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METAPHYSICAL THEMES IN THOMAS AQUINAS II

John F. Wippel



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IN THOMAS AQUINAS II**

**STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY
AND THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY**

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John F. Wippel

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Abbreviations

CCL	<i>Corpus Christianorum. Series Latina</i>
CSEL	<i>Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum</i>
PG	<i>Patrologiae cursus completus, Series Graeca</i> , ed. J. P. Migne
PL	<i>Patrologiae cursus completus, Series Latina</i> , ed. J. P. Migne
ST	<i>Summa theologiae</i> , Thomas Aquinas
SCG	<i>Summa contra Gentiles</i> , Thomas Aquinas

**METAPHYSICAL THEMES
IN THOMAS AQUINAS II**

Introduction

This volume includes a number of articles and book-chapters which have appeared since 1984 when my *Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas* was first published.¹ Many of them have also appeared since 1999 when I completed my work on *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas: From Finite Being to Uncreated Being*.² Since in various ways the present studies complement work contained in the two volumes just mentioned, I trust it will be helpful to interested readers for me to gather them together in one place rather than simply leave them in the scattered publications where they originally appeared. I have updated these studies by adding bibliographical references in the notes and have introduced certain changes into the text where I have judged it appropriate. One of them, Chapter IX below, has not previously been published. In order to situate this volume in relation to my *Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas* of 1984, I have decided to entitle it *Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas II*.

In Chapter I of the present volume I revisit from a slightly different perspective an issue that I had already considered at some length in the first chapter of my *Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas*. There I presented and then subjected to critique Étienne Gilson's views on Christian Philosophy. The present study adopts a broader perspective by first offering some general remarks about the distinction and relationship between faith and reason in Christian thinkers prior to Aquinas. Then some additional precisions made by Thomas Aquinas on the relationship between reason and faith and philosophy and theology are introduced. Finally, I enter into a more theoretical discussion of the issue of Christian Philosophy in light of Aquinas's texts on faith and reason. Here I develop somewhat more fully a distinction already employed in my earlier discussion in *Metaphysical Themes* between Christian philosophy in the moment of discovery and Christian philosophy in the moment of proof. As the reader will see, while I am sympathetic to the notion of Christian philosophy taken in the first sense, I find the idea of Christian philoso-

1. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1984.

2. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2000.

phy in the moment of proof to be contrary to Aquinas's principles and self-refuting in itself.

In Chapter II the Latin version of Avicenna's *First Philosophy* or *Metaphysica* is examined as an important source for Aquinas's development of certain aspects of his personal metaphysics. A number of positive influences are first identified and examined. Thus in developing his own solution to the difficult issue of reconciling Aristotle's description of a science of being as being in *Metaphysics* IV, cc. 1–2 with his presentation of a philosophical "divine science" in *Metaphysics* VI, c. 1, Thomas sides with Avicenna and against Averroes' solution. But on the issue of the relationship between God and being as being—the subject of metaphysics—Aquinas goes well beyond the Avicennian position.

Again, in his frequent references to being as that which is first known to the intellect and that into which the intellect resolves its other conceptions, Aquinas clearly follows Avicenna. But I also suggest that in developing his own explanation of how one arrives at knowledge of the subject of metaphysics—being as being—by appealing to a special kind of judgment (*separatio*), Thomas may have been influenced by Avicenna. Nonetheless, Thomas's fully developed theory is not to be found in Avicenna.

Aquinas is also familiar with and, at least in his earlier writings, accepts Avicenna's distinction of three ways in which a nature or essence may be considered. He maintains that Avicenna distinguishes between essence and existence in beings other than God in a way that is not merely logical or conceptual; but he also believes that Avicenna viewed existence as if it were an accident superadded to essence, and criticizes him for this.

On the other hand, there are other aspects of Avicenna's metaphysics that Aquinas simply rejects and corrects. Perhaps most notable among these is the Avicennian and Neoplatonic view that from the supreme principle, the One or God, only one effect can proceed immediately. According to Avicenna, this unique effect—the First Intelligence—necessarily and eternally proceeds from God, followed by the necessary and eternal procession of a Second Intelligence and two other principles from the First Intelligence, and of still other Intelligences and principles by a similar descending procession. Against this Aquinas develops a series of arguments to show that God freely creates effects external to himself. He denies that God's creative power can be communicated to any creature. He explains how many different effects can be created immediately by God. And he denies that it can be demonstrated philosophically that the world is eternal even though, as is well known, he also denies that human reason can prove that the world began to be.

Chapter III presents a fairly detailed study of Aquinas's understanding of truth, including both truth of being or ontological truth, and truth as

it exists in the intellect or logical truth. In fact, because of the length of this study, it originally appeared as a two-part article. Here, however, in order to preserve its intrinsic integrity, I have judged it better to unite the two parts into one chapter, even though this results in its being the longest chapter in this volume. After some introductory remarks on Aquinas's understanding of truth as an adequation of the intellect and a thing and his distinction between truth of being and truth as it exists in the intellect, I raise seven questions around which the remainder of the chapter turns. Here I will simply mention the first two since they strike me as being especially important.

The first question is this: Is truth formally and intrinsically present only in the intellect, or is it also present in things themselves, that is, in being? In tracing this issue through various texts in Aquinas, I have found it helpful to distinguish with him between truth taken in the strict sense (*proprie*) and truth taken broadly (*improprie*). According to Thomas truth is present in the divine intellect primarily and when taken in the strict sense. It is also present in the human intellect when it is taken strictly (*proprie*), but only in secondary fashion. It is present in things or in being only in secondary fashion, and only when truth is taken broadly (*improprie*). Nonetheless, it *is* present in things or in being intrinsically and formally, but only, if I may repeat this point, when it is taken broadly.

The second general question asks whether truth is transcendental. To anticipate briefly Aquinas's answer to this, when truth is predicated of things it is convertible with being in the order of predication, but not when it is taken as referring to truth of the intellect. When taken in the latter sense truth is convertible with extramental being only by way of consequence. I also would like to stress the point that throughout his different discussions of truth, Aquinas defends both truth of being (ontological truth) and truth of the intellect (logical truth).

If Chapter III stands out in this volume because of its great length, the opposite is true of Chapter IV. Its brevity is owing to the spatial limitations of the festschrift in which it originally appeared. Nonetheless, it has something in common with the two immediately following chapters in that it is concerned with one of those axioms or, some might say, adages, that Aquinas frequently cites and which, it seems to me, deserve greater attention in their own right from Thomistic scholars. In Chapter IV the axiom in question states that "whatever is received is received according to the mode of the receiver." While Thomas frequently appeals to this axiom and in different contexts, four different kinds of application are considered here, even though they should not be viewed as exhaustive, namely, sense perception, human intellection, divine knowledge of creatures, and divine knowledge of future contingents.

In Chapter V another of these axioms or adages is examined which, at least in my view, plays a central role in Aquinas's metaphysics. In its first part the axiom states that "unreceived act is unlimited." In its second part it maintains that "act is not limited except by a distinct potency that receives it." However, its role in Aquinas's metaphysics, and especially its application to his theory of essence and *esse*, is disputed among Thomistic scholars.

Some maintain that Aquinas applies it widely, and emphasize his application of it to the essence-*esse* relationship. Others also recognize that Aquinas accepts and frequently employs this axiom, but deny that he in fact applies it to the essence-*esse* relationship. But they grant that it can be so applied. Still others, however, deny that Thomas himself defended and used this axiom at all, at least in its second part.

Consequently, I have judged it helpful to collect and examine the textual evidence. This evidence, I maintain, indicates that Thomas did indeed embrace and use this axiom in both of its parts. I also suggest that it offers one promising way of arguing for his theory of distinction and composition of essence and *esse* in finite beings, although it is not the way in which he usually argues for this conclusion. Finally, I explore different possible ways in which one might attempt to justify this axiom in light of Thomas's texts and metaphysical thought.

In Chapter VI still another general axiom or adage is examined, namely, that "every agent produces something that is like itself." The introductory part of this chapter briefly recalls Aquinas's view that when it comes to our knowledge of God, we can know that he is, and what he is not, but not what he is. Certain texts are then considered in which Thomas turns to this principle to support his view that some names can be predicated of God analogically, to be sure, but also with some kind of positive meaning or content, that is, the names of pure perfections such as being, good, true, etc.

A second part of this chapter explores the different justifications for this principle or axiom that may be found in Aquinas's texts. At times, in fact, he simply cites the axiom without offering any justification for it. On other occasions he offers a kind of inductive justification for it, but very rarely when he applies it to the issue of the divine names. Indeed, it seems to me that an inductive approach will not suffice to justify his transcendent application of this axiom to the divine names.

On still other occasions he offers a kind of deductive justification, and some examples of this are examined and criticized. His presentations of this approach are extremely brief and, in my view, require some metaphysical strengthening when it comes to transcendent applications of this axiom to the issue of the divine names. I suggest that this buttressing

may be found in Thomas's argumentation for the point that God is all perfect and must, therefore, formally possess in preeminent and analogical fashion those pure perfections that we first discover in creatures.

Chapter VII examines another difficult and disputed issue in Thomistic interpretation, concerning whether created agents may be regarded as causes of *esse* in any way. In the twentieth century it was frequently asserted that, according to Aquinas, no created agent can efficiently cause existence either as a principal cause or as an instrumental cause. My findings support this claim only up to a certain point. Thomas denies in his mature writings that any created agent can serve either as a principal or as an instrumental cause in the act of creating itself. But when it comes to determining whether any created agent might serve as an instrumental cause in generating or in conserving *esse* in some noncreative sense, his position proves to be more complicated.

A first part of the chapter examines Thomas's oft-repeated statement to the effect that "form gives *esse*" (*forma dat esse*). It is clear that this should not be taken as implying that the substantial form of any created entity could be the efficient cause of its own act of being (*esse*). Thomas explicitly rejects this as self-contradictory.

But examination of some of his more mature texts suggests that regarding the production of *esse* in the generation of material substances, and in their conservation in being, his position is very nuanced. Without repeating here my detailed analysis of these texts, let it suffice for me to note that Thomas's distinction between created *causae fiendi* and *causae essendi* is an important part of his solution. While he never maintains that a created agent could be the principal efficient cause of *esse* in the generation of material entities, he does in some texts assign some lesser role as an instrumental cause of *esse* to certain created agents in generating such entities and also, in a less extended way, in conserving them in *esse* as well. Because of the complicated nature of his different discussions of this, I conclude this chapter by offering a ten-point résumé of his mature position.

Chapter VIII contains a somewhat expanded version of an article originally published in 1998 in a special issue of the *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* dedicated to Aquinas and edited by Norman Kretzmann. It addresses itself in a modest way to an issue that Thomas seems to have left partly unanswered for his readers. If one grants with him that philosophical arguments can prove, indeed can demonstrate certain truths about God (preambles of faith) such as his existence and unity and other things of this kind, to how many of the divine attributes does Thomas extend this possibility? Since he does not give us an exhaustive list of such attributes, it seems that we can address this only by reviewing his ar-

gumentation for each attribute in detail in order to determine whether or not he regards such argumentation as demonstrative or as only probable. This chapter concentrates on only one attribute—divine omnipotence. Even in this case, one encounters some difficulty in reconciling seemingly opposed responses in Thomas’s corpus.

Thus in a challenging text from *De veritate*, q. 14, a. 9, ad 8, Aquinas writes that the “unity of the divine essence in the way it is held by believers, namely, together with omnipotence and providence over all and other things of this kind which cannot be proved, constitutes an article (of faith).” Something very similar seems to be implied by another very late text, *Summa theologiae* [ST] II-II, q. 1, a. 8, ad 1.

On the other hand, as this chapter brings out in some detail, in a series of discussions in other texts ranging from his very early Commentary on the *Sentences* until his mature ST I, Aquinas offers a series of rational or philosophical arguments to show that God is powerful, and that he is infinitely powerful and, therefore, that he is omnipotent. Moreover, he often implies, and in at least one case explicitly states, that the philosophers have demonstrated that God is omnipotent. One seems, therefore, to be left with two alternatives. Perhaps Aquinas changed his mind on this point (at the time of *De veritate*, q. 14) and then quickly changed it again, and subsequently changed it still again (by the time of ST II-II). Or perhaps these two seemingly opposed lines of thinking can be reconciled. I make an effort at the end of the chapter to show how this may be done.

Chapter IX is an extended version of my inaugural lecture in the newly created Theodore Basselin Chair in Philosophy at the Catholic University of America in January 2002. It addresses an issue that follows from Thomas’s attribution of will to God: Is God free to create or not to create at all? While debate concerning the legitimacy of Aquinas’s position on this was prompted in the 1930s by the interpretation offered by Arthur Lovejoy’s *Great Chain of Being*, it has recently been reopened because of the interpretation and critique offered by the late Norman Kretzmann in several of his publications. Here I briefly place the problem within its broader historical context and then present and defend Aquinas’s position in light of his texts.

Aquinas’s critics on this point recognize that he defended God’s freedom to create or not create as well as his freedom to create this particular universe or any other. The controversy has to do with whether he was philosophically successful in defending these positions. Kretzmann, for instance, maintains that while Thomas did successfully establish God’s freedom to create this or some other universe, he failed to show that God was free to create or not to create at all. A major reason for this is Thomas’s frequent recourse to the Neoplatonic axiom that the good is

diffusive of itself. According to some, Thomas should have concluded from this that because God is perfectly good, and because the good is diffusive of itself, he was not free not to create. He had to create.

After presenting Aquinas's argumentation in defense of God's freedom to create or not to create, I turn in the final part of the chapter to his particular way of interpreting the Neoplatonic axiom, and especially as he finds it in Pseudo-Dionysius. Central to his acceptance of this axiom is his refusal to interpret it as implying that the good must efficiently communicate goodness. According to Aquinas the axiom should rather be interpreted as implying final causality, not efficient causation. Also central to Thomas's solution is his explanation of God's *reason* for deciding to create (God's decision has no cause) and his claim that God's manifestation of his own goodness can be achieved equally perfectly with or without distinct created effects.

Chapter X addresses another contested issue within relatively recent Thomistic scholarship: Why did Thomas Aquinas spend so much time and effort during the final years of his life in writing detailed commentaries on Aristotle? Some more theologizing students of Aquinas have maintained that this was simply part of his work as a theologian, and that we should therefore read his commentaries on Aristotle as theological writings. For instance, R.-A. Gauthier held that Thomas composed his Commentaries on the *De anima* and the *Ethics* in order to support his writing of the related parts of the *Summa theologiae*. Such an explanation does not adequately account for his writing the other Aristotelian commentaries, however, nor does it preclude a genuine philosophical interest on Thomas's part in writing the two Commentaries just mentioned as well as the others.

And so the discussion continues. According to one explanation, with Étienne Gilson as its best-known champion, Thomas's purpose in writing his Aristotelian commentaries was simply to offer an objective presentation of Aristotle's thought. Therefore he was simply the *expositor* in composing them, and we should not turn to them when we are seeking to identify his personal philosophical thought. At the opposite end of the spectrum, other twentieth-century interpreters have claimed that everything we find in the commentaries is an expression of Aquinas's personal philosophical views. Not only should we turn to them in our attempts to discern his personal philosophical thought; some seem to think that we should use them exclusively rather than rely on his more independent writings. Another view suggests that, at least in his Commentary on the *Metaphysics*, Aquinas wanted to do both, that is, to set forth Aristotle's thought objectively, and to express his own views. But he could not in fact achieve this because the two are not identical.

In order to cast some light on this, and in line with the general nature of this volume, here I restrict myself to only one of his commentaries, his Commentary on the *Metaphysics*. And since I cannot comment on this entire Commentary within the limits of the present chapter, I have selected a small number of “test cases,” as it were, in order to illustrate how Thomas actually proceeds in different situations.

Without anticipating here my discussion of each of these test cases, let me simply note that I have found no simple answer to the question about Thomas’s intention in writing this Commentary. Suffice it to say that throughout the Commentary, Thomas is certainly attempting to set forth Aristotle’s thought as clearly and accurately as possible. Moreover, in most of the cases I have here examined, he also regards Aristotle’s thought as true. However, in some of these cases he does introduce certain of his own insights and positions into Aristotle’s text. In some of these cases he evidently thinks that they are compatible with Aristotle’s own thought and, if not explicitly present in his texts, are legitimate developments of the Stagirite’s text. Nonetheless, at times he seems to force Aristotle’s text in doing this, presumably because he is convinced of the truth of the position he is introducing and believes that Aristotle must have held the same, in accord with the medieval tradition of reverential interpretation of authoritative texts. At times Thomas introduces a personal position, such as his view on the relationship between essence and *esse* while criticizing Avicenna’s position, without attributing this to Aristotle at all, and this is, in my view, very significant. And at times he simply corrects Aristotle, as when he criticizes his argumentation for an eternal world.

My view, therefore, is that one should not ignore Thomas’s Commentary on the *Metaphysics* when seeking after his personal metaphysical thought. He was not merely the *expositor* in writing this Commentary. On the other hand, one should not assume that every interpretation of Aristotle offered there expresses Thomas’s personal view. Nor should one assume that he is attributing to Aristotle every personal position that he himself espouses there. If one were to restrict oneself to this Aristotelian Commentary in searching for Aquinas’s personal metaphysics, one would miss many of his most original contributions which are to be found in his more independent writings. But if one were to ignore it in one’s search for Aquinas’s personal metaphysics, one would overlook another important source for the same.

The paper included here as Chapter XI was originally presented at a meeting of the Pontifical Academy of Saint Thomas Aquinas at Vatican City in June 2004, and may also serve as a fitting conclusion for this volume. Directed to the question of “Platonism and Aristotelianism in Aquinas,” it

follows naturally from the discussion in Chapter X of Thomas's intention in writing his Commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. In this final chapter I again restrict myself to a consideration of Thomas's metaphysics since it is there that the strongest case can be made for the presence of significant non-Aristotelian elements, that is, of Platonic and/or Neoplatonic elements, in his philosophy. And so I begin by acknowledging that his philosophy of nature, including his philosophy of human nature, is fundamentally Aristotelian. So too, it seems to me, is his theory of knowledge.

Nonetheless, I also note that in his Commentary on the *De Trinitate*, q. 6, a. 2, he explains that while all our knowledge begins with sense experience, it does not always terminate there. In the case of metaphysics, in particular, one deals with the kind of things that do not depend on matter in the order of existence. Therefore our knowledge of such things should not terminate either at the level of the external senses (as in physics or natural philosophy) or at the level of the imagination (as in mathematics), but only at the level of the intellect. Then, in order to explain how we can arrive at knowledge of such things, he cites Dionysius rather than Aristotle, and notes that in order to do this we must use the way of causality, the way of transcendence, and the way of negation. Here, therefore, he has introduced an important Neoplatonic element into his explanation of our knowledge of the things studied by metaphysics.

It must also be granted that many Aristotelian themes are present in Aquinas's metaphysical thought. After mentioning some of these, I note that while both Thomas and Aristotle hold that metaphysics is the science of being as being, they do not understand being in the same way. For Thomas being is a complex notion, involving both a quidditative and an existential aspect, and expressed by him as "that which is." This complexity in our understanding of being corresponds to and reflects an ontological complexity in all finite beings—a distinction and composition of essence and *esse*.

Thomas's view on the essence-*esse* distinction and composition is one of the most important non-Aristotelian aspects of his personal metaphysics, along with the various types of argumentation he offers for this. In this chapter I single out for the purpose of illustration the complex three-stage argumentation he presents in *De ente et essentia*, c. 4. The second stage reasons from the impossibility of there being more than one being in which essence and *esse* are identical to their distinction in all other beings, and is repeated in its essentials in various discussions of this issue in Thomas's subsequent writings. As for earlier sources for his views on essence and *esse*, he was familiar with an earlier version of an essence-existence distinction which he finds in Avicenna, but is critical

of Avicenna's theory as he understands it. While it is doubtful whether this theory is really present either in Boethius's *De Hebdomadibus* or in the *Liber de causis*, Thomas himself does credit both with some such theory. They, of course, are Neoplatonic sources.

Moreover, as will be noted below in different contexts, Thomas views *esse* as the actuality of all acts and the perfection of all perfections, thereby introducing his understanding of it as intensive act or as the *actus essendi*. This, too, should be recognized as another important non-Aristotelian element of his metaphysics, and one which has been traced back to Dionysius and also to the *Liber de causis* and to Proclus as likely influences. Nonetheless, Thomas's own understanding of this notion is original. In addition, as I suggest in Chapter V, his understanding of *esse* as intensive act underlies his view that unreceived *esse* is unlimited. And this, as W. N. Clarke pointed out more than 50 years ago, presupposes an understanding of infinity that is absent from both Plato and Aristotle, that is, of infinity taken intensively and as perfection rather than extensively and as imperfection. Clarke has shown, at least to my satisfaction, that this understanding of infinity is present in Plotinus. Hence he is another important but indirect Neoplatonic source, since Thomas himself did not have direct access to his texts.

Finally, I conclude my illustrations of Platonic/Neoplatonic influences on Aquinas's metaphysics by considering his theory of participation, especially of finite beings as participating in *esse*, and the important role he assigns to divine exemplar ideas. But rather than conclude from all of this that Aquinas's metaphysics is primarily Platonic/Neoplatonic with important elements taken from Aristotle or that it is primarily Aristotelian with important elements taken from the Platonic/Neoplatonic tradition, I would point out that it is not reducible to any earlier philosophical tradition or source(s). It is an original production by Thomas himself, with his unique way of drawing upon both the Platonic/Neoplatonic and the Aristotelian traditions being one mark of its originality. The best name I can think of to describe it is the familiar one—"Thomistic"—if we simply mean thereby the metaphysical thought present in Aquinas's own writings.

Chapter I

THE POSSIBILITY OF A CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY A Thomistic Perspective

In addressing myself to this issue, I have chosen to concentrate on what one might call a “Thomistic” perspective for at least two reasons: first in order to bring some historical background to bear on this topic; and secondly, because in my opinion today’s believing Christian who would engage in philosophizing about certain questions of relevance to his religious belief may find something useful in Aquinas’s approach. At the same time, I am only too aware that the proper interpretation of Aquinas’s thinking on this matter has been subject to considerable debate during the twentieth century, and especially during the period running roughly from 1930 into the 1960s. In 1931 a memorable conflict about the possibility of Christian Philosophy broke out between Émile Bréhier and Étienne Gilson at a meeting of the *Société française de philosophie*. This was followed by another lively session devoted to the same problem some two years later at a meeting of the French Thomist society, held at Juvisy.¹ While these debates were by no means limited to the

1. For the Proceedings of the first meeting see *Bulletin de la Société française de Philosophie* 31 (1931). See in particular pp. 40–49 (Gilson’s presentation), pp. 49–52 (Bréhier’s presentation), and pp. 52–59 (running debate between them). Also see the important interventions by Jacques Maritain (pp. 59–72), L. Brunschvicg (pp. 73–77), and the discussion between Gilson and Brunschvicg (pp. 77–82). An interesting letter from Maurice Blondel is also published there as an appendix (pp. 86–92). For the second meeting see *Journées d’Études de la Société thomiste*, Vol. 2: *La Philosophie chrétienne*. Juvisy, 11 Septembre 1933 (Juvisy, 1934). For a bibliography of other discussions of this issue during the years 1931–1933 see pp. 165–69. For an interesting report about this meeting prepared before the appearance of the published proceedings see F. Van Steenberghe, “La IIe Journée d’Études de la Société Thomiste et la notion de ‘philosophie chrétienne,’” *Revue néoscholastique de philosophie* 35 (1933), pp. 539–54. Already at this point in the discussion Van Steenberghe had taken a strong position: there are indeed Christian philosophers, but there is no such thing as a Christian Philosophy when this expression is taken in a formal and rigorous sense (see p. 554). Also see M. Nédoncelle, *Is There a Christian Philosophy*, Twentieth Century Encyclopedia of Catholicism, Vol. 10 (New York, 1960), Ch. V (“The Debate of 1931”), pp. 85–99.

proper interpretation of Aquinas's thinking on this matter, this would become a central part of much of the ensuing controversy concerning the possibility of a Christian Philosophy.²

One reason for the disagreement concerning the proper interpretation of Aquinas's thought on this issue may be the fact that he did not address himself in so many words to the problem of Christian Philosophy. He did, however, have a great deal to say about the relationship between faith and reason. And in his own work as a professional theologian, he did develop a highly sophisticated philosophy. One can learn from Thomas not only by observing what he said about the faith-reason problem, but also by considering carefully what he did—the procedure he followed—in addressing himself to topics of philosophical interest.³

It will not be my intention here to rehearse the various elements of the twentieth-century debate concerning Christian Philosophy. What I rather propose to do is to single out certain generally accepted principles and procedures which one finds in many Christian thinkers long before Aquinas. Then I would like to highlight some additional precisions contributed by Thomas himself to the general issue of the faith-reason problem. Finally, I would like to offer some reflections about the possible application of some of Thomas's precisions to the twentieth-century situation for the Christian philosopher.

I

Long before the time of Aquinas we find a fairly clear awareness on the part of many leading Christian thinkers of the difference between believing in something because it has been revealed by God, on the one

2. For an effort to trace the development of Gilson's thinking on this matter see my *Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas* (Washington, D.C., 1984), ch. I, section 1. For some critical reactions to Gilson's interpretation of Aquinas, see ch. I, section 2. For a good résumé of Van Steenberghen's long disagreement with Gilson concerning the general issue of Christian Philosophy and the proper interpretation of Aquinas concerning the same see his "Étienne Gilson, historien de la pensée médiévale," *Revue philosophique de Louvain* 77 (1979), esp. pp. 493–505.

3. What I have in mind here is the manner in which he carefully distinguishes between the way of philosophy and the way of faith, for instance, in his rebuttal of the Averroistic theory of the intellect in his *De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas*. There, while noting that this particular theory is indeed at odds with Catholic faith, Thomas states his intention of showing that the Averroistic interpretation is against the principles of philosophy. See *Tractatus de unitate intellectus contra Averroistas, Sancti Thomae de Aquino Opera Omnia* (Leon. ed., Rome, 1882—), Vol. 43, p. 291:29–32 = Leon. 43.291:29–32. Again, his writing of philosophical opuscula and of detailed commentaries on Aristotle shows considerable concern for the work of the philosopher. Finally, his careful presentation of a distinctive subject-matter, methodology, and level of verification for each of the theoretical sciences manifests the same concern for the integrity of the philosophical sciences. See his *Expositio super librum Boethii De Trinitate* (Leon. 50), q. 5, a. 1; q. 5, a. 3; q. 5, a. 4; q. 6, a. 1; q. 6, a. 2.

hand, and accepting it as true because it has been demonstrated, on the other. One can offer illustrations of this from some of the Fathers of the Church. For that matter, a number of Christian thinkers also saw this same distinction implied by Paul's statement in Romans 1:20: "For since the creation of the world his invisible attributes are clearly seen—his everlasting power and divinity—being understood through the things that are made." Without pausing here to discuss whether this is or is not the correct interpretation of this oft-quoted scriptural passage, it will be enough for me to stress the fact that it was frequently enough cited—and cited to make the point that certain fundamental truths can be discovered about God without one's relying on revelation and that these were accessible to the pagans.⁴

At the same time, we have an interesting case in Justin the Martyr. He tells of his having investigated the various leading philosophies of his day, and of his ability to find satisfaction only in Christianity. For this, as he puts it, is the only sure and useful philosophy. Here the term "philosophy" is being used in a broad sense, so as to be equivalent to a distinctive world-view, in this case, Christianity. But Justin also refers to the writings of the prophets, who "gave no proof at that time for their statements. For, as reliable witnesses of the truth, they were beyond proof." Implied in that remark seems to be our distinction between believing something and accepting it because it has been proved.⁵

Or if we turn to St. Augustine, he distinguishes clearly between believing something on religious grounds and proving it philosophically, for instance, in Bk. II of his *De libero arbitrio*. But in that very same context he quotes Isaias 7:9 from the Latin translation of the Septuagint to this

4. For this in Augustine see, for instance, *De Genesi ad Litteram* IV, ch. 32, 49 (PL 34.316–17), English trans. *St. Augustine. The Literal Meaning of Genesis*, Ancient Christian Writers, No. 41 (New York, 1982), p. 139; *Enarrationes in Psalmos* 41, 6–8 (PL 36.467–69; CCL 38.463–66). Cf. *Confessions* X, 6, 10 (CCL 27.160); and *Sermo 126* (PL 38.699). Concerning the first two texts see Gilson's remarks in his *The Christian Philosophy of St. Augustine* (New York, 1960), p. 19 and nn. 34, 37. For Anselm see his *Reply to Gaunilo* VIII, Latin and English in *St. Anselm's Proslogion With A Reply on Behalf of the Fool by Gaunilo and The Author's Reply to Gaunilo*, trans. M. J. Charlesworth (Oxford, 1965), pp. 186, 187. Though Paul's text is frequently cited by Aquinas, it will be enough here for me to mention his Commentary on Paul's Letter to the Romans. For this see *S. Thomae Aquinatis Super Epistolam ad Romanos Lectura* in *S. Thomae Aquinatis Super Epistolas S. Pauli Apostoli Lectura*, Vol. 1, ed. R. Cai (Turin-Rome: Marietti, 1953), c. 1, lect. 6 (pp. 21–23).

5. For Justin see his *Dialogue with Trypho*, cc. 8 and 7, English translation in *Writings of St. Justin Martyr*, trans. T. B. Falls, Fathers of the Church, Vol. 6 (New York, 1948), pp. 160, 159. For Justin's appeal to the Stoic teaching about an all-pervading Logos in order to account for the pagans' discovery of some truth before the coming of Christ see his *First Apology*, c. 46 (ed. cit., pp. 83–84); *Second Apology*, cc. 8, 10, 13 (pp. 127–28, 129–30, 133–34). On this in Justin see H. Chadwick, in *The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy* (Cambridge, 1967), ch. 9, pp. 160–66; R. A. Markus, in A. H. Armstrong and R. A. Markus, *Christian Faith and Greek Philosophy* (London, 1960), pp. 143–44.

effect: “Unless you believe, you shall not understand.” The fact that the Septuagint, and hence its Latin translation as known to Augustine, was a mistranslation does not alter the historical importance this admonition was to have on subsequent Latin medieval thought. First believe, and then seek to understand, we are repeatedly reminded by an Anselm and others who follow in his wake.⁶

Against this, one might offer Boethius as a counterexample. In him we have a far sharper separation between that which he accepts on religious faith, and that which he analyzes philosophically. This is reflected by the fact that he did write purely philosophical works—translations and commentaries in large measure, to be sure—and that he also wrote what we know today as his “theological treatises.” In most of the latter, however, there is an interesting application of philosophical reasoning to topics which follow from and presuppose the Christian faith. His *Consolation of Philosophy* stands apart. There we have a philosophical discussion of some of the great problems both for theistic philosophers and for religious believers—the seeming triumph of evil rather than of virtue in this life, and the reconciliation of all of this and of free human activity with an omniscient and provident God. So sparing is Boethius of references to his Christian faith in the *Consolation* (there is no explicit mention of it) that for a time some scholars doubted that this work could have been written by a believing Christian, that is, by the author of the theological treatises. Yet it clearly was.⁷

6. For this see his *De libero arbitrio libri tres* II, cc. 2–3 (CSEL 74.41–42). On Augustine’s usage of the text from Isaiah see the brief but helpful discussion by F. J. Thonnard in *Oeuvres de saint Augustin VI. Dialogues Philosophiques III: De l’Âme à Dieu, De magistro, De libero arbitrio* (Paris, 1952), pp. 514–17. For Anselm see, for example, the closing remark in *Proslogion* I: “For I do not seek to understand so that I may believe; but I believe so that I may understand. For I believe this also, that ‘unless I believe, I shall not understand.’” See Charlesworth, ed. cit., p. 115. For Charlesworth’s discussion of faith and reason in Anselm see pp. 30–46, including some major objections to Karl Barth’s well-known interpretation (pp. 40–45). As Charlesworth rightly points out, extreme interpretations of Anselm can make him out to be a rationalist, on the one side, or a fideist, on the other. In fact he appears to be neither. Also see J. Hopkins, *A Companion to the Study of St. Anselm* (Minneapolis, 1972), ch. II (“Faith and Reason”). The recommendation first to believe and then to seek to understand admits of a twofold application, both in Augustine and in Anselm. It may be directed to naturally knowable truths, such as God’s existence; or it may be directed to one’s subsequent effort to penetrate more deeply into that which one can only believe.

7. Among Boethius’s theological treatises the one frequently referred to as the *De Hebdomadibus* does not apply philosophical reasoning to a distinctively Christian topic, but rather concentrates on a fundamental metaphysical problem: How may substances be good in their essence (*in eo quod sint*) without being good of their essence (*substantialia bona*)? For the Latin text and an English translation see *Boethius. The Theological Tractates with an English Translation; The Consolation of Philosophy with an English Translation*, trans. H. F. Stewart, E. K. Rand, and S. J. Tester (Cambridge, Mass.–London, 1978), pp. 38–51. On the authorship of the theological treatises and the *Consolation* see H. Chadwick, *Boethius. The Consolations of Music, Logic, Theology, and Philosophy* (Oxford, 1981), pp. 174ff. On Boethius’s logical works

I have recalled the above points in order to show that long before the time of Aquinas Christian thinkers were already well aware of the need to make some distinction between that which they believed and that which they claimed to establish by natural reason. At the same time, it must also be admitted that relatively few of these Christian writers were interested in working out a pure philosophy for its own sake, or in protecting the autonomy of any such philosophy. Most of them were much more interested in developing what, for want of a better expression, we might call “Christian wisdom.” Many of them would employ and even develop a great deal of philosophical reasoning in pursuing Christian wisdom, as they understood it, and some wrote what we might, even by post-medieval standards, refer to as philosophical works.⁸ But in the main, as I have indicated, they were much more interested in using and developing philosophy only insofar as it could be of service to their pursuit of Christian wisdom. To what extent, then, if at all, were these writers engaged in what we might call “Christian Philosophy?”

It has been suggested, for instance by F. Van Steenberghen, that we might take the term “philosophy” very broadly, so as to signify a general *Weltanschauung* or world-view. In this sense we can refer to the achievements of such thinkers not only as illustrations of Christian wisdom, it would seem, but also as illustrations of Christian Philosophy. The only problem with this is that the word “philosophy” is being used very broadly, so as to be equivalent to wisdom, and this application as Christian Philosophy seems to cover both the philosophical and theological dimensions of the achievement of such Christian writers. But suppose we take the term “philosophy” much more strictly, so as to apply only to an enterprise worked out on purely rational grounds and under the positive guidance of natural reason alone. Then, while it remains true that we can refer to such early Christian thinkers as Christian philosophers, it seems to be more difficult to justify describing their work as Christian Philosophy.⁹

see the same, pp. 108–73. Also see E. Stump, *Boethius's De topicis differentiis. Translated, with Notes and Essays on the Text* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1978). On the theological treatises and the *Consolation* also see J. Marenbon, *Boethius* (Oxford, 2003), cc. 5–8.

8. See, for instance, the various logical writings by Boethius, as well as his *Consolation* and, as mentioned in n. 7, among his “theological treatises,” the *De Hebdomadibus*. Also see Anselm’s *De Grammatico* which may be regarded “purely as a philosophical manual providing training in dialectic and having no ostensible connection with theology” (Hopkins, op. cit., p. 5). Also see Abelard’s logical works. Cf. M. Tweedale, *Abailard on Universals* (Amsterdam–New York–Oxford, 1976), pp. 11–13; J. Marenbon, *The Philosophy of Peter Abelard* (Cambridge, 1997), pp. 36–53.

9. For Van Steenberghen see “Étienne Gilson, historien de la pensée médiévale,” pp. 496, 503. Throughout his career Van Steenberghen has maintained that while there are Christian philosophers, there is no such thing as Christian philosophy when this expression is taken in the strict sense. See p. 497, n. 15. Cf. n. 1 above. The formula “christiana

II

With this, I would now like to turn to Thomas Aquinas. Like his predecessors and his contemporaries, Thomas clearly distinguished between believing something on religious grounds—on the authority of God revealing—and knowing something because of natural or philosophical evidence or demonstration. Corresponding to this, he also distinguishes two kinds of truths about divine things which are accessible to us.

On the one hand, there are certain truths concerning God and divine things which natural reason can discover, truths such as God's existence, or God's unity, and others of this kind. Thomas acknowledges that the philosophers have in fact demonstrated some of these things concerning God (SCG I, 3). But there is another kind of truth concerning divine things which completely surpasses human understanding. Here Thomas has in mind what we might refer to as revealed mysteries, such as the Trinity or the Incarnation. These could never be discovered by unaided natural or philosophical means. Given this distinction, Thomas also argues that it was fitting for God to reveal some of those truths about himself which, at least in principle, unaided human reason could discover. For otherwise, reasons Thomas, very few human beings would succeed in discovering truths such as God's existence. Even those who did succeed in this effort would do so only after a long period of time had passed, and quite likely with a considerable degree of error intermingled with the truth they had discovered (SCG I, 4).

Thomas goes on within this same general context in Bk I of the *Summa contra Gentiles* to argue that there can be no real contradiction between the truth which natural reason or philosophy can discover and that truth which has been revealed to man by God. Thomas spells out his reasons for making this claim even more clearly in his Commentary on the *De Trinitate* of Boethius. There Thomas is considering the question whether in the science of the faith which treats of God (in other words, whether in one's theology) it is permissible for one to use philosophical arguments and authorities.¹⁰

He begins his reply by stressing one of his central theological points: the gifts of grace are not added to nature so as to destroy nature but rather so as to perfect it. If this is so, the light of faith which is given

philosophia" employed by Augustine in his *Contra Julianum* IV, 14, 72 (PL 44.774) is surely being used there in the broader sense—as Christian wisdom. Cf. Van Steenberghen, p. 503.

10. For this in the *Summa contra Gentiles* (SCG) see I, 7. See *Sancti Thomae de Aquino Expositio super Librum Boethii De Trinitate*, q. 2, a. 3: "Utrum in scientia fidei, quae est de deo, liceat rationibus philosophicis et auctoritatibus uti" (Leon. 50.92:4–6).

to us as a grace does not destroy the light of natural reason. Thomas immediately adds that this light of natural reason is also given to us by God. Granting that the natural light of the human mind is insufficient to manifest those things which can be discovered only by faith—that is, the revealed mysteries—it is impossible, continues Thomas, for those things which are given to us by God through faith to be contrary to those which are instilled in us by nature. For one or the other would have to be false. (Here the unexpressed premise is that two contradictory propositions cannot both be true at the same time.) And since both of these come to us from God, to admit this would be to make God himself the author of falsity. This, of course, Thomas rejects as impossible.¹¹

Thomas then applies this same reasoning to the relationship between faith and philosophy. (Until this point in our text he had compared faith and reason.) Just as what he here calls sacred teaching (*sacra doctrina*)—which is roughly equivalent to theology—is based on the light of faith, so is philosophy based on the natural light of reason. Therefore, continues Thomas, it is impossible for those things which belong to philosophy to be opposed to those which are given to us through faith. He also comments that the things known to us by philosophical means will fall short of those which we accept on faith. Again the implied presuppositions are twofold. First, both religious faith and philosophically discovered truth are given to us by God, one by him as the author of revelation, and the other by him as the creator. Secondly, two contradictory propositions cannot both be true at the same time. Hence we have Thomas's serene conclusion that there can be no real conflict between faith and reason, and therefore none between faith and philosophy. While in this discussion Thomas is writing as a theologian and is seeking to justify the appropriateness of employing philosophical argumentation in theologizing, he clearly recognizes the distinctiveness of the philosophical approach and its legitimacy.¹²

11. Leon. 50.98:114–99:126.

12. Leon. 50.99:131–135. The precise relationship between Thomas's usage of *sacra doctrina* and *theologia*, especially in ST I, q. 1, aa. 1–10, has long been contested among Thomistic commentators. For a good survey of this and for some interesting personal reflections, see J. Weisheipl, "The Meaning of *Sacra Doctrina* in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 1," *The Thomist* 38 (1974), pp. 49–80. Here it will be enough for me to stress the importance of Thomas's distinction between two kinds of theology. There is one, he writes, in which divine things are not considered as the subject of the science but rather as principles of the subject of that science. Such is the theology which philosophers pursue, which is also known as metaphysics. As Thomas had already indicated in this same text (*In De Trinitate*, q. 5, a. 4), this science has as its subject being as being (*ens in quantum est ens*). See Leon. 50.154:161–162. Thomas contrasts this with another theology or divine science which considers divine things themselves (or God himself) as the very subject of the science. This is the theology which is given to us by Scripture. Farther on in this same article, Thomas refers to this as "theologia . . . sacrae scripturae" (Leon. 50.154:180–182, 202).

Still, Thomas is aware that in times past philosophers have arrived at conclusions which are at odds with the faith. And he himself would actively intervene in another such controversy some years later during his second Parisian teaching period (1268/1269–1272) when confronted with certain heterodox views being advanced in the Arts Faculty there. What, then, of such situations where there is contradiction between philosophers and religious belief? Thomas comments that if anything is found in the sayings of the philosophers which is contrary to religious belief, this is not philosophy but rather an abuse or misuse of philosophy resulting from the weakness of human reason. Here again his overriding conviction is the same. There can be no real conflict between faith and reason. Hence, in cases of conflict between an alleged philosophical conclusion and something that is really contained in revelation, Aquinas concludes that the philosopher must have made some mistake in arriving at this conclusion. In other words, Thomas allows for one's religious belief to correct one's philosophizing in cases of conflict between the two.¹³

In fact Thomas concludes from this that in such a situation it is possible by using the principles of philosophy to refute an error of this kind either by showing that it is impossible, or else by showing that it has not been demonstrated. Here he is allowing for two types of situations. It might be that the revealed truth which has been contradicted by a particular philosopher is the kind which is also capable of being demonstrated

13. Leon. 50.99:137–140: "Si quid autem in dictis philosophorum invenitur contrarium fidei, hoc non est philosophiae, sed magis philosophiae abusus ex defectu rationis." The literature concerning the doctrinal controversies at the University of Paris leading to the condemnations of 1270 and 1277 is considerable. For an introduction to this and for further references see my "The Condemnations of 1270 and 1277 at Paris," *Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies* 7 (1977), pp. 169–201. Among the many studies of these controversies to appear since the completion of that article, two should be noted especially: F. Van Steenberghen, *Maître Siger de Brabant* (Louvain-Paris, 1977), especially ch. III: "Entre les deux condamnations (1271–1276)"; R. Hissette, *Enquête sur les 219 articles condamnés à Paris le 7 mars 1277* (Louvain-Paris, 1977). Hissette has continued to make important contributions to our knowledge of the circumstances surrounding these events. See in particular his "Étienne Tempier et ses condamnations," *Recherches de Théologie ancienne et médiévale* 47 (1980), pp. 231–70. Perhaps I should mention in passing that I remain unconvinced by his ongoing efforts to prove that none of the propositions condemned by Tempier in 1277 was directly (rather than indirectly) aimed at Thomas Aquinas. See more recently his "Albert le Grand et Thomas d'Aquin dans la censure parisienne du 7 mars 1277," in *Miscellanea Mediaevalia* 15 (1982), pp. 226–46; "L'implication de Thomas d'Aquin dans les censures parisiennes de 1277," *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales* 64 (1997), pp. 3–31. For my own view see "Thomas Aquinas and the Condemnation of 1277," *Modern Schoolman* 72 (1995), pp. 233–72. For a new edition and study of the Condemnation of 1277 see D. Piché, *La condamnation parisienne de 1277. Texte Latin, Traduction, introduction et commentaire* (Paris, 1999). For the aftermath see *Nach der Verurteilung von 1277: Philosophie und Theologie an der Universität von Paris im letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts. Studien und Texte*, ed. J. A. Aertsen, K. Emery, Jr., and A. Speer, *Miscellanea Mediaevalia* 28 (2001).

philosophically—a truth such as God’s existence, for instance. In that case it should be possible for the believer, by using purely philosophical means, to demonstrate the falsity of the alleged philosophical position and, in effect, thereby demonstrate the truth of its contradictory, that is, of the revealed datum. On the other hand, it may be that the kind of revealed truth which has been contradicted by a philosopher is a pure mystery, and hence not open to philosophical demonstration—a truth such as the Trinity, for instance. In this case Thomas does not hold that one can demonstrate the falsity of the denial of that truth; for then one would in effect be demonstrating the truth of the revealed mystery itself. But one can, he is convinced, show that the alleged philosophical conclusion has not in fact been demonstrated.¹⁴

Thomas concludes this discussion by singling out three ways in which one may use philosophy in *sacra doctrina*: (1) in order to demonstrate certain things which he here describes as preambles of faith, such as God’s existence, or the unity of God, and other things of this kind which, he says, are proved by natural arguments, i.e., by philosophy, and presupposed by faith; (2) in order to make manifest certain things which are proper to faith by using similitudes (analogies) drawn from the philosophical order for the purpose of illustration; (3) in order to reply to attacks against the faith either by showing that such attacks are false in their claims, or at least by showing that their claims have not themselves been demonstrated.¹⁵

Thomas also comments that those who use philosophy in their theologizing can fall into error in one of two ways: either by introducing things which are opposed to the faith and which are not, in Thomas’s judgment, true philosophy but rather a corruption or an abuse of philosophy; or by attempting to include within philosophy things which are reserved for faith (for instance, by refusing to accept on faith anything which cannot be proven philosophically).¹⁶

Thomas’s immediate purpose in this discussion from his Commentary on the *De Trinitate* was to justify and then to clarify the theologian’s usage of philosophical reasoning in his theologizing. But here we are interested in the question of Christian Philosophy. What do Thomas’s remarks tell us about his views concerning the believer’s use and practice of philosophy, even if that believer does not happen to be a theologian?

14. Leon. 50.99:140–147.

15. Leon. 50.99:148–161. Thomas’s words regarding the first usage merit quotation: “Primo ad demonstrandum ea quae sunt praeambula fidei, quae necesse est in fide scire, ut ea quae naturalibus rationibus de Deo probantur, ut Deum esse, Deum esse unum et alia huiusmodi vel de Deo vel de creaturis in philosophia probata, quae fides supponit.”

16. Leon. 50.99:161–171.

Such a situation was not unknown to Aquinas, for there were Masters in the Arts Faculty at Paris who were Christians and who claimed to be philosophers. They were certainly not theologians. Names such as Siger of Brabant and Boethius of Dacia come to mind. What of them? And what of the Christian today who would be a philosopher, and who is perhaps neither professionally trained as nor interested in becoming a theologian?

Certain points from Thomas's discussion of the faith-reason relationship should be recalled here. First of all, he does clearly distinguish between faith and reason, and then just as clearly between both faith (and theology), on the one hand, and philosophy, on the other. If the motive for accepting something as true in the case of religious belief is divine authority, in the case of philosophy it can only be naturally accessible evidence. Secondly, in the course of defending the theologian's right to use philosophy in his theologizing, Thomas has also defended the legitimacy of philosophy. Not only is it distinct from faith and from theology; it can arrive at truth, and even at some truths concerning divine things. Finally, Thomas has allowed faith to play a negative role in the believer's assessment of any philosophical conclusion which conflicts with revealed data. In such cases, because of his conviction that two contradictory propositions cannot both be true at the same time and because he believes that God is the author of revealed truth, Thomas holds that there must be something wrong with one's philosophizing.

But some twentieth-century defenders of the Christian character of Thomas's philosophy insist that this is not enough. It is not enough for the believing Christian to allow his religious belief to serve as a negative norm in his philosophizing. As they note, Thomas himself was by profession a theologian rather than a pure philosopher. In the course of developing his theology he also worked out a highly interesting and original philosophy. But, we are reminded, and especially by Étienne Gilson and his followers, Thomas philosophized only as a believing Christian and as a professional theologian. Hence one must allow for some kind of positive and intrinsic influence which runs from Thomas's faith to his philosophy. Any effort on our part to separate his philosophy from its original theological context is bound to be inaccurate, historically speaking, and to run counter to his spirit. In short, Thomas Aquinas was not a pure philosopher, but a philosophizing theologian or, as Gilson often expressed it, a Christian philosopher. And if this is so, one should describe his philosophical achievement as "Christian Philosophy," not as pure philosophy.¹⁷

17. For my effort to trace Gilson's developing views concerning this see the reference in n. 2 above. For Gilson's effort to set forth a number of issues whose full philosophical

Not only this, but if a believing Christian today would be guided by Aquinas's procedure in his own philosophizing, he should do no less. He should not attempt to develop a philosophy independently from his religious belief or, according to the later Gilson, independently from his theology. In fact, if one wishes to become a philosopher in the Thomistic sense, or to become a Christian philosopher as Gilson understands this, it seems that according to the later Gilson, one should first become a theologian and philosophize from within one's theology.¹⁸

development during the medieval period was due to the positive influence of Christianity see his *The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy*, Gifford Lectures 1931–1932 (London, 1936; repr. 1950), passim. The notes of the French original (*L'Esprit de la philosophie médiévale* [Paris, 1932], 2 vols.) have been considerably shortened in the English version. For his criticism of any attempt to present Thomas's philosophy by following the philosophical order see his *The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas* (New York, 1956), pp. 442–43, n. 33. This translation is based on the fifth edition of Gilson's *Le thomisme*. A sixth French edition appeared in 1965 (Paris: J. Vrin) and has recently been translated into English by T. L. K. Shook and A. Maurer: *Thomism: The Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas* (Toronto, 2002). For Gilson's efforts to define his understanding of Christian Philosophy during his earlier discussions see cc. 1–2 of *The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy*. The historical justification for this expression ("Christian Philosophy") is, in Gilson's eyes, the presence in the Fathers and medieval scholastics of certain philosophical positions which are found in their writings for the first time in this precise form. See, for instance, in addition to the general thesis of *The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy*, Gilson's *Christianity and Philosophy* (New York–London, 1939). In *The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas* (p. 441, n. 20), Gilson refers to his *Christianity and Philosophy* in the following terms: "The basic idea in this book is that the phrase 'Christian philosophy' expresses a theological notion of a reality observable in history." Cf. his "La possibilité philosophique de la philosophie chrétienne," *Revue des sciences religieuses* 32 (1958), p. 168. On the need for an intrinsic relationship between revelation and reason for a philosophy to be Christian see *The Spirit . . .*, pp. 35–37. While granting with J. Maritain that this involves both objective aids and subjective reinforcements, Gilson has concentrated on the former because such can be discovered by historical investigation. See *L'Esprit . . .*, (2d ed. Paris: J. Vrin, 1948), pp. 439–40, n. 80; *Le thomisme*, 6th ed., pp. 42–43. As Gilson sees it, both history and the words of Aquinas indicate that a true philosophy could not in fact be constituted without the help of "revelation, acting as an indispensable moral support to reason . . ." (*The Spirit . . .*, pp. 40–41). For the point that Thomas was not a pure philosopher but a philosophizing theologian see *Elements of Christian Philosophy* (Garden City, 1960), p. 12; "Thomas Aquinas and Our Colleagues," in *A Gilson Reader*, ed. A. Pegis (Garden City, 1957), p. 289; *The Philosopher and Theology* (New York, 1962), pp. 194–95.

18. For the point that philosophy, insofar as it is worked out by the theologian and employed in his theologizing, thereby becomes a part of theology, see *Elements of Christian Philosophy*, pp. 289–90, n. 36. Also see p. 42: "Since the philosophy that is in the *Summa* [*theologiae*] is there in view of a theological end, and since it figures in it as integrated with that which is the proper work of the theologian, it finds itself included within the formal object of theology and becomes theological in its own right. For the same reason, the order of exposition has to be theological." See *The Philosopher and Theology*, p. 198: "It matters little whether the truths at stake be accessible to natural reason or escape it; taken in its most comprehensive meaning, Christian philosophy transcends the distinction of scholastic philosophy and scholastic theology. It designates the use the Christian makes of the philosophical reason when, in either one of these two disciplines, he associates religious faith and philosophical reflection." On Gilson's recommendations for today's Thomist see pp. 213–14: "Whatever the outcome, the art of being a Thomist will be acquired and perfected in this

Since on other occasions I have critically examined the historical accuracy of some aspects of Gilson's presentation of Aquinas's philosophy as a Christian Philosophy, I shall quickly pass over that issue here.¹⁹ On the historical side, it will be enough for me to recall some of Thomas's views concerning the intrinsic integrity, the methodology, and the order which are proper to philosophy, and especially to metaphysics.

Aquinas has worked out in detail his views concerning the distinction between theology and philosophy, and within philosophy itself, between its different parts. He distinguishes practical philosophy from speculative or theoretical philosophy, both by reason of the different kinds of things studied in each, and by reason of diversity in end or goal. Within theoretical philosophy he distinguishes between natural philosophy, mathematics, and metaphysics, and this in turn by reason of the different kinds of subjects for theoretical inquiry (*speculabilia*); the different kinds of intellectual processes required to discover these subjects; and the different levels of termination or verification for the propositions which are characteristic of each, that is, of natural philosophy, mathematics, and metaphysics.²⁰ More than this, he also clearly distinguishes between the theological order (wherein one moves from a study of God to a study of creatures) and the philosophical order (wherein one moves

undertaking, namely, philosophizing, as only a Christian can, *within faith*" (p. 214). For certain rather radical pedagogical consequences, see "Thomas Aquinas and Our Colleagues," *passim*. Without maintaining that philosophy should be taught everywhere (including non-religious educational institutions) in this way, Gilson does suggest that "if we wish to introduce Christian students to metaphysics and ethics, to teach them the relevant parts of his [Thomas's] theology will be to provide them with the best short cut to some understanding of these disciplines" (p. 292). Also see p. 297, n. 10. To return to the historical issue, another way of illustrating Gilson's point is indicated by his contribution in 1950 to the *Congressus scholasticus* in Rome. There he strongly stressed the point that the originality of medieval philosophies is largely due to their being included in and developed within theological syntheses ("c'est dans sa fonction théologique que la pensée philosophique est alors devenue créatrice . . .," pp. 137-38). Therefore the future of scholastic philosophy is connected with its intimate association with theology (p. 142). See "Les recherches historico-critiques et l'avenir de la scolastique," *Scholastica ratione historico-critica instauranda* (Rome: Pontificium Athenaeum Antonianum, 1951), pp. 131-42. Similar thoughts are repeatedly voiced in Gilson's *Introduction à la philosophie chrétienne* (Paris, 1960). See for instance, pp. 114, 152 ("Le philosophe chrétien . . . théologise, et le théologien ne se prive pas de philosopher"), 215, 223. For these and other references as well as for a number from *Le philosophe et la théologie* see Van Steenberghen, *Introduction à l'étude de la philosophie médiévale* (Louvain-Paris, 1974), pp. 73-76. For critical comments see pp. 103ff.

19. See n. 2 above.

20. For the distinction between practical philosophy and theoretical philosophy see, for instance, *In De Trinitate*, q. 5, a. 1 (Leon. 50.137:93-110). For the division of theoretical philosophy into its three parts by reason of diversity in the kind of subject studied see q. 5, a. 1 (Leon. 50.138:141-167); by reason of the different kinds of intellectual operations required to discover the subject of each, q. 5, a. 3; and for the different levels of termination or verification appropriate to each q. 6, a. 2.

from a study of created being to a study of God, its cause).²¹ Throughout his literary corpus, both in his philosophical and in his theological writings, various elements of his philosophy, and especially of his metaphysics, are to be found.

It is true that Thomas never presented a *Summa philosophiae* or a *Summa metaphysicae* which would more or less be his philosophical parallel to his *Summa theologiae* or his *Summa contra gentiles*. It is also clear that he had created a general philosophical and in particular a metaphysical synthesis in his own mind, and that he constantly drew upon this in addressing himself to particular philosophical and theological issues. From the historical standpoint, therefore, today's historian of philosophy has every right to try and recapture the essential elements of Thomas's philosophical and metaphysical thought. In doing this he should use all of Thomas's writings in which the various elements of that philosophical thought are to be found—both philosophical writings and theological writings. He should not ignore Thomas's Commentaries on Aristotle, or minimize the importance of his philosophical opuscula, as Gilson tended to do. Today's scholar should be guided in his efforts at historical reconstruction by Thomas's detailed indications concerning the proper subject-matter, distinctive type of thinking, and level of verification which are appropriate to metaphysics and to the other parts of theoretical philosophy. And he should present the elements of this thought according to the philosophical order as this is defined by Aquinas, not according to the theological order followed by Thomas in his works of theological synthesis, as Gilson would have today's scholar do.²²

I stress these historical points because they show that Thomas had worked out the distinction between philosophy, on the one hand, and

21. For this distinction see, for instance, SCG II, c. 4: "Exinde etiam est quod non eodem ordine utraque doctrina procedit. Nam in doctrina philosophiae, quae creaturas secundum se considerat et ex eis in Dei cognitionem perducit, prima est consideratio de creaturis et ultima de Deo. In doctrina vero fidei, quae creaturas non nisi in ordine ad Deum considerat, primo est consideratio Dei et postmodum creaturarum" (Editio Leonina manualis [Rome, 1934]), p. 96.

22. For my own attempt to follow these guidelines in setting forth Aquinas's metaphysics see my *The Metaphysical Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas: From Finite Being to Uncreated Being* (Washington, D.C., 2000). On the relative unimportance assigned by Gilson to the Aristotelian commentaries and philosophical opuscula when compared with works of theological synthesis such as the two *Summae* see *The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas*, pp. 8, 22; *Elements of Christian Philosophy*, p. 282, n. 6; *The Philosopher and Theology*, pp. 210–11. In the last reference Gilson seems to take the *De ente* more seriously, but comments that in it "the level of theology is not far from the surface." In other words, there Gilson seems to be inclined to regard it also as a theological work. On Gilson's presentation of Aquinas's philosophy according to the theological order see the procedure he has followed in the various editions and translations of *Le thomisme* as well as in his *Elements*. For his justification see *The Christian Philosophy . . .*, p. 442, n. 33, as well as pp. 21–22.

faith as well as theology, on the other, with greater thoroughness and precision than any other Christian thinker before his time. They also indicate how concerned he was with defining precisely the distinctive subject-matters and methodologies of the various parts of philosophy, especially of theoretical philosophy.

III

Rather than delay longer over the accuracy of Gilson's historical reading of Aquinas I shall now turn to the more theoretical question: If one would philosophize today while remaining a believing Christian, and if one would do so in accord with Aquinas's views concerning the proper relationship between faith and reason and between theology and philosophy, should one move from one's faith to the development of one's philosophy? Or to put this even more forcefully, should one first become a theologian and move from one's theology to one's philosophy? And if one does proceed in either of these ways, can the resulting enterprise fittingly be described as Christian Philosophy? Gilson has, at least in his later writings, replied in the affirmative to each of these questions.²³ On the other side, if one rejects any such approach (as I would at least in part) and still wishes to philosophize while continuing to be a Christian, is there any proper sense in which one's undertaking may be described as Christian Philosophy?

For my part, I would prefer to fall back upon a distinction between the order or moment of discovery, on the one hand, and the order or moment of proof, on the other. Some other scholars have already suggested that this distinction can be applied to the present issue. Often enough those who reject the possibility of a Christian Philosophy do so because they view philosophy only in its moment of proof—as a completed set of propositions including principles, proofs, and conclusions. Here, it seems to me, they conclude correctly that nothing borrowed from religious belief or theology can enter in. To admit the contributions of faith into the process of proof would be to destroy the philosophical character of the undertaking and to turn it into theology or, at the least, an extension of religious belief.²⁴

One may also consider philosophy, or a particular philosophical position, in terms of its development, that is, in terms of the process or inquiry whereby it is discovered. In the positive sciences it is possible for one to work backward from a given hypothesis and to search for evi-

23. See the references given above, especially in n. 18.

24. On this distinction see G. Klubertanz, "Metaphysics and Theistic Convictions," in *Teaching Thomism Today*, ed. G. McLean (Washington, D.C., 1963), pp. 278–81.

dence which might verify that hypothesis. So too, *mutatis mutandis*, in the course of developing a philosophical point it may be that, in the moment of discovery, a particular issue was first suggested to the philosopher by some nonphilosophical source. If so, there seems to be nothing to prevent the philosopher from then working backward, as it were, to search for philosophical evidence which might or might not lend support to the original proposal.²⁵

Thus for the Christian it may be that in certain instances some revealed datum serves as a leading question or working hypothesis for his philosophical inquiry. While as a believing Christian he will continue to assent to this datum or believe in it, he may now decide to investigate it as a possible object of rational or philosophical demonstration. If he succeeds in finding rational evidence which supports it, then and to that extent his procedure will be strictly philosophical in the moment of proof. In other words, in the moment of proof his procedure cannot be described as Christian Philosophy. But since in the moment of discovery it was his religious belief that first suggested this particular issue to him as a possible subject for philosophical investigation, one might refer to such a procedure as Christian Philosophy in the order of discovery.²⁶

This would seem to be one way in which a particular philosophical inquiry might be described as Christian in its moment of discovery, without necessarily being described as or changed into theology, I might add, even in that same moment of discovery. In its moment of proof, however, it would be pure philosophy, not Christian Philosophy. And in this same rather qualified sense I would be willing to admit not only that there are Christian philosophers, but that there can be such a thing as Christian Philosophy—that is, in the moment of discovery.²⁷

This distinction seems to parallel more or less one offered some decades ago by Gilson himself, when he distinguished between philosophy considered concretely (or as it exists in the mind of the philosopher), and philosophy considered abstractly (or in terms of its essence). He

25. For this see Klubertanz, *ibid.*; A. Naud, *Le problème de la philosophie chrétienne. Eléments d'une solution thomiste* (Montreal, 1960), pp. 35–44.

26. Klubertanz, *op. cit.*, pp. 281–82; Naud, *op. cit.*, pp. 45–52. For some thoughts which are close to the proposal I am suggesting also see G. Grisez, "The 'Four Meanings' of Christian Philosophy," *Journal of Religion* 42 (1962), pp. 113ff.

27. If one concedes this, then one might think that the formula *fides quaerens intellectum* expresses well the methodology of Christian Philosophy. For a critique of any such suggestion see Naud, pp. 54–56. What I would stress is that this suggested way in which philosophy might be regarded as Christian applies only to the moment of discovery, and since here one has to do only with particular points which may be suggested to the believing philosopher by one's religious belief, it does not really apply to the whole of one's philosophical enterprise. If one is a genuine philosopher, one will hardly confine oneself to those points which are suggested by revelation but will explore many other points which are not.

then argued that philosophy is not Christian when it is viewed simply in terms of its essence, but that it is Christian when considered as it exists concretely in the Christian who philosophizes. I would accept this distinction, but in the way just indicated. Philosophy as it exists concretely in the mind of the Christian who philosophizes may be described as Christian in its moment of discovery of certain points, though not in its moment of proof even of those points. In other words, this distinction would seem to justify our speaking not only of Christian philosophers, but also of Christian Philosophy in its moment of discovery.²⁸

An additional question could be raised. If philosophy can be Christian in its moment of discovery, is it intrinsically Christian when it is so viewed? Or is this not merely like naming it Christian because the people who are practicing it happen to be Christian? There has been some disagreement with respect to this on the part of those who have applied the distinction between moment of discovery and moment of proof to the issue of Christian Philosophy. Here I will speak only tentatively. It seems to me that, as regards its moment of discovery, if a particular point was first suggested to a believing philosopher because of his religious faith, that same religious faith does enter into our philosopher's initial discovery of the point under examination, and in an intrinsic way. Hence I would suggest that if this way of philosophizing can be called Christian in its moment of discovery, it can also be regarded as intrinsically Christian, but once again only in its moment of discovery, not in its moment of proof.²⁹ This would seem to follow to the extent that one is willing to include the mo-

28. For Gilson see *The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy*, pp. 36–37. Cf. *The Philosopher and Theology*, p. 192. For a similar distinction proposed by J. Maritain see *An Essay on Christian Philosophy* (New York, 1955), pp. 15–18; *Science and Wisdom* (London–New York, 1940; repr. 1954), pp. 79–80, 90–93, 97. Also see his intervention at the meeting of the *Société française de Philosophie* cited in n. 1 above. See pp. 59–67. Maritain distinguishes between philosophy considered in terms of its nature (or essence), on the one hand, and in terms of its state or as it is historically realized in the individual philosopher, on the other. He too concedes that considered in the first way philosophy is not Christian but purely rational; but he holds that it may be Christian when considered in the second way. Gilson has accepted Maritain's proposed distinction as the theoretical counterpart of his own, which he had arrived at on historical grounds. See *L'Esprit de la philosophie médiévale* (2d ed., Paris, 1948), pp. 439–40, n. 80.

29. Klubertanz (op. cit. p. 279) remarks about philosophy in its moment of discovery: "It is in this area that I believe there can be a positive influence of the Faith upon philosophy, to render it intrinsically Christian." Naud (p. 91) rejects every attempt to make of philosophy something that is formally and intrinsically Christian. See pp. 92ff. Here Naud is particularly opposed to another aspect of Maritain's solution, that Christian philosophy also implies certain subjective aids and reinforcements for the Christian who philosophizes. It seems to me that so long as one restricts the expression "Christian Philosophy" to philosophy in its moment of discovery of a particular point, since it is only the moment of discovery that is being so described and, according to the hypothesis, it is one's Christian faith which has proposed this point for philosophical investigation, one may describe this procedure as Christian and as intrinsically Christian.

ment or process of discovery within one's understanding of philosophy.

Moreover, it appears to me that on various occasions the procedure actually followed by Aquinas and many of his medieval predecessors and contemporaries in developing particular philosophical points could be described as Christian Philosophy in this same way. For surely neither Thomas nor anyone who has been a believing Christian from birth first demonstrated truths such as God's existence or God's providence before believing in them. Rather, having been instructed in the faith and having professed belief in God and many like truths, our believer would only subsequently be introduced to philosophy in the formal sense. At that point a medieval believer or, for that matter, a contemporary believer, might well wonder what philosophy has to say about some of the things he has already believed, and he might regard some of them as working hypotheses or as possible subjects for philosophical inquiry. He would be influenced, therefore, in the order of discovery by his religious belief and would practice Christian Philosophy. If he should eventually succeed in demonstrating any such conclusion philosophically, that demonstration should be referred to as pure philosophy, not as Christian Philosophy.

To offer but two other illustrations, this description seems to me to capture quite well Augustine's usage of philosophy in Bk. II of his *De libero arbitrio*. There, after recalling explicitly that he believes that God exists, Augustine proposes to demonstrate this by rational argumentation or, if you will, philosophically. Indeed, within that context this is his way of carrying out the admonition that one should first believe and then seek to understand. Again, this would be one way of interpreting Anselm's procedure in the *Proslogion*. After calling upon God for assistance, Anselm now wishes to understand that which he believes—that God exists as Anselm believes, and that God is that which Anselm believes him to be. It is only then that he presents his well-known if much controverted "Anselmian" argument for God's existence. Moreover, one could view the entire *Proslogion* as one continuing illustration of this same procedure.³⁰

30. For a helpful survey of a number of ways in which Anselm's argumentation in the *Proslogion* has been interpreted see A. C. McGill, "Recent Discussions of Anselm's Argument," in J. Hick and A. C. McGill, *The Many-Faced Argument* (New York, 1967), Ch. III. The discussion, of course, has continued. See, for instance, G. Schufreider, "Reunderstanding Anselm's Argument," *New Scholasticism* 57 (1983), pp. 384-409, and the references to other interpretations, including Hopkins' critique of the reading offered by Schufreider in his book, *An Introduction to Anselm's Argument* (Philadelphia, 1978). If, as I have suggested above in n. 6, one may apply the Augustinian and Anselmian admonition first to believe and then to seek to understand on two different levels, that is, as directed to naturally knowable truths or as directed to subsequent efforts to penetrate more deeply into the mysteries of faith, it is in the first sense that I am using it here. As I am interpreting both Augustine and Anselm in the passages under consideration, each would call upon us

It also seems to me that in works such as his *The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy* Gilson has shown that a number of particular points first entered into human consciousness as a result of belief in the Judeo-Christian revelation. To the extent that some of these points eventually served as objects for philosophical inquiry by Christian thinkers, they may be regarded as additional illustrations of what I would describe as Christian Philosophy in the order of discovery.

One of the great strengths in Thomas's approach—at least in my opinion—is the clarity with which he himself distinguishes between faith and reason, and between faith and philosophy. To me it is important for today's interpreter of Aquinas, and for that matter, for today's believing Christian who would also be a philosopher, to preserve this distinction as clearly as possible. This does not necessarily mean, of course, that one will always sharply distinguish between purely philosophical writings and purely theological writings. Thomas himself often combines philosophizing and theologizing within the same work. But it does mean that one should be consciously aware of what one is doing when one reflects upon such issues—that one should know when one is accepting something for religious reasons or on faith, and when one is attempting to establish a point philosophically.

Granting all of this, however, I must also acknowledge that the situation is often more complicated in practice than my previous remarks may have suggested. It is not always simply a question of distinguishing between the order of discovery and the order of proof. To illustrate, how are we to describe seemingly philosophical inquiries which rest upon and presuppose data supplied by and only by religious belief—for instance, an intricate philosophical discussion of the relationships between the divine persons within the Trinity, or a similar discussion of the distinction between nature and person as applied to the mystery of the Incarnation? Can such investigations be described as philosophical, properly speaking, or perhaps as Christian Philosophy, or perhaps only as straight theology?

Even concerning such cases different possible situations may be envisioned. For example, it might be that the philosophical inquiry itself presupposes the truth of the religious beliefs which have been assumed, and that there is no conceivable way in which such a truth or truths can be demonstrated philosophically. In this event it would seem that such

first to believe in a truth such as God's existence. This would correspond to the moment of discovery in which philosophy might be described as Christian. Then each would also have the thinking believer attempt to understand that which he believes, in this case, by proving God's existence. If, as I read them, each then offers philosophical argumentation for God's existence, each would be practicing philosophy, and not Christian philosophy, in the moment of proof.

investigations go beyond the realm of the purely philosophical, and even beyond the realm of Christian Philosophy in the order of discovery. In other words, in such cases it seems to me that one is in fact practicing speculative theology, not pure philosophy, and not Christian Philosophy. Here, to use a metaphor taken from Aquinas himself, the water of philosophy will have been transformed into the wine of theology.³¹

Another possible situation comes to mind. Suppose that one's philosophical investigation is directed to articles of religious belief, and articles of faith in the strict sense—that is, those which cannot be demonstrated philosophically—but in such fashion that the philosophical inquiry does not rest upon or presuppose in any way that the articles of faith are true. Could such an inquiry be described as philosophy? And if so, could it be called Christian Philosophy? For example, suppose that one were simply interested in determining whether one article of faith was logically compatible with another, without necessarily committing oneself to accepting the truth of either as a presupposition for one's investigation, and without having any hope or intention of demonstrating the truth of either. It would seem that this kind of inquiry could be undertaken by the nonbeliever as well as by the believer. In what sense, if at all, should such an enterprise be called Christian Philosophy?

Since no revealed premise is necessarily accepted as true, it would seem that such an enterprise would not presuppose either faith or theology, at least in any intrinsic way. Hence it seems that it should not be described as theology but as philosophy in some sense. Still, since the subject-matter under investigation is, according to our hypothesis, distinctively Christian, would this be enough for us to describe this particular kind of philosophizing as another instance of Christian Philosophy?

I would think not. One should not immediately conclude that because a particular philosophical inquiry is about an article or articles of Christian belief, the philosophical inquiry itself is Christian. To make such an inference would be somewhat like moving immediately from the objective genitive (a philosophy of Christianity in that it is about Christian beliefs) to the subjective genitive (a philosophy of Christianity in the sense that it is exercised by some one who is Christian, and in a distinctively Christian way). This would be no more justified than for us to conclude that because a philosophy of literature or history is about literature or about history it is necessarily and intrinsically literary or historical in itself.

31. See *In De Trinitate*, q. 2, a. 3, ad 5: "Unde illi, qui utuntur philosophicis documentis in sacra doctrina redigendo in obsequium fidei, non miscent aquam vino, sed aquam convertunt in vinum" (Leon. 50.100:213–216). On Gilson's usage of this passage see *Elements of Christian Philosophy*, pp. 289–90, n. 36.

Finally, while I have defended at least one qualified way in which philosophy might be described as Christian in its pursuit of particular points—in its moment of discovery, and while I have rejected some other ways in which philosophy itself might be called Christian, I do not wish to leave the impression that I have examined all possibilities. I definitely have not, and by limiting myself in large measure to an approach inspired by the principles of Aquinas, I have tried to free myself from any obligation to consider all possible alternative candidates for the title Christian Philosophy. This I shall leave to others.³²

I would suggest that, as other possible candidates for the description Christian Philosophy are considered, certain precisions introduced by Aquinas may be helpful. Thus one may ask, does a proposed Christian Philosophy preserve with clarity the distinction between faith, on the one hand, and philosophy viewed as a rational enterprise, on the other? Secondly, does it hold out the possibility of maintaining with some clarity the distinction between theology and philosophy, and between the theological and philosophical components of a particular enterprise? If the answer to each of these questions is affirmative, does the association of any putative Christian Philosophy with Christian religious belief point to something that enters into and even serves to define its way of philosophizing as distinctively Christian in the moment of discovery? If the answer to either of the first two questions is negative, then one may doubt that one is dealing with philosophy in any proper sense. If the answer to the last question is negative, then one may doubt that the enterprise under consideration deserves to be called Christian in any proper sense, granted that it may be described as philosophy.

32. See, for example, the different possibilities proposed and examined critically by M. Nédoncelle in his *Is There a Christian Philosophy?* ch. VI (“The Existing Options”), pp. 100–114. Note in particular his discussion of the approach inspired by M. Blondel and developed by H. Duméry.

Chapter II

THE LATIN AVICENNA AS A SOURCE FOR THOMAS AQUINAS'S METAPHYSICS

As is well known, those seeking to study philosophy in the Arabic-speaking world during the tenth and eleventh centuries were better positioned to do so than were their Latin counterparts during that same period. This was so because a very small portion of classical Greek philosophical texts had been preserved in Latin translation, whereas a considerable amount of the Greek legacy had by then become available in Arabic translation. Moreover, an important philosophical movement had developed within the Arabic-speaking world. This included figures such as Al-Kindi, Al-Farabi, Avicenna, and in the twelfth century, Averroes. In the twelfth century a first wave of philosophical literature was translated into Latin, some directly from Greek, some from Arabic. The Arabic-Latin translations included both Greek originals then already available in Arabic, and original philosophical writings in Arabic. Not least among the original Arabic writings were important works by the Muslim philosopher Ibn Sina, or as the Latins knew him, Avicenna.¹

1. On this see L. Gardet, "Saint Thomas et ses prédécesseurs arabes," in *St. Thomas Aquinas 1274-1974: Commemorative Studies*, ed. A. Maurer et al. (Toronto, 1974), Vol. 1, pp. 419-20, with references to earlier studies (see nn. 4, 5) including L. Gardet and G. C. Anawati, *Introduction à la théologie musulmane*, 2d ed. (Paris, 1970), pp. 195-200, 244-48; M.-Th. d'Alverny, "Avicenna Latinus I," *Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge* 28 (1961), pp. 281-316 (see pp. 284-85, n. 2 for references to her earlier investigations of this); S. Van Riet and G. Verbeke, *Avicenna Latinus. Liber de Philosophia Prima sive Scientia Divina I-IV* (Louvain-Leiden, 1977), p. 123*. There Van Riet notes that Avicenna's *Metaphysics* was translated at Toledo in the twelfth century, after 1150. In the first article cited in this note Gardet refers to two waves of Arabic-Latin translation dating from the twelfth century, the first owing to Ibn Dāwūd-Gundisalvi, and the second to Gerard of Cremona. A third wave took place early in the thirteenth century and included among other translators Michael the Scot in Toledo and in Italy, and Hermann the German in Toledo (pp. 435-36). Now also see H. Daiber, "Lateinische Übersetzungen arabischer Texte zur Philosophie und ihre Bedeutung für die Scholastik des Mittelalters. Stand und Aufgaben der Forschung," in *Rencontres de cultures dans la philosophie médiévale: traductions et traducteurs de l'antiquité tardive au XIVe siècle*, ed. J. Hamesse and M. Fattori (Louvain-la-Neuve-Cassino, 1990), pp. 203-50.

Avicenna lived from 980 until 1037, and among his many writings produced a kind of philosophical encyclopedia known as the *Shifa*. Important parts of the *Shifa* were translated into Latin in the twelfth century, including works of great interest to thirteenth-century thinkers such as Thomas Aquinas, i.e., a *De anima*, a *Metaphysics* (*Liber de philosophia prima sive divina scientia*), a *Physics*, and a small part of the *Logic*.²

In this discussion I propose to concentrate on the Latin translation of Avicenna's *Metaphysics* and the influence it exercised on Thomas Aquinas. As we shall see, this influence is both positive and negative. That is to say, Thomas borrows and incorporates into his own philosophy various points already made by Avicenna, though frequently not without changing and adapting them to his own purposes. At the same time, Thomas is aware of a number of other Avicennian positions which he regards as incorrect and which he therefore rejects. Moreover, on many occasions Thomas cites Avicenna by name, thereby leaving no doubt concerning whom he has in mind. On many other occasions he does not explicitly identify Avicenna as his source even when he actually uses him. This is something Thomas's reader must discover for himself.

In order to confine this chapter to reasonable length, I shall not here attempt to list all of the points on which Avicenna's influence upon Aquinas can be detected. Some general efforts have been made in this direction by others, such as Forest, Anawati, and Vansteenkiste. Instead I shall concentrate on a few points where there is a clear and positive influence running from Avicenna to Thomas. In the final part of the paper I shall turn to an area where Aquinas knows an Avicennian position, and reacts against it.³

2. Until recently critical editions of the medieval Latin versions of Avicenna were not available, and the Latin reader was confined to noncritical editions: *Avicennae perhypatetici philosophi ac medicorum facile primi Opera in lucem redacta ac nuper quantum ars niti potuit per canonicos emendata* (Venice, 1508; repr. Frankfurt am Main, 1961); and *Metaphysica Avicennae sive eius Prima Philosophia* (Venice, 1495; repr. Louvain, 1961). The Latin *Metaphysics* was also included in the 1508 ed., fols. 70–109, under the title "Philosophia prima." Fortunately a critical edition of the entire Latin *Metaphysics* is now available, in 2 volumes, by S. Van Riet, with doctrinal introductions by G. Verbeke. For vol. 1 see the preceding note. For vol. 2 see *Avicenna Latinus. Liber de Philosophia Prima sive Scientia Divina V–X* (Louvain-Leiden, 1980).

3. See A. Forest, *La structure métaphysique du concret selon saint Thomas d'Aquin*, 2d ed. (Paris, 1956), pp. 331–60; G. C. Anawati, "Saint Thomas d'Aquin et la *Métaphysique* d'Avicenne," in *St. Thomas Aquinas 1274–1974*, Vol. 1, pp. 449–65; C. Vansteenkiste, "Avicenna-Citaten bij S. Thomas," *Tijdschrift voor Filosofie* 15 (1953), pp. 457–507. For additional bibliography on Avicenna and his influence on Latin scholasticism see G. C. Anawati, *Essai de bibliographie avicennienne* (Cairo, 1950), section 4, "Les travaux sur Avicenne en langues autres que l'arabe," and for a French résumé of this see his "La tradition manuscrite orientale de l'œuvre d'Avicenne," *Revue thomiste* 51 (1951), pp. 407–40; also see his "Chronique avicennienne 1951–1960," *Revue thomiste* 60 (1960), pp. 630–31; "Bibliographie de la philosophie médiévale en terre d'Islam pour les années 1959–1969," *Bulletin de philosophie*

1. THE NATURE AND SUBJECT OF METAPHYSICS

For Aquinas, metaphysics is the science which studies being as being. In developing his view of metaphysics, he is ultimately indebted to the texts of Aristotle. Nonetheless, a number of problems were posed for later thinkers, including both Avicenna and Aquinas, by Aristotle's remarks about the nature of this discipline. Briefly stated, Aristotle seems to offer two conflicting accounts of this part of philosophy. Thus in his *Metaphysics*, Bk IV, c. 1, he refers to a science which investigates being as being, and the properties which pertain to being per se. In order to drive home his meaning, he contrasts this science with more particular ones. They cut off a portion of being and concentrate on the attributes or properties of that portion, presumably, on being as mobile in physics, or on being as quantified in mathematics. Unlike such more particular sciences, Aristotle's science of being does not restrict itself to a given kind or part of being. It studies being taken universally, and it studies it insofar as it is being.⁴ In c. 2 of this same Bk IV of the *Metaphysics*, Aristotle clarifies what he means by the term "being." While granting that this term is applied to different things in different ways, he singles out as its primary referent *ousia* or substance. Other things are called beings only insofar as they bear some relationship to and depend in some way upon the primary instance of being—substance. And since scientific knowledge must entail knowing something in terms of its principles and causes, Aristotle concludes that it is of being as being, i.e., of substances, that one must grasp the principles and causes.⁵

Well and good, we may say; but when we turn to Bk VI of the *Metaphysics*, something different seems to emerge from Aristotle's text. As in Bk IV, he begins by referring to the need to study beings as beings. Once again he contrasts this approach with that of more particular sciences which single out some particular class or kind of being and concentrate on that. They do not deal with being as such, and as being. Presumably, therefore, it is only the science we today call metaphysics that deals with being as such, and as being. But then Aristotle turns to a more thorough exami-

médiévale 10–12 (1968–1970), p. 361; cf. pp. 343–49. For an earlier more general study see A.-M. Goichon, *La philosophie d'Avicenne et son influence en Europe médiévale* (Forlong Lectures, 1940), 2d ed. (Paris, 1951). For studies of particular doctrinal influences of Avicenna on Aquinas see my "Aquinas and Avicenna on the Relationship between First Philosophy and the Other Theoretical Sciences (*In De Trin.*, q. 5, a. 1, ad 9)," in *Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas*, ch. II, pp. 37–53, and contributions by others as cited there in n. 2, pp. 37–38. Also now see C. Steele, "Avicenna and Thomas Aquinas on Evil," in *Avicenna and His Heritage: Acts of the International Colloquium*, Leuven–Louvain-la-Neuve September 8–September 11, 1999, ed. J. Janssens and D. De Smet (Leuven, 2002), pp. 171–96.

4. See Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IV, c. 1 (1003a 21–32).

5. *Met.* IV, c. 2 (1003a 33–1003b 19).

nation of natural philosophy and of mathematics. He notes that physics (natural philosophy) studies the kind of substances or things which do not exist in separation from matter and which are not immutable, i.e., which are mutable. Mathematics treats of things which likewise do not exist in separation from matter, but it studies them as immutable. In saying this he is thinking of our ability to study being as quantified without our thinking of it as subject to motion. But it belongs to a third science, which he now refers to as “first philosophy” and also as “divine science,” to study things which are eternal and immutable and separate (free from matter). The problem is this. Has Aristotle not now reduced his first philosophy, which still seems to be his science of being as being, to another particular science? It now seems that it does not study the whole range of being, but only one kind of being, separate or divine. How can it continue to be regarded as the universal science of being as being?⁶

Aristotle himself recognized the difficulty he had created, and replied that “if there is some immutable substance, the science which studies this will be prior (to physics), and first philosophy, and universal insofar as it is first. And it will belong to this science to study about being as being, both what it is, and the attributes which belong to it as being.”⁷

In other words, even though Aristotle recognized the difficulty of uniting into one the universal science of being as being and the science of separate or divine being, he wanted to make them one and the same science. Whether or not he really succeeded in this effort is another question, of course, and one that has occasioned many controversies among specialists.⁸

6. See *Met.* VI, c. 1 (1025b 3–1026a 19). At 1026a 14 I am following the original manuscript reading rather than the Schwegler-Ross emendation, i.e., I take it that Aristotle intends to say that physics deals with things which are not separate and not immutable. For Aristotle’s recognition of the difficulty of uniting into one the science of the divine and the science of being as being see 1026a 23–25.

7. 1026a 29–32 (translation mine). Unless otherwise indicated, the translations of classical and medieval texts will be mine.

8. For references to recent discussions of this see I. Düring, *Aristoteles. Darstellung und Interpretation seines Denkens* (Heidelberg, 1966), pp. 594–99; E. König, “Aristoteles’ erste Philosophie als universale Wissenschaft von den APXAI,” *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 52 (1970), pp. 225–46; J. Owens, *The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics*, 3d ed. (Toronto, 1978), pp. xiii–xxvii, 35–67, plus Part Two (for his personal interpretation of Aristotle); B. Dumoulin, *Analyse génétique de la Métaphysique d’Aristote* (Montreal-Paris, 1986), pp. 107–74. Two important contributions by A. Mansion should also be mentioned: “L’objet de la science philosophique suprême d’après Aristote, *Métaph.* E 1,” in *Mélanges de philosophie grecque offerts à Mgr A. Diès* (Paris, 1956), pp. 151–68; “Philosophie première, philosophie seconde et métaphysique chez Aristote,” *Revue philosophique de Louvain* 56 (1958), pp. 165–221. For a brief survey of some medieval reactions to this problem see my “Essence and Existence,” ch. 19 in *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy*, ed. N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny, J. Pinborg (Cambridge, 1982), pp. 385–92. For fuller discussion see A. Zimmermann, *Ontologie oder Metaphysic?* as cited below in n. 12.

With this we may turn to Avicenna. He is aware of this same difficulty. In the first Book or Treatise of his *Metaphysics* (*Book on First Philosophy*), he takes up the issue of the subject of metaphysics. He assumes that every theoretical science should have an appropriate subject. He identifies the subject of natural science (physics) as bodies insofar as they are subject to motion and rest. The subject of the mathematical sciences is quantity, whether simply considered as such, or in terms of that which has quantity. But the third theoretical science—divine science—investigates things which are separate from matter both in terms of their existence and in the order of definition. He then notes the need to identify more precisely the subject of divine science.⁹

One possible candidate for the subject of this science would seem to be God. Such might be suggested by one of the titles used to describe it by Aristotle in Bk VI of his *Metaphysics*, i.e., “divine science.” Nonetheless, Avicenna denies that God is the subject of this discipline. God’s existence is rather one of the issues to be investigated in this science. Avicenna notes that the subject of a science is something the existence of which is taken as given by that science, not something the existence of which is to be demonstrated in that science itself. In other words, Avicenna is convinced that no science can demonstrate the existence of its subject. But he maintains that God’s existence can be established only in metaphysics, not in any other philosophical science. And the question of his existence must not remain unexamined by philosophy. Therefore, if no science can demonstrate the existence of its own subject, and if God’s existence can be demonstrated only in metaphysics, it follows that God cannot be the subject of metaphysics.¹⁰

9. Van Riet ed., Vol. 1, p. 2:20–30. Here I shall cite from this edition, with occasional reference to the Arabic-French translation by G. C. Anawati, *La Métaphysique du Shifāʾ. Livres I à V* (Paris, 1978); *Livres VI à X* (Paris, 1985). Note that Avicenna refers to the things investigated by mathematics as being free from any species of matter or capacity for motion in their definition. On the other hand, divine science “non inquirunt nisi res separatas a materia *secundum existentiam et definitionem*” (italics mine), p. 2:28–30. That the things studied by divine science are free from matter in existence as well as in definition is crucial for the Avicennian view. On the need to clarify the subject of metaphysics see pp. 2–4. On p. 4 he identifies first philosophy with wisdom taken without qualification, and also notes that three characteristics which have been associated with wisdom pertain to first philosophy, namely, that wisdom is a nobler science which deals with a nobler object, that its knowledge is more certain and fitting, and that it is the science which deals with the first causes of all (see p. 3:47–50).

