, but there is a great deal of Roman malaria at the foot of it."<sup>34</sup> In Rome, this remark was taken to refer to the Roman Curia and the counselors of Pius IX. Bishop Ullathorne replied to Cardinal Franchi by stating that Newman had always said that he wanted Rome to deal with him directly and not through intermediaries and secretly. Therefore, if Rome wanted action, it should act itself.<sup>35</sup> In the words of Charles Dessain, "That seems to have been the end of the matter."<sup>36</sup>

These three incidents illustrate some of Newman's conflicts with the magisterium. The ways in which Newman responded in these conflictual situations can perhaps provide some direction for Catholics, particularly Catholic theologians, in their encounters with the magisterium today. Newman's significance for Catholics today will be examined from the point of view of the following aspects: his fidelity to the magisterium, his openness to theological dialogue, his courage in the defense of his own views, his criticisms of the magisterium, and his hope and vision for change in the church.

### **Newman's Fidelity to the Magisterium**

One aspect of Newman's encounters with the magisterium that Catholic theologians, and all Catholics, should emulate is his steadfast fidelity to the magisterium in spite of all his conflicts with it. One of the constants in Newman's dealings with the magisterium is that he always accepted the legitimate role of the magisterium and showed respect for the teaching authority of the church. In his initial encounter with Roman theology, he summarized his attitude toward the authority of the church in a letter he wrote to Dalgairns in 1847. Newman writes that he always has had the "inward habitual intention" to submit "what I say to the judgement of the Church."<sup>37</sup> One of the things that stands out in the *Rambler* incident is Newman's willingness to cooperate with his ecclesiastical superiors, particularly his own bishop. It was solely at the request of Bishop Ullathorne that Newman met with Richard Simpson and persuaded him to resign as editor of the *Rambler*. Newman agreed to accept the editorship of the magazine for a limited time, because he thought that he was doing what Cardinal Wiseman and Bishop Ullathorne wanted him to do. When he eventually resigned as editor of the *Rambler*, Newman did so at the request of his bishop. In speaking of his resignation, Newman writes, "It is impossible, with the principles and feelings on which I have acted all through life, that I could not have acted otherwise, I never have resisted, nor can resist, the voice of a lawful Superior, speaking in his own province."<sup>38</sup> In

a letter to Döllinger on June 25, 1859, Newman states that it has always been his rule in life never to take a public act in opposition to legitimate authority.<sup>39</sup> Newman's cooperation with ecclesiastical superiors is also demonstrated by his willingness to respond to Propaganda's objections to his article "On Consulting the Faithful" and his willingness to accept whatever dogmas he was supposed to have called into question.

In the *Letter to the Duke of Norfolk*, Newman comes to the defense of the legitimate authority of the pope. He both explains and defends the meaning of the church's teaching on the infallibility of the church and the pope as defined at the First Vatican Council in 1870. Newman's respect for the pope can be seen in his attitude toward Pius IX during the early years of Pius IX's papacy. During these years, Newman was very enthusiastic about Pius IX and liked him very much. In July 1846, Pius IX, shortly after he was elected, sent Newman his blessing.<sup>40</sup> Referring to the political problems and turmoil in Italy, Newman wrote in December 1847, "how it would pierce my heart, if any thing happened to him [the pope]."<sup>41</sup> In June 1848, Newman wrote, "The Pope needs all our prayers, we continually think of him, and have no fears that he is divinely guided in all he does."<sup>42</sup> When in Rome in the winter of 1855–1856 to deal with a dispute with the London Oratory, Newman said that it was the pope who remained his friend and "smashed the whole intrigue."<sup>43</sup> In a reference to this incident, Newman wrote, "The Pope treated us as if we were the only people in the world he had to care for. He is a most wonderful Pope."<sup>44</sup>

### Openness to Theological Dialogue

Another quality that emerges from Newman's encounter with the magisterium that is significant for Catholics today is his openness and willingness to discuss his theological views. In an effort to counter the Roman suspicions against his view on faith and reason in the *University Sermons*, Newman enters into a theological discussion with one of the Roman theologians. On February 24, 1847, in a letter to Dalgairns, Newman mentions that he intends to "scrape acquaintance" with Giovanni Perrone, one of the leading Roman theologians on faith and reason, and that he will "put before him [Perrone] as clearly as I can my opinions about Faith and Reason."<sup>45</sup> Following through on this, Newman sent Perrone a list of formal propositions summarizing his own view on faith and reason.<sup>46</sup> For his part, Newman writes in his letters that he was very much pleased with Perrone's opinions on dogmatics.<sup>47</sup> Perrone at first seems to have been suspicious of Newman's views on faith and reason, but, eventually, he came to appreciate the value of Newman's views, and the two became friends.<sup>48</sup>

When Gillow questioned Newman's statements on the role of the laity in matters of doctrine, Newman entered into a dialogue with Gillow and discussed the matter openly with him. Also, the *Letter to the Duke of Norfolk* demonstrates Newman's readiness to enter into dialogue with Prime Minister Gladstone on the issue of English Catholics' loyalty to the British government.