10. Van Riet ed., pp. 4–6. Note in particular Avicenna’s claims: that God is one of the things investigated in this science (p. 4:64–65); that if this were not so, then either God’s existence would be granted in this science, and investigated in some other science, or else granted in this science and not investigated in any other (both of these alternatives are to be rejected as false), see pp. 4:66–5:81; that because God’s existence is investigated in this science, he cannot be the subject of this science (for no science should establish that its subject is): “Nulla enim scientiarum debet stabilire esse suum subiectum” (p. 5:83–85);

Avicenna also considers as another candidate for the subject of this science the four causes, that is to say, all four of them taken together, not merely any one of them taken individually. He rejects this position as well. Hence Avicenna concludes that the subject of this science can only be being as being (according to the Latin translation), or the existent insofar as it is an existent (as the Arabic is often rendered).¹¹

Concerning this issue, Avicenna's influence on thirteenth-century Latin thinkers is pronounced indeed. As they saw things, another and later Islamic thinker—Averroes—had in fact concluded that the subject of metaphysics is a special kind of being, i.e., separate or divine entity. While Averroes agreed with Avicenna that no science can establish the existence of its own subject, he emphatically denied that God's existence is proved in metaphysics. It is rather physics which demonstrates this by proving that there is a First Mover. By doing this, physics establishes the point that there is indeed being which is separate from matter and mo-

more detailed proof that God's existence can be established only in this science, since it investigates things completely separate from matter: "quod ipsa inquirat res separatas omnino a materia" (pp. 5:87-6:96). Cf. H. Davidson, *Proofs for Eternity, Creation and the Existence of God in Medieval Islamic and Jewish Philosophy* (Oxford, 1987), pp. 284-86.

11. Avicenna considers four different ways in which the causes might be regarded as the subject of this science: (1) insofar as they exist; or (2) insofar as they are causes without qualification ("inquantum sunt causae absolutae"); or (3) insofar as each of the four is a cause according to the mode which is proper to it; or (4) insofar as they constitute a whole which results from their union. He considers and rejects in turn alternatives 2, 3, and 4 (see pp. 6:97-8:49). If one turns to alternative 1 and speaks of studying the causes insofar as they exist ("inquantum habent esse") and of all that happens to them in terms of this, it will be more appropriate to conclude that being insofar as it is being is the subject of this science ("oportet tunc ut ens, inquantum est ens, sit subiectum, quod est convenientius"), see p. 8:49-52. Note that Anawati renders this: "il faut alors que le sujet premier . . . soit l'existant en tant qu'existant" (ed. cit., p. 90:7-8). Verbeke also expresses it this way (see Van Riet ed., Introduction, p. 17*). And as we shall see below, in commenting on *Metaphysics* I, c. 5 and Avicenna's discussion there of primary concepts such as *ens*, *res*, and *neesse* (as the medieval Latin translation expresses them), M. Marmura renders the first (which translates the Arabic *al-mawjūd*) not as "being" but as "the existent." See his "Avicenna on Primary Concepts in the *Metaphysics* of his *al-Shifā*," in *Logos Islamikos. Studia Islamica in honorem Georgii Michaelis Wickens*, ed. R. M. Savory and D. A. Agius (Toronto, 1984), pp. 219-39. And so does G. Finianos in commenting on our present passage. See his *Les grandes divisions de l'être "mawjūd"* (Fribourg, 1976), p. 19. On the other hand, M. Fakhry refers to the "primary object of this science as being qua being . . ." in his *A History of Islamic Philosophy* (2d ed. New York, 1983), p. 147, while presenting the Avicennian position. But in another context he refers to it as "the existing entity (*al-mawjūd*) insofar as it exists. . . ." See his "The Subject-Matter of Metaphysics: Aristotle and Ibn Sina (Avicenna)," in *Islamic Theology and Philosophy: Studies in Honor of George F. Hourani*, ed. M. E. Marmura (Albany, 1984), p. 139. The Arabic-Latin-Italian version by O. Lizzini and P. Porro (*Avicenna. Metaphysica* [Milan, 2002]) renders it "essere in quanto essere" (p. 29) but in n. 35 (p. 1056) explains: "Letteralmente: 'l'esistente in quanto esistente.'" Most recently in his bilingual version of Avicenna's *Metaphysica* Marmura again renders this as "the existent inasmuch as it is an existent." See his *Avicenna: The Metaphysics of "The Healing"* (Provo, Utah, 2005), Bk I. c. 2, pp. 9:32 and 10:3-4.

tion, and hands this over to metaphysics to serve as its subject.¹² Thus we find a late thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century thinker such as Duns Scotus explicitly contrasting Avicenna and Averroes concerning this before he attempts to work out his own solution.¹³

As for Thomas Aquinas, he maintains that the subject of metaphysics is being (*ens*) as being, or as he also some times puts it, being in general (*ens commune*). Its subject is definitely not God.¹⁴ On these points he sides with Avicenna, not with Averroes. But on one issue related to this he seems to go beyond Avicenna and beyond his own contemporaries. Avicenna does not spell out for us the precise relationship between God

12. For the Latin Averroes see *In I Phys.*, com. 83 (Venice, 1562–74), Vol. 4, fols. 47rb–48va: “Sed notandum est quod istud genus entium, esse scilicet separatum a materia, non declaratur nisi in hac scientia naturali. Et qui dicit quod prima Philosophia nititur declarare entia separabilia esse peccat. Haec entia sunt subiecta primae Philosophiae, et declaratum est in Posterioribus Analyticis quod impossibile est aliquam scientiam declarare suum subiectum esse, sed concedit ipsum esse, aut quia manifestum per se, aut quia est demonstratum in alia scientia. Unde Avicenna peccavit maxime cum dixit quod primus Philosophus demonstrat primum principium esse, et processit in hoc in suo libro de Scientia Divina per viam, quam existimavit esse necessariam et essentialem in illa scientia, et peccavit peccato manifesto.” Also see *In II Phys.*, com. 22, fols. 56vb–57ra; *In IV Met.*, com. 1 (Venice, 1562–1574), Vol. 8, fols. 64rb–64va; com. 2, fols. 65rb–66rb; *In XII Met.*, com. 5, fols. 292vb–293va. On this see A. Zimmermann, *Ontologie oder Metaphysik? Die Diskussion über den Gegenstand der Metaphysik im 13. und 14. Jahrhundert* (2d ed. Leuven, 1998), pp. 152–54; for his exposition of Avicenna see pp. 144–150; cf. J. Wippel, “Essence and Existence,” in *Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy*, pp. 386–87.

13. See *Ordinatio*, Prol., pars 3, q. 2, ad 2, nn. 193–94 (Vatican ed., 1950—), Vol. 1, pp. 129–31; *Lectura*, Prol., pars 2, q. 2, ad arg., n. 97, Vol. 16, pp. 34–35; *Report. Paris. examinata*, Prol., q. 3, a. 1: “De primo est controversia inter Avicennam et Averroem. Poneit enim Avicenna quod Deus non est subiectum in metaphysica sed aliquid aliud, ut ens. Quia nulla scientia probat suum subiectum esse. Metaphysicus probat Deum et substantias separatas esse, ergo etc. Averroes reprehendit Avicennam in commento ultimo, I Physicorum. Supposita maiori Avicennae quod nulla scientia probat suum subiectum esse, quae est communis utriusque, capit quod Deus est subiectum in metaphysica, et hoc non probatur in metaphysica sed in physica. . . . Sed Avicenna bene dicit et Averroes valde male. . . . Dico ergo ad questionem . . . quod Deus non est subiectum in metaphysica.” See *John Duns Scotus: The Examined Report of the Paris Lecture, Reportatio Examinata I-A. Latin Text and English Translation*, by A. B. Wolter and O. V. Bychov (St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 2004), pp. 75–76, nn. 214–218. There is some difficulty in reconciling Scotus’s general position concerning this with his discussion in his *Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis, Libri I–V*, Bk I, q. 1 (St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1997), pp. 15–72. So true is this that J. Owens has suggested that here we have not Scotus’s personal opinion but rather a school disputation in which “both sides of the question were treated problematically, but no decision given, at least in the extant text.” See “Up to What Point Is God Included in the Metaphysics of Duns Scotus,” *Mediaeval Studies* 10 (1948), p. 165. For an attempt to reconcile to some degree Scotus’s discussion here with what he says elsewhere see A. Zimmermann, *Ontologie oder Metaphysik?* pp. 294–329. Also see L. Honnefelder, *Ens in quantum ens. Der Begriff des Seienden als solchen als Gegenstand der Metaphysik nach der Lehre des Johannes Duns Scotus* (Münster, 1979), pp. 99–125 (esp. pp. 111–12; 119ff.).

14. See his *In De Trinitate*, q. 5, a. 4 (Leon. 50.154:161–162): “quae habet subiectum ens in quantum est ens”; *In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio* (Turin-Rome, 1950), Prooemium, p. 2: “Quamvis autem subiectum huius scientiae sit ens commune. . . .”

and being as being—the subject of metaphysics. If God is not the subject of metaphysics, is God included under being as being, its subject? It would seem so. And this view is defended by thirteenth-century thinkers such as Siger of Brabant, Godfrey of Fontaines, and at the turn of the century, Duns Scotus.¹⁵

For Thomas Aquinas, however, this is not the case. As he views things, we should distinguish between the subject of a science and the principles of that subject. A science such as metaphysics must take its subject as given, presumably because in the case of being, one does not demonstrate it. One discovers it. But it is the business of a given science to arrive at knowledge of the causes and principles of its subject. This means that one must strive in metaphysics to arrive at knowledge of the cause of being as being or of being in general, i.e., of everything that falls under this general notion. But God is the cause of the existence of every other being. Therefore, in metaphysics one should strive to reach knowledge of God, the principle and cause of every other being, and hence the cause of that which falls under being as being.¹⁶ Hence one's metaphysical inquiry will not be completed until one reaches knowledge of God's existence. But not only is God not the subject of metaphysics. According to Thomas, God does not fall under the notion of being in general or being as being that is its subject. Hence God enters into the metaphysician's consideration only indirectly, as the principle or cause of that which the metaphysician considers directly—being as being.¹⁷ Here, then, we have

15. For discussion and references to Siger and Scotus see my treatment in *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy*, pp. 387–90. On Avicenna concerning this also see A. Zimmermann, *Ontologie oder Metaphysik?* pp. 144–52. For Scotus see also n. 13 above. See *Siger de Brabant. Quaestiones in Metaphysicam* (Munich and Vienna mss.), ed. Wm. Dunphy (Louvain-la-Neuve, 1981), Intr., q. 1 (Munich ms.), pp. 35–37; *Siger de Brabant. Quaestiones in Metaphysicam* (Cambridge and Paris mss.), ed. A. Maurer (Louvain-la-Neuve, 1983), Intr., q. 1. (Cambridge ms.), pp. 23–25; (Paris ms.), pp. 395–96. For Godfrey's views concerning this see my *The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines* (Washington, D.C., 1981), pp. 2–15, esp. pp. 8–11.

16. For the distinction between the principles or causes of the subject of a science and the subject itself see *In De Trinitate*, q. 5, a. 4 (Leon. 50.153:82–87; 154:176–201); Prooemium to his *Commentary on the Metaphysics*, p. 2. On knowledge of the causes or principles of the subject as the end of the science see Prooemium, p. 2; *In De Trinitate*, q. 5, a. 4 (Leon. 50.153:85–86): “. . . cum scientia non perficiatur nisi per cognitionem principiorum . . .” For the point that it belongs to one and the same science to consider the causes of a given subject-genus, and that genus itself, see Prooemium, p. 1.

17. This is clearly implied by the two sources cited in the preceding note. In addition, for Thomas's refusal to include God under *esse commune*, see his *Commentary on the Divine Names*, *In librum beati Dionysii De divinis nominibus expositio* (Turin-Rome, 1950), C. V, 1. 2, n. 660, p. 245: “Secundo, quantum ad hoc quod omnia existentia continentur sub ipso esse communi, non autem Deus, sed magis esse commune continetur sub eius virtute. . . .” While it is true that Thomas here speaks of *esse commune* rather than of *ens commune*, it is clear that the two are coequal in terms of extension. To speak of *esse commune* is to emphasize the *actus essendi* which is included in Thomas's understanding of *ens com-*

a case where Thomas borrows heavily from Avicenna, but also goes beyond his Islamic predecessor.

2. THE DISCOVERY OF BEING AS BEING

If being as being is the subject of metaphysics, how does one discover this subject? According to Aquinas, some understanding of being is available to every thinking human being. In fact, he would often state, frequently with explicit reference to Avicenna, that being (*ens*) is that which is first known to the intellect and that into which the intellect resolves all its other conceptions.¹⁸ Avicenna applies this to three primary notions, thing (*res*), being (*ens* or the existent [*al-mawjūd*]), and the necessary, in his *Metaphysics* I, c. 5: “We will say, therefore, that thing (*res*) and being (*ens*) and the necessary are such that they are immediately impressed on the soul by a first impression, which is not taken from other things better known than these themselves.” Avicenna also draws a parallel between these primary ideas or conceptions, and first principles or judgments to which assent is given immediately.¹⁹ In his *De veritate* q. 1, a. 1, Aquinas draws this same parallel between the need for first principles in the order of things which are subject to demonstration, and the need for a first conception such as being: “That which the intellect first conceives as most known, and into which it resolves all its (other) conceptions is being (*ens*), as Avicenna says at the beginning of his *Metaphysics*.”²⁰

mune. On this see my “Thomas Aquinas and Participation,” in *Studies in Medieval Philosophy*, ed. J. F. Wippel (Washington, D.C., 1987), pp. 150–51; *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas*, pp. 123–24. Thomas explicitly states that *ens commune* and *esse commune* are equal in extension (“communissimum”) in his Commentary on the *De Hebdomadibus*. See *In De Hebdomadibus*, lect. 2 (Leon. 50.271:95–102).

18. See, for instance, *De ente et essentia*, Prologus (Leon. 43.369:3–5) “. . . ens autem et essentia sunt quae primo intellectu concipiuntur, ut dicit Avicenna in principio suae *Metaphysicae* . . .”; *In De Trinitate*, q. 1, a. 3, obj. 3: “. . . quia ens est illud quod primo cadit in cognitione humana, ut Avicenna dicit” (Leon. 50.86:28–29); *De veritate*, q. 21, a. 1: “Cum autem ens sit id quod primo cadit in conceptione intellectus, ut Avicenna dicit . . .” (Leon. 22.3:593:144–146); *In I Met.*, lect. 2, p. 13, n. 46: “. . . nam primo in intellectu cadit ens, ut Avicenna dicit, et prius in intellectu cadit animal quam homo . . .”; ST I-II, q. 55, a. 4, ad 1: “. . . id quod primo cadit in intellectu est ens: unde unicuique apprehenso a nobis attribuumus quod sit ens” (Leon. 6.353).

19. Van Riet ed., Vol. 1, Tr. I, c. 5, pp. 31–32: “Dicemus igitur quod res et ens et necesse talia sunt quod statim imprimuntur in anima prima impressione, quae non acquiritur aliis notioribus se, sicut credulitas quae habet prima principia, ex quibus ipsa provenit per se, et est alia ab eis, sed propter ea.” Cf. Anawati’s French translation from the Arabic for the latter part of the above: “En effet, [il en est] comme dans le domaine du jugement (*taṣdīq*): il y a des principes premiers que l’on admet pour eux-mêmes et à cause desquels on admet les autres” (ed. cit., p. 106). For an English translation see M. Marmura, “Avicenna on Primary Concepts in the *Metaphysics* of his *al-Shifā*,” p. 222: “We say: the ideas of ‘the existent’, ‘the thing’ and . . .” Also see his *Avicenna: The Metaphysics of “The Healing,”* Bk I, c. 5, p. 22:19.

20. “Illud autem quod primo intellectus concipit quasi notissimum et in quod concep-

At the same time, Thomas does not believe that everyone is a born metaphysician. In fact, he seems to be rather pessimistic about there being any such thing as a metaphysics for the many. When it comes to metaphysical conclusions such as the existence of God, he writes in a text already mentioned in Ch. I (*Summa contra Gentiles* I, c. 4), it was fitting for God to have revealed certain truths to us which unaided human reason can discover, at least in principle, and this for three reasons. Otherwise most men would never discover such truths, owing to their lack of ability, their lack of sufficient time, or simple laziness. Secondly, even those who did succeed in such an endeavor would do so only after a long period of time had passed. And finally, even for these, considerable error might be intermingled with the truth they had discovered.²¹

It is true that in this context Thomas is speaking about sophisticated metaphysical conclusions such as our knowledge that God exists or that God is one. Even so, in supporting his argumentation in that same passage, he writes that “almost all of philosophy is directed towards the knowledge of God, and this is why metaphysics, which deals with divine things, is the last part of philosophy to be learned.”²² Hence it seems that for Aquinas a considerable amount of philosophical sophistication is required even for one to begin metaphysics and even for one to discover being as being.

It seems to me, therefore, that one should distinguish two notions of being within Thomas’s thinking. The first is the ordinary premetaphysical grasp of reality, or of being, which is open to everyone. But this notion is still restricted to the kinds of being with which our knowledge begins, i.e., material and changing being. In order to move on to a knowledge of being as being—the subject of metaphysics—one must free one’s understanding of being from restriction to any particular kind or class of being. In order to account for this, Thomas appeals to a special kind of judgment, a negative judgment, which he refers to as “separation.” Through this judgment one recognizes that that by reason of which something enjoys being is not to be identified with that by reason of which it enjoys a given kind of being, such as canine being, or living being, or changing being, or mathematical being. As a consequence, one judges that being, in order to be realized as such, need not be material and changing, or

tiones omnes resolvit est ens, ut Avicenna dicit in principio suae Metaphysicae” (Leon. 22.1.5:100–104).

21. See *Summa contra Gentiles*, Ed. Leon. man. (Rome, 1934), p. 4.

22. “. . . cum fere totius philosophiae consideratio ad Dei cognitionem ordinetur; propter quod metaphysica, quae circa divina versatur, inter philosophiae partes ultima remanet addiscenda” (p. 4).

quantified, or spiritual. It need only be being. Only at this point does one discover the subject of metaphysics—being as being.²³

In my opinion this is one of the most interesting and original features in Thomas's approach to metaphysics. But I would also like to suggest that in developing this, Thomas was once again influenced by Avicenna. This time the debt is not explicitly acknowledged by Aquinas. And the doctrine found in the two thinkers is not identical. Nevertheless, in Bk I, c. 2 of his *Metaphysics*, Avicenna makes a studied effort to show how it is that we can think of being as being. He notes that the subject of natural science is body, not insofar as it is being (*ens*) or existent (according to the Arabic), nor insofar as it is substance, nor even insofar as it is composed of matter and form, but only insofar as it is subject to motion and rest. The subject of the mathematical sciences is measure, whether this is understood without matter (in geometry) or as in matter (in astronomy), and number, whether this is understood without matter (in arithmetic) or as in matter (in music). Avicenna comments that it does not belong to mathematics as such to determine whether or not measure and number are understood without matter or in matter; mathematics merely accepts this as already settled, and derives appropriate attributes therefrom. The subject of logic will be second intentions, not first intentions, but without any reference to their mode of existence.²⁴

Therefore, reasons Avicenna, there must be some science which studies substance insofar as it is being (an existent, according to the Arabic) or substance, and body insofar as it is substance, and measure and number insofar as they exist and how they exist, and which also considers the kinds of forms which do not exist in matter, or if they do, not in corporeal matter. But such a consideration cannot be carried out by any of the sciences which deal only with sensible things as such (i.e., physics), or with things which exist only in sensible matter even if these sciences abstract them from sensible matter (i.e., mathematics). Rather such things are included among those which have a being which is in some way separated from matter.²⁵

23. For fuller discussion of this see my *Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas*, especially pp. 70–82; and now *The Metaphysical Thought*, pp. 23–44 (on our premetaphysical understanding of being), pp. 44–62 (on our discovery of being as being). Cf. Thomas's remark in *In VI Met.*, lect. 1, p. 298, n. 1165, where he explicitly mentions Avicenna.

24. Van Riet ed., Vol. 1, pp. 9–10.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 10. Note especially: "Deinde consideratio de substantia in quantum est ens vel est substantia, vel de corpore in quantum est substantia, et de mensura et numero in quantum habent esse et quomodo habent esse, et de rebus formalibus quae non sunt in materia, vel, si sint in materia, non tamen corporea, et quomodo sint illae, et quis modus est magis proprius illis, separatim per se debet haberi." The meaning of the next two sen-

And then, in terms which seem to anticipate Thomas's later discussion of separation, Avicenna comments that the existence of substance, insofar as it is substance, does not depend upon matter. Otherwise there could be nothing but sensible substances.²⁶ Again, it is incidental to number whether it be realized in sensible things or in things which are not sensible. Hence number, insofar as it is number, does not depend upon sensible things. Measure, too, even though its meaning is more complex, should be investigated in its different usages in terms of its relationship to existence. And to consider it in terms of its existence is not to consider it insofar as it depends upon matter. Second intentions, the subject of logic, do not depend on sensible things for their being. Therefore, all of these fall within the scope of a science which studies that whose realization (*constitutio* or, closer to the Arabic, "subsistence") does not depend upon sensible reality.²⁷

Avicenna concludes that the only subject which can be common to all of these and of which they may be regarded as dispositions and accidents

tences in the Latin is clearer in the Arabic-French translation. See Anawati, p. 92: "Il n'est pas possible, en effet, que cela ressortisse à la science des sensibles ni à une des sciences de ce dont l'existence est dans le sensible mais que la représentation (*tawahhum*) et la définition dépouillent des sensibles." See the Latin: "Non enim potest esse subiectum alicuius scientiarum de sensibilibus nec alicuius scientiarum de eo quod habet esse in sensibilibus. Nam aestimatio est expoliatio a sensibilibus. . . ." The Latin concludes: "haec autem sunt de universitate eorum quae habent esse separata a materia." Also see Marmura, *Avicenna: The Metaphysics of "The Healing"*, p. 8:1-12.

26. Van Riet ed., p. 10: "Manifestum est enim quod esse substantiae, in quantum est substantia tantum, non pendet ex materia; alioquin non esset substantia nisi sensibilis." Cf. Marmura, *ibid.*, p. 8:13-15. Compare with Thomas, *In De Trinitate*, q. 5, a. 3: "Substantia autem, quae est materia intelligibilis quantitatis, potest esse sine quantitate." Thomas immediately goes on to apply his distinction between separation and abstraction: "unde considerare substantiam sine quantitate magis pertinet ad genus separationis quam abstractionis" (Leon. 50.149:270-274).

27. Van Riet ed., pp. 10-12. Avicenna's discussion of measure is more complicated than the remark in my text might suggest, and the Latin text needs to be controlled by the Arabic-French version at one point in order for it to be coherent. Compare p. 11:99-01 with Anawati, p. 92: "Aucune d'elles n'est séparée de la matière; mais la mesure au sens premier, bien qu'elle ne se sépare pas de la matière, elle est également principe de l'existence des corps naturels. Si donc elle est principe de leur existence, il ne se peut pas que sa substance (*qiwām*) dépende d'eux en ce sens que la substance (for *substance*, in Anawati) proviendrait (au corps) à partir des sensibles, mais au contraire, ce sont les sensibles qui prennent de lui leur substance. La mesure est donc antérieure par essence aux choses sensibles." Also see Marmura, *ibid.*, pp. 8:18-9:6. In sum, Avicenna notes that measure may be understood as the extension which constitutes a natural body, or else as continuous quantity which is said of a line, a surface, or of a determined body. While neither of these is separate from matter, taken in the first sense measure itself is to be regarded as a principle of existence for natural bodies. Far from measure depending upon them for its existence, they depend upon it for their existence. Taken in the second sense, he goes on to argue, one can consider measure either from the standpoint of its existence, or from the standpoint of its accidents. To consider it in terms of its existence is not to consider it insofar as it depends on matter.

is *esse*. Some of these are substances, some are quantities, and some fall under other predicaments. The only common feature which applies to all of them is that of being (*intentio essendi*).²⁸ Therefore being insofar as it is being (*ens inquantum est ens*) is the subject of this science.²⁹

In his effort to show that all of these can be studied from the standpoint of their being or their existence, Avicenna is attempting to make the same point that Aquinas does through his appeal to the negative judgment of separation. The point is to show that being, in order to be realized as such, need not be restricted to this or that given kind such as material being, or changing being, or quantified being, and therefore that metaphysics or first philosophy should study being as such, not as restricted to material or changing or quantified being. Hence it seems to me that in developing his theory of separation, Aquinas must have drawn considerable inspiration from this Avicennian text. (I propose this while recognizing that Aquinas's explicit distinction between separation taken as a negative judgment and mere abstraction is not present in the Avicennian text.) It should also be noted that in developing other parts of q. 5 of his Commentary on the *De Trinitate*, Thomas explicitly acknowledges his debt to Avicenna.³⁰

28. Van Riet ed., p. 12; "Sed non potest poni eis subiectum commune, ut illorum omnium sint dispositiones et accidentalialia communia, nisi esse. Quaedam enim eorum sunt substantiae, et quaedam quantitates, et quaedam alia praedicamenta; quae non possint habere communem intentionem qua certificentur nisi intentionem essendi." He then lists other things which should also be studied, and which are common to the sciences but treated by no particular science. He mentions the one insofar as it is one, the many insofar as it is many, the fitting, the unfitting, the contrary, etc. He notes that these, too: "nec possunt esse accidentalialia alicui nisi ei quod est esse, inquantum est esse." He concludes: "Igitur ostensum est tibi ex his omnibus quod ens, inquantum est ens, est commune omnibus his et quod ipsum debet poni subiectum huius magisterii. . . ."

29. He makes the point that there is no need to inquire whether being is or what it is, as if another science were required to do this. This is rather to be taken as given. "Ideo primum subiectum huius scientiae est ens, inquantum est ens; et ea quae inquirunt sunt consequentia ens, inquantum est ens, sine condicione" (p. 13). Note how the Latin easily moves from referring to the subject of this science as *esse* (see n. 28) to speaking of it as *ens* (*inquantum est ens*). For confirmation of the distinctiveness of this perspective see Bk I, c. 2, near the end. There he notes that while this science studies different kinds of things, all of them have this in common, that they are considered as separate from matter in definition and in existence: ". . . et propterea definitur scientia divina sic quod est scientia de rebus separatis a materia definitione et definitionibus (read with French: "dans la definition et l'existence" [p. 95]), quia ens, inquantum est ens, et principia eius et accidentalialia eius, inquantum sunt, sicut iam patuit, nullum eorum est nisi praecedens materiam nec pendet esse eius ex esse illius. Cum autem inquiratur in hac scientia de eo quod non praecedat materiam, non inquiratur in ea nisi secundum hoc quod eius esse non eget materia" (p. 16). Also see Marmura, p. 12:4-5. See Van Riet ed., pp. 16-17 for a listing of four different kinds of things which may be described as or at least studied as not dependent upon matter. Even material things such as rest and motion can be studied in this science, not insofar as they are in matter, "sed secundum esse quod habent" (p. 17).

30. For at least the suggestion that Thomas may have been inspired by Avicenna in de-

3. ESSENCE AND EXISTENCE

The name of Thomas Aquinas has long been associated with the theory of distinction and composition in all finite beings of two principles, an essence which accounts for their being what they are, and an act of existing (*esse*, or *actus essendi*) which accounts for the fact that they exist and is their ultimate intrinsic source of actuality and perfection. Much has been written about the central role this doctrine plays within his metaphysics.³¹ But for the present I shall take as granted the importance of this theory within Thomas's philosophy. Here I wish to turn again to the Latin Avicenna, to determine if and to what extent he may be regarded as a partial source for Aquinas.

Among contemporary students of the Arabic Avicenna,³² there are

veloping his theory of *separatio* see L. Geiger, "Abstraction et séparation d'après s. Thomas *In de Trinitate*, q. 5, a. 3," *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 31 (1947), p. 27 and n. 2. Geiger gives no reference to Avicenna, however. For a more recent suggestion of this same influence see J. J. Haladus, *The Negative Judgment of Separation According to Saint Thomas Aquinas's Commentary on the De Trinitate of Boethius* (Rome, 1979), pp. 122–27; cf. pp. 70–72. Curiously, he argues in large measure from texts of Avicenna which were not available to Thomas in Latin translation and, when using texts which were known to Aquinas, concentrates on Bk VIII of the *Metaphysics*, totally bypassing the discussion of the subject of metaphysics in Bk I. See n. 3 above for reference to my earlier study of Thomas's usage of Avicenna in q. 5, a. 1, ad 9 of his Commentary on the *De Trinitate*. For Thomas's ten explicit references to Avicenna in this same Commentary see C. Vansteenkiste, "Avicenna-Citaten bij S. Thomas," pp. 458–60.

31. For discussion of some of these issues and for references to other secondary literature see my *The Metaphysical Thought*, ch. V.

32. See F. Rahman, "Essence and Existence in Avicenna," *Mediaeval and Renaissance Studies* 4 (Oxford, 1958), pp. 1–16; "Ibn Sina," in M. M. Sharif, *A History of Muslim Philosophy* (Wiesbaden, 1963), Vol. 1, pp. 481–86; "Essence and Existence in Ibn Sina: The Myth and the Reality," *Hamdard Islamicus* 4 (1981), pp. 3–14; P. Morewedge, "Philosophical Analysis and Ibn Sina's 'Essence-Existence' Distinction," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 92 (1972), pp. 425–35; F. Shehadi, *Metaphysics in Islamic Philosophy* (Delmar, N.Y., 1982), pp. 77–83. Shehadi's point is that existence for Avicenna is an accident in the logical sense, but not in the metaphysical sense. For some who find Avicenna defending a real or at least more than a conceptual distinction between essence and existence see A.-M. Goichon, *La distinction de l'essence et de l'existence d'après Ibn Sina (Avicenne)* (Paris, 1937), pp. 130–48; G. C. Anawati, *La métaphysique du Shifā'*, Vol. 1, pp. 71, 78 (where he seems to agree with the charge by Aquinas that Avicenna also mistakenly regarded existence as a kind of accident superadded to essence); J. Jolivet, "Aux origines de l'ontologie d'Ibn Sina," in *Études sur Avicenne*, ed. Jolivet and R. Rashed (Paris, 1984), p. 13 (on the distinction of essence and existence in *Metaphysics* I, c. 5), p. 15 (passing reference to the adventitious nature of existence in relation to essence, and after his presentation of *Metaphysics* I, c. 5), p. 24 (where he refers to "la distinction essentielle, mais non réelle, entre la chose et l'existant" and then to "la distanciation de celle-là (l'essence) par rapport à celle-ci (l'existence)"); M. Marmura, "Avicenna on Primary Concepts . . ." pp. 225–27; "The Metaphysics of Efficient Causality in Avicenna (Ibn Sina)," p. 180; "Avicenna IV. Metaphysics," in *Encyclopaedia Iranica*, ed. E. Yarshater (London–New York, 1982–), Vol. III, Fascicle 1, pp. 75–78 (this entire article is an excellent introduction to Avicenna's metaphysics; see pp. 73–79). Also now see R. Wisnovsky, *Avicenna's Metaphysics in Context* (Ithaca, N.Y., 2003), cc. 7–9, for a sustained effort to show that Avicenna's distinction between essence (*māhiyya*) and existence (*wujūd*)

some who deny that he defended the kind of real distinction between essence and existence which has long been associated with his name by Western interpreters, and who insist especially that he did not regard existence as an accident or accidental reality which is superadded to essence. Others, however, continue to attribute these views to the Arabic Avicenna. Not being an Arabic scholar myself, I shall leave examination of this issue to those who are. I shall continue to restrict myself to the only Avicenna known to Aquinas, the Latin Avicenna. And once we turn to medieval Latin thinkers, it becomes clear that not only Aquinas but many of his thirteenth-century contemporaries saw in Avicenna a defender of real distinction between essence and existence. Moreover, encouraged as they were in this reading by the Latin Averroes, thinkers such as Aquinas, Siger of Brabant, and James of Viterbo criticized Avicenna for viewing being (and hence, by implication, existence), as a kind of accident that is superadded to essence.³³

owes much to earlier debates within Islamic Kalam concerning the relationship between "thing" (*shay'*) and "existent" (*mawjūd*). As he recognizes, in Avicenna in himself these two relationships are not identical. Also see p. 265. For a helpful overview of his findings now see his "Avicenna and the Avicennian Tradition," in *The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy*, ed. P. Adamson and R. C. Taylor (Cambridge, 2005), pp. 105–13.

33. For the text from the Latin Averroes see *Aristotelis opera cum Averrois Commentariis* (Venice, 1562–1574), *In IV Met.*, Vol. 8, fol. 67ra: "Avicenna autem peccavit multum in hoc, quod existimavit quod unum et ens significant dispositiones additas essentiae rei." Averroes's reference to *ens* as a disposition which is added to the essence of a thing was taken by some of the Latins as implying both that Avicenna defended real distinction between essence and existence, and that he regarded existence as a kind of accident which is superadded to essence. See, for instance, Thomas Aquinas, *In IV Met.*, lect. 2, n. 556: "Sciendum est autem quod circa hoc Avicenna aliud sensit. Dixit enim quod unum et ens non significant substantiam rei, sed significant aliquid additum. Et de ente quidem hoc dicebat, quia in qualibet re quae habet esse ab alio, aliud et esse rei, et substantia sive essentia eius: hoc autem nomen ens, significat ipsum esse. Significat igitur (ut videtur) aliquid additum essentiae." For Siger see his *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam* (Munich version), ed. Dumphy, Introduction, q. 7, p. 42 where reference is made to Avicenna's claim that the meaning of *res* and the meaning of being (*ens*) are two different meanings (*intentiones*); pp. 43–44 where Siger refers to Albert the Great as holding that a thing (*res*) exists through a *dispositio* which is added to its essence, but in language which is unmistakably that of Avicenna, as is confirmed on p. 44; pp. 45–46 where Siger criticizes Avicenna, as he notes Averroes had already done, for not distinguishing between names which signify different *intentiones*, and those which signify the same essence but in different ways. "Et ideo credidit quod esse significat aliquid additum essentiae: unde ad modum significandi diversum credidit diversam essentiam consequi." See p. 47:93–94 for the same point against Avicenna. For the Cambridge version of Siger's *Quaestiones* see Maurer ed., p. 32, where Siger explicitly attributes the same view both to Avicenna and to Albert. See pp. 34 and 35 for criticisms of Avicenna. Cf. pp. 397–398 for the briefer Paris *reportatio*. For James of Viterbo see his *Disputatio prima de quolibet*, ed. E. Ypma (Würzburg, 1968), *Quodlibet* I, q. 4, p. 46: "Avicenna vero dixit quod ens significat intentionem seu dispositionem superaditam illi de quo dicitur, ita quod unumquodque dicitur ens non per essentiam suam, sed per aliquid superaditum, sicut res aliqua dicitur alba vel nigra per aliquid superaditum, quod est accidens illi rei. Unde posuit quod ens dicitur accidens sive accidentalem dispositionem in eo de quo praedicatur." James contrasts Avicenna's view with that of Aristotle and

In Bk I, c. 5 of his *Metaphysics* Avicenna writes that being (or the existent), thing, and the necessary are such that they are immediately impressed on the soul by a first impression. This we have already mentioned.³⁴ Farther on in this same chapter he remarks that the meaning (*intentio*) of being (existence according to the Arabic) and the meaning of thing are distinct. Their relationship is not like that of synonyms, or different terms which have the same meaning, such as being and something (*aliquid*, or, according to the Arabic, the given or acquired). Rather the term “thing” and whatever is equivalent to it in other languages signifies something different from that which the term “being” signifies. For every thing has a nature (*certitudo*) or reality by which it is what it is. For instance, a triangle has a nature whereby it is a triangle, and whiteness has a nature whereby it is white. He acknowledges that one might perhaps refer to a thing’s nature as its particular or proper being (*esse*), but immediately distinguishes this usage of *esse* from that whereby we affirm that something exists. It is the latter usage of being or existence, that whereby something exists, that he distinguishes from a thing’s nature (or essence, as we might call it).³⁵

Averroes, according to which “ens significat essentiam omnis eius de quo dicitur. . . .” Then he goes on to speak of different ways in which *esse* is understood by various *doctores*, i.e., thirteenth-century Masters. For more discussion of this and of James’s personal view on the essence-existence distinction see my “The Relationship between Essence and Existence in Late-Thirteenth Century Thought: Giles of Rome, Henry of Ghent, Godfrey of Fontaines, and James of Viterbo,” in *Philosophies of Existence, Ancient and Medieval*, ed. P. Morewedge (New York, 1982), pp. 132–34, 146–48. On James also see M. Gossiaux, “James of Viterbo on the Relationship between Essence and Existence,” *Augustinia* 49 (1999), pp. 73–107.

34. See n. 19 above and the corresponding text.

35. “Dico ergo quod intentio entis et intentio rei imaginantur in animabus duae intentiones; ens vero et aliquid sunt nomina multivoca unius intentionis nec dubitabis quin intentio istorum non sit iam impressa in anima legentis hunc librum. Sed res et quicquid aequipollet ei, significat etiam aliquid aliud in omnibus linguis; unaquaeque enim res habet certitudinem qua est id quod est, sicut triangulus habet certitudinem qua est triangulus, et albedo habet certitudinem qua est albedo. Et hoc est quod fortasse appellamus esse proprium, nec intendimus per illud nisi intentionem esse affirmativi, quia verbum *ens* significat etiam multas intentiones, ex quibus est certitudo qua est unaquaeque res, et est sicut esse proprium rei” (pp. 34–35). For Anawati’s French translation from the Arabic see pp. 107–8. For Marmura’s English translation see his *Avicenna: The Metaphysics of “The Healing,”* p. 24:11–24: “[Moreover,] we say: The meaning of ‘existence’ and the meaning of ‘thing’ are conceived in the soul and are two meanings, whereas the ‘existent,’ the ‘established’ and the ‘realized’ are synonyms. We do not doubt that their meaning has been realized in the soul of whoever is reading this book. ‘The thing’ or its equivalent, may be used in all languages to indicate some other meaning. For, to every thing there is a reality by virtue of which it is what it is. Thus, the triangle has a reality in that it is a triangle, and whiteness has reality in that it is whiteness. It is that which we should perhaps call ‘proper existence,’ not intending by this the meaning given to affirmative existence; for the expression ‘existence’ is also used to denote many meanings, one of which is the reality a thing happens to have. Thus [the reality] a thing happens to have is, as it were, its proper existence.” I take Avicenna as distinguishing here two meanings for *esse*, actual existence (as affirmed), and a proper *esse* which, as Marmura indicates, is identical with a thing’s quiddity or essence

Avicenna repeats his point by recalling that each and every thing has a nature (*certitudo*) which is its quiddity. Again he distinguishes this nature or quiddity from that existence (*esse*) which is synonymous with the term “something,” whereby we affirm that a given thing exists.³⁶ In support of this claim, he introduces another interesting point. We may speak of the nature or essence (*certitudo*) of a thing in three different ways: (1) as existing in individual things (for instance, horseness as realized in Man of War or in Secretariat); (2) as existing in the soul (if I think of horseness in general or universally); (3) absolutely, as common to the first two ways. In other words, he is attempting to bring out the difference between thinking of a nature or essence simply considered in itself, and thinking of it insofar as it exists in an individual entity, or in the intellect as a universal.³⁷

So far, therefore, we have textual justification in the Latin Avicenna for two points which Thomas borrows, at least in part, from the Islamic thinker. If we may reverse the order in which we have presented them, there is the possibility of viewing an essence or nature in any one of three ways, to repeat, as existing in the mind, or as existing in an individual thing, or absolutely, when it is simply considered in itself without reference to its mode of existence. Thomas in fact accepts and uses this distinction—for instance, in one of his earliest works, the *De ente et essentia*—and it reappears elsewhere in his writings, for instance, in his early Quodlibet 8, q. 1 of 1257.³⁸ (However, Thomas would never admit, and

(see p. 386, n. 6). Hence it seems that the term *nisi* should be eliminated from the Latin text in the last sentence quoted above, as occurs in text A, i.e., the Arabic Cairo edition (see Van Riet ed., *ad locum*).

36. “Redeamus igitur et dicamus quod, de his quae manifesta sunt, est hoc quod unaquaeque res habet certitudinem propriam quae est eius quidditas. Et notum est quod certitudo cuiuscumque rei quae propria est ei, est praeter esse quod multivocum est cum aliquid . . .” (p. 35). Marmura translates this: “To resume, we say: It is evident that each thing has a reality proper to it—namely its quiddity. It is known that the reality proper to each thing is something other than the existence that corresponds to what is affirmed” (p. 24:25–28). For the French see Anawati, p. 108: “Revenons [à notre sujet]. Nous dirons: il est évident que pour toute chose, il y a une nature (*haqiqa*) propre, qui est sa quiddité (*mahiyya*). On sait que la nature (*haqiqa*) de toute chose qui lui est propre est autre que l’existence (*al-wujūd*) qui est synonyme de l’affirmation (*al-ithbāt*).”

37. “. . . quoniam, cum dixeris quod certitudo rei talis est in singularibus, vel in anima, vel absolute ita ut communicet utrisque, erit tunc haec intentio apprehensa et intellecta. Sed cum dixeris quod certitudo huius . . . vel certitudo illius est certitudo, erit superflua enuntiatio et inutilis” (Van Riet, p. 35). Marmura: “This is because if you said, ‘The reality of such a thing exists either in concrete things, or in the soul, or absolutely, being common to both,’ this would have a meaning [that was] realized and understood; whereas, if you were to say, ‘The reality of such a thing is the reality of such a thing,’ or ‘The reality of such a thing is a reality,’ this would be superfluous, useless talk” (p. 24:29–34). Also see Avicenna, *Logica* I, c. 1 (Venice, 1508), fol. 2rb.

38. For Thomas see *De ente et essentia*, c. 3 (Leon. 43:374:26–72). Also see Quodlibet 8, q. 1, a. 1 (Leon. 25:1:51:53–52:64). According to Aquinas, the absolute consideration

for that matter, neither would Avicenna, that an essence or nature, taken absolutely in itself, could exist without being realized either as actually existing in an individual, or as being present in the mind in universal fashion. As Avicenna puts it, if a thing is not realized in either of these ways, it is not a thing at all.)³⁹ Moreover, Thomas also appears to be justified in concluding from the Latin texts we have examined that Avicenna does distinguish between essence or nature or quiddity and existence in individual existing entities. In other words, there is sufficient textual justification for Thomas to conclude that Avicenna defended a distinction between essence and existence which is not merely mind-dependent or conceptual.

But does the Latin Avicenna really view existence as if it were an accident which is superadded to essence? In *Metaphysics* V, c. 1, we read the following:

of nature abstracts from its existence either in singulars or in the intellect but not in such fashion as to exclude either in positive fashion, i.e., not according to abstraction by precision (see *De ente*, Leon. 43.374:68–72). For discussion of these two texts see F. Wilhelmson, “A Note: The Absolute Consideration of Nature in *Quaestiones Quodlibetales*, VIII,” *The New Scholasticism* 57 (1983), pp. 352–61. Also see an interesting study by G. Galluzzo, “Aquinas on Common Nature and Universals,” *Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales* 71 (2004), pp. 131–71, esp. 154–71. There is some question as to whether the notion of essence or nature absolutely considered continues to play an important role in Thomas’s later writings. To show that it does play some role, Galluzzo cites *De potentia*, q. 5, a. 9, ad 16 even though, as he acknowledges, in this text Thomas speaks of three ways in which a universal (nature) may be considered. Thomas describes the first of these: “Potest enim uno modo considerari natura universalis secundum quod abstrahit a quolibet esse” (*Quaestiones Disputatae*, Vol. 2 [Turin-Rome: Marietti, 1965], p. 155). Galluzzo also acknowledges that explicit reference to nature considered absolutely is missing from other later texts (and even from this text, I would add), and that in later texts such as *In De anima*, lect. 12 (Leon. 45.1.115:96-116:141); *ST I*, q. 85, a. 2, ad 2; a. 3, ad 1 and ad 4; *In VII Met*, lect. 13, Thomas rather emphasizes the distinction between nature as it exists in extramental individual entities and as it exists in the intellect (see pp. 165–71). Galluzzo also notes that D. Black has offered a more “radical” interpretation about the diminishing importance in Aquinas’s later writings of the threefold way in which essence or nature may be considered in her “Mental Existence in Thomas Aquinas and Avicenna,” *Mediaeval Studies* 61 (1999), pp. 45–79. See Galluzzo, pp. 165–66, n. 59. It seems to me that this issue merits further study.

39. Van Riet ed., p. 36: “. . . quoniam intellectus de ente semper comitabitur illam, quia illa habet esse vel in singularibus vel in aestimatione vel intellectu. Si autem non esset ita, tunc non esset res.” Whether Henry of Ghent exercised the same restraint in assigning real being to what he calls *esse essentiae* is another matter, however. For discussion see my *The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines* (Washington, D.C., 1981), pp. 66–79. Also see J. Paulus, *Henri de Gand. Essai sur les tendances de sa métaphysique* (Paris, 1938), pp. 69–94. For a more sympathetic reading of Henry on this, cf. S. Marrone, *Truth and Scientific Knowledge in the Thought of Henry of Ghent* (Cambridge, Mass., 1985), pp. 105–29; and *The Light of Thy Countenance. Science and Knowledge of God in the Thirteenth Century. Volume Two: God at the Core of Cognition* (Leiden-Boston-Köln, 2001), pp. 350–51. Also see P. Porro, “Possibilità ed *Esse Essentiae* in Enrico di Gand,” in *Henry of Ghent. Proceedings of the International Colloquium on the Occasion of the 700th Anniversary of His Death (1293)*, ed. W. Vanhamel (Leuven, 1996), pp. 211–53.

Animal will be able to be considered in itself, even though it exists with something other than itself; for its essence exists with something other than itself; therefore its essence belongs to it per se; but its existing together with something other than itself is something which *happens* to it (*accidit ei*) or something which accompanies its nature, just as does this animality and this humanity.⁴⁰

The primary point of this text, when taken within its context, is not to assert that existence is accidental to essence. It is rather to show that the essence of animal, for instance, belongs to animal of itself. This consideration of animal in itself is said to be prior in existence (*esse*) to animal insofar as it is rendered individual by its accidents, or insofar as it is universal, that is, it is prior to animal which exists in individual sensible things or which exists in the intellect. But when an essence such as that of animal is realized in either of these two ways it unites with something that is other than itself, and something which “happens” to it. By putting matters this way, Avicenna was at the least inviting his Latin readers to conclude that a thing’s individual existence is also something which “happens” to it, and therefore something “accidental” in that sense to that thing’s essence.⁴¹

Hence, whether or not Avicenna really intended to treat of existence as if it were an accident superadded to essence, this was widely taken to be his position by his Latin readers. Thus in his Commentary on *Metaphysics* IV, c. 2, Thomas explicitly attributes this view to Avicenna. According to Aquinas, Avicenna held that both unity and being (*ens*) signify something added to the essence (*substantia*) of a thing. And Avicenna said this about being because in every thing which receives its existence from another,

40. “Poterit autem animal per se considerari, quamvis sit cum alio a se; essentia enim eius est cum alio a se; ergo essentia eius est ipsi per se; ipsum vero esse cum alio a se est quiddam quod accidit ei vel aliquid quod comitatur naturam suam, sicut haec animalitas et humanitas . . .” (Van Riet ed., p. 233). For the French translation see Anawati (p. 236): “La considération de l’animal en lui-même sera possible, même s’il est avec autre chose, parce que son essence, [bien qu’elle soit] avec d’autres [reste] son essence. Son essence est à lui, par elle-même, et le fait qu’il soit avec d’autre [chose] que (for *qui*) lui est quelque chose qui lui est accidentel ou un concomitant nécessaire à sa nature, comme l’animalité et l’humanité.” For Marmura see *Avicenna: The Metaphysics of “The Healing,”* p. 153:11–15.

41. To put this another way, if a reader had already concluded from *Metaphysics* I, c. 5 that Avicenna defends some kind of real distinction between essence and existence, he would easily enough find confirmation for this in the present text. For the continuation of the text cited in the preceding note see Van Riet ed., pp. 233–34: “. . . igitur haec consideratio praecedit in esse et animal quod est individuum propter accidentia sua et universale quod est in his sensibilibus et intelligibile, sicut simplex praecedit compositum et sicut pars totum. . . .” Note Marmura’s literal translation of this: “it is prior in existence to the animal, which is particular with its accidents or universal, existential, or intellectual” (p. 404, n. 8). Avicenna also notes that a genus or species, when simply viewed in itself, is neither one nor many, but only animal or only man. Nonetheless, to be one or many accompanies such a genus or species whenever it is realized or exists in reality, “cum impossibile sit aliquid esse et non esse alterum istorum, quamvis sit comitans ipsum extrinsecus . . .” (p. 234).

the existence (*esse*) of that thing and its essence differ. Therefore *esse* signifies something added to essence. To this Thomas responds in one of his better known texts:⁴²

But in making this (first point) he (Avicenna) does not seem to have spoken correctly. Although the existence (*esse*) of a thing is other than its essence, it must not be thought that it is something superadded after the manner of an accident, but it is, as it were, constituted by the principles of the essence.⁴³

In other words, Aquinas agrees with Avicenna that essence and existence differ in created entities. Nevertheless, he does not want existence (the act of existing) to be regarded as an accident. At the same time, if he rejects this part of the Avicennian theory, Thomas agrees with his Islamic predecessor on three issues relating to essence and existence. (1) An essence or nature may be considered in any one of the three different ways we have already seen, i.e., as existing in an individual, or as existing in the intellect in universal fashion, or simply or absolutely in itself. (2) Essence and existence are to be distinguished in all beings save God. (3) Though I have not yet mentioned this, the existence of any thing other than God comes to it from without, or is (efficiently) caused by something else.

4. AVICENNA'S THEORY OF EMANATION

By referring to the existence of any caused being as coming to it from without we are now in position to consider an issue where Thomas knows an Avicennian position and emphatically rejects it. According to Avicenna's discussion in *Metaphysics* I, c. 6, every existent when it is simply considered in itself is either a necessary being, or else one that is not impossible, i.e., a possible being.⁴⁴ In fact, only God is a necessary being in the sense of that which is necessary in itself. All other entities are possible beings when

42. Ed. cit., n. 556, quoted above in n. 33.

43. "Sed in primo quidem non videtur dixisse recte. Esse enim rei quamvis sit aliud ab eius essentia, non tamen est intelligendum quod sit aliquod superadditum ad modum accidentis, sed quasi constituitur per principia essentiae. Et ideo hoc nomen Ens quod imponitur ab ipso esse, significat idem cum nomine quod imponitur ab ipsa essentia" (n. 558). In the last sentence in this text Thomas is referring to the convertibility of being (*ens*), though not of the act of being (*esse*), and thing (*res*), which name is derived from the essence of an entity.

44. "Dicemus igitur quod ea quae cadunt sub esse possunt in intellectu dividi in duo. Quorum unum est quod, cum consideratum fuerit per se, eius esse non est necessarium; et palam est etiam quod eius esse non est impossibile, alioquin non cadet sub esse, et hoc est in termino possibilitatis. Alterum est quod, cum consideratum fuerit per se, eius esse erit necesse. Dicemus igitur quod necesse esse per se non habet causam et quod possibile esse per se habet causam . . ." (Van Riet ed., p. 43).

they are simply considered in themselves.⁴⁵ Nonetheless, when a possible being receives actual existence from something outside itself, i.e., from some cause, it too then becomes a necessary being, but necessary only by reason of something else. To put this another way, Avicenna holds that when a possible being is actually given existence by some other being, the possible being is in some way necessitated in its existence. It becomes a necessary being by reason of something else.⁴⁶

As Avicenna develops this thinking in *Metaphysics* I, c. 7, a possible existent may be rendered a necessary existent by something else in one of two ways—either eternally, or only at some point in time. The kind of possible being to which this happens only at some point in time must include matter in its metaphysical structure, matter which is prior in time to the caused necessary being. The kind of possible being which is eternally produced by something else need not be composed of matter, though it may be, as in the case of heavenly bodies.⁴⁷ Eternally produced Intelligences are not composed of matter and form. Yet Avicenna holds that such eternally produced Intelligences are not perfectly simple. Why not, we may ask. This is so, reasons Avicenna, because that which such an eternally caused entity has by reason of itself—its possibility—is dif-

45. Van Riet ed., p. 43: “. . . et quod impossibile est ut esse eius (i.e., that of the Necessary Being) quod est necesse esse sit coaequale ad esse alterius, ita ut unumquodque eorum sit aequale alteri in necessitate essendi vel comitetur . . . et impossibile est etiam ut in certitudine quam habet necesse esse communicet ei aliquid aliud. Quod cum certificaverimus, sequetur quod necesse esse non est relativum nec mutabile nec multiplex nec communicat ei aliquid aliud in suo esse quod est ei proprium.” (Cf. I, c. 7 for an extended argument to show that the necessary being [per se] is only one.) See also p. 44: “Quicquid autem est cuius esse est per aliquid, cum consideratum fuerit per se, non habebit esse necessarium; quicquid autem consideratum per se sine alio non habet esse necessarium, non est necesse esse per se.” Cf. c. 7, p. 50:65–69.

46. See p. 46: “Igitur manifestum est quod quicquid possibile est esse, non habet esse nisi cum necessarium est esse respectu suae causae.” For discussion of this see M. Marmura, “The Metaphysics of Efficient Causality in Avicenna (Ibn Sina),” in *Islamic Theology and Philosophy*, pp. 179–83. See p. 180 for Marmura’s comment: “If, on the other hand, the existent is in itself only possible, this means that in terms of its own quiddity it is something that can exist or not exist. Implicit here is Avicenna’s distinction in contingent things between essence and existence. The quiddity or essence of the contingent does not include existence.” Also see A.-M. Goichon, *La distinction*, pp. 136–45. Also see A. Ivry, “Destiny Revisited: Avicenna’s Concept of Determinism,” in *Islamic Theology and Philosophy*, pp. 162–63, and his acknowledged usage there of G. Hourani’s “Ibn Sina on Necessary and Possible Existence,” *Philosophical Forum* 4.1 (1972), pp. 74–86. See pp. 82–84 for Hourani’s English translation of the first part of *Metaphysics* I, c. 6.

47. Van Riet ed., pp. 54–55: “Eius autem quod est possibile esse, iam manifesta est hoc proprietates, scilicet quia ipsum necessario eget alio quod faciat illud esse in effectum; quicquid enim est possibile esse, respectu sui, semper est possibile esse, sed fortassis accidet ei necessario esse per aliud a se. Istud autem vel accidet ei semper, vel aliquando. Id autem cui aliquando accidit, debet habere materiam cuius esse praecedat illud tempore, sicut iam ostendemus.” See below concerning eternally produced intelligences, and heavenly bodies.

ferent in some way from that which it has by reason of its cause, i.e., its necessitated existence. Given this, Avicenna concludes that there is only one being which is entirely free from all potentiality and possibility when it is viewed in itself, that is to say, the being which is necessary of itself, or God. Every other being includes that which it has by reason of itself, its possible being, and that which it has by reason of something else, its existence. In light of this, it is easy enough to understand why certain thirteenth-century thinkers such as Aquinas would see in this theory another expression of Avicenna's view that essence and existence differ in every being with the exception of God.⁴⁸

In explaining how many beings can derive from the one being which is absolutely necessary in itself, Avicenna is heavily influenced by the Neoplatonic tradition, and especially by the notion that from the supreme One only one effect can be produced immediately. If this is so, how can God produce a multiplicity of effects? As Avicenna remarks in *Metaphysics* IX, c. 4, among things to be accounted for in the universe are Intelligences, separated souls, and bodies. In order to account for the production of many Intelligences, many souls and many bodies, and in order to do justice to the axiom that from the One only one thing can proceed immediately, he proposes the following scheme.⁴⁹

The only effect which is immediately produced by God is the highest separate intelligence, the First Intelligence. But even this First Intelligence, though it is eternally and necessarily produced by God, is a possible being in and of itself, but a necessary being by reason of God. This first produced Intelligence understands three objects: (1) God, its source; (2) itself as a possible being in itself; (3) itself as a necessary being by reason of God, its eternally producing cause.⁵⁰ Insofar as this

48. P. 55: "Sed id cui semper accidit, eius quidditas non est simplex: quod enim habet respectu sui ipsius aliud est ab eo quod habet ab alio a se, et ex his duobus acquiritur ei esse id quod est. Et ideo nihil est quod omnino sit expoliatum ab omni eo quod est in potentia et possibilitate respectu sui ipsius, nisi necesse esse." For Thomas see *De potentia*, q. 3, a. 16, p. 88, cited below in our text.

49. "Tu scis autem quod hic sunt intelligentiae et animae separatae multae. Unde esse eorum non potest esse acquisitum ab aliquo mediante quod non sit separatum. Item nosti quod, in universitate eorum quae sunt a primo, sunt corpora, et nosti quod omne corpus est possibile esse quantum in se, et quod necessarium est per aliud a se, et nosti non esse illis viam essendi a primo absque mediante aliquo: sunt igitur ex ipso, sed mediante aliquo, et nosti quod medium non est unitas pura; *nostis etiam quod ex uno, secundum quod est unum, non est nisi unum*" (Van Riet ed., Vol. 2, p. 481) (italics mine). See Marmura, *Avicenna: The Metaphysics*, pp. 329:28–330:3.

50. See pp. 481–82: "Intelligentiis enim separatis non potest esse aliqua multitudo nisi quemadmodum dicam, quoniam causatum per se est possibile esse in seipso, propter primum autem est necessarium esse. Sed necessitas sui esse est secundum quod est intelligentia, et intelligit seipsum et intelligit primum necessario. Unde oportet ut sit in eo multitudo ex hoc quod intelligit se quod est possibile esse quantum in se, et ex hoc quod intelligit

First Intelligence thinks of God, it necessarily and eternally produces a Second Intelligence. Insofar as it thinks of itself as necessary by reason of God, the First Being, it produces the soul of the first or outermost heavenly sphere. And insofar as it thinks of itself as a possible being in itself, it produces the body of the outermost heavenly sphere.⁵¹

The second eternally produced Intelligence likewise eternally thinks of three objects: (1) of the First Intelligence which produces it; (2) of itself as a possible being in itself; (3) of itself as a necessary being by reason of the First Intelligence which eternally produces it. Therefore it in turn produces three effects, i.e., a Third Intelligence, and the body and the soul of the second heavenly sphere. This same process is repeated by the Third Intelligence, which in turn produces a Fourth Intelligence along with a third heavenly sphere both in terms of body and soul until, by working inward as it were, one reaches the Tenth Intelligence. This is the separated Agent Intellect which plays an important role in enabling us to think or understand here on earth, and which is also a giver or producer of the forms of material things on earth. With this step the last of the heavenly spheres is also produced, that of the moon.⁵²

(One might wonder why the Agent Intellect does not produce still another and lower intelligence. Presumably this is because the creative power of the First Necessary Being [God] cannot be communicated indefinitely to ever less perfect beings. Moreover, there is the observable

necessitatem sui esse a primo quod est intellectum per se (. . .)” Here there appears to be a lacuna in the Latin text. For this see Anawati's French translation, Vol. 2, p. 140: “en fin qu'il intellige le Premier”; and Marmura (p. 330:15–16): “of its own intellectual apprehension of the First.”

51. Van Riet ed., pp. 482–83. See in particular: “Sub unaquaque autem intelligentia est caelum cum sua materia et sua forma, quae est anima et intelligentia inferior ea. Igitur sub omni intelligentia sunt tria in esse; unde oportet ut possibilitas essendi haec tria sit ab illa intelligentia prima in creatione propter trinitatem quae est nominata in ea, et nobile sequitur ex nobiliore multis modis. Igitur ex prima intelligentia, in quantum intelligit primum, sequitur esse alterius intelligentiae inferioris ea, et in quantum intelligit seipsam, sequitur ex ea forma caeli ultimi et eius perfectio et haec est anima, et propter naturam essendi possibile quae est ei et quae est retenta in quantum intelligit seipsam, est esse corporeitatis caeli ultimi quae est contenta in totalitate caeli ultimi.” Cf. pp. 487:86–488:95. See Marmura, pp. 330:39–331:13.

52. See Van Riet ed., p. 484: “Similiter est dispositio in intelligentia et intelligentia, et in caelo et caelo, quousque pervenitur ad intelligentiam agentem quae gubernat nostras animas.” See p. 487: “Igitur multitudo recipientis causa est multitudinis actionis principii quod est unum in essentia. Et hoc est post completionem esse omnium caelestium, et sequitur semper intelligentia post intelligentiam, quousque fiat sphaera lunae, et deinde fiant elementa et aptantur recipere impressionem unam in specie, multam numero, ab intelligentia ultima. Si enim causa multitudinis non fuerit in agente, debet esse necessario in patiente. Oportet igitur ut, ex unaquaque intelligentia, fiat intelligentia inferior ea et esset tunc quousque possint fieri substantiae intelligibiles divisibiles multae numero propter multitudinem causarum, et usque huc perveniunt.” See Marmura, *ibid.*, pp. 333:38–334:11.

fact that the moon is closer to the earth than are the other heavenly bodies. Nonetheless, as already noted, the agent intellect plays an important role in life here on earth. From it flow both the substantial forms found in material things, and the intelligible forms required for our intellects to think.)⁵³

Avicenna's theory of emanation calls for some comments. First of all, it is his way of showing how everything else in the universe is ultimately produced by God, but not directly or immediately. God directly and immediately produces only one effect, the First Intelligence. Secondly, Avicenna is strongly motivated by the Neoplatonic view that from the One only one effect can proceed immediately. To admit that two or more effects could immediately proceed from the One would be to introduce some kind of multiplicity into God, and this would compromise the divine simplicity. Thirdly, this is not a theory of free creation or production on God's part. On the contrary, the first effect, and as a consequence, all other effects, are necessarily produced. Finally, this process of necessary emanation or production never began to be. It is an eternal process, meaning thereby that it is without beginning, and that the universe itself is necessarily eternal in its existence.

With this we may turn again to Thomas Aquinas. First of all, is he familiar with Avicenna's theory? Indeed he is, and he recognizes it in its details, its presuppositions, and its metaphysical implications. As for his knowledge of its details, one can hardly do better than consult his presentation of Avicenna's position in his *Disputed Questions on the Power of God*, q. 3, a. 16:

For he held that the First Being, insofar as it understands itself, produces only one effect, which is the First Intelligence. It was necessary for this (First Intelligence) to fall short from the simplicity of the First Being, namely insofar as potentiality (there) begins to be mixed with actuality in that it, as receiving its existence (*esse*) from another, is not its existence (*esse*), but in some way is in potency with respect to it. And thus insofar as it understands the First Being, there proceeds from it another Intelligence below itself; but insofar as it understands its own potency, there proceeds from it the body of the heaven, which it moves; insofar as it understands its own actuality, there proceeds from it the soul of the first heaven; and thus, through many intermediary causes, diverse things are consequently multiplied.⁵⁴

53. See G. Verbeke, Introduction to Vol. 2, p. 65*. Cf. M. Marmura, "The Metaphysics of Efficient Causality in Avicenna (Ibn Sina)," in *Islamic Theology and Philosophy*, ed. M. Marmura (Albany, 1984), pp. 174-76. Also see B. Zedler, "Saint Thomas and Avicenna in the 'De Potentia Dei,'" *Traditio* 6 (1948), pp. 110-11; "St. Thomas, Interpreter of Avicenna," *Modern Schoolman* 33 (1955-1956), pp. 4-6. Cf. E. Fackenheim, "The Possibility of the Universe in Al-Farabi, Ibn Sina and Maimonides," *American Academy for Jewish Research* 16 (1947), pp. 1-14 (to be used with some caution, since it tends to unite into one the positions of Avicenna and Al-Farabi).

54. See *De potentia*, ed. P. M. Pession, in *Quaestiones disputatae*, Vol. 2 (Turin-Rome,

Thomas offers another detailed presentation of this theory in his *Treatise on Separate Substances*, c. 10.⁵⁵ And for a more general presentation of this theory without many of the details, but still based on the axiom that from the One only one thing can proceed (immediately), we may consult his earlier Commentary on the *De Trinitate*, q. 4, a. 1. (There, as I have argued elsewhere, Thomas is probably following a version of the theory made known to the Latins through the Latin translation of what they called the *Metaphysics* of Algazel.)⁵⁶

As for Thomas's reaction, it is not difficult to anticipate that he will have strong reservations. First and foremost, he rejects the Avicennian view that created things necessarily proceed from God, or that they are

1953), p. 88: "Posuit enim, quod primum ens, in quantum intelligit se ipsum, producit unum tantum causatum, quod est intelligentia prima, quam necesse erat a simplicitate primi entis deficere, utpote in quantum potentialitas inceptit admisceri actui, in quantum esse recipiens ab alio non est suum esse, sed quodammodo potentia ad illud. Et sic in quantum intelligit primum ens, procedit ab ea alia intelligentia ea inferior, in quantum vero intelligit potentiam suam procedit ab ea corpus caeli, quod movet; in quantum vero intelligit actum suum, procedit ab ea anima caeli primi; et sic consequenter multiplicatur per multa media res diversae." On one point Thomas here seems to depart from the Avicennian text which he is following (*Metaphysics* IX, c. 4), i.e., his statement that according to Avicenna the first intelligence moves the body of the first heaven ("quod movet"). Strictly speaking, Avicenna distinguishes between a soul of a heavenly sphere, which indeed moves the heavenly sphere, and an intelligence which does not move the heavenly sphere in any way except as an object of desire. See Van Riet ed., p. 484: "... nos enim iam ostendimus quod anima cuiusque caeli est eius perfectio et eius forma, nec est substantia separata; alioquin, esset intelligentia, non anima, nec moveret ullo modo nisi ad modum desiderii. . . ." In defense of Thomas's reading one could suggest that he has in mind nothing but motion as an object of desire in the text in question; or one could suggest that the subject of *movet* is not *intelligentia* but *corpus caeli*. But if the latter suggestion were correct, *movetur* would be a more natural expression than *movet*.

55. Leon. 40.D 59. Note that Thomas concludes his presentation with this remark: "et haec est positio Avicennae, quae etiam videtur supponi in *Libro de causis*" (lines 25–27). Note that in *De potentia*, q. 3, a. 4 Thomas refers to the *Liber de causis*, and to the *Metaphysics* of Avicenna and to the *Metaphysics* of Algazel as holding some elements of the theory we have just seen: (1) that from the simple One only one thing can proceed immediately; (2) that by means of this first produced one multiplicity proceeds; (3) that God acts out of necessity of nature (ed. cit., p. 46). In other words, Thomas does not here ascribe all of the details of Avicenna's threefold kind of emanation to the *Liber de causis* and to Algazel. B. Zedler ("Saint Thomas and Avicenna in the 'De Potentia Dei,'" p. 112, n. 7) refers to propositions 6, 7, 8, 20, 23 of the *Liber de causis* (see *Le Liber de causis*, ed. A. Pattin [Louvain, no date]; also in *Tijdschrift voor Filosofie* 28 [1966], pp. 90–203).

56. "et secundum hoc quidam posuerunt quodam ordine pluralitatem ab uno primo causari, ut ab uno primo procedat primo unum, quod cum causa pluralitatem constituat, et ex eo iam possunt duo procedere: unum secundum se ipsum, aliud secundum conjunctionem ipsius ad causam" (Leon. 50.120:104–110). Cf. my "Thomas Aquinas on the Distinction and Derivation of the Many from the One: A Dialectic between Being and Nonbeing," *Review of Metaphysics* 38 (1985), pp. 566–67, and nn. 8 and 9. For Algazel see *Algazel's Metaphysics*, ed. J. T. Muckle (Toronto, 1933), Tr. V, pp. 119–21. The most notable difference between this exposition and that found in Avicenna's *Metaphysics* is that according to Algazel the emanations proceed in pairs (an intelligence and a heavenly sphere) rather than in triads (intelligence, soul of sphere and body of sphere).

necessarily produced by God. Instead, he argues that God creates or produces effects external to himself owing to a decision on the part of the divine will. Because of this, God freely decides to create or not to create, and to create this rather than that among the many possible choices which are available to him.⁵⁷

Secondly, in all but one of his earliest writings, Thomas rejects the notion that God could communicate the power to create to any creature. While Thomas always defends the view that created agents do indeed produce their appropriate effects, he denies that the power to create can be granted to them, even as instrumental causes. In other words, he rejects Avicenna's theory of mediate creation as opposed to immediate creation. God is the immediate creative cause of whatever is created.⁵⁸

Thirdly, Thomas always maintains against Avicenna and other defenders of the same position that many effects can be immediately and directly produced by God, the supreme One. To put this another way, he strongly resists the claim that from the supreme One, or God, only one effect can be produced immediately. And he insists that this position does not in any way compromise the divine simplicity.⁵⁹

Finally, in defending the freedom of God's creative activity, Thomas denies that this must result in an eternally produced effect, or an eternal universe. In other words, he rejects any and all arguments which attempt to prove that the universe has existed or has been produced from eternity. As is well known, he also denies that human reason can prove that

57. For references and for discussion, see below.

58. See, for instance, *De potentia*, q. 3, a. 4 (pp. 46–47), where he maintains that the power to create, even as an instrumental cause of a higher agent, would require infinite power on the part of that instrumental cause. To prove that creation requires infinite power on the part of the creative agent, even a quasi-instrumental cause, he offers five arguments. The first of these rests on his claim that *non esse* is infinitely distant from *esse*. Therefore only an infinite power can produce something from absolute nonbeing, or create. For Thomas's admission in his Commentary on the *Sentences* that creative power might be communicated by God to a creature which would act as an instrumental cause see *In II Sent.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 3 (Mandonnet ed., Vol. 2, p. 22). There Thomas refers to a view which denies that the power to create can be communicated to any creature, and to another position which holds that, though this power was not given to any creature, it could have been. Thomas finds the Lombard himself seeming to support the last-mentioned view. Then he comments: "Utraque autem harum ultimarum opinionum videtur habere aliquid cui innitatur." Farther on he remarks: ". . . et ex parte ista accipiendi creationem, potuit communicari creaturae, ut per virtutem causae primae operantis in ipsa, aliquid esse simplex, vel materia produceretur: et hoc modo philosophi posuerunt intelligentias creare, quamvis sit haereticum." Hence, if here he is cautiously open to the possibility that God could have communicated the power to create to a created agent in instrumental fashion, he regards it as heretical to hold that such has indeed happened. Cf. his reply to obj. 2. In later discussions Thomas rejects this possibility. See Ch. VII below.

59. For texts and discussion see below.

the world began to be. This is something the Christian can know only through revelation.⁶⁰

For the moment, I would like to consider more fully two of the points just mentioned—Thomas's denial that things are produced necessarily by God; and his claim that from the supreme One more than one effect can proceed or be produced immediately.

As for Avicenna's view that God has produced necessarily the First Intelligence, Aquinas cannot accept this. He repeatedly criticizes this position, and especially in a series of articles in q. 3 of his *De potentia*. For instance, in q. 3, a. 17, he faces an objection which is taken directly from Avicenna's *Metaphysics* IX: Every effect, when taken in relationship to its cause, is necessary. This is to say, given a sufficient cause for an effect, that effect necessarily follows. But God is the sufficient cause for the universe. Therefore, since God always existed, the universe has always existed.⁶¹

In replying to this (ad 4), Thomas acknowledges that every effect bears a necessary relationship to its efficient cause, whether that cause operates by nature or whether it is voluntary. But we cannot hold that God is the cause of the universe by necessity of his nature, but by reason of his will. Therefore it is not necessary for an effect of God to be realized whenever the divine nature has existed, i.e., from eternity, but only when the divine will has determined that the effect is to exist.⁶²

In a. 15 of this same q. 3 of the *De potentia*, Thomas had directly faced the claim that things proceed from God by necessity of nature. He offers a series of arguments to establish the opposite, i.e., to show that God produces things freely through his will.⁶³

1. First of all, the universe must have some end. Otherwise, everything within the universe would be owing to chance. If the universe must have an end, in producing creatures God must have some end in mind. But both nature (natural agents) and the will act for an end, but in different fashion. Nature does so without understanding either the end, or its nature, or the relationship of the means to the end. Hence nature or a

60. For fuller bibliography and discussion see my "Thomas Aquinas on the Possibility of Eternal Creation," *Metaphysical Themes*, ch. VIII.

61. Ed. cit., p. 91. See obj. 4.

62. "Ad quartum dicendum, quod omnis effectus habet necessariam habitudinem ad suam causam efficientem, sive sit causa naturalis, sive voluntaria. Sed non ponimus Deum causam mundi ex necessitate naturae suae, sed ex voluntate, ut supra (art. 15) dictum est: unde necessarium est effectum divinum sequi non quodcumque natura divina fuit, sed quando dispositum est voluntate divina ut esset, et secundum modum eundem quo voluit ut esset" (p. 94).

63. "Respondeo. Dicendum quod, absque omni dubio, tenendum est quod Deus ex libero arbitrio suae voluntatis creaturas in esse produxit nulla naturali necessitate" (p. 83). For briefer presentations of these and other arguments see SCG II, c. 23.

purely natural agent cannot present an end to itself for its consideration. Because of this, it cannot direct or move itself to an end. But an agent which acts through will can do all of this, since it belongs to such an agent to understand both the end and the means to the end. Therefore a voluntary agent acts for an end in such fashion that it presents to itself an end and in some way moves itself to the end by ordering its actions to that end. Nature simply tends to an end by being ordered and directed to it by some other intelligent and willing agent, as may be seen in the case of an arrow which is directed to its target by an intelligent agent. (Because of this, Thomas cites the “philosophers” with approval to the effect that a work of nature is a work of intelligence, i.e., to be reduced to a work of intelligence.) But what exists through another is posterior to what exists of itself. Therefore, the First Being which orders things to an end does so through will. Hence God produced things through his will, not out of natural necessity.⁶⁴

2. Thomas’s second argument is based on the variety present in the universe. Nature or natural agency is always determined to one thing. And since every agent produces something that is like itself, it follows that nature must tend to produce something that is exactly like itself, only one kind of effect. But how is one to account for the variety present in the universe? Equality and sameness derive from unity, and inequality derives from some kind of multiplicity. If, therefore, a natural agent fails to produce something like itself or equal to itself, this will result either from some deficiency in its productive power, or from some deficiency in the passive potency which receives its causal action. But neither of these situations can apply to God’s creative activity. God requires no pre-existing matter in order to create. And his productive power cannot be deficient, since it is infinite. Therefore whatever proceeds from God by nature must be equal to him, as is true of the Son according to Christian religious belief concerning the Trinity. Because no creature is equal to God, a creature can only be produced by him through his will, not by natural necessity or nature. Nor can it be argued that because the divine power is infinite that it is determined to produce only one effect. On the contrary, because the divine power does produce different degrees among creatures, it establishes any creature in its given degree by free choice, not by natural necessity.⁶⁵

3. Since every agent produces something that is in some way like itself, an effect must preexist in some fashion in its cause. But whatever is pres-

64. *Ibid.*, pp. 83–84.

65. *Ibid.*, p. 84. See the conclusion of the argument: “Unde cum divina virtus se extendat ad diversos gradus inaequalitatis in creaturis constituendos; quod in hoc gradu determinato creaturam constituit, ex arbitrio voluntatis fuit, non ex naturali necessitate.”

ent in something is present in it in accord with the mode of that in which it is present. Because God himself is intellect, creatures preexist in him in intellectual fashion. But what is present in the intellect is not brought into external existence except by means of will. Therefore creatures can be produced by God only through the divine will. It is interesting to observe that in this argument Thomas falls back upon two of his oft-cited axioms: every agent produces something like itself; whatever is present in something is present in it in accord with the mode of that in which it is present.⁶⁶

4. With Aristotle Aquinas distinguishes two kinds of action. One type remains within an agent and is to be regarded as a perfection of the agent, such as intellection, volition, or what is often referred to as immanent action. A second type, often called transitive action, proceeds from an agent into some external recipient and is to be regarded as a perfection and actualization of the recipient (see the action of heating some distinct object, for instance). God's operations should not be understood according to the second model, that of transitive action, because his action and his essence are one and the same. Therefore, God's action as such does not pass outside himself. Hence it is to be understood according to the first model, i.e., the kind found in understanding and willing. Even an action which results in the production of an effect which exists in distinction from God is intrinsic to him and identical with him. Such an action can be accounted for only if we appeal to the fact that he understands and wills. Therefore, every creature is produced by God by means of the divine will, not by necessity of nature.⁶⁷

In insisting that God produces creatures through his will and therefore freely, Thomas evidently does not deny that God has an end or purpose in creating. This purpose or end is ultimately the goodness of God, which he chooses to manifest in a special way through creation. As Thomas notes in replying to objection 5, God's goodness, insofar as it is itself willed and loved by God is, by means of his will, the cause of the creature that is produced.⁶⁸ As Thomas remarks in replying to objection

66. *Ibid.* For the latter note especially: "Omne autem quod est in aliquo, est in eo per modum eius in quo est; unde cum ipse Deus sit intellectus, creaturae in ipso intelligibiliter praeexistunt. . . . Quod autem est in intellectu, non proceditur nisi mediante voluntate. . . ." On these two axioms see below, Chs. VI and IV respectively.

67. *Ibid.* For an interesting résumé and criticism of these four arguments see William of Ockham, *In I Sent. (Ordinatio I)*, d. 43, q. 1 (*Opera theologica* 4, pp. 623–29). For discussion and a defense of Aquinas see A. Pegis, "Necessity and Liberty: An Historical Note on St. Thomas Aquinas," *New Scholasticism* 15 (1941), pp. 22–27, 29, 33–38. Note his references to *De potentia*, q. 1, a. 3, and *De veritate*, q. 23, a. 4. Also see Ch. IX below.

68. "Ad quintum dicendum, quod bonum est proprium obiectum voluntatis; unde bonitas Dei, in quantum est ab (for *ad*) ipso volita et amata, mediante voluntate est creaturae causa" (*ibid.*).

10, God acts insofar as he is good. Goodness is present in him in necessary fashion. But it does not follow from this that God has to create or has to communicate his goodness to other entities. For goodness results in production only by means of the divine will, insofar as it is an object or end of that will. But will is not constrained to choose things which are only means to its end.⁶⁹ Thomas's point here is that the divine will is not necessarily constrained to choose those things which are only means or ways in which God may reflect his goodness since he can reflect his goodness in some other way.

As Thomas remarks in this same work at q. 5, a. 3, God's goodness does not depend upon creatures in any way so that it could not be realized without creatures. Through the existence of creatures, nothing is added to the divine goodness.⁷⁰ This is so, of course, because the divine goodness is infinite in itself and nothing can be added to that which is intensively infinite. As Thomas remarks in replying to objection 4 within this same article, in creating the end of God's creative action is to manifest the bounty of the divine goodness. So too, if God were to annihilate creatures, his end could simply be to manifest the self-sufficiency of his own goodness, a goodness which is so sufficient in itself that it needs no external goods.⁷¹ Hence, as he repeats in replying to objection 5, effects which follow from a will are realized when that will determines that they are to be realized. Because creatures proceed from God through his will, they exist when God wills them to exist; they do not exist whenever God's will, or God himself, actually exists. Otherwise they could not have begun to be.⁷²

69. For objection 10 see p. 82. According to the objection God operates insofar as he is good. But God is a necessary good. Therefore he operates out of necessity. For Thomas's reply see p. 85: ". . . dicendum, quod licet Deus operetur in quantum est bonus, et bonitas ei necessario insit, non tamen sequitur quod de necessitate operetur. Bonitas enim mediante voluntate operatur, in quantum est eius obiectum vel finis; voluntas autem non necessario se habet ad ea quae sunt ad finem; licet respectu ultimi finis necessitatem habeat."

70. Ed. cit., p. 136. "Similiter Deus non producit creaturas ex necessitate naturae ut sic potentia Dei determinetur ad esse creaturae, ut in alia quaestione (3, a. 15) est probatum. Similiter etiam nec bonitas Dei a creaturis dependet, ut sine creaturis esse non possit: quia per creaturas nihil bonitati divinae adiungitur." Here Thomas is defending the view that it is not impossible for God to annihilate creatures, except under the supposition that he has ordained not to do so. See SCG I, c. 81, where he also offers a series of arguments to show that God does not will things other than himself out of necessity. According to the first argument, will is not directed of necessity to the means to an end, if the end can be attained without those means. Since the divine goodness can be realized without any other goods, and no other good adds anything to it, there is no necessity which compels God to will things other than himself because of the fact that he wills his own goodness. See Ed. Leon. man., p. 75.

71. *De potentia*, q. 5, a. 3, ad 4 (p. 136) ". . . ut sicut in productione rerum, finis est manifestatio copiae divinae bonitatis, ita in rerum annihilatione finis esse potest sufficientia suae bonitatis, quae in tantum est sibi sufficiens, ut nullo exteriori indigeat." Cf. *De potentia*, q. 10, a. 2, ad 6 (p. 260); ST I, q. 19, a. 3c.

72. Ed. cit., p. 136.

Finally, Thomas makes an interesting comment in *Summa contra Gentiles* I, c. 82: "The divine intellect apprehends not only the divine *esse*, which is the divine goodness, but also other goods. . . . It apprehends these as certain likenesses of the divine goodness and essence, not as its principles. And thus the divine will tends toward these (created) goods as being fitting for its goodness, not as being necessary for its goodness."⁷³

In sum, at the risk of oversimplification, one may summarize Thomas's critique of Avicenna as follows. First of all, Thomas is convinced that God, as an intellectual being, produces external effects only through the mediation of his will; if effects are to be produced by God, this can only be owing to the mediation of his will, not out of natural necessity. Secondly, God's end or purpose in creating is to manifest his goodness. Because the divine goodness is infinite, nothing can be added to it. Hence external manifestation of God's goodness through creation adds nothing to God or to his goodness. Therefore it is not necessary for him to create in order to achieve this end, i.e., the manifestation of his goodness. Therefore, if God creates, this can only be because he freely chooses to do so.

As for the claim that from the One only one effect can proceed immediately, Thomas was familiar with this even in his earliest writings, for instance, in his Commentary on II *Sentences* (d. 18, q. 2, a. 2), where he refers to it in detail.⁷⁴ And in his early Commentary on the *De Trinitate* of Boethius, he refers to a slightly more simplified version of the same, which, as I have suggested above, seems to be taken from Algazel's presentation in his *Metaphysics*.

In the last-mentioned discussion, Thomas counters that there is another way of accounting for multiplicity in the order of being. One first effect may imitate the First Being (God) in a way in which another effect falls short of the First Being. And it may fall short of the First Being in a way in which another immediately produced effect imitates it. In this way many different effects can be produced immediately by the First Being. In fact, Thomas goes on to observe that in each of these first and immediately produced effects there will be a negation both of the First Being and of any other effect. By this I take Thomas to mean that in some way any given effect may be said not to be God and not to be any other effect.⁷⁵

73. "Intellectus enim divinus apprehendit non solum divinum esse, quod est bonitas eius, sed etiam alia bona, ut supra ostensum est. Quae quidem apprehendit ut similitudines quasdam divinae bonitatis et essentiae, non ut eius principia. Et sic voluntas divina in illa tendit ut suae bonitati convenientia, non ut ad suam bonitatem necessaria" (ed. cit., p. 77). For additional discussion of Thomas's critique of Avicenna's view of necessary emanation, see B. Zedler, "Saint Thomas and Avicenna in the 'De Potentia Dei,'" pp. 113–19.

74. Mandonnet ed., Vol. 2, p. 463.

75. See q. 4, a. 1 (Leon. 50.120–21). Note in particular: "Quod dicere non cogimur,

As I have argued elsewhere, to this one may apply Thomas's metaphysics of essence and act of existing, and his view that in every creature there is a composition of an essence principle and a distinct act of existing. Because the essence principle of a creature is not identical with its intrinsic act of existing (*esse*), Thomas has also written elsewhere that it may be described as nonbeing. By this he means that it is not identical with the creature's intrinsic act of existing or act of being. In other words, he ascribes to the essence of any such being what we may refer to as relative nonbeing, though certainly not absolute nonbeing. The presence of this within the creature enables Thomas to account for the fact that it is only a limited being, and that it is not identical with God or with any other created effect.⁷⁶ This, therefore, allows Thomas to account for the possibility of there being more than one being, or many beings, within reality, and for their immediate creation by God. But this explanation concentrates on the side of the produced effects rather than on the side of God, their producing cause.

How does Thomas meet the Avicennian claim that from the One only one effect can proceed immediately when he turns to God, the First Cause of all else? In q. 3, a. 16 of the *De potentia* he directly challenges this claim. If this view is correct, reasons Thomas, it must be because it is the nature of such a cause when considered with reference to its effect that whenever that cause exists, its determined effect must result. Such determination might be thought to arise from the side of the material, or formal, or efficient, or final cause. But such determination for a given effect to be produced cannot arise from the side of the formal cause, for that is intrinsic to the effect itself; the form of the effect does not exist before the effect itself does. Again, when we are dealing with God as the cause, he cannot be determined by nature to produce any given effect from the side of the material cause. As a creative cause he needs no pre-existing matter which might determine him to produce this given effect rather than any other. Nor can such a determination to produce only one effect apply to God when we view him as an efficient cause. Because God's power is infinite, it cannot be determined to produce any given effect except one that would be equal to God himself; but no effect can be equal to God. As for effects which are less perfect than God, his power

cum unum primum possit aliquid imitari in quo alterum ab eo deficit, et deficere in quo alterum imitatur; et sic possunt inveniri plures primi effectus, in quorum quolibet est negatio et causae et effectus alterius secundum idem, vel secundum remotiorem distantiam etiam in uno et eodem."

76. For discussion and references see my "Thomas Aquinas on the Distinction and Derivation of the Many from the One," *Review of Metaphysics* 38 (1985), pp. 563–90; also *The Metaphysical Thought*, pp. 177–90.

could not be determined to produce this one rather than that one; for no such effect will be equal to his power.⁷⁷

By process of elimination we come to the final cause. In creating or producing an effect, continues Thomas, God's end can only be his own goodness. And nothing can be added to this through the production of any effect. For the divine goodness can neither be completely represented by any effect nor totally communicated to an effect. Rather, it is quite possible for different effects to participate in the divine goodness in different ways. But there is no necessity which binds God to produce any one effect because of any compulsion on his part to communicate his goodness.⁷⁸

Hence, if there is any justification for the claim that God had to produce one given effect and only one, this can arise only from the side of the kind of form which is the end of the work being performed (*finis operationis*) rather than the end of God, the producing agent. By this Thomas means that if God wishes to create a given kind of effect, e.g., a human being, he must create something with a rational soul and a body endowed with organs; for this is required for a human being to be a human being. *Mutatis mutandis*, one may say the same of the universe. If God wills to create a given kind of universe, then, under that supposition, he must also produce such and such creatures without which that given kind of universe cannot be realized. And if the perfection of that universe requires both multiplicity and diversity among creatures, it will follow that because no single creature can supply the required multiplicity and diversity, God will have to produce many creatures—some composite, some simple, some corruptible, and some incorruptible. But, insists Thomas, there is no necessity which compels God to create the universe at all. With this argumentation in place, he then goes on to reject in explicit terms the Avicennian theory of emanation along with some other accounts.⁷⁹

77. Ed. cit., p. 87.

78. "... unde nullius eorum necessitas est ex fine" (ibid.).