### Courage in Defense of His Own Views

Yet, along with his openness to dialogue Newman displays a strong confidence and trust that his theology is authentically Catholic, and he defends it when it is appropriate, sometimes rather strongly. Writing to Dalgairns on February 14, 1847, about the *University Sermons*, he states, "And now after reading these Sermons I must say I think they are, as a whole, the best things I have written, and I cannot believe that they are not Catholic, and will not be useful."<sup>49</sup> In defending his views, Newman was not above pointing out the inadequacies of his opponents. Commenting on the state of theology in Rome, Newman writes, "They [Roman theologians] have no philosophy." Aristotle and Aquinas are not read. "Facts are great things and nothing else. . . . All this show how little they [Roman theologians] have of a view."<sup>50</sup>

In the *Rambler* incident, when reflecting on Bishop Brown's delation of his article on consulting the faithful to Rome, Newman wonders about what would be the best way to respond to Propaganda. In a memorandum on the delation written on January 14, 1860, Newman states that he does not think that it would be a good policy to be too eager to put himself into the hands of Propaganda. On the other hand, he says, it would be an "extremely wrong policy to seem to shuffle."<sup>51</sup> In the same memorandum, Newman talks about the necessity of guarding against getting angry and indignant about the delation. He says that reason would lead him to be quiet and composed, but it is difficult at times to go by reason. Then, Newman seems to indulge in a little self-pity. He speaks of himself as a scapegoat. After recalling some of the past incidents in his life, both as an Anglican and as a Catholic, in which he has been under suspicion, he writes, "others, when they do wrong or act from infirmity, escape—I have always been smitten."<sup>52</sup> In a similar tone, he writes to Cardinal Wiseman on January 19, 1860:

I marvel, but I do not complain, that after many years of patient and self-denying labour in the cause of Catholicity, the one appropriate acknowledgement in my old age should be considered to consist in taking advantage of me of what is at worst a slip of the pen in an anonymous un-theological paper. But, I suppose it is the law of the world, that those who toil much and say little, are little thought of.<sup>53</sup>

In reflecting on the whole *Rambler* affair, Newman says, "I suppose saints have been more roughly treated at Rome than any one else."<sup>54</sup> John Coulson points out that one of the lessons Newman learned from the *Rambler* incident is that the English Catholic Church would never be able to achieve spiritual and intellectual vitality as long as it was under the immediate domain of Propaganda.<sup>55</sup>

### Newman's Criticisms of the Magisterium

Newman's encounters with the magisterium also show us that criticisms of the magisterium are at times appropriate and can be signs of one's faithfulness and commitment to the Catholic Church. In a letter to John Acton in July 1859, in the context of the *Rambler* controversy, Newman makes the following critique of the Roman Curia:

There will necessarily always be round about the Pope second-rate people, who are not subjects of that supernatural guidance which is his prerogative. For myself, certainly I have found myself in a different atmosphere, when I have left the Curia for the Pope himself.<sup>56</sup>

Four years later, after the delation of his article on consulting the faithful and the condemnation of the *Rambler*, Newman's criticism of the Roman Curia is even harsher.

This country [England] is under Propaganda, and Propaganda is too shallow to have the wish to use such as me . . . no one can have been more loyal to the Holy See than I am. I love the Pope personally into the bargain. But Propaganda is a quasi-military power, extraordinary, for missionary countries, rough and ready. It does not understand an intellectual movement. It likes quick results . . . scalps from beaten foes by the hundred.<sup>57</sup>

Suggesting that there might be some advantages if the pope loss temporal power over the papal states, Newman makes the following remark about the Roman congregations.

It puts in a striking light the miseries which the Roman Congregations would suffer if a secular sovereign had sway over them. But there is no evil without its alleviation—it would cut off a great deal of unprofitable gossip sent to Rome from the orbis terrarum, and of crude answers sent back from Rome by men who seem to have authority, but have none—and it would throw power into the hands of the local bishop everywhere.<sup>58</sup>

After Pius IX surrendered Rome to the Italians on September 20, 1870, Newman wrote, “a new system must supersede the old: and one better suitable to modern times.”<sup>59</sup>

But Newman’s criticisms of the magisterium were not restricted to the Roman Curia. As the years went by, Newman’s disillusionment with the Curia spread to the pope himself. Ian Ker points out that, although much could be blamed on subordinates, the ultimate responsibility for extreme Ultramontanism, for the agitation for maintaining the temporal power of the papacy, for the definition of Papal Infallibility at Vatican I, and for the *Syllabus of Errors* lay with Pius IX.<sup>60</sup> It seems that after 1870 Newman’s enthusiasm for the papacy became more cautious and guarded. Ker states that increasingly Newman began to view the papacy in a more or less negative light, as an institution whose nature and purpose was to be conservative.<sup>61</sup> The papacy, Newman remarks, has not really manifested a gift for originating anything but instead has tended to act according to routine, “the routine of 1000 years.”<sup>62</sup> His disillusionment with Pius IX can be seen in the following remark made in November 1870: “The present Pope cannot live long—he has lived too long—but, did he live Methuselah’s age, he could not in his acts go beyond the limit which God has assigned to him—nor *has* he, though he wished it.”<sup>63</sup> This disillusionment seemed to reach a climax in the following statement: “We have come to a climax of tyranny. It is not good for a Pope to live 20 years. It is an anomaly and bears no good fruit; he becomes a god, has no one to contradict him, does not know facts, and does cruel things without meaning it.”<sup>64</sup>

### Newman’s Hope and Vision for Change

Although Newman became disillusioned with some of the actions of the Roman Curia and Pius IX, his encounters with the magisterium show that he never gave up hope in the vitality of the institutional church and its innate capacity to renew itself. In spite of all the challenges to his theology, his personal setbacks, and sufferings, Newman never gave up hope. He writes, “Let us have faith, and a new Pope, and a re-assembled Council may trim the boat.”<sup>65</sup> His imagination inspires him to consider possible reforms within the church. He wonders if the new political situation of the pope (the loss of control over the papal states) might introduce some changes in the church, such as “throwing open St. Peter’s Chair to all nations” or “to an ‘extension’ of the College of Cardinals.”<sup>66</sup> Although Newman himself did not live to see any institutional reforms of the Roman Curia, some of his hopes did bear fruit in his lifetime. He lived to see a new pope, Leo XIII, who made Newman a cardinal partly in order to show that a new era of openness had arrived in the church.<sup>67</sup>

What enables Newman to maintain this hope in the face of all obstacles is his personalist understanding of faith. His personalist vision of faith enables him to remain faithful to the realities of God's revelation even when the institutional church fails him. Without this personal element of hope, faith would degenerate into despair or rejection of the church. In fact, Newman's vision of faith is such that fidelity to the realities of God's revelation in Jesus Christ requires that the church be open to change its concrete formulations and institutional structures. By renewing itself, the church more fully becomes itself. When, as an Anglican, Newman described his view of holiness, he wrote, "Growth [is] the only evidence of life."<sup>68</sup> Later on in 1845, while contemplating the move from Anglicanism to Catholicism, Newman wrote, "here below, to live is to change, and to be perfect is to have changed often."<sup>69</sup> Newman's principle of the development of doctrine maintains that one of the reasons the Catholic Church has been able to remain faithful to the apostolic church is because it has changed often.

Newman's critical fidelity to the magisterium and his optimistic hopes for continual renewal in the church can provide the inspiration and incentive for Catholics today to work for the continual renewal of the church and its institutions in this new millennium. Newman's vision of hope allows Catholics like Thomas Reese to imagine how the Catholic Church might look in the future. In his book *Inside the Vatican*, Reese suggests that the church in this millennium will require a new style of leadership, one that will be able to deal with an educated faithful who are used to asking questions and exercising freedom. This new leadership will recognize that commands to obey are not sufficient, but the teachings of the church should be explained to believers, and the magisterium should make an effort to persuade believers of the truth of its teachings. It will be a style of leadership that will be comfortable with mass communications, a variety of views, group discussion, dialogue, and consensus building in a setting of diversity.<sup>70</sup>

Reese also envisions a reform of the Roman Curia. He sees a scaled down decentralized curia, one that is more of a clearinghouse than a policymaking body. He suggests that perhaps there could be five offices, one for each continent (Africa, Asia, Europe, North America, and Latin America).<sup>71</sup> He goes on to suggest that members of the Roman Curia and the papal diplomatic corps would no longer be made bishops or cardinals. Membership in the college of bishops and the college of cardinals would be restricted to those who head local churches. As a result, the role of the college of bishops, as rulers of the church together with the pope, would be strengthened and would be given priority over the Roman Curia. Reducing secrecy and encouraging honest debate would enhance the role of the synod of bishops, and local bishops could be given a greater role in overseeing the Curia. Reese suggests that

having an ecumenical council at least once every twenty-five years would further strengthen the college of bishops. Also, national conferences of bishops could be given more decision-making discretion, and restrictions on their freedom by the Roman Curia would be curtailed. In addition, Reese suggests that local churches could be given a greater role in choosing their own bishops.<sup>72</sup>

Reese's hopes are presented as examples of how the church might change in the future. They are not presented as absolutes or a final blueprint. Also, there are not any signs at the moment that the Catholic Church will adopt the types of reforms suggested by Reese. Yet, following Newman's example of faith, Catholics today should never give up hope.

## FAITH AND RATIONAL CRITICISM

As noted earlier, Newman's insistence on the unconditional nature of the certitude of Catholic faith does not mean that faith is immune to rational criticism. For Newman, the act of faith is not a blind act of obedience, nor is it an uncritical acceptance of the truths of faith. His insistence on the compatibility of the act of faith and rational criticism most certainly has significance for contemporary Catholicism.

In his treatment of infallibility, Newman points out its limitations. The infallibility of the pope is limited by God's revelation to the whole church; it is to be exercised in the service of God's revelation, not as an end in itself. Newman's accurate and balanced description of infallibility serves as a caution against any attempt to overextend the claims of infallibility. His approach to this topic could certainly serve as a model for both the magisterium and theologians in our contemporary age of "creeping infallibility."

On the matter of the noninfallible teachings of the church, Newman defends the general principle that Catholics have a responsibility to accept these teachings. However, if there is a conflict between conscience and a noninfallible teaching, he insists that conscience must be followed, even if it means disobeying the pope. What Newman has reminded us of here is that the priority of conscience is a fundamental Catholic principle that needs to be respected today by all in the Catholic Church. The personal nature of the act of faith makes it imperative that the magisterium today has to find a way in its teachings and procedures to respect this priority of conscience. Demands to obey so-called definitive noninfallible teachings, which is a problematic category, do not indicate that such a respect is always present in the magisterium today.

Newman's approach to interpreting the texts of the magisterium was a critical one. This critical approach is rooted in his personalist understanding of

faith. In discussing the object of faith, Newman makes a distinction between the reality of revelation and the concrete propositional statements of revelation. Although both are necessary for the fullness of God's revelation, the two are not completely identical according to Newman. In the Catholic Church today, the magisterium often gives the impression that its statements are above the canons of historical and textual criticism. As a result, they sometimes encourage the type of dogmatic fundamentalism that Newman warned us against.

Newman's distinction between the pope and the Roman Curia is also important for understanding how the magisterium works today. All too often we see members of the Roman Curia going off on their own making claims that certain teachings of the church are infallible. Newman's distinction reminds us that the authority of the Roman Curia is not an intrinsic and essential part of the church's magisterium. As the Second Vatican Council clearly points out, it is the pope together with the bishops throughout the world who make up the magisterium. The Roman Curia has no *de jure* (from the [divine] law) commission from Christ. In today's situation, there are grounds for suggesting that Newman's healthy suspicion and critique of some of the methods of the Roman Curia might be necessary and quite appropriate for the development of the Catholic understanding of faith.

Newman also was a strong advocate of freedom of thought within the church. If Newman's trust in the power of truth and his belief in the enduring presence of the Holy Spirit in the church were motivating forces in the Catholic Church today, there would be much less fear of error. Juridical mandates, banning discussion of certain issues, and calls for punishment of those who do not agree with the official statements of the church do not encourage the freedom of thought that Newman envisioned.

From what we have seen, it is evident that Newman's mature notion of Catholic faith has a great deal of significance for Catholics today. However, as significant and relevant as Newman's theology of faith is, it is limited by its nineteenth-century historical context. As a result, some aspects of Newman's notion of faith are not sufficiently developed from the point of view of Catholic theology in the new millennium. Five of these areas will be examined: the relationship between faith and doubt, the dimension of social justice, cultural diversity, ecumenism, and interreligious dialogue.