79. See pp. 87–88. Note especially: "Sed supposito quod tale universum producere voluerit, necessarium fuit quod tales et tales creaturas produxerit, ex quibus talis forma universi consurgeret. Et cum ipsa universi perfectio et multitudinem et diversitatem rerum requirat, quia in una earum inveniri non potest propter recessum a complemento bonitatis primae; necesse fuit ex suppositione formae intentae quod Deus multas creaturas et diversas produceret; quasdam simplices, quasdam compositas; et quasdam corruptibiles, et quasdam incorruptibiles." Cf. ST I, q. 19, a. 3, for Thomas's usage of *necessitas ex suppositione*, and its application to this issue. Also see *De veritate*, q. 23, a. 4, ad 1; SCG I, c. 83. In an interesting article, K. P. Keane charges Thomas with having fallen into the opposite extreme—reducing God's decision to create to an "arbitrary and radically free act of the divine will." Keane emphasizes Thomas's denial that God's will has a cause in its decision to create, and concludes that because of his understanding of creation as resulting from a "pure and ungrounded decision" of the divine will, Thomas is "a radical voluntarist where

Two additional questions might be raised about Thomas's proposed solution. First of all, will not the fact that God intends to produce a multiplicity of creatures introduce a multiplicity of divine intentions and of divine ideas into the divine intellect, and thereby compromise God's simplicity? Secondly, suppose one grants that Thomas's argumentation succeeds in showing against Avicenna that God did not have to create or produce the universe at all and also that from God, the supreme One, more than one effect can be produced immediately. Has Thomas not now committed God to the necessary production of only one kind of universe, the one we know?

Thomas will meet the first objection through his theory of divine ideas. A divine idea is not something which is really distinct from the divine essence. It is simply a way in which God views himself, that is, his essence, as capable of being imitated by a creature. And when conjoined with a decision on the part of the divine will, a divine idea becomes productive, resulting in the creation of an actually existing creature at some point in time. But if a divine idea is really identical with the divine essence, so is a divine "intention" (decision) to produce a given creature. Neither introduces real multiplicity or composition into God.⁸⁰ For the second difficulty, the reader may see Ch. IX below.

the act of creation is concerned, though he takes an 'intellectualist' position on the internal structure and goodness of creation." See his "Why Creation? Bonaventure and Thomas Aquinas on God as Creative Good," *Downside Review*, n. 311 (1975), pp. 101, 106–7, 110. What Keane fails to recognize sufficiently is the important role assigned by Thomas to the divine ideas, that is, to God's knowledge of himself or of his essence insofar as it is viewed as capable of being imitated by creatures. Far from being arbitrary or capricious in his decision to create or not to create, Thomas's God is restricted to what we might call a rational choice—one modeled on God's view of possible ways in which his essence can be imitated by creatures. Within the limits of that which is possible, Thomas's God is free to determine whether to create or not to create, and whether to create this or that. For references concerning Thomas's theory of divine ideas, see the following note.

80. On Thomas's theory of divine ideas see J. F. Wippel, *Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas*, pp. 166–68; "Thomas Aquinas on the Divine Ideas," *Etienne Gilson Series* 16 (Toronto, 1993); V. Boland, *Ideas in God according to Saint Thomas Aquinas* (Leiden, 1996). Also see L. Geiger, "Les idées divines dans l'œuvre de S. Thomas," in *St. Thomas Aquinas 1274–1974: Commemorative Studies*, ed. A. Maurer (Toronto, 1974), Vol. 1, pp. 175–209; Gregory T. Doolan, "St. Thomas Aquinas and Divine Exemplarism" (Ph.D. dissertation, Catholic University of America, 2003). For texts in Thomas see especially *In I Sent.*, d. 19, q. 5, a. 3, ad 2 (Mandonnet ed., Vol. 1, p. 496): "Ad secundum dicendum quod rationes ideales rerum, quae sunt in Deo ab aeterno, non sunt aliud secundum rem ab ipso intellectu et essentia divina"; ST I, q. 15, a. 1, ad 3; "Ad tertium dicendum quod Deus secundum essentiam suam est similitudo omnium rerum. Unde idea in Deo nihil est aliud quam Dei essentia" (Leon. 4.90); ST I, q. 15, a. 2 (because God perfectly knows his essence, he knows every way in which it can be participated in by creatures). On the identity of the divine willing (and the divine will) with the divine essence see ST I, q. 19, a. 1; q. 59, a. 2.

Chapter III

TRUTH IN THOMAS AQUINAS

Thomas Aquinas is well known for having defended the view that truth consists of an adequation between the intellect and a thing. Perhaps no discussion of this within his literary corpus is better known than that offered in question 1 of his *Disputed Questions on Truth* (*De veritate*). Even so, in addition to describing truth as an adequation of the intellect and a thing, he there considers a number of other definitions. Most importantly, he develops a notion of truth of being (what might be called “ontological truth”) along with truth of the intellect (what might be called “logical truth”).¹ As various scholars have pointed out, prior to Thomas’s time two general traditions regarding the nature of truth had already appeared. One is heavily Neoplatonic and emphasizes truth of being. It was known to Aquinas especially through the writings of Augustine, Anselm, and Avicenna. The other, more Aristotelian, stresses truth as an adequation of mind and reality, or truth of the intellect. Both of these traditions deeply influenced Aquinas’s own thinking, as we shall see. But he could and did appeal to a variety of earlier definitions of truth in developing his own view, and this suggests that the two traditions were not so opposed to one another in Thomas’s mind as one might think.²

1. This terminology (“ontological truth” and “logical truth”) is not found in Thomas’s writings themselves, but has long been used by later interpreters of scholastic philosophy. See, for instance, R. J. McCall, “St. Thomas on Ontological Truth,” *New Scholasticism* 12 (1938), pp. 9–29; J. Vande Wiele, “Le problème de la vérité ontologique dans la philosophie de saint Thomas,” *Revue philosophique de Louvain* 52 (1954), pp. 521–71.

2. For historical background on these two earlier traditions see Vande Wiele, pp. 522–27 (on Aristotle), pp. 527–31 (on Augustine), pp. 532–35 (on Avicenna), and pp. 543–45 for summarizing remarks. Unfortunately, Vande Wiele neglects Anselm’s role as a source for the truth of things (ontological truth). For Thomas’s usage of Anselm’s definition, see M. J. Lapiere, “Aquinas’ Interpretation of Anselm’s Definition of Truth,” *Sciences ecclésiastiques* 18 (1966), pp. 413–41. Cf. A. Zimmermann, “Bemerkungen zu Thomas von Aquin, *Quaest. disp. De veritate* 1,” *Miscellanea Mediaevalia* 15 (1982), pp. 247–61, esp. 248–55; J. A. Aertsen, *Medieval Reflections on Truth. Adaequatio rei et intellectus* (Inaugural Address, Free University of Amsterdam, Nov. 9, 1984), pp. 5–6; and more recently, for these two aspects of Thomas’s understanding of truth, *Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals* (Leiden–New York–Cologne, 1996), c. 6, pp. 253–56, 262–69. Also see J. Pieper, *Wahrheit*

In order to set the stage for closer examination of Aquinas's views on truth, this chapter will begin with his earliest discussion in Book I, distinction 19, question 5 of his Commentary on the *Sentences*, dating in its oral presentation from about 1252. In article 1 of this question he asks whether truth is to be identified with the essence of a thing.³ In developing his reply Thomas distinguishes three different kinds of things which terms may signify. One type enjoys complete and total being outside the mind, that is, independently from the mind's consideration. In illustration Thomas cites complete entities such as human beings or stones. A second type enjoys no reality in itself independently from the mind, for instance, dreams or chimeras. A third kind has a foundation in extramental reality, but depends upon the intellect's operation for its complete and formal realization. As illustrations Thomas cites universals and time. Each of these enjoys some foundation in extramental reality; but that which makes time to be time, or a universal to be universal, depends upon an intellectual operation. Thomas places truth in this third class.⁴

Accordingly, if truth has a foundation in extramental reality, its nature as truth is perfected only through an operation by the intellect—when the intellect grasps a thing as it really is. In confirmation Thomas cites the oft-quoted text from Aristotle's *Metaphysics* VI, c. 4 to the effect that while truth and falsity exist in the soul, good and evil exist in things. In fact, Aristotle's Greek text does not quite say this, but this reading is given by the medieval Latin translation from the Arabic which accompa-

der Dinge. Eine Untersuchung des Hochmittelalters (4th ed., Munich, 1966), especially pp. 73–86 for some interesting remarks on the historical tradition on the truth of things. See also the dissertation by R. B. Schmitz, *Sein-Wahrheit-Wort. Thomas von Aquin und die Lehre von der Wahrheit der Dinge* (Münster, 1984), pp. 398–401. In his *La relation de vérité selon Saint Thomas d'Aquin* (Vatican City, 1996), A. Contat concentrates on truth of the intellect rather than on transcendental truth (see p. xxii). This book contains interesting material, but should be read with some caution.

3. "Utrum veritas sit essentia rei," *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum*, ed. P. Mandonnet (Paris, 1929), vol. 1, p. 484. For the dating of Thomas's works here and throughout this volume, unless otherwise indicated, I shall follow J.-P. Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas. Vol 1: The Person and His Work* (Washington, D.C., 1996), and the "Brief Catalogue" near the end by G. Emery. For additional discussion see Torrell, *Initiation à Saint Thomas d'Aquin*, 2d ed. (Paris, 2002), pp. 611–13. According to Torrell, Thomas would have commented on the *Sentences* orally from 1252 to 1254, and prepared his written version from 1254 to 1256.

4. *In I Sent.*, p. 486. Note Thomas's remarks about this third class: "Quaedam autem sunt quae habent fundamentum in re extra animam, sed complementum rationis eorum quantum ad id quod est formale, est per operationem animae, ut patet in universali. Humanitas enim est aliquid in re, non tamen ibi habet rationem universalis, cum non sit extra animam aliqua humanitas multis communis; sed secundum quod accipitur in intellectu, adiungitur ei per operationem intellectus intentio, secundum quam dicitur species: et similiter est de tempore. . . . Similiter dico de veritate, quod habet fundamentum in re, sed ratio eius completur per actionem intellectus, quando scilicet apprehenditur eo modo quo est." On this see F. Ruello, *La notion de vérité chez saint Albert le Grand et chez saint Thomas d'Aquin* (Louvain-Paris, 1969), pp. 179–227.

nied the Latin translation of Averroes's commentary on the *Metaphysics*.⁵ Thomas immediately goes beyond Aristotle, however, by appealing to his metaphysics of essence and existence (*esse*). Since both quiddity and existence (*esse*) are present in a thing, truth is grounded on the thing's existence (*esse*) more so than upon its quiddity. Thomas finds a confirming argument for this in the grammatical fact that the name being (*ens*) is imposed on a thing by reason of its *esse*. He adds that it is only through the operation of the intellect which grasps the *esse* of a thing as it is by becoming assimilated to that thing that the relation of adequation is completed. And it is in this relation of adequation that the nature (*ratio*) of truth consists.⁶ Therefore, in this earliest text, we already see Thomas defending the view of truth as adequation.

Given all of this, Thomas concludes that a thing's *esse* causes truth about that thing to be present in the intellect. He also comments that the nature of truth exists in the intellect in prior fashion to its existence in the thing. He recalls Aristotle's example of the different ways in which the term "healthy" can be predicated. Thus the hot and the cold and other causes account for the presence of health in an animal; but "healthy" is not said of these in primary fashion but of the animal, and of the others only by analogy with "healthy" as it is predicated of an animal. So, too, truth is said in primary fashion of truth of the intellect, and of a proposition insofar as the latter is a sign of the truth which is present in the intellect. It is only insofar as a thing causes truth to be present to the intellect that truth is said of the thing itself. (In developing this point Thomas also notes that a thing is said to be true because it is naturally fitted by reason of its external appearances to produce a correct understanding of itself in the intellect. And other things are referred to as "false" because they are naturally suited by reason of their external appearances to produce a false understanding of themselves. Consider, for instance, something which appears to be gold but is not.)⁷

5. *In I Sent.*, p. 486. For Aristotle, see *Metaphysics* VI, c. 4 (1027b 25–27): "for falsity and truth are not in things—it is not as if the good were true, and the bad were in itself false—but in thought" (W. D. Ross translation in *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, ed. J. Barnes, vol. 2 [Princeton, 1984], 1623). See Averroes, *In VI Metaph.* (Venice, 1562), vol. 8, fols. 151vb–152ra: "Verum enim et falsum non sunt in rebus, sicut bonum et malum, ut verum sit sicut bonum, et falsum sicut malum, sed sunt in cognitione." For Averroes's commentary on this see fols. 152rb–152va. And if one may judge from Thomas's own commentary on this same text, he must have had a similar reading at hand at the time he prepared this. See his *In XII libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio* (Turin-Rome, 1950), Bk VI, lect. 4, nn. 1230–1231.

6. *In I Sent.*, d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, p. 486: "Cum autem in re sit quidditas eius et suum esse, veritas fundatur in esse rei magis quam in quidditate, sicut et nomen entis ab esse imponitur; et in ipsa operatione intellectus accipientis esse rei sicut est per quamdam similitudinem ad ipsum, completeretur relatio adaequationis, in qua consistit ratio veritatis."

7. *In I Sent.*, d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, p. 486. Note in particular: "Unde dico, quod ipsum esse rei

Both kinds of truth—truth of the intellect and truth of a thing—are reduced or traced back to God as to their first principle. This is because God's being is the cause of all other being (*esse*) and his understanding is the cause of all other knowing. Therefore he is the first truth just as he is the first being, for each and every thing stands in relation to truth just as it does to being (*esse*). It is for this reason, Thomas continues, that Aristotle shows in *Metaphysics* II that the first cause of being is identical with the first cause of truth and true to the maximum degree. (This passage is interesting for in it Thomas can see some justification for finding a theory of truth of being in Aristotle as well as a theory of truth of intellect.)⁸

In sum, Thomas has singled out three levels of truth in this discussion. Truth in the full and complete sense is assigned to the intellect insofar as the intellect's grasp of a thing corresponds to that thing as it is in itself. Truth is then assigned to things themselves, but only analogically, because of their capacity to produce truth in the intellect. Finally, truth in the fullest and most perfect sense is assigned to God because he causes both the being of all other things and the acts of knowing of all other intellects. At the same time, it is clear from this discussion that Thomas reserves truth in the full and primary sense for it insofar as it is present in the intellect.⁹ It is here, apparently, that it best meets its description as an adequation of the intellect and the thing known.

If we were to end our investigation of Thomas's theory of truth at this point, a number of questions would remain unanswered. For instance, (1) if, as Aquinas here maintains, truth is assigned to things only analogically because of their ability to cause truth in the intellect, is truth

est causa veritatis, secundum quod est in cognitione intellectus." For Aristotle's use of the example of health to illustrate how being can be predicated in different ways but always by reason of reference to a first, see *Metaphysics*, IV c. 2 (1003a 33–b6).

8. For Thomas see *In I Sent.*, p. 487. For Aristotle see *Metaphysics* II, c. 1 (993b 26–31): "so that which causes derivative truths to be true is most true. Therefore the principles of eternal things must be always most true; for they are not merely sometimes true, nor is there any cause of their being, but they themselves are the cause of the being of other things, so that as each thing is in respect of being, so is it in respect of truth" (Barnes ed., vol. 2, p. 1570). Vande Wiele insists that there is no doctrine of ontological truth in Aristotle, but while discussing this, he does not refer to the present passage ("Le problème de la vérité ontologique," pp. 522–25). On the other hand, Reale emphasizes that the truth Aristotle here has in mind is "ontological truth" and not the logico-epistemological truth of which he speaks in VI c. 4, and IX c. 10. See G. Reale, *The Concept of First Philosophy and the Unity of the Metaphysics of Aristotle*, trans. J. Catan (Albany, N.Y., 1979), p. 40 and n. 114 (pp. 58–59). Cf. Thomas's much later discussion from his Commentary on *Metaphysics* II, lect. 2, nn. 295–98. Thomas brings together Aristotle's discussion of truth of being with his discussion in Bk VI, c. 4 (see note 5 above) by noting that a thing's *esse* is the cause of the true knowledge the mind has of that thing (see n. 298).

9. This remark should be restricted to truth on the created level. See section 3 below for Thomas's application of truth to God.

formally and intrinsically present in things themselves or only in the intellect? (2) Is truth regarded by Thomas as transcendental? (3) In what sense may truth be assigned to God—merely as the cause of truth of intellect in creatures, or also in some formal and intrinsic way? (4) If there were no mind (divine or human), would truth exist in any way at all? (5) If truth in the formal sense has a foundation in a thing's being and in its existence (*esse*) more so than in its quiddity or essence, does essence play any role in grounding truth? (6) Is the intellect's first operation—that whereby it forms concepts and knows what things are—sufficient for one to grasp truth, or must one move on to the intellect's second operation—composing and dividing—in order to do so? (7) Since Thomas cites a number of definitions of truth from earlier thinkers, how does he fit them together?

Most important among these questions from the standpoint of metaphysics and most difficult to answer in light of Thomas's various discussions is the first. In our effort to determine Aquinas's view concerning truth of being, we shall begin with his Commentary on I *Sentences* of 1252, and then take in turn his treatments in *De veritate*, q. 1 of 1256, *Summa contra Gentiles* I (ca. 1259), and *Summa theologiae* I of 1265–1268.¹⁰ Although consideration of these same texts will shed some light on Thomas's answers to some of the other questions just raised, I shall devote subsequent sections of this chapter to brief but explicit treatments of each of them.

1. IS TRUTH FORMALLY PRESENT ONLY IN THE INTELLECT OR ALSO IN BEING?²

Text 1: In I Sent., d. 19, q. 5. As already noted, in q. 5, a. 1 of this text Thomas has indicated that truth in the complete and perfect sense applies only to truth as it exists in the intellect. Truth is assigned to things only analogically, insofar as they can produce truth in the intellect. We may immediately ask whether truth is formally and intrinsically present in things, or only in extrinsic fashion. One commentator, J. Vande Wiele, has concluded from this text that Thomas has transferred truth from the mind to things, but only by extrinsic denomination. I take Vande Wiele to mean by this that truth is not really intrinsically present in things.¹¹

10. For these dates see Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas*. Vol. 1. But for *Summa theologiae* I see also Torrell, *Initiation*, 2d. ed., p. 614, where he proposes 1265–1268 for this, and p. 636 where in his “Nouvelle Chronologie Sommaire” he suggests that Thomas began the *Prima Pars* in October 1265.

11. “Le problème de la vérité ontologique,” pp. 548–49. He reasons that when secondary terms are related to a primary term only by a relation of reason, application of the notion in question to the secondary analogates is only by extrinsic denomination. Such is true

Nonetheless, perhaps something more can be gleaned from Thomas's discussion in q. 5 concerning truth of being.

As will be recalled, the explicit question to which a. 1 is directed is this: "Whether truth is the essence of a thing."¹² The first objection or argument in support of an affirmative answer to this question harks back to two earlier definitions of truth. According to Augustine's *Soliloquies*, "the true is that which is." And according to another definition, offered by Philip the Chancellor, "the true is the undividedness of being (*esse*) and that which is."¹³ Therefore, continues the objection, each and everything is true insofar as it enjoys *esse*. But *esse* is the act of essence. Therefore, since each and everything is true in the formal sense by reason of truth, it seems that truth and essence are completely identical.¹⁴

Thomas proposes two possible replies to this objection. First of all, the verb *esse* may be taken in two ways: (1) insofar as the term being (*ens*) signifies the essence of things as when being itself is divided into the ten supreme genera (in simpler terms, insofar as being points to extramental reality); or (2) insofar as the verb *esse* signifies a composition effected by the soul; that is, when the intellect judges by composing (or dividing). When Aristotle describes being (*ens*) as true in *Metaphysics* V, continues Thomas, he is using being in the second way. So too, when Augustine refers to the true as "that which is," it is as if he were saying that truth is realized when it is *said* of that which is. And the same may be said of truth when it is taken as the undividedness of *esse* and that which is (as in Chancellor Philip's definition).¹⁵ In other words, in this rather surprising

in the case of health and such is also true, Vande Wiele argues, in transferring the notion of truth from the intellect to a thing. He stresses that the relation of things to the human intellect is a pure relation of reason.

12. See note 3 above.

13. For Augustine see *Soliloquia* II, c. 5, n. 8 (CSEL 89:56): "Ergo illud dico et sic definitio nec vereor ne definitio mea ob hoc improbetur, quod nimis brevis est; nam verum mihi videtur esse id quod est." For Philip see his *Summa de bono*, q. 2, ed. N. Wicki (Bern, 1985), vol. 1, p. 13: "... verum est indivisio esse et eius quod est." Cf. p. 11. Philip's work (ca. 1225–28) is apparently the first medieval treatise on the transcendentals. In his preferred definition of truth, Philip views truth as a property which pertains to being in itself, without any reference to an intellect: "Verum enim dicitur sine respectu ad intellectum" (p. 13). For discussion see Vande Wiele, pp. 535–38; J. A. Aertsen, "Die Transzendentalienlehre bei Thomas von Aquin in ihren historischen Hintergründen und philosophischen Motiven," *Miscellanea Mediaevalia* 19 (1988), pp. 94–95; *Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals*, pp. 35–37. Also see the important earlier study by H. Pouillon, "Le premier traité des propriétés transcendentales. La 'Summa de bono' du Chancelier Philippe," *Revue néoscholastique de philosophie* 42 (1939), pp. 40–77.

14. *In I Sent.*, d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, pp. 484–85. The final part of the objection reads: "Ergo unumquodque dicitur verum, secundum quod habet esse. Esse autem est actus essentiae. Ergo cum unumquodque veritate formaliter sit verum, videtur quod omnino idem sit veritas et essentia."

15. *In I Sent.*, p. 488. Note especially: "... dicendum, quod esse dicitur dupliciter: uno modo secundum quod ens significat essentiam rerum prout dividitur per decem genera;

move, Thomas proposes to reinterpret the two last-mentioned definitions. Even though each seems to refer to truth of being, he suggests that we might shift its focus to truth of the intellect.

On the other hand, Thomas proposes a second possible reply. One might simply counter that the definitions in question refer not to truth taken in its complete meaning, but only to truth insofar as it is grounded in or has a foundation in reality. According to either approach, then, Thomas here remains unwavering in his view that truth in the complete and primary sense is truth of the intellect.¹⁶

Thomas's reply to the second objection is helpful in that he brings out more fully his understanding of the relationship between truth and being. According to that objection, if things differ either really or even merely conceptually, one of them can be understood without the other. But the essence of a thing cannot be understood without its truth. Therefore, the essence of a thing does not differ even conceptually from its truth.¹⁷

In reply, Thomas counters that the claim that one thing cannot be understood without another may be interpreted in two different ways. It may mean that one cannot be understood unless the other is held to exist. Thus being (*esse*) cannot be understood without the true in this sense, because being cannot be understood at all unless it is also intelligible or true. But this might be taken in another way, as meaning that we cannot even think of one thing without also thinking of the other. Thus we cannot think of human being without also thinking of animal. According to this second usage Thomas acknowledges that we can understand or think of a being without thinking of it as true; but the converse does not hold—we cannot think of something as true without also thinking of it as a being. From this Thomas concludes that being (*ens*) is the intellect's first conception.¹⁸ Truth is not. If this text suggests that there is a concep-

alio modo secundum quod esse significat compositionem quam anima facit; et istud ens Philosophus, V *Metaph.*, text. 14, appellat verum. Et similiter Augustinus, cum dicit quod verum est id quod est; quasi dicat: Verum est quando dicitur de eo quod est; et similiter intelligitur quod dicitur: Verum est indivisio esse et eius quod est." For Aristotle see *Metaphysics* V, c. 7 (1017a 31–35).

16. "Vel potest dici, quod definitiones istae dantur de vero non secundum completam sui rationem, sed secundum illud quod fundatur in re" (p. 488).

17. *In I Sent.*, p. 485. Note the conclusion of the argument: "Ergo essentia rei et veritas non differunt neque re neque ratione."

18. *In I Sent.*, p. 488: "Duplíciter enim dicitur aliquid non posse intelligi sine altero. Aut ita quod unum non possit intelligi si non ponatur alterum esse; et sic dicitur quod esse non potest intelligi sine vero, sicut etiam non potest intelligi sine hoc quod est esse intelligibile. Sive ita quod quandocumque intelligitur unum, intelligatur alterum, sicut quicumque intelligit hominem intelligit animal. Et hoc modo 'esse' potest intelligi sine vero, sed non e converso: quia verum non est in ratione entis, sed ens in ratione veri. . . . Unde etiam patet quod ens est prima conceptio intellectus."

tual distinction between the being of a thing and its truth, it also appears to deal directly with truth of being rather than with truth as it exists in the intellect. This leads us to suspect that Thomas does in fact assign some importance to truth of being, not merely to truth of the intellect.

In article 2 of this same question Thomas asks whether all things are true by reason of the uncreated truth. As he again reminds us, the nature of truth involves both a thing's existence (*esse*) and an act of apprehension on the part of a cognitive power. Both of these are to be traced back to God as first efficient and first exemplar cause. Nonetheless, Thomas also insists both that every particular entity participates in its own created existence (*esse*) whereby it exists in the formal sense, and that every created intellect participates in its own light by which it judges correctly, a light which is exemplated by the uncreated light. Hence there is one divine *esse* by reason of which all other things exist as dependent upon their efficient and exemplar cause. Nonetheless, each creature has its own *esse* as well. So too, there is one truth—the divine—by which all other things are true insofar as they depend upon it as their exemplar and efficient cause. Nonetheless, there are also many truths in created things by reason of which each is said to be true in the formal sense (*formaliter*).¹⁹

In saying this, does Thomas have in mind truth of being or only truth of the intellect? He has concluded that there are many truths in created things by reason of which each is true formally. In light of his previous discussion, one might argue that he must, therefore, be restricting his conclusion to truth as it exists in the intellect. On the other hand, no such restriction is explicitly stated. Moreover, such a restricted reading seems to be offset by his reply to the first objection.

That objection directly contests Thomas's claim that there are many created truths. It points out, as Thomas himself has maintained in the preceding article, that true is predicated analogically of the various things in which truth is present just as health is predicated analogically of healthy things. But there is really only numerically one health by reason of which an animal is said to be healthy as the subject of health, and

19. *In I Sent.*, pp. 491–92. Note in particular: “. . . nihilominus tamen quaelibet res participat suum esse creatum, quo formaliter est, et unusquisque intellectus participat lumen per quod recte de re iudicat, quod quidem est exemplatum a lumine increato. . . . Unde dico, quod sicut est unum esse divinum quo omnia sunt, sicut a principio effectivo exemplari, nihilominus tamen in rebus diversis est diversum esse, quo formaliter res est; ita etiam est una veritas, scilicet divina, qua omnia vera sunt. . . ; nihilominus sunt plures veritates in rebus creatis, quibus dicuntur verae formaliter.” On the significance of Thomas's remark about every thing participating in its created *esse* whereby it exists in the formal sense for his metaphysics of participation, see my *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas*, pp. 120–24.

urine as its sign, and so forth. Therefore it seems that there is only one truth by which all other things are said to be true.²⁰

In replying to this Thomas offers one of his most interesting early texts on analogical predication. He notes that something may be predicated analogically in any one of three ways. (1) The analogy may apply to the order of meaning alone but not to the order of existence (*esse*), as in the case of health. Although the notion of health is predicated analogically of different things in terms of priority and posteriority, the analogy applies only to the order of meaning, not to the order of existence; for the perfection health is actually realized only in one analogate, the animal. (2) The analogy may apply to the order of existence but not to the order of meaning. This happens when different things share equally in the same meaning or intention, even though the perfection signified by the common term does not enjoy being in the same way in the different analogates. In the order of meaning one does not have analogy but univocity. Thomas offers a very medieval example—body insofar as it is said of terrestrial and of celestial entities. (3) Finally, the analogy may apply both to the order of meaning and to the order of existence, as when being (*ens*) is said of substance and accident. It is in this way that truth, goodness, and all such names are said analogically of God and creatures. Hence the perfections signified by such names must be present in God and in creatures in terms of their existence (*esse*), though in varying degrees of perfection. And because truth and similar perfections cannot be present in different subjects according to only one existence (*esse*), there must be distinct truths, and thus, many truths.²¹

This text indicates that if truth is predicated in analogical fashion of God and creatures, it is intrinsically present in creatures as well as in God. In this respect, therefore, truth differs from health. But, we may ask, would Thomas apply this conclusion to truth of being or only to

20. *In I Sent.*, p. 491.

21. *In I Sent.*, p. 492. Though the text is too long to permit full citation here, note that Thomas introduces the three kinds of analogy as applying “vel secundum intentionem tantum, et non secundum esse,” “vel secundum esse et non secundum intentionem,” and “vel secundum intentionem et secundum esse.” As regards the third kind, which is of concern here, he continues: “et hoc est quando neque parificatur in intentione communi, neque in esse; sicut ens dicitur de substantia et accidente; et de talibus oportet quod natura communis habeat aliquod esse in unoquoque eorum de quibus dicitur, sed differens secundum rationem maioris vel minoris perfectionis. Et similiter dico, quod veritas, et bonitas, et omnia huiusmodi dicuntur analogice de Deo et creaturis. Unde oportet quod secundum suum esse omnia haec in Deo sint, et in creaturis secundum rationem maioris perfectionis et minoris; ex quo sequitur, cum non possint esse secundum unum esse utrobique, quod sint diversae veritates.” On this text see B. Montagnes, *La doctrine de l’analogie de l’être d’après saint Thomas d’Aquin* (Louvain-Paris, 1963), 60–61, and his reference for fuller treatment to J. Ramirez, “En torno a un famoso texto de santo Tomás sobre la analogía,” *Sapientia* 8 (1953), pp. 166–92.

truth of the intellect? Though Thomas does not perhaps here answer this question quite as explicitly as we might wish, it seems clear enough that he does not restrict his claim to truth of the intellect. Truth is intrinsically present in things as well. Still, Thomas would not endorse this conclusion without some qualifications or distinctions, it would seem, such as the difference between truth taken strictly (*proprie*) and truth taken broadly (*improprie*), to which he will appeal in later writings.²² But we shall see more of this below.

Some additional support for this reading may be found in Thomas's reply to the second objection. According to that objection, truth is a kind of rectitude or rightness (*rectitudo*). Anselm's definition of truth as "rectitude which can be grasped only by the mind" is clearly intended. But if one time serves as the measure for all temporal things, it seems to follow that there is only one truth to which all true things correspond as their measure. Hence there is no need to hold that there are many truths.²³

In his reply Thomas acknowledges, as the objection implies, that truth is a kind of rightness and commensuration. Therefore the note of measure must be included within the nature of truth. Hence, if the nature of truth is to be perfected, it must include a commensuration of a thing to an intellect. But different things stand in different relationships to different intellects. Because the divine intellect is the cause of all other things, every created thing must be measured by the divine intellect, for everything is measured by its first principle. Accordingly, Anselm writes in his *De veritate* that a thing is said to be true when it fulfills that to which it has been ordered within the divine intellect. But created things are related to our intellects as causes since our intellects take their knowledge from such things. Our knowledge does not measure things but is measured by them.²⁴

From all of this it follows that the divine intellect is the first measure which is not measured by anything else. Created things are second measures, and they are also measured (by the divine intellect). The human intellect is measured (by its objects), but does not measure. Thomas concludes, therefore, that there is only one first measure of truth; but there are many second measures just as there are many created things.

22. For this see our discussion below of texts from *De veritate*, *Summa contra Gentiles*, and *Summa theologiae* I.

23. For Anselm see *De veritate*, c. 11: "Possumus, igitur, nisi fallor, definire quia veritas est rectitudo mente sola perceptibilis." See *S. Anselmi Cantuariensis Archiepiscopi Opera Omnia*, ed. F. S. Schmitt, t. 1, vol. 1 (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, 1968), p. 191. For the objection as presented by Thomas see *In I Sent.*, p. 491.

24. *In I Sent.*, pp. 492-93. For Anselm see the whole of chapter 7 in his *De veritate*, Schmitt ed., pp. 185-86.

Accordingly, he also concludes that there are many truths, presumably because truth involves a relationship between an intellect and a measure, and there are many created measures. In fact, he adds, even if there were only one measure of truth, it would still not follow that there is only one truth; for truth itself is not a measure but a commensuration or adaequation. There could be different commensurations in different things to one and the same measure.²⁵ For instance, many different creatures would be related in different fashion to the divine intellect.

This text is interesting in that it seems to offer two focal points which justify one in assigning truth to being. A created being may be regarded as measured by the divine intellect, and therefore as enjoying truth of being. And it may also be regarded as true because of its ability to be understood by and to produce truth in a created intellect. Again, therefore, it enjoys truth of being.

In article 3 of this same question Thomas asks whether there are many eternal truths. He replies that because the nature of truth is completed through an act of the intellect, and because truth is grounded in a thing's *esse*, one's view about the eternity of truth will follow from one's view about the eternal existence of things and the eternal existence of intellect. Since he holds that there is only one eternal *esse*, the divine, he quickly concludes that there is only one eternal truth. He goes on to say the same of immutable truth. There is only one completely and totally immutable being, the divine. The *esse* of all other things is mutable, at least in the sense that if they were left to fend for themselves, ontologically speaking, they would be nothing. Therefore, no truth as found in creatures is absolutely necessary. Moreover, Thomas adds, if we speak of truth insofar as its nature is perfected by reason of the intellect, no intellect is eternal and immutable of its nature except the divine. Even so, much of Thomas's discussion here has been directed to truth of being (*esse*), whether the eternal being of God or the non-eternal being and truth of creatures. Again he seems to be assuming that truth is to be

25. *In I Sent.*, p. 493. Note especially: "Sic ergo intellectus divinus est ut mensura prima, non mensurata: res autem est mensura secunda, mensurata; intellectus autem noster est mensuratus et non mensurans." For more on Thomas's understanding of measure see J. McEvoy, "The Divine as the Measure of Being in Platonic and Scholastic Thought," in *Studies in Medieval Philosophy*, ed. J. F. Wippel (Washington, D.C., 1987), pp. 107–13, esp. 110–11. Also see the general study by G. Isaye, *La théorie de la mesure et l'existence d'un maximum selon saint Thomas*, Archives de Philosophie 16.1 (Paris, 1940); E. P. Mahoney, "Metaphysical Foundations of the Hierarchy of Being According to Some Late-Medieval and Renaissance Philosophers," in *Philosophies of Existence Ancient and Medieval*, ed. P. Morewedge (New York, 1982), pp. 169–72 (with richly documented notes); H. Seidl, "Bemerkungen zu Erkenntnis als Massverhältnis bei Aristoteles und Thomas von Aquin," *Miscellanea Mediaevalia* 16.1 (1983), pp. 32–42.

assigned to being, whether divine or created, in some intrinsic fashion, even though its complete and perfect nature requires an operation on the part of some intellect.²⁶

Text 2: De veritate, q. 1. With this we move forward a few years, to question 1 of the *De veritate* of 1256. While the whole of this question is directed to truth, article 1 explicitly asks: “What is truth?” Thomas begins his response by drawing a parallel between the need for first principles in the order of things subject to demonstration and the need for something which is first in the order of conceptualization. But that which the intellect first conceives as most known and into which it resolves all its other conceptions is being (*ens*), as Avicenna states at the beginning of his *Metaphysics*. Therefore all other conceptions of the intellect must arise from some addition to being. This seems to present a problem. As Thomas puts it, nothing can be added to being from without in the way a difference is added to a genus or an accident to a subject. The implication is that anything superadded to being in such fashion would not actually be included within being itself; but, as Thomas immediately comments, any such nature that might be added to being must itself share in being. He also draws support from Aristotle’s claim in the *Metaphysics* that being cannot be a genus.²⁷

From this Thomas concludes that something can be said to add to being only in the sense that it expresses a mode of being (*modus entis*) which is not expressed by the name “being” itself. This may happen in two different ways. It may be that the mode which is expressed is some more particularized or special mode of being. Thus there are different degrees

26. *In I Sent.*, pp. 495–96. Note especially: “Unde sicut esse unum tantum est aeternum, scilicet divinum, ita una tantum veritas. Similiter de mutabilitate veritatis idem dicendum est quod de mutabilitate essendi. . . . Quorumdam vero esse est mutabile solum secundum veritatem in nihil, si sibi relinqueretur; et horum veritas similiter mutabilis est per veritatem in nihil, si sibi relinqueretur.” On this see A. Maurer, *St. Thomas and Historicity* (Milwaukee, 1979), pp. 23–32; also his “St. Thomas and Eternal Truths,” *Mediaeval Studies* 32 (1970), pp. 91–107.

27. Leon. 22.1.4–5. For Avicenna see his *Liber de philosophia prima* I, c. 5, ed. S. Van Riet, pp. 31–32. For discussion see Aertsen, “Die Transzendentalienlehre bei Thomas von Aquin,” pp. 92–95; Aertsen, *Nature and Creature: Thomas Aquinas’s Way of Thought* (Leiden, 1988), pp. 144–47; S. Breton, “L’idée de transcendantal et la genèse des transcendentaux chez Saint Thomas d’Aquin,” in *Saint Thomas d’Aquin aujourd’hui* (Paris, 1963), pp. 45–74; M. Jordan, “The Grammar of *Esse*: Re-reading Thomas on the Transcendentals,” *The Thomist* 44 (1980), pp. 1–26; H. Seidl, “Die aristotelischen Quellen der Transzendentalien-Aufstellung bei Thomas von Aquin, *De ver.*, q. 1, art. 1,” *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* 80 (1973), pp. 166–71. For Aristotle’s denial that being is a genus see *Metaphysics* III, c. 3 (998b 22ff.). Note how Thomas summarizes this thinking: “Sed enti non possunt addi aliqua quasi extranea per modum quo differentia additur generi vel accidens subiecto, quia quaelibet natura est essentialiter ens” (Leon. 22.1.5:106–109).

of entity, according to which the different modes of existing (*modi essendi*) themselves are derived. Corresponding to these modes are the ten supreme genera—substance and the nine accidents. On the other hand, something may be said to add to being by expressing a mode of being (*modus entis*) which is not more particularized (restricted in extension) than being itself, but which is as general as being or, as Thomas phrases it, which follows upon every being.²⁸ Thomas goes on to argue that there are five distinct modes which are as broad in extension as being itself or, to use non-Thomistic language, there are five transcendental properties of being. Thus such a general mode may follow upon any being insofar as that being is in itself, or insofar as that being is in relation to something else. If it follows upon every being insofar as that being is in itself, the mode may express something about that being either affirmatively or negatively. If affirmatively, the mode expresses the essence of the being, and corresponding to its essence one may refer to any being as (1) a “thing” (*res*). The negation which follows upon every being taken absolutely or in itself is its undividedness from itself. This mode is expressed by the name (2) “one,” or unity.²⁹

If the mode follows upon every being only insofar as the being is in relation to something else, this also may happen in two different ways. The mode may follow upon a being insofar as it is viewed as divided from every other being. In this case we may refer to it as (3) “something” (*aliquid*), meaning thereby that it is, as it were, “another what” (*quasi aliud quid*). In other words, if a being is described as one insofar as it is not divided from itself, it is referred to as “something” insofar as it is divided from every other being. Or the mode may follow upon every being insofar as it is conformed to or in agreement with something else. Thomas argues that this can happen only by reason of something to which it belongs to be in agreement with everything else, specifically, the soul. Thus Aristotle writes that the soul is in a certain fashion all things.³⁰ But in the soul there is a cognitive power and there is an appetitive power. When we consider any being as in agreement with the appetitive power of the soul, we may describe it as (4) “good.” And when we consider it as in agree-

28. *De veritate*, Leon. 22.1.5. Note in particular: “Alio modo ita quod modus expressus sit modus generalis consequens omne ens. . . .” (lines 124–125).

29. Leon. 22.1.5. Note especially lines 131–141: “non autem invenitur aliquid affirmative dictum absolute quod possit accipi in omni ente nisi essentia eius secundum quam esse dicitur, et sic imponitur hoc nomen res, quod in hoc differt ab ente, secundum Avicennam in principio Metaphysicae, quod ens sumitur ab actu essendi sed nomen rei exprimit quidditatem vel essentiam entis; negatio autem consequens omne ens absolute est indivisio, et hanc exprimit hoc nomen unum: nihil aliud enim est unum quam ens indivisum.”

30. Leon. 22.1.5. For Aristotle see *De anima* III, c. 8 (431b 21).

ment with the cognitive power of the soul—the intellect—we may refer to it as (5) “true.”³¹ Of immediate interest to us, of course, is the fact that Thomas has now introduced truth as a property of being or, if you will, as a transcendental. So far in this text there is no suggestion that truth taken formally or intrinsically is restricted to truth of the intellect.

Thomas immediately observes that knowledge involves an assimilation of a knower to something known, so much so that such assimilation is said to be the cause of knowledge. But the first relation of being to intellect is that it be conformed to the intellect. This agreement or conformity is known as an adequation of the intellect and the thing. And it is in this that the nature of truth is formally perfected. If we ask, therefore, what truth adds to being, it is this conformity or adequation of thing and intellect. Knowledge of the thing follows upon such conformity. Therefore, while the entity of a thing is prior to its truth, knowledge of it is an effect of its truth.³²

In this context Thomas appears to be concentrating on truth of being. In any event, he has begun with truth so viewed. And now he has distinguished three moments, in the order of nature, I assume, if not necessarily in the order of time. First, there is simply a thing or entity. Secondly, there is the added note of conformity of being to an intellect (or adequation of intellect and thing). Finally, there is the resulting knowledge of the thing on the part of the intellect. It is in the second moment—adequation of intellect and thing—that the nature of truth is formally perfected, Thomas has written. And yet that conformity could be taken as referring to the adequation of any created entity to the divine intellect, or to a created entity’s ability to produce knowledge of itself in a human intellect, or to the adequation of the human intellect with any being or entity it understands. Though Thomas does not exclude any of these ways of taking conformity or adequation of thing and intellect, in his explicit discussion of truth in this text he has at least begun with the second (and by implication the first), it would seem, and therefore with truth of being.³³

Thomas immediately attempts to coordinate each of these three mo-

31. Leon. 22.1.5. Note in particular lines 159–161: “. . . convenientiam vero entis ad intellectum exprimit hoc nomen verum.”

32. Leon. 22.1.5:166–6:176: “. . . prima ergo comparatio entis ad intellectum est ut ens intellectui concordet, quae quidem concordia adaequatio intellectus et rei dicitur, et in hoc formaliter ratio veri perficitur. Hoc est ergo quod addit verum super ens, scilicet conformitatem sive adaequationem rei et intellectus, ad quam conformitatem, ut dictum est, sequitur cognitio rei: sic ergo entitas rei praecedat rationem veritatis sed cognitio est quidam veritatis effectus.”

33. This should occasion no surprise, of course, since in this context he is dealing with general properties which follow upon every being.

ments he has just distinguished with earlier definitions of truth known to him. Corresponding to the first moment in which, as he now notes, truth is defined in terms of that which is prior to its formal meaning (*ratio*) and which serves as its foundation, is Augustine's definition in his *Soliloquies*: truth is "that which is." So too, Avicenna refers to the truth of a thing as the "proper characteristic of its being which has been established for it." And it is from this same perspective that it has been defined by the still unnamed Philip the Chancellor as the "undividedness of being and that which is."³⁴

Corresponding to the second moment—in which the nature of truth is formally perfected—is a definition which Thomas now, albeit apparently incorrectly, ascribes to Isaac Israeli: "Truth is the adequation of a thing and an intellect." Thomas also places here Anselm's definition of truth as "rectitude which can be perceived by the mind alone." Thomas does this, he explains, because rectitude as it appears in Anselm's definition implies a kind of adequation. Also corresponding to this moment is Aristotle's statement in *Metaphysics* IV that we speak the true when "what is said to be or what is not is said not to be."³⁵

Finally, corresponding to the third moment—the knowledge that results from it—truth is defined by Hilary of Poitiers in these terms: "the true is that which declares or manifests being" and by Augustine in his *De vera religione*: "Truth is that whereby that which is is shown"; and also: "Truth is that according to which we judge inferior things."³⁶

Of the definitions offered as corresponding to the second moment, in which truth's nature is formally perfected, the first two—that ascribed by Thomas to Isaac and that offered by Anselm—might be applied to truth of being and not merely to truth of the intellect. The definition taken

34. Leon. 22.1.5–6. For references to Augustine and Philip see note 13 above. For Avicenna see *Liber de philosophia prima* VIII, c. 6, vol. 2, ed. S. Van Riet, p. 413. Here Avicenna is discussing the necessary being (God) and its perfections, including truth: "Quicquid autem est necesse esse est veritas; veritas enim cuiusque rei est proprietates sui esse quod stabilitum est ei; igitur nihil est dignius esse veritatem quam necesse esse" (italics mine.)

35. Leon. 22.1.6:184–193: "Alio modo diffinitur secundum id in quo formaliter ratio veri perficitur, et sic dicit Ysaac quod 'Veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus,' et Anselmus in libro De veritate 'Veritas est rectitudo sola mente perceptibilis,'—rectitudo enim ista secundum adaequationem quandam dicitur—; et Philosophus dicit IV *Metaphysicae* quod diffinientes verum dicimus 'cum dicitur esse quod est aut non esse quod non est.'" J. T. Muckle originally pointed out that he was unable to find the definition of truth as adaequation in Isaac Israeli, and apparently no one else has managed to do so. See "Isaac Israeli's Definition of Truth," *Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge* 8 (1933), pp. 5–8. Also see Aertsen, *Medieval Reflections on Truth*, p. 6; *Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals*, p. 244 and n. 2. For Anselm's text see note 23 above. For Aristotle see *Metaphysics* IV, c. 7 (1011b 25–28).

36. Leon. 22.1.6. For Hilary see his *De Trinitate* V, 3 (PL 10.131/CCL 62.154–55). For Augustine see *De vera religione*, c. 36 (PL 34.151/CCL 32.230–31); c. 31 (PL 34.147/CCL 32.225). None of these citations is completely literal.

from Aristotle, however, is clearly restricted to truth of the intellect. And in replying to the first objection, Thomas suggests, as he had already done in the corpus, that Augustine's first-mentioned definition of truth as "that which is" might be taken as referring only to truth's foundation in reality, not to its nature as perfected through an adequation of a thing to an intellect. Or it might be reinterpreted much as Thomas had previously suggested in his Commentary on I *Sentences* so as to refer not to a thing's act of being (*actus essendi*) but only to the being produced by the intellect when it judges (composes and divides). In other words, it might be shifted from truth of being to truth of the intellect.³⁷

On the other hand, in replying to objection 4, Thomas writes that truth is a characteristic of being (*dispositio entis*), but not so as to add to it a distinct nature nor so as to express a more particularized mode of being. Truth is something which is present in every being even though it is not explicitly expressed by the name "being."³⁸ Again, we may presume, Thomas would have us bear in mind that what truth adds to being is a relation of adequation or conformity to an intellect. Here the focus is again on truth of being.

Since much of the discussion in q. 1, a. 1 has to do with properties which are present wherever being is found and therefore, so far as truth is concerned, with truth of being, we may ask which is primary, truth as it exists in the intellect or truth as it is present in things. In light of Thomas's earlier treatment in his Commentary on I *Sentences*, we can easily anticipate his answer here. He explicitly considers this issue in a. 2. Thomas replies that when something is predicated of different things according to posteriority and priority, it does not necessarily follow that it is predicated in prior fashion of that which causes it to be present in the others. Rather, it is predicated in prior fashion of that in which its complete and perfect nature is first realized. For instance, "healthy" is said of an animal in prior fashion because it is in an animal that the complete and perfected nature of health is first realized; this is so even though medicine is said to be healthy because it causes or produces health. So too, the true must be said in prior fashion of that in which the complete

37. Leon. 22.1.6. Note from the second solution: "Vel dicendum quod cum dicitur verum est id quod est, li est non accipitur ibi secundum quod significat actum essendi sed secundum quod est nota intellectus componentis, prout scilicet affirmationem propositionis significat . . . ut sic in idem redeat diffinitio Augustini cum diffinitione Philosophi supra inducta" (lines 205–213). Note Thomas's explicit reference to *est* as not signifying the *act* of being on this reading. This would suggest that in referring to truth as grounded in a thing's *esse* in *In I Sent.*, d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, Thomas may also have in mind a thing's intrinsic act of being rather than its mere facticity (nn. 6–7 above). Cf. my *The Metaphysical Thought*, pp. 31–33.

38. *De veritate* (Leon. 22.1.7), "Ad quartum. . ."

nature of truth is first realized. The perfection of any motion or operation is present in the terminus of that operation. Therefore the motion of a cognitive power is present in the soul; for what is known must be in the knower according to the mode of the knower. Consequently, a thing is not said to be true except insofar as it is adequated to an intellect. Therefore, the true is present in an intellect in prior fashion, and in things only in posterior fashion.³⁹

Thomas immediately qualifies this conclusion by restricting it to theoretical knowledge as distinguished from practical knowledge and the practical intellect. In the case of practical knowledge, the intellect causes and measures things. But the speculative intellect is in a certain way measured by the things it knows. And if these things serve as measures of our intellect, they themselves are also measured by the divine intellect.⁴⁰

In terms of adequation, therefore, natural things fall between two intellects. According to their adequation to the divine intellect they are said to be true because they fulfill that to which they have been ordered by God. (Aquinas finds this point confirmed by Anselm's classical definition of truth as rectitude, by that offered in Augustine's *De vera religione*, and by the one he has cited from Avicenna.) To this extent, I would comment, Thomas is still considering truth of being or the truth of things. But when we refer to a thing as true by reason of its relationship to a human intellect, the thing is so described because it is naturally apt to produce a correct awareness of itself within such an intellect.⁴¹ Truth of being is still at issue.

Thomas also comments that if there were no human intellect whatsoever, things would still be true by reason of their relationship to the divine intellect. In other words, they would enjoy truth of being. But if,

39. See Leon 22.1.8:1–3 for the statement of the question: “Secundo quaeritur utrum veritas principalius inveniatur in intellectu quam in rebus.” For Thomas's response see p. 9. Note in particular lines 171–180: “. . . et quia bonum, sicut dictum est, dicit ordinem entis ad appetitum, verum autem dicit ordinem ad intellectum, inde est quod Philosophus dicit in VI Metaphysicae quod bonum et malum sunt in rebus, verum autem et falsum sunt in mente. Res autem non dicitur vera nisi secundum quod est intellectui adaequata, unde per posterius verum invenitur in rebus, per prius autem in intellectu.”

40. Leon. 22.1.9:87–92: “. . . ex quo patet quod res naturales, a quibus intellectus noster scientiam accipit, mesurant intellectum nostrum . . . sed sunt mesuratae ab intellectu divino, in quo sunt omnia sicut omnia artificata in intellectu artificis. . . .” As he had done in his Commentary on I *Sentences*, d. 19, Thomas again refers to the divine intellect as measuring but not measured, to natural things as measuring and measured, and to our intellect as measured but not measuring natural things (though it does measure artificial things). See note 25 above.

41. *De veritate*, Leon. 22.1.9. For the definitions from Anselm and Avicenna see notes 35 and 34 above. For Augustine see the first of his two definitions cited in note 36, though Aquinas there (in article 1) included this under the third moment rather than under the second.

per impossibile, neither human nor divine intellect remained while such things continued to exist, the nature of truth would remain in no way whatsoever. To put this another way, things would no longer enjoy truth of being.⁴² And if no mind existed, they evidently could not enjoy truth of intellect.

In summarizing we should recall that even in this discussion Thomas has insisted that truth applies both to truth of the intellect and truth of things or of being; but taken in its primary sense, it refers to truth of the intellect. Only in the intellect does truth reach its fullness and perfection. Even so, things may be regarded as true both in relation to the divine intellect and in relation to a human intellect. Hence it seems to follow that, in the order of nature, the definition of truth as an adequation of thing and intellect applies first of all to the relationship between a thing and the divine intellect to which it corresponds, and only then to the relationship between a human intellect and a thing. If we concentrate on the latter relationship—that between a thing and the human intellect—in the order of nature the thing causes truth in the intellect. Hence the thing can again be referred to as true in itself because it enjoys this capacity. But truth as it exists in the human intellect is truth in primary fashion. Truth of being is not.⁴³

Thomas's reply to the first objection makes an interesting distinction. According to the objection, the true and being are convertible. But being pertains to things more so (*principalius*) than it does to the soul, that is, to mental entities. Therefore so does truth. To this Thomas counters that the true is said in primary fashion of a true intellect, and only by consequence of a thing which is adequated to that intellect. But, he now adds, taken in either way the true and being are convertible. When truth is said of things, it is convertible with being in the order of predication. Hence we can say that every being is true, and that every instance of the true is being. This is because every (finite) being is adequated to the di-

42. Leon. 22.1.9. Note that Thomas prefaces this by remarking that because a thing's relationship to the divine intellect is prior to its relationship to a human intellect, truth taken as a thing's adequation to the divine intellect is prior to truth taken as a thing's adequation to a human intellect. Also note lines 118–120: “. . . sed si uterque intellectus, rebus remanentibus per impossibile, intelligeretur auferri, nullo modo ratio veritatis remaneret.” One might object to this admission on Thomas's part that it implies a real separability of being and truth, at least in created entities. Under the hypothesis, being would endure without being true. And what greater sign of real distinction can there be than this? Hence being and truth of being are not merely conceptually but really distinct. To this, Thomas would probably counter that the two are not really distinct; for the separability in question presupposes an impossible situation, namely, the nonexistence of God's intellect (and therefore of God) and the continuing existing of creatures.

43. This is not yet to resolve completely the question whether according to Aquinas, truth is intrinsically present in things. As we shall shortly see, he adds some helpful clarifications in article 4.

vine intellect and is also capable of making a human intellect adequated to it. But when taken in the second way—as truth of the intellect—the true is also convertible with extramental being, though not in the order of predication but by way of consequence. This is so because some being must correspond to every true intellect, and conversely. I take Thomas to mean by this that every being must be conformed to the divine intellect; and every being can produce true knowledge of itself in a human intellect.⁴⁴ The important point to be retained from this text is that convertibility of being and truth in the order of predication applies only to truth of being, not to truth of the intellect.

In article 4 Thomas clarifies his thinking concerning truth of things or truth of being a little more fully. This article considers the by now familiar question of whether there is only one truth by which all things are true.⁴⁵ Thomas responds that truth taken strictly (*proprie*) is present either in a human intellect or in the divine intellect, just as health taken strictly is present in an animal. But truth is present in extramental things, that is, in beings, by reason of their relationship to the intellect, just as health is said of other things only because they produce or preserve or bear some relationship to the health of an animal. Therefore truth is in the divine intellect in both primary fashion and in the strict sense (*proprie*). It is present in human intellects in the strict sense (*proprie*), but only in secondary fashion—secondary, I take it, in comparison with its presence in the divine intellect. And truth is present in extramental things only in secondary fashion and broadly speaking (*improprie*), that is to say, only when truth is not taken in the strict sense. It is present in such things only because of some relationship on their part to truth taken in one of the other two senses, that is, as present in the divine intellect or in the human intellect.⁴⁶

This text is interesting, although some question might be raised about its compatibility with two points already made by Thomas. According to his Commentary on I *Sentences*, d. 19, q. 5, a. 2, ad 1, perfections such as goodness and truth are present in God and in creatures by an analogy which applies to the order of meaning and the order of existence (*esse*).

44. For the objection see *De veritate*, Leon. 22.1.8. For Thomas's reply see p. 10. From his reply note lines 125–129: “. . . quia secundum quod (verum) dicitur de rebus convertitur cum ente per praedicationem—omne enim ens est adaequatum intellectui divino et potens adaequare sibi intellectum humanum, et e converso. . . .”

45. “Quarto quaeritur utrum sit tantum una veritas qua omnia sunt vera” (Leon. 22.1.11:1–2).

46. Leon. 22.1.13. Note the key text: “Est ergo veritas in intellectu divino quidem *primo et proprie*, in intellectu vero humano *proprie* quidem *sed secundario*, in rebus autem *improprie et secundario*, quia non nisi per respectum ad alteram duarum veritatum” (lines 159–163; italics mine).

We have suggested that this early text referred to truth of being and not merely to truth of the intellect. And as we have also seen, in the corpus of that same article, Thomas states that created things are true in the formal sense. Secondly, in *De veritate*, q. 1, a. 1, Thomas has written that truth taken formally consists of the agreement or conformity known as adequation of intellect and thing. Again, there we did not find him restricting such adequation to truth of the intellect. But according to the present text, he restricts truth taken strictly (*proprie*) to it as present in an intellect, whether divine or human.⁴⁷ If truth taken strictly does not apply to things, how can it be realized in them either intrinsically (*secundum esse*) or formally?

This seeming inconsistency may be resolved if we take Thomas as distinguishing between a strict or proper understanding of an attribute such as truth, on the one hand, and intrinsic and formal possession of the same, on the other. Accordingly, he holds that truth is intrinsically present in things, and that it is formally present in them insofar as they are adequated to an intellect, whether this be the divine intellect by which they are measured or the human intellect in which they can produce knowledge of themselves. But according to the present text this holds only when we understand truth broadly, or *improprie*. When we take truth in the strict sense (*proprie*), it is intrinsically and formally present only in some intellect.

(At this point an objection might be raised against my proposed solution. At times Thomas draws a contrast between predicating names

47. See my discussion of these texts above, pp. 72–74, and 77–78. Contributing to the difficulty in interpreting Thomas correctly on this point is his repeated reference to the example of health. Thus in *In I Sent.*, d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, he appeals to this example to show that truth is said in primary fashion of truth of the intellect, and of a thing insofar as it causes truth in the intellect (see above, pp. 67–68, and n. 7). One should not conclude from this that Thomas there holds that truth is not intrinsically present in things. See his reply to obj. 1 in a. 2 of the same question. The objection appeals to the example of health to argue that just as there is numerically only one health by which an animal is said to be healthy as its subject, with urine as its sign, etc., so too there seems to be only one truth by which all other things are said to be true. Thomas counters that truth is said of God and creatures according to an analogy which applies both to the order of meaning and to the order of existence (*esse*). In other words, the analogy is not purely extrinsic, and truth is not assigned to creatures or to God in purely extrinsic fashion. But in this same text Thomas refers to another kind of analogy which applies only to the order of meaning, not to the order of existence (*esse*). He illustrates this with the example of health. I conclude that when he likens the case of truth to that of health he wishes to make one point—that truth is assigned to things because they cause truth in the intellect. When he distinguishes the case of truth from that of health (reply to obj. 1, in a. 2), he wishes to make another point—that truth is intrinsically present in both the primary and the secondary analogates, though health is not. In the text from *De veritate*, q. 1, a. 4, he again likens truth to health, this time to make the point that truth is assigned to things because of their relationship to an intellect. He concludes from this not that truth is present in things only extrinsically, but that it is in an intellect *proprie* and in things *improprie*.

of God properly [*proprie*] and doing so only metaphorically [*metaphorice vel symbolice*]. As regards that which such names signify directly [*res significata*], certain names are said of God properly [*proprie*], but this does not hold for the way in which they signify [*their modus significandi*]. These names must include no imperfection in that which they signify [*res significata*], even though the way in which they signify will always include some reference to the imperfect manner in which they are realized in creatures. Other names, however, include imperfection or limitation even in that which they signify [*res significata*] and can, therefore, be applied to God only metaphorically. It is only in this way, for instance, that we might refer to God as a “lion.”⁴⁸ Should we not conclude from such usage that when Thomas speaks in the present text of truth as present in things only when truth is taken *improprie* that he has the same distinction in mind and therefore means to say that truth is said of things only metaphorically and in extrinsic fashion?

Tempting though it may be, I do not think we should draw this conclusion. Thomas includes truth among those names which imply no imperfection in their *res significata* and which can therefore be said of God in nonmetaphorical, albeit analogical, fashion. But would Thomas say this of truth of being as distinguished from truth of the intellect? Yes, as we shall see below in Section 3; for he identifies truth of being and truth of intellect in God. Still, one may insist, would Thomas say this of truth of being as it is realized in created entities? Yes, I would again answer, in light of Thomas’s defense of the convertibility of being and truth and in light of his appeal to an intrinsic analogy [*secundum esse*] in assigning truth both to creatures and to God [*In I Sent*, d. 19, q. 5, a. 2, ad 1].

What, then, does Thomas have in mind in our text from *De veritate*, q. 1, a. 4, when he refers to truth as present in things only when we take truth broadly or, to translate literally, improperly? I take him to mean by this that the meaning or definition of truth in its strict sense includes an adequation or conformity of an intellect to a thing. This meaning does not apply in the same sense to truth as it is realized in things. He makes this point by referring to truth as applied to things as a broad or improper understanding of truth [*improprie*]. But it does not follow from this that he wishes to say that truth can be applied to things only metaphorically and that it is not intrinsically present in them.

In fact, as we shall shortly see, in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 16, a. 6, Thomas

48. See *In I Sent.*, d. 4, q. 1, a. 1 (Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 131); d. 22, q. 1, a. 2 (p. 535), where he notes that wisdom, goodness, *essentia*, and all names of this kind (those which Anselm says in *Monologium*, c. 15 it is better to be than not to be) are said of God *proprie* as regards the *res significata*; d. 35, q. 1, a. 1 (p. 811); *De potentia*, q. 7, a. 5, and ad 2; ST I, q. 13, a. 3. Cf. SCG I, c. 30 (for discussion see my *Metaphysical Themes*, 224–26, *The Metaphysical Thought*, pp. 506–8).

singles this out as a difference between analogical and univocal predication. In the case of univocal predication, what is predicated of different things is present in each of them according to its proper meaning [*propria ratio*]; but in analogical predication, this is not the case. What is predicated analogically of different things is present in only one of them according to its proper meaning [*ratio*], and it is from this that the same name is applied to the others. For Thomas this holds whether the analogy in question is intrinsic, as in the case of truth, or purely extrinsic, as illustrated by the case of health. That issue can be decided only on other grounds. Hence I conclude that for Thomas to say that truth is present in things only when it is taken *improprie* is not for him to hold that it is said of them only metaphorically or that it is not intrinsic to them.)

With this aside out of the way, we may return to Thomas's text from the *De veritate*. After making his distinction between taking truth *proprie* and *improprie*, he turns directly to the question at issue: Is there only one truth by which all things are true? The truth of the divine intellect is only one, and from it many truths derive in human intellects, just as from one face many likenesses may result in a mirror. But the truths present in extramental things are many, just as are those entities themselves. Nonetheless, the truth assigned to such things by reason of their relationship to the human intellect is in some sense accidental to such things. Even if no human intellect either existed or could exist, such things would remain in their essences. And the truth assigned to them by reason of their relationship to the divine intellect would also remain, for it accompanies them in inseparable fashion.⁴⁹

Thomas also comments that when truth is taken in the strict sense (*proprie*) so that things are said to be true only in secondary fashion, there are many truths (of intellect) for the many true things which exist, and there are also many truths in different intellects for one and the same thing. But when truth is taken broadly (*improprie*) so that all things may be said to be true, there are still as many truths as there are true entities; but there is only one truth for each. (This is so, of course, because such truth is identified with the thing's being.) Thomas concludes his reply by observing that things are named true in the strict sense from the truth which is present either in the divine intellect or in the human intellect, just as food is said to be healthy from the health present in an animal,

49. *De veritate*, Leon. 22.1.13–14. Note in particular lines 169–179: “. . . veritates autem quae sunt in rebus sunt plures sicut et rerum entitates. Veritas autem quae dicitur de rebus in comparatione ad intellectum humanum, est rebus quodam modo accidentalis, quia, posito quod intellectus humanus non esset nec esse posset, adhuc res in sua essentia permaneret; sed veritas quae de eis dicitur in comparatione ad intellectum divinum, eis inseparabiliter concomitatur, cum nec subsistere possint nisi per intellectum divinum eas in esse producentem.”

and not from an inherent form. But when things are said to be true by reason of the truth which is present in the things themselves (truth taken broadly or *improprie*), they are so named from a form that is intrinsic to them, just as food is said to be healthy from a quality present in it which enables it to be so described.⁵⁰

In saying that things are true in the broad sense by reason of a form that is intrinsic to them, Thomas has in mind their entity as adequated to the divine intellect and their capacity to make themselves known to human intellects. Again, we may ask, does it follow from this that truth of being is intrinsically present to them? No, Thomas would reply, if we take truth strictly (*proprie*) or according to its proper definition. Yes, he would answer, if we take truth broadly and improperly so as to identify it with the being of the thing which has the capacity to be understood by some intellect. For confirmation of this we may turn to his reply to the first argument for the contrary. While truth is a certain agreement of intellect and thing, it is not present in the strict sense (*proprie*) in both, but only in the intellect. As he puts this in replying to the second argument for the contrary, truth taken strictly (*proprie*) is not said of the things which are exemplated by the divine intellect.⁵¹

Text 3: Summa contra Gentiles I, c. 60. These views concerning truth when taken strictly (*proprie*) and when taken broadly (*improprie*) are confirmed by later treatments in Thomas's *Summa contra Gentiles* I and in *Summa theologiae* I. In *Summa contra Gentiles* I, c. 60, Thomas attempts to show that God is truth. In one of his arguments he acknowledges that when the true is taken strictly (*proprie*), it exists in the intellect, but not in things. Again he turns to Aristotle's *Metaphysics* VI, c. 4, for support. Even so, he continues, a thing is sometimes said to be true insofar as it achieves in a proper way (*proprie*) the act of its own nature. This usage is

50. *De veritate*, Leon. 22.1.14. Thomas has also just noted that truth is present in a thing by reason of its relationship to the divine intellect in prior fashion to its presence in a thing by reason of its relationship to a human intellect. Therefore the thing is said to be true more so (*principalius*) by reason of its relationship to the truth of the divine intellect than to the truth of the human intellect. Note especially lines 197–209: “. . . si autem accipiatur veritas improprie dicta secundum quam omnia dicuntur vera, sic sunt plurium verorum plures veritates, sed unius veri tantum una veritas. Denominantur autem res verae a veritate quae est in intellectu divino vel in intellectu humano sicut denominatur cibus sanus a sanitate quae est in animali et non sicut a forma inhaerente; sed a veritate quae est in ipsa re, quae nihil aliud est quam entitas intellectui adaequata vel intellectum sibi adaequans, denominatur sicut a forma inhaerente, sicut cibus denominatur sanus a qualitate sua, qua sanus dicitur.”

51. Note his comment in the text cited in the previous note to the effect that the truth which is in a thing is nothing other than that thing's entity as adequated to (the divine) intellect or as adequating (a) human intellect to itself. For the replies to the arguments for the contrary see Leon. 22.1.15.

confirmed by Avicenna's description of truth as "the proper characteristic (*proprietas*) of each and every thing which has been established for it." As Thomas explains, this applies to a thing insofar as it is naturally suited to produce a true awareness of itself in an intellect and insofar as it imitates its proper idea (*ratio*) in the divine mind. But God is identical with his essence. Therefore, whether we speak of truth of the intellect or truth of a thing, God is truth.⁵²

Text 4: Summa theologiae I, q. 16. In article 1 of this question Thomas again argues that the terminus of knowledge—the true—is in the intellect insofar as the intellect is conformed to a thing which is understood. The meaning (*ratio*) of truth is transferred from the intellect so as to be applied to the thing understood. Because of this, the thing itself is said to be true. But a thing is true only insofar as it is related in some way to an intellect, and it can be related to an intellect either *per se* or *per accidens*. It is related *per se* to that intellect on which it depends for its being. It is related *per accidens* to an intellect by which it can be known. But our judgment about a thing is based not on what pertains to it *per accidens* but on what belongs to it *per se*. Therefore, every thing is said to be true in the unqualified sense by reason of its being ordered to that intellect upon which it depends. Thus artifacts are said to be true by reason of their relationship to the intellect of an artisan. A statement is true insofar as it is a sign of truth in the intellect. Natural things are true insofar as they attain to a likeness of their forms or ideas (*species*) in the divine intellect. Hence truth exists in primary fashion in the intellect, and in things in secondary fashion by reason of their relationship to an intellect as to their principle. But, as Thomas remarks in replying to the third objection, it is not the truth of a thing but rather its very existence (*esse*) which causes truth in our intellect.⁵³

52. *Editio Leonina manualis*, p. 56. For Aristotle see note 5 above. For Avicenna see note 34. From Thomas's text note: "res tamen interdum vera dicitur, secundum quod proprie actum propriae naturae consequitur." He explains Avicenna's definition as follows: "... in quantum talis res nata est de se facere veram aestimationem, et in quantum propriam sui rationem quae est in mente divina, imitatur."

53. Leon. 4.206–7. Art. 1 is entitled: "Utrum veritas sit tantum in intellectu." Note from Thomas's discussion: "Res autem intellecta ad intellectum aliquem potest habere ordinem vel per se, vel per accidens. Per se quidem habet ordinem ad intellectum a quo dependet secundum suum esse; per accidens autem ad intellectum a quo cognoscibilis est. . . . Iudicium autem de re non sumitur secundum id quod inest ei per accidens, sed secundum id quod inest ei per se. Unde unaquaeque res dicitur vera absolute, secundum ordinem ad intellectum a quo dependet. . . . Sic ergo veritas principaliter est in intellectu; secundario vero in rebus, secundum quod comparantur ad intellectum ut ad principium." See from the reply to obj. 3: "Et similiter esse rei, non veritas eius, causat veritatem intellectus" (p. 207). The point of this remark seems to be that if a thing is to be regarded as true only insofar as it is related to some intellect, and first and foremost to the divine intellect, it can cause truth in our intellect by reason of its very *esse*. This squares with Thomas's view as expressed

Thomas draws upon this same reasoning in framing his reply to article 6. There he asks once again whether there is only one truth by which all things are true. He replies that in a certain sense there is only one such truth, and in a certain sense not. When something is predicated univocally of different things, the perfection in question is present in each of these things according to its proper meaning (*ratio*). But when something is said analogically of different things, it is present according to its proper meaning in only one of them. It is from this that the others receive the common name. Again he turns to the example of health. “Healthy” is said of an animal, of urine, and of medicine. This is not because health is present (anywhere) except in an animal, but rather because it is from the health of the animal that the others are said to be healthy. If health itself is not really present in the medicine or in urine, something else is present in each of them by reason of which one produces and the other is a sign of health.⁵⁴

Thomas now recalls that he has explained (see article 1) that truth is in the intellect in primary fashion (*per prius*) and in things only in secondary fashion insofar as they are ordered to the divine intellect. If we speak of truth as it exists in the intellect and therefore according to its proper meaning, there are many truths in many different intellects. Indeed, many truths may be present in one and the same intellect insofar as it knows different things. But if we speak of truth as it exists in things, all things are true by the one primary truth, to which each is likened according to its own entity.⁵⁵

in *In I Sent.* d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, that truth in the intellect has a foundation in reality, i.e., in a thing's *esse*.

54. Leon. 4.213. Note especially: “. . . sciendum est quod, quando aliquid praedicatur univoce de multis, illud in quolibet eorum secundum propriam rationem invenitur, sicut animal in qualibet specie animalis. Sed quando aliquid dicitur analogice de multis, illud invenitur secundum propriam rationem in uno eorum tantum, a quo alia denominantur. Sicut sanum dicitur de animali et urina et medicina, non quod sanitas sit nisi in animali tantum, sed a sanitate animalis denominatur medicina sana, in quantum est illius sanitatis effectiva, et urina, in quantum est illius sanitatis significativa.” For an interesting discussion of this text, and for criticism of Cajetan's reading that whenever the *ratio propria* is present in only the primary referent, all other applications of a corresponding common name must be extrinsic, see Ralph McInerny, *The Logic of Analogy: An Interpretation of St. Thomas* (The Hague, 1961), pp. 18–23, 30. As McInerny indicates, a reading such as Cajetan's will be hard pressed to distinguish analogous terms from metaphors (see pp. 22, 144–52). Note McInerny's comment on p. 147: “What distinguishes the analogous name from metaphor is this: those things which do not verify the proper notion of the common name are nonetheless properly, if less so, signified by it and consequently it can properly suppose for them.” This seems close to, though not identical with, the position I have defended above, i.e., that when Thomas says that truth is present in things *improprie*, he does not mean that it is present in them in purely extrinsic fashion and said of them metaphorically. For additional development of McInerny's position see his *Studies in Analogy* (The Hague, 1968), ch. 2 (“Metaphor and Analogy”).

55. Leon. 4.213. Note in particular: “Si vero loquamur de veritate secundum quod est

In sum, therefore, Thomas's position continues to be that truth is realized in primary and proper fashion in an intellect, and in things only insofar as they bear some relationship to an intellect. According to his later texts, truth is said to be present in the intellect when we take the term "truth" in the strict sense (*proprie*), and in things only when we apply that term broadly (*improprie*). As for the presence of truth in things, it applies to things only insofar as some relationship to an intellect is included in our understanding of them. If the thing is understood in terms of its relationship to the divine intellect which serves as its measure, truth taken broadly (*improprie*) applies to such a thing *per se*. If we consider such a thing in terms of its ability to be known by created intellects, truth taken broadly (*improprie*) does apply to it, but only *per accidens*. In each case truth taken as adequation adds to such a thing or entity a relationship to intellect. The relationship of a being to a created intellect does not entail any real addition to the being in question and according to Thomas is a relation of reason.⁵⁶

Thomas has been criticized for holding this last-mentioned point. If the relation assigned to being insofar as it is true is only a relation of reason, is this not to make truth of being purely extrinsic?⁵⁷ In *De veritate*, q. 21, a. 1, Thomas does state that the relation added either by truth or by goodness to being can only be a relation of reason. But in justifying his additional claim that the relation is nonmutual, he offers some helpful precisions. In such a relationship, the being which is related does not really depend upon that to which it is related; but the converse does not hold. That to which the being is related—the intellect in the case of truth—does depend in some way upon the being in question. Thomas illustrates this by appealing to the relationship between science (*scientia*) and an object of

in rebus, sic omnes sunt verae una prima veritate, cui unumquodque assimilatur secundum suam entitatem."

56. See *De veritate*, q. 21, a. 1, where Thomas explicitly asks whether the good adds something to being. After distinguishing different ways in which something may add to something else, he concentrates on the third of these—one thing may add to another in the order of reason alone, so that something is included in the notion (*ratio*) of one which is not included in the *ratio* of the other. The good cannot add anything to being so as to contract or restrict it to a given class. Therefore it can add to it only something that pertains to the order of reason. While the one adds a negation of division to being, the true and the good are said of being positively. Therefore they can only add a relation of reason: "... unde non possunt addere nisi relationem quae sit rationis tantum" (*De veritate*, Leon. 22.3.593:161–162).

57. For a good statement of this objection see Aertsen, *Medieval Reflections on Truth*, pp. 10–11. Aertsen attributes this weakness in Thomas's explanation to his restricted understanding of relation. Accordingly, Thomas cannot appeal to a real relation in this case because he views every real relation as falling within the category of relation, and therefore as an accident which inheres in a substance. Aertsen laments the fact that in his doctrine on the transcendentals, Thomas has not taken into account the possibility of a real transcendental relation. Now also see Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals*, pp. 269–74.

scientific knowledge (*scibile*). While science depends upon the object, the object does not depend upon the science. The relation of science to the object is real; that of the object to the science is only a relation of reason. The same holds, Thomas continues, in all cases where things are related as measure and that which is measured, or as that which perfects and that which is perfected. What is measured and what is perfected are really related to that which measures or perfects, but the converse does not obtain. Therefore the true and the good add to the intelligible content of being the relation of perfecting.⁵⁸ In other words, being insofar as it is true is viewed as perfecting the (human) intellect.

From this text we may conclude that for Thomas a being or a thing insofar as it is true is only conceptually related to the human intellect which understands it, while that intellect is really related to it. If one were to stop here, one might agree that the relation added by truth to being is only conceptual (a relation of reason), and one might fear that truth of being is no longer being regarded as intrinsic to being. But if one bears in mind what Thomas has said about the relation between that which measures and that which is measured, or between that which perfects and that which is perfected, another dimension is introduced. Thomas also holds that a being is regarded as true insofar as it is related to the divine intellect upon which it depends for its every *esse*. This, as we have seen from other texts, is a relationship of that which is measured to that which measures. And this, we have now learned, is a real relation, even though that which runs from a measure to that which is measured is only conceptual. Therefore we should conclude that when we consider truth of being in terms of a being's relation to the divine intellect and measure, being as so viewed is really related to the divine intellect. Therefore, truth of being, when viewed from this perspective, entails a real relation to its divine measure, not one that is merely conceptual.⁵⁹

58. *De veritate*, Leon. 22.3.593. Note especially lines 168–174: “scientia enim dependet a scibili sed non e converso. Unde relatio qua scientia refertur ad scibile est realis, relatio vero qua scibile refertur ad scientiam est rationis tantum. . . . Et ita est in omnibus aliis quae se habent ut mensura et mensuratum, vel perfectivum et perfectibile. Oportet igitur quod verum et bonum super intellectum entis addant respectum perfectivi.”

59. To this one might object, what of the text cited from *De veritate*, q. 21, a. 1, at the end of note 56 above? According to that passage, because the true and the good are said (of being) in positive fashion, they can add to it only a relation which is of reason. The simplest answer is that there Thomas is restricting himself to the relationship between truth and any created intellect. A little farther on in that same article he comments: “verum enim est in mente ut philosophus dicit in VI Metaphysicae, et unumquodque ens in tantum dicitur verum in quantum est conformatum vel conformabile intellectui; et ideo omnes recte diffinientes verum ponunt in eius diffinitione intellectum” (Leon. 22.3.593:187–193). While Thomas's focus here continues to be on truth of the intellect, his references to the nonmutual relations between a thing measured and that which measures invite us to apply this to the relation between a created thing and the divine intellect.

In sum, therefore, in response to the first of the seven questions raised above in connection with Thomas's Commentary on I *Sentences*, d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, Thomas holds that truth is formally and intrinsically present in things themselves. But this applies to truth only when it is taken broadly (*improprie*), not when it is taken strictly (*proprie*). The same text from Thomas's Commentary on the *Sentences* prompted me to raise six additional questions about his theory of truth, and it is to the first of those questions, i.e., to general question 2, that I now turn.

2. IS TRUTH TRANSCENDENTAL?

If Thomas does not use the term "transcendental" to describe truth, he does at times refer to it and like perfections as "transcendent." For instance, in *De veritate*, q. 21, a. 3 he asks whether the good is prior in its intelligible content (*ratio*) to the true. He notes that we may compare perfections with one another either in terms of the perfections themselves, or in terms of the things perfected by such perfections. If we compare the true and the good in the first way—in terms of the perfections themselves—the true is prior to the good in intelligible content. Truth perfects something in terms of its species, whereas goodness perfects it in terms of the existence it enjoys in reality. Therefore the intelligible content of the good includes and presupposes more than does the intelligible content of the true. In fact, the good presupposes the true just as the true presupposes the one. Summing up, Thomas comments that this is the order which obtains between such "transcendent terms" when they are considered in themselves. After being comes the one; after the one comes the true; and after the true comes the good.⁶⁰ In his Disputed Question *De virtutibus*, a. 2, ad 8, he again refers to certain *transcendentia* which encompass every being.⁶¹

In his Commentary on *Physics* III, while criticizing an argument directed against the possibility of an actual infinite multitude, he distinguishes between number and multitude. Number adds to multitude the note of mensuration, since number is multitude as measured by the unit.

60. See Leon. 22.3.598. Note especially lines 59–63: "Unde istorum nominum transcendentium talis est ordo, si secundum se considerentur, quod post ens est unum, deinde verum post unum, et deinde post verum bonum."

61. The objection maintains, against the definition of virtue as a good quality of the mind, etc., that what is predicated abstractly cannot also be predicated concretely. In reply, Thomas counters that this restriction does not hold in the case of "transcendents" which encompass every being: ". . . istud fallit in transcendentibus, quae circumeunt omne ens. Nam essentia est ens, et bonitas bona, et unitas una, non autem sic potest dici albedo alba. Cuius ratio est, quia quidquid cadit in intellectu, oportet quod cadat sub ratione entis, et per consequens sub ratione boni et unius. . . ." See *Questiones disputatae*, vol. 2 (Turin-Rome, 1953), p. 712.

Therefore number falls within the species of discrete quantity. Multitude does not, but rather pertains to the “transcendent” (*transcendentia*).⁶²

In sum, therefore, if by “transcendental” we have in mind certain characteristics which are found wherever being is found, or which follow upon every being, Thomas does regard truth as transcendental. This clearly follows from his derivation of the general properties of being in *De veritate*, q. 1, a. 1. Moreover, it is implied by his repeated defense of the convertibility of truth and being. For instance, in our opening text from his Commentary on I *Sentences*, d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, ad 2, Thomas notes that being (*esse*) cannot be understood without truth in the sense that being cannot be understood at all unless it is intelligible or true. This is to say that every instance of being enjoys truth of being.⁶³ In replying to objection 3 in that same article, Thomas comments that truth adds to being only in the way goodness and unity do. None of these adds a difference which contracts or restricts being, but each adds an intelligible note which follows upon every being.⁶⁴

As we have already seen, in *De veritate*, q. 1, a. 2, ad 1, Thomas holds that when the true is predicated of things, it is convertible with being in the order of predication. This is so because every being is adequated to the divine intellect and at the same time capable of rendering a human intellect adequated to itself. On the other hand, if we take the true as referring to truth of the intellect, it is not convertible with extramental being in the order of predication but only by way of consequence. In other words, when truth is taken in this way it may be said to follow upon being in the sense that some intellect must correspond to every being, and some being to every (true) intellect.⁶⁵ From this I conclude that truth is transcendental in the strict sense, that is, in the order of predication, only when we refer to truth of being, not when we refer to truth of the intellect. For every being is adequated to its appropriate idea in the divine intellect; and every being is capable of making itself known to human intellects.

This is confirmed by Thomas’s explicit discussion in *Summa theologiae* I, q. 16, a. 3 of the convertibility of the true and being. There he writes that just as the good contains the note of the desirable, the true includes a relationship to knowledge. But each and every thing is knowable to the degree that it enjoys existence (*esse*). Therefore, just as the good is con-

62. *In III Phys.*, lect. 8 (Turin-Rome, 1954), p. 175, n. 352: “Et propter hoc numerus ponitur species quantitatis discretæ, non autem multitudo; sed est de *transcendentibus*” (italics mine).

63. Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 488 (cited in note 18 above).

64. *Ibid.*, p. 488. Thomas concludes his reply: “. . . et ideo hæc quatuor convertuntur, ens, bonum, unum et verum.”

65. Leon. 22.1.10. See note 44 above.

vertible with being (*ens*), so is the true. In replying to the first objection, Thomas notes once more that the true is realized in things and in the intellect. The true which is present in things is convertible with being in terms of its very substance; but the true which is present in the intellect is convertible with being only in the way in which what manifests is convertible with what is manifested.⁶⁶

Still, we may ask if and to what extent the convertibility of truth and being applies to God. In fact, one might suspect that the distinction between truth of being and truth of the intellect will not hold in the case of God. This brings us to question 3.

3. IN WHAT SENSE IS TRUTH ASSIGNED TO GOD?

When we initially raised this question we also asked whether truth is to be assigned to God intrinsically and formally, or only as the cause of truth in creatures.⁶⁷ To some extent we have already seen Thomas's answer to this. From his Commentary on I *Sentences*, d. 19, q. 5, a. 2, it will be recalled that Thomas there holds both that all things are true by reason of the Uncreated Truth, and that they possess truth in their own right. In replying to the first objection he developed this final point by distinguishing three ways in which things may be predicated analogically. Truth and similar perfections, he concluded, must be present in God and creatures according to an analogy which applies not only to the order of meaning but also to the order of existence (*esse*). If, as we have already suggested, Thomas does not there restrict this conclusion to truth of the intellect but applies it to truth of being, it follows that truth is intrinsically present in God and in creatures.⁶⁸

Well and good, one may comment, but Thomas has also argued that truth involves an adequation between a thing or being and an intellect. Moreover, when we concentrate on truth of being, we have seen that being is true primarily because it is adequated to (and measured by) the

66. Leon. 4.210. Note especially from the reply to objection 1: "Verum autem quod est in rebus, convertitur cum ente secundum substantiam. Sed verum quod est in intellectu, convertitur cum ente, ut manifestativum cum manifestato." For an interesting discussion of Thomas's reply to objections 2 and 3 in this same article, see Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals*, pp. 267–69. However, I am puzzled by Aertsen's remark on p. 268 with reference to Thomas's reply to objection 2: "The reply to this objection shows that *ens* and *verum* are not convertible because in all cases being is knowable through itself and is apt to be conformed to the intellect" (p. 268). It seems to me that Thomas's point in this reply is to support his claim in the corpus of the article that being and the true (truth of being) *are* convertible, once appropriate distinctions are made, though truth in the intellect is broader in extension than truth of being.

67. See above, p. 69, general question 3.

68. For this text see n. 21 above and for discussion of the corresponding text.

divine intellect. One can hardly say that the divine being is measured by the divine intellect, or that the divine intellect is measured by the divine being. When it comes to truth in God, what role remains for adequation, which is so essential to Thomas's understanding of truth?

Thomas touches on this in *De veritate*, q. 1, a. 7, while considering a decidedly theological question: Whether truth in God is said in essential fashion, that is, of the divine essence, or in personal fashion, that is, of divine persons. Thomas comments that if the name truth is applied to God, it may be taken strictly (*proprie*) or else metaphorically. If taken strictly or properly, it will imply an equality of the divine intellect and some thing (*res*). But the thing that is first understood by the divine intellect is the divine essence. Through this God understands all else. Therefore, truth in God implies primarily an equality of the divine intellect and the divine essence and only by way of consequence a relation between the divine intellect and created things. But the divine intellect and the divine essence are not adequated to each other as measured and measure, since they are completely identical. Therefore the truth which results from such equality does not imply a principle and something which depends upon the principle. This is so whether truth be viewed from the side of the divine intellect or from the side of the divine essence; for, to repeat, they are one and the same. Hence, in God truth of being and truth of intellect are one and the same.⁶⁹

This text is helpful because it indicates that, as Thomas views matters, truth taken as adequation must be understood very differently in God and in creatures. Instead of speaking of adequation in the case of truth in God, Thomas prefers to speak of equality. Because of the identity between the divine intellect and the divine essence, in God truth of being and truth of intellect are one and the same. In God, therefore, truth of being is present when truth is taken in the strict or proper sense (*proprie*), not merely when it is taken *improprie* as in creatures. But in both cases, we have argued, truth of being is intrinsically present, not merely by extrinsic denomination.

In *Summa contra Gentiles* I, cc. 59–62, Thomas attempts to show that truth is present in God, that God is truth and the purest truth, and that the divine is the first and supreme truth. For instance, in c. 60 he argues

69. Leon. 22.1.25. Note especially lines 33–47: “. . . ideo et veritas in Deo principaliter importat aequalitatem intellectus divini et rei quae est essentia eius, et consequenter intellectus divini ad res creatas. Intellectus autem divinus et essentia divina non adaequantur ad invicem sicut mensurans et mensuratum cum unum non sit principium alterius, sed sunt omnino idem; unde veritas ex tali aequalitate resultans nullam principii rationem importat, sive accipiatur ex parte essentiae sive ex parte intellectus, quae una et eadem ibi est: sicuti enim ibi est idem intelligens et res intellecta, ita est *ibi eadem veritas rei et veritas intellectus sine aliqua connotatione principii*” (italics mine).

that truth is a certain perfection of an intelligence or of an intellectual operation. But God's act of understanding is identical with his very substance. Therefore the divine substance is truth itself. Near the end of this same chapter Thomas comments that whether we speak of truth of the intellect or of truth of a thing, God is his truth.⁷⁰ Or as Thomas reasons in c. 62, truth as it exists in the human intellect involves an adequation of intellect and what is understood. But unity is the ultimate cause of equality. Because in God intellect and that which is understood are completely identical, the divine truth is the first and supreme truth.⁷¹ Again, therefore, we find Thomas holding that truth of being and truth of intellect are identical in God. He also makes the same point in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 16, a. 5.⁷² In sum, therefore, in response to our third question, truth is present in God formally, intrinsically, properly, and to the maximum degree. And this brings us to question 4.