## FAITH AND DOUBT

One aspect of Newman's understanding of the role of rational criticism in faith that might be considered for further development is his view on the

incompatibility of faith and doubt. Some post-Vatican II Catholic theologians such as Gregory Baum,<sup>73</sup> Avery Dulles,<sup>74</sup> and Oliver A. Rabut<sup>75</sup> speak about the compatibility of faith and doubt. From the perspective of these views, Newman's position on the incompatibility of faith and doubt appears somewhat inadequate.

When Newman admits that investigation is compatible with faith, he does so because he says that investigation excludes doubt. Yet, one might ask, can not a doubt sometimes be the impetus for a process of investigation? When my students are presented with Newman's understanding of the relationship between investigation and doubt, they find it difficult to comprehend an investigation that excludes doubt. Newman himself admits that a Catholic can dissent from the noninfallible teachings of the church. There are occasions when, as an Anglican, Newman spoke about the compatibility of faith and doubt. The understanding of doubt in contemporary theology goes beyond Newman's limited understanding of doubt as suspension of assent. Given these observations, is it not possible that Newman's personalist notion of Catholic faith could be developed so as to include the acceptance of some forms of doubt? From the perspective of the language of contemporary Catholic theology, are not some of Newman's difficulties really doubts?

## THE DIMENSION OF SOCIAL JUSTICE

From the perspective of contemporary Catholic theology, another area in which Newman's mature notion of Catholic faith appears inadequate is on the issue of social justice. As a result of the influence of liberation theology and a heightened sense of the significance of Catholic social teaching, an effective theology of faith today has to include an implicit statement on the social implications of the act of Christian praxis. Newman is surprisingly reticent on the social implications of the act of faith, and the attempt to try to clarify his position on this issue is met with ambiguity.

On the one hand, Newman seems to be hesitant to get involved in political and social issues. Henry Tristram writes that Newman "held aloof from public affairs whether political or ecclesiastical."<sup>76</sup> Newman himself appears to support this position when he writes, "It has never been my line to take up political or social questions, unless they came close to me as matters of personal duty."<sup>77</sup> Jay Newman questions whether Newman had a social conscience.<sup>78</sup> This position is also supported by Terence Kenny, who says that, although he found much to admire in Newman's personality, Newman did not have much by way of a social conscience.<sup>79</sup> Kenny cites Newman's preference for the education of the upper class and his apparent hostility to the education of the

Catholic poor as an illustration of this attitude.<sup>80</sup> Jay Newman adds that Newman could not understand why people like Cardinal Manning, Marx, and Bentham spent so much time worrying about the economic condition of the poor.<sup>81</sup>

On the other hand, there are occasions when Newman does get involved in political and social issues. Even Jay Newman admits that Newman's concern for the factory girls of Birmingham was genuine and that Newman actually did some social work in the Edgbaston area.<sup>82</sup> In 1850, Newman publicly spoke out against the anti-Catholicism in Protestant England and the Ecclesiastical Titles Bill. Newman went so far as to contemplate civil disobedience as a Catholic response to the bill.<sup>83</sup> In the end, however, Newman settled for education as the answer. Since prejudice and bigotry were the cause of Protestant anti-Catholicism, Newman argued that, if Protestants truly understood Catholicism, they would come to see that the bases of their anti-Catholicism were false.<sup>84</sup> What is interesting is that Newman never calls for a reform of the laws and structures of English society that were also the causes of this anti-Catholicism. Even though Newman realized that institutional reforms in England had aided the position of Catholics in England in the past, he does not urge the laity to get politically involved or to struggle against their oppression. On the contrary, he urges them not to be rude or offensive or to cultivate a "controversial temper."<sup>85</sup> Writing to J. M. Capes in February 1851, Newman says that he does not support a popular crusade against the establishment.<sup>86</sup> In this instance, Newman does not choose to be a reformer.

Another example of Newman's expression of social concern is found in his notes for a sermon to be preached on October 11, 1857. In these notes, Newman speaks out against the atrocities committed by British soldiers in their efforts to put down uprisings in India. He speaks about the sins of the soldiers and says that, by the admission of their own officers, they are becoming demons.<sup>87</sup> Newman suggests that there is a collective responsibility for such actions since we all share a common human nature with the soldiers who committed these acts.<sup>88</sup> He cautions his audience against sharing the feelings of vengeance of the soldiers who are perpetrating these actions. He asks, "How do we make matters better by sharing and propagating the savageness of human nature?"<sup>89</sup>

Newman appeals to the incarnation as the theological basis for this position. Because Christ assumed a human nature that could have sinned (but actually did not), the sins of all humans weighed on him and were, in one sense, his.<sup>90</sup> Newman says that Jesus was *in solidum* (in solidarity) with the sins of all humans.<sup>91</sup> In dying on the cross, Jesus took on this burden of human sin and did not condemn his torturers but "felt a tenderness to that fallen nature which was showing itself so awfully devilish in His persecutors, for it was His own."<sup>92</sup>

In these sermon notes, Newman goes on to list several other similar atrocities and injustices that have been committed throughout history. One of these is Cromwell's slaughter of the inhabitants of Drogheda in Ireland after the citizens of the town had accepted the quarter that he had offered.<sup>93</sup> In his letters and diaries, Newman has more to say about the injustices of the English against the Irish. In a letter to Gerard Manley Hopkins, Newman urges him to moderate his feelings about Irish nationalism that accused the British of oppression against freedom. He reminds Hopkins that the Irish had never accepted British rule and thus were not rebels against legitimate authority. Newman writes, "Irish patriots hold that they never have yielded themselves to the sway of England and therefore never have been under her laws and never have been rebels." And then he adds, "If I were an Irishman, I should be at heart a rebel."<sup>94</sup>