4. IF THERE WERE NO MIND, WOULD TRUTH EXIST?

In addressing this question, we may consider two situations. First of all, if there were no created intellect, would truth still exist? Secondly, if there were no created intellect and, *per impossibile*, no divine intellect, would truth exist in any way? Although in Section 1 of this chapter I have touched on Thomas's answer to both questions, it may be helpful to the reader for me to recapitulate here. As regards the first question, in his Commentary on I *Sentences*, d. 19, q. 5, a. 3, he offers a brief reply in responding to the third objection. If there were no soul nor any created intellect, truth insofar as it consists of an operation on the part of the soul would not exist. But truth would still remain insofar as it has a foundation in reality, that is, in extramental being.⁷³ Presumably by this Thomas means that created truth of being would still exist because cre-

70. Ed. cit., p. 56. Note in particular: "Ergo, sive de veritate intellectus loquamur sive de veritate rei, Deus est sua veritas."

71. Ibid., p. 57. "Praeterea. Veritas in nostro intellectu ex hoc est quod adaequatur rei intellectae. Aequalitatis autem causa est unitas, ut patet in V *Metaphysicae*. Cum igitur in intellectu divino sit omnino idem intellectus et quod intelligitur, sua veritas erit prima et summa veritas."

72. Leon. 4.212: "... veritas invenitur in intellectu secundum quod apprehendit rem ut est, et in re secundum quod habet esse conformabile intellectui. Hoc autem maxime invenitur in Deo. Nam esse suum non solum est conforme suo intellectui, sed etiam est ipsum suum intelligere; et suum intelligere est mensura et causa omnis alterius esse, et omnis alterius intellectus; et ipse est suum esse et intelligere. Unde sequitur quod non solum in ipso sit veritas, sed quod ipse sit ipsa summa et prima veritas."

73. Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 496: "... si anima non esset, nec aliquis intellectus creatus, veritas, secundum quod consistit in operatione animae, non esset. Posset tamen remanere, secundum quod fundamentum habet in re." Thomas also adds: "Remaneret etiam intentio veritatis intellecta in Deo."

ated entities would exist, each of which would still be adequated to the divine intellect.

As for the second question, suppose, *per impossibile*, that created things continued to exist but that neither created intellects nor the divine intellect remained. As we have already seen, in *De veritate*, q. 1, a. 2, Thomas concludes that if there were no human intellect whatsoever, things would still be true by reason of their relationship to the divine intellect. We have taken this to mean that they would continue to enjoy truth of being. But, Thomas continues, if neither the human intellect nor the divine intellect continued to exist while some created things remained, truth would exist in no way whatsoever.⁷⁴ This reply is interesting for an additional reason, for it again shows that the relationship to intellect which Thomas requires for truth applies to truth of being, not merely to truth of the intellect. If there were no created intellects, then there would be no truth produced in such intellects by created things. And if there were no divine intellect, surviving created entities would not be adequated to it. Hence in neither sense would they continue to enjoy truth of being. With this we turn to question 5.

5. IF TRUTH IS BASED ON A THING'S EXISTENCE (ESSE) MORE SO THAN ON ITS ESSENCE, WHAT ROLE DOES ESSENCE PLAY IN GROUNDING TRUTH?

This issue is occasioned for us by Thomas's discussion in his Commentary on I *Sentences*, d. 19, q. 5, a. 1. As will be recalled, he reasons there that if truth has a foundation in extramental reality, its nature as truth is perfected only through an intellectual operation. But he also notes that both quiddity (or essence) and existence (*esse*) are present in things, and that truth is grounded on a thing's *esse* more so than upon its quiddity. He remarks that it is only through that operation whereby the intellect grasps a thing's *esse* that the relation of adequation is completed in which the nature of truth consists. Therefore, he concludes, the *esse* of a thing is the cause of truth insofar as the latter is realized in the intellect.⁷⁵ As we shall see more fully in discussing the following general question of this chapter, what Thomas has in mind is the intellect's second operation, which we often today refer to as judgment. And the kind of truth he is discussing is clearly truth of the intellect.

The ultimate justification in this immediate context for the primacy Thomas accords to *esse* in grounding truth appears to be an earlier remark in this same article to this effect—the nature of truth is completed

74. Leon. 22.1.9. See n. 42 above.

75. Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 486 (cited above in nn. 6 and 7).

through an act on the part of the intellect when a thing is grasped as it *is*.⁷⁶ Should we assume that in the present text Thomas is distinguishing between essence and *esse* as between two distinct, intrinsic principles of being? And if so, what role remains for essence in Thomas's explanation of the extramental foundation for truth of the intellect?

Thomas is well aware that the term *esse* can take on different meanings. For instance, in another text from this same Commentary on I *Sentences* (d. 33, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1), he singles out three. The term *esse* may signify (1) the quiddity or nature of a thing, as when we take a definition as signifying what a thing's *esse* is; (2) the act of essence, meaning thereby not its second act or operation but its first act, what we might express in English as its actual existence or its "act of existing"; or finally (3) the truth of composition, that is, of judgment as this is expressed in a proposition. When used in this third sense the verb "is" is known as the copula. Thomas also comments that when taken in this third way, *esse* is realized in the full sense in an intellect which composes and divides, that is, which judges. Even so, this usage of *esse* is grounded on the *esse* of a thing—on its act of its essence—just as truth is.⁷⁷

This text would seem to settle the issue. *Esse* taken as the act of essence (actual existence) has been identified as that which grounds *esse* when it functions as a copula and therefore as that which grounds truth. The same should hold, therefore, for our text from distinction 19, q. 5, a. 1. Still, some ambiguity seems to remain. Even when *esse* signifies the "act of essence" (actual existence), one might simply understand thereby that the essence is actualized, that is to say, that it actually exists. Or one might understand thereby Thomas's unique view of *esse* as an intrinsic *actus essendi* which enters into composition with essence in finite beings and is really distinct from it. It is this last-mentioned understanding that Thomas has in mind elsewhere when he describes *esse* as the "actuality of every form or nature" (*Summa theologiae* I, q. 3, a. 4) or as "the actuality of all acts and because of this the perfection of all perfections" (*De potentia*, q. 7, a. 2, ad 9).⁷⁸ For that matter, something of the same ambiguity is

76. *Ibid.* (cited above in note 4, end of text).

77. Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 766. Note Thomas's descriptions of the second and third usages: "Alio modo dicitur esse ipse actus essentiae; sicut vivere, quod est esse viventibus, est animae actus; non actus secundus, qui est operatio, sed actus primus. Tertio modo dicitur esse quod significat veritatem compositionis in propositionibus, secundum quod 'est' dicitur copula: et secundum hoc est in intellectu componente et dividente quantum ad sui complementum; sed fundatur in esse rei, quod est actus essentiae, sicut supra de veritate dictum est."

78. For ST I, q. 3, a. 4, see Leon. 4.42: "Secundo, quia esse est actualitas omnis formae vel naturae: non enim bonitas vel humanitas significatur in actu, nisi prout significamus eam esse. Oportet igitur quod ipsum esse comparetur ad essentiam quae est aliud ab ipso, sicut actus ad potentiam." Cf. *De potentia*, q. 7, a. 2, ad 9: "Quaelibet autem forma signata

also conveyed by the English “actual existence.” In which sense, therefore, is Thomas using the term *esse* when he writes that truth is grounded in it more so than in quiddity? Does he have in mind simple facticity, the fact that something exists? Or is he referring to a thing’s intrinsic act of being *esse* (*actus essendi*) which is the ultimate intrinsic explanation for that fact?⁷⁹

In the texts at hand Thomas may mean by *esse* the intrinsic act of being (*actus essendi*). Already at d. 8, q. 5, a. 1 of his commentary he has defended composition of quiddity and *esse* in every complete created entity.⁸⁰ And in q. 5, a. 2 of this same distinction he contrasts the composition of quiddity and *esse* (*actus essendi*) in souls and angels with God’s simplicity.⁸¹

On the other hand, in his much later commentary on the *De interpretatione* he distinguishes between what we might call “judgments of existence” and “judgments of attribution.” In a judgment of existence the verb “is” is predicated in its own right, as when we say “Socrates is.” In a judgment of attribution the verb “is” is not predicated in its own right (*per se*) as if it were the principal predicate but only, as it were, as conjoined

non intelligitur in actu nisi per hoc quod esse ponitur. Nam humanitas vel igneitas potest considerari ut in potentia materiae existens, vel ut in virtute agentis, aut etiam ut in intellectu: sed hoc quod habet esse, efficitur actu existens. Unde patet quod hoc quod dico esse est actualitas omnium actuum, et propter hoc est perfectio omnium perfectionum.” Ed. cit., p. 192.

79. Some such as Joseph Owens question the validity of seeing this distinction between *esse* as facticity and *esse* as intrinsic *actus essendi* in Thomas. See his “Aquinas on Knowing Existence,” in his *St. Thomas Aquinas on the Existence of God*, ed. J. Catan (Albany, 1980), pp. 32–33. Owens is taking exception to Fabro’s way of expressing this distinction: “But Fabro concludes that Thomistic participation distinguishes existence as actuality from its *result*, the existence as fact.” For Fabro see his “The Intensive Hermeneutics of Thomistic Philosophy: The Notion of Participation,” *Review of Metaphysics* 27 (1974), p. 470. As will be evident from what follows, it seems to me that such a distinction is indeed present in Thomas’s writings, although it is sometimes difficult to determine in which sense he is using *esse*.

80. Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, pp. 226–27. There, in referring to creatures which have complete being (*esse*) in themselves, such as a human being, Thomas comments: “. . . et talis creatura ita deficit a simplicitate divina quod incidit in compositionem. Cum enim in solo Deo esse suum sit sua quidditas, oportet quod in qualibet creatura, vel in corporali vel in spirituali, inveniatur quidditas vel natura sua, et esse suum, quod est sibi acquisitum a Deo, cuius essentia est suum esse; et ita componitur ex esse, vel quo est, et quod est.”

81. Ibid., pp. 229–30. Earlier he has noted that the expression “quo est” can be taken in three different ways, the second of which he describes: “Potest etiam dici ‘quo est’ *ipse actus essendi*, scilicet esse, sicut quo curritur, est actus currendi” (p. 229, italics mine). It is *quo est* taken in this sense (*esse = actus essendi*) which enters into composition with quiddity or essence in the soul and in angels. See p. 230: “Et hoc modo intelligo in angelis compositionem potentiae et actus, et de ‘quo est’ et ‘quod est’, et similiter in anima. Unde angelus vel anima potest dici quidditas vel natura vel forma simplex, in quantum eorum quidditas non componitur ex diversis; sed tamen advenit ibi compositio horum duorum, scilicet quidditatis et esse.” Also see n. 37 above for a text from *De veritate*, q. 1, a. 2, which seems to support interpreting the text from *In I Sent.*, d. 19, q. 5, a. 1 this way.

with the principal predicate in order to unite it with the subject. For instance, when we say “Socrates is white,” it is not our intention to assert that Socrates exists but to attribute whiteness to him by means of the verb “is.” This statement will, of course, be true only if Socrates is indeed white.⁸² But in the order of philosophical discovery, one need not have discovered or accepted Thomas’s metaphysical composition of essence and *esse* in order to formulate true judgments of existence and of attribution. Hence it seems clear enough that, in the order of discovery, we may recognize that truth of intellect is grounded in the way things are or exist without thinking of *esse* as a thing’s intrinsic *actus essendi*. And it is clear from other texts and contexts that at times Thomas himself speaks this way.⁸³

In sum, therefore, while I acknowledge that Thomas could be thinking of the intrinsic *actus essendi* in those passages where he grounds truth of the intellect in *esse*, I do not believe that we must always read him that way. He may only be thinking of *esse* as asserting that the composition or division effected by the intellect in judging is adequated to a state of affairs that obtains in reality when judgments are true. Even on this reading, however, we should recognize that, once Thomas has his metaphysics of essence and *actus essendi* in hand, he can also conclude that if truth of the intellect is grounded in the way things actually are or exist, any given being actually exists by reason of its intrinsic act of being, that is, *esse* taken as *actus essendi*. Hence even according to the second interpretation we should not exclude all implicit reference to *esse* taken as *actus essendi*. It is just that we need not assume that this usage of *esse* is explicitly intended by Thomas in all of these texts.⁸⁴

But however we may interpret these references to *esse*, does any role

82. See *Expositio Libri Peryermenias* II, 2 (Leon. 1*1.88:36–48): “. . . considerandum est quod hoc verbum ‘est’ quandoque in enunciatione praedicatur secundum se, ut cum dicitur: ‘Sortes est’, per quod nihil aliud intendimus significare, quam quod Sortes sit in rerum natura; quandoque vero non praedicatur per se, quasi principale praedicatum, sed quasi coniunctum principali praedicato ad connectendum ipsum subiecto, sicut cum dicitur: ‘Sortes est albus’, non est intentio loquentis ut asserat Sortem esse in rerum natura, sed ut attribuat ei albedinem mediante hoc verbo ‘est’; et ideo in talibus ‘est’ praedicatur ut adiacens principali praedicato. . . .” For the terminology “judgment of attribution” and “judgment of existence” see É. Gilson, *Being and Some Philosophers*, 2d ed. (Toronto, 1952), 200ff. But Gilson would not be pleased with the distinction I am making here between *esse* as facticity and *esse* as *actus essendi*.

83. See, for instance, ST II-II, q. 83, a. 1, arg. 3, where Thomas refers to the Aristotelian distinction between two operations of the intellect. Concerning the second he comments: “. . . secunda vero est compositio et divisio, per quam scilicet apprehenditur aliquid esse vel non esse” (Leon. 9.192). Although this appears as one of the opening arguments, Thomas’s reply indicates that he accepts this part of it. This is a typical judgment of existence, and one in which there is no explicit reference to *esse* in the sense of intrinsic *actus essendi*.

84. For more on this see my *The Metaphysical Thought*, pp. 26–34.

remain for essence in grounding truth? It will be recalled that Thomas often refers to truth as an adequation between the intellect and a thing (*res*). But thing (*res*), convertible as it is with being (*ens*), includes both essence and act of being according to Thomas. This is so even though he holds that the name “thing” (*res*) is taken from the side of a thing’s essence. A being (*ens*) also includes both essence and act of being, but in this case the name “being” is taken from the act of existing (*actus essendi*), as he has also explained.⁸⁵

These considerations suggest that essence, too, must play some role in grounding truth of the intellect. If we take *esse as* meaning only actual existence (facticity) in some texts, it is evident that some *kind* of thing or entity (including its essence principle) must exist if one’s judgment about it is to be true. Hence while actual existence enjoys primacy in grounding truth, as Thomas has argued, this is not for him to reject any role for the quidditative side of existing things in doing the same. It is for him to say that truth of the intellect requires that a thing be or exist as one judges it to be or exist.⁸⁶

On the other hand, if in the passages cited above Thomas means to

85. See *De veritate*, q. 1, a. 1 (cited in n. 29 above); *In IV Met.*, lect. 2 (Turin-Rome, 1950), p. 155, n. 553: “. . . et hoc nomen Res imponitur a quidditate tantum; hoc vero nomen Ens, imponitur ab actu essendi: et hoc nomen Unum, ab ordine vel indivisione. . . . Unde ista tria, res, ens, unum, significant omnino idem, sed secundum diversas rationes.” Cf. n. 558. For an earlier text see *In I Sent.*, d. 25, q. 1, a. 4: “Respondeo dicendum, quod, secundum Avicennam, . . . hoc nomen ‘ens’ et ‘res’ differunt secundum quod est duo considerare in re, scilicet quidditatem et rationem eius, et esse ipsius; et a quidditate sumitur hoc nomen ‘res’. Et quia quidditas potest habere esse, et in singulari quod est extra animam et in anima, secundum quod est apprehensa ab intellectu; ideo nomen rei ad utrumque se habet: et ad id quod est in anima, prout ‘res’ dicitur a ‘reor res’, et ad id quod est extra animam, prout ‘res’ dicitur quasi aliquid ratum et firmum in natura. Sed nomen entis sumitur ab esse rei” (Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, pp. 611–12). The final part of this text is interesting because of its twofold explanation of the derivation of the name *res*—from *reor, reris* when it refers to that which is in the soul, and from *ratum* when it refers to that which exists outside the soul. Henry of Ghent would exploit a similar distinction (though he would refer to the second usage as deriving from *res a ratitudine*) in setting the stage for developing his highly original doctrine of *esse essentialia*. For brief discussion see my *Metaphysical Themes*, pp. 176–77, and 178, n. 30. For fuller treatments see J. Paulus, *Henri de Gand. Essai sur les tendances de sa métaphysique* (Paris, 1938), pp. 22–27; S. Marrone, *Truth and Scientific Knowledge in the Thought of Henry of Ghent* (Cambridge, Mass., 1985), pp. 108–30; P. Porro, *Enrico di Gand. La via delle proposizioni universali* (Bari, 1990), pp. 23–8; “Possibilità ed *esse essentialia* in Enrico di Gand,” in *Henry of Ghent: Proceedings of the International Colloquium on the Occasion of the 700th Anniversary of His Death (1293)*, ed. W. Vanhamel (Leuven, 1996), pp. 211–53.

86. See Thomas’s remark in ch. 1 of his *De ente et essentia*: “Et quia illud per quod res constituitur in proprio genere vel specie est hoc quod significatur per diffinitionem indicantem quid est res, inde est quod nomen essentialia a philosophis in nomen quidditatis mutatur. . . . Dicitur etiam forma, secundum quod per formam significatur certitudo uniuscuiusque rei. . . . Hoc etiam alio nomine natura dicitur, . . . secundum quod natura dicitur omne illud quod intellectu quoquo modo capi potest, *non enim res est intelligibilis nisi per diffinitionem et essentialiam suam. . . .*” Leon. 43.369–70 (italics mine).

say that truth is based on an entity's intrinsic act of being (*actus essendi*) more so than upon its quiddity or essence, a certain role still remains for essence in grounding truth. Essence is an intrinsic principle of the thing or entity which serves as the extramental foundation for truth of the intellect. According to Aquinas, the degree and the kind of *esse* present in any existing entity is measured by, specified by, and limited by its corresponding essence.⁸⁷ Hence essence plays an important and indispensable role in the metaphysical structure of any being and hence a role in grounding truth of the intellect. These reflections naturally lead to the next general question in this chapter.

6. IN WHICH OF ITS OPERATIONS DOES THE INTELLECT GRASP TRUTH?

We originally raised this question by asking whether, according to Aquinas, the intellect grasps truth through its first operation (whereby it knows what things are) or only through its second operation (composition and division).⁸⁸ Thomas explicitly takes up this issue at different points in his career. For instance, in d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, ad 7 of his Commentary on I *Sentences*, he distinguishes two operations. The first, named by Aristotle the "understanding of indivisibles," consists in one's grasp of a simple quiddity. The other, known as belief (*fides*), consists in the composition or division of a proposition. While the first operation looks to a thing's quiddity, the second has to do with its *esse*. Because truth is grounded in *esse* rather than in quiddity, truth and falsity taken in the strict sense (*proprie*) are found in the second operation and in its sign, a statement, but not in the first operation or in its sign, a definition, except in a qualified sense.⁸⁹ However we may understand *esse* here, whether as

87. I am here assuming that some kind of positive content is assigned by Thomas to the essence principle of a finite being. For discussion and criticism of another reading which would reduce essence to a given mode or degree of existence in such beings see my "Thomas Aquinas on the Distinction and Derivation of the Many from the One: A Dialectic between Being and Nonbeing," *Review of Metaphysics* 38 (1985), pp. 585–90. For texts where Thomas appeals to essence to account for the specification or kind of being enjoyed by individual entities see p. 588, n. 49.

88. See p. 69 above.

89. Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 489: ". . . dicendum, quod cum sit duplex operatio intellectus: una quarum dicitur a quibusdam imaginatio intellectus, quam Philosophus, III *De anima*, text. 21, nominat intelligentiam indivisibilem, quae consistit in apprehensione quidditatis simplicis, quae alio etiam nomine formatio dicitur; alia est quam dicunt fidem, quae consistit in compositione vel divisione propositionis: prima operatio respicit quidditatem rei; secunda respicit esse ipsius. Et quia ratio veritatis fundatur in esse, et non in quidditate, ut dictum est, ideo veritas et falsitas proprie invenitur in secunda operatione, et in signo eius quod est enuntiatio, et non in prima, vel signo eius quod est definitio, nisi secundum quid; sicut etiam quidditatis esse est quoddam esse rationis, et secundum istud

actual existence or, as appears to be more likely, as the *actus essendi*, the connection—drawn by Thomas between truth and the intellect’s second operation—judgment—remains firm.⁹⁰

In his slightly later Commentary on the *De Trinitate* of Boethius (1257–1258), q. 5, a. 3, Thomas repeats the point that there are these two intellectual operations. While the first is directed to the natures of things, the second looks to their *esse*, an *esse* which results from the uniting of the principles of things in the case of composites, or accompanies the nature of the thing in the case of simple entities. Because the intellect’s truth results from its being conformed to a thing (*res*), it is clear that in its second operation the intellect cannot truthfully distinguish that which is united in reality; for it would then be false.⁹¹

In *De veritate*, q. 1, a. 3, Thomas directly faces the question whether or not truth is present only in the intellect which composes and divides, that is, in judgment. He replies that just as truth (literally: the true) is present in prior fashion in the intellect rather than things, so too it is present in prior fashion in that act through which the intellect composes and divides rather than in that act through which it grasps the quiddi-

esse dicitur veritas in prima operatione intellectus: per quem etiam modum dicitur definitio vera.” Note at the end of this text the qualified way in which truth can also be assigned to the intellect in its first operation.

90. There is a slight difference in emphasis between the text cited in the preceding note and that found in the corpus of this same article (see note 6 above). According to the corpus, truth is grounded on a thing’s *esse* more so than upon its quiddity. According to the present text, “ratio veritatis fundatur in esse, et non in quidditate.” I have taken the reading from the corpus as a more precise expression of Thomas’s position. It leaves some role for essence in grounding truth of the intellect along with *esse*. On this also see Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals*, p. 256 and n. 56; Vande Wiele, “Le problème,” pp. 547–48.

91. See *Super Boetium De Trinitate* (Leon. 50.147). Note especially: “Et hae quidem duae operationes duobus quae sunt in rebus respondent. Prima quidem operatio respicit ipsam naturam rei, secundum quam res intellecta aliquem gradum in entibus obtinet, sive sit res completa, ut totum aliquod, sive res incompleta, ut pars vel accidens. Secunda vero operatio respicit ipsum esse rei; quod quidem resultat ex congregatione principiorum rei in compositis, vel ipsam simplicem naturam <rei> concomitatur, ut in substantiis simplicibus. Et quia veritas intellectus est hoc quod conformatur <rei>, patet quod secundum hanc secundam operationem intellectus non potest vere abstrahere quod secundum rem coniunctum est; quia in abstrahendo significaretur esse separatio secundum ipsum esse rei. . . .” As regards the meaning of *esse* towards which the intellect’s second operation is directed, in this passage it seems to me to signify a thing’s actual existence, though not explicitly that thing’s intrinsic *actus essendi*. Cf. *In I Sent.*, d. 38, q. 1, a. 3 (vol. 1, p. 903) for another interesting text where Thomas draws a parallel between the quiddity and the *esse* of a thing, and these same two operations on the part of the intellect: “Cum in re duo sint, quidditas rei, et esse eius, his duobus respondet duplex operatio intellectus. Una quae dicitur a philosophis formatio, qua apprehendit quidditates rerum, quae etiam a Philosopho . . . dicitur indivisibilium intelligentia. Alia autem comprehendit esse rei, componendo affirmationem, quia etiam esse rei ex materia et forma compositae, a qua cognitionem accipit, consistit in quadam compositione formae ad materiam vel accidentis ad subiectum.” A stronger case can be made for taking *esse* in this text as signifying the *actus essendi* of a thing. For discussion see my *The Metaphysical Thought*, pp. 29–32.

ties of things. He recalls that truth consists of an adequation of a thing and an intellect. But the same thing is not adequated to itself; equality can obtain only between things which are diverse. Therefore, truth is first realized in the intellect at that point where the intellect begins to have something which is proper or unique to itself and not present in extramental things. Still, that which is proper to the intellect in this sense must correspond to what is present in things, so that the relation of adequation can obtain.⁹²

In its first operation, the intellect, in grasping the quiddity of a thing, has present to itself nothing but a likeness of an extramental thing, just as an external sense power does when it receives the species of a sensible object. (In other contexts Thomas refers to this as receiving the form of an extramental thing, but in an immaterial way. And he explains that in the process of being cognized the form of the object takes on a new mode of existing, intentional *esse*, in addition to the physical or extramental *esse* it continues to enjoy in the object itself.)⁹³ But, he now insists, when the intellect begins to judge about a thing it has apprehended, this judgment is something that is proper and peculiar to the intellect itself, and something that is not present in the extramental thing. When this judgment itself is adequated or conformed to the thing, truth is present in the intellect. Or as Thomas puts it, this judgment is true. But the intellect judges about something which it has apprehended when it says

92. Leon. 22.1.10–11. Note in particular lines 27–35: “Veri enim ratio consistit in adaequatione rei et intellectus; idem autem non adaequatur sibi ipsi sed aequalitas diversorum est; unde ibi primo invenitur ratio veritatis in intellectu, ubi primo intellectus incipit aliquid proprium habere quod res extra animam non habet, sed aliquid ei correspondens inter quae adaequatio attendi potest.”

93. Leon. 22.1:35–38: “Intellectus autem formans quidditatem rerum non habet nisi similitudinem rei existentis extra animam, sicut et sensus in quantum accipit speciem sensibilis.” For some texts and for discussion of Thomas’s view that cognition involves receiving the form of an object in an immaterial way, see Ch. IV below. Note that for Thomas a sensible species or an intelligible species is not that which is perceived or known directly, but rather that by means of which the form of an object is received in immaterial fashion and cognized. See n. 11 in Ch. IV below and the texts cited there, especially *De spiritualibus creaturis*, a. 9, ad 6 (Leon. 24.2.97:427–436). Also see my *The Metaphysical Thought*, p. 37, note 48, especially the reference to *Quodlibet* VIII, q. 2, a. 1. This interpretation has been contested by some, recently, for instance by C. Panaccio, who balances passages of the kind just mentioned against those in which Thomas refers to species as *similitudines*, and who concludes that Thomas is not a direct realist but a representational realist. See his “Aquinas on Intellectual Representation,” in *Ancient and Medieval Theories of Intentionality*, ed. D. Perler (Leiden–Boston–Cologne, 2001), pp. 185–201. Such a reading is difficult to reconcile with Thomas’s explicit statements to the effect that an intelligible species is not that which is understood but that by means of which the thing or object is understood. For another unusual way of interpreting Aquinas on this see R. Pasnau, *Theories of Cognition in the Later Middle Ages* (Cambridge, 1997), especially ch. 6 (“Aquinas and Direct Realism”). For a very different and, in my judgment, a more reliable account, see E. Stump, *Aquinas* (London–New York, 2003), ch. 8.

that something is or is not. To do this is proper to it only insofar as it composes and divides.⁹⁴

Most important in this discussion is Thomas's added reason for assigning truth of the intellect to judgment. Through this operation the intellect produces something unique and proper to itself, and something which can be adequated to an external thing. Truth of the intellect occurs when this composition or division effected in and by the intellect corresponds to a state of affairs that obtains in reality.

Thomas finds reinforcement for this view in a statement by Aristotle in *Metaphysics* VI to the effect that composition and division take place in the intellect, not in things. If he continues to hold that truth is present in the intellect in primary fashion (*per prius*) insofar as it composes and divides, he also acknowledges that in a secondary and derived sense (*per posterius*) truth (the true) may be assigned to the intellect when it conceptualizes or grasps the quiddities of things or definitions. Thus, a definition may be described as true or false by reason of the true or false composition, i.e., the judgment implied by the definition.⁹⁵

Thomas concludes this discussion by distinguishing four ways in which truth (literally, "true") may be assigned. It is said in primary fashion of the composition and division effected by the intellect, that is, of judgment. Secondly, it is said of the definitions of things insofar as a true composition on the part of the intellect is implied by a given definition. Thirdly, it is said of things themselves either insofar as they are adequated to the divine intellect, or insofar as they are naturally suited to be adequated to (known by) the human intellect. Finally, true may even be said of a human being insofar as he chooses what is true, or produces a true awareness of himself or of others through what he says or does.⁹⁶ In this text

94. *De veritate*, q. 1, a. 3 (Leon. 22.1.11:38–46): "Sed quando incipit iudicare de re apprehensa, tunc ipsum iudicium intellectus est quoddam proprium ei quod non invenitur extra in re; sed quando adaequatur ei quod est extra in re, dicitur iudicium verum; tunc autem iudicat intellectus de re apprehensa quando dicit aliquid *esse* vel *non esse*, quod est intellectus componentis et dividitantis" (*italics mine*). *Esse* and *non esse* as used here clearly do not refer directly and explicitly to the *actus essendi* but simply indicate that a state of affairs is or is not the case. Cf. ad 1 (p. 11).

95. Leon. 22.1.11:53–64: "Unde diffinitio dicitur vera vel falsa ratione compositionis verae vel falsae, ut quando scilicet dicitur esse diffinitio eius cuius non est, sicut si diffinitio circuli assignetur triangulo, vel etiam quando partes diffinitionis non possunt componi ad invicem, ut si dicatur diffinitio alicuius rei 'animal insensibile'. . . . Et sic diffinitio non dicitur vera vel falsa nisi per ordinem ad compositionem sicut et res dicitur vera per ordinem ad intellectum." For Aristotle see *Metaphysics* VI, c. 4 (1027b 29).

96. Leon. 22.1.11:65–74: "Patet ergo ex dictis quod verum per prius dicitur de compositione vel divisione intellectus; secundo dicitur de diffinitionibus rerum secundum quod in eis implicatur compositio vera vel falsa; tertio de rebus secundum quod adaequantur intellectui divino vel aptae natae sunt adaequari intellectui humano; quarto dicitur de homine propter hoc quod electivus est verorum vel facit existimationem de se vel de aliis veram vel falsam per ea quae dicit vel facit."

the first application illustrates what we may call truth of the intellect, as does the second by extension. The third illustrates both aspects of truth of being, i.e., the truth that things enjoy because they are adequated to the divine intellect, and the truth assigned to them because they can be understood by a human intellect. The fourth may be regarded as an extension of truth of being insofar as it is applied to human actions, and then to truth of the intellect.

Thomas clarifies somewhat more fully his understanding of truth as adequation in this passage from *Summa contra Gentiles* I, ch. 59:

For, since the truth of the intellect is “the adequation of intellect and thing,” inasmuch as the intellect says that what is is and what is not is not, truth belongs to that in the intellect which the intellect says, not to the operation by which it says it. For the intellect to be true it is not required that its act of understanding be adequated [*aequetur*] to the thing known, since the thing is sometimes material whereas the act of understanding is immaterial. Rather, what the intellect in understanding says and knows must be adequated [*aequatum*] to the thing, so that, namely, the thing be such as the intellect says it to be.⁹⁷

To put this another way, it is the composition or division expressed by the intellect in judging which must correspond to a state of affairs in reality if truth is to be realized.

Additional precision concerning this is offered by a text from *Summa theologiae* I, q. 16, a. 2. There again Thomas defends the view that truth is present in the intellect which composes and divides, that is, in judgment. The intellect viewed as a knowing power is true insofar as it possesses a likeness of the thing known. This is why truth is defined in terms of conformity of intellect and thing. Therefore, to know this conformity is to know the truth. Although sense perception and even the intellect in its first operation (conceptualization) may be conformed to a thing, or “true” in this qualified way, neither sense nor the intellect in its first operation *knows* this conformity. The intellect can know this conformity only through its second operation, when it judges that the thing indeed is as is that which the intellect apprehends about it. In this text Thomas stresses that it is the intellect’s *knowledge* of this conformity with the thing

97. English translation from *Summa contra Gentiles. Book One: God*, trans. A. C. Pegis (Notre Dame, 1975), pp. 201–2. For the Latin see ed. cit., p. 55: “Cum enim veritas intellectus sit *adaequatio intellectus et rei, secundum quod intellectus dicit esse quod est vel non esse quod non est*, ad illud in intellectu veritas pertinet quod intellectus dicit, non ad operationem qua illud dicit. Non enim ad veritatem intellectus exigitur ut ipsum intelligere rei aequetur, cum res interdum sit materialis, intelligere vero immateriale: sed illud quod intellectus intelligendo dicit et cognoscit, oportet esse rei aequatum, ut scilicet ita sit in re sicut intellectus dicit.”

known which is required for truth. Since such knowledge is reserved for judgment, the intellect's second operation, so is truth.⁹⁸

It should be noted that Thomas had already mentioned this element of reflection by the intellect back upon itself in a much earlier discussion in *De veritate*, q. 1, a. 9, but in a different context. There he asks whether there is truth in sense perception. He acknowledges that in some way truth is present at the level of sense perception, but not in the same way as in the intellect. Truth is present in the intellect both as something which follows upon an act of the intellect and as something which is known by the intellect. It follows upon that operation of the intellect whereby the intellect judges about a thing as that thing really is. And it is known by the intellect insofar as the intellect reflects upon its own act, not merely by knowing its act, but also by knowing the relationship of its act to the thing itself. This kind of reflection requires that the intellect be aware of the nature both of its act and of the intellect itself, whose nature it is to be conformed to things.⁹⁹

By joining together these various texts we may conclude that Thomas reserves truth of the intellect taken strictly to the intellect in its second operation, that is to say, to the intellect insofar as it composes and divides, and this for three reasons. First of all, it is only at the level of judgment that the intellect produces something that is unique to itself and therefore sufficiently diverse from a thing so as to be capable of being adequated to that thing. Secondly, this adequation requires not that the

98. Leon. 4.208. Note especially: "Unde conformitatem istam cognoscere, est cognoscere veritatem. Hanc autem nullo modo sensus cognoscit. . . . Intellectus autem conformitatem sui ad rem intelligibilem cognoscere potest: sed tamen non apprehendit eam secundum quod cognoscit de aliquo quod quid est; sed quando iudicat rem ita se habere sicut est forma quam de re apprehendit, tunc primo cognoscit et dicit verum. Et hoc facit componendo et dividendo. . . . Et ideo bene invenitur quod sensus est verus de aliqua re, vel intellectus cognoscendo quod quid est: sed non quod cognoscat aut dicat verum."

99. Leon. 22.1.29:16–33: "Dicendum quod veritas est in intellectu et in sensu, sed non eodem modo. In intellectu enim est sicut consequens actum intellectus et sicut cognita per intellectum: consequitur namque intellectus operationem secundum quod iudicium intellectus est de re secundum quod est; cognoscitur autem ab intellectu secundum quod intellectus reflectitur super actum suum, non solum secundum quod cognoscit actum suum sed secundum quod cognoscit proportionem eius ad rem, quae quidem cognosci non potest nisi cognita natura ipsius actus, quae cognosci non potest nisi natura principii activi cognoscatur, quod est ipse intellectus, in cuius natura est ut rebus conformetur: unde secundum hoc cognoscit veritatem intellectus quod supra se ipsum reflectitur." Cf. concerning this text P. Hoenen, *Reality and Judgment According to St. Thomas* (Chicago, 1952), pp. 151–61. He acknowledges his debt to an earlier article by C. Boyer, "Le sens d'un texte de S. Thomas: *De veritate*, q. 1, a. 9," *Gregorianum* 5 (1924), pp. 424–43, reproduced in Hoenen as an Appendix (pp. 295–309). Also see the detailed discussion by F.-X. Putallaz, *Le sens de la réflexion chez Thomas D'Aquin* (Paris, 1991), pp. 178–89.

intellect's very act of understanding be adequated to the thing known, but that what the intellect says or knows through its act of understanding be so adequated. Thirdly, truth, when taken in the strict or proper sense, requires that the intellect judge that the composition or division it has effected at the level of judgment is in fact adequated to or in conformity with an existing state of affairs.

With respect to the third reason just mentioned, someone might conclude that this will in fact require a second judgment about the original judgment (composition or division) already produced by the intellect. Accordingly, truth of intellect will not occur when I judge, for instance, that Socrates is a man, but only through a distinct and second-level judgment which asserts that the composition effected through my original judgment is adequated to an existing state of affairs. Thomas would reject any such suggestion, I think, and would insist that it is through one and the same operation that the intellect composes man and Socrates, for instance, and judges that this composition is adequated to the situation that obtains in reality. This follows from Thomas's understanding of the self-reflection he has assigned to the intellect in its judging operation. Moreover, to accept the position implied by the other view would, it seems, result in an infinite regress of judgments about judgments. My suggestion about Thomas's answer seems to be confirmed by the following remark from his Commentary on *Metaphysics* VI:

For when the intellect conceives this which is a rational mortal animal, it has in itself a likeness of a human being; but it does not on account of this know that it has this likeness, because it does not judge that a human being is a rational and mortal animal; and therefore it is only in this second operation of the intellect that there is truth and falsity, according to which (operation) the intellect not only has a likeness of the thing understood, but also reflects upon this likeness by knowing and judging it.¹⁰⁰

With this we now turn to our concluding general question.

100. *In VI Met.*, lect. 4, p. 311, n. 1236, translation mine: "Cum enim intellectus concipit hoc quod est animal rationale mortale, apud se similitudinem hominis habet; sed non propter hoc cognoscit se hanc similitudinem habere, quia non iudicat hominem esse animal rationale et mortale: et ideo in hac sola secunda operatione intellectus est veritas et falsitas, secundum quam non solum intellectus habet similitudinem rei intellectae, sed etiam super ipsam similitudinem reflectitur, cognoscendo et diiudicando ipsam." The final part of this text seems to indicate that only one act of judging is involved, through which one reflects on the likeness in knowing and judging it. For some extensive studies of judgment in Aquinas the reader may consult A. McNicholl, "On Judging," *The Thomist* 38 (1974), pp. 768–825; "On Judging Existence," *The Thomist* 43 (1979), pp. 507–80; and B. Garceau, *Judicium. Vocabulaire, sources, doctrine de saint Thomas d'Aquin* (Montreal-Paris, 1968).

7. HOW DOES THOMAS FIT TOGETHER THE VARIOUS DEFINITIONS OF TRUTH OFFERED BY EARLIER THINKERS?

Passing reference has already been made to Thomas's citation of a number of these earlier definitions, but in this concluding section it may be helpful to see how he interprets and correlates them at different points in his career. Particularly interesting is the emphasis he places upon the definition of truth as adequation in his different treatments, along with his varying interpretations of Anselm's view of truth as rectitude.

In his Commentary on I *Sentences*, d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, Thomas concludes his discussion by noting how different definitions of truth have been proposed. One kind of definition is offered insofar as truth is perfected or completed through a manifestation on the part of the intellect. For instance, in his *De vera religione*, c. 36, Augustine writes: "Truth is that whereby that which is is shown." And Hilary (of Poitiers) writes in his *De Trinitate* V that "the true is that which declares and manifests being (*esse*)."¹⁰¹

Another type of definition of truth is offered in terms of that which serves as its foundation in reality. Thus in his *Soliloquies* II, c. 5, Augustine writes: "The true is that which is." Another definition of this kind, which Thomas here simply refers to as *magistralis*, was proposed by Philip the Chancellor: "The true is the undividedness of being and of that which is." Moreover, in *Metaphysics* VIII Avicenna writes: "The truth of every thing is the proper characteristic (*proprietas*) of its being which has been established for it."¹⁰²

Still another type of definition of truth focuses on the commensuration of what is in the intellect to what obtains in reality. For instance, according to one definition (here not attributed to any particular thinker), "Truth is an adequation of a thing to the intellect." And Augustine in his *Soliloquies* also writes: "The true is that which so stands that it appears to a knower if he wills and is capable of knowing it."¹⁰³

After mentioning a theological definition of truth insofar as it is applied by appropriation to the Second Person of the Trinity,¹⁰⁴ Thomas concludes with another which includes in some way all of the other

101. Mandonnet ed., vol. 1, p. 487. For Augustine see PL 34.151/CCL 32.230-31. For Hilary see PL 10.131/CCL 62.154-55.

102. For Thomas see p. 487. For the texts from Augustine and from Philip see note 13 of this chapter. For Avicenna's text see note 34 above.

103. On the definition of truth as adequation see note 35 above. For Augustine see *Soliloquia* II, c. 5 n. 8 (CSEL 89.55).

104. See p. 487. Thomas cites from Augustine's *De vera religione*, c. 36: "Veritas est summa similitudo principii quae sine ulla dissimilitudine est" (see PL 34.152/CCL 32.231).

meanings: “truth is a rectitude which can be perceived by the mind alone.” This, of course, is the definition taken from Anselm’s *De veritate*. Thomas justifies his claim that this definition includes the others by singling out two aspects. The term “rectitude” includes commensuration. And in referring to that “which can be perceived by the mind alone,” the definition touches on that which completes the nature of truth.¹⁰⁵

As we have already seen, in this same article Thomas develops the notion of truth as adequation. Nonetheless, in listing these earlier definitions at the end of his discussion, he hardly places exclusive emphasis on the definition of truth as adequation. In fact, he seems to prefer the Anselmian definition because it combines the elements included in the other earlier definitions.

As we have also seen, in *De veritate*, q. 1, a. 1 Thomas distinguishes three moments in our analysis of truth: (1) there is simply the thing or entity which is said to be true; (2) there is conformity or adequation of thing and intellect; (3) there is the resulting knowledge on the part of the intellect. Corresponding to the first moment, where he observes that truth is defined in terms of that which is prior to its formal nature and which serves as its foundation, he again cites Augustine’s definition from *Soliloquies* II (“The true is that which is”), along with those proposed by Avicenna in *Metaphysics* VIII and the still unnamed Philip the Chancellor.¹⁰⁶ So here he applies all three of these definitions to truth of being.

Corresponding to the second moment—conformity or adequation—is the definition Thomas now attributes to Isaac Israeli: “Truth is the adequation of a thing and the intellect.” But instead of appealing to another definition from Augustine as he had in his Commentary on I *Sentences*, he now places Anselm’s definition here rather than at the end. He comments that this is because rectitude implies a kind of adequation. He adds another definition of truth as adequation taken from Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* IV: we speak the truth “when what is is said to be or what is not is said not to be.”¹⁰⁷

Corresponding to the third moment—truth as the resulting knowledge—Thomas refers back to the two definitions he had offered of truth

105. Ibid. “Quaedam autem datur de veritate, comprehendens omnes veritatis acceptiones, scilicet: Veritas est rectitudo sola mente perceptibilis. In rectitudine tangitur commensuratio; et in hoc quod dicitur sola mente perceptibilis, tangitur id quod complet rationem veritatis.” For Anselm’s text see note 23 above.

106. Leon. 22.1.6. For references to the texts from Augustine, Avicenna, and Philip, see note 102 above. Also see above in our text, p. 109.

107. Ibid. For references to the definitions attributed to Isaac Israeli, Anselm, and Aristotle see note 35 above. Thomas introduces this second type of definition: “Alio modo diffinitur secundum id in quo formaliter ratio veri perficitur. . . .”

as manifestation in his Commentary on I *Sentences*, that is, Hilary's and Augustine's in his *De vera religione*; but he adds another taken also from Augustine's *De vera religione*: "Truth is that according to which we judge inferior things."¹⁰⁸

When compared with the grouping of definitions offered in our earlier text from the Commentary on I *Sentences*, the classification in *De veritate*, q. 1, a. 1 is interesting both because it assigns the central position (and importance) to truth taken as adequation of thing and intellect and because it places Anselm's definition in this same central position. By explaining that rectitude as used here implies a kind of adequation, Thomas seems to be reducing the Anselmian definition to his own understanding of truth as adequation. Also interesting is his appeal to Aristotle's *Metaphysics* IV for another definition of truth as adequation.

In *Summa theologiae* I, q. 16, a. 1, Thomas concludes that truth is in the intellect in primary fashion (*principaliter*), and in things in secondary fashion insofar as they are ordered to the intellect as to their principle. Accordingly, once more he recalls a number of the earlier definitions. Both Augustine's definition from *De vera religione*, c. 36 ("Truth is that whereby that which is is shown") and Hilary's definition he now applies to truth as it is in the intellect.¹⁰⁹

Thomas proposes three earlier definitions which refer to the truth of a thing insofar as it is ordered to the intellect. These include another taken from Augustine's *De vera religione* ("Truth is a supreme likeness of a principle which is without any unlikeness"), Anselm's definition of truth as rectitude, and that taken from Avicenna's *Metaphysics* VIII. To justify including Anselm's definition here—as defining truth of a thing—he comments that that is "right which is in accord with its principle."¹¹⁰

This is interesting, first of all, because the final and all-embracing position had been assigned to Anselm's definition in the earliest text from *In I Sent.* In *De veritate*, q. 1, a. 1, Anselm's definition was placed in the middle position along with the definition assigned to Isaac—truth as adequation; but within that context, this was the most important position because of Thomas's heavy emphasis there on truth as adequation. In

108. Ibid. For references to the definitions taken from Hilary and from Augustine's *De vera religione* see note 101 above. For the second definition from Augustine's *De vera religione* as cited here see c. 31 (PL 34.147/CSSL 32.225).

109. Ed. cit., pp. 93–94. For references to Augustine's *De vera religione*, c. 36, and to Hilary, see note 101 above.

110. Ibid. Note that he had earlier cited the definition from Augustine's *De vera religione*, c. 36, in a theological application to the Word by appropriation. See *In I Sent.*, d. 19, q. 5, a. 1 (cited above in note 104, with the reference to Augustine). For references to Anselm and Avicenna see notes 23 and 34 above. To justify including Anselm's position here, i.e., as a definition of a thing insofar as it is ordered to an intellect, Thomas comments: ". . . nam rectum est, quod principio concordat" (ST I, q. 16, a. 1 [Leon. 4.207]).

our third text (*Summa theologiae* I, q. 16, a. 1) Anselm's definition seems to have been demoted, as it were, for here it is cited as one of three definitions of truth of a thing insofar as that thing is ordered to the intellect.

If truth taken as adequation of thing and intellect appears in the central and most important position according to the classification in the *De veritate*, in the text from the *Summa theologiae* it is placed in the last position. This seems to imply that it covers both truth of a thing (or being) and truth of the intellect.¹¹¹ Hence truth defined as adequation has now been promoted, if I may so speak, so as to reflect Thomas's emphasis on adequation in his theory of truth. I would also propose that Thomas's flexibility in coordinating the Anselmian definition of truth as rectitude and the definition of truth as adequation suggests not that his theory of truth is determined by earlier definitions, but that he interprets such earlier definitions in light of his own theory of truth. And this theory, as we have now seen in many texts, includes both truth of being, when truth is taken broadly (*improprie*), and truth of the intellect, when truth is taken strictly (*proprie*).

111. Ibid. "Quod autem dicitur quod veritas est adequatio rei et intellectus, potest ad utrumque pertinere."

Chapter IV

THOMAS AQUINAS AND THE AXIOM “WHAT IS RECEIVED IS RECEIVED ACCORDING TO THE MODE OF THE RECEIVER”

On many occasions in his writings, Thomas Aquinas appeals to the principle that whatever is received in something is received in accord with the mode of that which receives it. He seems to regard this as so evident that he easily turns to it to resolve other problems. These problems range widely. Thus Thomas uses this principle to explain fundamental issues at the metaphysical level; for instance, that the act of being (*esse*) is present in caused or created beings only to a finite degree, or that form is present in matter-form composites only in finite or limited fashion.¹ He also applies it very frequently to what one might call theory of knowledge, both at the human and at the divine level. Inasmuch as it will not be possible for me to consider all of these applications in the present study, I shall limit my remarks to Thomas’s employment of this principle in four areas: (1) sense perception; (2) human intellection; (3) divine knowledge of creatures; (4) divine knowledge of future contingents.

1. SENSE PERCEPTION

I propose to begin here because it is my suspicion that Thomas regarded this and human intellection as the most evident illustrations of the principle in question, and that he proceeded to generalize from these applications to the others yet to be considered. In developing his general

1. See, for instance, *In I Sent.*, d. 8, q. 2, a. 1, Mandonnet ed., Vol. 1, p. 202: “et hoc modo solum divinum esse non est terminatum, quia non est receptum in aliquo, quod sit diversum ab eo”; *In I Sent.*, d. 43, q. 1, a. 1 (where Thomas first applies this reasoning to form, and then to *esse*), p. 1003; *Summa contra Gentiles* I, c. 43 (Editio Leonina manualis [Rome, 1934], p. 41), where it is applied to act and used to establish divine infinity; *Summa theologiae* I, q. 7, a. 1 (Leon. 4.72), where it is applied to form as limited by matter, and then to *esse* in order to establish divine infinity; *De spiritualibus creaturis*, a. 1 (Leon. 24.2.13:343–344): “. . . nam materia prima recipit formam contrahendo ipsam ad esse individuale.”

explanation of what it means to know at the purely human level, Aquinas operates from an Aristotelian background. He repeats and accepts as his own Aristotle's remark in Bk II, c. 12 of the *De anima* to this effect, that in perceiving, the senses receive the forms of things without their matter.²

In his Commentary on this text, Thomas notes that any receiver may be said to receive a form from an agent. Even so, forms are received in different ways. Thus a form which is received from an agent sometimes retains in the receiver the same mode of existing (*modus essendi*) it enjoyed in the agent. This will happen when the recipient possesses the same disposition for the form in question as does the agent: "for whatever is received in another is received according to the mode of that which receives."³

What Thomas has in mind are purely physical changes whereby a form is introduced into external matter by a distinct physical agent—for instance, heat is introduced into something cold by an agent that is actually hot. On other occasions, he continues, a receiver may receive a form according to a different mode of existing—different, that is to say, from the mode of existing the form enjoys insofar as it is present in the agent. This is because the receiver's disposition to receive this form is unlike the receiving dispositions present in the agent. Underlying Thomas's interpretation continues to be his conviction that whatever is received is received according to the mode of the receiver.⁴

In the case of sense perception, a receiving power, a sense, receives a form without its matter. This means that the form as it is received by the knowing power takes on a new mode of existing, one that is different from the mode of existing which that same form has in the agent—that is, in the object being sensed. As present in the sensible object, a form enjoys a physical or natural existence (*esse*). And it continues to have this even after it has been perceived by a knowing power, so long as the external object continues to exist. But when such a form is received in a knowing power, it also takes on a different mode of existing—a spiritual or intentional existence (*esse intentionale sive spirituale*), as Thomas here describes it.⁵ In other words, he is saying that the form of a physical object may have two modes of existence at one and the same time: (1) its purely physical existence in extramental reality; (2) a cognitive or intentional existence insofar as it is present in a knowing power.

2. 424a 17–21.

3. Leon. 45.1.169. Note in particular: "... unumquodque enim recipitur in altero secundum modum recipientis" (lines 35–36).

4. Leon. 45.1.169.

5. Ibid. Note in particular: "Et per hunc modum sensus recipit formam sine materia, quia alterius modi esse habet forma in sensu et in re sensibili; nam in re sensibili habet esse naturale, in sensu autem habet esse intentionale sive spirituale" (lines 52–56).

This text dates from a relatively late period in Thomas's career (1267–1268), but we can turn back to earlier writings for confirmation. We find him appealing to the same principle in his discussion of cognition at the very beginning of his career. Thus in his Commentary on Bk I of the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard (d. 38, q. 1, a. 2c) he observes that in every act of knowing two modes must be taken into account—the mode enjoyed by the thing which is known, and the mode of the knower. He immediately comments on the fact that the mode of cognition is not that of the thing known but that of the knower, and refers to Boethius's *Consolation of Philosophy* for support. Though Thomas does not explicitly quote this passage, in Bk V of the *Consolation* Boethius writes: "For everything which is known is grasped not according to its own power but rather according to the capacity of those which know it." Boethius himself goes on to apply this in different ways to external sense perception, imagination, reason, and finally to what he regards as the highest kind of knowing activity—understanding (*intelligentia*).⁶

In this same context Thomas comments that this claim—that the mode of the known and the mode of the knower differ—is evident from the fact that one and the same thing can be known by the senses together with that thing's material conditions, and by the intellect without such material conditions. This is so, reasons Thomas, because the sense is a power present in matter, whereas the intellect is immaterial; and knowledge does not take place except insofar as an object known is present in a knower.⁷ To reinforce his case, Thomas also cites from proposition 10 of the *Liber de causis*: each and every thing is present in something else not through its own mode, but through the mode of that other thing.⁸

As we move forward in Thomas's writings to the later 1250s, we find him defending the same position in the *De veritate*, q. 10, a. 4.⁹ There he explains that all knowledge takes place according to some form. Such a form serves in the knower as a principle of knowing. But a form of this kind may be considered either (1) in terms of the existence (*esse*) it enjoys in the knower, or (2) according to the relationship it bears to the object of which it is a likeness. When considered in the first way, such a

6. See the Mandonnet ed., Vol. 1, p. 901. For Boethius, see *The Theological Tractates. The Consolation of Philosophy*, H. F. Stewart, E. K. Rand, and S. J. Tester (Cambridge; Mass., 1978), Bk V, prop. 4, p. 410:75–77: "Omne enim quod cognoscitur non secundum sui vim sed secundum cognoscentium potius comprehenditur facultatem."

7. Mandonnet ed., Vol. 1, p. 901.

8. Ibid. See *Le Liber de causis*, ed. A. Pattin, prop. 9(10), p. 72. Cf. *Sancti Thomae Aquino super Librum de causis expositio*, ed. H. D. Saffrey (Fribourg, 1954), p. 71.

9. Torrell indicates that the elaboration of the questions in this work extends over three academic years (1256–1259). See his *Saint Thomas Aquinas. Vol. I*, pp. 62, 334. Weisheipl (*Friar Thomas D'Aquino: His Life, Thought and Works*, 2d pr. [Washington, D.C., 1983], pp. 362–63) dates questions 8–20 of this work in 1257–1258.

form makes a knower actually know—that is, it serves as a principle of knowing. But under the second aspect the form in question determines the act of knowing to some determined knowable object. Therefore, continues Thomas, the mode of knowing a thing is in accord with the conditions of the knower in which the form is received. It does not follow from this, however, that the thing's external mode of existing must be the same as the mode its form has in the knower. Therefore, there is nothing to prevent material things from being known through forms that exist in immaterial fashion in the mind.¹⁰

This text, when taken with that already considered from the Commentary on the *Sentences*, indicates that a major reason for Thomas's acceptance of the principle in question, at least in the area of theory of knowledge, is the following: a thing that is known must in some way be made present to the power that knows it. Because it cannot exist in the knowing power according to its extramental or physical existence (*esse*), Thomas appeals to a form (which he sometimes calls a "species") by means of which the thing is present in the knowing power.¹¹ Once this is granted, Thomas regards it as evident that the thing known is present in the knower in accord with the mode of the knower, not in accord with its own mode of existing. So far we have been concentrating on Thomas's application of this principle to the area of sense perception. As we shall now see, he also appeals to it in accounting for human intellection.

2. HUMAN INTELLECTION

In the *Summa theologiae* I, q. 14, a. 1, Thomas attempts to show that there is knowledge (*scientia*) in God. In developing his argument Thomas comments that knowers are distinguished from nonknowers by reason of the fact that a nonknower has only its own form. A knower is of such a nature as to be able to have the form of something else as well, for the

10. Leon. 22.2.306.

11. Limitations of space will not permit me to go into detailed discussion of Thomas's rather difficult notion of sensible and intelligible species. For some reference to this see Ch. III above, n. 93. In Thomas himself see *Quodlibet* 8, q. 2, a. 1; ST I, q. 85, a. 2; II-II, q. 173, a. 2; *De spiritualibus creaturis* a. 9, ad 6. To repeat a point made above in Ch. III, n. 93, as Thomas makes clear, especially in the last-mentioned passage, neither a sensible species nor an intelligible species is that which is perceived or known; rather each is that by which the object in question is perceived or known. On the absence of any such doctrine of intelligible species in Averroes and Siger of Brabant, see B. Bazán, "Intellectum Speculativum: Averroes, Thomas Aquinas, and Siger of Brabant on the Intelligible Object," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 19 (1981), pp. 432ff., 439–46. Also now see the more general study by L. Spruit, *Species Intelligibilis: From Perception to Knowledge. Vol. I. Classical Roots and Medieval Discussions* (Leiden–New York–Cologne, 1994), although his discussion of particular authors such as Aquinas or Godfrey of Fontaines, to mention but two, needs to be supplemented by more specialized studies.

species of a thing which is known is made to be present in the knower. Therefore, the nature of a nonknower is more restricted and limited than that of a knower. But the limitation imposed on form derives from matter. Therefore, the more immaterial a form, the closer it approaches to a kind of infinity. Hence a thing can know insofar as it is in some way immaterial; and its mode of knowledge is in accord with its mode of immateriality. Thus plants do not know at all. The senses know, for they can receive the form (*species*) of a thing without its matter, though this is still subject to the individuating conditions of matter. The intellect enjoys a higher level of knowing, for it is freed from matter and is unmixed (i.e., not composed of the elements), as Aristotle says in Bk III of the *De anima*.¹²

As Thomas had explained in q. 12, a. 4, of this same work, by reason of the soul human beings enjoy two levels of cognitive powers. A sense power is the act of some corporeal organ, and it is connatural for such a power to know things insofar as they are subject to material conditions—that is to say, insofar as they are individuated. Our other cognitive power is the intellect. Because it is not the act of any corporeal organ, it is connatural for us to know by means of it natures which do not exist except in individual matter; but we know them not as individual but as abstracted from individuating conditions—that is to say, in a universal fashion.¹³

Also in his *Summa theologiae* I, in q. 84, a. 1 Thomas surmises that it was because Plato failed to recognize the distinction between the mode of the knower and the mode of that which is known that he developed his theory of forms (*species*) or ideas. Plato recognizes that all knowledge takes place by reason of some similitude or likeness. But he thought that the form of the thing known must be in the knower in the same way as it is in that which is known. Because the form of the thing understood is present in the intellect in universal, immaterial, and immobile fashion, Plato concluded that the things the intellect knows must subsist in this same way. Thomas of course rejects this, and develops his own explanation.¹⁴

Even at the level of sensible objects, we see that a form is realized in different fashion in one sensible object than in another. For instance, whiteness is present in one object more intensively, and in another object less intensively. Or it is present in one thing together with the quality of sweetness, but in another without sweetness. So too, a sensible form is present in a sensible object in one way, and in a sensing power in another. The sense power grasps the forms of sensible things without their

12. Leon. 4.166. For Aristotle, see *De anima* III, c. 4 (429 a18–27).

13. Leon. 4.121.

14. Leon. 5.314.

matter—for instance, the color of gold without the gold itself. In like fashion, the intellect receives the species, that is, the forms of bodies, which are material and mobile, but it receives them in immaterial and immobile fashion. This is to say that the intellect receives the form of a sensible object according to the intellect's own mode of existing—for what is received is present in the receiver according to the receiver's mode of existing. It is for this reason, therefore, that through its intellect the soul knows bodies by a knowledge that is immaterial, universal, and necessary.¹⁵

3. GOD'S KNOWLEDGE OF CREATURES

Having now examined Thomas's applications of our principle to sensation and intellection, we may turn to his discussion of divine knowledge. Here I shall concentrate on his general explanation of God's knowledge, and shall reserve for the final section his appeal to this same general principle in accounting for God's knowledge of future contingents.

Inasmuch as Aquinas regards intellection as a higher and more perfect way of knowing than sensation, we are not surprised to find him applying intellection to divine knowing in *Summa theologiae* I, q. 14. He does so within the general context of singling out that which is required for knowledge to be knowledge, and of removing from it or denying of it anything that implies imperfection or limitation. Only then will he be in a position to assign knowledge in analogical fashion to God, and this by reasoning from effect to cause. As he puts it in q. 13, a. 5: "And thus, whatever is said of God and creatures is said according to a certain ordering [relationship] of the creature to God as to its principle and cause, in which such perfections preexist in preeminent fashion."¹⁶

In taking up divine knowing (*scientia*) in q. 14, a. 1, Thomas distinguishes between a knower and a nonknower for this reason: a nonknower can possess only its own form, whereas a knower can also possess the forms of other things. This, of course, we have already seen.¹⁷ And if, as Thomas has always maintained, knowledge involves possessing the form of a thing without its matter or in immaterial fashion, the more immaterial a knower, the more perfect its ability to know. Because God is su-

15. *Ibid.* Note especially: ". . . nam receptum est in recipiente per modum recipientis."

16. Leon. 4.147: "Et sic, quidquid dicitur de Deo et creaturis, dicitur secundum quod est aliquis ordo creaturae ad Deum, ut ad principium et causam, in qua praeeexistunt excellenter omnes rerum perfectiones." In this article Thomas has rejected univocal and purely equivocal predication of names of God and creatures, and has opted for analogical predication.

17. For the reference see n. 12 above.

premely immaterial, as Thomas has already shown in q. 3 by using the way of negation, God knows to the maximum degree.¹⁸

However, if we continue to stress the point that what is known is known according to the mode of the knower, and if a knower must *receive* the form of the object it knows, will this not imply some kind of passivity on the part of the divine knower? Thomas faces a difficulty of this type in ST I, q. 14, a. 2, obj. 2. He counters that when we are dealing with the kind of intellect that is in potency with respect to its intelligible objects, this conclusion will indeed follow. But the divine intellect is not in potency in any such fashion; therefore it is not rendered like its intelligible object and perfected by it. Rather the divine intellect is really identical with its intelligible object.¹⁹

In developing this point in subsequent articles, Thomas explains that God, in knowing the divine essence, knows all the ways in which that essence can be participated in by creatures. As a perfect knower, God must know his power and everything to which that power can or does extend.²⁰ But every effect preexists in God as in its first cause and must, therefore, be present in the divine understanding. This means that all possible and all actually realized creatures are present in God's intellect according to that intellect's mode of being. Thomas now makes this point: "that which is in something other is in it according to the mode of that in which it is present."²¹ In so stating the principle, Thomas has now freed it from any necessary implication of receptivity and passivity, and is thereby enabled to apply it to God. We should also note, if only in passing, that according to Thomas, God's knowledge of creatures which are realized in actuality must be conjoined with a corresponding decision on the part of the divine will.²²

My immediate purpose here, however, is simply to stress the point that, for Thomas, even in the case of divine knowing, what is known is known according to the mode of the knower. As Thomas sees things, the divine mode of being is eternal; hence, so too is the divine way of know-

18. See q. 3, aa. 1–2 (Leon. 4.35–36; 37–38): God is not a body; God is not composed of matter and form. For the application to divine knowing, see q. 14, a. 1, and the replies to objections 1 and 2 (Leon. 4.166–67).

19. Leon. 4.169. Here Thomas is meeting an objection raised against God's knowledge of himself.

20. See q. 14, a. 6 (Leon. 4.176); a. 5 (Leon. 4.172). Cf. a. 9 on God's knowledge of possible but nonexistent entities. For references to other texts see my *Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas*, pp. 164–73. Also cf. q. 15, a. 2 (on the multiplicity of divine ideas).

21. ST I, q. 14, a. 5 (Leon. 4.172): ". . . nam omne quod est in altero, est in eo secundum modum eius in quo est." Note that in this article Thomas is defending God's knowledge of things other than himself.

22. See ST I, q. 14, a. 8 (Leon. 4.179–80). Cf. *In I Sent.*, d. 38, q. 1, a. 1 (Mandonnet ed., Vol. 1, p. 899); *De veritate*, q. 2, a. 14 (Leon. 22.1.92).

ing. Whatever is known by God, whether it is past or present or future from our perspective, is known by him in his eternal present.²³ With this observation in mind, we may now turn to our final point.

4. GOD'S KNOWLEDGE OF FUTURE CONTINGENTS

Thomas's reflections on this topic are fairly complicated, and appear in writings ranging throughout his career. Here I can offer only the briefest presentation of his position, and this in order to highlight the role our principle continues to play therein.²⁴ Because one of his fullest treatments is to be found in *De veritate*, q. 2, a. 3, I shall concentrate on that text and refer to other discussions in the notes.

There Thomas poses this question: Does God know individual future contingents? Thomas immediately rejects two unsatisfactory responses to this question. According to the first, God does not know future contingents. Thomas dismisses this, because it would exclude human affairs from God's providence. According to the second response, God knows future contingents, but only because they happen out of necessity—that is to say, because they are not really contingent. For Thomas this is no more acceptable, since it entails a denial of human freedom.²⁵

In developing his own reply, Thomas explains that by “the contingent” he means that which can be impeded before it is actually brought into being. Once a contingent has been realized in actuality, it cannot be prevented from having actually existed. Therefore even a contingent event can be correctly grasped by one or other human knowing power after it has happened. For instance, if Socrates is now actually sitting, even though this is a contingent event, the event can be grasped by my sense perception.²⁶ On the other hand, Thomas also acknowledges that insofar as something contingent is truly future, certain knowledge cannot be had of it. Not even God can know future contingents, if this be understood in the sense that God would know them as future to himself. For something to be understood as future, there must be some transition from past to future between one's knowing it and the actual event itself. But such will not apply to God's knowledge of anything. Divine knowledge is always ordered to that which God knows as that which is present to that which is present.²⁷

23. For references see below.

24. For additional references to primary and secondary sources, see my *Metaphysical Themes*, c. 10.

25. Leon. 22.1.82–83.

26. Leon. 22.1.83. Cf. *In I Sent.*, d. 38, q. 1, a. 5 (Mandonnet ed., Vol. 1, p. 910).

27. Leon. 22.1.83. Cf. *In I Sent.*, p. 911.

Taking his inspiration from Boethius, Thomas stresses the point that God's knowledge ("vision") is measured only by eternity. But eternity is simultaneous and whole, and therefore involves no temporal transition. Therefore whatever takes place in time is viewed by God not as future to God himself but as present. Nonetheless, Thomas also holds that what God sees as present to himself may still be future with respect to other events that come before it in the course of time.²⁸

Here again we detect Thomas's distinction between the mode of the knower (divine and eternal) and the mode of that which is known (created and temporal). With all this in mind, Thomas holds that because God's knowledge is not in time but outside time, any such event is not future for God but present to him. Because we are measured by time, such events may be future for us. As will be recalled, Thomas had noted that a human cognitive power—for instance, our sense of sight—is not deceived when it sees a contingent object as present to itself, once that object has been realized in actuality. Even so, our knowledge of that contingent event does not destroy its contingency; so too, the divine knowledge of any contingent event as present to God does not rob that event of its contingency.²⁹

In developing another point already made by Boethius, Thomas writes that it would be better for us to say that God knows that a contingent event *is* than to say that God knows that it *will be*. Or to make this same point as Boethius himself had done, God's knowledge of events that are future for us is more accurately called providence (*providentia*) than foreknowledge (*praevidentia*).³⁰

Thomas's discussion of this involves much more than I have been able to bring out here. His replies to certain objections raised in this same question in the *De veritate* lead him to develop a number of precisions. For my present purpose it will be enough to stress the point that underlying his answer to this question is his continuing conviction that whatever is known is known according to the mode of the knower. He brings this out quite explicitly in replying to the seventh objection. According to that objection, in a true conditional proposition, if the antecedent is absolutely necessary, the consequent is also absolutely necessary. But this conditional proposition is true: if something was known by God, it will be. Because the antecedent ("this was known by God") is absolutely necessary, the consequent ("it will be") must also be absolutely necessary.³¹

28. Leon. 22.1.84. Cf. *In I Sent.*, pp. 910–11. For Boethius see *Consolation of Philosophy*, Bk V, prop. 6, p. 422.

29. Leon. 22.1.84.

30. *Ibid.* For Boethius, see ed. cit., p. 426.

31. Leon. 22.1.81–82. Cf. *In I Sent.*, pp. 907–8 (obj. 4).

To this Thomas counters that the consequent is absolutely necessary only in the sense that it follows from the antecedent. He distinguishes between that which applies to something insofar as it exists in itself, and that which applies to it insofar as it is known. That which belongs to the thing in itself applies to it according to its proper mode of existing. But that which belongs to it insofar as it is known applies to it according to the mode of the power that knows it, not according to its own mode.³²

In order to drive home this point, Thomas uses an illustration. Suppose I say, "If I understand something, it is immaterial." From this we need not conclude that the thing is immaterial in itself. It is immaterial only insofar as it is understood. So too if I say, "If God knows something, it will be," the consequent need not be taken as applying to the thing in terms of its own mode of existing, but only according to the mode of its divine knower. As we have seen, it would be more accurate for us to say, "If God knows something, it is." And this does not imply that the thing is absolutely necessary in itself.³³

In concluding this chapter I would recall that four areas have been examined in which Thomas appeals to the principle that whatever is received (or known, or present), is received (or known, or present) according to the mode of that which receives it (or knows it, or to which it is present). I have suggested that Thomas may have drawn his original inspiration for this principle from its applications at the level of human cognition—sense perception and intellection. As for Thomas's historical sources, reference has already been made to his use of Aristotle's *De anima*, Boethius's *Consolation of Philosophy*, and the *Liber de causis*. Thomas also finds this principle at least implied in Pseudo-Dionysius's treatise *On the Divine Names*.³⁴

32. Leon. 22.1.86.

33. Ibid. For discussion of Thomas's reply to other objections in this text, and for texts from other works, see my *Metaphysical Themes*, pp. 249–55. On the additional complication following from Thomas's view of the causal character of God's knowledge, see *ibid.*, pp. 255–63. Also see B. J. Shanley, *The Thomist Tradition* (Dordrecht-Boston-London, 2002), pp. 199–205 and the references given there.

34. See *In librum beati Dionysii De divinis nominibus expositio*, ed. C. Pera (Turin-Rome, 1950), c. 2, lect. 4, p. 56, n. 176; c. 5, lect. 1, p. 234, n. 629 (a more ontological application). For a very full treatment of this principle one may now consult J. Tomarchio, "The Modus Principle in the Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas" (Ph.D. dissertation, The Catholic University of America, 1995), as well his "Four Indices for the Thomistic Principle *Quod recipitur in aliquo est in eo per modum recipientis*," *Mediaeval Studies* 60 (1998), pp. 315–67.

Chapter V

THOMAS AQUINAS AND THE AXIOM THAT UNRECEIVED ACT IS UNLIMITED

Among twentieth-century students of Thomas Aquinas, different aspects of his thought have been singled out as central to, indeed as holding the key to, his metaphysics. Thus his metaphysics of essence and existence, his theory of act and potency, his views concerning the analogy of being, his stress on the primacy of existence (*esse*), his metaphysics of participation—each has been emphasized in due course. Recently Jan Aertsen has greatly stressed the importance of the transcendentals in his thought in a series of articles and in an important book. Each of these aspects does play a significant role in his metaphysical thought, although I would hesitate to assign exclusive primacy to any one of them over the others.¹

1. For works which have stressed each of these points in turn see, for instance, N. Del Prado, *De veritate fundamentali philosophiae christianae* (Fribourg, 1911); G. M. Manser, *Das Wesen des Thomismus*, 3d ed. (Fribourg, 1949); M. T. Penido, *Le rôle de l'analogie en théologie dogmatique* (Paris, 1931), which has been completely superseded by B. Montagnes, *La doctrine de l'analogie de l'être d'après saint Thomas d'Aquin* (Louvain, 1963); and the many studies by Gilson emphasizing the primacy of existence in Thomas's metaphysics, including, for instance, *Being and Some Philosophers*, 2d ed. (Toronto, 1952), *The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas*, trans. L. K. Shook (New York, 1956), *Elements of Christian Philosophy* (Garden City, 1960), *Introduction à la philosophie chrétienne* (Paris, 1956), *Le thomisme*, 6th ed. (Paris, 1965), recently translated into English by L. Shook and A. Maurer, as *Thomism: The Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas* (Toronto, 2002). This last-mentioned line of interpretation has been developed by many of Gilson's followers, especially by J. Owens. On participation see C. Fabro, *La nozione metafisica di partecipazione secondo S. Tommaso d'Aquino* (Milan, 1939; 2d rev. ed., Turin, 1950); L.-B. Geiger, *La participation dans la philosophie de s. Thomas d'Aquin* (1942; reissued, Paris, 1953); A. Little, *The Platonic Heritage of Thomism* (Dublin, 1949). As Little indicates, his book "was projected before the war and written immediately after it" (p. xiv). See the sympathetic but critical review article by W. N. Clarke, "The Platonic Heritage of Thomism," *Review of Metaphysics* 8 (1954), pp. 105–24. Also see R. J. Henle, *Saint Thomas and Platonism: A Study of the "Plato" and "Platonici" Texts in the Writings of Saint Thomas* (The Hague, 1956). For Clarke see his "The Limitation of Act by Potency in St. Thomas: Aristotelianism or Neoplatonism?" in *New Scholasticism* 26 (1952), pp. 167–94; "The Meaning of Participation in St. Thomas," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association* 26 (1952), pp. 147–57, both reprinted in his *Explorations in*

In this chapter I propose to concentrate on what appears to be a special but decidedly non-Aristotelian application of his act and potency theory within Aquinas's metaphysics. According to the first part of this axiom, as I shall refer to it, "Unreceived act is unlimited." However, closely related to this is a second part, that "Act is not limited except by a distinct potency that receives it."

Reactions to the importance of this principle in Aquinas's metaphysics have varied considerably over the past several decades. For some, not only is this principle an essential part of Thomas's metaphysical thought; it is an effective, perhaps his most effective, way of establishing real rather than merely mind-dependent distinction and composition of essence and act of being (*esse*) in entities other than God.²

For other interpreters, although the general axiom or principle is present in Thomas's thought, he does not explicitly turn to it to establish the composition of essence and act of being in finite entities. The elements for such an application are clearly present in his thinking, it is contended, and this axiom can rightfully be applied to support or establish this conclusion in any systematic exposition of his metaphysics. Jean-Dominique Robert presented a good exposition of this view in a 1949 article.³

Still others, however, while conceding the presence and importance of the essence-existence composition in Aquinas's thought, not only deny that he ever used this axiom to establish that distinction and composition. They also deny that he defended the axiom as such, at least as regards its second part. According to this reading, recently proposed by a young Dutch scholar, Rudi A. te Velde in his important book on participation in Aquinas, Thomas did not espouse the view that act is unlimited unless it is received and limited by a distinct limiting principle. In particular, te Velde denies that according to Aquinas the act of being (*esse*) is limited by a receiving principle.⁴

Metaphysics: Being—God—Person (Notre Dame, 1994), pp. 65–88, 89–101, which I shall cite here. See R. te Velde, *Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas* (Leiden, 1996), and now my *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas*, ch. IV. For Aertsen see his *Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals* (Leiden, 1996), and his bibliography for references to his earlier treatments of this.

2. J.-H. Nicolas, "Chronique de philosophie," *Revue thomiste* 48 (1948), p. 561; Fabro, *Participation et causalité selon S. Thomas d'Aquin* (Louvain, 1961), pp. 64–69; del Prado, *De veritate fundamentalis*, pp. 38–40; L. De Raeymaecker, *Metaphysica generalis* (Louvain, 1931), vol. 1, pp. 99–102, 107–9; J. de Finance, *Être et agir dans la philosophie de Saint Thomas*, 2d ed. (Rome, 1960), pp. 54–55, 105–7.

3. See "Le principe: 'Actus non limitatur nisi per potentiam subjectivam realiter distinctam,'" *Revue philosophique de Louvain* 47 (1949), pp. 44–70.

4. See his *Participation*, pp. 150–54 especially, although this is a recurring concern in his

Finally, for still others, going back to the earlier decades of the past century, Aquinas did not employ this principle at all, or at least never applied it to the essence-existence relationship in finite beings. Indeed, he never defended real distinction or real composition of essence and existence in such entities. Names such as M. Chossat, P. Descoqs, and more recently, F. Cunningham come to mind.⁵

In light of this background, I propose to explore the following issues in this chapter:

I. Is there textual evidence to show that Aquinas accepted the principle that unreceived act is unlimited and that where one finds limited instances of act, especially of the act of being, one must account for this by appealing to a distinct principle that receives and limits it?

II. Whether or not Thomas did so employ this principle, is it in accord with his thought to apply it as an argument for composition and distinction of essence and *esse* in finite entities?

III. If Thomas does accept and employ this principle, what justification does he offer for it?

I

In this section key texts from the different major periods in Aquinas's career will be considered in order to give the reader some sense of development, to the extent that there is any, in his treatment of this issue.

book. On p. 151, n. 37, he also cites in support A. Keller, *Sein oder Existenz? Die Auslegung des Seins beim Thomas von Aquin in der heutigen Scholastik* (Munich, 1968), p. 207. Not surprisingly, Keller has difficulty admitting any real distinction and composition of a receiving essence and a received *esse* in finite beings, according to Thomas. See, for instance, pp. 256–57. On p. 257, n. 4, he has also been misled by a textual mistake in the Marietti edition of Thomas's Commentary on the *De Hebdomadibus of Boethius* (“compositum, quod est participatum ipsum esse”) which has now been corrected in the recent Leonine edition (“compositum quod est participando ipsum esse”). For Thomas see his *In De Hebdomadibus* (Leon. 50.273:214–215). For the Marietti text see *Opuscula theologica*, Vol. 2 (Turin-Rome, 1954), p. 398, n. 32.

5. For some who have denied that Aquinas defends real distinction between essence and *esse* see M. Chossat, “Dieu,” *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique*, Vol. 4, pt. 1, col. 1180; “L'Averroïsme de saint Thomas. Note sur la distinction d'essence et d'existence à la fin du XIII^e siècle,” *Archives de Philosophie* 9 (1932), pp. 129[465]–177[513]; P. Descoqs, “Thomisme et Suarezisme,” *Archives de Philosophie* 4 (1926), pp. 131–61; “Thomisme et scolastique à propos de M. Rougier,” 2d rev. ed., *Archives de philosophie* 5.1 (1935), pp. 1–227, esp. pp. 156–59 (where he specifically refuses to apply the principle to the order of *esse*); F. Cunningham, “Distinction According to St. Thomas,” *New Scholasticism* 36 (1962), pp. 279–312; “Textos de Santo Tomás sobre el *esse* y *esencia*,” *Pensamiento* 20 (1964), pp. 283–306; “The ‘Real Distinction’ in John Quidort,” *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 8 (1970), pp. 9–28; and finally his large volume, *Essence and Existence in Thomism: A Mental vs. the “Real Distinction”* (Lanham, Md., 1988).

1. *De ente et essentia* (1252–1256)

Although one does not find the axiom we are investigating cited explicitly in this very early treatise, there are hints in the text that suggest that it is already present in Thomas's thinking. As many readers will recall, in c. 4 Thomas has argued for a distinction and indeed a potency-act composition of essence and act of being (*esse*) in finite separate substances. In c. 5 he sums up his thinking about how essence is realized in different levels of substance. Since he had also argued for the existence of God in the preceding chapter, he now recalls that God's essence is identical with his act of being (*esse*). If we can say that God is *esse tantum*, Thomas warns that we should not make the mistake of identifying God with existence taken universally, in other words, with *esse commune*, which, he adds, is that whereby particular substances exist formally.⁶

Thomas then returns to created intellectual substances. In them, he recalls, as he had established in the preceding c. 4, the act of being (*esse*) and essence differ even though, as he had also insisted, their essences are free from matter. Therefore, he now continues, their *esse* is not unqualified (*absolutum*), but it is received and therefore it is limited and restricted (*limitatum et finitum*) to the capacity of a nature that receives it. However, the nature or quiddity of any such substance is itself unrestricted in its own order, since it is not received in matter. For this reason the *Liber de causis* states that intelligences are infinite from below and finite from above. Thomas interprets this as meaning that they are finite with respect to their *esse* (act of being) which they receive from above; but they are not finite from below because their forms are not limited to the capacity of some matter that would receive them. Therefore, he holds, they cannot be multiplied within their species, with the exception of human souls which are multiplied by reason of their union with their respective bodies.⁷

According to this text, therefore, the act of being of a separate substance is not unrestricted (*absolutum*) but received. Moreover, because it is received it is limited to the capacity of the nature that receives it. Thomas's reason for saying that the act of being of such a substance is not unrestricted is that he has already argued in c. 4 for distinction of essence and act of being in any such entity and therefore that its act of being is efficiently caused. Furthermore, he has now stated that because

6. *De ente et essentia*, c. 5 (Leon. 43.378:15–31).

7. Leon. 43.378:44–56. Note especially: "Secundo modo invenitur essentia in substantiis creatis intellectualibus, in quibus est aliud esse quam essentia earum, quamvis essentia sit sine materia. Unde esse earum non est absolutum sed receptum, et ideo limitatum et finitum ad capacitatem naturae recipientis; sed natura vel quidditas earum est absoluta, non recepta in aliqua materia."

the act of being of such an entity is received, it is limited. Hence one might reason: if a thing's act of being is not limited, it is not received. However, this is not yet for Thomas to say in so many words that if a thing's act of being is not received, it is not limited. To find this more explicitly stated, it will be necessary to turn to other texts.

Before doing this, however, I should note that a second question may be raised about the second part of our axiom: Does Thomas state in this text that when the act of being is received, it is limited by the nature or essence that receives it? Or does he simply mean that it is created to a finite degree in accord with its receiving nature, but without being limited by that nature, as some interpreters hold? He has here written that the *esse* of any such substance, because it is received, is limited and restricted to the capacity of the nature that receives it.

To this I would respond that this text is certainly not opposed to the interpretation according to which the *esse* of such a substance is limited by the nature that receives it. However, this text does not explicitly affirm that point. (Thomas has established in c. 4 that whatever receives something from another is in potency with respect to it, and that what is received is present in it as its act. From this he has concluded that the very quiddity or form that is an intelligence is in potency with respect to the *esse* it receives from God.)⁸

2. *In librum primum Sententiarum (hereafter In I Sent.) (1252)*

In this work, which is roughly contemporary with the *De ente*, different texts may be cited which are of interest for our topic. Here I will concentrate on two.

(a) *d. 8, q. 2, a. 1.* In this context Thomas is discussing the appropriateness of Boethius's definition of eternity as the simultaneous, total, and perfect possession of boundless life. Thomas begins his response by noting that the term "eternity" is so named because it implies being, as it were, without *termini* (limits). However, a given instance of *esse* may

8. Leon. 43:377:147-152. I should note that near the end of c. 5 Thomas discusses matter-form composites, and observes that their acts of being are received and limited because they have their *esse* from another. Moreover, their nature or quiddity is received in designated matter. Therefore they are finite from above and from below (Leon. 43:379:131-136). The first part of this text might be cited by those who hold that in finite substances *esse* is limited only because they are caused and only by their efficient cause; but the second part might be used to support the claim that their forms are limited because they are received in designated matter. The two explanations are not mutually exclusive, I would point out. Thomas will always appeal to an extrinsic cause to account for the existence of a finite separate substance, and for a finite material one. But this does not mean that he eliminates any limiting function for the essence or nature of such beings, which essence or nature, he has stated, receives its act of being.

be said to have limits (to be *terminatum*) in three ways: (1) according to its total duration, as that which has a beginning and an end; or (2) by reason of parts of its duration, as that is said to be limited whose every part is terminated with respect to the past, present, and future, as in the case of motion; or (3) by reason of the subject (*suppositum*) in which *esse* is received. He immediately comments with respect to this third usage that *esse* is received in something according to the mode of the latter and is, therefore, limited, like any other form which, when simply considered in itself is common, but which, insofar as it is received in something, is limited to that.⁹

When taken in this third sense, he continues, only the divine *esse* is unlimited. This is because it is not received in something that is diverse from it. Here, therefore, we do find Thomas clearly asserting that unreceived *esse* is unlimited, or to put it another way, that if the act of being is not received in something else, it is not limited. Further, we might conclude from this that if the act of being is limited, that is to say, if it is not unlimited, it must be received. Yet this text does not explicitly state that it must be limited *by* that which receives it. Farther on in this same context, however, Thomas notes that in his definition of eternity as the “simultaneous, total, and perfect possession of boundless life” Boethius has included the word “perfect.” He has done this in order to exclude from his definition the kind of termination that arises from the side of a receiver (*recipientis*). Thomas refers to things in which *esse* is not present without restriction, but is limited by that which receives it (*per recipiens*). These do not enjoy an *esse* that is *perfectum*. Only that which is identical with its act of being does so.¹⁰ Here Thomas does address our second question. If *esse* is limited because it is received, it is also limited *by* (*per*) that which receives it. And so here Thomas employs both parts of what we may refer to as the limitation axiom.

(b) *d. 43, q. 1, a. 1*. In this context Thomas is seeking to prove that God’s power is infinite. He begins by distinguishing between the infinite taken as privation, which he eliminates from God, and the infinite taken negatively, that is, as the negation of limitation. This kind of infinity he assigns to God because he is limited in no way. Thomas again distin-

9. Mandonnet ed., Vol. 1, p. 202. Note in particular: “Esse autem aliquod potest dici terminatum tripliciter . . . vel ratione suppositi in quo esse recipitur; esse enim recipitur in aliquo secundum modum ipsius, et ideo terminatur, sicut et quaelibet alia forma, quae de se communis est, et secundum quod recipitur in aliquo, terminatur ad illud . . .”

10. Ibid. “. . . et hoc modo solum divinum esse non est terminatum, quia non est receptum in aliquo, quod sit diversum ab eo.” Then note: “Ad excludendum tertiam terminationem, quae est ex parte recipientis, additur, ‘perfecta’: illud enim in quo non est esse absolutum, sed terminatum per recipiens, non habet esse perfectum, sed illud solum quod est suum esse: et per hoc dividitur esse aeternum ab esse rerum immobilium creaturarum, quae habent esse participatum, sicut spirituales creaturae.”

guishes different ways in which the term “limit” or *terminus* may be used. One might have in mind a *terminus* for quantity. Taken in this sense, that which lacks such a *terminus* or limit would be called infinite. This he rejects as inappropriate when one is dealing with incorporeal things. In another sense, the term “limit” may be applied to a thing’s essence. In this sense a thing is said to be limited by that (*per illud*) which contracts its essence. Thus, to take an example from the logical order, that which is indifferent to many, such as a genus, is limited by a given difference. Or again, to take an example from the ontological order, prime matter, being indifferent to all forms, is limited by a given form. In these cases limitation really means determination. However, Thomas also remarks that form—which, considered in itself, can perfect different parts of matter—is limited by (*per*) the matter in which it is received. He adds that it is by the negation of any such limit (*fnis*) that the divine essence is unlimited or infinite.¹¹

In support Thomas reasons that any form, when it is taken in terms of its proper nature and considered abstractly, that is, apart from any subject, enjoys infinity within its own order. Thus if whiteness is considered abstractly, apart from any subject, the nature of whiteness so considered is not limited to anything. Therefore, he continues, that which has an *esse* (act of being) that is unrestricted and not received in anything else, indeed which is identical with its act of being, is infinite without qualification. Therefore its essence is infinite, and its goodness, and whatever else can be said of it; for none of these is limited to something, as that which is received in something is limited to the capacity of that which receives it. From this Thomas concludes that the divine essence is unlimited, and because of this, so too is the divine power.¹²

For our purposes it is interesting to find Thomas arguing that if a form is simply considered in itself, it enjoys infinity within its own order. In oth-

11. Mandonnet ed., Vol. 1, pp. 1002–3. Note on p. 1003: “. . . et similiter forma, quae, quantum in se est, potest perficere diversas partes materiae, finitur per materiam in qua recipitur. Et a negatione talis finis essentia divina infinita dicitur.”

12. Ibid. “Omnis enim forma in propria ratione, si abstracte consideretur, infinitatem habet: sicut in albedine abstracte intellecta, ratio albedinis non est finita ad aliquid; sed tamen ratio coloris et ratio essendi determinatur in ea, et contrahitur ad determinatam speciem. Et ideo illud quod habet esse absolutum et nullo modo receptum in aliquo, immo ipsemet est suum esse, illud est infinitum simpliciter: et ideo essentia eius infinita est, et bonitas eius, et quidquid aliud de eo dicitur: quia nihil eorum limitatur ad aliquid, sicut quod recipitur in aliquo limitatur ad capacitatem eius. . . .” See d. 43, q. 1, a. 2 (ed. cit., p. 1005), where Thomas states that no created essence can be infinite for the reason that its *esse* is not unrestricted (*absolutum*) but is received in something else. Also see *In III Sent.*, d. 13, q. 1, a. 2, sol. 2 (*Scriptum super Sententiis*, Vol. 3, ed. M. F. Moos [Paris, 1933], p. 402) for an application of the axiom to a discussion of the grace of Christ. Note in particular: “Limitatur autem aliquid ex capacitate recipientis: unde illud quod non habet esse receptum in aliquo, sed subsistens, non habet esse limitatum, sed infinitum, sicut Deus.”

er words, unreceived form is unlimited. He also holds that if form perfects different instances or parts of matter, it is limited by the matter in which it is received. Finally, he has gone on to apply the same thinking to *esse* (the act of being). If it is unreceived, it is unlimited or infinite in the unqualified sense. In other words, unreceived *esse* is unlimited. Since Thomas has stated that form is limited not only to the matter which receives it but also by (*per*) the receiving matter, we may assume that he would say the same of *esse*. It is limited by the nature or essence that receives it.