Several reasons have been proposed to explain Newman's ambiguity on the issue of political and social involvement. Terence Kenny suggests that Newman was more interested in intellectual than social problems. He states that Newman was "absolutely engrossed in the intellectual problems of recommending Christianity to an increasingly scientific and irreligious age."<sup>95</sup> Jay Newman thinks that Newman was more concerned with souls than with bodies.<sup>96</sup> According to Edward Norman, Newman thought that the injustices of society were caused by spiritual and moral breakdowns, rather than social and political problems. As Norman puts it, "The sickness of human society was spiritual; his [Newman's] preoccupation was with the error in men's heart rather than with the circumstances of their material lives."<sup>97</sup> Another possible reason for Newman's reticence on issues of social justice is that, both religiously and politically, he was conservative by nature.<sup>98</sup>

Whatever the reasons for Newman's hesitancy in this area, he fails to fully integrate the dimension of social justice into his mature notion of Catholic faith. Yet, as withdrawn and conservative as he might have been, there were occasions when he did accept the responsibility to get involved in social and political issues. In his own limited way, Newman was sensitive to these issues. Also, Newman's *in solidum* notion of the incarnation could provide a theological starting point for showing how his ideas on the social implications of faith might be more fully developed.

## CULTURAL DIVERSITY

Another area in which Newman's theology of faith might appear to be inadequate from the perspective of contemporary Catholic theology is that of cultural diversity. A Catholic theology of faith today cannot ignore this dimen-

sion. Although Newman is very much aware of the historical and occasional character of all theological writings, including his own, he does not explicitly integrate the elements of cultural diversity into his mature notion of Catholic faith. Yet there are elements in his understanding of the process of arriving at certitude that suggest that Newman might be open to some of the contemporary contributions that cultural studies have made in the field of theology.

When Newman speaks of antecedent considerations, he maintains that the starting point of the process of arriving at certitude is the person's awareness of one's contextual self, the acknowledgment of one's particular concrete standpoint and situation. Although the step to extend antecedent considerations to include the dimension of cultural diversity is not an automatic one, it would be a logical one. But, if one adds to this Newman's acceptance of the historical and contextual nature of all theological statements, it seems reasonable to suggest that Newman might have been open to acknowledging the significance of cultural diversity for faith and theological reflection.

Although Newman himself does not make this application, I would like to give one illustration of how Newman's thought might be developed along these lines. Since Newman was open to antecedent considerations, moral dispositions, history, and development as elements to be considered in the process of faith and theological reflection, one cannot help but think that he might have been equally open to such cultural elements as background theories, retroductive warrants, and philosophical and religious pluralism. Based on such an observation, it is quite possible that Newman might have been open to something like Francis Schüssler Fiorenza's understanding of systematic theology as paradigmatic reconstruction. Fiorenza describes the theological process of the development of tradition as a process of paradigmatic reconstruction. Tradition "develops and changes in a way that constantly reconstructs what it considers to be paradigmatic, what it considers to be its vision or 'essence.'"<sup>99</sup> One can still speak of an essence of the Gospel, but, because of the dynamic quality of God's revelation, the essence itself is constantly evolving.

Admittedly, Newman never used this kind of language, but such an understanding of development seems compatible with his understanding of revelation as a living idea and with his understanding of the dynamic elements present in his theory of development. Although Newman did hold that there could be no new revelation that would surpass the "idea" revealed in Jesus Christ, he did seem open to the possibility of real developments in revelation. True development had to be faithful to the original idea, but, for Newman, development of doctrine was not simply a matter of making implicit what was already explicitly there. Development could generate something new. For Newman, the process of theology required a critical dialogue between the living idea of

Christian Revelation and the elements of the contemporary situation. Only then could the true message be reconstructed for a new age.

## ECUMENISM AND INTERRELIGIOUS DIALOGUE

Pointing out the significance of Newman's notion of faith for ecumenical and interreligious dialogue indeed appears to be a daunting task. As a Catholic, Newman held that the Catholic Church was the one and only true church. All other Christian churches not in communion with Rome were considered to be either in schism or in heresy.<sup>100</sup> In his book *Certain Difficulties Felt by Anglicans*, Newman states that the Catholic Church "is the one ark of salvation" and "that Church in which alone is salvation."<sup>101</sup> Such a view of the church does not seem to leave much room open for ecumenical dialogue. Yet, Avery Dulles finds elements in Newman's theology that would facilitate the development of an ecumenical attitude. He points out that Newman had a great desire for restoring the unity of all Christian churches.<sup>102</sup> Dulles also mentions that Newman's view on the freedom of conscience made him sensitive to the religious beliefs of other Christians and that he was on guard against unsettling them in their faith.<sup>103</sup> To this Dulles adds that Newman had a "measure of appreciation for the workings of grace in other Christian communions."<sup>104</sup> Dulles concludes by stating that Newman was a "forerunner, standing on the threshold of a new ecumenical age."<sup>105</sup> In a similar spirit, John T. Ford writes, "it does not seem inappropriate to recognize Newman as an ecumenist—at least from a contemporary perspective."<sup>106</sup>

The significance of Newman's theology for interreligious dialogue appears even more problematic. Newman shared the polemical attitude of the early Christian writers toward Judaism. He believed that because the majority of the Jews had rejected Jesus, they ceased to be God's chosen people. In *A Grammar of Assent*, he says that the Jews committed a heinous sin when they crucified Jesus and that the curse that resulted from this sin is the cause of their guilt and rejection.<sup>107</sup> Newman is even stronger in his denunciations of Islam, which he regards as a violent opponent of the true faith.<sup>108</sup> In *A Grammar of Assent*, Newman states that Islam—Mahometanism, as he calls it—"was little more than a rebellion against a living religion."<sup>109</sup>

Yet, along with these negative and intolerant views, there is one element in Newman's theology that might serve as a basis for a Christian dialogue with other religions. In several of his writings, Newman presents the notion of a universal revelation. As an Anglican, Newman subscribed to the notion of a universal revelation in two of his works, the 1830 University Sermon entitled "The Influence of Natural and Revealed Religion Respectively" and his 1833

book *The Arians of the Fourth Century*. According to Francis McGrath, Newman continued to hold the notion of a universal revelation as a Catholic.<sup>110</sup> In *A Grammar of Assent*, Newman describes his idea of universal revelation in the following way: "As far as we know, there never was a time when . . . revelation was not a revelation continuous and systematic, with distinct representatives and an orderly succession."<sup>111</sup> If this notion of universal revelation can be more fully incorporated into Newman's notion of Catholic faith, perhaps we have a theological foundation for developing Newman's attitude toward other religions beyond what he himself was able to do in the atmosphere of nineteenth-century English Catholicism.

## CONCLUSION

The inadequacies of Newman's notion of faith pointed out in this chapter are not intended to be exhaustive. But what they illustrate is that, although Newman himself might not directly address some contemporary issues, there are elements in his theology of Catholic faith that provide guidelines and principles for addressing these issues. Newman's significance today lies not only in how he himself responded to a particular issue but in his overall balanced and integrated view of Catholic faith. Newman would have recognized that there is more in the living idea of God's revelation in Jesus Christ than either he or the Catholic Church of his day could have appropriated. The overall direction of his understanding of Catholic faith is one that would have been open to developing the implications of his theological views, even those that he himself did not develop. Catholics and Catholic theologians today can look at Newman as one who stresses the personal elements of faith over the intellectual. By doing so, his vision of faith can inspire the church today to focus on the fundamental core principles and values of the Gospel and to view the intellectual and institutional elements as subservient. Newman's balanced view of Catholic faith can lead the church to put new wine in old wineskins in order to fulfill its mission of preaching Jesus' gospel of love.

Furthermore, Newman's vision of faith is truly Catholic. In replying to Propaganda's proposed censure of Newman's *Letter to the Duke of Norfolk* in 1875, Cardinal Manning wrote, "The heart of the revered Fr. Newman is as right and Catholic as it is possible to be."<sup>112</sup> Yet, Newman's mature notion of Catholic faith goes beyond the intellectual notion of faith that the magisterium today seems to be insisting on. In fact, we have seen that in his early Catholic years, Newman attempted to integrate his view of faith in the *University Sermons* with the Roman view of faith. These efforts met with some success and enabled Newman to clarify his Catholic understanding of faith.

Yet, when he developed his mature notion of Catholic faith in *A Grammar of Assent*, he rejected the intellectual-based approach of Roman theology and chose a more personalist approach. In doing so, Newman opens up a way to define faith in a Catholic sense that transcends the traditional Roman and neoscholastic approaches. The point is not that Newman's view of Catholic faith is perfect or that it answers all contemporary questions, but certainly his view of faith can help Catholics today put the different elements of the experience of faith in their proper perspective. His vision, his Catholic sensibility, and his critical fidelity to the church can provide the impetus for Catholics, especially Catholic theologians, to continue to reflect on the reality of faith and to work to develop Catholic understandings of faith that can serve as models for the church in the new millennium.

## NOTES

1. Aquinas, *Summa Theologica* II, 2, Q.1, A.1–10, 1055–73. Thomas Aquinas presents an intellectual approach to faith that recognizes both the personalist and critical elements in the act of faith. For Aquinas, the act of faith involves the intellect, the will, and the grace of God, and the assent of faith is compatible with what Aquinas calls *cogitatio*, thinking. Also, Aquinas's treatment of *fides formata* (the faith lived through love) is a personalism expressed through scholastic language. In discussing the object of faith, Aquinas distinguishes between the primary object of faith, God as First Truth, and the secondary, those things related to God as First Truth. As a result, Aquinas does not completely identify the teachings of the church with the Word of God.

2. These manuals include such works as Camillus Mazzella, *Praelectiones Scholastico-Dogmaticae* (Romae: S.C. De Propaganda Fide, 1884); Christian Pesch, *Compendium Theologiae Dogmaticae* (Friburgi Brisgoviae: Herder, 1924); A. D. Tanquerey, *Synopsis Theologiae Dogmaticae* (Parisus-Tornaci-Romae: Desclee & Socii, 1959); and Van Noort, *Dogmatic Theology: The Sources of Revelation*, trans. and rev. John J. Castelot and William R. Murphy (Westminster, MD: Newman, 1961). Although based on Aquinas, many of the manualists present an exaggerated, and often distorted, version of the intellectual approach to faith. Their treatment of the exclusion of doubt often gives the impression that all forms of questioning (thinking, *cogitatio*) are incompatible with faith. Also, they tend to identify the teaching of the Catholic Church completely with the Word of God. It is this approach that Newman encountered in Roman theology, and it is this intellectual approach that the magisterium of the Catholic Church seems to be intent on reviving today.

3. *Documents of the Church in English Translation*, trans. John F. Clarkson, John H. Edwards, William J. Kelly, and John J. Welch (St. Louis: Herder, 1962), #63-66, 28–29. See also Dermot A. Lane, *The Experience of God: An Invitation to Do Theology* (New York: Paulist, 1981), 55–56.