3. *In De Hebdomadibus, lect. 2 (probably after 1257-1258)*

In his Commentary on this Boethian work, Thomas has reached the point in the text where he finds that Boethius distinguishes between *esse* and “that which is” no longer merely in the order of intentions, but in the order of reality. Thomas writes: “Just as *esse* and ‘that which is’ differ in the order of intentions, so in composite entities do they differ really.”¹³ He then offers two arguments to make this point.

The second runs this way. He distinguishes between that which is simple in the absolute or unqualified sense and lacks all composition, and that which is simple only in a qualified sense. Thus if there are certain forms that do not exist in matter, they will be simple insofar as they lack matter and quantity. If any such forms do exist, however, it does not immediately follow that they are perfectly simple. Suppose, he proposes as a kind of thought-experiment, that one admits with Plato the reality of subsisting separate forms or ideas, or else Aristotle’s separate entities. In either case any such form will determine *esse* with respect to its kind of being. No such form will be identical with *esse* (*commune*) in itself, but each will only “have,” that is to say, participate in, *esse*. However, each, insofar as it is distinguished from other separate forms, will be a specific form that participates in *esse*. None will be simple in the absolute or unqualified sense but, we may conclude, each will be composed of its form or essence and of the *esse* in which it participates.¹⁴

13. Leon. 50.272:204–273:206: “Est ergo primo considerandum quod sicut esse et quod est differunt secundum intentiones, ita in compositis differunt realiter.”

14. Leon. 50.273:230–251. Note especially: “Quia tamen quaelibet forma est determinativa ipsius esse, nulla earum est ipsum esse, sed est habens esse . . . unaquaeque enim illarum, in quantum distinguitur ab alia, quaedam specialis forma est participans ipsum esse, et sic nulla earum erit vere simplex.” Thomas moves from this to the conclusion that the only perfectly simple being is one that does not participate in *esse* but is subsisting *esse*. He reasons that there can only be one such being; for if *esse* insofar as it is *esse* admits of nothing extrinsic to itself, subsisting *esse* cannot be multiplied by any diversifying principle (*per aliquid diversificans*). See p. 273:249–258. In other words, *esse* is not self-dividing or self-diversifying. For fuller discussion of this text see my *The Metaphysical Thought*, pp. 100–102, 162–64.

If Thomas does not here explicitly refer to the infinity of unreceived *esse*, he does indicate that in any separate substance other than God, its form, i.e., its essence, determines, that is, limits or restricts its *esse*, and he concludes from this that in any such being its form or essence is not identical with the *esse* it determines.

4. *Summa contra Gentiles* (1259–1264/65)

(a) *SCG I, c. 43*. Here Thomas is offering a series of arguments to prove that God is infinite. Once again he distinguishes between the infinite in the sense of privation, based on quantity (including number), and the infinite taken negatively, meaning thereby the negation of all imperfection. Only the latter applies to God.¹⁵

One of his arguments runs this way. Every act that inheres in something else receives its limitation (*terminatio*) from that in which it is present. What is in another is in it in accord with the mode of that which receives it. Therefore, Thomas continues, an act that exists in nothing is limited by nothing (*Actus igitur in nullo existens nullo terminatur*). Moreover, he offers again what by now has become his favorite example to illustrate this. Suppose that whiteness could exist in itself. In that case the perfection of whiteness would not be limited so as to prevent whatever can be had of the perfection of whiteness from being fully realized in that subsisting whiteness. God, however, is an act that exists in no way in something else, since he is not a form received in matter, nor does his act of being (*esse*) inhere in any form or nature; for he is identical with his act of being. Therefore he is infinite.¹⁶

This text is a very interesting illustration of Thomas's usage of the principle or axiom that an act that exists in nothing is limited by nothing or, in other words, that unreceived act is unlimited. So now we have seen him applying this to form, to *esse*, and in this text also to act in general. He has introduced his appeal to this principle by noting that every act that inheres in something receives its limitation from that (*ex eo*) in which it is present. So far, therefore, we may conclude from this that

15. Editio Leonina manualis, 41: "Sed in Deo infinitum negative tantum intelligitur: quia nullus est perfectionis suae terminus sive finis, sed est summe perfectum. Et sic Deo infinitum attribui debet."

16. Ibid., p. 41. "Amplius. Omnis actus alteri inhaerens terminationem recipit ex eo in quo est: quia quod est in altero, est in eo per modum recipientis. Actus igitur in nullo existens nullo terminatur: puta, si albedo esset per se existens, perfectio albedinis in ea non terminaretur, quominus haberet quicquid de perfectione albedinis haberi potest. Deus autem est actus nullo modo in alio existens: quia nec est forma in materia, ut probatum est; nec esse suum inhaeret alicui formae vel naturae, cum ipse sit suum esse, ut supra ostensum est. Relinquitur igitur ipsum esse infinitum."

unreceived act is unlimited. But can we also conclude from this that he holds that when act is received, it is limited *by that* in which it is present? Presumably we can, for he then writes that an act that exists in nothing is limited *by* nothing. This implies that his opening remark—that every act that inheres in something receives its limitation *from that* in which it is present—is here equivalent to his saying that it is limited *by that* in which it is present. Hence his use of the ablative (*nullo terminatur*) in this passage is crucial.

Still, someone might object that in earlier texts analyzed above Thomas has said that *esse* is limited *per recipiens* (see n. 10), and that form is limited *per materiam* in which it is received (see n. 11). Rather than interpret this as meaning that *esse* is limited “by the recipient” or that form is limited “by matter,” as I have done above, one should rather understand these passages as merely saying that *esse* is received “through the recipient” and that form is limited “through the matter” that receives it. Apart from going against what seems to be the obvious meaning of these passages when read in context, such an interpretation is obviated by Thomas’s usage of the ablative case in the present text. It indicates that in all of these texts, including the last one cited in n. 12 above (which states that something is limited “from” the capacity of the receiver), Thomas means to say that if a form or act or if *esse* is limited, it is limited by that which receives it. Moreover, in the text cited from Thomas’s Commentary on the *De Hebdomadibus* (see n. 14), Thomas has expressed the same point actively by stating that even a separated form (or essence) determines (and thus limits) *esse* in separate substances.

Moreover, in the present text Thomas has supported his claim by observing that what is present in something is present in it in accord with the mode of that which receives it (*per modum recipientis*). This suggests that there is a close connection between the axiom under discussion and another one broadly employed in Thomas’s texts—that what is received is received according to the mode of the receiver.¹⁷

Finally, since the example of a hypothetical subsisting whiteness will recur again and again in Thomas’s employment of our principle, it may be helpful to turn back to SCG I, c. 28. There he introduces the same example as part of one of his arguments for divine perfection. Without repeating the whole argument, I would note that he reasons that if there is something to which the total power of being (*virtus essendi*) belongs,

17. See Ch. IV above along with the reference in n. 34 to the important study of this principle by J. Tomarchio. However, he rejects the view that, according to Aquinas, essence limits existence. See his “Aquinas’s Division of Being According to Modes of Existing,” *Review of Metaphysics* 54 (2001), p. 603, n. 55, an issue which he plans to discuss more fully elsewhere.

no excellence or perfection will be lacking to that entity. However, to that thing which is identical with its act of being, *esse* actually belongs according to the total power of being (*essendi potestas*). Moreover, almost as proof, he notes that if there were some separate (subsisting) whiteness, nothing of the power (*virtus*) of whiteness would be lacking to it. Something of the power of whiteness is lacking to any given white thing because there is some deficiency on the part of the subject that receives it; for such a subject receives it in accord with its own mode, and not, perhaps, according to the total power (*posse*) of whiteness. Because Thomas has already shown above in c. 22 of this same work that God is identical with his *esse*, he can conclude that God cannot lack any degree of perfection that might belong to any being.¹⁸ It is difficult to determine how much probative force Thomas assigns to this example of whiteness, but he certainly likes to use it. Joseph de Finance has referred to it as a *manuductio*, and this may well be the best way of describing its role in these contexts.¹⁹

In sum, before leaving SCG I, c. 43, we may recall that in it we have additional evidence indicating that Thomas accepts both the first part of our principle—that unreceived act, and especially, unreceived *esse*, is unlimited—as well as the second part—that if a form or act, especially *esse*, inheres in something, it receives its limitation from that in which it is present and is limited by it.

I should note, however, that in this same c. 43, where he is still arguing in support of divine infinity, Thomas offers another argument. *Esse* considered absolutely, or without any qualification, is infinite; for it can be participated in by an infinity of things and in an infinity of ways. If, therefore, the *esse* of a given thing is finite, it must be limited in that thing by (*per*) something which is in some way (*aliqua liter*) the cause of that *esse*. Since there can be no such limiting cause of the divine *esse*, it is unlimited or infinite.²⁰

Thomas's reference in this text to something which is "in some way"

18. Ed. cit., pp. 29–30. "Igitur si aliquid est cui competit tota virtus essendi, ei nulla nobilitatum deesse potest quae alicui rei conveniat. Sed rei quae est suum esse, competit esse secundum totam essendi potestatem: sicut, si esset aliqua albedo separata, nihil ei de virtute albedinis deesse posset; nam alicui albo aliquid de virtute albedinis deest ex defectu recipientis albedinem, quae eam secundum modum suum recipit, et fortasse non secundum totum posse albedinis. Deus igitur, qui est suum esse, ut supra probatum est, habet esse secundum totam virtutem ipsius esse. Non potest ergo carere aliqua nobilitate quae alicui rei conveniat."

19. *Être et agir*, p. 52.

20. Ed. cit., p. 41. "Amplius. Ipsum esse absolute consideratum infinitum est: nam ab infinitis et infinitis modis participari possibile est. Si igitur alicuius esse sit finitum, oportet quod limitetur esse illud per aliquid aliud quod sit aliqua causa illius esse. Sed esse divini non potest esse aliqua causa: quia ipse est necesse per seipsum. Ergo esse suum est infinitum, et ipse infinitus."

the cause of any finite *esse* and which limits it could be taken in two ways. He may simply mean that the receiving principle, in limiting *esse* within a given entity, exercises a kind of quasi-receiving causality, almost like material causality, with respect to that entity's *esse*. But someone might argue that in this text Thomas is assigning some of the limiting function in some qualified way to an extrinsic cause as well, that is to say, to the efficient cause responsible for producing the entity in question. He certainly holds that any such thing is efficiently caused, and that this applies both to its *esse* and to its receiving principle, its nature or essence. Hence both interpretations are compatible with his thought, although it is the first that I believe he is has in mind here.²¹

(b) *SCG II, c. 52*. In this chapter Thomas is attempting to show that while finite intellectual substances are not corporeal and not composed of matter and form, nor even received in matter as are material forms, their simplicity is not equal to God's simplicity. There is a composition in them resulting from the fact that their *esse* (act of being) is not identical with that which they are. *Esse* insofar as it is *esse* cannot be divided. However, it can be rendered diverse by (*per*) something that is other than *esse*. So it is that the *esse* (act of being) of a stone is different from the *esse* (act of being) of a human being.²² This passage is interesting in that it confirms the point that for Thomas, because *esse* is not self-diversifying, it can be diversified only by something that differs from itself, that is, by the essence that receives it.

In his third argument to show that in every substance other than God, a thing's substance or essence differs from its *esse*, Thomas begins this way. It is impossible for there to be two completely infinite instances of *esse*. For an *esse* that is completely infinite embraces the total perfection of being. If there were two cases of this, there would be no way whereby one could be distinguished from the other. However, Thomas continues, subsisting *esse* must be infinite because it is not limited by any receiver (*aliquo recipiente*). Therefore, apart from this one case, there can be no other subsisting *esse*.²³ Hence, he expects us to conclude, in all other things,

21. For reference to the receiving and limiting function exercised by essence as potency with respect to the act of being that actualizes it as a kind of "material" causality see de Finance, *Être et agir*, p. 55, n. 57.

22. Ed. cit., p. 145. Note: "Invenitur enim in eis aliqua compositio ex eo quod non est idem in eis esse et quod est." Then as part of his first argument, Thomas continues: "Esse autem, in quantum est esse, non potest esse diversum: potest autem diversificari per aliquid quod est praeter esse; sicut esse lapidis est aliud ab esse hominis."

23. Ibid. "Adhuc. Impossibile est quod sit duplex esse omnino infinitum: esse enim quod omnino est infinitum, omnem perfectionem essendi comprehendit; et sic, si duobus talis adesset infinitas, non inveniretur quo unum ab altero differret. Esse autem subsistens oportet esse infinitum: quia non terminatur *aliquo recipiente*. Impossibile est igitur esse aliquod esse subsistens praeter primum" (italics mine).

including intellectual substances, there is a composition of substance or essence and act of being. Most interesting for our purposes is his remark that subsisting *esse* must be infinite because it is not limited by any receiver. Again he uses the ablative case (*aliquo recipiente*), thereby making it clear that in similar contexts where he uses the preposition *per*, it too should be translated as “by” and not merely as “through.” The implication from this passage is clear. Again Aquinas defends the second part of our axiom. In cases where *esse* is realized only in finite fashion, this is because it is limited by that which receives it, that is to say, by essence. And again he defends the first part as well. Unreceived *esse* is unlimited.

Before leaving SCG I, I should note that in the immediately following c. 53 Thomas maintains that in created intellectual substances there is an act-potency composition, since in each of them the substance of the thing is related to its act of being as potency to act.²⁴ In chapter 54 he points out certain similarities and certain differences between the composition of matter and form, and that of substance (essence) and *esse*. In material entities there is a twofold act-potency composition, that of form and matter, and that of the composite essence or substance and its act of being. In finite spiritual entities there is only a composition of substance and act of being. Therefore the act-potency composition is broader in extension than is that of matter and form since it applies to the entire realm of *ens commune* (being in general) which, for Thomas, is the subject of metaphysics. Because of this, certain things pertaining to potency-act composition are found both in material and in immaterial creatures, such as to receive and to be received, and to perfect and to be perfected.²⁵ Once again, therefore, we should not be surprised to find him assigning the function of receiving and limiting to essence insofar as it is a potency principle with respect to its act of being.

5. *Compendium theologiae* (first part, ca. 1265–1267)

In c. 18 of this treatise Thomas again offers arguments to show that God is infinite. According to the first, “no act is found to be limited

24. Ed. cit., c. 53, p. 146. Note from the first argument: “In substantia autem intellectuali creata inveniuntur duo: scilicet substantia ipsa; et esse eius, quod non est ipsa substantia, ut ostensum est. Ipsum autem esse est complementum substantiae existentis: unumquodque enim actu est per hoc quod esse habet. Relinquitur igitur quod in qualibet praedictarum substantiarum sit compositio actus et potentiae.”

25. Ed. cit., p. 147. “Sic igitur patet quod compositio actus et potentiae est in plus quam compositio formae et materiae. Unde materia et forma dividunt substantiam naturalem: potentia autem et actus dividunt ens commune. Et propter hoc quaecumque quidem consequuntur potentiam et actum inquantum huiusmodi, sunt communia substantiis materialibus et immaterialibus creatis: sicut *recipere* et *recipi*, *perficere* et *perfici*.”

except by (*per*) a potency that receives it.” For, continues Thomas, forms are limited in accord with the potency of matter. If, therefore, the first mover is act without any admixture of potentiality, it must be infinite.²⁶ In this text Thomas again states that unreceived act is unlimited; and he also affirms that no act is limited except by (*per*) a potency that receives it. Hence here both parts of the limitation axiom are reaffirmed. Such a text offers little support for the claim that he does not hold that a received act is limited by the potency that receives it.²⁷

6. *Summa theologiae I (1265–1268)*

(a) *ST I, q. 7, a. 1*. In this well-known text, Aquinas once more argues for the infinity of God. He recalls that something is said to be infinite because it is not finite. However, matter is limited in one way by form, and form is limited in another way by matter. Matter is limited by (*per*) form in the sense that, before it receives a given form, matter is in potency to many forms. We might say that it is undetermined. Once it receives a given form, it is then limited (*terminatur*) or restricted to that form. In other words, it is determined by that form. On the other hand, form is limited by (*per*) matter in the sense that, when it is simply considered in itself, form is common to many individuals. However, by reason of the fact that it is received in matter, it becomes the form of this particular thing. Thomas comments that matter is perfected by the form by which it is limited or, to use the language I have proposed, by which it is determined. Therefore the infinity assigned to matter is a mark of imperfection because, I would suggest, it is a mark of its indefiniteness, of its lack of determination. On the other hand, form is not perfected by matter; rather the fullness of form is contracted or limited by the matter that receives it. Therefore the infinity we assign to a form that is not determined or limited by matter falls on the side of perfection.²⁸

26. Leon. 42.88:7–13: “Nullus enim actus invenitur finiri nisi per potentiam quae est eius receptiva: invenimus enim formas limitari secundum potentiam materiae. Si igitur primum movens est actus absque potentiae permixtione, qui non est forma alicuius corporis neque virtus in corpore, necessarium est ipsum infinitum esse.”

27. See notes 4 and 17 above.

28. Leon. 4.72. Note especially: “Finitur autem quodammodo et materia per formam, et forma per materiam. Materia quidem per formam, in quantum materia, antequam recipiat formam, est in potentia ad multas formas: sed cum recipit unam, terminatur per illam. Forma vero finitur per materiam, in quantum forma, in se considerata, communis est ad multa: sed per hoc quod recipitur in materia, fit forma determinate huius rei.” For discussion of the limitation of potency by act see F. J. Kovach, “Saint Thomas Aquinas: The Limitation of Potency by Act: A Textual and Doctrinal Analysis,” in *Atti dell’VIII Congresso Tomistico Internazionale, 5: Problemi Metafisici, Studi tomistici*, 14 (Vatican City, 1982), pp. 387–411.

Thomas now turns to the case of *esse* (act of being). *Esse* itself, he writes, is the most formal of all. Because the divine *esse* is not received in anything else, and because God is his very subsisting *esse*, God is infinite and perfect. In other words, this is because unreceived *esse* is unlimited.²⁹

In this text Thomas continues to accept the axiom that unreceived form, especially an unreceived act of being, is unlimited. Moreover, he has again stated that form is limited by matter in that its fullness is contracted by the matter that receives it. Hence once again we find both parts of the limitation axiom.

(b) *ST I, q. 7, a. 2*. In article 2 of this same question Thomas wishes to show that nothing other than God can be infinite of its essence even though he acknowledges that other things may be infinite in a qualified sense. To concentrate on his discussion of infinity on the side of form or act, it should be noted that here he asserts that things whose forms are present in matter are finite in the unqualified sense and not infinite in any way. This is because their forms are limited by their matter, as we have just seen. However, if there are certain created forms which are not received in matter but which subsist in themselves, such as angels, these will be infinite in a qualified sense. This is so because forms of this type are not limited or contracted by (*per*) any matter. In other words, here again he maintains that unreceived act, in this case, unreceived form, is unlimited in its own order. He then considers the *esse* of such a form. Because any such form merely has *esse* but is not identical with it, in other words, because it merely participates in *esse*, its *esse* must be received in and contracted to its determined nature. Hence such a form is not infinite in the unqualified sense.³⁰ Here again he holds that where the act of being is merely “had” and hence realized in only finite fashion, it must be received in and limited to a distinct nature or form. Because he has just stated that a form is limited by the matter that receives it, he would expect his reader to understand that in any finite entity its act of being is likewise limited by the nature or form that receives it.

(c) *ST I, q. 50, a. 2, ad 4*. In this discussion Thomas has rejected matter-form composition of angels. He then considers this objection. A form

29. Leon. 4.72. “Cum igitur esse divinum non sit esse receptum in aliquo, sed ipse sit suum esse subsistens, . . . manifestum est quod ipse Deus sit infinitus et perfectus.” Note his reply to objection 3, where the example of whiteness appears again.

30. Leon. 4.74. Note especially: “Si autem sint aliquae formae creatae non receptae in materia, sed per se subsistentes, ut quidam de angelis opinantur, erunt quidem infinitae secundum quid, inquantum huiusmodi formae non terminantur neque contrahuntur per aliquam materiam: sed quia forma creata sic subsistens habet esse, et non est suum esse, necesse est quod ipsum eius esse sit receptum et contractum ad determinatam naturam. Unde non potest esse infinitum simpliciter.”

is limited and rendered finite by (*per*) matter. Therefore a form that is not present in matter is infinite. But the form of an angel is not infinite since every creature is finite. Therefore, the form of an angel must be present in matter.³¹

Thomas in fact accepts the premises of this objection: (1) a form is limited by matter; (2) a form that is not present in matter must be infinite; but only in a qualified sense, he will add to this. He responds by observing that every creature is finite in the unqualified sense because its act of being is not unrestricted and subsisting but is rather limited to the nature with which it is joined, literally, to which it comes (*cui advenit*). Thomas is willing to grant, however, that an immaterial creature may be infinite in a qualified sense insofar as its form is not received in something else. Hence he does not waver in his acceptance and application of the limitation axiom. He also again returns to his favored example of a subsisting whiteness. If such could exist, it would be infinite as regards the nature of whiteness because it would not be limited or restricted to any subject. However, its act of being would still be finite because it would be limited to some nature.³²

7. *De spiritualibus creaturis, a. 1 (1267–1268)*

In this article, Thomas again considers and rejects matter-form composition of purely spiritual creatures, especially because of their intellectual activity. He then points out that there is another kind of act-potency composition in them. God, the First Being, is infinite act, containing in himself the complete fullness of being, which is not contracted to any generic or specific nature. Therefore his *esse* is not instilled in some nature that is distinct from it; for if it were, then it would be limited to that nature. Therefore God is identical with his act of being, something which is true of nothing else. If there were some subsisting whiteness apart from any receiving principle or subject, it could not be multiplied. So too, there can be only one subsisting *esse*.³³

Thomas concludes that everything that comes after the First Being, because it is not identical with its act of being (*esse*), has an act of being that is received in something else, by which (*per quod*) that act of being is

31. Leon. 5.5 (for the objection).

32. Leon. 5.6 (reply to the objection).

33. Leon. 24.2.12–14. Note in particular: “Manifestum est enim quod primum ens, quod Deus est, est actus infinitus utpote habens in se totam essendi plenitudinem, non contractam ad aliquam naturam generis vel speciei; unde oportet quod ipsum esse eius non sit esse quasi inditum alicui naturae quae non sit suum esse, quia sic finiretur ad illam naturam; unde dicimus quod Deus est ipsum suum esse. Hoc autem non potest dici de aliquo alio. . . .” (p. 13:363–372).

limited or contracted. (Here, therefore, he is telling us that a received act of being is limited by that which receives it. This in turn explains why it is also limited to that nature, namely, because the nature that receives it also limits it.) In this same passage he goes on to apply this to his theory of participation. In every created thing, the nature that participates in *esse* is one, and the participated *esse* is something other. Further, because every creature participates by imitation in the First Act insofar as it has *esse*, in every such thing the participated act of being is related to the nature that participates in it as act to potency. Hence in the case of material entities there is a matter-form composition and there is another composition of the nature consisting of matter and form, taken as potency, and of the act of being which the nature receives. In the case of a subsisting created form, the nature itself is related to its act of being as potency to act, not in the sense that it could ever be separated from its act, but as a potency which its act always accompanies. Hence there would be no justification for concluding from this text that Thomas thinks that essences enjoy some kind of actual being in themselves before they receive and limit their respective acts of being.³⁴

Even so, in connection with this one might turn to a brief remark from *De potentia*, q. 1, a. 2, where Thomas writes that the *esse* of a human being is limited to the human species because it is received in a nature of that species. And so it is with respect to the *esse* of any creature. Because the divine *esse* is not received in something, it is not limited to any given mode of the perfection of being, but possesses the fullness of being itself. Hence it is clear from this passage that it is the reception of *esse* that accounts for its limitation to a given degree, and not vice versa. And here again Thomas holds that unreceived *esse* is unlimited.³⁵

34. "Omne igitur quod est post primum ens, cum non sit suum esse, habet esse in aliquo receptum, per quod ipsum esse contrahitur; et sic in quolibet creato aliud est natura rei quae participat esse, et aliud ipsum esse participatum. Et cum quaelibet res participet per assimilationem primum actum in quantum habet esse, necesse est quod esse participatum in unoquoque comparatur ad naturam participantem ipsum, sicut actus ad potentiam. . . . Unde in rebus compositis est considerare duplicem actum et duplicem potentiam: nam primo quidem materia est ut potentia respectu formae, et forma est actus eius; et iterum natura constituta ex materia et forma est ut potentia respectu ipsius esse, in quantum est susceptiva eius. Remoto igitur fundamento materiae, si remaneat aliqua forma determinatae naturae per se subsistens,—non in materia—, adhuc comparabitur ad suum esse ut potentia ad actum: non dico autem 'ut potentiam separabilem ab actu', sed quam semper suus actus comitetur" (Leon. 24.2.13:376–14:400).

35. See *S. Thomae Aquinatis Quaestiones disputatae*, Vol. 2 (Turin-Rome, 1953), p. 11 (where Thomas is considering the infinity of God's power). Note that Thomas here distinguishes two ways in which act may be limited: (1) "ex parte agentis; sicut ex voluntate artificis recipit quantitatem et terminum pulchritudo domus." (2) "Alio modo ex parte recipientis." He denies that God is limited in either way because he is not caused and because "ipse est actus purus non receptus in aliquo. . . ." Then note: "Esse enim hominis terminatum est ad hominis speciem, quia est receptum in natura speciei humanae: et simile est de

8. *De substantiis separatis, c. 8 (after 1271)*

In the course of responding to certain arguments taken from Avicbron in support of matter-form composition of created spiritual substances, Thomas replies that although such substances lack matter, they are distinct from God. Potency is present within them insofar as they are not identical with *esse* but only participate in it. Again he reasons that there can be only one instance of subsisting *esse*. In everything else we find both *esse*, as an act, and the substance of the thing which has *esse*, as a potency that receives this act (*tamquam potentia receptiva huius actus quod est esse*). A little farther on Thomas comments that those things that participate in *esse* from the First Being do not participate in it according to the universal mode of being, as it is realized in the First Principle, but in particular fashion according to a certain determined mode of being which pertains to this genus or this species. He repeats this point in replying to the fifth argument, and notes that since such a created spiritual substance participates in *esse* only according to the proper mode of its essence, its *esse* is not infinite but finite. In other words, he has extended the limitation principle once more to that which participates in *esse*, since such a thing can do so only to the degree marked out for it by its nature or essence. Therefore, because the nature or essence of any participating being is necessarily finite, so is the degree to which it can participate in *esse*.³⁶

9. *In librum de causis (ca. 1272, first half)*

In commenting on proposition 4 of this work (“The first of created things is *esse*, and nothing else is created before it”), Thomas explains how the unknown author accounts for multiplication at the level of intelligences in terms of their essences. He explains that if some form or na-

esse equi, vel cuiuslibet creaturae. Esse autem Dei, cum non sit in aliquo receptum, sed sit esse purum, non limitatur ad aliquem modum perfectionis essendi, sed totum esse in se habet. . . .” On this cf. de Finance, *Être et agir*, pp. 55–56. As he points out, the fact that a creature’s *esse* is efficiently caused does not eliminate the need for an intrinsic limiting principle as well.

36. Leon. 40.D55:164–186. Note especially: “. . . sublata omni potentialitate materiae, remanet in eis potentia quaedam in quantum non sunt ipsum esse sed esse participant. Nihil autem per se subsistens quod sit ipsum esse potest inveniri nisi unum solum, sicut nec aliqua forma si separata consideretur potest esse nisi una. . . . Omne autem quod est esse habet; est igitur in quocumque praeter primum et ipsum esse tamquam actus, et substantia rei habens esse tamquam potentia receptiva huius actus quod est esse.” See lines 199–204: “Sed considerandum est quod ea quae a primo ente esse participant non participant esse secundum universalem modum essendi, secundum quod est in primo principio, sed particulariter secundum quendam determinatum essendi modum qui convenit vel huic generi vel huic speciei.” For his reply to the fifth argument see p. D56:253–261.

ture is completely separate and simple, it cannot be multiplied, just as, if there were some separate whiteness, there could be only one. However, we find many different whitenesses which participate in whiteness. So too, if the first created *esse* were a separate existent like a Platonic form, there could be only one. Because this first (highest) created *esse* is participated by (literally in) the nature of intelligence(s), it can be multiplied in accord with diverse participants.³⁷

Thomas explains that this is what the author means by referring to such a being (an intelligence) as composed of the finite and the infinite, and Thomas finds the author's source for this in Proclus's then only recently translated *Elementatio theologica* (proposition 89). Thomas observes that if something should possess the infinite power of being (*virtus essendi*) in such fashion that it did not participate in *esse* from something else, it alone would be infinite. Such is true of God. However, if something possesses the infinite power to exist (*infinita virtus ad essendum*) according to an *esse* that is participated in from something else, insofar as it participates in *esse* it is finite. In proof Thomas recalls that what is participated is not received in the participant according to its total infinity, but only in particular fashion. This comment is interesting because Thomas again suggests that it follows from the very nature or definition of participation that a participant possesses only in partial, that is, in finite fashion, that which it participates from its source.³⁸

Hence, Thomas continues, this is what the *Liber de causis* means by saying that an intelligence is composed of the finite and the infinite. The nature of the intelligence is said to be infinite according to the power of being (*potentia essendi*) of its nature, but finite in terms of the act of being (*esse*) which it receives. While this reminds one of Thomas's earlier explanation in the *De ente* of the meaning of this statement from the *Liber de causis*, there is a change. There he had interpreted this as mean-

37. *Sancti Thomae de Aquino Super Librum de causis expositio*, ed. H. D. Saffrey (Fribourg-Louvain, 1954), pp. 29:27–30:4: “Ubi considerandum est quod, si aliqua forma vel natura sit omnino separata et simplex, non potest in ea cadere multitudo, sicut, si aliqua albedo esset separata, non esset nisi una: nunc autem inveniuntur multae albedines diversae quae participant albedinem. Sic igitur, si esse creatum primum esset esse abstractum, ut Platonici posuerunt, tale esse non posset multiplicari, sed esset unum tantum. Sed, quia esse creatum primum est esse participatum in natura intelligentiae, multiplicabile est secundum diversitatem participantium.”

38. *Ibid.*, p. 30:4–24. Note especially: “Si autem aliquid sic haberet infinitam virtutem essendi quod non participaret esse ab alio, tunc esset solum infinitum; et tale est Deus, ut dicitur infra in 16a propositione. Sed, si sit aliquid quod habeat infinitam virtutem ad essendum secundum esse participatum ab alio, secundum hoc quod esse participat est finitum, quia quod participatur non recipitur in participante secundum totam suam infinitatem sed particulariter.” For more on this last point see my *The Metaphysical Thought*, pp. 96–97. For Proclus see *The Elements of Theology*, ed. E. R. Dodds (2d ed., Oxford, 1963), prop. 89, (p. 82).

ing that a created separate substance is finite from above by reason of the *esse* it receives in limited fashion from its cause, and infinite from below by reason of the fact that its form is not received in matter.³⁹ Now, while he accounts for the finiteness of such a substance in the same way, he explains its infinity differently by appealing to its capacity to endure perpetually.⁴⁰

In commenting on proposition 5, Thomas finds the anonymous author taking up the distinction of souls, and offering the same justification for distinguishing or multiplying them as he had given for intelligences. The act of being of an intelligence is not subsistent, but is rather participated in by a given nature. By reason of that nature it can be divided or distinguished into many. The same holds for the act of being of soul. The author comments that soul's *esse* is also limited, but that its lower part is infinite. Thomas takes this reference to soul's being infinite from below as referring to its capacity to exist forever. More to the point under consideration here, however, he notes that the participated act of being of such an entity is said to be finite because it is not participated in according to the full infinity of its universality, but only according to the mode of the nature that participates in it.⁴¹

In commenting on proposition 9 Thomas finds the unknown author responding to this objection. It might be argued that if the First Cause is pure *esse* alone, it is *esse commune* which is predicated of all things. Therefore it is not an individual being that exists in distinction from others. For what is common is not rendered individual except by being received in something. However, since the First Cause is in fact a given individual in distinction from all others, it seems that it must have *yliatim*, that is, something that receives its *esse*.⁴²

39. For the *De ente* see Leon. 43-378:51-56. Also see n. 7 above and my corresponding text.

40. *Super librum de causis*, p. 30:13-14: ". . . quod potest in infinitum durare in esse est, quantum ad hoc, infinitae potentiae." See lines 25-30: "In tantum igitur intelligentia est composita in suo esse ex finito et infinito, in quantum natura intelligentiae infinita dicitur secundum potentiam essendi; et ipsum esse quod recipit, est finitum. Et ex hoc sequitur quod esse intelligentiae multiplicari possit in quantum est esse participatum: hoc enim significat compositio ex finito et infinito."

41. *Ibid.*, p. 39:7-20. Note in particular: "Et ponit eandem rationem distinctionis sive multiplicationis in animabus quam in intelligentiis posuerat: sicut enim esse intelligentiae compositum est ex infinito et finito, in quantum esse eius non est subsistens sed participatum ab aliqua natura ratione cuius potest distingui in multa, ita etiam est et de esse animae. . . . Inferius autem dicit ipsam naturam participantem esse, quam vocat *in finitum* propter virtutem ad durandum in esse in infinitum; ipsum autem esse participatum vocat finitum quia non participatur secundum totam infinitatem suae universalitatis sed secundum modum naturae participantis."

42. *Ed. cit.*, pp. 64:27-65:7. Note: "Ergo videtur quod *necesse* sit dicere causam primam habere *yliatim*, id est aliquid recipiens esse."

Thomas has been misled by the term *yliatim* and takes it as deriving from the Greek term for matter so as to mean something material or something like matter, that receives. He explains that to this objection the *Liber de causis* replies that the very infinity of the divine *esse*, because it is not limited by anything that receives it, plays the role in the First Cause that *yliatim* exercises in other beings. This is so because while in other things a common characteristic is rendered individual by (*per*) that which receives it, the divine goodness and the divine *esse* are individual by reason of their very purity, that is, by reason of the fact that they are not received in something else.⁴³ However, Thomas has accepted the anonymous author's claim that an intelligence is *esse* and form, and has taken this to mean that such a form is related to its participated *esse* as potency to act or as matter to form. The presence therein of form in this receiving capacity is enough for him to explain the author's claim that *yliatim* is present in intelligences as well as in souls and in natural bodies.⁴⁴

In this text Thomas has been interpreting the *Liber de causis*, and especially in light of his recovery of the recently translated *Elementatio theologica* of Proclus. Even so, it is clear that he still holds the view that if *esse* is received in an intelligence or in the soul, it is received by something that serves to limit it. Further, he continues to hold that if *esse* is not received in a subject, it is not limited and not multiplied but is unique.

This also raises an interesting question about possible sources for the limitation axiom prior to Aquinas. In an important article written some fifty years ago, W. Norris Clarke pointed to, among other sources, the

43. See p. 64:6–13: “Nam *intelligentia habet yliatim*, id est aliquid materiale vel ad modum materiae se habens: dicitur enim *yliatim* ab *yle*, quod est materia.” See p. 65:7–15: “Sed ad hoc respondet quod ipsa *infinitas* divini *esse*, in quantum scilicet non est terminatum per aliquod recipiens, habet in causa prima vicem *yliatim* quod est in aliis rebus. Et hoc ideo quia, sicut in aliis rebus fit individuatio rei communis receptae per id quod est recipiens, ita divina bonitas et esse individuatur ex ipsa sui puritate per hoc scilicet quod ipsa non est recepta in aliquo. . . .”

44. Ed. cit., p. 64:9–13. On Thomas's mistaken interpretation of *yliatim* as taken from the Greek term for matter, see R. Taylor, “St. Thomas and the *Liber De Causis* on the Hylomorphic Composition of Separate Substances,” *Mediaeval Studies* 41 (1979), pp. 506–13. Taylor points out that the Arabic original which has been rendered in this fashion (as a corruption of Gerard of Cremona's original transliteration *helyatin*) can be translated as “ornament,” “attribute,” “quality,” “state,” “condition,” “appearance,” or “form” (pp. 510–11). Hence it did not mean matter in the original, as Thomas assumes. But the unknown author is stressing the point that “created beings are entities limited by form” for “each has being which is limited, specified and made finite by form” (p. 512). So while Thomas was mistaken in thinking that *yliatim* comes from the Greek term for matter, he was correct in holding that according to the *Liber de causis* intelligences have no matter. But Taylor notes that in relating form to *esse* as potency to act, Thomas is reading his own position into the text (pp. 512–13). On the general accuracy of Thomas's Commentary on this work see Cristina d'Ancona Costa, “Saint Thomas Lecteur du *Liber de causis*,” in her *Recherches sur le Liber de causis* (Paris, 1995), pp. 229–58. Also see pp. 118–19.

Liber de causis. He specifically cited propositions 16 and 20, according to their numbering in the text on which Thomas commented. Although I have not found the axiom in so many words in this treatise, I too think it likely that it did influence Thomas's thinking on this issue and that the axiom's remote origins are Neoplatonic, especially insofar as it rests on the recognition of intensive infinity, or infinity viewed as perfection.⁴⁵ With that thought in mind, I will now turn, if only briefly, to Thomas's commentary on another likely Neoplatonic source for some of the thinking incorporated in the limitation axiom.

10. *In De divinis nominibus (perhaps 1261–1265, perhaps 1265–68)*

In chapter 5, lectio 1 of this Commentary, Thomas writes that every form which is received in something is limited and rendered finite in accord with the capacity of that which receives it. Again he illustrates this with his thought experiment concerning whiteness. This white body does not possess whiteness according to the total power of whiteness. However, if there were a separate whiteness, nothing could be lacking to it which could belong to the power of whiteness (*virtus albedinis*). All things other than God have an *esse* that is received and participated. Therefore they do not possess it according to the total power of being (*tota virtus essendi*), as does God alone. Therefore Dionysius can refer to God as the cause of being for all things because he does not exist under a certain mode (*non est existens quodam modo*). This, Thomas explains, means that he does not exist according to some finite and limited mode.⁴⁶ While this passage does not explicitly state that a form is limited

45. See "The Limitation of Act by Potency in St. Thomas: Aristotelianism or Neoplatonism?" as reprinted in Clarke's *Explorations in Metaphysics*, pp. 65–88. See especially pp. 76–8. For the *Liber de causis* see especially prop. 20 (in the Saffrey edition with Thomas's Commentary) = prop. 19(20) in *Le Liber de causis*, ed. A. Pattin, pp. 89–90. Note in particular: "Quod est quia causa prima est fixa, stans cum unitate sua pura semper, et ipsa regit res creatas omnes et influit super eas virtutem vitae et bonitatis secundum modum virtutis earum [receptibilem] et possibilitatem earum. Prima enim bonitas influit bonitates super res omnes influxione una; verumtamen unaquaque rerum recipit ex illa infusione secundum modum suae virtutis et sui esse. . . . Et diversificantur bonitates et dona ex concursu recipientis. Quod est quia recipientes bonitates non recipiunt aequaliter. . . ." This text more explicitly cites another axiom which Thomas closely associates with the limitation axiom, as we have already seen, namely: "Quidquid recipitur ad modum recipientis recipitur." For this connection also see SCG I, c. 43, as cited above in n. 16.

46. *In librum beati Dionysii De divinis nominibus expositio*, ed. C. Pera (Turin-Rome, 1950), p. 234, n. 629. "Ad cuius evidentiam considerandum est quod omnis forma, recepta in aliquo, limitatur et finitur secundum capacitatem recipientis; unde, hoc corpus album non habet totam albedinem secundum totum posse albedinis. Sed si esset albedo separata, nihil deesset ei quod ad virtutem albedinis pertineret. Omnia autem alia, sicut superius dictum est, habent esse receptum et participatum et ideo non habent esse secundum totam virtutem essendi, sed solus Deus, qui est ipsum esse subsistens, secundum totam virtutem

by that which receives it, it does state that it is limited in accord with it. If, as Thomas states in other texts examined above, act or form or *esse* is limited by what receives it, then it is also limited in accord with what receives it. But this text does employ the first part of the axiom: that unreceived form or *esse* is unlimited.

II

From this textual survey we may conclude that Aquinas did accept and use the principle that unreceived act is unlimited and, moreover, in a number of the texts, he reasons that, where one finds limited instances of act, one must appeal to a principle that receives and limits it in order to account for this. In other words, he accepts both parts of this principle as we have distinguished them above. We have seen him applying this principle to form, to the act of being (*esse*), and on some occasions to act in general. This brings us back to the second general question we raised at the beginning: Does Thomas use this principle as an argument to establish real composition and/or real distinction of essence and act of being in things other than God? If he does not, is it in accord with his thought for us to do so?

It is difficult to find many explicit texts where Thomas actually turns to this principle in order to argue immediately for real distinction or composition of essence and act of being in finite beings. Indeed, after completing his own survey of the texts, Robert concluded that he could not find any text where Thomas appealed immediately to this principle in order to establish this point. Even so, he also recognized that many twentieth-century students of Aquinas do so reason in arguing for this conclusion.⁴⁷

Nonetheless, I would suggest that Robert has not paid sufficient attention to a text from Thomas's Commentary on *I Sent.*, d. 8, q. 5, a. 1 (*sed contra*). Here Thomas is considering the question whether any creature is simple. After listing four arguments offered in support of this claim, he presents two counter-arguments in the *sed contra*, and needless to say, two arguments that support his own view that every creature is composed of

essendi, esse habet; et hoc est quod dicit, quod ideo Deus potest esse causa essendi omnibus, quia Ipse *non est existens quodam modo*, idest secundum aliquem modum finitum et limitatum. . . ." Cf. C. 5, 2 (n. 661), where Thomas says of God: ". . . non enim esse suum est finitum per aliquam naturam determinatam ad genus vel speciem, ut possit dici, quod est hoc et non est illud, ut sunt determinatae etiam substantiae spirituales. . . ."

47. See his "Le principe: 'Actus non limitatur . . .,'" p. 51. For his explanation as to why this is the case see pp. 51–52. For other interpreters who do so argue see those cited above in note 2. Also see C. Hart, *Thomistic Metaphysics: An Inquiry into the Act of Existing* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1959), pp. 88–89, 95–97.

esse and *quod est*. The second argument touches directly on our immediate concern:

Every creature has finite *esse*. However, an *esse* that is not received in something is not finite, nay it is unrestricted (*absolutum*). Therefore every creature has an *esse* that is received in something, and so must have these two at least—namely, *esse*, and that which receives *esse*.⁴⁸

Here we have a very clear expression of the first part of the limitation axiom, to the effect that unreceived *esse* is not finite, but unrestricted or infinite. Moreover, we also have an immediate application of this to the metaphysical constitution of creatures. Because every creature is finite, it must have both an act of being that is received in something, and something that receives that act of being. Otherwise, according to the limitation axiom, its act of being would be unlimited. Therefore it consists of these two at least, an act of being, and that which receives it.

As I have already noted, this argument appears in the *sed contra* of Thomas's text. Even so, there is good reason to think that he accepts its reasoning as his own. We have already seen ample evidence that for him, if *esse* is not received in something else, it is not finite but infinite. Moreover, in the solution to this article he accepts the conclusion of this reasoning, that in every creature there is both its quiddity or nature and its *esse*, each of which is given to it by God. Therefore it is composed of these two.⁴⁹

Hence I would suggest that at least on this occasion Thomas did apply our axiom to the essence-*esse* relationship in finite beings. Moreover, as has been noted above, in SCG II, c. 52, he bases an argument for the composition of "that which is" and *esse* on the impossibility of there being two instances of infinite *esse* and, therefore, of subsisting *esse*. Subsisting *esse*, however, must be infinite because it is not limited by any receiving principle. In everything else *esse* can only be limited and, therefore, in all such beings there must be a composition of *esse* and something else (some other principle) which limits it.⁵⁰

While I acknowledge that Thomas rarely employs this principle immediately as part of his argumentation for composition and/or distinction

48. Mandonnet ed., Vol. 1, p. 226: "Praeterea, omnis creatura habet esse finitum. Sed esse non receptum in aliquo, non est finitum, immo absolutum. Ergo omnis creatura habet esse receptum in aliquo; et ita oportet quod habeat duo ad minus, scilicet esse, et id quod esse recipit."

49. See p. 227. Also see a. 2 (pp. 229–30), where he applies this to the human soul as well. Note especially: "Et hoc modo intelligo in angelis compositionem potentiae et actus, et de 'quo est' et 'quod est', et similiter in anima. Unde angelus vel anima potest dici quidditas vel natura vel forma simplex, in quantum eorum quidditas non componitur ex diversis; sed tamen advenit ibi compositio horum duorum, scilicet quidditatis et esse" (p. 230).

50. SCG II, c. 52, p. 145, cited above in n. 23.

of essence and act of being in finite entities, I conclude from the above that it is in accord with his thought to do so. Robert himself granted that if one wishes to offer a systematic presentation of Aquinas's metaphysics in which one follows the philosophical order, such an approach to establishing the essence-*esse* distinction will be perfectly appropriate. All of the essential elements for such an argument, including the limitation axiom, are present in his texts. To summarize, according to Thomas's thinking, act, especially the act of being, is not self-limiting. It is not enough to appeal to an extrinsic principle or cause for one to account for the intrinsic limitation within a finite entity of that which is not self-limiting. Therefore, Thomas would have us conclude to the need for an intrinsic principle therein that receives and limits its act of being. For him, of course, the act of being and the principle that receives and limits it must be related to one another as actuality and potentiality.⁵¹

At the same time, certain caveats are in order in interpreting this general theory. Thomas has drawn some parallels between the relationship of matter and form, and that of essence and act of being. However, as he points out in SCG II, c. 53, these similarities must not be pressed too far, since there are also important differences. He has spoken of essence or substance as receiving and limiting *esse*. One should not conclude from this that he regards them as two more or less independent and pre-existing things which come to be joined together by their efficient cause at some appropriate point in time. This would indeed be a caricature of his position, but one that was drawn by William Carlo to illustrate what he regarded as a traditional reading of Thomas on this. Thus in accord with an example he takes from Giles of Rome, an essence would be regarded as a vessel or container and existence as an infinite ocean of being, like water, which is poured into it until its capacity is filled at the moment of its production.⁵²

51. See Robert, pp. 53–54, 59–60, and especially the conclusions beginning on p. 67. Also see my *The Metaphysical Thought*, pp. 170–76. On the relationship of essence to *esse* as potency to act and as participant to participated see Fabro, *La nozione metafisica di partecipazione*, pp. 338–56.

52. See W. E. Carlo, *The Ultimate Reducibility of Essence to Existence in Existential Metaphysics* (The Hague, 1966), pp. 103–5. Also see his "The Role of Essence in Existential Metaphysics: A Reappraisal," in *Readings in Metaphysics*, ed. J. Rosenberg (Westminster, Md., 1963), pp. 278–81, which originally appeared in *International Philosophical Quarterly* 2 (1962), pp. 584–89. Carlo notes that Giles of Rome had used a similar analogy, according to which God gives to each nature that is created as much *esse* as that nature can receive, so that the diversity in *esse* will result from the diversity in receiving natures. Giles goes on to liken God to the sea which offers itself to every vase, with no vase receiving the totality of the sea, but each a greater or lesser amount in accord with its capacity. So too in creating things, by producing each nature God offered to it all of his *esse*. Each nature participates in that *esse* according to the capacity of its substance. Thus there is uniformity from the side of the communicating God, who offers himself wholly to each nature, and diversity from the side

The difficulty with such an example is that both essence and *esse* are presented as if they were distinct things or entities. Indeed, shortly after the death of Aquinas, Giles of Rome did present his own theory of real distinction between essence and existence as a distinction between thing and thing (*res et res*). Although some, myself included, do not believe that his understanding of this theory was as unnuanced as this language might suggest, he certainly did thereby set up his presentation of it as an easy target for opponents of any theory of the real distinction to criticize.⁵³ Henry of Ghent and the Godfrey of Fontaines were quick to point out the flaws in such an approach by arguing that the same reasoning that led Giles to postulate a real distinct thing (*esse*) to account for the existence of an essence should have also led him to postulate still another composition within the *esse* itself, and so on *ad infinitum*.⁵⁴

Given this, it is important to take seriously certain warnings one finds in Thomas's texts which anticipate, as it were, possible misinterpretations of his thought. In the passage from his *De spiritualibus creaturis* considered above, he relates the nature of a subsisting created form to its act

of the receiver. Giles does insist, however, that the entire creature, including its nature (essence) and its *esse*, is created by God. But his image is surely unfortunate in that it tends to give the impression that essence and *esse* are pre-existing "things" (*res*) combined in appropriate fashion at the moment of the creation of a particular entity. See Carlo, *The Ultimate Reducibility*, pp. 28–29. For Giles see his *Super librum de causis* (Venice, 1550; repr. Frankfurt, 1968), commenting on prop. 24, fols. 81v–82r.

53. In his Commentary on *I Sentences* (ca. 1271–1273) Giles seems to defend some kind of composition of "quod est" and "esse," although his position is not yet finalized. See *In I Sent.*, d. 8, p. 2, pr. 1, q. 2 (Venice, 1521), fol. 52v; pr. 2, q. 1, fols. 53vb–54ra. In his probably slightly later *Theoremata de corpore Christi* (ca. 1274), he seems to defend some kind of real distinction between essence and *esse*, but also refuses to identify this with the kind that obtains between two essences. See *De corpore Christi theoremata L* (Bologna, 1481), prop. 29, fols. 19vb–20ra. In his *Theoremata de esse et essentia* (ca. 1278–1285) he not only defends real distinction of essence and existence (*esse*), but describes them as two things (*res*). See *Aegidii Romani Theoremata de esse et essentia*, ed. E. Hocedez (Louvain, 1930), th. 16 (p. 101), th. 19 (p. 127): "Verum quia in propositione quinta et etiam in duodecima multis rationibus probabatur et etiam hic ostenditur quod esse et essentia sunt duae res. . ."; th. 19 (p. 134). And in his *Quaestiones disputatae de esse et essentia* (Venice, 1503), dating from ca. 1285–1287/8), he continues to use similar language. See q. 9 (fol. 20vb), and q. 11 (fol. 24vb). For discussion and for additional references to primary and secondary sources see my "The Relationship Between Essence and Existence in Late-Thirteenth-Century Thought: Giles of Rome, Henry of Ghent, Godfrey of Fontaines, and James of Viterbo," in *Philosophies of Existence: Ancient and Medieval*, ed. P. Morewedge (New York, 1982), pp. 134–41. I have adjusted some of the datings proposed there for Giles's works in light of more recent research by R. Wielockx, *Aegidii Romani Opera Omnia. III.1 Apologia* (Florence, 1985), pp. 229–40, and S. Donati, "Studi per una cronologia delle opere di Egidio Romano. I: Le opere prima del 1285—I commenti aristotelici," in *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale I*, 1 (1990), pp. 1–70 (see summarizing table on p. 71). Also now see G. Pini, "Being and Creation in Giles of Rome," in *Miscellanea Mediaevalia* 28 (2001), pp. 390–409.

54. For Henry see *Henrici de Gandavo Quodlibet I*, q. 9, R. Macken ed. (Leuven, 1979), p. 51. For Godfrey see *Quodlibet III*, q. 1, in Vol. 2 of *Les Philosophes Belges* (Louvain, 1904), p. 164. Henry's *Quodlibet I* dates from 1276 and Godfrey's *Quodlibet III* from 1286.

of being as potency to act, not, however, as a potency that could ever be separated from its act, but only as a potency that its act always accompanies.⁵⁵

This points to an important difference between the essence-*esse* relationship and that of matter and form, since matter can be separated from a given form and receive another, although it can never exist without some form. Giles of Rome did, indeed, press the analogy between the two somewhat farther. He reasoned that just as generation makes us understand that matter is different from form, so does creation make us understand that essence is other than *esse*. He does recognize, however, some differences between matter-form composition and that of essence and existence, and notes in particular that if matter pre-exists before it receives a given form, essence does not pre-exist before it receives its existence. Unlike Thomas, however, Giles does hold that essence and *esse* are separable, even though he does not say they can exist in separation from one another.⁵⁶

Again, as Aquinas points out, for instance in *De potentia*, q. 3. a. 5, ad 2, “from the fact that *esse* is given to quiddity, not only the *esse* but the quiddity itself is said to be created; for before it possesses *esse*, the quiddity is nothing, except perhaps in the intellect of the creator where it is not a creature but the creative essence.”⁵⁷ He makes the same point at q. 3, a. 1, ad 17, where he says that simultaneously when God communicates *esse*, he produces that which receives it.⁵⁸ Hence, while Thomas does correlate essence and act of being as that which receives and limits and that which is received and limited, he does not regard either as some kind of entity that might pre-exist or continue to exist without the other.

III

If this is Thomas’s understanding of this axiom or principle, what justification does he offer for it, especially for its first part—that unreceived act or unreceived *esse* is unlimited?

55. See note 34 above for the text from *De spiritualibus creaturis*, a. 1.

56. For Giles of Rome on the similarities between the matter-form relationship and that of essence and *esse* see his *Theoremata de esse et essentia*, th. 4, pp. 19–20; *Quaestiones disputatae de esse et essentia*, q. 9, fols. 20vb–21rb. On essence and *esse* as separable see *Theoremata*, th. 12, pp. 68–70, especially p. 70:15.

57. *De potentia*, q. 3, a. 5, ad 2, p. 49: “Ad secundum dicendum, quod ex hoc ipso quod quidditati esse attribuitur, non solum esse, sed ipsa quidditas creari dicitur: quia antequam esse habeat, nihil est, nisi forte in intellectu creantis, ubi non est creatura, sed creatrix essentia.”

58. *De potentia*, q. 3, a. 1, ad 17, p. 41: “Ad decimum septimum dicendum, quod Deus simul dans esse, producit id quod esse recipit: et sic non oportet quod agat ex aliquo praeexistenti.”

In previous attempts to answer this question, I have not found an explicit reply in Thomas's texts. One might be tempted to use a God-to-creatures approach and argue that because God is self-subsisting and unlimited *esse*, Thomas can easily conclude that unreceived *esse* must be unlimited or infinite. This approach, however, is eliminated by the fact that in a number of texts Thomas reasons in reverse fashion, that is, from this axiom itself to the conclusion that God is infinite or unlimited *esse*.

As I have indicated elsewhere, I had once entertained the thought that Thomas would have us apply to this issue his understanding of *separatio* or a negative judgment more or less in the way he appeals to this to account for our discovery of being as being, the subject of metaphysics. But it now seems to me that this approach will be no more successful than the first one because Thomas applies *separatio* to being (*ens*) rather than to *esse* when discussing this intellectual operation in q. 5, a. 3 of his *In De Trinitate*, and even more importantly, because the present axiom makes a stronger claim. Through *separatio* one may discover that being (*ens*) insofar as it is being need not be considered as material or as changing or as restricted to any given kind, and so one may simply study being as being.⁵⁹ But the limitation principle maintains that *esse* insofar as it is *esse* is not self-limiting.

And so by a process of elimination I have concluded that Thomas regards it as a self-evident axiom or adage. This seems to follow from his well-known view that *esse* is the actuality of all acts and the perfection of all perfections, as he puts this in *De potentia*, q. 7, a. 2, ad 9.⁶⁰ To hold that *esse* is self-limiting would therefore amount to saying that the ontological principle of actuality and perfection in any finite being also accounts for its finitude, that is, for its lack of further actuality and fuller perfection or for its imperfection. And since imperfection involves a negation of further perfection, this would make perfection the ontological explanation of its own negation, something that does not seem to follow from the nature of perfection itself.

It also seems helpful to connect this principle with another point that has been mentioned in some of the texts examined above, namely, Thomas's references to a "power of being," a *virtus essendi* or *essendi potestas* which he attributes to the *actus essendi* itself. Thus in SCG I, c. 28 he

59. See my *The Metaphysical Thought*, pp. 44–49.

60. Ed. cit., p. 192: "... quod ex hoc patet quia actus est semper perfectio < r > potentia. Quaelibet autem forma signata non intelligitur in actu nisi per hoc quod esse ponitur. Nam humanitas vel igneitas potest considerari ut in potentia materiae existens, vel ut in virtute agentis, aut etiam ut in intellectu: sed hoc quod habet *esse*, efficitur actu existens. Unde patet quod hoc quod dico *esse* est actualitas omnium actuum et propter hoc est perfectio omnium perfectionum." Note how he begins his response to obj. 9: "Ad nonum dicendum, quod hoc quod dico *esse* est inter omnia perfectissimum. . . ."

reasons that if there is something to which the total power of being (*virtus essendi*) pertains, no excellence or perfection will be lacking to it. He indicates that God, who is identical with his act of being, possesses *esse* according to the total power of being (*essendi potestas*). In his Commentary on the *Liber de causis*, proposition 4, he writes that if something should possess the infinite power of being in such fashion that it did not participate in it, that thing and it alone would be infinite. For Thomas, of course, this is true of God. And in another passage considered above from Thomas's Commentary on the *Divine Names*, he writes that because things that differ from God have a received and participated *esse*, they do not possess it according to the total power of being (*virtus essendi*). God alone does.⁶¹

C. Fabro is well known for having emphasized the notion of intensive *esse* in Aquinas and he, along with F. O'Rourke, has also identified Pseudo-Dionysius as an important influence on Thomas's development of this. O'Rourke has also especially stressed Dionysius's influence on Thomas's understanding of the "power of being" which Thomas assigns to *esse*.⁶² These two notions seem to be closely connected with Thomas's view of *esse* as the actuality of all acts and the perfection of all perfections. And that, in turn, seems to me to be the ultimate ontological insight that underlies Thomas's acceptance of the axiom in question. Precisely because *esse* is the actuality of all acts and the perfection of all perfections, one cannot account for its limitation simply by appealing to *esse* itself. And so unreceived *esse* must be unlimited. And where it is realized in limited fashion, as in every finite being, it must be limited by some other intrinsic principle within that being—its essence.

61. See nn. 18, 38, and 46 above for these texts.

62. For Fabro see, for instance, *Participation et causalité selon s. Thomas d'Aquin* (Louvain-Paris, 1961), p. 195, where he describes this intensive notion of *esse* as "le véritable fondement de la métaphysique thomiste de la participation." Also see p. 229 where he identifies Pseudo-Dionysius as the principal source for the Thomistic understanding of intensive *esse*. For O'Rourke see his *Pseudo-Dionysius and the Metaphysics of Aquinas* (Leiden, 1992), pp. 155–87. For more on this see Ch. XI below, pp. 281–84.

Chapter VI

THOMAS AQUINAS ON OUR KNOWLEDGE OF GOD AND THE AXIOM THAT EVERY AGENT PRODUCES SOMETHING LIKE ITSELF

As is well known, Thomas Aquinas states that when it comes to our knowledge of God, by reasoning philosophically we can know that God is, and what he is not, but not what he is. In light of this, Aquinas goes on to apply many names to God by following the way of negation. Not only this, but in many instances the very content of the names he predicates of God is negative, not positive. To describe God as infinite is really to say that he is not finite. To refer to him as eternal is to say that he is not subject to time or to any change. To describe him as simple is to deny any kind of composition of him. And so on.¹

However, in the course of denying any kind of quiddative knowledge to us in this life, and while still following the way of negation, Thomas goes on to refer to God as all perfect. For instance, in the *Summa contra Gentiles* I, c. 28, after having employed the way of negation and justified a long series of negative names of God from cc. 14 through 27, Thomas introduces a subtle shift into his procedure. By denying any kind of imperfection of God, he now draws the conclusion that God is all perfect. In other words, while continuing to use the way of negation, he ends with a notion from which he can draw positive consequences. He does this by denying any kind of restriction or limitation or imperfection of God or, in other words, by negating any such negation of him.²

It is this move whereby he shows that God is all perfect that justifies

1. See SCG I, cc. 14–27; ST I, q. 3, Introduction (Leon. 4.35).

2. Editio Leonina manualis, pp. 29–30. See his introductory remarks, especially: “Et dico universaliter perfectum cui non deest alicuius generis nobilitas.” Then note from his first argument: “Igitur si aliquid est cui competit tota virtus essendi, ei nulla nobilitatum deesse potest quae alicui rei conveniat.” Also see the argument beginning with the first “*Amplius*.” Cf. his similar procedure in ST I, qq. 3–11.

Thomas's going on here and in his other major synthetic treatments of the divine names to assign certain names to God that seem to be positive in content, such as goodness, wisdom, life, and of course, being. And while he continues to deny that in this life we can know what God is (reach quidditative knowledge of him), in his later treatments in *De potentia*, q. 7 and in ST I, he maintains that we can predicate such names of God *substantialiter*. But even this applies only to the *res significata* of such names, not to the way in which they signify. The way in which they signify, their *modus significandi*, must always be denied even when we predicate such positive names of God. We find Thomas following this same order not only in SCG I, but in ST I, qq. 3–11 and, for that matter, in his *Compendium theologiae*. It is true that successful predication of such positive names of God also involves Thomas's defense of analogical predication of the divine names. And it is significant that in his synthetic presentations he develops his theory of analogy only after he has considered and rejected the possibility of quidditative knowledge of God on our part. Hence it seems that an adequate presentation of his theory of the divine names must take into account both his treatment of quidditative knowledge of God and his defense of analogy.³

It is not my purpose in this chapter, however, to revisit in any detail his discussion of quidditative knowledge of God and his theory of analogy. Here I will concentrate on an underlying metaphysical presupposition, a principle at least if not an axiom as I have, perhaps prematurely, described it in my title, namely that “every agent produces something like itself” (*omne agens agit sibi simile*). Thomas frequently has recourse to this principle when, while defending analogical predication of the divine names, he rejects merely equivocal predication of such names. So too, he falls back on this same principle in rejecting what he regards as the too restrictive position concerning such names advanced by Moses Maimonides. In other words, he appeals to this principle when he wants

3. In SCG I, c. 30, Thomas concludes with the remark that we cannot know what God is, but only what he is not and how other things are related to him, i.e., we can have no quidditative knowledge of him. It is not until cc. 32–34 that he examines the issue of univocal, equivocal, and analogical predication of the divine names. In ST I, qq. 3–11 are directed to showing how God is not. Q. 12 examines how God is known by us, and in a. 12 Thomas denies that we can ever reach quidditative knowledge of him by using natural reason or even, according to a. 13, by relying on revelation. In q. 13, a. 2 he nonetheless defends the position he had developed in *De potentia*, q. 7, a. 5, i.e., that certain names can be predicated of God substantially. And then, only in q. 13, a. 5, does he develop and defend his theory of analogical predication of such names. In the *Compendium theologiae* he rejects quidditative knowledge of God on our part in cc. 24 and 26, and then in c. 27 he explicitly rejects univocal and equivocal predication of the divine names and defends analogical predication. On this see my *Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas*, c. 9; and *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas*, ch. XIII, esp. p. 544, n. 144.

to overcome excessive agnosticism with respect to meaningful predication of certain positive names of God.⁴

If I may state this briefly, let us assume with Aquinas, for the sake of this discussion, that he has already demonstrated the existence of God as the first efficient cause. If a perfection such as goodness or being may be predicated of creatures and God with any positive content when it is applied to God, this can only be because there is some similarity or likeness between that perfection as it is present in creatures and viewed as an effect and that perfection as realized in God, its uncaused cause. Often enough Thomas establishes this likeness by appealing to the principle that every agent produces something like itself. Because of this one may reason from the presence of that perfection in a creature viewed as an effect to its presence in some way in God, its First Cause.⁵

In this investigation, therefore, I propose first to consider some of the texts in which Thomas appeals to this principle, and in a second part, to examine why he accepts it.

1. APPLICATIONS OF THE PRINCIPLE/AXIOM

Thomas's applications of this principle range over many different contexts, both philosophical and theological.⁶ Here, however, I shall concentrate on those contexts where Thomas appeals to this principle to justify philosophically predication of certain names of God. For instance, in his very early Commentary on I *Sentences* dating from 1252, at distinction 22, q. 1, a. 2, Thomas defends the view that some names can be predicated of God properly, i.e., not metaphorically. Thomas begins by observing that every perfection present in creatures descends from God as from its exemplar cause and hence as from a principle that precontains in itself

4. References will be given below to illustrate each of these situations.

5. See for instance, ST I, q. 13, a. 2: "Intellectus autem noster, cum cognoscat Deum ex creaturis, sic cognoscit ipsum, secundum quod creaturae ipsum repraesentant. . . . Unde quaelibet creatura intantum eum repraesentat, et est ei similis, inquantum perfectionem aliquam habet . . ." (Leon. 4.142). Cf. a. 5: "Et sic quidquid dicitur de Deo et creaturis, dicitur secundum quod est aliquis ordo creaturae ad Deum, ut ad principium et causam, in qua praexistunt excellenter omnes rerum perfectiones" (Leon. 4.147).

6. See, for instance, *In I Sent.*, d. 7, q. 1, a. 1, where Thomas draws upon it in his effort to show that there is a *potentia generativa* in God with respect to the generation of the Son by the Father according to likeness, indeed in this case, according to identity in nature (Mandonnet ed., Vol. 1, pp. 176–77); SCG I, c. 49, where Thomas cites the principle in order to show that God understands other things: "Adhuc. Omnis effectus in sua causa aequaliter praexistit similitudo: cum omne agens agat sibi simile" (ed. cit., p. 47); SCG II, c. 22 ("*Praeterea*"), where Thomas appeals to it as part of one of his arguments to prove that no effect can be excluded from divine agency on the grounds that it bears no likeness to him because "omne ens, inquantum habet esse, sit ei simile," and where he has explicitly cited the principle in the preceding paragraph (p. 108).

the perfections of all things. But no creature can receive such a perfection according to the manner in which it is present in God. Hence, in accord with its limited way of being received in any creature, such a perfection falls short of perfectly representing its divine exemplar.⁷

Given this, Thomas comments that there is a certain gradation among creatures in that some receive more excellent perfections from God and participate in them more fully than do others. One must therefore distinguish between the *res significata* of such names and their *modus significandi*. Since we must derive from creatures the names of perfections we may assign to God, such names will always fall short of representing him with respect to their way of signifying (*modus significandi*). But if we consider the thing signified by such names, some are imposed to signify primarily perfections as they are exemplated by God in himself without including any reference to the particular way in which they are realized in creatures. We often refer to these as pure perfections. Other names, however, always imply some reference to a finite way of participating in the perfection they signify, and hence, we may infer, always include imperfection in their *res significata*. We often refer to these as mixed perfections. Thomas concludes that names of the first kind are properly said of God and indeed in primary fashion with respect to that which they signify, though not, of course, with respect to their way of signifying. As examples of such names he cites knowledge, wisdom, goodness, being (*essentia*) and all names of this kind as mentioned by Anselm in his *Monologion*, c. 15.⁸

While there is no explicit citation of our principle here, it is implied in that Thomas rests the justification for predicating names of pure perfections of God on our recognition that, insofar as we find these perfections in creatures, they depend on God as their exemplar cause. In other words, they imitate him. If one has established this, one can reason in reverse fashion and apply such names to him in some nonmetaphorical way.⁹

In his somewhat later but still early Commentary on the *De Trinitate* of Boethius (ca. 1257/1258 or perhaps 1259) in q. 1, a. 2 Thomas asks whether the human mind can arrive at knowledge of God. Thomas responds that in this life God can be known by us only by means of forms

7. Mandonnet ed., Vol. 1, p. 535.

8. Ibid. For Anselm see his *Monologion*, c. 15, in *S. Anselmi Cantuariensis Archiepiscopi Opera Omnia*, ed. F. Schmitt (Stuttgart-Bad Canstatt, 1968), Vol. 1, pp. 28–29. Note especially: “Quare necesse est eam esse viventem, sapientem, potentem et omnipotentem, veram, iustam, beatam, aeternam, et quidquid similiter absolute melius est quam non ipsum” (p. 29:29–31).

9. See Mandonnet ed., Vol. 1, pp. 534–35, and my *The Metaphysical Thought*, pp. 506–7.

found in his effects.¹⁰ But effects are of two kinds. Some are equal to the power of their cause. Through such an effect the power of its cause can be fully known. Another kind of effect falls short of the perfection of its cause. By knowing such an effect we cannot fully grasp the power of its agent and, consequently, neither can we know its essence. We can know only that its cause exists. Because every created effect enjoys only the latter kind of relationship to God, in the present life, by reasoning from effect to God, we can know of him only that he is.¹¹

But there are degrees even in such deficient knowledge. A cause is more perfectly known from its effect when by means of the effect the relationship between the cause and effect is more perfectly grasped. Thus in the human intellect's advance in its knowledge of God, one will arrive at a more perfect knowledge that God is (1) insofar as God's power in producing a given effect is more perfectly known; (2) insofar as he is known as the cause of more excellent effects that, because they are more like God, better reflect his eminence, and (3) insofar as one advances in recognizing that God is far removed from all of those things that appear in his effects.¹² Of interest to us is his assumption that an effect must in some way be like its cause (see his second step).¹³

With this we may turn to Thomas's slightly later discussion in *Summa contra Gentiles* I. As we have already mentioned, in Bk I, c. 28, he has argued for God's perfection. Fortified by this conclusion, in c. 29 he discusses the similarity that creatures have and do not have with God. While effects that fall short of their causes do not agree with them either in name or in intelligible content (*ratio*), Thomas insists that there must be some likeness between them: "It is of the nature of action that an agent produce something like itself, since each and every thing acts insofar as it is in act." Therefore, he continues, the form of an effect must be found in some way (even) in a cause that surpasses it in perfection, but according to another mode of being and with a different intelligible content. This is why such a cause is referred to as an equivocal cause.¹⁴

To illustrate his point, Thomas draws an analogy with the sun. Based though it is on an outmoded physics, this analogy is worth noting in order to help us appreciate his point. According to this view, the sun causes

10. See Leon. 50.84:81–82.

11. Leon. 50.84:82–95.

12. Leon. 50.84:105–85:115.

13. "secundo prout nobiliorum effectuum causa cognoscitur, qui cum eius similitudinem gerant, magis eminentiam eius commendant . . ." (Leon. 50.84:110–112).

14. *Ed. Leon. man.*, p. 31: "Effectus enim a suis causis deficientes non conveniunt cum eis in nomine et ratione, necesse est tamen aliquam inter ea similitudinem inveniri: de natura enim actionis est ut agens sibi simile agat, cum unumquodque agat secundum quod actu est." See N. Kretzmann, *The Metaphysics of Theism*, Vol. 1, p. 145. He stresses the point that for Aquinas likeness means sharing the same (kind of) form. Also see pp. 149–50.

heat in lower bodies by acting insofar as it is in act. Therefore the heat generated by the sun in lower bodies bears some likeness to that active power in the sun whereby the sun produces it. But heat as produced in lower bodies differs in nature (in kind) from that active power whereby the sun produces it and, therefore, from heat as it is realized in the sun. Consequently, the sun is in some way like the heat it produces in its effects, and at the same time is also unlike it. So too, continues Thomas, God produces the perfections present in all other things, and consequently bears both some likeness and some unlikeness to them all.¹⁵

Against this background Thomas is now in position in c. 30 and thereafter to defend the view that certain names such as goodness, wisdom, and being which signify pure perfections can be predicated of God and of other things. But as he brings out here again in c. 30, perhaps more clearly than anywhere else in his corpus, such names carry with them the built-in deficiency we have already noted. While what such names signify—their *res significata*—involves no imperfection, every such name involves some deficiency with respect to the way in which it signifies when it is applied to God. Hence the *modus significandi* of any such name must be denied of him. And so at the end of this chapter he draws the oft-quoted conclusion that we cannot grasp what God is, but only what he is not, and how other things stand in relation to him.¹⁶

In c. 31 Thomas draws upon this same thinking in his effort to show that our predicating different names of God does not militate against the divine simplicity. The perfections found in other things are attributed to God in the way equivocal effects are present in their cause, as he has shown in c. 29. But such effects are present in the power of their cause in the way heat is present in the sun, as he recalls his analogy with the sun. The sun is said to be hot not merely by reason of that power whereby it produces heat, he now reasons, but also because the power by which it produces heat is something that is like heat. (Here we should recall that in c. 29 he has also indicated that heat as realized here on earth differs in nature or in kind from heat as it is present in the sun.) So too, *mutatis mutandis*, we must attribute to God according to his single power the perfections of all things that are realized in them according to different forms. In God this power is identical with his essence. Thus God is said to be wise not merely because he causes wisdom but also because, insofar as we are wise, we thereby imitate that power whereby he makes us wise.

15. Ed. cit., p. 31. Note that Thomas corrects himself near the end of this chapter by remarking that it is better to say that a creature is like God rather than that God is like a creature. Cf. Kretzmann, pp. 150ff.

16. Ed. cit., p. 32: "Non enim de Deo capere possumus quid est, sed quid non est, et qualiter alia se habeant ad ipsum."

In other words, Thomas again rests his case on the likeness that obtains between a cause and its effect, no matter how great the lack of likeness between them.¹⁷

And so Thomas rejects univocal predication of divine names in c. 32, and purely equivocal predication in c. 33. In his first argument against purely equivocal predication he reasons that if such names were purely equivocal, the fact that a name is imposed on one thing, i.e., an effect, would not imply that that thing bears any relationship to another thing which receives the same name, i.e., its cause. But he counters that this is not true of certain names that we predicate of creatures and God. An ordering or relationship between an effect and its cause is implied by such names, as he has shown in c. 29.¹⁸

And in a second argument in c. 33 Thomas reasons that where equivocal predication obtains, no likeness is expressed between the things named. But he recalls that in c. 29 he has already shown that there is some kind of likeness between creatures and God. And, I would recall, there he had explicitly appealed to our axiom or principle to prove that there is some such likeness. And so he goes on in c. 34 to adopt analogical predication of divine names, not the analogy of many to one perfection in which all would share in some way, but the analogy of one to another, i.e., that of an effect to its cause.¹⁹

For another helpful discussion of all of this we may turn to Thomas's *De potentia*, q. 7, dating from 1265–1266. Here in q. 7, a. 5 he goes beyond his earlier texts, or so I maintain, in holding that certain divine names, such as good, wise, etc., do signify the divine substance, although they do not yield any kind of quidditative knowledge of God. In developing this point he presents and criticizes the view of Moses Maimonides.²⁰

As Aquinas understands Maimonides, such names when predicated of God do not signify the divine substance. When applied to God, they may be understood in either of two ways. Taken in one way, they simply describe some similarity between the effects of God and the effects of created causes. Thus if we say that God is wise, wisdom here does not signify anything that is really present in God; it signifies only that he acts in the manner of one who is wise with respect to his effects. Or else such names simply signify negatively. Thus if we refer to God as living, we do not mean that life is something really present in him. We merely deny of

17. *Ibid.*, p. 32.

18. *Ibid.*, c. 33, p. 34. On this see Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought*, pp. 558–60.

19. *Ibid.*, cc. 33, 34, p. 34. See Wippel, *ibid.*, pp. 560–61.

20. See *De potentia Dei*, ed. P. M. Pession (Turin-Rome, p. 1965), p. 198. On Thomas's development concerning our ability to predicate some names of God *substantialiter*, see my *The Metaphysical Thought*, ch. XIII, section 1, especially the summary on pp. 540–43.

him that mode of being whereby nonliving things exist. Or if we say that God is intelligent, we do not take this as signifying something really present in God. We merely deny of God the mode of being whereby brute animals exist.²¹

Thomas rejects both of these approaches as inadequate and as incorrect (*inconveniens*). Instead he turns to the view of Pseudo-Dionysius, according to whom names of this type—names of pure perfections—do signify the divine substance albeit in deficient and imperfect fashion. Since every agent acts insofar as it is in act, and therefore produces something like itself, the form of any effect must be present in its efficient cause in some way. Sometimes the effect is equal to the power of the agent, and the same name and definition will apply to both. In this case they coincide in species, and Thomas describes these as univocal causes. But on other occasions the effect is not equal to the power of its cause. Then the form of the effect will not agree in definition with that present in the agent. It will be present in the agent more eminently. And insofar as it is present in the agent, the agent must have the power to produce it. But because the total power of the agent is not expressed by such an effect, it follows that the mode whereby the form is in the agent surpasses the mode whereby it is present in the effect. In this case we are dealing with equivocal causes, as when the sun generates fire.²²

Thomas, of course, holds that created effects are related to God only in the second way, not in the first. Each must fall short of the power of God. Therefore the form of no effect is present in a creature and in God with the same definition (*ratio*). Rather those forms that are present in different effects in distinct and varied fashion must be united in God as in one common power whereby he produces them all.²³

Accordingly, the perfections of creatures are likened to God according to his one and simple essence. But since our intellect takes its knowledge from created things, it is informed by the likenesses of the perfections it finds in creatures, such as wisdom, power, goodness, etc. “Therefore, just as created things through their perfections are in some way like God, albeit in deficient fashion, so too is our intellect informed by the (intelligible) species of such perfections.” Once again we see how critical for

21. *De potentia*, q. 7, a. 5, p. 198. For Maimonides see *The Guide of the Perplexed*, trans. S. Pines (Chicago, 1963), I, cc. 52–59, esp. c. 58 (pp. 134–37).

22. *De potentia*, p. 198.

23. *Ibid.* On this also see Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought*, pp. 523–27. For references to literature on this in Maimonides see pp. 523–24, n. 81. Also see G. P. Rocca, *Speaking the Incomprehensible God: Thomas Aquinas on the Interplay of Positive and Negative Theology* (Washington, D.C., 2004), pp. 298–99, n. 20. His general discussion of “Aquinas’s Positive Theology” (pp. 297–313) is also helpful, although written from a theological perspective.

Thomas's defense of meaningful predication of such names of God is his claim that the perfections present in creatures are in some way like their divine cause. And he has used our principle to establish this.²⁴

In q. 7, a. 7 Thomas defends analogical predication of certain divine names by eliminating both univocal and purely equivocal predication. In making his case against equivocal predication he again refers to the view of Maimonides, which he had already criticized in a. 5. Now he counters that in the case of equivocal predication something is not said of one thing because of its relationship to another when the same name is applied to both. But things that are said of God and creatures are said of God because of some relationship that obtains between creatures and God. Moreover, he again explicitly states, an effect must in some way be like its cause. So once more we see our axiom being employed. If an effect must be like its cause, this is because every agent produces something like itself. Thomas again ends by adopting analogical predication of such names, not the analogy of many to one, but the analogy of one to another.²⁵

We will now turn briefly to the *Summa theologiae* I. After having completed the Five Ways in q. 2, a. 3, Thomas introduces q. 3 by noting that because we cannot know what God is, but only what he is not, we will now consider first, how he is not, second, how he is known by us, and third, how he is named by us.²⁶ And so in qq. 3–11 he concentrates on the first of these tasks—to show how God is not. As in SCG I he again uses the way of negation in q. 3 to show that God is simple, i.e., not composed in any way; but here he turns much more quickly than he had in SCG I to show in q. 4 that God is perfect. Here too he uses the way of negation by denying any lack of perfection to God.²⁷

In his first argument in q. 4, a. 2 he reasons that whatever perfection is present in an effect must also be present in its efficient cause, either with the same intelligible content (*ratio*) if the agent is univocal, or more eminently if the agent is equivocal. This is so because an effect preexists virtually in, that is, within the power of, its efficient cause. And since God is the first efficient cause of all things, the perfections of things must preexist in him in a more eminent way.²⁸ Even so, we may still ask

24. Ed. cit., pp. 198–99. Note: “Unde sicut res creatae per suas perfectiones aliquantulum licet deficienter—Deo assimilantur, ita et intellectus noster harum perfectionum speciebus informatur.”

25. Ed. cit., pp. 203–4. See Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought*, pp. 563–66.

26. Leon. 4.35.

27. For q. 4, a. 1 see Leon. 4.50–51. For more on his procedure in qq. 3–11 see Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought*, pp. 529–33.

28. Leon. 4.51–52.

whether this is enough to show that created effects are really like God in the formal sense.

And so in q. 4, a. 3 Thomas attempts to show that creatures are in some formal way like God. Again he distinguishes different degrees in which one thing may be like another. But even in the case of things, that is, effects and causes, that are not like one another by sharing in a form that is defined in the same way—nonunivocal causes and effects—he insists that every agent produces something like itself insofar as it is an agent. And, he adds, each thing acts in accord with its form. Because of this, there must be some likeness of the form of the agent in the effect.²⁹ In this case the form in the effect will be like the form of the agent only according to some kind of analogical similarity, in the way in which *esse* is common to all things. It is in this way that things produced by God are like him insofar as they are beings, thereby being likened to him as the first and universal principle of all being.³⁰

And in his defense of analogical predication of names of pure perfections of God in q. 13, a. 5, he recalls that whatever is said of God and a creature is said of the latter insofar as it is in some way ordered to God as to its principle and cause, in which cause the perfections of other things preexist in excellent fashion.³¹

Having seen how heavily Thomas relies on the claim that every effect must be like its cause in some way, and how that follows from the principle that every agent produces something like itself, we may still ask: What justification does Thomas offer for this principle, what we may call the principle or axiom of similitude, and especially for applying it to the relation between creatures and God?

2. THOMAS'S JUSTIFICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE/AXIOM OF SIMILITUDE

On many occasions Thomas is content simply to cite this principle and employ it without offering any justification for it. So true is this that some have concluded that he regards it as a self-evident principle. For instance, Battista Mondin in his book *The Principle of Analogy in Protestant*

29. *Ibid.*, pp. 53–54. Note that here again he appeals to the example of the sun. See Kretzmann, *The Metaphysics of Theism*, Vol. 1, pp. 152–53.

30. Leon. 4.54: “Si igitur sit aliquod agens, quod non in genere contineatur, effectus eius adhuc magis accedent remote ad similitudinem formae agentis: non tamen ita quod participant similitudinem formae agentis secundum eandem rationem speciei aut generis, sed secundum aliqualem analogiam, sicut ipsum esse est commune omnibus. Et hoc modo illa quae sunt a Deo, assimilantur ei in quantum sunt entia, ut primo et universali principio totius esse.”

31. Leon. 4.147. For another reference to the sun example see p. 146.

and *Catholic Theology*, cites a number of examples of such usage by Thomas and concludes, perhaps a little hastily, that sometimes “Aquinas says that the principle *omne agens agit simile sibi* is self-evident”³² Thomas does not actually *say* this so far as I can determine in any of these texts cited by Mondin or in any of those I have consulted. Nonetheless, it must be acknowledged that he does often use it without justifying it.

2A. Inductive Justifications

Mondin also points out that on other occasions Thomas “tries to prove it inductively.” And indeed on at least one occasion, in *Summa contra Gentiles* III, c. 69, Thomas explicitly states that it is evident by induction that in all cases what is like produces something like itself.³³ Here he is offering one of a series of arguments against those who would deny causal agency to natural entities.³⁴ There are other texts where he uses such an approach, and especially in contexts where he finds it in Aristotle. For instance, in *Metaphysics* XII, c. 3, Aristotle writes:

Next [note] that each substance comes into being from something of the same name. (For natural things and others are substances). For things come into being by art or by nature or by chance or by spontaneity (1070a 4–7).³⁵

In his Commentary on this text, Thomas explains Aristotle as meaning by this that every substance comes into being from an agent that is univocal, i.e., one that is similar to it in terms of form. Accepting Aristotle’s reference to things as coming into being by art, or by nature, or by chance, or spontaneously, he notes with Aristotle that art differs from nature because art is a principle of acting on another, whereas nature is a principle of action and motion in that in which it is present. It is clear, continues Thomas, that those things that are generated by art are made by some-

32. (The Hague, 1963), p. 86. Cf. P. Rosemann, *Omne Agens Agit Sibi Simile. A “Repetition” of Scholastic Metaphysics* (Leuven, 1996), p. 25, where in referring to the central notions of the “Scholastic theory of causal similarity,” he writes that these notions “constitute the basic assumptions of medieval metaphysics which underlie everything that is expressed in it, while their own justification remains unexpressed.”

33. For Mondin see p. 86. For Thomas see Ed. Leon. man.: “Item. Apparet per inductionem in omnibus quod simile agat suum simile” (p. 304).

34. Ed. cit., p. 304.

35. Translation mine in light of the Ross translations as found in R. McKeon, *The Basic Works of Aristotle* (New York, 1941), and in J. Barnes, *The Complete Works of Aristotle* (Princeton, 1984), Vol. 2. The Moerbeke Latin translation used by Thomas here reads: “Postea quia quaeque ex univoco fit substantia; nam et quae sunt natura substantia et alia. Aut enim arte aut natura fiunt aut fortuna aut casu” (*Aristoteles Latinus* XXV.3.2, p. 249). Rosemann comments that the first sentence just cited is the “first explicit formulation of the law of similarity in the history of philosophy” (p. 54).

thing similar to themselves. For a builder produces a house in matter by means of the form of that house that he has in his mind. So, too, the same appears in nature, because a human being generates a human being. And, writes Thomas, since this applies to things that come into being by art and by nature, it is evident that each and everything is generated by something like itself.³⁶ He excludes things produced by chance or spontaneously.³⁷

However, in this text Thomas makes no effort to extend this principle of similitude to divine agency or creative causality. And this again prompts one to raise the question whether any inductive defense of the principle based on observation of natural agency, or on the generation or production of things by means of art, can justify such an extrapolation or extension of the principle.

Thomas's discussion of this principle here in his Commentary on *Metaphysics* XII is very similar to remarks he makes in commenting on *Metaphysics* VII, cc. 7–8. In commenting on c. 7 he follows Aristotle in singling out the need for matter, an agent, and the resulting composite to account for cases of natural generation (lectio 6, n. 1386). Thomas comments that the principle by which generation occurs, that is, the agent, is the same in species as the nature of that which is generated, although the two differ numerically; for a human being generates a human being (n. 1391). He also observes that this applies to things generated by art, noting that in this case the form that is introduced into matter proceeds from a form that exists in one's own mind (nn. 1404–1410). And while following Aristotle in taking this as established in commenting on c. 8, Thomas acknowledges that in some cases there is doubt concerning whether a generating principle is similar to what is generated. Again he notes that in certain cases this is evident, for a human being generates a human being and a horse a horse, and each natural thing generates something that is like it in species. But, with Aristotle he recognizes that something may be generated that is *praeter naturam*, i.e., beyond the purpose or intention of a given particular nature, as when a horse generates a mule. But even in this case he reasons that in some way the generating principle is like what is generated, not in species, to be sure, but in some unnamed proximate genus that is common both to the horse and the donkey, and into which the mule also falls (lectio 7, nn. 1432–1433).³⁸ But throughout these texts it is clear that Thomas does not move from this quasi-inductive approach to an application of the principle of simili-

36. See *In XII Met.*, lect. 3, n. 2444.

37. *Ibid.*, n. 2445.