4. *The Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation of Vatican Council II*, commentary and trans. George H. Tavard (Glen Rock, NJ: Paulist, 1966), #2-4, 58-60. (Hereafter cited as *Dei Verbum*.)
5. *Dei Verbum*, #5, 60-61.
6. Lane, *Experience of God*, 59-60.
7. Thomas J. Norris, *Only Life Gives Life: Revelation, Theology and Christian Living According to Cardinal Newman* (Dublin: Columba, 1996), 33.
8. Norris, *Only Life Gives Life*, 33.
9. *GA*, 89.
10. *GA*, 82.
11. *GA*, 89.
12. *GA*, 89.
13. *GA*, 89.
14. *GA*, 90.
15. Norris, *Only Life Gives Life*, 51.
16. Norris, *Only Life Gives Life*, 51.
17. Charles Stephen Dessain, *John Henry Newman* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1961), 112.
18. John Coulson, "Introduction," in John Henry Newman, *On Consulting the Faithful in Matters of Doctrine* (Kansas City: Sheed & Ward, 1961), 8. Newman had written the passage, but it was left unsigned.
19. *LD*, XIX:136-37 and 141.
20. Newman, *On Consulting the Faithful*, 63.
21. Newman, *On Consulting the Faithful*, 75.
22. Newman, *On Consulting the Faithful*, 77.
23. *LD*, XIX:204-5.
24. Coulson, "Introduction," 38. Coulson points out that Bishop Brown wrote three letters to Propaganda before it decided to take up the case.
25. *LD*, XIX:277.
26. *LD*, XIX:289.
27. Sheridan Gilley, *Newman and His Age* (Westminster, MD: Christian Classics, 1991), 307. Gilley writes, "Wiseman's negligence can be explained by his illness, the onset of diabetes, and his preoccupation with the Errington affair, as well as by his legendary inefficiency."
28. Ian Ker, *John Henry Newman: A Biography* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1988), 608.
29. *LD*, XIX:276, n. 2.
30. Coulson, "Introduction," 42-43. In 1871 in the third edition of *The Arians of the Fourth Century*, Newman added an appendix in which he included an abbreviated version of the *Rambler* article and gave a point-by-point refutation of Rome's objections. Newman also made some significant changes in this version of the article.
31. Ker, *Newman: A Biography*, 690.
32. Dessain, *Newman*, 146.
33. Gilley, *Newman and His Age*, 379-80. A copy of Franchi's original letter is found in *LD*, XXVII:401.
34. Newman, *Norfolk*, 166.

35. Gilley, *Newman and His Age*, 380.
36. Dessain, *Newman*, 146.
37. *LD*, XII:29.
38. *LD*, XIX:150, Letter to Edward Healy Thompson, May 29, 1859.
39. *LD*, XIX:159.
40. *LD*, XI:212, Letter to Dalgairns, July 21, 1847.
41. *LD*, XII:137, Letter to Mrs. John Mozley, December 21, 1847.
42. *LD*, XII:214, Letter to Miss Giberne, June 6, 1848.
43. *LD*, XX:390.
44. *LD*, XVII:148.
45. *LD*, XII:55.
46. Ker, *Newman*, 330. Newman also sent Perrone a paper on his theory of development.
47. *LD*, XI:293, Letter to W. G. Penny, December 13, 1846. See also *LD*, XII:21, Letter to Wiseman, January 17, 1847.
48. *LD*, XI:352. The notation on Perrone mentions that at various times, notably in 1867, Perrone defended Newman's theology in Rome.
49. *LD*, XII:32.
50. *LD*, XI:279–80, Letter to Dalgairns, November 22, 1846.
51. *LD*, XIX:280.
52. *LD*, XIX:282–83.
53. *LD*, XIX:289–90. In this letter to Wiseman, Newman makes a point of the fact that the article on consulting the faithful in the July issue of the *Rambler* was unsigned; therefore, Propaganda could not, for certain, know that Newman was the author.
54. *LD*, XIX:280, January 24, 1860, memorandum.
55. Coulson, "Introduction," 43.
56. *LD*, XIX:167.
57. *LD*, XX:446.
58. *LD*, XXII:317.
59. *LD*, XXV:213, Letter to John Yeatman, September 26, 1870.
60. Ian Ker, "Newman and the Papacy," *Downside Review* 103 (April 1985): 90.
61. Ker, "Newman and the Papacy," 91.
62. Ker, "Newman and the Papacy," 137.
63. *LD*, XXV:224, Letter to Lady Simeon, November 1, 1870.
64. *LD*, XXV:231, Letter to Lady Simeon, November 18, 1870.
65. *LD*, XXV:310, Letter to Alfred Plummer, April 3, 1871.
66. *LD*, XXV:420, Letter to William Maskell, October 22, 1871.
67. Ker, "Newman and the Papacy," 97.
68. *Apo.*, 26.
69. *Dev.*, 40.
70. Thomas J. Reese, *Inside the Vatican: The Politics and Organization of the Catholic Church* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), 277–78.
71. Reese, *Inside the Vatican*, 281.
72. Reese, *Inside the Vatican*, 279–81.

73. Gregory Baum, *Faith and Doctrine: A Contemporary View* (New York: Newman, 1969), 44.
74. Avery Dulles, *The Survival of Dogma* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1971), 137–51.
75. Oliver A. Rabut, *Faith and Doubt*, trans. Bonnie and William Whitman (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1967), 68–83.
76. Henry Tristram, “Introduction,” in *AW*, 16.
77. *LD*, XXX:209, Letter to Malcolm Maccoll, April 28, 1883.
78. Jay Newman, *The Mental Philosophy of John Henry Newman* (Waterloo, Canada: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1986), 31.
79. Terence Kenny, *The Political Thought of John Henry Newman* (London: Longmans, Green, 1957), 169–73.
80. Kenny, *Political Thought of Newman*, 169.
81. Newman, *Mental Philosophy of Newman*, 32. Jay Newman adds, “Perhaps his intense hatred of Benthamism had made him somewhat callous; or maybe he was just too much an Oxford-trained ‘élitist’ to be able to relate well to the ungentlemanly masses.”
82. Newman, *Mental Philosophy of Newman*, 32.
83. *LD*, XIV:213–15, Letter to J. M. Capes, February 18, 1851.
84. John Henry Newman, *Lectures on the Present Position of Catholics in England* (London: Longmans, Green, 1903), 324, 326, 332, and 372–73. (Hereafter abbreviated *Prepos.*)
85. *Prepos.*, 373.
86. *LD*, XIV:214.
87. John Henry Newman, *Sermon Notes of John Henry Cardinal Newman, 1849–1878*, introduction and notes by James Tolhurst (Notre Dame: Gracewing, University of Notre Dame Press, 2000), 151. (Hereafter abbreviated *SN.*)
88. *SN*, 150.
89. *SN*, 151.
90. *SN*, 148.
91. *SN*, 149.
92. *SN*, 149.
93. *SN*, 153–54.
94. *LD*, XXXI:195, Letter to Hopkins, March 3, 1887.
95. Kenny, *Political Thought of Newman*, 168.
96. Newman, *Mental Philosophy of Newman*, 32.
97. Edward Norman, “Newman’s Social and Political Thinking,” in *Newman after a Hundred Years*, ed. Ian Ker and Alan G. Hill (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990), 173. Norman’s reasons for this position are questionable. He suggests that Newman held that the political and social order were derived from the order of natural truth and were not elements of revealed truth. This view appears to be at odds with Newman’s understanding of the relationship between the natural and the supernatural. The two are inseparable.
98. Newman, *Mental Philosophy of Newman*, 31.
99. Francis Schüssler Fiorenza and John P. Galvin, eds., *Systematic Theology: Roman Catholic Perspectives* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1991), 74.