38. For this last point in Aristotle see *Metaphysics* VII, c. 8 (1033b 29–1034a 2).

tude to divine agency. Here he restricts it to natural agency and human artistic production.³⁹

One would expect this restriction to apply to all of Thomas's attributions of this principle to Aristotle. And this proves to be true in most instances. However, in his early Commentary on I *Sentences*, d. 36, q. 2, a. 3, while defending the presence of ideas in God for all the things he knows, Thomas connects our axiom with Aristotle. He had argued in the preceding article that a divine idea is the divine essence insofar as it is an exemplar imitated by a creature in a given way.⁴⁰

And now, on the authority of Pseudo-Dionysius (*De divinis nominibus*, c. 5), he writes that a (divine) idea is a likeness or *ratio* of a thing that exists in God insofar as it is productive and predeterminative of things. And therefore, he continues, each and every thing, insofar as it is produced by God, must have an idea in God. But whatever is produced by a per se agent must, insofar as it is produced by that agent, imitate it. And in support of this seeming universal application of our principle, he cites Aristotle's *De anima* II, where Aristotle proves that "like produces what is like itself" both in the case of things that act by will and in the case of those that act by necessity. From this Thomas concludes that insofar as something is produced by God, it must have a likeness in him, and therefore an idea in him and be known by him in accord with this idea.⁴¹

39. For further distinctions and clarifications one may consult Thomas's Commentary on c. 9 (see *Lectio* 8), as well as the discussion in Rosemann, pp. 54–56. For Thomas's references in other passages to this principle in Aristotle see, for instance, SCG II, c. 6, arg. 4 (*Adhuc*), where he notes that it is a sign of perfection in lower beings that they can produce things like themselves, as is clear from Aristotle in *Meteorology* IV, with the editors supplying a reference to c. 3, 980a (Ed. Leon. man., p. 96). Also see SCG II, c. 76 (*Adhuc*) where he argues that the agent intellect does not produce intelligible species in actuality in order that it should be understood by means of them, but in order that the possible intellect should do so. Therefore it produces them only insofar as it is appropriate for the possible intellect to understand: "Tales autem facit eas quales est ipse: nam omne agens agit sibi simile" (p. 182). Here the editors see a reference to Aristotle's *De generatione et corruptione* I, c. 7 (324a). Unfortunately, in neither of these instances do Thomas's respective Commentaries on Aristotle reach the point in Aristotle's texts indicated by the editors. But in neither of these references in SCG does Thomas attribute to Aristotle any application of the principle to divine causality. And in his Commentary on *De generatione et corruptione* I, c. 5 (see *lectio* 13), Thomas paraphrases Aristotle's claim that the efficient cause of things coming to be is either an actual thing, which is identical in species or in genus with its effect or, if not, at least something that exists in actuality (*In De generatione et corruptione expositio*, ed. R. Spiazzi [Marietti, 1952]), p. 370, n. 94. But Thomas does not interpret Aristotle as applying this to divine agency.

40. *In I Sent.*, d. 36, q. 2, a. 2 (Mandonnet ed., Vol. 1, pp. 841–42).

41. Mandonnet ed., Vol. 1, p. 844. Note especially: "Omne autem quod ab aliquo agente per se producitur, oportet quod secundum hoc quod ab ipso effectum est ipsum imitetur; quia, ut probat Philosophus, II *De anima*, text. 34, simile agit sibi simile, tam in his quae agunt per voluntatem quam in his quae agunt per necessitatem." For more on the general context for this discussion see my *Thomas Aquinas on the Divine Ideas* (The Etienne Gilson Series 16), Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1993, pp. 2–10.

Of greatest interest to us here is Thomas's appeal to Aristotle's *De anima*. There in Bk II, c. 4 (415a 26–415b 1), while describing the operations of the nutritive soul, Aristotle writes:

For it is the most natural function in living things, such as are perfect and not mutilated or do not have spontaneous generation, to produce another thing like themselves—an animal to produce an animal, a plant a plant—in order that they may partake of the everlasting and divine in so far as they can.⁴²

In his much later Commentary on the *De anima* (1267–1268), at this particular point Thomas follows Aristotle's text very carefully and more or less paraphrases it. He notes that a living thing produces another of the same kind because an animal produces an animal and a plant a plant. Thomas takes these examples as signifying generic likeness and goes on to add that this also applies to specific likeness, by citing a human being producing a human being and an olive tree an olive tree. From these examples he concludes, based again on a limited kind of induction, that it is natural for living things to produce others of the same kind so that they may always participate insofar as they can in the divine and immortal, that is, explains Thomas, by being likened to this insofar as possible.⁴³

So far as our principle is concerned, therefore, here it is limited in Aristotle to natural reproduction of the living by the living. In his Commentary on the *De anima* Thomas does not attempt to extend the likeness between effect and cause to that between created effects and God. Indeed, by the time of the *Summa contra Gentiles*, dating from 1259–1264, one finds Thomas there citing our axiom 28 times, with slight variations, but without attributing it to Aristotle or to any of his works. Gauthier, who has assembled all of these references, notes that while the thought is found on many occasions in Aristotle, it is never expressed there in these terms but “toujours diluée.”⁴⁴ At the same time, in these texts Thomas often enough does apply it universally or transcendentally, i.e., to created effects and God, but without attributing this transcendent application to Aristotle. And from what we have seen so far, inductive justifications are not likely to succeed in justifying any such transcendent application of this principle. At least by the time of his commentaries on Aristotle, Thomas seems to have recognized this.

42. For the English translation see *Aristotle's De Anima books II, III*, trans. D. W. Hamilyn (Oxford: Clarendon, 1977), p. 17.

43. See his *Sententia Libri Secundi De anima*, cap. viii (Leon. 45.1.96–97).

44. See his *Saint Thomas d'Aquin. Somme contre les gentils. Introduction* (Paris, 1993), p. 96. Gauthier points out that the honor of giving this adage its definitive form goes to Michael the Scot in his translation of Averroes's Great Commentary on the *De Anima*, II, comm. 118 (*Commentarium Magnum in Aristotelis De Anima Libros*, ed. F. Stuart Crawford [Cambridge, Mass., 1953], p. 314:14): “Omne agens agit sibi simile in actu.”

2B. Deductive Justifications

In some of the texts we touched on in the first part of this chapter and elsewhere, Thomas offers what may be regarded as a more deductive approach to our principle, especially in his efforts to extend the likeness that generally obtains between effects and causes to that between creatures and God. For instance, as we have noted above, in *Summa contra Gentiles* I, c. 28, Thomas argues that God is all perfect by denying any lack of perfection to him. And then in c. 29 he attempts to show that, the great diversity between perfections as realized in any creature and in God notwithstanding, there is still some likeness of creatures to God. He writes:

For it is of the nature of action that an agent produce something like itself, since each and every thing acts insofar as it is in act. Therefore the form of an effect is found in some way in a cause that surpasses it, but according to another mode and with another intelligible content.⁴⁵

This argument moves very quickly. If we may reconstruct its steps:

1. Each and every thing acts insofar as it is in act.
2. Therefore it is of the nature of action that an agent produce something like itself.
3. Therefore the form of an effect is present in some way in a cause that surpasses it (in perfection).

As regards proposition (1)—that each and every thing acts insofar as it is in act—Thomas seems to base this on the common sense view that if something is to produce something else in actuality, it must itself exist in actuality. In other words, nonexistent agents do not actually produce effects. And at this point in SCG I, Thomas can assume that he has already proved that God exists.

More difficult to understand, however, is the transition from this to proposition (2)—that because each and every thing acts insofar as it is in act, therefore it is of the nature of action that an agent produce something like itself. It is easy enough to grant that if an agent produces a given effect, it must actually exist and must have the power to produce that effect, indeed, to use Thomas's terminology on other occasions, it must virtually precontain that effect. But does it automatically follow from this

45. Ed. Leon. man., p. 31: "de natura enim actionis est ut agens sibi simile agat, cum unumquodque agat secundum quod actu est. Unde forma effectus in causa excedente invenitur quidem aliquo modo, sed secundum alium modum et aliam rationem, ratione cuius causa aequivoca dicitur." Thomas goes on to appeal to his analogy with the sun to illustrate this.

that the effect it produces must be like some perfection that is formally present in the agent?

If one grants proposition (2) in the sense just indicated, then proposition (3) follows. In other words, if one grants that it is of the nature of action that an agent produce something like itself as it is formally in itself, then one may conclude that the form of an effect must in some way be like a form present in its equivocal and surpassing agent, although not in the same way nor with precisely the same meaning.⁴⁶

Even so, it seems that Thomas's argument for similitude in SCG I, c. 29 needs some buttressing in order to justify his concluding that the forms of pure perfections as realized in creatures must in some way be like such perfections as they are formally present in a divine agent. One way of doing this may be to recall that in c. 28 he has already established the point that God is all perfect. According to the first argument Thomas offers there, the degree of excellence of a thing is in accord with its degree of being. Therefore if there is something to which the total power of being (*virtus essendi*) pertains, no perfection that can belong to any being can be lacking to it. But the total power (*potestas*) of being belongs to that being which is identical with its act of being, just as, if there were some separate subsisting whiteness, nothing of the power of whiteness would be lacking to it. But God is identical with his act of being, as Thomas has shown in c. 22. Therefore God possesses *esse* according to the total power of being and consequently cannot lack any excellence that may pertain to any thing.⁴⁷

And in another argument (*Amplius*) Thomas reasons that each and every thing is perfect insofar as it is in act. But something is imperfect insofar as it is in potency in the sense that it lacks actuality. Therefore that which is in potency in no way whatsoever but is pure actuality must be most perfect. But God is such. Therefore God is most perfect.⁴⁸

Then one may reason that since God is all perfect, he must possess in preeminent fashion the perfections of all things, formally in the case of pure perfections, or virtually in the case of mixed perfections. For to the extent that any effect shares in a pure perfection in any way whatsoever, to that extent the effect must in some albeit different and analogical way be like that perfection as it is realized in God, its all perfect cause.

A few years earlier, in *De veritate* q. 2, a. 3, Thomas had offered a very similar justification for our principle as part of his effort there to prove that God knows not only himself but all other things, but there Thomas

46. *Ibid.*

47. Ed. Leon. man., pp. 29–30. Note: “Non potest ergo carere aliqua nobilitate quae alicui rei conveniat.”

48. *Ibid.*, p. 30 (“*Amplius*”).

had arranged the steps differently. In explaining in what manner (*per quem modum*) God knows creatures, he writes:

It must be known, therefore, that since every agent acts insofar as it is in act, what is produced by an agent must in some way be present in that agent. And from this it follows that every agent produces something like itself.⁴⁹

So here he reasons:

1. Every agent acts insofar as it is in act.
2. Therefore, what is produced by an agent must in some way be present in that agent.
3. Therefore every agent produces something like itself.

Proposition (1) is identical with proposition (1) of the argumentation in SCG I, c. 29. As for proposition (2)—what is produced by an agent must in some way be present in that agent—it almost repeats proposition (3), i.e., the conclusion of the argument in SCG I, c. 29, namely, therefore the form of an effect is present in some way in a cause that surpasses it in perfection. Thomas's reason for holding this in the present text presumably rests on the common sense conviction that an agent cannot actually cause that which it does not have. Therefore whatever is produced by the agent must in some way be present in that agent. But one may still ask: Must the perfection found in the effect be formally present in the agent, or only virtually, in the sense that the agent has the power to produce it? And if it is only virtually present in the agent, how does proposition (3) follow therefrom?

With this we will return to *De potentia*, q. 7, a. 5. As we have already seen, in this text Thomas defends the view that certain divine names do signify the divine substance, albeit imperfectly. In rejecting the view of Moses Maimonides and in turning to Dionysius, Thomas bases his claim on the following reasoning:

Since every agent acts insofar as it is in act, and consequently produces something that is in some way like [itself], it is necessary that the form of the effect be present in some way in the agent.⁵⁰

This argument is essentially the same as that of SCG I, c. 29 and follows its order rather than that of the text from the *De veritate*. Thus it reasons:

49. Leon. 22.1.51: "Sciendum est igitur quod cum omne agens agat in quantum est in actu, oportet quod illud quod per agentem efficitur aliquo modo sit in agente, et inde est quod omne agens agit sibi simile."

50. Pession ed., p. 198: "Cum omne agens agat in quantum actu est, et per consequens agat aequaliter simile, oportet formam facti aliquo modo esse in agente."

1. Every agent acts insofar as it is in act.
2. Therefore it produces something that is in some way like itself.
3. Therefore the form of the effect must in some way be present in the agent.

Thomas goes on to apply this reasoning both to univocal causes and to situations where the effect is not equal to the power of its cause. In the latter case the form present in the effect will not agree in definition with that present in its cause, but will be present in the cause more eminently. Because the total power of the agent is not expressed in the effect, the mode whereby the form is present in the agent will surpass that whereby it is present in the effect. After noting that we observe (*videmus*) this situation in all equivocal agents, as when the sun generates fire, he then applies this to God and his effects. Created effects cannot be equal to the power of God, for then he could produce only one effect. But since we find many effects produced by his one and universal power, each of them falls short of his power. Therefore no form present in one of God's effects has the same intelligible content as it actually has in him. And it must be present in God according to a higher mode. From this Thomas concludes that all of those forms that are distinct and divided from one another in different effects are united in God as in one common power. And so the perfections of created things are likened to God according to his one and simple essence.⁵¹

Still, the same concern we expressed above about the argument in SCG I, c. 29 may also be raised here: How does Thomas justify proposition (2) in this argument—that every agent produces something that in some way is like itself? Again he simply derives it from proposition (1)—that every agent acts insofar as it is in act. Does this establish more than the virtual presence of such perfections in God? It seems to me that to show that it does, the argument needs something more, such as an appeal to God's being all perfect, as I have suggested above.

As we have already seen, in ST I, q. 4, a. 2⁵² Thomas again attempts to show that God is all perfect, and in a. 3 that in some way created effects are like God. But instead of proving our principle in that context, he simply incorporates it into his argumentation.⁵³

Since every agent produces something like itself insofar as it is an agent, and each thing acts in accord with its form, in an effect there must be a likeness of the form of the agent.

51. *Ibid.*

52. Leon. 4.51–52

53. Leon. 4.54: "Cum enim omne agens agat sibi simile in quantum est agens, agit autem unumquodque secundum suam formam, necesse est quod in effectu sit similitudo formae agentis."

This conclusion follows, of course, if one has already granted the principle of similitude or at least conceded that it follows immediately from the nature of being an agent. Nonetheless, it may be helpful here to recall the conclusion Thomas draws from applying this to God's causation of his effects. Since he is not contained in any genus (or species), his effects approach to any likeness of the form of their agent even more remotely than effects contained in the same species or genus as their cause, and only according to some kind of analogy insofar as *esse* itself is common to all things. In this way, that is, only analogically, those things which are caused by God are likened to him insofar as they are beings (*entia*), as to the first and universal principle of all *esse*.⁵⁴

CONCLUSION

To sum up, we have found Thomas approaching the principle of similitude in different ways. On many occasions he simply cites it as part of his argumentation to make some other point, and without offering any justification for it. Perhaps on those occasions he did regard it as self-evident, or at least as a generally accepted adage.

On other occasions he approaches the principle of similitude inductively, and at least once appealed to a text from Aristotle's *De anima* to justify extending it to God's causality. But years later, in commenting on that very passage, he avoided making any such extrapolation of the principle, and wisely so.

On still other occasions he seems to deduce this principle from the nature of causal action as such and, on the strength of this, goes on to apply it to divine causality as well. This approach is, it seems to me, the most interesting and the most promising from a philosophical standpoint, but it is rather cryptic. Is this intended to be a proof of the principle of similitude, as I take it, or perhaps only an effort to enable us to recognize it as self-evident, as Mondin claims?⁵⁵ If it is to succeed as a proof, it needs

54. Leon. 4:54: Note: "Si igitur sit aliquod agens, quod non in genere contineatur, effectus eius adhuc magis accedent remote ad similitudinem formae agentis: non tamen ita quod participant similitudinem formae agentis secundum eandem rationem speciei aut generis, sed secundum aliquam analogiam, sicut ipsum esse est commune omnibus. Et hoc modo illa quae sunt a Deo, assimilantur ei in quantum sunt entia, ut primo et universali principio totius esse."

55. *The Principle of Analogy in Protestant and Catholic Theology*, p. 88. According to Mondin, Thomas implicitly deduces it from the principle of sufficient reason. Without agreeing with him that Thomas defended the principle of sufficient reason, I would note the restrictions he rightly points out in Aquinas's application of our principle: (1) cause, as used here, refers only to causes *per se*, not to causes *per accidens*; (2) cause as used here refers to principal causes, not to those that are only instrumental; (3) a cause assimilates its effect to itself only insofar as it is the cause of that effect, not insofar as the effect results from the action of other causes (pp. 89–90).

some strengthening, such as an appeal to God's perfection, as I have suggested above.

Finally, this is not for me to deny that within Thomas's thought there may be other philosophical ways of establishing some analogical likeness between God and creatures.⁵⁶ Hopefully here I have said enough to indicate how frequently Thomas has recourse to this principle or axiom, and what I regard as his best way of justifying it.

56. Surprisingly little has been written about Aquinas's philosophical justification for this principle. For one interesting earlier effort, see J. Bittremieux, "Similitudo creaturae cum Deo fundamentum cognoscibilitatis Dei," *Divus Thomas* (Piacenza) 43 (1940), pp. 310–23, which is a less than satisfactory attempt to develop various arguments for the similitude of creatures to God by drawing on a variety of texts from Thomas and various Thomistic sources without paying attention to the historical context for those texts, and without noting the distinction between virtual and formal possession of such perfections in God. Many of the arguments he proposes presuppose that one has already proved that God is intelligent (see pp. 313–14). But here one must be careful not to employ arguments for the presence of intelligence in God that presuppose the principle of similitude, as does, for instance, Thomas's argument in SCG I, c. 49 to prove that God understands things other than himself (see n. 6 above). In this case, however, Thomas is not guilty of begging the question because he has already argued for a similarity between creatures and God earlier in SCG I, c. 29 although, as we have seen, there he did employ our principle in establishing this similitude. But in the preceding c. 28 he had established the point that God is all perfect which supports his argumentation in c. 29. In his *La creación como asimilación a Dios. Un estudio desde Tomás de Aquino* (Navarra, 1996), J. Pérez Guerrero seems to regard Bittremieux's article as an adequate systematic exposition of all the arguments offered by Thomas in support of the existence in creatures of a certain likeness with God, and then goes on to evaluate and criticize these arguments (pp. 122–36). This weakens his own understanding of Thomas's texts as well as the value of his own evaluations. But to his credit he is aware of the need to establish more than virtual presence in God of perfections found in creatures (p. 127). Rosemann's *Omne Agens Agit Sibi Simile* contains much useful historical background information for his treatment of this axiom or principle in Aquinas, but he does not really come to terms with Thomas's explicit efforts to justify the principle itself, at least so far as I can determine. This may be because he believes that Thomas did not regard such a justification as necessary. And finally, of course, there is the theological approach to establishing creaturely similitude to God, which Thomas certainly accepted, at least as regards human beings, based on the Biblical testimony in Genesis 1:26 to the effect that human beings were made in the image and likeness of God. For this one may see J.-P. Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas. Vol. 2: Spiritual Master*, trans. R. Royal (Washington, D.C., 2003), ch. 4.

Chapter VII

THOMAS AQUINAS ON CREATURES AS CAUSES OF *ESSE*

Among students of Thomas Aquinas, it is well known that he reserved the act of creating to God alone. Apart from some slight hesitation concerning this in his Commentary on the *Sentences*, owing perhaps to his youthful deference to Peter the Lombard, he also denied that any creature could serve as a minister or as an instrumental cause of God in his creative activity.¹ For instance, in *Summa theologiae* I, q. 45, a. 5 he writes: “To produce the act of being (*esse*) in the unqualified sense, and not insofar as it is this or such, belongs to the nature of creation. Therefore it is evident that creation is an action that is proper to God himself.”²

In that same context Thomas acknowledges that it can happen that something participates in the action proper to something else, not by its own power but by acting as an instrument with the power of that other thing. For instance, according to the physics of his time, air was regarded as having the power to heat and to ignite by reason of the power of fire. Accordingly, some held in analogous fashion that, while creation is the proper action of the universal cause, i.e., God, certain lower causes can also create, not insofar as they act on their own but insofar as they act by the power of the First Cause. Thus, continues Thomas, Avicenna held that the first separate substance which is created by God, the First Intelligence, creates another substance (Intelligence) after itself, as well

1. See *In II Sent.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 3 (Mandonnet ed., Vol. 2, pp. 21–22), where Thomas refers to Peter as holding that, while the creative act has not in fact been shared with any creature, it could have been. Here Thomas sees at least some merit in Peter’s position. If he is more inclined to reject Peter’s opinion when he comments on Bk IV, he is still hesitant. See *In IV Sent.*, d. 5, q. 1, a. 3, ad 5 (Moos ed., Vol. 4, pp. 210–11). For Peter’s text see *Sententiae in IV Libris distinctae*, T. II (*Liber III et IV*), Bk IV, d. V, c. 3, n. 3 (Grottaferrata [Rome], 1981) pp. 267:6–17. On this see J. de Finance, *Être et agir dans la philosophie de Saint Thomas*, 2d ed. (Rome, 1960) pp. 142–44.

2. Leon. 4.469: “Producere autem esse absolute, non in quantum est hoc vel tale, pertinet ad rationem creationis. Unde manifestum est quod creatio est propria actio ipsius Dei.”

as the substance (or matter) of the outermost heavenly sphere and its soul as well.³ So too, Thomas notes that Peter the Lombard in his *Sentences*, Bk IV, c. 5 writes that God can communicate to a creature the power to create so that it would create not on its own authority but as a minister of God.⁴

Here as always after the time of his Commentary on the *Sentences*, Thomas flatly rejects any such proposal. A secondary and instrumental cause does not participate in the action of a higher cause unless, by means of an action that is proper to it, it can dispose or prepare in some way for the effect of the principal agent. If it cannot do this, its intervention in the act in question would be pointless. But the act of being taken as such (*esse*) is the proper effect of God and is presupposed for everything else. Since creation does not proceed from any preexisting or presupposed subject, there is nothing on which a created agent could act in a dispositive way and thereby serve as an instrumental cause in God's creative activity. Therefore it is impossible for the act of creating to pertain to any creature, whether by its own power or merely as an instrument or minister of God.⁵

Texts such as these have led various scholars to conclude that, for Thomas, God "alone can produce the very existence of other beings," as É. Gilson expressed this in his *The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas*.⁶ Or as H. Renard put it in his *Philosophy of God*, "there really are two types of efficient causality in the order of existence, two types of existential causes: the cause of the *becoming* which is generally a creature, and the cause of the 'to be' which can only be God."⁷ Or as James Anderson

3. Ibid. In other contexts Thomas shows that he has a much more detailed knowledge of the Avicennian theory than his brief sketch here would indicate. See, for instance, *De potentia*, q. 3, a. 16 (Marietti ed., p. 88); *De substantiis separatis*, c. 10 (Leon. 40.D59). For this in Avicenna, see his *Philosophia prima*, Bk IX, c. 4 in *Avicenna Latinus: Liber de Philosophia Prima sive Scientia Divina V-X*, ed. S. Van Riet (Louvain-Leiden, 1980), pp. 481-84. On Thomas's reaction to this theory, see Ch. II above in this volume.

4. ST I, q. 45, a. 5 (Leon. 4.469).

5. Ibid. Note in particular: "Illud autem quod est proprius effectus Dei creantis, est illud quod praesupponitur omnibus aliis, scilicet esse absolute. . . . Sic igitur impossibile est quod alicui creaturae conveniat creare, neque virtute propria, neque instrumentaliter sive per ministerium." See de Finance, pp. 143-44; and the valuable Ph.D. dissertation by F. X. Meehan, *Efficient Causality in Aristotle and St. Thomas* (Washington, D.C., 1940), pp. 280-82.

6. (New York, 1956), p. 123. Also see Gilson, *Elements of Christian Philosophy* (Garden City, 1960), pp. 175-76; note his remark on p. 175: "But a corollary of this corollary (that to create is an action proper to God) is that no finite being is able to cause the act of being." Gilson recognizes that this issue is controverted but repeats his point on p. 176: "No finite being, then, can produce another act of being." Cf. his *Christian Philosophy*, trans. A. Maurer (Toronto, 1993), p. 93, where he suggests that "in strict Thomistic language (to which, however, St. Thomas does not always restrict himself), it could be said that the secondary cause causes everything in a being (*ens*) except its being (*esse*)."

7. (Milwaukee, 1951), p. 20.

insists in the first chapter of his *The Cause of Being*, to ask whether a finite being can cause existence is really to ask whether existence can be the effect of a change or transformation. Since in his judgment Aquinas's answer to the latter question was negative, Anderson concluded that for him creation is the only possible explanation of the act of existing of any existing substance.⁸

One can easily understand the concern on the part of such scholars to reserve the creative act to God alone, and on this point their reading of Aquinas is surely correct. Even so, within Thomas's metaphysical perspective the conclusion that only God can cause the act of being raises some difficulties on philosophical and on textual grounds. On the philosophical level, if one grants with Thomas that every finite substance consists of an essence principle and a distinct intrinsic act of being (*esse*), what really happens when a new finite substance is generated by natural agency, for instance, a puppy by its parents? Not only must one account for the presence of a new substantial form in prime matter resulting in an individually distinct new essence; the newly generated puppy must also possess its own and distinctive act of being (*esse*). The question of concern to us here has to do with the efficient causality of that new act of being. According to Aquinas, what is generated is not merely the individual new essence, or the new act of being, but the complete entity. But if only God can produce the very existence or the "to be" (*esse*) of things, are we to conclude that, in every such act of generation, two lines of efficient causality must be distinguished? The natural agents, that is, the parents, would be principal efficient causes accounting for the eduction of the new substantial form from matter and the impression of this on pre-existing matter. And God alone would simultaneously be the sole efficient cause of the puppy's new act of being (*esse*).

While some such explanation might possibly be proposed with respect to the generation of a new human being because of the spiritual nature of the human soul and the need for it to be created immediately by God, such an account would be surprising in the case of the natural generation of purely material substances. Indeed, it would seem to compromise rather seriously the causal efficacy of such natural agents. Not surprisingly, therefore, John Duns Scotus directed a similar criticism against Aquinas's argumentation in ST I, q. 45, a. 5.⁹

8. (St. Louis, 1952), pp. 20, 28, and 30.

9. For Scotus see *Opus Oxon.* IV, d. 1, q. 1 (Vivès ed., Vol. 16, p. 15) (where he follows closely Thomas's ST I, q. 45, a. 5), and pp. 17–20 (his critique of Thomas). In brief, Scotus challenges the claim that *esse simpliciter* is a proper effect of God on the grounds that the *esse* of a composite is produced efficiently by whatever efficient cause generated the composite itself. But one must admit that some composite is generated by some created cause, unless

Moreover, this position does not seem to do justice to some of Thomas's more mature texts on the interrelationship between God, the First Cause, and created causes. With these concerns in mind, therefore, I now propose to turn to some of Thomas's texts concerning this issue. First, some passages will be considered where he seems to assign some role to form in causing the act of being.

1. FORMA DAT ESSE

For instance, in *De ente*, c. 4 Thomas writes: "Such is the relationship of form and matter that form gives *esse* to matter."¹⁰ Since Thomas often repeats this notion and seems to regard it as axiomatic, one might be tempted to conclude from it that he defends a position diametrically opposed to that held by interpreters such as Gilson, Renard, and Anderson. Far from denying that any creature can cause the act of being, Thomas would assign this function to every substantial form with respect to its own act of being.

Such a suggestion is not likely to be correct. While one would expect Thomas to hold that a substantial form exercises formal causality with respect to the act of being of the substance which it informs, it is most unlikely that he would ever assign the efficient causation of a thing's act of being to its intrinsic substantial form. Indeed, in *De ente*, c. 4 he makes it clear that it is impossible for a thing's *esse* itself to be efficiently caused by that thing's own form or quiddity; for then something would be the efficient cause of itself and would produce itself in the order of existence. This he rejects as impossible.¹¹

As he makes clear in his Commentary on I *Sentences* in a number of passages, a thing's act of being may be said to come from its form in the order of formal causality but not in the order of efficient causality. Thus, at *In I Sent.*, d. 8, q. 1, a. 2, ad 2, Thomas writes that created *esse* is not (caused) by something else (i.e., by something extrinsic to a

one wants to eliminate efficient causal action by creatures. Also see *Reportata Parisiensis*, Bk IV, d. 1, q. 1 (Vivès ed., Vol. 23, pp. 533–37). In his commentary on ST I, q. 45, a. 5 (Leon. 4.471), Cajetan counters that Scotus has misunderstood Thomas's usage of the term "proper" in this context. Cajetan writes that this term "non significat idem quod *solum* seu *tantum*, ut arguens intellexit, imponens Auctori quod esse est effectus solius Dei"; he adds: "Hoc enim nunquam somniavimus. Immo omnem causam tenemus dare esse, virtute tamen primae causae . . ." (ibid.).

10. "Talis autem invenitur habitudo materiae et formae quod forma dat esse materiae . . ." (Leon. 43.376:45–46). For many more texts and for discussion, see C. Fabro, *Participation et causalité selon S. Thomas d'Aquin* (Louvain-Paris, 1961), pp. 349–62.

11. "Non autem potest esse quod ipsum esse sit causatum ab ipsa forma vel quidditate rei, dico sicut a causa efficiente, quia sic aliqua res esset sui ipsius causa et aliqua res se ipsam in esse produceret . . ." (Leon. 43.377:131–135).

thing) if by this term “by” (*per*) we have in mind its intrinsic formal cause. But if we have in mind a formal cause outside the thing (an exemplar cause), or an efficient cause, in that sense it is (caused) by the divine *esse* and not by itself.¹² And at *In I Sent.*, d. 17, q. 1, a. 1 he comments that all *esse* comes (literally, “is”) from some inhering form, as being white (*esse album*) comes from whiteness, and substantial *esse* is from substantial form.¹³ And there, in replying to obj. 5, he comments that something is said to make or produce something in two ways, either in the manner of an efficient principle, as when a painter makes a wall white, or in the manner of a form, as whiteness makes something white. As Cornelio Fabro comments, this text covers causality both in the area of *esse* and in the area of becoming (*feri*).¹⁴

The same point is brought out in other texts. For instance, in *De veritate*, q. 27, a. 1, ad 3 Thomas writes that in creating, God produces a natural act of being (*esse*) in us by means of no (other) efficient cause but, nonetheless, by means of some created formal cause; for a natural form is a (formal) principle of natural being (*esse*).¹⁵ Fabro suggests that Thomas’s formulation of this point has matured by the time of the *Summa contra Gentiles*. Thus, in Bk I, c. 27, Thomas refers to the form of a body not as *esse* itself but as a principle of being (*essendi principium*). And in SCG II, c. 68 he writes that a form is a principle of existing substantially for that of which it is a form; not an efficient principle, however, but a formal principle.¹⁶ In sum, therefore, when we find Thomas in later writings referring to form as causing *esse*, we should always keep this distinction in mind. He means thereby not that a thing’s form is the efficient cause of its *esse* but that it is its intrinsic formal cause.

Here, however, someone might raise an objection. In Ch. V above we considered a number of texts where Thomas refers to essence (or to form

12. Mandonnet ed., Vol. 1, p. 198: “Si autem dicat causam formalem extra rem, vel causam effectivam, sic est per divinum esse et non per se.”

13. Ibid., Vol. 1, p. 393: “Constat enim quod omne esse a forma aliqua inhaerente est, sicut esse album ab albedine, et esse substantiale a forma substantiali.”

14. Ibid., Vol. 1, p. 396. See Fabro, *Participation et causalité*, p. 350.

15. Leon. 22.3.791:182–186: “Ad tertium dicendum quod esse naturale per creationem Deus causat in nobis nulla causa agente mediante, sed tamen mediante aliqua causa formali; forma enim naturalis principium est esse naturalis.”

16. Fabro, *Participation et causalité*, p. 351. By this comment he means that here Thomas clearly distinguishes between the act that constitutes the essence, i.e., form, and the act of being, i.e., *esse*. For Thomas see *Summa contra Gentiles* I, c. 27 in Editio Leonina manualis, p. 29, “*Amplius*”; and Bk II, c. 68, *ibid.*, p. 167. In the latter context Thomas is explaining how an intellectual substance can be united to the body as its form. For something to be the substantial form of something else, two conditions are required. The first is that mentioned in my text: “Quorum unum est, ut forma sit principium essendi substantialiter ei cuius est forma: principium autem dico, non factivum, sed formale, quo aliquid est et denominatur *ens*.” The second is that the form and matter have one act of being in which the composite substance subsists.

in the case of separate substances) as that which receives and limits *esse*. How can Thomas assign a receiving and limiting function to essence in its relationship to *esse* and yet refer to form (a principle of essence in corporeal entities, or essence itself in separate substances) as a formal cause of *esse*? Are not receiving and limiting, on the one side, and specifying and determining as a formal cause, on the other, as opposed to one another as material and formal causation?

To this one may respond, first of all, that while there are similarities between the matter-form relationship and that of essence (or form) and *esse*, there are also important differences. In the texts examined in Ch. V above, Thomas was making the point that essence (or form in separate substances) receives and, on my reading, limits *esse*. This points to a certain similarity between matter, which receives form, and essence (or form), which receives *esse*. And so essence (or form) is related to *esse* as potency to act. But, unlike prime matter, the essence principle also determines *esse* by specifying it, that is, by making it to be the act of existing of this kind of being. This is because it is the role of form, whether it be identical with essence as in a separate substance, or an intrinsic principle of a corporeal essence, to determine and specify the kind of essence, and hence the kind of *esse*. Here, then, we may distinguish the order of essence and the order of existence (*esse*). In the order of essence form serves as a specifying and determining principle and hence as act on the side of essence. Because of this it can be said to “cause” the *esse* it receives by serving as a formal cause. But in the order of existence, form, whether identical with essence as in a separate substance, or an intrinsic constituent of a corporeal essence, is still a potential principle in relation to the act of being (*esse*) which it receives and limits, and which actualizes it. Hence Thomas does not contradict himself by assigning both a receiving and limiting role as well as a specifying role as formal cause to one and the same substantial form within a particular finite entity.¹⁷

As Fabro has summed this up while commenting on a text from SCG II, c. 54, the meaning of the formula *forma dat esse* is not simple but complex in Thomism. On the one hand form gives *esse formale*, which is to say that whether alone or together with matter, it is the constitutive element of every real essence. (In other words, it is the act principle on the side of essence.) Secondly, form gives *esse* in the sense that it is the real essence alone, which form determines [by serving] as its formal act, which is the true subject of *esse* taken as the *actus essendi*.¹⁸

17. See my *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas*, pp. 103–5.

18. “La forme est pour ainsi dire transfigurée métaphysiquement dans le thomisme: elle donne à l’essence l’acte formel et par conséquent en fait ensuite la puissance réceptive de l’*esse-actus essendi*” (*Participation et causalité*, p. 351, n. 67). Here Fabro is commenting

Nonetheless, to return to our major issue, Thomas's frequent appeals to form as the intrinsic formal cause of a thing's act of being also suggests that substantial form plays some role in his full account of the causation of that thing's *esse*. As we have seen, this is not to say that he will ever make the form itself the thing's intrinsic and efficient cause of the act of being. But in the order of formal causality, it does seem to communicate *esse* to the matter of a corporeal entity. Reference has already been made to the unique situation of the human soul within Thomas's perspective, and Fabro has suggested that this case, along with that of created separate substances, is of decisive importance for Thomas's clarification of the relationship between form and the act of being.¹⁹ To repeat a point already made, in the case of the human soul, Thomas holds that it is immediately created by God. Hence, it receives the act of being in itself and communicates this to the body during life on earth; but it also retains the act of being in itself after it is separated from the body.²⁰

But one should not conclude from this that, according to Thomas, simultaneously there are two acts of being in humans such that the body would receive one act of being from its parents and the soul would acquire a separate act of being from God, its Creator. Such an explanation would destroy the substantial unity of the human being and would be

on SCG II, c. 54, from which note especially: "Deinde quia ad ipsam etiam formam comparatur ipsum esse ut actus. Per hoc enim in compositis ex materia et forma dicitur *forma esse principium essendi, quia est complementum substantiae, cuius actus est ipsum esse*. . . . Unde in compositis ex materia et forma nec materia nec forma potest dici ipsum quod est, nec etiam ipsum esse. Forma tamen potest dici *quo est*. . . . ipsa autem tota substantia est ipsum *quod est*, et ipsum esse est quo substantia denominatur ens" (Ed. Leon. man., p. 147). Fabro also cites a helpful remark by de Finance, who notes that when Thomas here goes so far as to give to form the name he normally reserves for *esse: quo est*, "il veut dire que c'est elle qui habilite le sujet à recevoir l'esse." See de Finance, *Être et agir*, p. 117).

19. Fabro, *Participation et causalité*, p. 355.

20. See, for instance, *Quaestiones disputatae de anima*, a. 1, ad 2 (Leon. 24.1.10–11): "Sicut ergo esse animae est a Deo sicut a principio activo . . ."; *De potentia*, q. 3, a. 9 (Marietti ed., pp. 65–66): "Unde restat quod exeat in esse per creationem, quasi ex nihilo facta." See M. Schulze, *Leibhaft und Unsterblich. Zur Schau der Seele in der Anthropologie und Theologie des Hl. Thomas von Aquin* (Freiburg-Schweiz, 1992), pp. 112–15. At the same time, there seems to be some development in the preciseness of the terminology Thomas uses with respect to the human soul. For this see B. C. Bazán, "The Human Soul: Form and Substance? Thomas Aquinas' Critique of Eclectic Aristotelianism," *Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge* 64 (1997) 95–126, esp. 112–24. Basing himself primarily on Thomas's *Quaestiones disputatae de anima* (Leon. 24.1), which Bazán has recently edited and which he dates in 1266–1267 (p. 96), he contrasts Thomas's willingness at the beginning of his career to refer to the human soul as a substance and as a form (e.g., in *In II Sent.*, d. 19, q. 1, a. 1, ad 4 [Mandonnet ed., Vol. 2, pp. 483–84]; also see SCG II, cc. 68, 69) with his refusal in this discussion, especially in q. 1, to admit that it is a *hoc aliquid* (a first substance) in the strict sense but only by reduction (Leon. 24.1.7–10). See Bazán, pp. 112–17. Bazán concludes that the separated soul should be described as a subsistent substantial form but not as the lowest of spiritual substances (pp. 122–24). Also see Thomas, *Quaestiones disputatae de anima* a. 14, ad 10 (Leon. 24.1.128).

diametrically opposed to Thomas's defense of unicity of substantial form in such entities. As Thomas puts it in *De potentia*, q. 3, a. 9, ad 20, it is rather that God, the Creator, gives *esse* to the soul as realized in the body and that a human generator disposes the body so that it can participate in this same act of being through the soul which is united to it.²¹ In other words, the mediating function of the soul or substantial form emerges clearly in this explanation. As Thomas expresses this in ST I, q. 76, a. 1, ad 5, the soul communicates to corporeal matter that very act of being in which it subsists so that the act of being of the composite whole is the very same act of being as that of the soul itself.²²

At the same time, we must remember that, for Thomas, the creation of the human soul and, of course, of created separate substances (angels) is to be attributed to God alone. Hence, he alone is the efficient cause of their respective acts of being. This still leaves unanswered our query concerning the efficient causation of the acts of being of purely material substances when they are naturally generated.

2. PRODUCTION OF ESSE IN THE GENERATION OF MATERIAL SUBSTANCES

Throughout his career Thomas assigns the production (efficient causation) of material terrestrial substances, though not of heavenly bodies, to created agents as regards their coming into being. But frequently enough he distinguishes this from the production of their respective acts of being and assigns the latter to God. At times he expresses this point by distinguishing between causes of becoming (*causae fiendi*) and causes of being (*causae essendi*). For instance, in *De veritate*, q. 5, a. 8, in replying to obj. 8, Thomas comments that, as Avicenna says in his *Metaphysica*, no effect can remain if that which was its cause, insofar as it is of this given kind, is removed. But among lower causes some are causes of becoming and some are causes of being. Thomas describes a cause of becoming as one which educes a form from the potentiality of matter through motion, for instance, when an artisan makes a knife. A cause of being, on the other hand, is that upon which the act of being (*esse*) of an effect depends per se, for instance, as the existence of light in air depends upon the sun. While the continuing existence of the knife does not depend upon the continued exercise of causality by the artisan, the existence of light in the air would cease in the absence of the sun. So too, the existence of a crea-

21. Marietti ed., p. 68. Note: "sed quia creans dat esse animae in corpore, et generans disponit corpus ad hoc quod huius esse sit particeps per animam sibi unitam."

22. Leon. 5.210: "ita quod illud esse quod est totius compositi, est etiam ipsius animae."

ture would cease if God's creative action were to cease, since God is both a cause of becoming and a cause of being with respect to creatures.²³

As Thomas's passing reference to Avicenna in this text would suggest, and as Fabro also indicates, Aquinas seems to have taken this distinction from the Muslim thinker. Thus he comments at *In I Sent.*, d. 7, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3: "Avicenna says that the divine agent differs from a natural agent: for a natural agent is a cause of motion, but the divine agent gives complete being (*esse totum*) as the Creator of the world." In the immediately preceding context Thomas has just pointed out that the divine action does not function by way of motion but by way of operation, and that this differs from motion as the perfect differs from the imperfect. Therefore it does not require any pre-existing matter on which to operate.²⁴

One finds this same distinction, even if expressed in slightly different terms, in later writings. In *De potentia*, q. 5, a. 1 (1265–1266) Thomas defends the point that things are conserved in being by God and would immediately be reduced to nothingness if his conserving action were to cease. He recalls that an effect depends upon its cause and notes that this is evident with respect to material and formal causes. If a material or formal principle is removed, the thing ceases to exist. The same thing should be said of efficient causes. An efficient cause causes something insofar as it induces a form or insofar as it disposes matter (to receive a form). Hence, as a thing depends upon its form and matter, so does it depend upon its efficient cause. Accordingly, the *esse* of an effect depends upon its efficient cause to the extent that the form of the effect depends on it. Thomas notes that there is a kind of efficient cause on which the form of the effect does not depend per se and in terms of its nature as a form but only per accidens. It is in this way that the form of fire which is generated depends upon another generating instance of that fire. The two instances of fire are only numerically distinct or, as he puts it, distinguished by a material division, that is, by the division of matter. Ultimately, however, one must conclude to the existence of a higher and incorporeal principle (which he eventually identifies as God) upon which the form of the effect depends per se and for its specific nature as a form. He adds that, if some corporeal principle can in some way cause

23. Leon. 22.1.160:329–333. Note: "et dicitur causa fiendi quod educit formam de potentia materiae per motum . . . causa vero essendi rem est illud a quo per se esse rei dependet. . ." As the Leonine editors indicate, here Thomas may be referring to Avicenna's *Philosophia prima*, Bk VI, c. 2 (Van Riet ed., pp. 301–4).

24. Mandonnet ed., Vol. 1, pp. 177–78. Note: "unde Avicenna, tractat. X *Metaphy.*, cap. ix, dicit, quod agens divinum differt a naturali: agens enim naturale est causa motus; sed agens divinum est dans esse totum, sicut Creator mundi." This reference to Avicenna is incorrect. See Fabro, p. 381 and n. 44, where he also cites Avicenna's *Metaphysica* = *Philosophia prima*, Bk VI, c. 1 (for which see Van Riet ed., pp. 291–92).

such a form, it can do so only insofar as it acts by the power of this higher and incorporeal principle and, as it were, as its instrument.²⁵

Of particular interest to us here is the point that Thomas makes next. Lower corporeal agents are not principles of the forms found in their effects except so far as causality based on change can extend; for they act only by changing, that is to say, by disposing matter and by educating form from matter. Therefore the forms of things that are naturally generated depend upon such causes in order to be educed from the potentiality of matter but not for their being (*esse*) in the unqualified sense.²⁶ Here again we have a distinction between causes which produce the becoming of something and the cause which produces its being (*esse*). In replying to obj. 5 within this same discussion, Thomas comments that, if one holds (with Aristotle) that substantial forms are educed from the potency of matter, natural agents will be causes not only of the dispositions of matter but also of substantial forms. To that extent they are principles of being with respect to the coming into being of such forms but not with respect to their act of being as such (*esse absolute*).²⁷ And as will be seen below, in ST I, q. 104, a. 1 Thomas again has recourse to this distinction between causes of becoming and causes of being.

On other occasions Thomas distinguishes between a cause of being in the unqualified sense (*causa essendi simpliciter*) and a cause of being this or such (*causa essendi hoc vel tale*). For instance, in SCG II, c. 21 he again maintains that God alone can create. In one of his arguments he reasons that *esse* is the first effect, which is evident from its universality. Therefore the proper cause of *esse* must be the first and universal agent, God. Other agents are not the cause of the act of being as such (*causa essendi simpliciter*) but are a cause of being this (*essendi hoc*), such as being a human or being white. The act of being as such is caused through creation, which, he continues, presupposes nothing, that is, no subject. Through other productions “this” (*hoc*) being or “such” (*tale*) being is produced. As seems clear from the examples which he has introduced (being a human and being white), what Thomas has in mind by producing “this” being is the introduction of a substantial form into this matter; and by producing “such” being, he has in mind the introduction of some accidental form.²⁸

25. Marietti ed., p. 131.

26. *De potentia*, q. 5, a. 1 (Marietti ed., p. 131). Note: “Quantum igitur ad hoc, formae generatorum dependent a generantibus naturaliter, quod educuntur de potentia materiae, non autem quantum ad esse absolutum.”

27. *Ibid.*, p. 132. Note: “et per consequens sunt essendi principia quantum ad inchoationem ad esse, et non quantum ad ipsum esse absolute.”

28. Ed. Leon. man., p. 106 (“*Adhuc*”). Note: “Alia vero agentia non sunt causa essendi

On still other occasions he distinguishes between the cause of a species and the cause of an individual. As he phrases this in SCG III, c. 65, no particular univocal agent can be the cause of a species as such. Thus this individual human being cannot be the cause of the human species, for it would then be the cause of every human being, including itself. This individual human being is the cause of that individual human being within the species since it is the principle or cause by reason of which human nature is realized in this matter, i.e., in individuating matter. Thomas reasons that there must be some other efficient cause of the human species as such and of every other natural species. This cause is God, either mediately or immediately. Farther on in this same discussion, he notes that no body can be the cause of the *esse* of something insofar as it is *esse*; it can only cause its being moved toward *esse*, i.e., its becoming.²⁹

But then, in SCG III, c. 66, he introduces a new dimension. He maintains that lower agents do not give the act of being (*esse*) except insofar as they act by divine power. The implication seems to be that, by reason of divine power, in some way they do give the act of being. For instance, in one argument Thomas reasons that, if *esse* is an effect that is common to all agents (for every agent makes something be in actuality), it follows that (created) agents produce this effect insofar as they are ordered under the First Agent and act with its power.³⁰ In another argument he reasons that the ultimate in goodness and perfection among those things which a secondary cause can produce is that which it can effect by reason of the power of the First Agent. But among all effects *esse* is most perfect since a nature or form is perfected by reason of the fact that it is realized in act, and it is related to its actual *esse* as potency to act. Therefore secondary agents can produce the act of being (*esse*) by the power of the First Agent.³¹

Or as Thomas reasons in still another argument, the order of effects must correspond to the order of causes. But first among all effects is *esse*, since all other things are certain determinations of it. Therefore it is

simpliciter, sed causa *essendi hoc*, ut hominem vel album. Esse autem simpliciter per creationem causatur. . . . Per alias factiones fit hoc ens vel tale." Also see *De potentia*, q. 3, a. 1 (Marietti ed., p. 39): "et inde est quod nulla earum est activa entis secundum quod est ens, sed eius entis secundum quod est hoc ens, determinatum in hac vel illa specie. . . ."

29. Here Thomas is arguing that it pertains to divine providence to conserve things in being. For the first argument presented in our text see ed. cit., pp. 297–98 (second "*Item*"); for the second see *ibid.*, p. 298 (first "*Adhuc*"). Note: "Nullum igitur corpus est causa esse alicuius rei in quantum est esse, sed est causa eius quod est moveri ad esse, quod est fieri rei."

30. *Ibid.*, p. 299 (first "*Amplius*"): "Cum igitur esse sit communis effectus omnium agentium, nam omne agens facit esse actu; oportet quod hunc effectum producant in quantum ordinantur sub primo agente, et agunt in virtute ipsius."

31. *Ibid.* (second "*Amplius*"). Note: "Igitur esse est quod agentia secunda agunt in virtute agentis primi."

the proper effect of the First Agent, and other things produce it insofar as they act in the power of the First Agent. He also adds that secondary agents which, as it were, particularize and determine the action of the First Agent, produce as their proper effects other perfections which determine *esse*.³² This text is helpful because here, after again distinguishing between *esse* as the proper effect of God and as something which other agents can produce insofar as they act with the power of God, Thomas also distinguishes between the proper effect of secondary causes—the production of perfections which determine *esse*—and the production of *esse* itself, in which they may share (only) by acting with the power of the First Cause. As he expresses this in the course of his final argument, the *esse* of each existing thing is the proper effect of God. Whatever else shares in producing something in *esse* does so insofar as it acts with the power of God.³³

This text, dating as it does from the period between 1259 and 1264, is very important for our discussion. Thomas has now acknowledged that lower agents do not cause the act of being except insofar as they act with the power of God. But he has repeatedly indicated that they do this—that is, by acting with the power of God, they themselves in some way cause the acts of being of their effects. Moreover, in at least one passage within this context, he has distinguished between this effect which they produce only by means of God's power and other proper effects which they produce by their own power, namely, perfections which determine and particularize *esse* in some way. By these he seems to have in mind substantial and accidental forms.³⁴

A question may be raised concerning how widespread, in Thomas's eyes, is this sharing in causing *esse* by secondary causes when they act with divine power. Does he want to apply this to all instances of secondary causal activity, or at least to all instances of their production of new substances? Or does he want to restrict it to certain kinds of secondary causes? He does not really answer this question in this context. On the one hand, he has here referred to *esse* as an effect that is common to all agents because every agent makes something enjoy being in actuality. This might suggest that he has in mind all secondary causes which generate new substances. On the other hand, in c. 65 he has written that no

32. Ibid. (“Item”). Note: “Igitur esse est proprius effectus primi agentis, et omnia alia agunt ipsum in quantum agunt in virtute primi agentis. Secunda autem agentia, quae sunt quasi particulantes et determinantes actionem primi agentis, agunt sicut proprios effectus alias perfectiones, quae determinant esse.”

33. Ibid. (“Praeterea”). Note: “Esse igitur cuiuslibet existentis est proprius effectus eius, ita quod omne quod producit aliquid in esse, hoc facit in quantum agit in virtute Dei.”

34. See the text cited in note 28 above, from SCG II, c. 21 (Ed. Leon. man., p. 106), as well as my ensuing discussion of SCG III, c. 65.

body causes the *esse* of a thing insofar as it is *esse* but only causes it to become.³⁵ This would suggest that he has in mind a much more restricted application of his theory, one that would limit it to created incorporeal agents. For more detailed discussion we now turn to later treatments in the *De potentia* and the *Prima pars*.

3. DE POTENTIA (1265–1266)

In *De potentia*, q. 3, a. 7 Thomas is directly concerned with explaining whether and how God works in the operations of nature. He begins by noting that it must be granted that God does work both in the operations of nature and in those performed by created wills. Thomas first considers and rejects a form of occasionalism reported by Moses Maimonides as having been defended by certain Muslim theologians (*loquentes in lege Maurorum*). According to this view, God has so arranged things in nature that, when one thing seems to operate on another (for instance, when fire seems to cause heat), God himself really produces the apparent effect which only seems to be caused by the alleged cause. In fact, one natural thing does not really act upon another so as to introduce any form into it.³⁶

Thomas rejects such occasionalism out of hand as opposed to sense experience, to reason, and to the divine goodness which tends to be communicative of itself and as a result of which God produces things similar to himself not only in being but also in the order of action. He also adds that this theory falsely assumes that all forms are accidents with the consequence that there would be no substantial being among natural things.³⁷

He then considers and rejects another theory proposed by Avicbron,

35. For the first text see note 30 above. Also note that in SCG III, c. 67, in his first argument to show that God is a cause with respect to everything else which operates insofar as it operates, he reasons that everything which operates is in some way a “causa essendi, vel secundum esse substantiale, vel accidentale.” And he repeats the point that he had made in the preceding chapter: “Nihil autem est causa essendi nisi in quantum agit in virtute Dei . . .” (Ed. Leon. man., p. 300). For the text from c. 65, see note 29 above. One could ask whether created agents can cause accidental *esse*. Thomistic scholars disagree as to whether Thomas assigns an *esse* to accidents distinct from the essence of those accidents, but limitations of space will not permit fuller discussion of that issue here. On the *esse* of accidents see my *The Metaphysical Thought*, pp. 253–65.

36. Marietti ed., p. 56. For Maimonides’s presentation of this theory, see his *The Guide of the Perplexed*, trans. and with intro. by S. Pines (Chicago, 1964) I.73, pp. 200–203.

37. Marietti ed., pp. 56–57. Note: “Repugnat etiam divinae bonitati, quae sui communicativa est; ex quo factum est quod res Deo similes fierent non solum in esse, sed etiam in agere.” Thomas also rejects their view that all natural forms are accidents (*ibid.*, p. 57). Cf. Meehan, pp. 256–64. Also see R. A. te Velde, *Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas* (Leiden, 1995), pp. 161–64.

according to which no purely corporeal substance truly operates. Rather, a certain spiritual power which penetrates all bodies acts in them and is responsible for their apparent activity. As one of the arguments which Thomas offers for this position indicates, the First Agent (according to this view) is purely active and in no way passive. While intermediate substances are both active and passive, purely corporeal entity, being the lowest, must be passive only and not active in any way. Thomas is equally critical of this theory and argues that it arises from the mistaken notion that the totality of corporeal reality is, as it were, numerically one and the same substance.³⁸

Thomas himself defends the view that there is mutual interaction between different corporeal substances since, in the matter of one thing, the form of another is potentially present. Consequently, one must not think that God operates in natural agents in such a way that they would in fact do nothing. Thomas then goes on to explain in some detail how God operates in the works of nature and in those of agents acting with will. Something can be said to cause the action of some other thing in different ways. First, this may happen because it grants to that other thing its very power of acting. In this way God does indeed produce the actions of created nature, since he gives to natural things the powers by means of which they act. Second, God not only gives such powers to natural things but also continuously keeps those powers in existence. In other words, he causes such powers not only in terms of their becoming but also with respect to their continuing being (*esse*) by conserving them.³⁹

In a third way something may be said to cause the action of another thing insofar as it moves that thing to act. Here Thomas explains that he does not have in mind either the original conferring of existence upon that thing's active power or its continuing conservation in being. He is thinking of what he calls the "application" of that power to action in the way, for instance, that someone is said to cause the act of cutting on the part of a knife insofar as he applies the sharp point of the knife to something by moving it. Because, within the world of nature, lower bodies do not act except insofar as they are moved and because one must ultimately arrive at God, the unmoved mover, Thomas concludes that it necessarily follows that God causes the action of every natural thing by moving and applying its power to action.⁴⁰

Fourth, continues Thomas, because of the similarity of effect to cause, there is a certain order among effects which corresponds to the order among causes. Thus a secondary cause cannot by its own power operate

38. Marietti ed., p. 57. See Thomas's presentation of Avicenna's "tertia ratio."

39. Ibid., pp. 57-58.

40. Ibid., p. 58.

upon an effect that is proper to a first cause, but it may serve as an instrument of a first cause with respect to such an effect. An instrumental cause does in some way cause the effect of a principal cause, not through its inherent form or powers, but only insofar as it participates in some of the power of the principal cause owing to the motion exercised by the latter. For instance, a tool is the cause of an artifact not by reason of its own form or power but by means of the power of the artisan by which it is moved and in which it participates. Thus, in this fourth way, one thing may cause the action of another in the way that a principal cause is a cause of the action performed by an instrumental cause.⁴¹

In this way too, continues Thomas, God must be said to be the cause of every action of every natural thing. The higher a cause is, the more universal and efficacious it is, and therefore the more profoundly does it enter into its effect and reduce it from a more remote potentiality to actuality. But every natural agent is (1) a being (*ens*), (2) a natural thing, and (3) of such or such a nature. Of these the first (being) is common to all things; the second applies to all natural things; the third applies to things within one and the same species; and a fourth, if we wish to add accidents, applies to this individual. Because of this, an individual natural agent cannot through its action produce another thing which belongs to a similar species except insofar as it functions as an instrument of something which is the cause of that entire species and, indeed, of the total being (*esse*) of lower nature. Consequently, reasons Thomas in accord with the physical outlook of his day, no purely natural cause can exercise causality with respect to a species of lower things except insofar as it acts through the power of (that is, as an instrument of) a heavenly body. Nor can it exercise causality with respect to *esse* except insofar as it acts with the power of (that is, as an instrument of) God himself.⁴²

Regarding this final point, Thomas notes that *esse* itself is the first and most universal effect and is more intimately present to things than any other effect. Therefore it is proper to God alone to produce this effect by his own power. Hence, as is stated in the *Liber de causis* (prop. 9), even an intelligence does not communicate *esse* except insofar as the divine power is present in that intelligence. In other words, here Thomas main-

41. *Ibid.*

42. *Ibid.* Note in particular: "Hoc ergo individuum agendo non potest constituere aliud in simili specie nisi prout est instrumentum illius causae, quae respicit totam speciem et ulterius totum esse naturae inferioris. Et propter hoc nihil agit ad speciem in istis inferioribus nisi per virtutem corporis caelestis, nec aliquid agit ad esse nisi per virtutem Dei." On this text see Meehan, pp. 293–301; Fabro, *Participation et causalité*, pp. 397–404; J. Aertsen, *Nature and Creature: Thomas Aquinas's Way of Thought* (Leiden, 1988), pp. 314ff.; te Velde, *Participation and Substantiality*, pp. 164–75 (including discussion of the *Liber de causis* and Thomas's usage of it here and in his commentary on the same).

tains that, if a secondary cause such as an intelligence can communicate *esse*, it can do so only by acting as an instrument of God and not by its own inherent power. The implication is that it can communicate *esse* in this instrumental role.⁴³ From this Thomas concludes that God is the cause of every action insofar as every other agent is an instrument of the divine operative power. If we consider particular agents themselves, each is immediate with respect to its effect. But if we concentrate on that power by means of which an agent operates, the power of a higher agent will be more immediately present to an effect than is the power of a lower agent. This is so because a lower power is not conjoined to an effect except through a higher power, as is said in the *Liber de causis* (prop. 1). Therefore, Thomas reasons, again in accord with the physics of his time, God's power must be present to every other agent in the way in which the power of a heavenly body is present to every acting elementary body.⁴⁴

In a summarizing passage Thomas then repeats the main points of this discussion. God is the cause of the action of every other agent insofar as (1) he gives the power of acting to each agent, (2) he conserves in existence its power of acting, (3) he applies it to its action, and (4) by his power every other power acts. Thomas also repeats the point that God operates immediately within every other agent's operations, including those of the will and of nature.⁴⁵

In light of the question proposed for discussion in *De potentia*, q. 3, a. 7—whether God operates in the work of nature—one can understand why Thomas has directed most of his discussion here to God's role within the operations of natural agents. We, however, are more interested in the causation of *esse* which he assigns to such agents and to other created agents. In his presentation of the fourth way in which God works in the operations of natural agents, Thomas has indicated that no lower natural cause can exercise causality with respect to an entire species unless it acts by the power of, or as an instrument of, a heavenly body. Without

43. Marietti ed., p. 58: "Ipsium enim esse est communissimus effectus primus et intimior omnibus aliis effectibus; et ideo soli Deo competit secundum virtutem propriam talis effectus: unde etiam, ut dicitur in lib. *De Causis* [propos. IX], intelligentia non dat esse, nisi prout est in ea virtus divina." This statement is not literally found in prop. 9 of the *Liber de causis* but, as te Velde indicates (p. 171), is freely adapted from it. For this proposition and Thomas's Commentary, see *Sancti Thomae de Aquino Super Librum de causis expositio*, ed. H. D. Saffrey (Fribourg-Louvain, 1954), pp. 57–64.

44. Ed. cit., p. 58. For prop. 1 from the *Liber de causis*, see ed. cit., p. 4; for Thomas's Commentary, see pp. 6:22–7:22. Cf. te Velde, pp. 167–68.

45. Ed. cit., p. 58. Note: "sequetur quod in quolibet operante immediate operetur, non exclusa operatione voluntatis et naturae." The essential elements of this text, including the four ways in which God operates in other agents, can also be found in less systematically organized fashion in SCG III. c. 67 (Ed. Leon. man., pp. 300–301). Also see ST I, q. 105, a. 5 (Leon. 5.476) for still another presentation.

wishing to espouse this particular part of Thomas's medieval worldview, we should emphasize the next point which he has made. Something cannot efficiently cause the act of being (*esse*) of an effect unless it also acts in some way by the power of God. As we have noted, the implication here is that, with the aid of God's power, at least some created agents can exercise such causality. This is reinforced by Thomas's reference to the role which, according to the *Liber de causis*, an intelligence may exercise in communicating *esse*, a role which Thomas apparently grants. Even in this case such an agent can communicate *esse* only by acting with, by participating in, God's power, not by acting on its own. At the same time, this passage might give the impression that this kind of causation of *esse* is restricted only to pure intelligences.⁴⁶

But Thomas has immediately added that God is the cause of every action (of every other agent) insofar as every agent is an instrument of the divine operative power. And in his summarizing statement he repeats this point. This comment seems to be general in application and suggests that he is not restricting this fourth kind of divine role in creaturely causal activity to the production of *esse* by separate substances or intelligences.⁴⁷ Here we should recall Thomas's distinction in SCG III, c. 66 between that which a created agent produces as its proper effect and through its own power and that which it produces only insofar as it acts as an instrument of God, i.e., *esse*. He has also reasoned there that, because every agent makes something be in actuality, *esse* is an effect that is common to all agents.⁴⁸

4. SUMMA THEOLOGIAE I

For additional clarification we may turn to the *Prima pars*, which dates from 1265–68 and is, therefore, very close in time to the *De potentia*. As we saw above, in ST I, q. 45, a. 5 Thomas maintains once more that to create is proper to God alone. The first objection reasons that what is perfect can produce something like itself. But immaterial creatures are more perfect than those that are material, and material creatures can produce things like themselves. Therefore immaterial creatures should be able to do this. And since immaterial substances can be produced only by means of creation, some immaterial creatures must be able to create.⁴⁹

46. Texts (Marietti ed., p. 58) cited in notes 42 and 43 above. For the language of participation, also see *De potentia*, q. 3, a. 1 (Marietti ed, p. 39): "nulla res dat esse, nisi in quantum est in ea participatio divinae virtutis."

47. *Ibid.*, p. 58.

48. See notes 30, 31, and 32 above.

49. Leon. 4.469.

In replying to this objection, Thomas comments that some perfect (complete) entity which participates in a given nature produces something like itself not by producing that nature in the unqualified sense but by applying that nature to something. So it is that this individual human being cannot cause human nature as such, for then it would cause itself. But it can cause human nature to be realized in this generated human being. In order for an individual human being to do this, determined matter is presupposed on which it can operate and by reason of which human nature is rendered this individual human being. And then Thomas writes: "Just as this human being participates in human nature, so does every created being participate, if I may so speak, in the nature of being; for God alone is his own act of being." From this he concludes that no created entity can cause any being in the absolute sense (*ens absolute*) except insofar as it causes it to be present or realized in this individual. This text is interesting because it implies that a created agent can cause being as such to be realized in this individual.⁵⁰

Next we turn to ST I, q. 104, a. 1, where Thomas again argues that creatures are conserved in being by God. Fabro sees this text as confirming the progress marked by Thomas's recognition of the efficient causality exercised by an individual agent over the act of being in a concrete singular thing.⁵¹ Thomas begins by clarifying that he has in mind not indirect conservation whereby someone preserves a thing in being by removing that which would corrupt it, but direct conservation whereby what is conserved so depends upon its conserving principle that without this it could not exist. He insists that in this way all creatures must be conserved in being by God, so much so that without God's conserving action they would not subsist even for a moment but would fall into nothingness.⁵²

In support of this position, Thomas introduces the distinction between a cause of a thing's becoming and a cause of its being. This distinction may be applied to the causation of artifacts and of natural entities. As regards artifacts, he illustrates this with the example of a builder who causes a house to come into being but does not directly cause its continuing being. Thomas comments that the being (*esse*) of the house follows upon its form. Since the house is an artifact, he identifies its form as a certain composition and order which follows upon the natural powers of certain things (such as the cement, stones, and wood) which the builder uses

50. Leon. 4.469–70: "Sed sicut hic homo participat humanam naturam, ita quodcumque ens creatum participat, ut ita dixerim, naturam essendi: quia solus Deus est suum esse. . . ." Note also: "Nullum ens creatum potest producere aliquod ens absolute, nisi in quantum esse causat *in hoc*. . ." See Fabro, *Participation et causalité*, pp. 377–78.

51. Fabro, *Participation et causalité*, p. 378.

52. Leon. 5.463–64.

in constructing it and which receive and preserve its composition and order, that is, its form as a house. Therefore the being (*esse*) of the house depends upon the natures of these things just as its coming into being depends upon the action of the builder. The dependency in the order of being illustrated by this example seems to be in the order of material causality rather than efficient causality. But Thomas then turns to the production of natural things. If a given agent (efficient cause) does not cause the form of an effect insofar as it is that kind of form, that agent will not be the per se cause of the being (*esse*) which follows from that form; it will only cause the effect to become.⁵³

If two things belong to the same species, one cannot be the per se cause of the form of the other insofar as it is that kind of form, for then it would (efficiently) cause its own form. But it can cause a form of this same kind to be present in matter; that is, it can cause this individual matter to receive this individual form. This is to cause something in terms of its becoming, as when one human being generates another or when one instance of fire generates another.⁵⁴

Accordingly, Thomas now proposes a criterion for distinguishing between a cause of becoming only and a cause of being. If a given natural effect receives an impression from its efficient cause of the same kind (*rationem*) that is present in that agent, the effect will depend upon that cause for its becoming only, not for its being (*esse*). If, however, the effect does not receive an impression from the agent of the same kind that is present in the agent or, to put it in other words, if the agent and the effect differ in species, such an agent can be a cause of that form precisely insofar as it is that kind of form and not merely insofar as it is received in this individual matter. In this case the agent is not only a cause of becoming (*causa fiendi*) but also a cause of being (*causa essendi*) with respect to that form. It is in this way, Thomas adds (again in accord with the physics and astronomy of his time), that heavenly bodies are causes of the generation of lower bodies which differ from them in species. In other words, they are causes of being as well as of becoming with respect to terrestrial bodies. This passage indicates that, at least in principle, Thomas now allows for secondary or created causes of being (*esse*) in some instances as well as created causes of becoming (even if his example is taken from an outmoded physical theory).⁵⁵

In a. 2 of this same question, Thomas asks whether God immediately conserves every creature. Again he distinguishes between direct and indirect conservation of things in being and comments that some created

53. Leon. 5.464.

54. Ibid.

55. Ibid.

things may be found to conserve others in each of these ways. Since here we are interested in direct causation and conservation of being, we may turn immediately to his discussion of this. He repeats the point that some effects are found to depend on another creature for their being (*esse*). When many causes are ordered to one another in exercising their causality, an effect will depend first and foremost (*principaliter*) on its first cause, but in secondary fashion on all the intermediary causes. Therefore, in primary fashion (*principaliter*), the first cause conserves the effect but, in secondary fashion, so too do the intermediary causes. Within such an ordered series of causes, one will conserve the effect to a greater extent than another to the degree that it is higher in the series of causes and more proximate to the first cause. Consequently, even among corporeal things the conservation and permanence of things is to be attributed to superior (created) causes. Again Thomas turns to the first and second motions of heavenly bodies to illustrate his point. More important for our purpose is his concluding remark: "Thus, therefore, it must be said that God conserves certain things in being (*esse*) by means of some causes."⁵⁶

From this one can see that Thomas holds that some created causes are indeed conserving causes of *esse* and not merely causes of becoming. He confirms this in his reply to the first objection, noting that God immediately creates all things but that within creation he has established an order so that certain creatures depend on others in such a way that they are conserved in being (*esse*) by them in a secondary way, and this without prejudice to their primary (*principalis*) conservation, which is exercised by God himself.⁵⁷

In replying to obj. 3, Thomas introduces another precision. He grants that no creature can cause another to acquire a new form or disposition except by means of some kind of change. But he adds that, after a creaturely agent has introduced a form or disposition into an effect, it may conserve that form or disposition in being without introducing any additional change in the effect.⁵⁸

These two articles are important sources for us in our effort to determine whether Thomas affirmed or denied that created agents can cause the act of being (*esse*). As I have noted, his conclusions in a. 1 make it clear that, after distinguishing between causes of becoming only and causes of being, he there allows for some secondary or created causes

56. Leon. 5.467: "Invenitur etiam quod ab aliqua creatura dependet aliquis effectus secundum esse." Also note: "Sic igitur dicendum est quod Deus conservat res quasdam in esse, mediantibus aliquibus causis."

57. Ibid. Note: "sed in ipsa rerum creatione ordinem in rebus instituit, ut quaedam ab aliis dependerent, per quas secundario conservarentur in esse, praesupposita tamen principali conservatione, quae est ab ipso."

58. Ibid.

of being (*causae essendi*). He restricts this to situations where the cause belongs to a higher species than the effect. In accord with what we have seen from earlier texts, we assume that Thomas would continue to insist that only God is the first and proper cause of being (*esse*) and that, if some created agents can also participate in causing *esse* with respect to certain effects, they can do this only with God's power.

In a. 2 Thomas has explicitly indicated that, if God alone is the immediate creative cause of all else, within created reality he has set up an order such that some created causes can function as intermediary causes in conserving other creatures in being (*esse*). Again, as he makes clear in replying to obj. 1, such created agents can exercise this conserving causality of *esse* only in a secondary way and without prejudice to the primary or principal conserving role which belongs to God alone.

5. CONCLUDING REMARKS

In an effort to fit together the thinking we have followed through these texts, I would like to offer the following summary of Thomas's position:

1. Created agents or efficient causes can never create or produce the act of being (*esse*) from nothingness, whether as principal causes or as instrumental causes.

2. From the beginning of his career, Thomas held that the *esse* of a thing follows upon its form, not so as to be efficiently caused by that form but so as to be formally caused by it.

3. Fairly early on in his career, Thomas also recognized that, because a thing's *esse* follows upon its form, to the extent that a thing's form is efficiently caused by some other agent, so is its *esse*.

4. By the time of SCG III, c. 66, Thomas came to assign to created agents some role in the production or efficient causation of being (*esse*), though not in its creation, and only insofar as such agents act as instruments of or by the power of God. He distinguishes this effect (*esse*) which they produce as instruments of God from their proper effects which they produce by means of their inherent powers, namely, certain determinations and particularizations of *esse*.

5. In *De potentia*, q. 3, a. 7 Thomas distinguishes four ways in which God operates in the actions performed by created agents. The fourth of these is especially pertinent to our discussion since, according to this mode, God causes the action of every natural agent or cause in the way in which a principal cause causes the action performed by an instrumental cause. Consequently, Thomas holds (in accord with the physical world-view of his time) that no purely natural cause can exercise causality with respect to a species of lower things except insofar as it acts through the

power of, as an instrument of, a heavenly body. And no purely natural agent can exercise causality with respect to *esse* except insofar as it acts with the power of God.

6. Thomas also notes that *esse* is the first and most universal effect and is more intimately present to things than any other effect. Therefore it is proper to God alone to produce this effect by his own power. Even a (separate) intelligence will not produce *esse* except insofar as it acts with the power of God, not merely by its own inherent power.

7. In commenting on this text, I wondered whether Thomas restricts this kind of creaturely participation in the causation of *esse* to certain created agents such as separate substances, or whether he applies it more generally. In light of his discussion here and in light of his comment in SCG III, c. 66 that, because every agent makes something to be in actuality, *esse* is an effect that is common to all agents, I conclude that he does not intend so to restrict it.

8. From this it follows that, for Thomas, whenever a new substance is efficiently caused by a natural or created agent, that agent's causation applies both to the act of being itself (*esse*) of the new substance and to a particular determination of *esse* as realized in that substance. Causation of the particular determination (this or that kind or form) is owing to the created efficient cause insofar as it operates by its own inherent power as a principal cause. Causation of the act of being itself (*esse*) is assigned to it as an instrumental cause acting with the power of God, and to God himself as the principal cause of the same. From this it follows that one should not maintain that Thomas denies that created causes can efficiently cause the act of existing or the act of being, at least in the process of bringing new substances into being.

9. Moreover, in ST I, q. 104, a. 1, Thomas recalls the distinction between a cause of becoming only and a cause of being (*causa essendi*). Here he allows for certain created causes of being. He restricts these to situations where the cause belongs to a higher species than the effect. Hence, his application of this way in which secondary causes can cause *esse* does not apply universally to all created or secondary causes.

10. And so, in ST I, q. 104, a. 2, Thomas distinguishes between creation and conservation in the sense that, while created agents cannot serve as secondary or intermediary causes in the act of creation, some of them can and do serve as intermediary or secondary causes in the conservation of *esse*. His recognition of this additional way in which some secondary causes can play a role in conserving things in being and, therefore, in conserving the acts of being of such things, is still further confirmation that he does hold that some created agents can cause the act of being (*esse*) in some way.

Chapter VIII

THOMAS AQUINAS ON DEMONSTRATING GOD'S OMNIPOTENCE

In recent times much research has been devoted to the distinction between God's absolute and ordained power in various thirteenth- and fourteenth-century authors.¹ In the present chapter I would like to concentrate on a related but perhaps even more fundamental question in the thought of Thomas Aquinas: How do we know that God is omnipotent? Did Aquinas think that God's omnipotence can be demonstrated philosophically, or did he regard it as an article of faith, something that can be accepted solely on the grounds of religious belief?

Interestingly enough, so far as I have been able to determine, most contemporary authors pass over this particular question in silence, at least when they treat of Aquinas. But in a different context, one contemporary scholar, M. F. J. M. Hoenen, has used this issue as one way of testing the reliability of some of the early followers of Aquinas in their defense of him against William de la Mare's *Correctorium*. According to Hoenen, one of these, the author of the *Correctorium* 'Sciendum,' mistakenly interpreted Aquinas as maintaining that among the things human

1. See, for instance, W. J. Courtenay, "The Dialectic of Omnipotence in the High and Late Middle Ages," in *Divine Omniscience and Omnipotence in Medieval Philosophy: Islamic, Jewish and Christian Perspectives*, ed. T. Rudavsky (Dordrecht-Boston-Lancaster, 1985), pp. 243–69; *Capacity and Volition: A History of the Distinction of Absolute and Ordained Power* (Bergamo, 1990); *Sopra la volta del mondo. Omnipotenza e potenza assoluta di Dio tra medioevo e eta moderna*, ed. A. Vettese (Bergamo, 1986), with a helpful bibliography by E. Randi, pp. 175–83; L. Moonan, "St. Thomas Aquinas on Divine Power," in *Atti del Congresso Internazionale (Roma—Napoli—17/24 Aprile, 1974). Tommaso d'Aquino nel suo settimo centenario*, Vol. 3 (Naples, 1977), pp. 366–407; and more recently his *Divine Power: The Medieval Power Distinction up to Its Adoption by Albert, Bonaventure, and Aquinas* (Oxford, 1994). Also helpful is L. Bianchi, "Omnipotenza divina e ordine del mondo," in his *Il vescovo e i filosofi. La condanna parigina del 1277 e l'evoluzione dell'aristotelismo scolastico* (Bergamo, 1990), pp. 63–105, especially, p. 80 on Duns Scotus's distinction between omnipotence as understood by Catholics (that God can do immediately, without using second causes, all that is possible in itself) and omnipotence as established by the philosophers (that God can do all that is possible in itself). Only the latter would be philosophically demonstrable, according to this view.

reason can demonstrate philosophically about God, and which therefore are not articles of faith, is the fact that there is one God, to be sure, but also the fact that God is omnipotent.²

According to Hoenen, this final point is not an accurate reflection of Aquinas's position. He writes: "Elsewhere, Thomas unambiguously states God's omnipotence to be an article of faith, as it cannot be proved!" Hoenen acknowledges that this "slip of the tongue" is not that unusual. Other medieval defenders of Aquinas, such as Thomas of Sutton, also held that God's omnipotence can be demonstrated philosophically.³

In support of his claim that according to Aquinas God's omnipotence is only an article of faith, Hoenen cites an interesting passage from *De veritate*, q. 14, a. 9, ad 8: "The unity of the divine essence in the way it is held by believers, namely, together with omnipotence and providence over all and other things of this kind which cannot be proved, constitutes an article (of faith)."⁴

One can immediately ask whether this text means that it is only "other things of this kind" that cannot be proved, or whether it also means that divine omnipotence and divine providence cannot be proved.⁵ At first sight the more natural reading appears to be the latter, and so Hoenen has interpreted it. And yet, this may strike someone who is familiar with other discussions by Aquinas of our knowledge of God's existence and attributes as surprising.

This being so, I shall now turn to some other passages where Thomas discusses the fact of God's omnipotence and our reasons for accepting the same. After reviewing those texts I shall return to a fuller discussion of the text from *De veritate*, q. 14.

2. See his "The Literary Reception of Thomas Aquinas' View on the Provability of the Eternity of the World in de la Mare's *Correctorium* (1278–9) and the *Correctoria corruptorii* (1279–ca 1286)," in *The Eternity of the World in the Thought of Thomas Aquinas and His Contemporaries*, ed. J. B. M. Wissink (Leiden–New York–Copenhagen–Cologne, 1990), p. 50.

3. *Ibid.*, pp. 50–51. For the text of this *Correctorium* see *Le correctorium corruptorii Sciendum*, ed. P. Glorieux (Paris, 1956), p. 50. As Hoenen indicates (see p. 65, n. 78), the author of "Sciendum" refers to Thomas's *Summa theologiae* I, q. 2, a. 2, ad 1 for support. There Thomas explicitly refers to the fact that God is and "alia huiusmodi quae per rationem naturalem nota possunt esse de Deo . . .," without explicitly mentioning omnipotence (Leon. 4.30). For Thomas of Sutton see his *Contra Quodlibet Johannis Duns Scoti*, ed. J. Schneider (Munich, 1978), pp. 91ff.

4. ". . . sed unitas divinae essentiae talis qualis ponitur a fidelibus, scilicet cum omnipotentia et omnium providentia et aliis huiusmodi quae probari non possunt, articulum constituit." Leon. 22.2.464:200–204.

5. One cannot really decide this issue simply on the basis of the presence or absence of commas in the Latin text since its punctuation is owing in large measure to the judgment of the modern editor. This is especially true of a dictated text such as that of the *De veritate* (see Leon. 22.1.174*–175*).

1. IN LIBRUM PRIMUM SENTENTIARUM

Thomas takes up the issue of divine omnipotence in one of his earliest writings, his Commentary on the *Sentences* of Peter the Lombard, dating as we have seen from 1252–1256.⁶ In Bk I, d. 42, Aquinas considers the issue of God's power. In q. 1, a. 1, he asks whether power is present in God and offers what appears to be philosophical argumentation to show that this is so.

The name "power" (*potentia*) was, writes Thomas, first used to signify capacity (*potestas*) in human beings. Thus in his *Metaphysics* IV, c. 2 Avicenna comments that certain human beings were said to be powerful (*potentes*), and the name was then transferred to natural things as well. Moreover, among human beings, someone is thought to be powerful if he is capable of doing whatever he wants without being impeded by others. To the extent that such a person could be impeded in acting by others, his power would be diminished. The power of any agent, whether natural or voluntary, is impeded to the degree that it can be acted upon by something else. Therefore included in the meaning of power is the absence of any capacity to be acted upon by another. Thomas concludes that power in its full meaning is realized in God both because he does all things (which pertains to him insofar as he is the First Act and perfect) and because he can be acted upon by nothing else. This too belongs to God because he is Pure Act and totally free from any mixture of potentiality.⁷

Absolutely central to Thomas's argumentation for the presence of power in God is his conviction that God is pure actuality, totally devoid of matter and passive potentiality. And this is a point for which Aquinas would argue philosophically in other works, for instance, when he presents argumentation for God's existence based on motion. See *Summa contra Gentiles* I, c. 13 for two such arguments; *Summa theologiae* I, q. 2, a. 3 for the "first way"; also q. 3, a. 1; and his *Compendium theologiae*, cc. 3, 4. Earlier in his Commentary on Bk I of the *Sentences* (at distinction 3, q. 1) Thomas raises the general question about what philosophers can know about God by using natural reason. He rejects any possibility of purely philosophical knowledge of the Trinity of Persons and comments that by using natural reason one can arrive at knowledge of only those divine attributes which

6. For the dating of this see Weisheipl, *Friar Thomas d'Aquino: His Life*, rev. ed., pp. 358–59; Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas. Volume I*, p. 332.

7. Mandonnet ed., Vol. 1, p. 983. For Avicenna see his *Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina I–IV*, Van Riet ed. (Louvain-Leiden, 1977), pp. 193ff., for a much fuller discussion of the meaning of the term "potentia" than Thomas's passing reference would lead one to suspect. For the specific text to which Thomas seems to be referring see p. 195:94–112.

pertain to the (one) divine essence. Even so, he adds that the philosophers were able to arrive at knowledge of those attributes which we assign to the different Persons only by appropriation (hence not properly), i.e., power, wisdom, and goodness. Here Thomas asserts that the philosophers could reach knowledge of God's power, although he does not explicitly mention his omnipotence.⁸

In q. 1, a. 2 of his Commentary on distinction 42, Thomas asks whether there is only one power in God, and firmly concludes that this is so. He observes that active power (the only kind present in God) may be considered with respect to its essence or with respect to the actions that follow from it. By a power's essence he has in mind its immediate principle of operation. In the case of God the principle of all divine operations is the divine essence, since he acts by his essence (and not, we may understand, by means of any superadded accident.) And just as God's essence is one in reality, although it admits of a certain plurality of meanings in accord with the various divine attributes, so too is his power one in reality, even though it too admits of a certain plurality of meanings in accord with the different attributes. This follows because the notion of power pertains to each attribute to the extent that it belongs to that attribute to serve as a principle of operation. But in fact, God's operation is really identical with his essence even though his operation admits of these different conceptions on our part. The divine power therefore is really one, whether it is considered with respect to its essence or its operation, although this single divine power can produce many different effects.⁹

Thomas directs question 2 of this same distinction 42 to those things that are subject to God's power. In article 2. Thomas asks whether God can do things that are impossible to nature. In developing his answer Thomas notes that something may be unable to do something either from the side of the agent or from the side of the thing that is to be done (*possibile*). Ability to do something (*posse*) from the side of the agent cannot be denied of God so long as that action would involve no imperfection on his part, as would the capacity to sin. But from the side of the thing in itself, if something simply does not meet the definition of the possible in itself, it cannot be done, not even by God.¹⁰

In order to develop the last-mentioned point, Thomas notes that every power is directed either to being (*esse*) or to nonbeing (*non esse*) as, to illustrate the latter case, something's capacity to undergo corruption. Whatever does not fall under the intelligible content of being or nonbe-

8. "Tamen personas, secundum appropriata eis, philosophi cognoscere potuerunt, cognoscentes potentiam, sapientiam, bonitatem" (Mandonnet ed., Vol. 1, p. 98).

9. Mandonnet ed., pp. 985–86.

10. Mandonnet ed., Vol. 1, p. 991.

ing cannot be regarded as possible in itself. For instance, for something to be and not to be, or to enjoy being and nonbeing (at the same time and in the same respect) is not possible in itself and cannot be brought about even by God. This does not imply any lack of power in God but only that what is being proposed is simply not possible in itself. Thomas cites as one illustration of that which cannot be done, to make the past not to have been.¹¹

In commenting on d. 43, q. 1, a. 1, Thomas asks whether God's power is infinite. Needless to say, his answer will be in the affirmative. But since we are here concerned about his reasons for affirming God's omnipotence, his argumentation for the infinity of God's power is of considerable interest. To put this another way, if he has offered philosophical argumentation to show that God is powerful and thinks that the philosophers were able to arrive at knowledge of this, and if he now offers additional philosophical argumentation to show that God's power is infinite, we should conclude that at least at this point in his career Thomas thought that God's omnipotence can be demonstrated philosophically.¹²

Thomas begins his reply by distinguishing between the infinite taken in the privative sense and in the negative sense. As he explains in replying to the first objection, the infinite taken in the sense of privation refers to something which is designed to have a terminus (*finis*) but in fact does not. This kind of infinity must be denied of God. As Thomas observes in the corpus of his response, the infinite in the negative sense refers to that which is limited in no way whatsoever. As we saw above when considering this text in Ch. V in connection with the limitation axiom, it is this kind of infinity that Thomas ascribes to God.¹³

In developing his argumentation, Thomas comments that an end or terminus may be understood in different senses. For instance, one may have in mind a terminus or limit for quantity such as a point which terminates a line. In this sense a line may be described as infinite if it lacks any such point or terminus. This is the infinite taken as privation and, because it is based on quantity, it is not present in incorporeal things.

11. Ibid. Thomas adds that whatever is not in itself repugnant to the intelligible content of being or nonbeing can be done by God, for instance to make the heaven not to be, or to create another world (pp. 991–92).

12. "Utrum potentia Dei sit infinita" (Mandonnet ed., p. 1002). Our reasoning does assume that, for Thomas, to demonstrate the infinity of God's power is equivalent to demonstrating his omnipotence.

13. For the corpus of Thomas's response see pp. 1002–1004. For his reply to objection 1 see p. 1004. See p. 1003 for Thomas's citation of John Damascene's authority for referring to God as infinite. See his *De fide orthodoxa*, ed. E. M. Buytaert (Louvain-Paderborn, 1955), c. 2, p. 14. Also see my Ch. V above, notes 11 and 12.

But a limit or terminus may also be applied to a thing's essence, as an ultimate difference is that to which the essence of a species is limited.

Indeed, continues Thomas, that which signifies a thing's essence is called its definition or terminus. In this sense a thing is said to be limited by that which determines or contracts its essence. Thus the nature of a genus which, considered in itself, is indifferent to many, is limited by a single difference to one species. While this might be regarded more as a logical limitation than as a metaphysical one, Thomas's next example is metaphysical. Prime matter considered in itself is indifferent to all forms and in that sense may be said to be infinite; but it is limited by its form. In like fashion a form, which of itself can perfect different parts of matter, is limited by the matter in which it is received. It is by negating or denying any such limitation of God, even that whereby form is limited by matter, that we assign infinity to the divine essence.¹⁴

The argument which Thomas offers for this conclusion develops a theme that will frequently recur throughout his metaphysics. As he puts it here, every form, when taken in itself or considered abstractly, that is, apart from any receiving subject, enjoys a kind of infinity. Thus if we consider the color whiteness in the abstract, i.e., apart from any white thing, it enjoys this kind of infinity, since the nature of whiteness is not restricted to any given subject. Even so, the intelligible content of color and the intelligible content of being are restricted to this particular kind of color—whiteness. Therefore if something enjoys the act of being (*esse*) in the absolute sense, which is in no way received in (and limited by) something else, indeed, if that thing is its very act of being (*esse*), such a thing is infinite without qualification. Therefore its essence is infinite, and its goodness, and whatever else may be affirmed of it. For none of those things is limited to something in the way what is received in a given subject is limited to the capacity of that subject. Underlying this argument, of course, is Thomas's acceptance of the axiom that unreceived act, in this case, unreceived *esse*, is unlimited or infinite. As he goes on to reason here, given the fact that God's essence is infinite, it follows that his power is also infinite.¹⁵

We may note in passing that in the very next article Thomas asks

14. See p. 1003. Note especially: “. . . et similiter forma, quae, quantum in se est, potest perficere diversas partes materiae, finitur per materiam in qua recipitur. Et a negatione talis finis essentia divina infinita dicitur.”

15. See p. 1003. Note especially: “Et ideo illud quod habet esse absolutum et nullo modo receptum in aliquo, immo ipsemet est suum esse, illud est infinitum simpliciter; et ideo essentia eius infinita est. . . . Et ex hoc quod essentia est infinita, sequitur quod potentia eius infinita sit. . . .” Note his citation of the *Liber de causis* in support: “et hoc expresse dicitur in lib. *De causis*, propos. 16, quod ens primum habet virtutem simpliciter infinitam, quia ipsemet est sua virtus” (pp. 1003–1004).

whether God's omnipotence can be communicated to a creature. This indicates that he believes that his argumentation for the infinity of God's power in a. 1 was an argument for divine omnipotence. It is also interesting to note that in arguing against the possibility that any creature might share in divine omnipotence, he again observes that a thing's power follows upon its essence. Therefore it is not possible for a finite essence to enjoy infinite power. Moreover, he continues, it is impossible for the essence of any creature to be infinite (in the absolute sense) for the very reason that its act of being (*esse*) is not absolute and subsistent, but is received in something else.¹⁶

In light of these texts from Thomas's Commentary on Bk I of the *Sentences*, I conclude that at least at this point in his career, ca. 1252, he regarded God's omnipotence as something that can be demonstrated philosophically and hence not as something that can be accepted only on the grounds of religious belief.

2. SCRIPTUM SUPER LIBRO TERTIO SENTENTIARUM

For confirmation one may next turn to his slightly later Commentary on Book III of the *Sentences*, dating ca. 1255 or 1256 in its written version. There at d. 23, q. 3, a. 2 Thomas is considering the view that faith (*fides informis*) is not a gift from God (an infused habit) but an acquired habit. One of the opening arguments offered in support of this position reasons that the philosophers believed that God is omnipotent. But they did not possess any infused habits. Therefore faith is not an infused habit.¹⁷

In replying to this argument Thomas counters that strictly speaking the philosophers did not *believe* that God is omnipotent. They *knew* this because they had demonstrated it (*quia demonstrative illud probaverunt*). Moreover, he adds, if some of them believed in God's omnipotence without having demonstrated it, they did not believe it on the authority of God's revelation, but by reason of some sign or indication from which they surmised it (*coniecturati sunt*). Perhaps by this Thomas is thinking of some cataclysmic natural event that might have moved some of them to this conclusion, even though such an approach would not be regarded as a strict philosophical demonstration.¹⁸

16. See d. 43, q. 1, a. 2 (p. 1004): "Utrum omnipotentia Dei possit communicari creaturae." For Thomas's response see p. 1005. Note that he adds that if the *esse* of any creature were absolute (because it was not received in something), it would not differ from the divine *esse*. He concludes: "unde sicut nulli creaturae potest communicari quod sit Deus, ita non potest sibi communicari quod est infinitae essentiae et infinitae potentiae, et quod omnipotentiam habet."

17. See Moos ed., Vol. 3, p. 746 (third opening argument).

18. *Ibid.*, p. 748: "Ad tertium dicendum quod Philosophi [proprie loquendo non] cre-

This statement could hardly be clearer, and indicates that at the time he was preparing this text for publication Thomas thought that some of the philosophers had demonstrated divine omnipotence. If they had done so, he evidently believed that they could do so. Before returning to the opening text from the *De veritate*, I will first consider a number of Thomas's more mature texts.

3. SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES

The *Summa contra Gentiles* should be dated from 1259 until about 1264. In Bk I, c. 3 Thomas explicitly notes that two ways of arriving at truth about God are available to human beings. Certain things are held to be true by believers which completely surpass human reason's ability to discover, such as the fact that God is both three and one. These can be accepted only on the grounds of religious belief. There are other truths concerning God which human reason can discover, such as the fact that God exists, that God is one, and other things of this kind which the philosophers have demonstrated by using natural reason. Because in this life the human intellect derives its knowledge from sense experience, it cannot arrive at knowledge of the divine substance in itself. By reasoning from sensible effects to God as their cause, the human intellect can know that God exists and other things of this kind which must be attributed to him as the first principle.¹⁹ Our concern, of course, is to determine whether at the time of writing the *Summa contra Gentiles* Thomas regarded omnipotence as a truth of the first or of the second type.

As will be recalled from my earlier discussion in Ch. I above, in SCG I, c. 4 Thomas indicates that because there are these two kinds of truths concerning divine things—those which completely surpass human reason's ability to discover, and those which purely rational or philosophical investigation can attain—both types have fittingly been proposed to us by God for our belief. If certain naturally knowable truths about God had not been revealed to us, unhappy consequences would follow. Only a few human beings would in fact reach purely natural knowledge of God. Those who succeeded in this effort would do so only after considerable time had passed. And error would still often be intermingled with the truths discovered about God by those few who succeeded in this quest. Hence it was most appropriate for God to propose for our belief

diderunt Deum esse omnipotentem, sed sciverunt, quia demonstrative illud probaverunt.” Note that the *proprie loquendo non* which I have bracketed is missing from a number of the manuscripts used by Moos in his edition, but, as he has concluded, is demanded by the context.

19. Ed. Leon. man., pp. 2–3.

truths about himself which unaided human reason can discover, at least in principle.²⁰

In Book I, c. 7, Thomas explicitly argues for the point that those truths concerning God which reason can discover on its own cannot be contrary to revealed truth. In other words, here as elsewhere in his writings, he defends an ultimate harmony between revealed truth and naturally known truth, or between faith and reason.²¹

In c. 9 Thomas offers some important methodological observations. It should be the concern of the wise person to treat of the twofold kind of truth he has distinguished concerning divine things and to refute opposed errors. In order to manifest those truths that can be discovered through purely rational investigation he will offer demonstrative arguments by which an adversary may be convinced. Since truths of the other type cannot be demonstrated, he will not attempt to demonstrate them but will resolve objections which an unbeliever might raise against them. This he will do because of his previously stated conviction that naturally discovered truth cannot be opposed to the truth of faith. He adds that the only way of convincing one who is opposed to such purely revealed truth is to appeal to the authority of Scripture as divinely confirmed through miracles. Nonetheless, he notes that certain likely arguments may be offered for the practice and solace of those who are believers, but not to refute adversaries.²²

Summing up, he indicates that he will first endeavor to manifest that kind of truth which faith professes and which reason can investigate by offering both demonstrative and probable arguments. Some of these arguments will be taken from the writings both of the philosophers and of the saints (Fathers of the Church). Then, in accord with the pedagogical principle that one should move from the more evident to the less evident, he will proceed (in Bk IV) to examine those truths which completely surpass human reason, both by resolving the opposing arguments of adversaries, and by appealing to probable arguments and authorities.

One interesting addition appears here regarding his examination (in Books I–III) of naturally knowable truths which faith also professes. He has now indicated that he will offer both demonstrative arguments *and probable arguments* in support of such truths.²³ He had first referred only to demonstrative arguments. This leaves to the reader of Books I–III

20. *Ibid.*, p. 4.

21. For c. 7 see *ibid.*, pp. 6–7. For another excellent statement on the harmony between reason and revelation and also between philosophy and theology see Thomas's *Super Boetium De Trinitate*, q. 2, a. 3 (Leon. 50.98–99).

22. *Ed. cit.*, pp. 7–8.

23. See p. 8. Note especially: “primum nitentur ad manifestationem illius veritatis quam fides proficitur et ratio investigat, inducentes rationes demonstrativas et probabiles. . . .”

the task of discerning when Thomas thinks he is offering demonstrative arguments, and when he regards his arguments as only probable. Sometimes he alerts us to this, but frequently he does not. As he also makes clear, in the first three books of this work he intends to pursue the path of reason in examining those things human reason can discover about God, according to the following order: (1) those things which pertain to God considered in himself (Bk I); (2) the procession of creatures from God (Bk II); (3) the ordering of creatures to God as to their end (Bk III). In Bk I, c. 13, as a necessary foundation for the entire task, he offers argumentation to demonstrate that God is.²⁴

These methodological remarks make it clear that in considering God in himself in Bk I and the procession of creatures from God in Bk II, Thomas wishes to set down what human reason can establish.

Consistent with this plan, in Bk II, c. 1 Thomas observes that perfect knowledge cannot be had of anything unless its operation is also considered. He distinguishes two kinds of operation, one which remains within an agent and is its perfection (such as to sense or to understand or to will), and another which passes over into external things and which, therefore, is a perfection of the thing made (such as to heat or cut or build something).

Thomas maintains that both types of operation pertain to God, the first insofar as he understands, wills, rejoices, and loves, and the second insofar as he brings things into being and conserves and governs them. Because the first kind of operation is a perfection of the agent and the second a perfection of what is made or done, the first must be regarded as the foundation for the second and is prior to it in nature just as a cause is prior to its effect. Thomas also comments that the first type, being a perfection of the agent, fully deserves the name operation or action, but that the second, as a perfection of the thing made or done, should better be called a doing or making (*factio*). Thomas recalls that he has dealt with the first type of divine operation in Bk I where he treated of divine knowledge and the divine will (see cc. 44–102). Now it remains for him to take up the second kind of operation, by which things are produced and governed by God.²⁵

In c. 4 Thomas offers some additional methodological considerations. He repeats a point just made in cc. 2 and 3 that it is proper for the teaching of Christian faith to take up a consideration of creatures both insofar as certain likenesses of God are found in creatures, and insofar as errors about creatures may lead to errors about divine things. But the philoso-

24. See the conclusion of c. 9: “. . . praemittendum est, quasi totius operis necessarium fundamentum, consideratio qua demonstratur Deum esse.”

25. Ed. cit., p. 93.

pher and the Christian believer consider creatures in different ways. The philosopher examines such realities precisely as they are in themselves. The Christian considers creatures not insofar as they are in themselves, but insofar as they are in some way related to God. Thomas quickly adds that it should not be regarded as a shortcoming on the part of the teaching of Christian faith if it bypasses many properties of created things in its investigations, such as the configuration of the heavens or the qualities of motion, etc.²⁶

Thomas also comments that these two types of teaching do not follow the same order. The teaching of philosophy, which considers creatures in themselves and moves from them to knowledge of God, first considers creatures and only then God. The teaching of faith, which considers creatures only insofar as they are ordered to God, first considers God and then only creatures. This second approach is more perfect in that it is more like God's knowledge, who in knowing himself knows other things.

The reader should not conclude from this that Thomas has now abandoned his effort in Bks II and III of the *Summa contra Gentiles* to investigate rationally or philosophically created reality as it proceeds from God and is ordered to him. As has already been noted, in beginning with God in Bk I and considering him as he is in himself, Thomas first found it necessary to demonstrate philosophically his existence. We may assume, therefore, that in his ensuing discussion of God's power in Bk II he will continue to appeal to philosophical argumentation. As he briefly explains in Bk II, c. 5, he will first consider the production of created things, secondly their distinctions, and thirdly the nature of the things produced by God, all of this insofar as it pertains to the truth of faith.²⁷

Thus in c. 6 he offers a series of philosophical arguments to show that it belongs to God to be a principle and cause of being (*essendi*) for other things. He recalls that in Bk I (c. 13) he has used Aristotle's demonstration to show that there is a first efficient cause which we name God. But an efficient cause brings its effects into being. Therefore, God is the cause of being (*causa essendi*) for other things.

Moreover, he has also shown in Bk I, again by using Aristotle's argument, that there is a first immobile mover, which we name God. But the first mover in any order of motions is the cause of all the motions in that order. And, in a reference to the Aristotelian and medieval theory

²⁶ Ed. cit., p. 95.

²⁷ Ed. cit., p. 96. This does not mean that he will not offer philosophical argumentation in pursuing these topics, but rather that he will discuss created realities only insofar as they are in some way related to God. As he has explained in c. 4, to that extent it is appropriate for the teaching of Christian faith to consider created realities.

of the heavens, he comments that because many things are produced in existence (*esse*) by the motion of the (first) heaven and because God has been shown to be the First Mover in that order, he must be the cause of being (*causa essendi*) for many things.²⁸

In c. 7 Thomas wishes to show that there is active power in God. As his first argument he reasons that an active power is a principle of acting on another insofar as it is other. But he has just shown that God is a principle of being (*principium essendi*) for other things. Therefore God is powerful (*potens*).

He also recalls from Bk I, c. 28 (*Adhuc*) that he has shown that the divine perfection includes in itself the perfections of all things. But active power is a perfection. Indeed, the more perfect a thing, the greater its active power. Therefore active power cannot be lacking to God. In a final argument he reasons that if in fact something acts, it can act. But he has shown in Bk I, c. 13 that God is both an agent and a moving principle, in other words, that God does act. Therefore God can act, and active power is fittingly ascribed to him. Since Thomas regards his arguments for God's existence in Bk I, c. 13 as demonstrations and in them he has concluded to the existence of God as the first agent and first moving principle, presumably he thinks that he has also demonstrated that God enjoys active power.²⁹

In c. 8 Thomas offers a series of arguments to prove that God's power is identical with his very essence (*substantia*). For instance, he reasons (*Amplius*) that active power pertains to a thing's perfection and, as he has shown in Bk I, c. 28, all divine perfection is contained within the divine being (*esse*). Therefore the divine power is not distinct from the divine being (*esse*). But God is identical with his very being (*esse*) as Thomas has shown in Bk I, c. 22. Therefore God is identical with his power.

In c. 9 Thomas offers another set of arguments to prove that God's power is not really distinct from his action. For instance, he reasons that those things that are identical with one and the same thing are identical with one another. But the divine power is identical with the divine substance, as he has just shown. And the divine action is also identical with the divine substance, as he established in Book I, c. 45, with respect to God's intellectual operation, through argumentation which, Thomas now comments, applies to other cases of divine operation. Therefore God's power and his operation are identical.³⁰

28. Ibid. It is interesting to find Thomas here devoting a special chapter to prove that God, whose existence he has already established in Bk I, ch. 13, is the *principium essendi* for other things.

29. Ed. cit., p. 97.

30. Ibid.

In c. 10 Thomas offers an important precision about God's power and action. Since the divine action is not really distinct from God's power, as he has just shown, and since nothing is a principle of itself, power is said to be present in God not as a principle of his own action but rather as a principle of something that is done or made (*facti*). Thomas recalls that an active power is a principle of acting on another insofar as it is other. From this it follows that power is said of God with respect to the things he produces, but not with respect to the divine action itself, except according to our mode of understanding. If certain divine actions such as understanding and willing are purely immanent (and do not pass over into other things), God's power does not really apply to them except according to our mode of understanding. Properly speaking, God's power has to do only with his production of distinct effects. Indeed, properly speaking, intellect and will are not present in God as powers but only as actions.³¹

In c. 15, Thomas offers a series of arguments to prove not only that God is a cause of being (*causa essendi*) for other things, as he has shown in c. 6, but that nothing other than God can exist without depending on him for its being. In one of his arguments (*"Item"*) he reasons that what is affirmed of something of its essence is the cause of all other instances where that same characteristic is present only by participation. But God is being (*ens*) of his essence because he is the act of being (*esse*) itself. Every being other than God is a being only by participation because, as Thomas has shown in Bk I (see c. 42), there can only be one being which is identical with its act of being (*esse*). Therefore, God is the cause of being for all other things. And in c. 16 he offers another series of arguments to prove that God produces things from nothing, that is, from no pre-existing subject, or as one may put it, that God creates.

After offering additional clarifications about the nature of creation in cc. 18–21, Thomas attempts to prove in c. 22 that God can do all things, or as he puts it, that God's power is not restricted to any one given effect. As he also states explicitly, this is to show that God is omnipotent.³² For instance, he reasons (*"Adhuc"*) that every agent acts insofar as it is in act. And the mode of an agent's power in acting is in accord with the mode of its act. But God is perfect act, containing in himself the perfections of all things, as Thomas has established in Book I, c. 28. Therefore God's active power is perfect and extends to all things which are not repugnant

31. See *ibid.*, p. 98, especially: "Intellectus igitur et voluntas in Deo non sunt ut potentiae, sed solum ut actiones."

32. See near the end of c. 22 (ed. cit., p. 109): "Restat igitur quod divina virtus non determinetur ad aliquem effectum, sed simpliciter omnia potest: quod est eum esse *omnipotentem*."

to being in actuality, that is, which do not entail contradiction. Therefore God can do whatever does not imply contradiction and, as Thomas will explicitly state, is omnipotent.

I conclude, therefore, that at the time of his writing the *Summa contra Gentiles*, Thomas still thought that God's omnipotence can be established by philosophical argumentation. Missing from Book II, c. 22, is the argument based on the infinity of the divine essence, as established by the principle that unreceived act is unlimited. But Thomas does use this principle in Book I, c. 43 to establish God's infinity, though not his omnipotence.

4. COMPENDIUM THEOLOGIAE

The first part of the *Compendium theologiae*, the part of interest here, very likely dates from 1265–1267, and therefore shortly after the completion of the *Summa contra Gentiles*.³³ In c. 1 Thomas indicates to Brother Reginald (of Piperno) that he wants to set down in writing a brief presentation of the teachings of the Christian religion, and that he wishes to divide his treatise into three parts, dealing respectively with faith, hope, and charity. Although he was prevented by other demands on his time (and ultimately by his premature death) from completing this work, Thomas did finish the first part (*De fide*), and a portion of the second part (*De spe*). As he indicates in c. 2, in the section on faith he will treat both of the divinity of the Trinity and of the humanity of Christ. As regards the Trinity, he proposes to proceed by considering: (1) the unity of the divine essence, (2) the Trinity of Persons, and (3) the effects of divinity.³⁴

While this treatise is clearly intended to be a theological writing, Thomas quickly devotes a series of chapters to rational or philosophical arguments for the existence and attributes of God. Thus in c. 3 he comments that as regards the unity of the divine essence, one must first hold that God exists. This, he continues, is evident from reason. He then offers a version of the argument based on motion, and concludes from this that there must be a first mover, which is supreme among all other movers, and which we call God. In c. 4 he reasons philosophically again in order to show that God, the First Mover, is completely and totally immobile. In c. 5 he proceeds from his proof that God is immobile to the conclusion that he is eternal. That which either begins to be or passes away undergoes this through motion or through change. But a perfectly

33. For this date see Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas. Vol. I*, p. 349; and the Preface to the Leonine ed., Vol. 42, p. 8.

34. For cc. 1–2 see Leon. 42.83–84.

immobile being cannot be subject to motion or change. Therefore God is eternal.³⁵

In c. 6 Thomas reasons from his conclusion that God is totally free from change (immutable) to show that he exists necessarily. In c. 7 he moves from the point that God exists necessarily to the conclusion that he always exists. Thomas also reasons to this same conclusion by recalling that God is perfectly immutable, and again by noting that if God began to be, he would be dependent upon something else for his very being. This would be incompatible with his nature as the first being. In c. 8 Thomas draws upon God's freedom from motion and change to show that his being is not successive, but simultaneous and total and therefore eternal.³⁶

Continuing to argue philosophically, Thomas concludes in c. 9 that God is a simple being in that he is completely free from any kind of composition, and in c. 10 that he is identical with his essence. To reject either of these conclusions would be to ascribe some kind of potency-act composition to God, something which is precluded by the fact that he is the first and completely Unmoved Mover. In c. 11 Thomas reasons that God's essence is not distinct from (literally: other than) his act of being (*esse*). To maintain such a distinction would imply that there is some composition in God, namely of that whereby he is, and that whereby he is a what. But this has already been eliminated by Thomas's earlier argumentation.³⁷

Thomas goes on to reason that God is not contained in any genus in the way a species is (c. 12), that God himself is not a genus (c. 13), and that he is not a species that might be predicated of different individuals (c. 14). The second argument offered in c. 14 to show that God is not a species containing various individuals rests upon Thomas's claim that in God essence and act of being (*esse*) do not differ. When different individuals fall within a given species, in each of them essence and act of being (*esse*) must differ, he reasons.³⁸

In c. 15, Thomas offers three arguments to prove that God is one, that is to say, that there is only one God. First of all, if there were many gods,

35. For cc. 3, 4, and 5 see Leon. 42.84.

36. For cc. 6–8 see Leon. 42.84–85. Thomas concludes c. 8 by noting that God is eternal in accord with the Boethian definition of eternity as the simultaneous, total and perfect possession of boundless life. See *The Consolation of Philosophy*, ed. S. J. Tester, in *The Theological Tractates*, ed. J. F. Stewart, E. K. Rand, and S. J. Tester (Cambridge, Mass., 1978), Bk V, prop. 6 (p. 422).

37. Leon. 42.85–86.

38. See Leon. 42.86–87. On a number of occasions Thomas uses a similar argument to show that anything that falls into the genus substance must be composed of a distinct essence and act of being. For discussion of these see my *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas*, pp. 157–61.

the term “gods” would be used either equivocally or univocally, each of which Thomas rejects as unsatisfactory. Secondly, it is impossible for that whereby a common essence is individuated to be realized in more than one thing. Although there can be many human beings, this particular human being can only be one. If an essence is individuated of itself and not by anything else, as is true of God, it cannot be realized in more than one instance. Finally, a form can be multiplied either by the addition of specific differences, or else by being received in different subjects. If a form cannot be multiplied by differences, and does not exist in a receiving subject, it cannot be multiplied. Thus if whiteness could exist apart from any substance, it would only be one. Because the divine essence is identical with the divine act of being (*esse*), and this in turn admits of no differences, and because it is a subsisting form that is not received in any subject, it can only be one.³⁹

After arguing in c. 16 that God cannot be a body and in c. 17 that he is not the form of a body or a power found in a body, in c. 18 Thomas reasons philosophically in order to prove that God's essence is infinite. As he explains, here he is not thinking of the infinite taken as privation and which follows upon quantity, but of the negative infinite—that which is limited in no way whatsoever. In his first argument to prove that God is infinite in his essence Thomas appeals to the principle we have already seen him employing in his Commentary on I *Sentences*. No act is limited except by a potency which receives it. Thus we find that forms are limited according to the potency of the matter (that receives them). If therefore, the First Mover is pure act and free from any admixture of potentiality, since it is neither the form of a body nor a power within a body, it must be infinite. Again one sees how central to Thomas's thinking is the principle that unreceived act is unlimited.⁴⁰

In c. 19 Thomas reasons from the infinity of the divine essence to the infinity of God's power. A thing's power (*virtus*) follows upon its essence, since each and every thing can act in accord with the mode whereby it exists. If God is infinite in essence, as Thomas has just shown in c. 18, his power must also be infinite.⁴¹

Lest there be any confusion between the kind of infinity Thomas assigns to God and the infinite based on quantity, he argues in c. 20 that while the infinite in quantity is a sign of imperfection, God's infinity sig-

39. Leon. 42.87.

40. For c. 18 see Leon. 42.88. Note in particular lines 7–13: “Nullus enim actus invenitur finiri nisi per potentiam quae est eius receptiva: invenimus enim formas limitari secundum potentiam materiae. Si igitur primum movens est actus absque potentiae permixtione, qui non est forma alicuius corporis neque virtus in corpore, necessarium est ipsum infinitum esse.” Cf. nn. 14 and 15 above in this chapter.

41. Leon. 42.88.

nifies that supreme perfection is present in him. This is because the infinite in quantity pertains to matter insofar as it lacks an end or terminus, whereas perfection arises from the side of form. Because God is pure form or pure actuality, containing no matter or potentiality, his infinity pertains to his supreme perfection.⁴² In other words, Thomas assigns intensive infinity to God, not extensive infinity.

In c. 21 Thomas argues that all the perfections found in other things are present in God as their originating principle and in superabundant fashion. That which moves something else toward a perfection must itself possess that perfection. Because God as the First Mover moves other things toward their perfections, the perfections of those things preexist in him in superabundant fashion. This does not necessarily mean that they exist in God in the formal sense; if they imply imperfection or finiteness in themselves, they will be present in God virtually, i.e., in that he has the power to bring them into existence as their cause, or as Thomas phrases it, as their originating principle.⁴³

Finally, as Thomas sums up in c. 22, all the perfections present in God are one in reality. This necessarily follows from God's simplicity for which Thomas has argued in c. 9. In the immediately following chapters Thomas reasons that no accident can be present in God (c. 23), and then takes up the issue of the divine names. The fact that we apply different names to God does not militate against his simplicity (c. 24). It is because our intellect cannot grasp God's essence as it is in itself that we move from knowledge of things which we can experience to knowledge of him. In these things we discover distinct perfections, each of which has its single origin and source in God. Hence we form different concepts and apply different names to these perfections as we find them in the things of our experience, realizing that in God they are really one (see c. 22).

And so, while we apply different names to God, they are not purely synonymous but signify the different concepts we form of him (see c. 25), notwithstanding the fact that he is perfectly simple. In c. 26 Thomas reasons that since our intellect cannot perfectly grasp the divine essence through any of the concepts signified by the names we apply to God, by using these names it is impossible for us to define that which is in God.⁴⁴

42. Leon. 42.88:1–12. Cf. ST I, q. 7, a. 1.

43. Leon. 42.89. Note especially: "Inde etiam apparet quod omnes perfectiones in quibuscumque rebus inventas, necesse est originaliter et superabundanter in Deo esse."

44. This also fits in nicely with Thomas's well-known claim articulated in other texts to the effect that while we can know that God is and what he is not, we cannot know what he is. See, for instance, SCG I, cc. 14 and 30; ST I, Introduction to q. 3. For discussion see Wippel, *Metaphysical Themes*, pp. 215–41; *The Metaphysical Thought*, pp. 502–43; B. Davies, "Aquinas on What God Is Not," *Revue internationale de philosophie* 52 (1998), pp. 207–25.

He goes on to argue in c. 27 that names are not said of God either in purely univocal or in purely equivocal fashion, but analogically. After showing in c. 28 that God is intelligent and discussing the way in which he understands (cc. 29–31), Thomas also argues that he possesses will (c. 32), that his will is not really distinct from his intellect, and that both are identical with his essence (c. 33). Finally, in c. 34, Thomas concludes that the will of God is identical with his actual willing.

From his opening argument to show that God exists in c. 3 until c. 34 Thomas has offered a series of rational or philosophical arguments to establish many points about God. Included among these were efforts to prove that God is infinite in essence and power. One would appear to be justified in concluding, therefore, that as of this writing Thomas still held that unaided philosophical reason can prove not only that God exists and that he is one, but also that his power is infinite or that he is omnipotent.⁴⁵

In c. 35 Thomas returns to the more strictly theological nature of his enterprise in the *Compendium theologiae*. From all that he has now established, he writes, we may conclude that God is one, simple, perfect, infinite, and equipped with intellect and will. All of these things are included in the brief article of faith which we profess by saying that we believe in “one omnipotent God.” He suggests that the name “God” appears to be taken from the Greek “theos,” and that this in turn is taken from the Greek “theaste” which means to see or to consider; hence the very name “God” indicates that he is intelligent and therefore possesses will. By professing that God is “one” we exclude all plurality of gods and any composition in him. By saying that he is “omnipotent,” we profess that he is infinite in power and perfect, since the power of a thing follows from the perfection of its essence. Again Thomas indicates that omnipotence implies infinity in power.⁴⁶

In c. 36 Thomas notes that these points about God which he has just made and which are handed down to us through revelation were also considered in subtle fashion by many of the gentile philosophers, although some of them fell into error on these matters. Those who arrived at the truth about these issues did so only after long and laborious investigation, and could barely reach the aforementioned truth. Other things about God have been handed down to us in the teaching of the Christian religion which the philosophers could not reach, and about which we have been instructed beyond purely human understanding

45. See *Compendium theologiae*, cc. 18, 19.

46. Leon. 42.92–93. As the Leonine edition indicates, a similar etymology of the Greek origins for the name “Deus” is to be found in John Damascene’s *De fide orthodoxa*, c. 9 (Buytaert ed., p. 49).

by the Christian faith. Specifically, Thomas has in mind belief in the Trinity.⁴⁷

Here then, Thomas makes belief in the Trinity the line of demarcation between what philosophical investigation can discover about God and what the Christian religion manifests to us. God's omnipotence falls under the former rather than under the latter and hence is not here regarded by Thomas as an article of faith. And this in turn again suggests that one should approach our opening and seemingly opposed text from *De veritate*, q. 14, a. 9, ad 8 with considerable caution. Before returning to that text, I shall now turn to two still later texts, the *De potentia* (ca. 1265–1266), and the *Summa theologiae I* (1265–1268).

5. DE POTENTIA, Q. 1

In q. 1, a. 1 of the *De potentia*, Thomas asks whether power is present in God. In his response he notes that the name "power" is taken from act, and that act itself is of two kinds: first act, or form; and second act, or operation. He comments that the name "act" was first assigned to operation and then transferred to form as well because form is a principle and end of operation. Corresponding to this he distinguishes two kinds of power: active power, to which the act known as operation corresponds; and passive power, to which first act or form corresponds. Just as nothing is acted upon except by reason of a passive potency or power, so nothing acts except by reason of a first act or form. But God is the first act and first form, a point for which Thomas argues philosophically elsewhere. Because God is pure act, to act belongs to him to the maximum degree. Therefore active power, taken as a principle of action, pertains to him to the maximum degree.⁴⁸

In a. 2 Thomas asks whether God's power is infinite. After again distinguishing between the infinite taken as privation and the negative infinite, he comments that only the latter is present in God. And this kind of infinity belongs to God with respect to all that is present in him. Because neither he nor his essence nor his wisdom nor his power nor his goodness is limited by anything, all are infinite. As regards his power, the degree of his active power follows upon the degree of his actuality. God is infinite act because act can be limited only from the side of some agent, or from the side of some receiving and limiting principle. The divine

47. See Leon. 42.93:10–14: "Est autem hoc quod, cum sit deus unus et simplex, ut ostensum est, est tamen Deus Pater, Deus Filius et Deus Spiritus Sanctus, et hii tres non tres dii sed unus Deus est."

48. See *De potentia*, Pession ed., Vol. 2, pp. 8–9. For Thomas's argumentation to show that God is pure act see, for instance, SCG I, c. 16; ST I, q. 3, a. 1.

act is not limited in either way because it does not depend on anything else and is not received in anything else, that is, in any distinct subject. Here again we find Thomas appealing to the principle that unreceived act is unlimited. And from this it follows that God's power is infinite.⁴⁹ As Thomas explains in a. 3, this means that he can do whatever is not impossible in itself, i.e., whatever is not contradictory.

Finally, in a. 7 Thomas asks why God is said to be omnipotent. To say that God is omnipotent because his power is infinite does not really explain the meaning of omnipotence, but identifies its cause. Thomas concludes that God is said to be omnipotent because he can do all that is possible in itself, all that does not imply contradiction.⁵⁰

6. SUMMA THEOLOGIAE I, Q. 25

Thomas follows essentially the same approach in *Summa theologiae* I, q. 25. There in a. 1 he attempts to prove that power is present in God. Again he has in mind active power. He reasons that each and every thing is an active principle to the extent that it is in act and perfect. But Thomas has shown above that God is pure act (q. 3, a. 1) and simply and universally perfect (q. 4, a. 1). This argumentation in turn presupposes that in q. 2, a. 3 Thomas has already proved that God is the first (efficient) principle, the first mover, and the first being. Therefore it belongs to him to the maximum degree to be an active principle, and to be acted upon in no way. But to be an active principle presupposes active power. Therefore active power must be present in him to the maximum degree.⁵¹

In q. 25, a. 2, Thomas appeals to the fact that God is infinite being (*esse*) to show that his active power is infinite. He recalls that he has already shown (in q. 7, a. 1) that God's being (*esse*) is infinite because it is not limited by any receiving principle. Therefore his active power must be infinite. Again we note the importance of Thomas's usage of the principle that unreceived act or unreceived *esse* is unlimited.⁵²

Finally, in a. 3 he explicitly addresses the point that God is omnipotent. Again he explains that God is said to be omnipotent because he can do all that is possible in the absolute sense, that is, all that can fall

49. Ed. cit., p. 11. Thomas then repeats his argumentation by explicitly applying it to the divine *esse*: "Esse autem Dei, cum non sit in aliquo receptum, sed sit esse purum, non limitatur ad aliquem modum perfectionis essendi, sed totum esse in se habet . . . ita divinum esse infinitum est; et ex hoc patet quod virtus vel potentia sua activa, est infinita."

50. Ed. cit., p. 23. Here Thomas is not attempting to demonstrate God's omnipotence, since he has done that in a. 2. He is rather explaining what it means for us to say that God is omnipotent.

51. Leon. 4.290.

52. Leon. 4.292.

under the nature (*ratio*) of being, all that does not imply contradiction. He points out that the divine *esse*, upon which the divine power is based, is infinite.⁵³

In sum, therefore, nothing we have seen in these two works would lead us to think that Thomas's position on the demonstrability of divine omnipotence has changed.

7. CONCLUDING REMARKS

Two approaches to establishing divine omnipotence suggest themselves from the texts we have reviewed. In a series of passages ranging throughout his career, Thomas offers rational or philosophical argumentation for God's omnipotence. He usually reasons from or presupposes his demonstration of God's existence and of his nature as pure actuality, and moves from this to show that he is infinite or unlimited being (*esse*). Thomas then reasons that God enjoys active power and that this, too, is infinite and thus that he is omnipotent. Indeed, in his Commentary on Book III of the *Sentences*, we found Thomas writing that the philosophers did not *believe* that God is omnipotent; they *knew* this because they had demonstrated it.⁵⁴ These texts would lead one to think that Thomas regards our knowledge of God's omnipotence, along with his existence, unity, and infinity, as falling under what he sometimes refers to as preambles of faith. As he comments in q. 2, a. 3 of his Commentary on the *De Trinitate* of Boethius, the teachings of philosophy contain certain likenesses of those things which are of faith, and certain preambles to them, just as nature is a preamble to grace.⁵⁵

In this same general context, Thomas points out three ways in which one may use philosophy in theology. Of these the first is to demonstrate those things which are preambles for faith and which must be known within faith, such as things that are proved by natural arguments about God, including the fact that God exists, that God is one, and other things of this kind that are proved in philosophy about God or about creatures and which faith presupposes.⁵⁶

As we have also seen, Thomas is well aware that in the first article of the Creed, Christians profess belief in one omnipotent God. Thus in the *Compendium theologiae* (c. 35) he has suggested that in making this

53. Leon. 4.293–94.

54. For this text see n. 18 above.

55. Leon. 50.99:135–137.

56. Leon. 50.99:149–154: “primo ad demonstrandum ea quae sunt praeambula fidei, quae necesse est in fide scire, ut ea quae naturalibus rationibus de Deo probantur, ut Deum esse, Deum esse unum, et alia huiusmodi vel de Deo vel de creaturis in philosophia probata, quae fides supponit. . . .”

profession we imply our belief that God is one, simple, perfect, infinite, and equipped with intelligence and will. And yet in the preceding chapters of this treatise he had just offered philosophical arguments for each of these items, along with omnipotence. And in c. 36 he acknowledges that these points were also considered with great subtlety by the gentile philosophers, although some of them fell into error on some of these points.

This might suggest that one and the same person might both believe and demonstrate one or more of these truths about God at one and the same time. Thomas rejects this possibility, for instance in *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 1, a. 5. He recognizes that something may be known (or proved) by one person and believed by another. He also considers as an objection to his position the fact that certain things contained within religious belief have been demonstrated by the philosophers, such as the fact that God exists, that God is one, and other things of this kind. Thomas now replies that those things which can be demonstrated may be included among things that are to be believed, not because they can be held only on faith, but because they are presupposed for those things which are strictly of faith. Therefore they should at least be held on faith by those who cannot demonstrate them.⁵⁷ Hence I am inclined to think that Thomas includes omnipotence among these and regards it as a preamble of faith.

But in replying to the first objection in q. 1, a. 8, he deals with an objection based on the fact that Aristotle and other philosophers have demonstrated that God is one and that this therefore should not be included as an article of faith. This time he responds that we hold many things on faith about God which the philosophers could not investigate by natural reason, concerning, for instance, his providence and his omnipotence and the fact that he alone is to be worshipped. Hence all of these fall under the first article of the Creed concerning God's unity.⁵⁸

57. Leon. 8.16. Note especially: "Et similiter potest contingere ut id quod est visum vel scitum ab uno homine, etiam in statu viae, sit ab alio creditum, qui hoc demonstrative non novit." See obj. 3 and the reply (p. 17): "Ad tertium dicendum quod ea quae demonstrative probari possunt inter credenda numerantur, non quia de ipsis sit simpliciter fides apud omnes; sed quia praeeleguntur ad ea quae sunt fidei et oportet ea saltem per fidem praesupponi ab his qui horum demonstrationem non habent." Also see his reply to obj. 4, as well as q. 1, a. 4 (that one cannot have faith about that which one sees either with one's senses or one's intellect).

58. Leon. 8.22: "Ad primum ergo dicendum quod multa per fidem tenemus de Deo quae naturali ratione investigare philosophi non potuerunt: puta circa providentiam eius et omnipotentiam, et quod ipse solus sit colendus. Quae omnia continentur sub articulo unitatis Dei." Strictly speaking here he does not explicitly include the *fact* that God is omnipotent or the *fact* that he is provident among the things the philosophers were unable to investigate, as distinguished from certain beliefs surrounding those facts. See q. 1, a. 5, ad 4.

This text seems to suggest a different approach to divine omnipotence and one which reminds us of our opening passage from *De veritate*, q. 14, a. 9, ad 8. To set the general context for that text, in a. 9 Thomas is seeking to determine whether faith can be had about things that are also known (by the same person). Thomas also rejects this possibility there, in brief because the object of faith properly speaking is that which is not present to the intellect, something which is not seen. As soon as something becomes present or apparent to the intellect, it can no longer be the object of an act of faith. Things which are “known” when this term is taken in the sense of scientific knowledge are accepted because they have been resolved back to first principles which themselves are evident to the intellect. Hence at that point they too can no longer be believed because they are known.⁵⁹

Thomas does note that something can be an object of belief in two ways. Some truths simply surpass the capacity of all human intellects in this life, such as our awareness that God is three and one. No human being can have demonstrative knowledge of such truths. Others are subject to belief only because scientific knowledge of them surpasses the capacity of some human beings, but not of all. Such are those truths that can be demonstrated about God, such as the fact that he exists, or that he is one, or incorporeal, and things of this type. These truths may be known by some who can demonstrate them and believed by others who cannot grasp demonstrations of them. But, Thomas repeats, it is impossible for the same thing to be both known and believed by the same individual at the same time.⁶⁰

It is against this conclusion that the eighth objection is directed. According to that objection, the fact that God is one is included under things that are to be believed (*credibilia*). But this same conclusion has been demonstrated by the philosophers and can, therefore, be known. Therefore there can be faith and knowledge of the same thing.⁶¹

In replying to this objection Thomas develops the troubling text with which we began. He observes that the truth that God is one insofar as it is demonstrated is not an article of faith, but is rather presupposed for the articles of faith. For the knowledge of faith presupposes natural knowledge just as grace presupposes nature; but the unity of the divine essence in the way it is held by believers, namely, together with omnipo-

where he notes that it is possible for someone to know one thing about a given subject and only to have opinion about another aspect of that same subject. Likewise concerning God, someone may know by demonstration that he is one, and still believe that he is triune (see p. 17).

59. Leon. 22.2.463:83-120.

60. Leon. 22.2.463:121-139.

61. Leon. 22.2.462:52-55.

tence and providence over all and other things of this kind which cannot be proved, constitutes an article (of faith).⁶²

Unless we are to conclude that Thomas changed his mind on this point at the time of *De veritate*, q. 14, and then quickly changed it back to his original position, and finally changed it still again in ST II-II, q. 1, we should interpret this text as meaning that knowledge of God's unity and existence in the way it is demonstrated philosophically is a preamble of faith, not an article of faith taken strictly. But when acceptance of God's unity is taken in the full sense in which believers profess it, i.e., together with omnipotence and providence, and together with other truths of this kind that cannot be proved, including most especially the Trinity of Persons, then it does constitute an article of faith. The text need not be interpreted as denying that divine omnipotence can be demonstrated philosophically unless this, too, is taken together with other truths about God which cannot be demonstrated, again including belief in the Trinity. In this way, I would suggest, one may reconcile this text, along with that from ST II-II, q. 1, a. 8, ad 1, with Thomas's many efforts to demonstrate philosophically God's omnipotence.

62. Leon. 22.2.464:196–204, and n. 4 above for the Latin of the final part of his reply.

Chapter IX

THOMAS AQUINAS ON GOD'S FREEDOM TO CREATE OR NOT

For those not familiar with a long-running controversy concerning the consistency of Thomas's Aquinas's thought on this point, I would like to begin by noting that in his two recent and important volumes on Thomas's *Summa contra Gentiles*, the late Norman Kretzmann has raised this issue again. In brief, no one doubts that in fact Aquinas defended God's freedom to create or not to create at all and, moreover, God's freedom to create this particular universe or any other. For Thomas this is required by orthodox Catholic belief, but is also something that can be established and defended on philosophical grounds. But the controversy concerns whether or not Aquinas was philosophically successful in defending God's freedom to create or not to create or whether he was inconsistent in doing so.

Kretzmann, for instance, grants that Thomas offers successful argumentation to establish the presence of intellect in God and, following from this, the presence of will as well. And thus he finds Thomas being consistent in maintaining that, just as the only adequate object of the divine intellect is the divine essence itself, so too, the only adequate object of God's willing must be the divine goodness itself. But, maintains Kretzmann, this is not of itself enough to justify Aquinas in concluding therefore that God freely decided to create the universe rather than not to create it. Kretzmann does grant that, given God's decision to create something, Thomas is correct in arguing that God is free to create this universe or any other universe, as he sees fit.¹

A major reason for Kretzmann's charge that Thomas should not have claimed that God is free to create or not to create at all is the fact that Aquinas frequently cites with approval a Neoplatonic philosophical ax-

1. Norman Kretzmann, *The Metaphysics of Theism: Aquinas's Natural Theology in Summa contra Gentiles I* (Oxford, 1997), c. 6 on intellect in God (see pp. 184–96 for a careful analysis of one of Thomas' arguments for intellect in God in SCG I, c. 44), c. 7 on will in God.

iom to the effect that the good is diffusive of itself (*bonum est diffusivum sui*). He claims that because Thomas grants that God is all-good, just as he naturally and therefore necessarily wills his own goodness, so too, he naturally and therefore necessarily must will the goodness of things other than himself. In other words, God was not free not to create. He had to create.²

Now this is not the first time that the charge of inconsistency on this point has been leveled at Aquinas. In his *The Great Chain of Being*,³ published in 1936 (and based on lectures given at Harvard in the second half of the academic year 1932–1933), Arthur Lovejoy argues that inconsistency on this issue is present in Aquinas and in other medieval Christian theologians; but he maintains that it goes back to the heights of Greek philosophy itself. According to Lovejoy, we find in Plato two conflicting views of the supreme ontological principle within all of reality. On the one hand, there is what he calls the other-worldly view, epitomized by Plato's magnificent description of the idea or form of the Good in *Republic* VI and VII. Here Plato places at the summit of reality a being that is so transcendent, so beyond being and essence, or so "other," as Lovejoy puts it, that it would seem that our physical world of change and becoming is simply not needed at all.⁴ The question may be raised, of course, concerning whether Plato's Idea or Form of the Good can be identified with God. According to Lovejoy, if we understand by God what the medieval Schoolmen called "the *ens perfectissimum*, the summit of the hierarchy of being, the ultimate and only completely satisfying object of contemplation and adoration, there can be no doubt that the Idea of the Good was the God of Plato . . ."⁵ From this, Lovejoy continues, it would follow that the existence of the sensible world, the world of becoming, can bring no "addition of excellence to reality." Lovejoy grants that Plato himself did not explicitly draw this conclusion.⁶

But, continues Lovejoy, Plato did not stop there. Already in *Republic* VI, in concluding his presentation of the Analogy of the Sun, Plato assigns to the Good the role of rendering other objects of knowledge intelligible, but also states that the "to be" and essence of the other ideas comes to them from the Good (509B). But as regards our world of becoming, it is

2. *The Metaphysics of Theism*, pp. 217–25. Also see his "Goodness, Knowledge, and Indeterminacy in the Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas," *Journal of Philosophy: Supplement* 80, n. 10 (1983), pp. 631–41; *The Metaphysics of Creation: Aquinas's Natural Theology in Summa contra Gentiles II* (Oxford, 1999), pp. 120–26, 132–36. For a fuller presentation and critique of Kretzmann's views on this see my "Norman Kretzmann on Aquinas's Attribution of Will and of Freedom to Create to God," *Religious Studies* 39 (2003), pp. 287–98.

3. (Cambridge, Mass., 1936.)

4. See pp. 40–41.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 43.

5. *Ibid.*, pp. 41–42.

in the *Timaeus* that he introduces what is often, though I think incorrectly, referred to as a “creation” myth. There Plato wants to account for the fact that there is a sensible world. And so, in the form of a myth, he posits the existence of a mysterious active principle, a Demiurge, who was responsible for forming or constructing the sensible universe as it actually is because “he was good, and in one that is good no envy of any kind ever arises. Being devoid of envy, then he desired that everything should be so far as possible like himself.”⁷ While Lovejoy recognizes that his next point is disputed and that other interpretations have been offered, he thinks it more probable that Plato in fact identified the supreme Idea of the Good of the *Republic* with the Demiurge of the *Timaeus*. But weakening Lovejoy’s claim is his assigning of creative production to Plato’s supreme principle, as Anton Pegis pointed out many decades ago.⁸

And then, once he has made this identification, Lovejoy concludes that the Demiurge may be regarded as possessing fully the attributes of the form of the Good. He finds Plato assigning to one and the same entity the characteristics of self-sufficiency and transcendence associated with the Good in the *Republic*, and the desire to communicate its goodness insofar as it can, taken from the Demiurge of the *Timaeus*. And so, Lovejoy reasons, the proposition already cited—that the good is diffusive of itself—makes its de facto appearance in the history of philosophy for the first time. And this, he proposes, would give rise to a persisting internal conflict that would bedevil Western philosophical thinking for much of its subsequent history—the conception of two Gods in one. On the one hand we have a complete and perfect God, and on the other, a divine completeness that cannot be realized without that God’s producing creatures. So now the intelligible world is declared to be incomplete without the sensible. A God unsupplemented by lesser goods would not itself be fully good.⁹

Moreover, on Lovejoy’s reading this expansiveness or fecundity on the part of the Good does not result from any free choice, but is a necessary consequence following from its nature as good. In other words, this supreme principle must produce other things like itself insofar as it can. Finally, Lovejoy also finds implicit in this thinking another consequence not explicitly drawn out in its fullness by Plato. Not only must the supreme principle or Good produce other things like itself; it must also produce every possible kind of thing in sensible reality that can correspond to an ideal type or Form. This eventually leads to the formulation of what

7. As cited by Lovejoy, p. 47. For Plato’s *Timaeus* text see 29E–30A.

8. Lovejoy, p. 48. For Pegis see *St. Thomas and the Greeks* (Milwaukee, 1939; 4th printing, 1980), pp. 48–49; 69–70.

9. Lovejoy, pp. 50, 52.

Lovejoy calls the principle of plenitude, meaning that God and creatures could not conceivably have been or done anything differently from what they have been and done.¹⁰

And so Lovejoy traces this theme resulting in his Great Chain of Being down through the centuries, and finds it brought out especially well in the thought of Plotinus with his view that all that exists necessarily and eternally emanates from his supreme principle, the One or the Good. This supreme principle necessarily and immediately produces another eternal principle, divine Mind, and that necessarily and eternally produces still another, Soul, and that in turn produces the various souls and things present in our sensible world.¹¹

In turning to the medieval period, Lovejoy cites a passage from the treatise *On the Divine Names* of Pseudo-Dionysius. This work was written by an anonymous Christian author of the late fifth or early sixth century who claimed and was thought by the medievals to be identical with the Dionysius the Areopagite cited in the Acts of the Apostles. In fact he could not have lived in Apostolic times because he was obviously influenced by the fifth-century Neoplatonic pagan philosopher Proclus. But this point was not demonstrated with certainty until centuries after the time of Aquinas.¹² I quote the text as cited by Lovejoy:

The Good by being extends its goodness to all things. For as our sun, not by choosing or taking thought but by merely being, enlightens all things, so the Good . . . by its mere existence sends forth upon all things the beams of its goodness.¹³

Now one can understand why Lovejoy (and others) might take this text as implying necessary creation on the part of God. It states that the Good

10. *Ibid.*, p. 54.

11. *Ibid.*, pp. 62–63. See, however, the discussion in John Rist, *Plotinus: The Road to Reality* (Cambridge, 1967), of the controversy concerning the reconciliation of various passages pointing to the necessary emanation of Divine Mind from the One, on the one hand, and references in Enneads 6.8 to some role for will on the part of the One in its being what it is, on the other hand (c. 6). For a strong statement of this aspect of Plotinus's position see K. Kremer, "Das 'Warum' der Schöpfung: 'quia bonus est' vel/et 'quia voluit'? Ein Beitrag zum Verhältnis von Neuplatonismus und Christentum an Hand des Prinzips 'bonum est diffusivum sui,'" in *Parusia: Studien zur Philosophie Platons und zur Problemgeschichte des Platonismus* (Festgabe für Johannes Hirschberger), ed. K. Flasch (Frankfurt am Main, 1965), pp. 243–54.

12. See in *Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works*, trans. C. Luibheid (New York–Mahwah, 1987), the introductions by J. Pelikan and by K. Froelich on the history of the discussion of the authenticity of these writings.

13. *The Great Chain of Being*, p. 68, translating from *De divinis nominibus* IV, 1 (Migne, PG 3.695). Cf. *Pseudo-Dionysius* for the Luibheid translation of this text, pp. 71–72. Also see F. Centore, "Lovejoy and Aquinas on God's 'Need' to Create," *Angelicum* 59 (1982), pp. 23–36; B.-T. Blakenhorn, "The Good as Self-Diffusive in Thomas Aquinas," *Angelicum* 79 (2002), pp. 803–37.

by being extends its goodness to all things. And this necessitarian interpretation seems to be strengthened by the analogy our author draws with the sun. Just as the sun, without choosing or even thinking but simply by being, enlightens all things, so the Good, by merely existing, sends forth the beams of its goodness to all things.

However, in commenting on this text, Thomas Aquinas does not interpret it this way. He rather observes that the point of the analogy with the sun is simply to show that, just as it extends its beams to all visible objects, so God, the supreme good, extends goodness to all other things that share in goodness. But the divine *esse* is identical with the divine acts of willing and understanding. So whatever God does through his *esse*, he does through his intellect and will. In other words, Aquinas suggests that, like every analogy, this one limps. It holds only for one side, the universality of God's communication of goodness to all good things. But the analogy does not hold for the other side, the necessary and automatic communication of the sun's rays that might seem to imply a necessary and automatic communication of God's goodness to other things.¹⁴

If only in passing I should note that St. Augustine is often cited as a strong representative of God's voluntarism with respect to creating. Well known are texts such as the following from his *On Genesis Against the Manichees*. After pointing out that the will of God can have no cause, for then something would be prior to God's will, Augustine continues:

Hence, one who says, "Why did God make heaven and earth?" should be told, "Because he willed to." For the will of God is the cause of heaven and earth¹⁵

On the other hand, different authors have cited other passages from Augustine's works which seem to stress another dimension, namely, that it is because God is good that he has created. For instance, R. Teske quotes from Augustine's *De Trinitate* (11.5.8): "For God made all things very good, for no other reason than that he himself is supremely good." And more to the point, perhaps, Teske cites from Augustine's *Literal Commentary on Genesis*:

But if he could not make good things, there would be no power; if, however, he could and did not, there would be great enviousness (*invidentia*). Hence, because he is almighty and good, he made all things very good.¹⁶

14. *In De divinis nominibus* I, 4 (ed. cit., lect. 1, nn. 270–271); *De potentia*, q. 3, a. 15, obj. 1, and ad 1 (Marietti ed., 1965), pp. 82, 84.

15. *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* 1.2.4, as translated by R. Teske, "The Motive for Creation according to St. Augustine," *Modern Schoolman* 65 (1988), p. 246. See PL 34:175: "Qui ergo dicit, Quare fecit Deus caelum et terram? Respondendum est ei, Quia voluit. Voluntas enim Dei causa est caeli et terrae. . . ."

16. For the *De Trinitate* see CCL 50:344:28–30: "Quid enim non pro suo genere ac

From these and similar texts where Augustine reasons that God, as supremely good, is envious toward no nature which he could make to be good, Teske concludes that such texts imply that goodness would be lacking if God had not created a universe. And he cites still others, especially *De libero arbitrio* 3.5.13, to conclude from these as well that God was not free not to create the best possible universe. Hence Teske finds some unresolved tension between Augustine's different texts on our topic.¹⁷

Perhaps I should mention in passing a legendary figure from the twelfth century, who managed to get himself in trouble with ecclesiastical authorities for a number of his views—Peter Abelard. One of these was his claim that God cannot do otherwise than he does. He necessarily does that which he does. Abelard develops this position both in his *Theologia Christiana* and in his *Theologia Scholarium*. In supporting this conclusion he cites from our passage from Plato's *Timaeus* 29D–30A, to the effect that God, being free from any kind of envy, wished to make the world like himself insofar as this is possible. Therefore, he could not have made the world better than he actually made it. While expressing some reservations about this in his earlier discussion (in his *Theologia Christiana*), in his second consideration of this text (in *Theologia Scholarium*) Abelard refers to Plato's argument (*ratio*) as *verissima*.¹⁸

With this we may turn to Thomas Aquinas himself. In doing so I propose to explore (1) his defense of God's freedom to create or not; (2) his defense of God's freedom to create this or any other possible universe of creatures as he sees fit; and (3) his interpretation of the Neoplatonic axiom that goodness is diffusive of itself. Since he often argues for the first two points within the same context, I will consider them more or less together.

pro suo modulo habet *similitudinem dei* quandoquidem deus fecit *omnia bona valde* non ob aliud nisi quia ipse summe bonus est?" (trans. Teske, p. 247). *Literal Commentary on Genesis*. (PL 34.307/CSEL 28.1.113): "Sed bona facere si non posset, nulla esset potentia; si autem posset nec faceret, magna esset invidentia. Quia ergo est omnipotens et bonus, omnia valde bona fecit . . ." (trans. Teske, p. 249).

17. Teske, pp. 251–53.

18. See *Theologia Christiana* 5.34–36, in *Corpus Christianorum. Continuatio Mediaevalis* 12. *Opera Theologica* 2, pp. 361–63; *Theologia Scholarium* in CC. *Cont. Med.* 13. *Opera Theologica* 3, p. 512. For texts and discussion see John Marenbon, *The Philosophy of Peter Abelard* (Cambridge, 1997), pp. 217–21. On the condemnation of nineteen positions allegedly defended by Abelard (including this one) by bishops attending the Council of Sens in 1140, and then by the Pope, see pp. 26–33. But also see Richard E. Weingart, *The Logic of Divine Love: A Critical Analysis of the Soteriology of Peter Abailard* (Oxford, 1970), pp. 32–33, who maintains that Abelard held that creation "is not absolutely necessary; yet because it is of the essence of love to diffuse itself, creation is both fitting and contingently necessary." But he grants that according to Abelard, because God is love, he could not have created a better world, nor could he make anything better or in a greater quantity than he actually has. But see Marenbon's general characterization of Weingart's work as "a study of Abelard's soteriology aimed principally at establishing Abelard's orthodoxy" (p. 349).

I

In taking up the question of Thomas's defense of God's freedom to create or not to create, I will assume for the sake of this discussion a number of items as already established on philosophical grounds, at least to Aquinas's satisfaction, before he addresses these issues. We may proceed in this way because Thomas himself follows this order in his synthetic treatments of this question, especially in SCG I and II, and in ST I. For Thomas one should have already demonstrated the existence of God, as he has done in SCG I, cc. 13 and 15, and in ST I, q. 2, a. 3. Moreover, Thomas also argues on philosophical grounds that God is all-perfect (SCG I, c. 28; ST I, q. 4), that he is completely or perfectly good (SCG I, c. 37, but with earlier reference to this in c. 30, and in ST I, q. 6), and that he is infinite (SCG I, c. 43; ST I, q. 7, a. 1). Only after this in both of these treatments does he turn explicitly to the presence of intellect in God, and then go on to derive from that the reality of the divine will.

I would like to begin by recalling one point which is, I think, essential for all that follows. It is well known that Aquinas holds that, when it comes to our knowledge of God in this life, we can, by reasoning from effect to cause, know that God is. Moreover, by denying of him all that implies imperfection, we can know what God is not. But we cannot know what God is.¹⁹ And so Thomas develops a considerable number of names which we apply to God by following the way of negation. For instance, when we say that God is immutable, we deny all kinds of process and becoming of him. When we say that he is eternal, we deny of him the succession involved in temporal existence or in time. When we say that he is infinite, we deny any kind of limitation of him. When we say that he is absolutely simple, we deny of him any kind of composition.

But, at some point in his discussion of the divine attributes and divine names, Aquinas introduces a subtle shift. Thus in Bk I of the *Summa contra Gentiles*, after systematically developing in cc. 15–27 a series of appropriate divine names which are negative in content, names such as those I have mentioned, and by using what we may call the way of negation, he introduces certain positive names as well. Thus something positive is involved when Thomas refers to God as good, or as being, or as understanding, something not expressed by the purely negative names we use to deny imperfection and limitation of him. The turning point takes place in Thomas's discussions of God's perfection.

19. See SCG I, c. 30, for instance, and my *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas*, pp. 502–43, for further discussion of this issue and for additional texts.

For instance, in SCG I, c. 28, he begins to discuss this issue by using the way of negation. A being is perfect in every respect to which no excellence of any kind is lacking. He then offers a number of arguments to show that this is true of God, that is, that no excellence of any kind is lacking to him. For instance, a first argument maintains that the excellence of a thing belongs to that thing in accord with the mode whereby it enjoys *esse*, the act of being. Accordingly, insofar as a thing's act of being is limited to a greater or lesser mode of excellence, that thing is said to be more or less perfect. Therefore, if there is something to which the total power of being (*virtus essendi*) belongs, no excellence that can pertain to any thing (*res*) is lacking to it. Because God's essence is identical with his act of being, he possesses the act of being according to the total power of being. Therefore, no excellence that can belong to any being is lacking to God. Therefore, God is all perfect. What I find fascinating about this argument is that, by negating any kind of limitation or imperfection, in other words, by negating any such negation of God, Thomas draws a positive conclusion. God is all perfect.²⁰

In a second argument he reasons that every excellence and perfection is present in a thing insofar as it exists. So too, any deficiency is present in it insofar as in some way it is not. Because God possesses *esse* in complete and total fashion (*totaliter*), *non esse* is completely absent from him. This is because through that mode whereby something has *esse*, it lacks *non esse*. Therefore all deficiency is absent from God, and so he is all perfect.²¹

On the strength of this Thomas goes on in c. 29 to argue that because every effect must in some way be like its cause, the form of an effect must in some way be present in the cause that produces it even though that cause may surpass the effect in excellence and perfection. Because the perfections of all of his effects must be traced back to God as their source, there must be some likeness, analogical though it will be, between perfections found in creatures and those found in God their source.²²

And then, in light of this, Thomas reasons in c. 30 that certain names such as goodness, wisdom, or being (*esse*), which signify perfection without any limitation whatsoever, may be applied both to creatures and to God, but with certain qualifications. The creaturely way in which they signify when applied to creatures and their perfections must be denied of them when they are affirmed of God. And that which such names signify can be applied to creatures and to God only analogically, not univocally.²³

20. Editio Leonina manualis, pp. 29–30. See Ch. V, n. 18, in the present volume for the Latin for part of this text, along with discussion of this in my corresponding text.

21. Ed. Leon. man., p. 30.

22. Ibid., p. 31.

23. Ibid. Also see my Ch. VI above, p. 157.

As we turn to God's goodness, we should recall that, according to Aquinas, the good is one of those perfections which is as general or universal in extension as being (*ens*) itself. Let me note that here he is discussing ontological goodness, or goodness of being, not moral goodness. And so he holds that when viewed ontologically, goodness is really identical with being, even though the two are distinct conceptually. In other words, as he explains in his fullest derivation of all transcendental perfections in *De veritate* q. 1, a. 1 (written in 1256), the good is one of those modes of being (*modus entis*) that follows upon every being. But it is recognized by the human intellect only insofar as we view being in relationship to a power of the soul for which it is an appropriate and desirable object, i.e., in relationship to appetite or to the will. Hence, when I recognize a being as an object of appetite or as desirable, I then explicitly recognize it as good. But its goodness does not exist apart from its very being and is not really distinct from it. This means that for Thomas every being (*ens*), insofar as it enjoys actuality or being, is also ontologically good.²⁴ Thomas develops this thinking about the good more fully in 1259 in q. 21, aa. 1–2 of the same *De veritate*, and later ca. 1265–1267 in ST I. In the latter context he moves immediately from his argumentation for divine perfection in q. 4 to his general discussion of the good in q. 5, and from this in q. 6 to conclude that God is good.²⁵

In *De veritate*, q. 21, a. 1 Thomas explicitly asks whether the good (*bonum*) adds anything to being (*ens*). He concludes that the good adds something to being in the conceptual order, namely a relationship of being as perfective with respect to something else. The good is perfective with respect to something else insofar as it serves as an end for that which is perfected by it. And so, continues Thomas, all who correctly define the good include in its meaning a relationship to an end. Thus in the *Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle refers to the good as that which all things desire.²⁶

It is interesting to note Thomas's response to the fourth opening objection, which is taken from Pseudo-Dionysius's *De divinis nominibus*. The

24. Leon. 22.1.5:155–159.

25. On goodness of being in Aquinas see Jan Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy & the Transcendentals: The Case of Thomas Aquinas* (Leiden–New York–Cologne, 1996), c. 7; "Good as Transcendental and the Transcendence of the Good," in *Being and Goodness: The Concept of the Good in Metaphysics and Philosophical Theology*, ed. S. MacDonald (Ithaca, N.Y., 1991), pp. 64–68; Rudi te Velde, "The Concept of the Good according to Thomas Aquinas," in *Die Metaphysik und das Gute. Aufsätze zu ihrem Verhältnis in Antike und Mittelalter*. Jan A. Aertsen zu Ehren, ed. Wouter Goris (Leuven, 1999), pp. 79–103.

26. "Oportet igitur quod verum et bonum super intellectum entis addant respectum perfectivi" (Leon. 22.3.593:176–178. See 593:198–594:209). For Aristotle see *Nicomachean Ethics* I, c. 9 (1094a 2–3).

objection reasons that the good is diffusive of itself and of being, and therefore that something is good by reason of the fact that it is diffusive. But to diffuse implies action. And action proceeds from something's essence by means of power. And so, because power is added to a thing's essence, it follows that the good does really add something to essence.²⁷ Thomas replies that if taken strictly the verb "diffuse" seems to imply the operation of an efficient cause. But when taken more broadly it can refer to any kind of causality. And so when the good is said to be diffusive according to its nature, diffusion does not imply efficient causality but rather final causality. And such diffusion does not occur by means of a superadded power.²⁸

In *De veritate*, q. 21, a. 2, Thomas explicitly argues for the convertibility of goodness and being. For our purposes here it will suffice to note that again he maintains that the nature of the good consists in this, that it is perfective of something else by serving as its end. Therefore, whatever shares in the nature of an end shares in the nature of the good.²⁹ As will be seen below, Thomas's emphasis on the good's causation as pertaining to the order of final causality is crucial to his defense of God's freedom to create.

In his later discussion in ST I, q. 5, a. 1 Thomas again writes that the good and being are identical in reality, but differ conceptually. Once more he makes the point that the nature of the good consists in this that something is an object of appetite. But something is an object of appetite insofar as it is perfect, because all things desire their own perfection. And something is perfect only insofar as it is in act. Therefore something is good only insofar as it is a being (*ens*), because the act of being itself (*esse*) is the actuality of each thing. Therefore, the good and being are identical in reality, but the good adds to being the note of serving as an object of appetite, something that is not included in one's understanding of being itself (*ens*).³⁰

As regards divine goodness, in SCG I, c. 37 Thomas introduces his discussion of this by noting that God's goodness follows from his perfection which, as we have seen, he has established in c. 28.³¹ In c. 38 Thomas

27. Leon. 22.3.591:25-31.

28. Leon. 22.3.594:251-262.

29. Leon. 22.3.596:61-65.

30. Leon. 4.56: "Unde manifestum est quod bonum et ens sunt idem secundum rem: sed bonum dicit rationem appetibilis, quam non dicit ens." See q. 5, a. 4 (p. 61) on the good as final cause. Note that te Velde sees an important development from Thomas's presentation of the good as *perfective* of something else in *De veritate*, q. 21, a. 1, to his portrayal of it as *perfect* in ST I, q. 5, a. 1 ("The Concept of the Good," pp. 83-94).

31. Ed. Leon. man., p. 35: "Ex perfectione autem divina, quam ostendimus, bonitas ipsius concludi potest."

argues that God is identical with goodness itself. In his first argument Thomas reasons that for a thing to exist actually is its good. But God is not only a being in actuality; he is his very act of being (*esse*). Therefore not only is he good, but he is goodness itself.³² And in the parallel discussion in the later ST I, q. 6, in a. 1 Thomas argues that to be good belongs to God in primary fashion. For something is good insofar as it is desirable. But each and every thing desires its own perfection. The perfection present in an effect is a certain likeness of its agent, since every agent produces something like itself. Therefore the agent itself is also desirable and must share in the nature of the good, since, as he has argued, its effect is good. And what is desired of an agent is that its likeness be participated in by others. Therefore, because God is the first efficient cause of all other things, it follows that the nature of the good as that which is an object of appetite pertains to him.³³ Indeed, in a. 3, Thomas goes on to show that God alone is good of his very essence. Again he uses the notion that a thing is good insofar as it is perfect, and that total perfection belongs to God alone.³⁴

To return to SCG I, there Thomas goes on to argue for the presence of intellect in God. In c. 44, he offers many arguments for this conclusion, only one of which I will mention (*"Adhuc"* 2), because it too is based on divine perfection. There Thomas recalls that he has already established that no perfection can be lacking to God which can be found in any kind of being. Nor, he recalls, can any [real] composition resulting from his perfection be admitted of God. But among perfections in created things the greatest (*potissima*) is for something to be intellective. For by means of this it is, in a certain sense, all things since by knowing all things it possesses in some way, that is, cognitively, the perfection of all things. Therefore because God is all perfect he is intelligent.³⁵

After devoting many additional chapters to different aspects of God's knowledge, Thomas turns to the presence of will in God in c. 72. Among the many arguments he offers there, I will mention the first. It reasons directly from the fact that God is intelligent to the conclusion that he wills. Here Thomas assumes that a good that is understood is the proper object of will. Given this, a good which is understood, insofar as it is understood as good, must be something that is willed. But something is said to be understood with reference to one who understands. Therefore, it is necessary that someone who understands a good as good be someone

32. *Ibid.*, p. 36.

33. Leon. 4.66.

34. Leon. 4.68.

35. Ed. Leon. man., p. 43. For an excellent discussion of this see Kretzmann, *The Metaphysics of Theism*, pp. 184–96.

who wills. (For Thomas this seems to follow from the definition of the good as an object of appetite.) But God understands the good. (Because he understands perfectly, he understands being together with its transcendental property, the good.) Therefore he wills. And so, if something is cognized by an intellectual being as good, in this case by God, it is an object of divine appetite or divine love, not as something that is lacking to him, to be sure, but as something in which he takes delight.³⁶

In c. 73 Thomas reasons that God's will is identical with his essence. This is not surprising, of course, since there can be no composition, not even of essence and operation, in God, the perfectly simple being (see the last argument).³⁷ And in c. 74 Thomas maintains that the primary thing willed by the divine will is the divine essence. First, he recalls from c. 72 that a good that is understood is the object of will. But the primary object of God's understanding is the divine essence. Therefore the divine essence is also the primary and principal object of the divine will. Or as he brings out as part of his third argument for this conclusion, if God willed anything other than himself as the primary object of his volition, it would follow that something else would be the cause of his willing. But his willing is identical with his very being (*esse*). Therefore it would follow that something else would cause his very being which is, of course, impossible. In sum, then, just as only God's essence can be the adequate object of his knowledge, so too, his essence is the only adequate and proportionate object of his will.³⁸

And then in c. 75 Thomas argues that God, by willing himself, also wills other things. In his first argument Thomas reasons that it belongs to one who wills an end in primary fashion (*principaliter*) to will those things which are ordered to that end. But God himself is the ultimate end of all things. Therefore it follows from the fact that he wills himself to exist that he also wills other things as well; for they are ordered to him as their end.³⁹

In another argument ("*Item*") Thomas reasons that everyone desires

36. Ed. Leon. man., p. 69. Kretzmann initially has trouble with this argument but then, by joining it with the third argument ("*Amplius*"), accepts it. The third argument is based on the claim that it belongs to every being to desire (*appetere*) its own perfection and the preservation of its existence (*esse*), either by seeking them if it lacks them, or by taking delight in them if it possesses them. Hence, when taken in the second sense, appetite cannot be lacking to God. He too must take delight in his perfection and being. Therefore, because he is intelligent, will is present in him whereby his *esse* and his goodness are pleasing to him. See *The Metaphysics of Theism*, pp. 203–7. Kretzmann also notes that Thomas uses this line of argument on other occasions (*In I Sent.*, d. 45, q. 1, a. 1; *Compendium theologiae* I, c. 32).

37. Ed. Leon. man., p. 70 ("*Item*").

38. *Ibid.*, p. 70 (arg. 1); p. 71, "*Praeterea*" (arg. 3).

39. *Ibid.*, p. 71.

the perfection of that which he wills and loves for its own sake, and therefore wills that it be improved and multiplied insofar as possible. But God wills his essence for its own sake. And his essence cannot be increased or multiplied in itself, but only by means of its likeness in which creatures can participate. Therefore God wills for beings to be multiplied by reason of the fact that he loves his own essence and perfection.⁴⁰

In still another argument (*"Amplius"*) Thomas reasons: Whoever loves something in itself and for its own sake consequently loves all those things in which that thing is found. He cites the case of someone who loves sweetness for its own sake, and therefore loves all sweet things, in other words, someone who has a sweet tooth. But God wills his own being in itself and for itself. Every other instance of being (*esse*) is a certain participation in the divine being (*esse*) by way of likeness. Therefore it follows that because God wills and loves himself, he wills and loves other things.⁴¹

And in yet another argument (*"Item 2"*) Thomas reasons: to the degree that something has more perfect power, to that degree does its causality extend to more things. But the causality of an end consists in this, that for its sake other things are desired. Therefore to the degree that an end is more perfect and more willed, to that degree the will of one who wills the end extends to more things by reason of that end. But the divine essence is most perfect in goodness and therefore as an end. Therefore it diffuses (*diffundet*) its causality to many things to the maximum degree, and so many things are willed by God in accord with the fullness of his power.⁴²

Now in light of these and other arguments in c. 75 of SCG I, it must be granted that Thomas does present a very strong case to show that God wills to diffuse his goodness insofar as he is the ultimate final cause of everything else. But does it follow from the fact that God wills himself that he necessarily wills everything else and therefore necessarily creates? Before addressing this issue specifically, in c. 76 Thomas adds another significant point: it is by one act of willing that God wills himself and other things. This is not surprising, of course, since Thomas cannot admit any kind of real distinction in God between his will, his essence, and his act of willing. For God is perfectly simple. Among the arguments Thomas offers here, the second is especially interesting. What is per-

40. Ibid.

41. Ibid.

42. See Kretzmann, "A General Problem of Creation: Why Would God Create Anything at All?" in *Being and Goodness*, ed. S. MacDonald (Ithaca, N.Y., 1991), p. 222, who cites this passage in particular as implying a Platonic-necessitarian tendency in Aquinas. Cf. *The Metaphysics of Theism*, pp. 217–20.

fectly known and desired is known according to its entire power (*virtus*) to be known and desired. But, continues Thomas, the power of an end consists not only in the fact that it is desired in itself, but also in the fact that other things are desired on account of it. Therefore one who perfectly desires an end does so in both ways. But God could not will himself without doing so perfectly. Hence by one and the same act whereby God wills himself, he wills not only himself but other things on account of himself. But at the same time, this seems to render Thomas's defense of God's freedom to create even more difficult, as critics such as Kretzmann point out.⁴³

And then in c. 80 Thomas seems to make his case still more difficult, by explicitly stating what he has earlier implied—that God necessarily wills his own being (*esse*) and his own goodness. As he brings out in his first argument for this conclusion, this follows from his earlier proof (see c. 74) that God wills his own *esse* and goodness as the primary object of his willing, and that this in turn is the reason for his willing other things. Moreover, Thomas argues that it is not possible for God not to will something actually, for otherwise he would will only potentially. But this would be impossible since his very act of willing is identical with his act of being. Therefore it is necessary that he will his own being (*esse*) and his own goodness.⁴⁴

Indeed, Thomas had already made this point earlier in *De veritate*, q. 23, a. 4. There, after distinguishing between the primary object of volition to which a will is directed by its nature, and a secondary object which is ordered to the primary willed object as to its end, he applies this distinction to God. The divine will has as its primary object that which it wills by its very nature and which is, as it were, the end of its will[ing], namely, the divine goodness itself. It is on account of this that God wills things other than himself. Those things that he wills with respect to creatures, including their very existence, we may add, are secondary objects of the divine will. As already noted, God wills these on account of his own goodness. So the divine goodness itself is the reason for his willing all things, just as the divine essence is the reason for his knowing all things.⁴⁵ With respect to the primary object of its volition, that is, the divine goodness, the divine will does indeed will this necessarily, not by a necessity

43. For Thomas see Ed. Leon. man., p. 72. For Kretzmann see *The Metaphysics of Theism*, pp. 219–20, who singles out Thomas's second argument in c. 76 ("Amplius").

44. Ed. Leon. man., p. 74.

45. Leon. 22.3.662:159–188. Note especially: "Unde ea quae circa creaturas vult sunt quasi eius volita secundaria quae propter suam bonitatem vult, ut divina bonitas ita sit eius voluntati ratio volendi omnia, sicut eius essentia est ei ratio omnia cognoscendi" (lines 184–188).

of coercion imposed from without, but by a necessity of natural order based on the divine nature. In sum, says Thomas, this means that God cannot not will himself to be good or intelligent or powerful, etc., or any of those things implied by his perfect goodness.⁴⁶

Thomas then comments that such necessity, natural necessity, does not apply to God's willing things other than himself. Since the reason for willing things that are ordered to an end is that end itself, insofar as something is ordered to an end, so is it ordered or related to the will. If, therefore, that which is ordered to an end is perfectly proportioned to the end in such a way that the end cannot be obtained without it, when the end is necessarily willed, so are the means. But because no effect can be equal to the power of God, nothing that is ordered to God as its end is adequately proportioned to that divine end. This is because no creature is perfectly like God. Therefore, no matter how excellent the way in which a mere creature is ordered to God and in some way like him, it is possible for some other creature to be ordered to God and to represent his goodness in equally excellent fashion, or, I would add, even in more excellent fashion. For no matter how perfect any creature may be, it will always be finite and therefore never equal to God.⁴⁷

So far Thomas's argument seems to show that no particular creature need be created rather than any other, since any creature could be matched in perfection by another creature which God could produce which would equally [or more fully] represent his goodness and perfection. But what about the alleged necessity for God to create anything at all? Does this not follow from the fact that God necessarily wills himself and his goodness? Thomas anticipates our question. He comments that it is clear from his argument that there is no necessity for the divine will, because of the love it has for its own goodness, to create this creature rather than that. Nor, he now adds, is there any necessity for God to produce the whole of creation, i.e., to create at all. This follows because the divine goodness is so perfect in itself that even if no creature existed, God's goodness would still be completely perfect in itself. The divine goodness is not the kind of end that is produced or results *from* those things that are ordered to it. It is rather the kind of end *by which* those things which are ordered to it are themselves produced and perfected.⁴⁸

The key, therefore, to Thomas's defense of God's freedom (1) to create or not to create, and (2) to create this creature rather than that, is the lack of proportion, the lack of any kind of equality, between the good-

46. Leon. 22.3.662:188–197.

47. Leon. 22.3.662:197–663:221.

48. Leon. 22.3.663:222–232.

ness and perfection of any creature or any number of creatures whether actual or possible and God's infinite goodness and perfection. This is because the divine goodness is so perfect in itself that, even if no creature whatsoever existed, the divine goodness would still be completely perfect in itself. Now as we turn back to the *Summa contra Gentiles* I, in c. 81 we find Thomas again developing this point. He realizes that the conclusion he has reached in c. 80 (that God necessarily wills his own goodness) might raise a problem. As he puts it, if God necessarily wills his goodness and his being (*esse*), it might seem to someone that he wills other things out of necessity. For as we have seen, in c. 75 Thomas has argued that it is by willing his own goodness that God wills other things.⁴⁹

Thomas responds by recalling that the divine will is directed to other things—to creatures—insofar as they themselves are ordered to the end of his own goodness. But a will is not ordered necessarily to things which are directed to an end if that end can be realized without them. Therefore, because the divine goodness can be realized without the existence of anything other than God, and since it receives no increase (in perfection) from the fact that they exist, the divine will is not necessitated to will other things or to create them simply because he [necessarily] wills himself.⁵⁰ Again the underlying metaphysical point is that there can be no addition to intensively infinite goodness and perfection.

Thomas's second argument ("*Adhuc*") is very similar to the first, and so I will pass over it. His third argument is quite different. By willing his own goodness, God wills other things to exist insofar as they participate in his goodness. But because the divine goodness is infinite, it can be participated in an infinity of ways, and in ways different from those which are now actually realized. If it were true that because God necessarily wills his own goodness he must will those things that participate in it, it would follow that he would have to will an infinity of creatures which would participate in his goodness in an infinity of ways. But this is clearly false, says Thomas, presumably because he judges it contrary to the actual state of affairs which we experience.⁵¹ Indeed, by pressing Thomas's argument still further, one might conclude that the necessitarian claim would require that all possible ways of imitating the divine goodness have already been realized. While this argument strikes me as being more dialectical and less metaphysical than the previous ones, it has its interest.

In light of this discussion one might ask whether anything *causes* God to will other things. In c. 86 Thomas points out that a *reason* or explanation (*ratio*) can be offered for God's willing other things. Again he

49. Ed. Leon. man., p. 75.

50. *Ibid.*, first argument.

51. *Ibid.*

notes that God wills his own goodness as the end of other things that are ordered to that end. Therefore his goodness is the reason why he wills those things.⁵² But, as he points out in c. 87, there is no cause for God's volition of things other than himself. Nonetheless, by offering a reason for God's willing things other than himself, he rejects any purely voluntaristic explanation for God's creation of other things. Thereby he answers in advance a charge of having fallen into divine voluntarism levelled against him by Kevin Keane.⁵³

Finally, in c. 88 Thomas argues that there is free choice (*liberum arbitrium*) in God. First of all, he explains that free choice is said of things that someone wills of one's own accord (*sua sponte*) and not of necessity. Thomas recalls that he has shown above (in c. 81) that God does not will other things of necessity. Therefore, he concludes, God has free choice.⁵⁴

In SCG II, c. 22 ("Quod Deus omnia possit") Thomas offers a series of arguments to show that God's creative action is not limited to only one effect. In this general context he seems to be especially concerned with defending God's freedom to create many and diverse effects, in opposition to the Avicennian view that from the supreme One only one effect can be produced immediately.⁵⁵ This is clear, for instance, from his first argument, where he reasons that because the act of creating is proper to God alone, those things that can be produced only by being created (as distinguished from being generated) must be produced immediately by God. He offers two examples of these—separate substances and the totality of corporeal matter as such. Assuming that one grants their reality for the sake of this discussion, then because they are distinct existents, it follows that God has immediately created more than one effect.⁵⁶ The remaining four arguments in this chapter all attempt to show that God can create all things that are not repugnant to the nature of being, that is to say, that do not involve contradiction. At the end of this chapter Thomas concludes that it follows that God's power is not determined to any single

52. Ed. Leon. man., p. 79, first arg. Note: "Sua igitur bonitas est ratio quare vult alia quae sunt diversa ab ipso."

53. Ibid., c. 87: "Aliorum autem a Deo volitorum nullum est Deo causa volendi." Also note Thomas's comment near the end of c. 87: "Per praedicta autem excluditur error quorundam dicentium omnia procedere a Deo secundum simplicem voluntatem: ut de nullo oporteat rationem reddere nisi quia Deus vult" (pp. 79–80). For Keane see his "Why Creation? Bonaventure and Thomas Aquinas on Creative Good," *Downside Review* 93 (1975), pp. 101–7, 110.

54. Ed. Leon. man., p. 80.

55. For fuller discussion of the Avicennian position see my Ch. II above, pp. 50–63.

56. Ed. Leon. man., p. 108. For discussion see Kretzmann, *The Metaphysics of Creation*, pp. 107–13.

effect, but that he can do all things [that are not self-contradictory] or, as he puts it, that God is omnipotent.⁵⁷

In c. 23 Thomas argues that with respect to creatures God acts not out of any necessity of his own nature but through the decision of his will. As Thomas realizes, the view that God acts out of the necessity of his nature would lead to the theory he had just rejected in c. 22—that God can immediately produce only one effect. As Thomas reasons in his first argument in c. 23, the power of an agent that acts out of the necessity of its nature is determined to only one effect. And so it happens that purely natural effects always happen in the same way unless something impedes them. But since he has just shown that the divine power is not determined to only one effect, he now concludes that God does not act by necessity of his nature but through his will.⁵⁸

In c. 26 Thomas follows up on the thinking of cc. 22 and 23 in order to prove that if, as he has now shown, God's power is not limited to determined effects so as to act out of necessity of nature, no more should one conclude that his intellect is restricted to only certain effects so that he would act out of a necessity based on the limitation of divine knowledge. In his first argument he recalls from SCG I (see c. 49) that God understands all things that can proceed from him by understanding his own essence; for things of this kind must be present in his essence through a similitude or likeness just as effects are present in the power of their cause. Since he has now shown to his satisfaction that God's power is not restricted to some determined effect or effects, one should say the same of the divine intellect. Neither is it limited to some particular effect or kind of effect.⁵⁹ After presenting some additional arguments in support of this, near the end of this chapter Thomas notes that his argumentation excludes the view of certain philosophers who hold that because God understands himself, there necessarily flows from him the actually realized order of created beings.⁶⁰

In c. 27 Thomas argues for the same conclusion concerning the divine will. It, too, is not restricted to producing only certain determined effects. I will pass over the limited argumentation he offers here since more fundamental is the question Thomas has addressed in Bk I—God's

57. P. 109. "Restat igitur quod divina virtus non determinetur ad aliquem effectum, sed simpliciter omnia potest: quod est eum esse *omnipotentem*."

58. Ibid. On this see Kretzmann, *The Metaphysics of Creation*, pp. 121–26. Note that on p. 126 he reiterates his view that "Aquinas's own presentation of God's willing of other things, particularly in Book I, and his acceptance of the Dionysian principle . . . commit him to a necessitarian explanation of God's willing things other than himself."

59. Ed. Leon. man., p. 113.

60. Ibid. "Per haec autem excluditur quorundam philosophorum positio dicentium quod ex hoc quod Deus seipsum intelligit, fluit ab ipso de necessitate talis rerum dispositio. . . ."

freedom to create or not create anything at all. And so now I turn to some later texts where Thomas continues to argue in support of this kind of divine freedom.

In *De potentia*, q. 3, a. 15 Thomas again considers the question whether things proceed from God by necessity of nature or by free choice.⁶¹ In defending God's free choice in creating, Thomas presents four arguments which have already been considered above in Ch. II⁶² and which will not be repeated here. Suffice it to say that Kretzmann maintains that three of these arguments (the first, third, and fourth) show that God produces creatures by means of his will, but objects that this is not enough to prove that he does so by free choice. For Thomas also holds that God wills himself, but necessarily rather than freely.⁶³ Interestingly, in the fourteenth century, William of Ockham had reproduced these same four arguments from the *De potentia*, and had argued that they suffice only to show that God created by means of his will. Like Kretzmann, Ockham maintains that this is not enough to prove that God creates freely rather than necessarily. According to Ockham, as Christians we must fall back on our religious belief for our assurance that God creates freely.⁶⁴

A year or so later, in ST I, q. 19, a. 4, Thomas reproduces the essentials of the first three of these four arguments. In this article Thomas explicitly seeks to determine whether God's will is the cause of things.⁶⁵ He responds that God's will is the cause of all other things, and he also adds that God acts by means of his will and not by natural necessity. However, one should grant to Ockham and to Kretzmann that the primary thrust of these arguments, as in arguments 1, 3, and 4 in *De potentia* q. 3, a. 15, is indeed to show that God's will is the cause of things. They would still protest that this is not enough to prove that God is free to create or not to create at all.⁶⁶

61. In the immediately following article 16 he is again concerned with the Avicennian theory of the necessary emanation of only one effect from God immediately and then of others only mediately. For discussion of this argumentation see Ch. II above, pp. 61–63.

62. See Ch. II, pp. 57ff.

63. For these four arguments see *De potentia*, ed. cit., pp. 83–84. See Ch. II above in this volume, nn. 63–66 for the Latin text. Note that Thomas lends some credence to Kretzmann's complaint by beginning his response with the remark that it must be held that God "ex libero arbitrio suae voluntatis creaturas in esse produxit nulla necessitate naturali" (p. 83), but concludes after presenting the four arguments with the remark: "Necesse est dicere omnem creaturam processisse per voluntatem. . . ." For Kretzmann see "A General Problem of Creation," p. 218, n. 31.

64. For Ockham see *Ordinatio* I.43.1 (*Opera Theologica* 4.623–28, 636). For discussion see Armand Maurer, *The Philosophy of William of Ockham in the Light of Its Principles* (Toronto, 1999), pp. 299–301; Anton Pegis, "Necessity and Liberty: An Historical Note on St. Thomas Aquinas," *New Scholasticism* 15 (1941), pp. 23–27.

65. "Utrum voluntas Dei est causa rerum" (Leon. 4.237).

66. *Ibid.*

But in article 10 of ST I, q. 19, Thomas explicitly attempts to prove that God also possesses free choice. And he bases his case on the fact that he has already shown that while God necessarily wills his own goodness, he does not necessarily will other things.⁶⁷ But where did he show this? Not in a. 4, where he reproduces three of the arguments from the *De potentia*, but in a. 3. There he employs reasoning similar to that which we have seen in *De veritate*, q. 23 and in SCG I, c. 81. In brief, God wills things other than himself insofar as they are ordered to his goodness as their end. One who wills an end does not necessarily will things that are ordered to that end unless they are such that the end cannot be achieved without them. Because God's goodness is perfect and can be fully realized without the existence of other things, and because other things add nothing to his perfection, it is not necessary in the absolute sense for him to will anything other than himself. Thomas repeats this reasoning in replying to objection 2.⁶⁸ Hence one should not consider his argumentation in ST I, q. 19, a. 4 or in *De potentia* q. 3, a. 15 for the presence of will in God to be his proof that God creates freely. Both Ockham and Kretzmann have focused on the wrong argumentation. It is really Thomas's proof that God does not act out of necessity in creating that enables him to say that God is free to create or not to create.

II

With this I turn to the third and final issue to be considered here—the Neoplatonic and Dionysian axiom that the good is diffusive of itself. As was noted at the beginning of this chapter, Kretzmann was impressed by Thomas's frequent citation of this axiom and felt that it pointed to a certain sympathy on his part for a necessitarian answer to the issue of God's freedom to create or not to create at all.⁶⁹ Kretzmann also claims that in *De potentia*, q. 3, a. 15 Thomas fails to answer adequately some of the objections against his own position which he considers there. For instance, obj. 1 is based on the text from Pseudo-Dionysius which we saw above as cited by Lovejoy. Just as the sun, without reasoning or choosing, illuminates with its light all visible things willing to participate in it, so the

67. Leon. 4.248. Note: "Cum igitur Deus ex necessitate suam bonitatem velit, alia vero non ex necessitate, ut supra ostensum est; respectu illorum quae non ex necessitate vult, liberum arbitrium habet."