100. Avery Dulles, *Newman, Outstanding Christian Thinkers* (London: Continuum, 2002), 116.
101. John Henry Newman, *Certain Difficulties Felt by Anglicans in Catholic Teaching Considered*, 2 vols. (London: Longmans, Green, 1908, 1910), 1:4–5.
102. Dulles, *Newman*, 129–30.
103. Dulles, *Newman*, 127.
104. Dulles, *Newman*, 130.
105. Dulles, *Newman*, 130.
106. John T. Ford, “Was Newman an Ecumenist?” *Josephinum Journal of Theology* 9, no. 2 (Summer/Fall 2002): 210.
107. *GA*, 438.
108. Dulles, *Newman*, 118.
109. *GA*, 440.
110. Francis McGrath, *John Henry Newman: Universal Revelation* (Macon, GA.: Mercer University Press, 1997), 89, 91. McGrath thinks that Newman’s reasons for not giving his notion of universal revelation a more prominent place in *A Grammar of Assent* are more practical and political than theological. Newman wanted to make sure that his Catholic readers would not be able to question the orthodoxy of *A Grammar of Assent* and so he employed, as McGrath puts it, “an ironical use of the principle of reserve” and downplayed the idea of a universal revelation.
111. *GA*, 431.
112. Gilley, *Newman and His Age*, 379–80. A copy of the letter from Propaganda is found in *LD*, XXVII:401.

## Appendix

### *Outline of Newman's Life and Works*

February 21, 1801	Born in London
May 1, 1808	Student at Ealing
March 8, 1816	Father's financial crisis
August/December 1816	Newman's evangelical conversion
December 14, 1816	Began matriculation at Trinity College, Oxford
February 12, 1822	Elected Fellow of Oriel College
May 16, 1824	Curacy at St. Clement
June 13, 1824	Ordained a deacon in the Anglican Church
September 1824	Father died
1925	<i>Apollonius of Tyana</i>
May 29, 1825	Ordained an Anglican priest
March 21, 1826	Tutor at Oriel
October/November 1827	Serious illness
January 5, 1828	Death of sister, Mary
December 8, 1832	Mediterranean vacation
1833–1841	<i>Tracts for the Times</i>
July 8, 1833	<i>The Arians of the Fourth Century</i>
July 14, 1833	Oxford movement
1834–1838	<i>The Via Media of the Anglican Church</i>
1834–1842	<i>Parochial and Plain sermons</i>
1838	<i>Lectures on Prophetical Office of the Church</i> <i>Lectures on Justification</i>
1839–1841	Crisis and doubts
1841	<i>Tract 90</i>
April 19, 1842	Moved to Littlemore

1843	<i>University Sermons</i> <i>Essay on Miracles</i> <i>Sermons on the Subject of the Day</i>
September 18, 1843	Resigned from St. Mary's
1844	Year of struggle <i>Lives of English Saints</i>
1845	<i>Development of Doctrine</i>
October 9, 1845	Conversion to Roman Catholicism
February 22, 1846	Moved to Oscott, Maryvale
1846–1847	Studies in Rome
May 30, 1847	Ordained a Catholic priest
1848	<i>Loss and Gain</i>
February 1, 1848	Oratory founded at Maryvale
1849	<i>Discourses Addressed to Mixed Congregations</i> Maryvale Oratory moved to Birmingham Oratory at London
1850	Catholic hierarchy restored <i>Lectures on Difficulties Felt by Anglicans</i>
1851	<i>Lectures on Present Position of Catholics in England</i>
November 12, 1851– November 12, 1858	The Catholic University in Ireland
1852	<i>Discourses on Scope and Nature of University Education (Idea 1)</i>
1853–1885 [1976]	<i>Theological Papers on Faith and Certainty</i>
1854–1856	<i>Office and Works of Universities</i>
1856	<i>Callista: A Sketch of the Third Century</i>
1857	<i>Sermons Preached on Various Occasions</i>
1858–1859	Rambler incident
1859	<i>Lectures and Essays on University Subjects (Idea 2)</i> <i>On Consulting the Faithful in Matters of Doctrine</i>
July 1859	Editor of <i>Rambler</i>
1859–1864	Years of silence
1864	Kingsley controversy <i>Apologia pro Vita Sua</i>
1864–1867	Oxford controversy
1866	<i>The Dream of Gerontius</i>
1868–1870	The Certitude of Faith
1870	<i>A Grammar of Assent</i>
1872	<i>Historical Sketches</i>

1873	<i>The Idea of a University, Defined and Illustrated</i> , final revision
1874	Revision of works
1874–1875	Gladstone controversy
1875	<i>Letter to the Duke of Norfolk</i>
February 1878	Honorary Fellow at Trinity College, Oxford
May 12, 1879	Made a cardinal
1879–1890	Final years
1884	<i>Obligations of Catholics Concerning the Inspiration of Scripture</i>
August 11, 1890	Died at Birmingham Oratory



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## About the Author

**JOHN R. CONNOLLY** is professor of theological studies at Loyola Marymount University in Los Angeles, California.