68. Leon. 4.235. Note from the corpus: "Unde, cum bonitas Dei sit perfecta, et esse possit sine aliis, cum nihil ei perfectionis ex aliis accrescat; sequitur quod alia a se eum velle, non sit necessarium absolute." Thomas does add that his willing of other things may be said to be necessary *ex suppositione*, meaning that under the supposition that God in fact has willed something, then he cannot not have willed it.

69. For references see n. 2 above in this chapter.

divine goodness, simply by its essence, sheds the beams of its goodness on all existent things in appropriate proportion. And just as the sun does this necessarily, so does God necessarily produce creatures. As the reader will recall, in his Commentary on the *Divine Names* of Dionysius, Thomas offers a clever reply, maintaining that the analogy between the sun and God's goodness applies only to the universality of his causing goodness, but not to any necessity. He repeats this reasoning in the present discussion. As he puts it here, the analogy does not apply to or imply a privation or absence of will in the divine nature.⁷⁰ But the fact that Kretzmann cites this indicates that he is much concerned about the axiom that the good is diffusive of itself. Thus he also cites objections 12 and 14 which are based on the same axiom.⁷¹

With respect to the Dionysian axiom that the good is diffusive of itself, Thomas repeatedly makes the point that goodness exercises its causality by serving as an end, as a final cause, for other things. In an article on this principle in Aquinas written in 1932, Julien Peghaire pointed out in convincing fashion that Thomas himself interprets this principle in terms of final causality rather than efficient causality. Peghaire acknowledges that it is almost instinctive for us not to do this. When we first encounter it, we assume that it means that the good must efficiently cause or communicate goodness to other things.⁷² Indeed, another recent student of both Dionysius and of Aquinas, Fran O'Rourke, acknowledges that, so far as Dionysius's text is concerned, it is at least likely that he himself understood it in terms of efficient causation.⁷³ And while O'Rourke acknowledges that this principle might be given a determinist, i.e., a necessitarian interpretation in Dionysius, he suggests that this may be simply owing to a lack of precision in his language rather than an expression of his real intent.⁷⁴

70. Ed. cit., p. 82 (obj. 1), p. 84 (reply to obj.). For Kretzmann see "A General Problem of Creation," p. 217 and n. 29.

71. Ibid., p. 216, n. 24 and pp. 217-21; also *The Metaphysics of Theism*, pp. 223-25. For further discussion of Kretzmann's views on this see my "Norman Kretzmann: On Aquinas's Attribution," pp. 295-97.

72. "L'axiome 'Bonum est diffusivum sui' dans le néo-platonisme et le thomisme," *Revue de l'Université d'Ottawa* 2 (1932), pp. 5*-30*. See especially pp. 5*ff. Peghaire points out that the principle is not found in those exact words in Dionysius's *De divinis nominibus*. But he proposes as the likely source for its being attributed to this treatise a text from the beginning of ch. IV: "iam sermone ad ipsam eam Boni nominationem, quam excellenter attribuunt Theologi superdeae Deitati, et ab omnibus determinant, ipsam, ut reor, thearchicam essentiam, Bonitatem dicentes, et quoniam EA QUAE EST BONUM, UT SUBSTANTIALE BONUM, AD OMNIA EXISTENTIA, EXTENDIT BONITATEM." See p. 7*. The capitalized words are, Peghaire believes, the primitive source for the forming of the axiom. He is surely correct in finding the doctrine in this text.

73. *Pseudo-Dionysius & the Metaphysics of Aquinas* (Leiden, 1992), p. 242.

74. Ibid., pp. 219-20.

Be that as it may, Thomas gives Dionysius a benign reading. When Dionysius refers to the good as diffusing goodness or being, this should be taken as referring to an exercise of final causality by the good. In other words, the good, in this case God's goodness, serves as his end in producing things other than himself so that they may imitate and reflect that goodness.⁷⁵ By stressing this point, Thomas can maintain that because no created good is proportionate to the divine perfection and goodness, the creation of other good things is not required for and adds nothing to the divine perfection and goodness. Therefore God remains perfectly free to choose to produce or not to produce things other than himself, and to produce this rather than any other creature or set of creatures.

Kretzmann is very unhappy with Aquinas's interpretation of the Dionysian axiom in terms of final causality and refers to it as "novel" and as "counter-intuitive."⁷⁶ And indeed, it may not be the most historically accurate rendering of that unknown author's true thought and, therefore, novel. And it may be counter-intuitive. However that may be, Thomas was accustomed to give the best interpretation possible, a benign interpretation, if you will, when dealing with great authorities from the past, whether these be philosophical or theological or, as he thought to be true in this case, Apostolic. He does this continually when dealing with Aristotle. He clearly felt that the great thinkers of the past, while not immune from making mistakes, had much to contribute to the human mind in its search for truth. Hence he did not read them merely for their historical interest, but insofar as they could assist him in his own pursuit of truth. As he puts this in a well-known statement in one of his Aristotelian commentaries: "The pursuit of philosophy is not directed to this that we may know what men have thought, but rather to this, that we may know what is the truth of the matter."⁷⁷

75. See *De potentia*, q. 5, a. 4: "Deus autem creaturarum universitatem vult propter se ipsam, licet et propter seipsum eam vult esse; haec enim duo non repugnant. Vult enim deus ut creaturae sint propter eius bonitatem, ut eam scilicet suo modo imitentur et repraesentent; quod quidem faciunt in quantum ab ea esse habent, et in suis naturis subsistunt. Unde idem est dictum, quod Deus omnia propter se ipsum fecit [quod dicitur *Prov.* 16.4: 'Universa propter semetipsum operatus est Dominus'] et quod creaturas fecerit propter earum esse, quod dicitur *Sap.* 1.14: 'Creavit enim [Deus] ut essent omnia'" (ed. cit., p. 138).

76. See "A General Problem of Creation," p. 220 (where he refers to Thomas's "novel" interpretation as "counterintuitive"). See *The Metaphysics of Theism*, pp. 223–25.

77. *In De caelo* I, 22, n. 228: "... quia studium philosophiae non est ad hoc quod sciatur quid homines senserint sed qualiter se habeat veritas rerum." See *In Aristotelis Libros De caelo et mundo, De generatione et corruptione, Meteorologicorum expositio* (Marietti, Turin-Rome, 1952), p. 109.

Chapter X

THOMAS AQUINAS'S COMMENTARY ON ARISTOTLE'S *METAPHYSICS*

Thomas Aquinas spent a considerable amount of time and effort during the final years of his career writing detailed commentaries on twelve works by Aristotle as well as on the *Liber de causis*. Indeed, the latter work had also been mistakenly regarded by some thirteenth-century thinkers as written by Aristotle, although others had attributed it to Al-Farabi or to some other unknown Arabic author. But with the translation in 1268 of Proclus's *Elementatio theologica* from the Greek, Aquinas quickly recognized that the *Liber de causis* had been excerpted from this work.¹

The question has often been raised as to why Thomas devoted so much time and attention to writing these commentaries, especially those on Aristotle. This is especially puzzling for those who would emphasize the point that he was a theologian and who would minimize his role as a philosopher. In these commentaries he gives evidence of a profound mastery of philosophy, especially of the philosophy of Aristotle, as well as of considerable interest in philosophical thinking for its own sake.

Some of the more theologizing interpreters of Aquinas such as R.-A. Gauthier and, somewhat more tentatively, Joseph Owens, have argued that Aquinas's composition of his commentaries was simply part of his work as a theologian.² Hence we should read them as theological writings.

1. And so he introduces his commentary on the *De causis* by referring both to the original Greek work by Proclus and to the Arabic treatise known by the Latins as the *De causis* which, says Thomas, was translated from the Arabic and does not exist in Greek at all. Thomas concludes that it seems to have been excerpted by one of the Arab philosophers from the aforementioned writing by Proclus, especially so since the things contained in this work are to be found much more fully and extensively in the Proclean work. See *Sancti Thomae de Aquino Super Librum De causis expositio*, ed. H. D. Saffrey (Fribourg, 1954), p. 3.

2. See J. Owens, "Aquinas as Aristotelian Commentator," in *St. Thomas Aquinas 1274-1974. Commemorative Studies*, Vol. 1 (Toronto, 1974), pp. 213-38. Here Owens proposes his position by asking a series of rhetorical questions. He also finds Thomas reading into Aristotle his own metaphysics of existence, especially in the Commentary on the *Metaphysics*. See pp. 222-29. For Gauthier see note 3 just below. Mark Jordan also strongly emphasizes the view that Aquinas was a theologian who changed the philosophy he used into theol-

According to Gauthier, Aquinas composed his commentaries on the *De anima* and the *Ethics* in support of his writing of the related parts of his *Summa theologiae*. Thus his Commentary on the *De anima* would have been written to prepare him to compose the "Treatise on Man" in ST I, qq. 75–89. And he would have composed his Commentary on the *Ethics* as part of his writing of the moral part of the *Summa*. The accepted dates for the composition of these respective works do support Gauthier's claim, at least up to a point³ (*In De anima*, and ST I, qq. 75–89, date from 1267–1268; and *In Ethicorum*, and ST I-II, II-II, date from 1271–1272). But it does not necessarily follow from this that Thomas's only reason for writing these two commentaries was to assist him in developing the related parts of the *Summa*. There may have been a personal interest on Thomas's part in penetrating even more deeply into Aristotle's thought, although he had been using it throughout his career. And such an explanation cannot account for Thomas's composition of the other Aristotelian commentaries or, for that matter, for his Commentary on the *De causis*. This is especially true of the work on which I propose to concentrate here, his Commentary on the *Metaphysics*.

And so the question remains: Why did Thomas write commentaries such as these? Or to focus on his Commentary on the *Metaphysics*, why did he write this particular commentary? Scholarly opinion has long

ogy, but he views Thomas's commentaries on Aristotle as efforts to explain or set forth the thought of Aristotle himself, and not as expressions of Thomas's personal philosophy. In other words he views them as straightforward *expositiones*. See "Thomas Aquinas's Disclaimers in the Aristotelian Commentaries," in *Philosophy and the God of Abraham: Essays in Memory of James A. Weisheipl, O.P.*, ed. R. James Long (Toronto, 1991), pp. 99–112; esp. p. 104; "The Alleged Aristotelianism of Thomas Aquinas," *The Etienne Gilson Series* 15 (Toronto, 1992); "Theology and Philosophy," in *The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas*, ed. N. Kretzmann and E. Stump (Cambridge, 1993), pp. 232–51.

3. For the dates see J.-P. Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas. Vol. I: The Person and His Work* (Washington, D.C., 1996), pp. 341, 343; and for additional precisions, *Initiation à Saint Thomas*, 2d rev. ed., p. 614. For Gauthier see his Preface (1984) to the Leonine volume: *Sententia libri De anima*, Vol. 45.1, pp. 288*–94*; also see his Appendix (1971), "Saint Thomas et l'Éthique à Nicomaque," in the Leonine volume 48: *Sententia libri Politicorum. Tabula libri ethicorum*, pp. xxiv–xxv. But in his recent *Aquinas's Philosophical Commentary on the Ethics: A Historical Perspective* (Dordrecht, 2001), pp. xv–xvi, n. 22, James Doig points out that after dating the Commentary on the *Ethics* as written after the *Prima-Secundae*, Gauthier refers to it as written in preparation for the *Partes Secunda*. If one takes this remark as applying only to the *Secunda-Secundae*, Doig asks why Thomas needed to comment on the *Ethics* to write this part if he did not judge it necessary for writing the *Prima-Secundae*. For Gauthier's dating of the Commentary after the *Prima-Secundae* Doig cites his "La date du Commentaire sur l'Éthique à Nicomaque," *Recherches de Théologie ancienne et médiévale* 18 (1951), pp. 66–105; Preface (1969) to Leon. ed., *Sententia libri Ethicorum*, Vol. 47.1, p. 178*; and "Saint Thomas et l'éthique à Nicomaque," p. xxiv. Doig strongly emphasizes the philosophical character of Thomas's Commentary on the *Ethics*. For further references to different views on Thomas's purpose in writing the commentaries see J. Jenkins, "Expositions of the Text: Aquinas's Aristotelian Commentaries," *Medieval Philosophy and Theology* 5 (1996), pp. 39–62, esp. pp. 39–40, n. 1.

been divided on this issue. First of all, more general explanations for his writing these commentaries have been offered by the two best and most recent biographers of Aquinas, James Weisheipl and Jean-Pierre Torrell. According to Weisheipl, when Thomas returned from Italy to Paris in late 1268 or early 1269 to resume his professorship in the theology faculty at the University there, he found serious doctrinal controversies under way. These centered upon particular interpretations of Aristotle and of philosophy being offered by certain young Masters from the Faculty of Arts, especially Siger of Brabant and Boethius of Dacia, who were heavily influenced by Averroes and, I would add, by other non-Christian sources, in their reading of Aristotle. In December 1270 the Bishop of Paris, Stephen Tempier, condemned thirteen propositions including, I would note, four which appear in works penned by Siger before 1270, and a fifth which does so by implication.⁴ And so, according to Weisheipl, Masters and students in Arts, while trying to understand Aristotle, were falling into heresy and incurring excommunication. Therefore Aquinas “commented on Aristotle because he felt an apostolic need to help young masters in arts to understand Aristotelian philosophy correctly in harmony with the actual text and the guideline of faith, where necessary.”⁵

Writing some years later, Torrell had the advantage of being able to incorporate more recent findings concerning the events reported by Weisheipl and more precise datings for some of the Aristotelian com-

4. *Friar Thomas d'Aquino: His Life, Thought & Works*, 2d ed. (Washington, D.C., 1983), p. 273. Note that Weisheipl states that all thirteen propositions are taken from Siger's writings or public teaching, but the evidence does not support this with respect to all thirteen. Weisheipl notes that much of the controversy centered around Siger's "Averroistic" interpretation of Aristotle's *De anima* III, c. 5, concerning the unicity of the material or possible intellect for the entire human race, and the implied denial of personal immortality of the soul. Aquinas dealt directly with this issue in his *De unitate intellectus* of 1270, and argued against the "Averroistic" account on the grounds that it was both an incorrect interpretation of Aristotle and bad philosophy in its own right. Other contested issues condemned in 1270 and clearly aimed at Siger in addition to unicity of the possible intellect (prop. 1) included eternity of the human species (prop. 6) and hence eternity of the world (prop. 5), the denial that the separated soul suffers from corporeal fire (prop. 8), and by implication, probably prop. 2 (that it is false or improper to say that this human being understands), and perhaps prop. 7 (that the soul which is the substantial form of man as man is corrupted with the corruption of the body). For further discussion of the Condemnation of 1270 and of Siger's implication in it see Fernand Van Steenberghen, *Maître Siger de Brabant* (Louvain-Paris, 1977), pp. 74–80; my "The Condemnations of 1270 and 1277 at Paris," *Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies* 7 (1977), esp. 169–85; "Thomas Aquinas and the Condemnation of 1277," *Modern Schoolman* 72 (1995), pp. 233–37; David Piché, *La condamnation parisienne de 1277. Texte Latin, traduction, introduction et commentaire* (Paris, 1999), pp. 159–64.

5. Weisheipl, p. 281. See pp. 284–85: "There was no need for Thomas to comment on Aristotle for his own amusement. He must have seen an academic apostolate demanding his best efforts. This apostolate, as we have said, was the plight of young masters in arts who needed an exegetical guide in order to understand and teach the Aristotelian books accurately without being led into heresy."

mentaries.⁶ As for Thomas's commentaries on Aristotle, Torrell notes that the Commentary on the *Ethics* is really a *Sententia*, i.e., a summary and "rather doctrinal explication, and not an *expositio*, an in-depth commentary with textual discussions." And regarding its purpose, he quotes Gauthier to this effect:

So that Aristotle's ethics, which hardly speaks of anything other than man, can speak of God, Saint Thomas, without wishing it, without his even noticing it, had to transform it profoundly. If he had wanted to perform the work of a historian or critic, a historian or critic would have been right to judge his work and to find it wanting. But Thomas only wanted to compose a work of wisdom.⁷

However, Torrell also seems to recognize that this explanation cannot account for Thomas's writing of many of the other commentaries. For instance, when he turns to the commentaries on the *Physics* and *Metaphysics*, Torrell remarks: "Thomas's motives for these labors are certainly to be found in the interest of Aristotle's work in itself . . ."⁸

Finally, Torrell returns to our question: What was Thomas's intention in writing these commentaries? He notes that, to use a formula Thomas himself frequently employs, in his commentaries Thomas wants to uncover the *intentio auctoris*, or as we would put it, the mind of the author. This is in accord with the tradition of *expositio reverentialis* used by medieval hermeneutic, and its purpose is to determine what an author really "wanted to say."

This means that in his commentaries Thomas wants to grasp the overall movement of Aristotle's thought and to recall the truth he is seeking, even if at certain points Aristotle himself expressed this only more or less clumsily or even incompletely. At such points Thomas feels justified in substituting his own thinking for that of Aristotle so as to extend his thought and even to make him say certain things Aristotle did not and perhaps could not have even conceived. Moreover, concludes Torrell,

6. Torrell, pp. 191–94. However, he also seems to accept Gauthier's debatable claim that the doctrine of unicity of the intellect is not to be found in Averroes's Long Commentary on the *De anima*, but was rather invented by theologians such as Albert, Robert Kilwardby, Bonaventure, and then accepted by Thomas as being the view of Averroes. Against this interpretation see B. C. Bazán, "Le Commentaire de S. Thomas d'Aquin sur le *Traité de l'âme*," *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 69 (1985), pp. 529–31. Also see H. Davidson, *Alfarabi, Avicenna & Averroes, on Intellect* (New York, 1992), pp. 282–98, for an excellent discussion of Averroes' development on this issue and his position in his Long Commentary on the *De anima* which, while not written in direct response to Gauthier, argues strongly against Gauthier's interpretation. Also now see the brief but precise presentation of this by R. Taylor in his "Averroes," in *A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, ed. J. J. E. Gracia and T. B. Noone (Blackwell Publishing, 2003), pp. 190–92.

7. Torrell, *Saint Thomas Aquinas*, p. 228, quoting Gauthier's Appendix to Leonine Vol. 48, pp. xxiv–xxv.

8. Torrell, pp. 231–32.

to appreciate Thomas's work in his commentaries more equitably, we should remember "that he undertook these commentaries in an apostolic perspective in order better to carry out his job as a theologian, and better to accomplish his labor of wisdom such as he would understand it in the double school of Saint Paul and Aristotle . . ." ⁹ And so if in the end Torrell seems to return to a position close to the theological reading of Gauthier, he does not thereby exclude philosophical interest on Thomas's part.

As for Thomas's Commentary on the *Metaphysics*, I would first note that it is not a mere summary (*sententia*), as Torrell finds the Commentary on the *Ethics* to be, but an in-depth commentary with detailed textual discussion. But this is not of itself enough for us to conclude that it is merely that. And so different twentieth-century scholars have approached it in quite different ways.

According to one approach, Thomas's purpose was simply to offer an objective presentation of Aristotle's authentic thought. In other words, he really was only the *expositor* in writing it. And so we should not look to this commentary in seeking Aquinas's personal metaphysical thought. In my judgment, by far the best-known example of this approach is Étienne Gilson. For instance, in his *The Philosopher and Theology*, Gilson writes:

In his commentaries on the writings of the Philosopher, Saint Thomas is not principally concerned with his own philosophy but with Aristotle's . . . Saint Thomas is only a commentator in his writing on Aristotle. For his personal thinking one must look at the two *Summae* and similar writings, in which he shows himself an author in the proper sense of the word. ¹⁰

Now this Gilsonian position is part of his broader view that the philosophy of Aquinas is a Christian Philosophy or, as he later developed his thinking on this, that Thomas was not a philosopher but a theologian. Hence one can largely ignore the commentaries on Aristotle, including the Commentary on the *Metaphysics*, in studying Aquinas's personal thought.

At the opposite end of the spectrum is another approach. Aquinas's

9. *Ibid.*, pp. 238–39. Quoted text, p. 239.

10. Gilson, *The Philosopher and Theology* (New York, 1962), pp. 210–11. Also see his *Elements of Christian Philosophy* (Garden City, N.Y., 1960), p. 282, n. 6: "Expositor Thomas is not the author of the *Summa Theologiae*; he is the author of the commentaries on Aristotle, in which it is literally true to say that he seldom or never disagrees with the teaching of Aristotle. Now this is precisely the reason one cannot expound the philosophy of Saint Thomas out of his commentaries on Aristotle alone." For my own presentation and critique of Gilson's views on Thomas's philosophy as a "Christian Philosophy," see my *Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas*, ch. 1, and Ch. I above in the present volume.

commentaries, including his Commentary on the *Metaphysics*, do indeed express his personal thought. And so we can assume that anything he says in the Commentary is his personal position unless he states otherwise. This seemed to be the approach of a number of mid-twentieth century interpreters of Aquinas, including members of the North American River Forest School, who would frequently cite from the commentaries without qualification in presenting their interpretations of Aquinas's personal philosophical thought.¹¹

A third approach would argue that there is an objective fidelity to Aristotle's texts in his Commentary, but that Thomas also expresses his personal views therein. In a somewhat controversial book of 1972 devoted to Aquinas's Commentary on the *Metaphysics*, James Doig defended his own version of this approach. If one asks "why" Thomas's Commentary was written, Doig finds that this third approach is correct. But if we ask "how" Thomas wrote it, Doig would combine the first and second approaches. In other words, Thomas wanted to set forth the thought of Aristotle objectively, but he also wanted to express his personal views. Doig maintains, however, that in fact Thomas did not achieve this. Indeed, he could not achieve this, because they are not the same. And so he read into Aristotle's text important metaphysical positions that are not in fact present there, especially his own metaphysics of essence and *esse*.¹²

Before offering some personal reflections on this, I would like to consider a few test cases from Thomas's Commentary on the *Metaphysics* to illustrate different ways in which he deals with certain metaphysical issues.

11. For a strong statement of this position Jenkins ("Expositions of the Text," p. 40, n. 2), cites Ioannes Isaac, O.P., "Saint Thomas interprète des oeuvres d'Aristote," in *Scholastica Ratione Historico-Critica Instauranda*. Acta Congressus Scholastici Internationalis Romae anno sancto MCML celebrati (Rome, 1951), pp. 353–63, esp. pp. 355–56. For a leading representative of the River Forest School who defends this view see Benedict Ashley, "The River Forest School and the Philosophy of Nature Today," in *Philosophy and the God of Abraham: Essays in Memory of James A. Weisheipl, O.P.*, ed. R. J. Long (Toronto, 1991), pp. 2–3, where he lists the principal theses of the River Forest School: "The first is that the philosophy of Aquinas, as distinct from his theology, is best gathered not from the *Summa theologiae* (supplemented by the *Commentary on the Sentences* and the *Summa contra gentiles*, etc.), as Gilson for example chose to do, but from the commentaries on Aristotle, in which the philosophical disciplines are treated according to their own principles and methods *via inventionis*. Nor can it be rightly maintained that these works are merely commentaries on Aristotle, not expressions of Aquinas' own thought. . . ." But one finds many other interpreters of Aquinas indiscriminately citing from his commentaries on Aristotle and from his more original works in their presentations of his thought.

12. *Aquinas on Metaphysics: A Historical Doctrinal Study of the Commentary on the Metaphysics* (The Hague, 1972), pp. ix–xi. Also see his conclusion, pp. 383ff.

CASE I

The first particular topic has to do with Thomas's solution to the dilemma left for subsequent Aristotelians by Aristotle himself concerning the unity of the science of being as being that he develops in *Metaphysics* Bk IV, cc. 1–2 and in the opening part of Bk VI, c. 1, and what he calls a divine science or theology as he presents this in the rest of Bk VI, c. 1. To recall this very briefly here (since we have considered it above in Ch. II, Section 1), can the science of being as being, the science that, unlike particular sciences, does not restrict itself to any particular part or kind of being but studies being as being, be identified with the science of separate entity or with the science of the divine? As is well known, the success of Aristotle's effort to identify these two in the final sentences of Bk VI, c. 1 continues to be disputed by present-day specialists in Aristotle. For that matter, before the time of Aquinas it had already been addressed in opposing ways by the Latin Avicenna in the *Metaphysics* or *First Philosophy* of his *Shifa*, and then by the Latin Averroes in his Long Commentaries on both the *Physics* and the *Metaphysics*. In brief, Avicenna argued that, because no science can establish the existence of its subject, and because God's existence is proved in metaphysics and only in metaphysics, God cannot be the subject of metaphysics. Its subject is being as being.¹³ Against this Averroes countered that God's existence can be established only in physics as the First Mover and concluded that separate entity, meaning God, is the subject of metaphysics. And so, when Aristotle refers to it as the science of being, he really means the science of substance and by implication the science of the ultimate final cause of all other substance, i.e., God.¹⁴

In Aquinas's case we are fortunate to have in the Introduction or Prooemium to his Commentary on the *Metaphysics* his personal solution to this issue, and one which coincides with the solution he had offered in his much earlier Commentary on the *De Trinitate* of Boethius, q. 5, a. 4.¹⁵ Thomas begins his Prooemium by recalling a text from Aristotle's *Politics* to the effect that when many things are ordered to one thing, one of

13. *Liber de Philosophia Prima sive Scientia Divina I–IV*, ed. S. Van Riet (Louvain-Leiden, 1977), Bk I, c. 2 (Vol. 1, pp. 4–6). For fuller discussion see in the present volume Ch. II above. Also see my *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas*, p. 13, note 1; and especially A. Zimmermann, *Ontologie oder Metaphysik? Die Diskussion über den Gegenstand der Metaphysik im 13. und 14. Jahrhundert* (Leuven, 1998), pp. 144–52.

14. *In I Phys.*, in *Aristotelis opera cum Averrois commentariis* (Venice, 1562–74), Vol. 4, fols. 47rb–48va; *In IV Met.*, Vol. 8, fols. 64rb, 65rb–66rb; *In XII Met.*, fol. 293va. Cf. Zimmermann, *Ontologie oder Metaphysik?* pp. 152–54.

15. For a presentation and comparison of the two see my *The Metaphysical Thought*, pp. 15–22.

those must be the director or ruler of the others, and the others directed or ruled. But all of the sciences and arts are directed to one end, the perfection of man which is beatitude. Therefore, one of these should be the director of the others, and it deserves the name wisdom. For it belongs to the wise person to direct others.¹⁶

In seeking to determine which science this is, he reasons that it should be that science which is supremely (maximally) intellectual, i.e., the science that studies what is most intelligible. But one can understand things as supremely intelligible from different perspectives. First of all, one may do so by taking into account the order of understanding, that is, by concentrating on those things from which the intellect derives certainty. Because certainty is reached in a science by knowledge based on causes, a knowledge of causes seems to be supremely intellectual. Therefore the science that considers the first causes seems best qualified to direct the others and, therefore, to be called wisdom.

In a second way one may identify that which is most intelligible by comparing intellectual knowledge with sense perception. While the senses afford a knowledge of individuals, the intellect can grasp universals. And so that science will be most intellectual which deals with the most universal principles. But these are being (*ens*) and those things that follow upon being, such as the one and the many, potency and act, etc. Things of this kind should not remain undetermined but should be considered in one universal science which, because it directs the others, is supremely intellectual.

Things may be regarded as most intelligible in a third way, by taking into account the nature of intellectual knowledge itself. A thing enjoys intellectual power to the extent that it is free from matter. And so those things are most intelligible which are most separate from matter. But such things are not merely separate in the sense that they are abstracted from designated matter, that is, from individuating matter, as are natural forms when they are grasped universally and studied by physics. Nor are such things abstracted from matter merely in the order of thought as are mathematical. Rather these most intelligible things must be separate from matter in the order of being (*esse*), as is true of God and intelligences. And so it now seems that the science which deals with God and the intelligences is most intellectual and therefore mistress of the others.

Thomas realizes that he now has three candidates for the most intellectual science: the science that studies the first causes; the science

16. See *In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio*, ed. M.-R. Cathala and R. M. Spiazzi (Turin-Rome, 1950), pp. 1–2, for the Prooemium. In citing from Thomas's Commentary itself I will usually simply insert into my text the appropriate paragraph numbers from this (the Marietti) edition.

that studies that which is most universal, that is, being; and the science that studies the divine, i.e., God and intelligences. He immediately comments that this threefold consideration should not be assigned to three different sciences, but only to one. And so he quickly introduces a two-step reduction. First he comments that the above-mentioned separate substances—God and the intelligences—are in fact identical with the first and universal causes of being (*causae essendi*). And so now he seems to have only two candidates, the science of being, and the science of the divine, meaning God and intelligences.

Here Thomas introduces a second reduction. It belongs to one and the same science to consider the proper causes of a given (subject)-genus and that genus itself. Thus the natural philosopher considers the principles of natural body as well as natural body itself (or *ens mobile*). Therefore, it belongs to one and the same science to consider separate substances and *ens commune* (universal being = being in general) which, Thomas explains, is the “genus” of which the aforementioned substances are the general and universal causes. And so, if this science does consider the three kinds of intelligible objects he has singled out, it does not consider each of them as its subject. Only *ens commune* is its subject.¹⁷

In developing this point Thomas writes that in a science one seeks after the causes and properties of the subject of that science. But, he warns, the causes themselves are not the subject of the science. Rather knowledge of the causes is the end at which knowledge of a given subject genus ultimately aims. And so if the subject of this science is *ens commune*, the whole science deals with things that are separate from matter both in being and in thought.¹⁸

Here he introduces an important distinction he had already developed in his Commentary on the *De Trinitate*, q. 5, a. 4.¹⁹ Things may be separate from matter in being (*esse*) and in definition in two ways: either in the sense that they are never present in matter, as is true of God and intelligences; or in the sense that they can be without matter, as is true of *ens commune*. But things would not be separate in this second sense if they necessarily depended on matter in order to be. Hence things that are separate in the second sense constitute the subject of metaphysics—being in general—while what is separate in the first sense can be studied

17. “Ex quo apparet, quod quamvis ista scientia praedicta tria consideret, non tamen considerat quodlibet eorum ut subiectum, sed ipsum solum ens commune” (p. 2).

18. “Quamvis autem subiectum huius scientiae sit ens commune, dicitur tamen tota de his quae sunt separata a materia secundum esse et rationem” (ibid.).

19. See *Super Boetium De Trinitate* (Leon. 50.154:182–206). Thomas had already introduced this distinction in q. 5, a. 1 (see p. 138:154–167).

by metaphysics only indirectly, as the cause of that which does fall under its subject.²⁰

It is interesting to compare Aquinas's personal solution to this problem with his commentary on the relevant passages in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*.²¹ In commenting on Bk IV, c. 1, he finds Aristotle presenting the science of being as being as a universal science. With Aristotle he distinguishes it from any particular science precisely because it does not cut off a part of being and study the attributes of that part. Rather, says Thomas, it considers universal being insofar as it is being (*ens universale in quantum huiusmodi* [n. 532]). In commenting on Aristotle's concluding remark at the end of IV, c. 1 ("That it is necessary for us too to grasp the first causes of being as being"), Thomas adds this comment: "Therefore being is the subject of this science, because every science seeks after the proper causes of its subject" (n. 533).²²

In commenting on Bk IV, c. 2 Thomas finds Aristotle addressing some of the *aporiai* he had raised in Bk III. Thomas divides Aristotle's discussion of these into three parts. Aristotle determines (1) whether it belongs to this science to consider both substances and accidents, and all substances as well; (2) whether it pertains to it to consider certain *communia*,²³ i.e., certain things which follow upon being as such, such as the one and the many, the same and the other, opposites, contrariety, etc.; (3) whether it belongs to it to consider the first principles of demonstration (n. 534).

Regarding the first, Thomas finds Aristotle giving an affirmative answer. It belongs to one science to consider both substances and accidents, but it is concerned first and foremost with substances and indeed with all substances (nn. 534, 546–547). Following Aristotle's text Thomas notes that while being (*quod est*)²⁴ is said in different ways, this is not by pure

20. Note that in q. 5, a. 4 of his Commentary on the *De Trinitate* Thomas refers to the subject of metaphysics as "ens in quantum est ens" (p. 154:161–162), whereas in the discussion in the Prooemium he describes it as "ens commune." In effect he takes these two as equivalent.

21. To anticipate a possible objection, I should note that the solution Thomas proposes in his Commentary on the *De Trinitate* does not appear in the literal exposition of the text with which he introduces each section of his Commentary, but rather in the much fuller part where he follows the scholastic method of disputation by using questions and articles, a method he retains even in his *Summa theologiae*. This being so, one can be confident that in that part of his Commentary on the *De Trinitate* he is expressing his personal views, just as he does in the Prooemium to the Commentary on the *Metaphysics*.

22. "Ergo in hac scientia nos quaerimus principia entis in quantum est ens: ergo ens est subiectum huius scientiae, quia quaelibet scientia est quaerens causas proprias sui subiecti."

23. Correction according to the not yet published Leonine edition of Thomas's Commentary, courtesy of Professor James Reilly Jr.

24. According to Reilly, in this part of Bk IV Thomas is following the twelfth-century

equivocation but rather by reference to something that is one and first, and which he identifies as substance. Moreover, he adds, all substances, insofar as they are beings or substances, will fall under the consideration of this science (n. 547).

In *lectio* II, Thomas notes with Aristotle that the one and being do not signify different natures, but one and the same thing, even though they differ conceptually. Hence they are ontologically convertible. This is part of Aristotle's effort (and of Thomas's) to show that the science that studies being will also study the one (n. 549). Moreover, following Aristotle, he points out that there are different parts of the one just as there are different parts of being (n. 561). And so if the parts of being are substance, quantity, quality, etc., so the parts of the one are the same, the equal, the like, etc. And just as it belongs to one science, philosophy, to study all the parts of being, so does it belong to it to study all the parts of the one (n. 563).

In *lectio* III, Thomas follows Aristotle in continuing to defend the unity and universality of the science of being by showing that it belongs to one and the same science to consider a thing and its opposite (n. 564). And multiplicity, or the many, is the opposite of unity or the one, and hence will be studied by the same science that studies the one. It will also study other opposites such as the opposite of the like (the unlike), the opposite of the equal (the unequal), and all other things that can be reduced to these or to the one and the many (n. 567). And so it belongs to one science to consider all of these *communia* or attributes of substance as well as substance itself (n. 569).

In *lectio* IV, Thomas continues to follow Aristotle as he defends the universality of the science of being and shows how the contraries are to be reduced to the one and hence to being (nn. 578–583). Thomas concludes his commentary on c. 2 by summing up Aristotle's thought:

It belongs to one science to consider being insofar as it is being, and those things which pertain to it per se. And from this it is evident that this science considers not only substances but also accidents, since being is predicated of both. It considers those things which have been mentioned—the same and the other, the

translation from the Greek of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* by James of Venice (*translatio Iacobi*). For Reilly's identification of the different translations from the Greek used by Thomas in composing his Commentary see "The *Alia Littera* in Thomas Aquinas' *Sententia libri Metaphysicae*," *Mediaeval Studies* 50 (1988), pp. 559–83, especially the chart on p. 562. Reilly concludes that the other two principal sources used by Thomas are the *Media* (*Anonyma*) and the *Moerbecana*. For the critical edition of the *translatio Iacobi*, see *Aristoteles Latinus XXV 1–1a. Metaphysica, Lib. I–IV.4. Translatio Iacobi sive 'Vetustissima' cum Scholiis et Translatio Composita sive 'Vetus'*, ed. Gudrun Vuillemin-Diem (Brussels-Paris, 1970). See p. 62:14: "Quod autem est dicitur quidem multipliciter, sed ad unum et unam quandam naturam et non equivoce," which corresponds to 1003a 33 in Aristotle's Greek text.

like and the unlike, the equal and the unequal, negation and privation and the contraries, which we have said above are *per se entis accidentia* (n. 587).²⁵

In commenting on Bk VI, c. 1, Thomas finds Aristotle drawing upon the point he had already established in Bk IV, namely, that being as being is the subject of this science. Because every science should investigate the principles and causes of its subject, in this science one must seek after the principles and causes of beings insofar as they are beings. If every intellectual science should deal with principles and causes, the other particular sciences deal only with some particular kind of being such as number, or magnitude, or something like this. None of them considers being in general (*ens in communi*) or being insofar as it is being. This is reserved for the metaphysician, that is, to consider every being insofar as it is being (n. 1147, end).²⁶

After distinguishing with Aristotle natural science from the practical and productive sciences and concluding that it is theoretical, Thomas develops the point that it deals with a determined kind of being, that is, that which can be moved. Therefore its subject is *ens mobile*, and so it has a determined way of defining things, namely, insofar as they are not separable from matter (nn. 1152–1155). But the things studied by mathematics are like the concave and defined without a reference to sensible matter. And so it investigates certain things *as immobile* and *as separate from sensible matter*, even though they are not such in reality (n. 1161).

Next, following Aristotle, Thomas turns to the method or mode proper to this science, i.e., to metaphysics, by noting that if there is something immobile in its being and therefore sempiternal and separable from matter in *esse*, some theoretical science must study this. Since neither physics nor mathematics can do so, the study of this will pertain to a science that is prior to both (n. 1162). And so this first science will deal with things that are separable in terms of their being and completely immobile (n. 1163). Continuing to paraphrase Aristotle here, Thomas comments that these immaterial and immobile causes are the causes of the sensible things that are evident to us, meaning, presumably, the heav-

25. "Colligit quae sunt supra ostensa; dicens, manifestum est, quod ad unam scientiam pertinet considerare ens secundum quod est ens, et ea quae per se illi insunt. Et per hoc patet, quod illa scientia non solum est considerativa substantiarum, sed etiam accidentium, cum de utrisque ens praedicetur. Et est considerativa eorum quae dicta sunt, scilicet eiusdem et diversi, similis et dissimilis, aequalis et inaequalis, negationis et privationis, et contrariorum; quae supra diximus esse per se entis accidentia."

26. "Nulla enim earum determinat 'de ente simpliciter', idest de ente in communi, nec etiam de aliquo particulari ente in quantum est ens, sicut arithmetica non determinat de numero in quantum est ens, sed in quantum est numerus. De quolibet enim ente in quantum est ens, proprium est metaphysici considerare" (n. 1147).

only bodies. And so it is clear that the science which studies beings of this kind is first among all the sciences, and that it considers the universal causes of all beings (n. 1164).

At this point the reader of Aristotle's text and of Thomas's Commentary may begin to wonder about the universality of this science which now seems to be defined as the science of a particular kind of being, that is, separate entity. Thomas seems to anticipate this concern by interjecting a warning. It must be noted that (*Advertendum est autem*) it belongs to first philosophy not only to study things that are separate from matter and motion in terms of their being and their definition; it also must consider sensible things insofar as they are beings. In other words, Thomas is concerned about safeguarding the universality of this science. Or, he adds, unless we should perhaps say with Avicenna that general things of this type (*communia*) with which this science is concerned are separate from matter in terms of *esse*, not in the sense that they always exist without matter, but in the sense that it is not necessary for them to be present in matter (n. 1165). So here he introduces the distinction he had employed in the Prooemium (and in his Commentary on the *De Trinitate*) between two kinds of things that are separable from matter and motion, that is, those that are never found therein, and those that may or may not be. While this distinction is central to Thomas's personal resolution of the unity of the science of being as being and the science of the divine, it is telling that he does not attribute it to Aristotle. But it does offer another way of defending the universality of this science.

Thomas then concludes with Aristotle that there are three parts of theoretical philosophy—mathematics, physics, and theology (which, Thomas specifies, is first philosophy). Thomas now cites literally the passage wherein Aristotle himself recognizes the difficulty he has created (see 1026a 23–25). Someone might wonder whether first philosophy is universal (because it considers being universally, adds Thomas), or whether it considers one determined genus and nature (n. 1169). After noting reasons that might be offered for each alternative, Thomas simply repeats Aristotle's answer to this question: if there is not some other substance apart from those that exist according to nature, with which physics is concerned (Thomas adds), physics will be the first science. But if there is some immobile substance, this will be prior to natural substance. And so the philosophy that considers a substance of this kind (1) will be first philosophy, and (2) will be universal because it is first, and (3) it will belong to it to study being insofar as it is being, both what it is and those things which pertain to being insofar as it is being (n. 1170). Then he adds one remark to the text from Aristotle which he

has just paraphrased: “for the science of the first being and the science of *ens commune* are one and the same, as was stated at the beginning of Bk IV” (n. 1170).²⁷

The difficulty with Aristotle’s text and with Thomas’s paraphrase is to determine how one can justify the transition from a science that is first because it studies the first or highest being(s) to the science that is universal. Since Thomas has added only one sentence to account for this, it is important to note that the order which he, following Aristotle, suggests here is different from the order Aristotle (and Thomas) follow at the beginning of *Metaphysics* IV, and which Thomas follows in the Prooemium as well as in his *In De Trinitate*, q. 5, a. 4. In those other contexts Thomas notes that because it belongs to one and the same science to study its subject and the principles of its subject, it will belong to the science that has being as being as its subject to study the principles and causes of that subject. But here the reasoning goes in the opposite direction. Because one is studying the highest being(s), and because the science of the first being is the same as the science of being in general, this divine science also studies being taken universally, or as being.

Neither Thomas nor Aristotle fully explains the justification for the reasoning here in *Metaphysics* VI. Perhaps Thomas thinks that because of the earlier reasoning in *Metaphysics* IV, Aristotle can now take it as granted that the two sciences are one and the same. Or perhaps this is the best sense he can make out of what is admittedly a problematic passage in Aristotle. But if one were to take this text alone as representing Thomas’s personal thinking, one would badly misinterpret his thought. One would conclude that for Thomas himself metaphysics is first and foremost the science of divine being. And so Thomas would have adopted Averroes’ solution to Aristotle’s problem. And then, for some not fully explained reason, because it is the study of the first being, Thomas would con-

27. Note in particular: “Sed, si est aliqua substantia immobilis, ista erit prior substantia naturali; et per consequens philosophia considerans huiusmodi substantiam, erit philosophia prima. Et quia est prima, ideo erit universalis, et erit eius speculati de ente in quantum est ens, et de eo quod quid est, et de his quae sunt entis in quantum est ens: eadem enim est scientia primi entis et entis communis, ut in principio quarti habitum est.” Compare Thomas’s Commentary with the Moerbeke translation of Aristotle which, according to Reilly, he is here following: “Sed si est aliqua substantia immobilis, haec prior et philosophia prima, et universalis sic quia prima; et de ente in quantum ens huius utique erit speculati, et quae est et quae insunt in quantum ens.” See *Aristoteles Latinus* XXV 3.2. *Metaphysica Lib. I–XIV. Recensio et Translatio Guillelmi de Moerbeka*, ed. G. Vuillemin-Diem (Leiden, 1995), p. 127:64–68. However, in some respects Thomas’s paraphrase here is closer to the *Media* version. Cf. *Aristoteles Latinus* XXV 2. *Metaphysica Lib. I–X, XII–XIV. Translatio Anonyma sive ‘Media,’* ed. G. Vuillemin-Diem (Leiden, 1976), p. 118:9–13. Note at the end of the text: “et de ente in quantum est ens eius est speculati, et quid est et quae insunt in quantum ens.”

clude that it is also the study of all other being. And so while Thomas's Commentary on this passage is his best effort to interpret Aristotle's text, it would be a mistake to identify this as his personal view.²⁸

When Thomas comments on the parallel discussion of this in Bk XI, c. 7, he again repeats the question raised by Aristotle's text: Is the science that deals with separable beings to be regarded as the universal science of being as being? (Thomas, of course, had no reason to question the authenticity of Kappa.) He finds Aristotle replying in the affirmative by using a process of elimination (n. 2266). After eliminating the practical sciences and mathematics as the universal science of all being, he comments, following Aristotle's text closely: "If natural substances which are sensible and mobile substances are the first substances among beings, natural science must be first among the sciences." Then Thomas adds to Aristotle's text: "for the order of the sciences corresponds to the order of the subjects (of the sciences)." He then basically repeats Aristotle's text: "If there is some other nature and substance apart from natural substances, which is separable and immobile, there must be another science for this being, which science is prior to natural science. And from the fact that it is first, it must be universal."²⁹ Again, the reader wonders why. Thomas this time adds two sentences of explanation. "The science which deals with first beings is the same as the science which is universal." This is the same as the addition he had introduced in his Commentary on Bk VI, c. 1. But now he adds another remark: "For the first beings are the principles of the others" (n. 2267).

One may again object, of course: How does it follow from the fact that one studies the first being that one studies all others? If Aristotle's Unmoved Mover in the *Metaphysics* is the final cause of the movers of the heavenly spheres, it does not follow that by studying the Unmoved Mover one will arrive at a direct and universal knowledge of all other things or at the science of being as being. Even if, as will be discussed below, Thomas maintains that Aristotle's God is a cause of being as well as a cause of motion, it will still not follow that in knowing this being one arrives at any direct knowledge of all other being or of being as being. Thomas leaves this largely unexplained. Again, I would suggest, he is

28. For fuller discussion of Thomas's personal view concerning this in its application to the conditions of possibility for discovering being as being and hence for beginning metaphysics, see my *The Metaphysical Thought*, pp. 51–59.

29. "Si autem est alia natura et substantia praeter substantias naturales, quae sit separabilis et immobilis, necesse est alteram scientiam ipsius esse, quae sit prior naturali. Et ex eo quod est prima, oportet quod sit universalis" (*In XI Met.* lect. VII, n. 2267). Compare with the Moerbeke translation of Aristotle: "Si autem est altera natura et substantia separabilis et immobilis, alteram necesse est scientiam ipsius esse et priorem naturali et universalem eo quod priorem" (ed. cit., p. 233:416–418).

puzzled by the reversed order in Aristotle's text. Instead of moving from the subject of metaphysics, being as being, and reasoning from this to knowledge of God as its principle and cause, here one would reason from one's knowledge of God to a universal science of being as being. This is not the order proposed by Thomas himself in his Commentary on the *De Trinitate*, q. 5, a. 4 and in the Prooemium to his Commentary on the *Metaphysics*. Hence this is not Thomas's personal position. But rather than impose his personal view on Aristotle's text here, as in his Commentary on Bk VI, c. 1 Thomas is again content simply to explain the text before him as best he can.

CASE II

It has been suggested by some that, perhaps without intending to do so, in his Commentary Thomas has seriously changed Aristotle's metaphysics by reading into it his own metaphysics of essence and *esse*.³⁰ Yet I myself have found very few, if any, instances in which Thomas explicitly assigns such an understanding to Aristotle himself. It is true that occasionally Thomas refers to being as "that which is" or as "what is." For instance, at the beginning of his Commentary on Bk IV, Thomas quotes from the James of Venice translation of *Metaphysics* IV, c. 2, where Aristotle writes that being is said in many ways. According to this translation, which Thomas reproduces in his own Commentary, "what is" (*quod est*) is said in many ways.³¹ And a little later (n. 535) Thomas refers to *ens* or *quod est*.³² This might be read as implying Thomas's view that all finite beings are composed of essence and *esse*. But it does not have to be so understood. As James's translation of Aristotle does, one can understand being as "that which is" without having ever thought of any real composition and distinction of essence and *esse* therein.

I would say the same of certain texts that have been cited by Doig to support his claim that Thomas has read his metaphysics of essence-*esse* into Aristotle's metaphysics. Thus in commenting on Bk XII, c. 1, Thomas writes: "For being (*ens*) is expressed, as it were, as 'that which has esse' (*quasi esse habens*)." And Thomas notes that this applies only to substance which subsists, in contrast to accidents, which are not called be-

30. See Doig, *Aquinas on Metaphysics*, pp. 312–16; Owens, "Aquinas as Aristotelian Commentator," pp. 222–28. They make this point in quite different ways, however, perhaps because they have significantly different conceptions of Aquinas's personal metaphysics.

31. Revised according to the Leonine version so as to read: "Quod autem est dicitur multipliciter" instead of "Ens autem multis" (Marietti, n. 529), courtesy of Professor Reilly. Cf. the James of Venice translation: "Quod autem est dicitur quidem multipliciter" (ed. cit., p. 62:14).

32. "Dicit ergo primo, quod ens sive quod est, dicitur multipliciter" (n. 535).

ings in the unqualified sense, but rather beings of being (n. 2419). While Thomas's language here is certainly compatible with his metaphysics of essence and *esse*, it does not presuppose it. Again, in commenting on Bk VI, c. 4, Thomas refers to those things that are beings strictly speaking, each of which is either a *quod quid est* or substance, or of a certain kind, or a quantity, etc. (n. 1241). Here the expression *quod quid est* refers to a thing's substantial quiddity and, far from implying Thomas's doctrine of essence-*esse* composition, simply repeats verbatim the Moerbeke translation of Aristotle.³³

However, farther on in his Commentary on Bk IV, c. 2, while explaining Aristotle's effort to show that the one and being are ontologically the same, Thomas introduces an important addition. As he interprets Aristotle, the Philosopher here offers two arguments to establish this. According to the first, if two things, when added to one thing, introduce no diversity, they themselves are completely identical. But the one and being when added to a man or to anything else introduce no diversity. Therefore they are identical (n. 550).

In support of the minor of this argument, Aristotle reasons that it is the same to speak of a man and of one man. Likewise it is the same to speak of an existing man and of a man. And so we do not add anything real by our repetition when we speak of an existing man, a man, and one man (nn. 550–551).³⁴

Thomas finds Aristotle reasoning in the same way about the generation of a man and the generation of one man. The addition of the terms “one” and “being” (*ens*) does not add any real nature to a man. So the one is not really distinct from being (n. 552) even though they differ conceptually. But now he introduces a personal metaphysical observation (“*Sciendum est*”). The name “man” is derived from the quiddity or nature of a man. And so the name “thing” (*res*) is taken from a thing's quiddity, but the name “being” (*ens*) is taken from its act of existing (*actus essendi*).³⁵ Now Thomas has introduced his metaphysics of essence and *esse* (here referred to as “act of existing”). And he also adds that these

33. The Moerbeke version reads: “aut enim quod quid est aut quia quale aut quia quantum. . .” (ed. cit., p. 131:176). For Doig on this text and the previous one see pp. 315–16.

34. Here the Marietti edition (n. 550) should be corrected so as to read with the Leonine edition: “Minor patet: idem enim est dictu ‘homo’ et ‘unus homo’. Et similiter idem est dictu ‘ens homo’ vel ‘quod est homo’ et ‘homo’; et non demonstratur aliquod alterum cum secundum dictionem replicamus, dicendo ‘ens homo’ et ‘homo’ et ‘unus homo.’” Courtesy of Professor Reilly.

35. “Sciendum est enim quod hoc nomen Homo, imponitur a quidditate, sive a natura hominis; et hoc nomen Res imponitur a quidditate tantum; hoc vero nomen Ens, imponitur ab actu essendi” (n. 553).

three (*res*, *ens*, and *unum*) all signify one and the same thing even though they differ conceptually.

Thomas also finds Aristotle offering a second argument to show that being and the one are the same in reality. If two things are predicated of the substance of some thing per se and not per accidens, they are identical in reality. But this is true of being and the one. The substance of each thing is one per se and not in accidental fashion. Therefore being and the one signify one and the same thing in reality (n. 554).

In support Thomas introduces an argument developed by Averroes in his Commentary on the same text, even though Thomas does not acknowledge his source. If being and the one were predicated of the substance of a thing by some being that was superadded, then being [and the one] would have to be predicated of that superadded thing either per se or by reason of something else superadded, and so on *ad infinitum*. Since the latter is impossible, one should grant immediately that the substance of a thing is one and being (*ens*) by reason of itself and not by reason of something superadded (n. 555).³⁶

Thomas remarks that Avicenna thought otherwise and held that the one and being (*ens*) do not signify the substance (essence) of a thing, but something that is superadded. Indeed, the Latin Averroes sharply criticized him for this.³⁷ Thomas comments that Avicenna said this about being because in everything which receives existence (*esse*) from something else, the *existence* (*esse*) of that thing differs from its substance or essence. But the name “being” (*ens*) signifies *esse* itself. Therefore it (“being”) seems to signify something superadded to essence (n. 556).

Thomas explains that Avicenna held this about the one because he thought that the one that is convertible with being is identical with the one that is a principle of number. While the numerical one signifies a nature added to substance because it is based on quantity, this is not true of the one that is convertible with being, that is, of what we refer to as transcendental unity (see nn. 557, 559–560). But of greater immediate interest to us is Thomas’s critique of Avicenna concerning *esse*:

Although the *esse* of a thing is other than its essence, it must not be thought that it is something superadded in the manner of an accident, but it is, as it were, constituted by the principles of the essence. And therefore the name “being” (*ens*), which is taken from *esse* itself, signifies the same thing as does the name [“thing”] which is taken from the essence itself.³⁸

36. For Averroes see *In IV Met.*, vol. 8, fol. 67va.

37. “Avicenna autem peccavit multum in hoc, quod existimavit quod unum et ens significant dispositiones additas essentiae rei” (*In IV Met.*, fol. 67ra).

38. “Esse enim rei quamvis sit aliud ab eius essentia, non tamen est intelligendum quod

In sum, in this important but easily misunderstood text, Thomas is stating that (i) a thing's *esse* is different from that thing's essence; (ii) *esse* should not be viewed as an accident that is added to essence, that is, as a predicamental accident; (iii) *esse* is, as it were, constituted by the principles of a thing's essence (which I take as meaning that, according to Thomas's metaphysics, a thing's act of existing is received by, limited by, and specified by that thing's essence principle); (iv) the name "being" (*ens*) is derived from a thing's act of existing; (v) the name *ens* which is taken from *esse* signifies the same reality as does the name *res* which is taken from essence.³⁹

In this discussion Thomas does add a great deal to Aristotle's metaphysics. Yet he does not attribute his views on the essence-existence distinction and relationship to Aristotle, even though he does correctly maintain that the identity of the one and being is in Aristotle.

CASE III

Next I would like to mention some points on which Thomas's interpretation of Aristotle's text does seem to differ from the thought of Aristotle himself. In his Commentary on *Metaphysics* II, c. 1, Thomas is explaining a discussion by Aristotle of truth as it is present in things (993b 23–31). Note in particular Aristotle's remark at 993b 26–31:

So that which causes derivative truths to be true is most true. Therefore the principles of eternal things must always be most true; for they are not merely sometimes true, nor is there any cause of their being, but they themselves are the cause of the being of other things, so that as each thing is in respect of being, so is it in respect of truth.⁴⁰

In commenting on this Thomas observes that the name "truth" is not restricted to any species but applies in general to all beings (n. 294). In other words, he finds Aristotle dealing with truth of being or transcendental truth. And so he continues, what causes derived things to

sit aliquod superadditum ad modum accidentis, sed quasi constituitur per principia essentiae. Et ideo hoc nomen *Ens* quod imponitur ab ipso *esse*, significat idem cum nomine quod imponitur ab ipsa *essentia*" (n. 558).

39. Certain specialists in Arabic philosophy have argued that Thomas was misled by the medieval Latin translation of Avicenna's *Prima Philosophia* into thinking that he viewed existence as an accident superadded to essence. Others disagree. While I must leave this to Arabic scholars to decide, I would recall that the Latin Averroes does accuse Avicenna of making this very mistake, or at least of viewing *ens* as a disposition added to essence. See *In IV Met.*, Vol. 8, fol. 67ra (cited above in note 37). For discussion and references see my Ch. II above, note 32.

40. Ross translation in *The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation*, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton, 1984), p. 1570.

be true is itself most true. From this he finds Aristotle concluding that the principles of those things that exist always, that is, the principles of heavenly bodies, must themselves be most true. This is so because they are not at some time true and at some time not, and therefore they surpass in truth things subject to generation. This also follows because these principles—the causes of heavenly bodies—are not themselves caused; rather they are the cause of being (*causa essendi*) for other things. And so the heavenly bodies, while incorruptible, have a cause not only for their motion, as some have claimed, but also for their very existence (*esse*), as the Philosopher here expressly states, observes Thomas (n. 295).⁴¹

In commenting on Bk VI, c. 1 (*lectio* I, n. 1164) Thomas notes, following Aristotle, that all [with the Leonine text] causes must be sempiternal; for the first causes of generated things must be ungenerated, lest generation regress to infinity. And this is especially true of those causes that are completely immobile and immaterial. A little farther on, Thomas comments that the science which considers beings of this kind, that is, separate entities, is first among the others, and considers the universal causes of all things. Therefore these are causes of beings insofar as they are beings. And so Thomas writes: “And from this the falsity of the view of those is clearly evident who held that Aristotle thought that God is not the cause of the substance of the heaven, but only of its motion.”⁴²

And so, while most modern interpreters of Aristotle do not find him presenting the Unmoved Mover as a cause of being, and certainly not as a creator, Thomas maintains that in these two texts Aristotle really does think that the principle(s) of the heavenly bodies or God is the cause of

41. “Secundo, quia nihil est eis causa, sed ipsa sunt causa essendi aliis. Et per hoc transcendunt in veritate et entitate corpora caelestia: quae etsi sint incorruptibilia, tamen habent causam non solum quantum ad suum moveri, ut quidam opinati sunt, sed etiam quantum ad suum esse, ut hic Philosophus expresse dicit” (*In II Met.*, lect. 2, n. 295). On this text in Aristotle and in Thomas’s Commentary see F. Van Steenberghe, *Le problème de l’existence de Dieu dans les écrits de s. Thomas d’Aquin* (Louvain-la-Neuve, 1980), pp. 263, 266; Jenkins, “Expositions of the Text,” pp. 46–48; Doig, *Aquinas’s Philosophical Commentary on the Ethics*, pp. 153–56. On Aristotle’s text also see A. Mansion, “Le Dieu d’Aristote et le Dieu des chrétiens,” in *La philosophie et ses problèmes. Recueil d’études de doctrine et d’histoire offert à Monseigneur R. Jolivet* (Lyon-Paris, 1960), pp. 23–25. These writers agree with the generally accepted view that Aristotle himself does not hold that the causes of the heavenly bodies are causes of the existence of the heavenly bodies themselves, but only of their eternal motion. Also see Mark Johnson, “Did St. Thomas Aquinas Attribute a Doctrine of Creation to Aristotle?” *New Scholasticism* 63 (1989), pp. 129–55 (who offers an affirmative answer to the question posed in his title).

42. “Necesse vero est omnes causas esse sempiternas” (Leonine correction courtesy of Professor Reilly). Note from the following text: “Unde sunt causae entium secundum quod sunt entia, quae inquiruntur in prima philosophia, ut in primo proposuit. Ex hoc autem apparet manifeste falsitas opinionis illorum, qui posuerunt Aristotelem sensisse, quod Deus non sit causa substantiae caeli, sed solum motus eius.” Here Thomas is commenting on *Met.* VI, c. 1 (1026a 16–18).

being or of the substance of the heavenly bodies. As Van Steenberghen puts it, he exploits a certain ambiguity in these texts of Aristotle when they are read in isolation apart from his overall metaphysical thought.⁴³ By doing this, Thomas attributes to Aristotle a position that runs counter to the view of the Unmoved Mover that Aristotle himself presents elsewhere, and thus seems to force upon Aristotle a position which Aquinas himself regards as true on both philosophical and religious grounds, but one which Aristotle himself did not actually hold. This is not to say that Thomas did not *think* that Aristotle defended the position in question. It is rather to suggest that in Thomas's eyes the truth of this position was so evident that Aristotle could not possibly have overlooked it.

CASE IV

Next we may turn to Thomas's Commentary on Aristotle's effort in Bk VII to determine the meaning of substance (*ousia*) and in particular of one of the four meanings proposed for this by Aristotle in c. 3 (1028b 33–36), i.e., the *quod quid erat esse* (Moerbeke's translation of the τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, or what Thomas often renders as the quiddity or essence of a thing. In commenting on the beginning of c. 4 (see *lect.* II, nn. 1299–1300), Thomas says that we must consider the *quid erat esse* of sensible substances, and then turn later to intelligible substances (Bk XII).

In commenting on c. 10 (see Lesson IX) Thomas finds Aristotle raising the question about the relationship between a definition, taken as a formula (*ratio*), and the parts of that formula to the parts of a thing that is defined. Is the formula (*ratio*) of the parts included in the formula (*ratio*) of the whole (n. 1460)? Aristotle's and Thomas's answer to this will turn on the distinction between different kinds of parts, that is, parts of the form or species, on the one hand, and parts of the composite (1035b 31–32). But before taking up this answer, which we cannot examine in detail here, Thomas introduces a major addition to Aristotle's text.

He notes that there are two different opinions concerning the definitions of things and their essences. Some say that the entire specific essence is the form so that, for example, the entire essence of a human being is the human soul. Therefore the form of the whole which is signified by the name "humanity" and the form of the part which is signified by the name "soul" are one and the same in reality, but differ conceptually. Insofar as the form perfects and actualizes matter, it is called the form of the part. Insofar as the composite whole is placed in its species by this same form, that form is called the form of the whole. Consequently,

43. Van Steenberghen, *Le problème*, pp. 266–68.

according to this view no parts of matter are included in the definition which expresses the species, but only the formal principles of the species, that is to say, the form. Such, says Thomas, seems to be the view of Averroes and of some who follow him (n. 1467).⁴⁴

Thomas comments that this position seems to be opposed to the mind of Aristotle. In Bk VI, c. 1 of the *Metaphysics* Aristotle holds that natural things include sensible matter in their definition and thereby differ from mathematical (see 1025b 32–1026a 7). But, Thomas comments, it cannot be said that natural substances are defined by something that is not included in their essence, since they are not defined by addition as are accidents. Therefore sensible matter is a part of the essence of natural substances, and not only as it is realized in an individual, but also as regards the essence of the species; for definitions are not given for individuals but for species (n. 1468).

And so, Thomas continues, there is another opinion, which Avicenna follows, according to which the form of the whole, which is the quiddity of the species, differs from the form of the part just as a whole differs from its part. For the quiddity of the species is composed of matter and form, although not of this form and this individual matter. This, says Thomas, is Aristotle's view, which he introduces here in order to eliminate Plato's theory of separate forms or ideas (n. 1469).⁴⁵

From this it is clear that Thomas not only wants to include matter within the essence or quiddity (and therefore the *quod quid erat esse*) of the species, but that he believes that this is Aristotle's view. As for the text Thomas has cited from *Metaphysics* VI, c. 1, Maurer has pointed out that there Aristotle is not attempting to explain the meaning of substance taken as essence, but merely wants to indicate how the natural philosopher defines a natural substance, that is to say, as composite.⁴⁶ But in Bk VII he is much concerned with defining substance taken as essence. And so he excludes matter from this, as not being part of the essence. In agreement with most Aristotelian scholars, Maurer insists that for Aristotle substance taken in this sense, i.e., as essence, is form alone.⁴⁷

The view Thomas defends and attributes to Aristotle is the position Thomas himself had personally held throughout his career, as early as the *De ente et essentia* (see cc. 1, 2). But in order to assign this view to

44. For Averroes see *In VII Met.* (vol. 8, fol. 184DG). Also see Armand Maurer, "Form and Essence in the Philosophy of St. Thomas," in *Being and Knowing: Studies in Thomas Aquinas and Later Medieval Philosophers* (Toronto, 1990), pp. 4–5.

45. For Avicenna see his *Liber de Philosophia Prima sive Scientia Divina*, V–X, ed. S. Van Riet (Louvain-Paris, 1980), Bk V, c. 5 (Vol. 2, p. 275).

46. For Aristotle see *Metaphysics* VI, c. 1 (1025b 28ff.). For Thomas's commentary on this see nn. 1155–1159. For Maurer see pp. 6, 8.

47. Maurer, "Form and Essence," p. 8.

Aristotle, as Maurer points out, Thomas has to force some of his texts.⁴⁸ Nonetheless, in this case it seems clear enough that he does so on strictly philosophical grounds. Since Thomas is philosophically convinced that the essence or quiddity of a natural substance includes both matter and form, he seems to have concluded that Aristotle himself must have held the same view. And so he does his best to find that position in the text of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*.

CASE V

Another interesting case where Thomas goes beyond the letter of Aristotle's text is to be found in his Commentary on Bk VI, cc. 2–3. In commenting on c. 2 he finds Aristotle denying that there can be scientific knowledge of being per accidens (nn. 1189–1190). Nonetheless, in *lectio* III Thomas also finds Aristotle rejecting the view of those who would completely eliminate being per accidens and who would hold that everything on earth happens out of necessity and that nothing happens by chance (nn. 1192–1201). As Thomas interprets Aristotle's text, in the case of a future contingent event the tracing of that event to some cause per se and that to another will ultimately lead to a principle that cannot be reduced to another cause per se, but which will be a "chance" cause or a cause per accidens of the chance event. Because being per accidens is not truly generated, one should not seek for a per se cause of its generation (n. 1201).

At this point Thomas observes that Aristotle's position seems to eliminate certain things defended by some working philosophically, namely, fate and providence. For each of these doctrines seems to entail that: (1) nothing in the world happens *per accidens*, i.e., by chance or fortune; and (2) all things here happen out of necessity, both of which claims Aristotle would reject (nn. 1203–1204). Thomas introduces a fairly lengthy discussion wherein he first shows that fate, understood as a certain disposition present in terrestrial bodies owing to the influence of heavenly bodies, does not eliminate all chance events (nn. 1212–1214). Next he shows that a doctrine of divine providence does not eliminate contingency, even though he grants that this is more difficult to establish

48. For discussion of these see Maurer, pp. 11–13. He lists Thomas's Commentary on *Metaphysics* VII, c. 10 (1035b 31–33), n. 1491; Commentary on *Met.* VII, c. 10 (1035b 14–16), n. 1484; Commentary on *Met.* VII, c. 7 (1032b 14), n. 1407; Commentary on *Met.* VII, c. 11 (1037a 26–30), n. 1530. Maurer also discusses Thomas's position in the *De ente* (see pp. 14–16). For further discussion see the careful and detailed study by G. Galluzzo, "Il problema dell'oggetto della definizione nel commento di Tommaso d'Aquino a *Metafisica* Z 10–11," *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 12 (2001), pp. 417–65, esp. pp. 439–56.

because of the universal character of God's causality (nn. 1217–1222). Indeed he has here granted that insofar as things that happen on earth are related to their first divine cause, they are found to be ordered and not to exist merely *per accidens*. And so, according to Catholic faith, it is said that nothing happens fortuitously with respect to divine providence, since all things are subject to it (n. 1216).

Thomas argues that, if one grants divine providence and therefore divine foreknowledge of future events, it still does not follow that every such event happens in necessary fashion, but only that every event must be either contingent or necessary. That it be contingent or necessary depends upon a higher cause which is the cause of being as being, and upon which the entire order of necessity and contingency itself depends (nn. 1220–1222). For Thomas, of course, this cause is God. While Thomas here wants to show that Aristotle's discussion of being *per accidens* is perfectly compatible with such an understanding of divine providence, he does not here explicitly attribute to Aristotle the doctrine of providence itself. He is content to show that Aristotle's position does not exclude it.

CASE VI

More forced, however, is Thomas's attribution to Aristotle's God both of knowledge of things other than himself and of will in his Commentary on Bk XII. In commenting on c. 6, Thomas closely follows Aristotle's text. He recognizes that Aristotle is convinced of the eternity of motion and of time, and that if motion is sempiternal, one must posit a sempiternal substance that actually moves (nn. 2490–2492). But Thomas comments that the arguments offered by Aristotle to prove that motion and time are sempiternal in *Physics* VIII, as well as the argument offered here in *Metaphysics* XII, are not demonstrations but probable arguments, unless perhaps they are demonstrative simply insofar as they refute the views of the ancient naturalists who claimed that motion began to be (nn. 2496–2498). He adds that Aristotle's argumentation for the sempiternal and immaterial nature of the first substance does follow necessarily (n. 2499).

In commenting on c. 7 (see *lectio* VII) Thomas finds Aristotle reasoning that the Unmoved Mover for which he has just argued moves as something that is desirable and intelligible. Only such things, things that are desirable and intelligible, can move without being moved (n. 2519). While Thomas grants that among movers known to us there is a distinction between that which moves as something desired and that which moves as an intelligible good (as illustrated by an incontinent person), there can be no such diversity in the case of the first intelligible entity and the first desirable entity. They must be identical (n. 2522). And just as the First

Mover is a simple substance and actuality, so too is the first intelligible a simple substance and actuality (2524). Therefore, concludes Thomas, the First Mover is identical with the first intelligible entity and the first desirable entity, which is the best (n. 2527).

Thomas notes that Aristotle compares the First Immobile Mover with the first mobile thing. Because the Immobile Mover moves as something that is "loved" (a term that Thomas finds preferable to "desired"), there must be something that is first moved by it, and by means of which it moves other things. This is the first heaven (n. 2529). Thomas follows Aristotle's text in concluding that the motion of the first heaven is local and circular (nn. 2530–2531). And then, writes Thomas, the first heaven depends upon this First Mover as upon its end both with respect to the perpetual nature of its substance, and with respect to its perpetual motion.⁴⁹ By saying that the heaven depends upon the First Mover with respect to the perpetual nature of its substance, Thomas has again gone beyond the letter of Aristotle's text, although this addition is consistent with his earlier claim in the Commentary that Aristotle's God is a cause of being and not merely of motion. Moreover, there is a certain ambiguity in Aristotle's text once more. According to the Moerbeke translation of 1072b 13–14, Aristotle's text reads: "On such a principle *depend* the heaven and nature" (*italics mine*).⁵⁰

And in another significant addition, Thomas remarks that Aristotle states that the necessity of the first motion (of the first heaven) is not absolute but is based on its end (that is, on that principle which Aristotle subsequently names God), insofar as by its motion it attains to a likeness or assimilation to God. But an assimilation to that which wills and is intelligent as, says Thomas, Aristotle shows God to be, is attained according to will and intelligence, just as artifacts are assimilated to an artisan insofar as the artisan's will is realized in them. Therefore, continues Thomas, the necessity of the first motion (of the first heaven) is subject to the will of God (n. 2535).⁵¹ So here Thomas attributes intellect to Aristotle's God, for which there is a basis in Aristotle's subsequent text. But Thomas also attributes will to Aristotle's God, for which there is no such textual support.

49. "Ex hoc igitur principio, quod est primum movens sicut finis, dependet caelum, et quantum ad perpetuitatem substantiae suae, et quantum ad perpetuitatem sui motus; et per consequens dependet a tali principio tota natura, eo quod omnia naturalia dependent a caelo, et a tali motu eius" (*In XII Met.*, lect. VII, n. 2534).

50. Ed. cit., p. 258.

51. "assimilatio autem ad id quod est volens, et intelligens, cuiusmodi ostendit esse Deum, attenditur secundum voluntatem et intelligentiam, sicut artificata assimilantur artifici, in quantum in eis voluntas artificis adimpletur: sequitur quod tota necessitas primi motus subiaceat voluntati Dei" (n. 2535).

In *lectio* VIII Thomas continues to comment on c. 7 of Aristotle's text. As Aristotle compares the First Mover as an object of understanding and desire to that which actually understands and desires it, Thomas comments that the first moved thing—the first heaven—must understand and desire the First Mover. This, says Thomas, is true for Aristotle since he holds that the heaven is animated by a soul that understands and desires (n. 2536). But the greatest and most perfect act of understanding is directed to the very best object and involves the greatest delight. And so in the act of understanding the First Mover consists the greatest delight (n. 2538). But now, continues Thomas, Aristotle shows that within the first intelligible object, that is, the First Mover itself, there is still more perfect understanding and delight. It is the nature of intellect that it understands itself insofar as it transumes or conceives in itself something that is intelligible; for the intellect itself becomes intelligible by reason of the fact that it attains some intelligible object. Hence the intellect and the intelligible object are one (n. 2539). And insofar as the intellect attains an intelligible object, it actually understands (n. 2540).

Now if one were to stop at this point, one would not yet have really shown that the First Mover itself actually understands, but only that it is actually understood by the soul of the first heaven. Thomas recalls that there is an intelligible substance that exists per se, with which Aristotle is now dealing. Therefore this First Mover must be both a substance that is intelligible and understood, and one that actually understands. In support he reasons that the relationship between the intellect of the first mobile thing and its object is similar to that which the Platonists posit between our intellect and separate forms. According to the Platonists, it is by entering into contact with such forms or ideas and by participating in them that our intellects are actualized. In like manner the intellect of the first moved thing (the first heaven) actually understands by reason of its contact with the first intelligible substance, that is, the First Mover (n. 2542). Here Thomas appeals to a principle or adage he has apparently taken from *Metaphysics* II, c. 1. As he formulates it here: "That by reason of which every other thing enjoys a given perfection is that perfection to a greater degree." Therefore it follows that whatever divine and excellent thing, such as understanding and taking delight, is present in the intellect which understands the first intelligible object must be present to a still greater degree in the first intelligible object or the First Mover itself.⁵² In other words, the act of understanding or taking delight must

52. See n. 2543: "Propter quod autem unumquodque tale, et illud magis. Et ideo sequitur quod quicquid divinum et nobile, sicut est intelligere et delectari, invenitur in intellectu attingente, multo magis invenitur in intelligibili primo quod attingitur." This seems to

be present to a still greater degree in the Unmoved Mover because it causes these acts to be present in the soul of the First Heaven. And so for the First Mover to consider this most intelligible object, i.e., itself, is most delightful and best. And, lest there be any doubt, Thomas notes that this first intelligible object is called God (n. 2543).

Here, therefore, Thomas has made a major addition to Aristotle's text, but this time in order to supply something that seems to be missing from that text itself, that is, a justification for the transition from a First Mover which is the object of intelligence and love on the part of the soul of the first heaven to a First Mover that understands and loves itself. And Thomas has done this by appealing to an apparent version of a principle which he also finds elsewhere in Aristotle, that is, in Bk II, c. 1.

Here I will bypass *lectiones* IX and X, where Thomas comments on Aristotle's discussion in c. 8 of the number of sempiternal movers. In *lectio* XI Thomas comments on c. 9 and considers certain doubts raised by Aristotle concerning the intellect of his First Mover or God. Most interesting for our immediate purpose is the question whether the First Mover understands itself, or something else (n. 2603). After presenting in some detail Aristotle's argumentation to show that it understands itself and that in it intellect and what is understood are identical (nn. 2611–2613), Thomas adds a personal remark. It must be noted that Aristotle here intends to show that God does not understand something other than himself but only himself in the sense that what is understood is viewed as perfecting both the one who understands and the act of understanding itself. When viewed in this way, acknowledges Thomas, it is clear that nothing other than God can be understood by him, for it would then perfect his intellect. But, continues Thomas, it does not follow from this that all other things are unknown to God; for by understanding himself he understands everything else (n. 2614).

In support of this Thomas reasons that because God is identical with his act of understanding and is most excellent and most powerful, his

be another version of the adage Thomas finds in Bk II, c. 2 (993b 24–25). There Thomas refers to this as a certain universal proposition, i.e., as an adage or axiom, and paraphrases it thus: "Unumquodque inter alia maxime dicitur, ex quo causatur in aliis aliquid univoce praedicatum de eis" (n. 292). In these two texts Thomas reasons, as Aristotle himself does, from the fact that something causes a perfection to be present in something else, to the conclusion that it is present in that cause to a maximum (or to a greater) degree. However, more frequently, as in the second part of the Fourth Way in ST I, q. 2, a. 3, Thomas reverses this reasoning. He moves from the maximum instance of a perfection within a given class or genus to the conclusion that this causes that perfection to be present in all others within that class. For a helpful examination of this in Thomas's texts see V. de Couesnongle, "La causalité du maximum. L'utilisation par Saint Thomas d'un passage d'Aristote," *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 38 (1954), pp. 433–44; "La causalité du maximum. Pourquoi Saint Thomas a-t-il mal cité Aristote?" *ibid.*, pp. 658–80.

act of understanding is most perfect. Therefore he understands himself most perfectly. But insofar as a principle is more perfectly understood, so much the more is its effect understood. The things produced are contained within the power of the principle that produces them. Therefore, because the heaven and the whole of nature depend upon the first principle, which is God, it is clear that by knowing himself God knows all other things (2615).

This reasoning is not to be found in Aristotle's text although, it should be noted, Thomas does not explicitly state that it is. Moreover, for it to be reconciled with Aristotle's Unmoved or First Mover, one would have to assume that it is not only the final cause of the motion of other things, but also the cause of the being of those other things. And more than this, one would also have to assume that it is the efficient cause of their being. Otherwise, by knowing himself as the end of other things, God would still not know those things themselves. But Thomas himself thinks that all of these things are true of God, and that they can be discovered philosophically. He also thinks that Aristotle's God is the cause of the being or the substance of other things and not merely of their motion. And he apparently takes this as at least implying that Aristotle's God is also the efficient cause of their being, not merely their final cause. This will be confirmed by our next text.

In commenting on c. 10, Thomas notes that here Aristotle inquires whether the the universe has a good and a best, and hence an end that is separate from it, or whether it has a good and a best that is intrinsic to it which consists in the appropriate ordering of its parts (n. 2628). Thomas finds Aristotle defending both positions. The First Mover is a separate good on which the heaven and the whole of nature depend as upon their end. And an appropriate intrinsic ordering must be present in its parts (n. 2629). In developing this Thomas expands upon an analogy drawn by Aristotle between the good of an army considered in itself and in its commander. Thomas comments that the greater good is found in the commander because the end is more perfect than the means to the end, and the order of the army exists in order to fulfill the goal of the commander (n. 2630). He also remarks that, because the nature of things ordered to an end is taken from their end, not only does the good of the army exist for the sake of the good of the commander; the order of the army derives from the commander (n. 2631).

So too, he reasons, the separate good for the universe, that is, the First Mover, is better than the internal good or order of the universe. This is because the internal order of the universe is for the sake of the First Mover, so that what is present in its intellect and will may be realized within the ordered universe itself. Therefore the entire ordering of the

universe comes from the First Mover (n. 2631). In other words, Thomas here attributes the internal order of the universe to the intellect and will of the First Mover and thereby, without using the word itself, attributes something like providence to Aristotle's God or First Mover. But this is a First Mover endowed with will and with knowledge or understanding of all things, and moreover, one which, says Thomas, instills in each thing a certain nature or inclination which orders that thing to its proper end. In other words, Thomas here assigns the efficient causation of natures or of natural inclinations to Aristotle's First Mover (n. 2634).⁵³

CONCLUDING REMARKS

And so Thomas's treatment of Aristotle in this Commentary varies considerably. Most of the time he expounds Aristotle's text as carefully as he can. Much of what he adds is intended to develop the implications of Aristotle's thought. At other times, as when he deals with the unity of the science of being as being and divine science while commenting on Bk VI, c. 1, Thomas proceeds very cautiously. He does not read his full personal solution for this issue into Aristotle's text. Again, in commenting on Bk IV, c. 2, even though he briefly introduces his own views on essence and *esse*, he does not attribute his position concerning this to Aristotle himself.

When dealing with Aristotle's supreme principle(s) as a cause of the being or of the substance of other things, he cites two texts from Aristotle (and eventually a third) to support his claim that this is Aristotle's position. He exploits a certain ambiguity in these texts in order to attribute to Aristotle what he takes to be the correct philosophical position; one should at least recognize the ambiguity in those texts even while granting that Thomas's interpretation is very difficult to reconcile with Aristotle's fuller discussions of the First and Unmoved Mover. In dealing with the specific essence or quiddity and the matter of composite entities, he does seem to misinterpret Aristotle and therefore finds himself constrained to force some of Aristotle's other passages. But theological motivations have nothing to do with this. It is rather that Thomas is philosophically convinced of the truth of his own position, and seems to think that Aristotle himself also must have held that position.

In finding Aristotle leaving a place for providence in his defense of being per accidens and contingency in *Metaphysics* VI, cc. 2–3, Thomas

53. On this see Van Steenberghen, *Le problème de l'existence de Dieu*, pp. 271–72. On Aristotle's God see also A. Mansion, "Le Dieu d'Aristote et le Dieu des Chrétiens," pp. 21–44.

is careful not to attribute the doctrine of providence itself to Aristotle. However, in his discussion of Aristotle's conception of the First Mover or God in *Metaphysics* XII, Thomas does make some significant additions to Aristotle's text. There is really no foundation in Aristotle's text for thinking that his First Mover is equipped with will, or that it knows things other than itself, or that it exercises providential care over the ordering of the created universe or, to repeat a point just made, that it is an efficient cause of the being or substance of other entities. Thomas is convinced that each of these points is true of God and that each can be established philosophically. He must have realized that most of these points are not explicitly defended by Aristotle, but he seems to have felt that they are not incompatible with Aristotle's description of his First or Unmoved Mover, and of its highest activity, thinking on its own thinking. Hence he may have thought that he was simply rendering explicit points that were only implicit in Aristotle.

In sum, in his effort to set forth Aristotle's thought as carefully and faithfully as possible, I would suggest that Thomas is largely successful, but not always. I also think that he is proceeding philosophically and not theologically in writing this Commentary. Some seem to assume that, whenever he defends a position that is compatible with Christian faith, he is proceeding theologically. There are two difficulties with this. First, as I have already mentioned, the positions he finds in Aristotle, even those we cannot justify on textual grounds, are positions that Thomas himself defends on philosophical grounds. If he finds them in Aristotle, he obviously thinks that Aristotle also defended them for philosophical reasons. Second, if Thomas is interested in showing that philosophy, or in this case, Aristotle's philosophy, is not incompatible with Christian faith with respect to the points mentioned above, this is not for him to proceed theologically. It is rather for him to be consistent with his claim as a Christian believer, not necessarily as a theologian, that divinely revealed truth and philosophically discovered truth cannot be in conflict with each other because both ultimately derive from one and the same source, God as the author of revelation and God as the creator (see his Commentary on the *De Trinitate*, q. 2, a. 3). What is missing from the Commentary on the *Metaphysics* is any effort to derive conclusions from premises based on religious belief and Scripture, in other words, the formal practice of scholastic theology.⁵⁴

54. Without necessarily agreeing with every interpretation in his article, I would cite Leo Elders as another who strongly emphasizes the philosophical character of this Commentary in his "St. Thomas Aquinas's Commentary on the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle," *Divus Thomas* (Piacenza) 86 (1983), pp. 307–26.

Finally, it seems to me that Thomas's Commentary on the *Metaphysics* can be read with profit by students of Aquinas's personal metaphysics, by those interested in his understanding of Aristotle's metaphysics, and by those interested in Aristotle's thought. This Commentary should not be viewed merely as an exposition of Aristotle's thought, since in writing it Thomas is also clearly interested in arriving at philosophical truth. Thus at times he goes beyond the text of Aristotle and at times he even corrects Aristotle (as with respect to his alleged demonstration of the sempiternal character of the universe).

On the other hand, the Commentary should not be taken as a complete or even as an adequate expression of Thomas's personal metaphysics. If one were to restrict oneself to this Commentary, one would have a very impoverished understanding of Thomas's metaphysics. To mention just a few points, one would know nothing about his recommended way of discovering the subject of metaphysics through the negative judgment known as *separatio*. One would not realize that Thomas himself assigns considerable importance to a metaphysics of participation of beings in *esse*, since throughout the Commentary Thomas constantly discusses participation in connection with Plato's theory of forms, a theory which both Thomas and Aristotle reject. One would know almost nothing about Thomas's metaphysics of essence and *esse*, nor would one have any appreciation of the philosophical argumentation he offers for their distinction, composition, and correlation as potency and act. While one would have a foundation for understanding his theory of analogy of being as it applies at the predicamental level to substance and accidents, one would not understand how Thomas applies it at the level of divine being. And one would know very little about Thomas's views on what philosophical reason can establish about the divine names and attributes, his rejection of quidditative knowledge of God on our part in this life notwithstanding.

Hence while his Commentary on the *Metaphysics* can and should be taken seriously by those interested in his metaphysical thought and in his understanding of Aristotle's metaphysics, it should be read with great care and in concert with Thomas's more independent writings. There is no simple key to understanding Thomas's Commentary on the *Metaphysics* or to understanding why he wrote it. Nor is there any simple key that will apply to all of his other commentaries on Aristotle. As I have attempted to do with respect to the Commentary on the *Metaphysics*, one should also pay particular attention to the Prologues when reading other commentaries.⁵⁵ One should read each of them with an open mind and

55. Very useful in this respect is the recent bilingual publication of the Prologues to the Aristotelian Commentaries (and the Commentary on the *Liber de causis*) edited and

constantly ask (1) whether Thomas at any particular point is explaining the text or at least the thought of Aristotle, (2) whether he also regards what he finds in Aristotle as true, or (3) whether he is introducing certain personal insights because he regards these as true. As for the Commentary on the *Metaphysics*, in the large majority of cases he is doing the first and the second, but at times he is doing the third, or so it seems to me.

introduced by F. Chevenal and R. Imbach, *Prologe zu den Aristoteleskommentaren* (Frankfurt am Main, 1995). Their introduction is also quite helpful.

Chapter XI

PLATONISM AND ARISTOTELIANISM IN AQUINAS

As is well known, Aquinas's philosophy has traditionally been closely associated with the philosophy of Aristotle. Textbooks have been written whose very titles bring out this intimate relationship, such as one used at The Catholic University of America in Washington during my undergraduate days there in the 1950s written by Iosephus Gredt and entitled *Elementa philosophiae aristotelico-thomisticae*.¹ And other more scholarly books and articles developed this theme in the twentieth century.² But another side of Aquinas's thought also came to be examined by various twentieth-century students of his thought, what might be called, loosely speaking, his Platonism.

Thus a collection of explicit references by Thomas to Plato or to Platonists has been published as a book by R. J. Henle.³ If one were to restrict oneself to such explicit references, one might readily conclude that Thomas was really not very sympathetic to this line of thinking. But if one broadens the term "Platonism" so as to apply both to Plato and Platonism taken strictly and to what we today refer to as Neoplatonism, and if one also takes into account implicit references and influences, the results may be different. And so beginning at about the time of World

1. Freiburg im Breisgau, 1937. This was thought to be one of the best of the Latin scholastic manuals of philosophy in the Thomistic tradition, but historical depth was not one of its strengths.

2. Cf. Manser, *Das Wesen des Thomismus* (3d ed., Freiburg in der Schweiz, 1949). Manser finds the innermost essence, the central point of Thomism in the consistent application and further development of the Aristotelian theory of act and potency. See pp. 99–100 for this, although this theme runs throughout his book. Also see R. Garrigou-Lagrange, *Reality: A Synthesis of Thomistic Thought* (St. Louis, 1950), First Part: Metaphysical Synthesis of Thomism, pp. 31–57. Also, this position seems to be espoused by North American representatives of the River Forest School who have heavily emphasized the importance of Aquinas's philosophy of nature such as B. Ashley, W. Wallace, and J. Weisheipl. See Ch. X above, n. 11.

3. *St. Thomas and Platonism: A Study of the "Plato" and "Platonici" Texts in the Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas* (The Hague, 1956).

War II and its immediate aftermath, a number of serious Thomistic scholars have provided textual evidence to establish the presence and the importance of certain “Platonic” themes in Aquinas’s philosophical thought—above all, the central role of participation in his metaphysics. Here I have in mind especially the ground-breaking books on participation by C. Fabro and L.-B. Geiger, as well as Joseph de Finance’s *L’être et agir*, and Arthur Little’s *The Platonic Heritage of Thomism*.⁴

Before turning to some particular points and texts in Aquinas, I propose to narrow the limits of my discussion. If a strong case can be made for the presence in Aquinas’s thought of non-Aristotelian elements, and indeed, of “Platonic” elements when that term is taken broadly, it is my view that this is most evident in his metaphysics. When it comes to his philosophy of nature, it seems to me that, while Aquinas does take into account various post-Aristotelian contributions to that discipline, one can make a strong case for its fundamentally Aristotelian character. Aquinas’s philosophy of human nature is also largely Aristotelian including his correlating soul and body as form and matter and his defense of unity of substantial form. Whether or not Aristotle really assigned individual spiritual intellectual souls to human beings is debatable, but Aquinas certainly maintained that he did, especially in his *De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas*.⁵

Likewise, Aquinas’s theory of knowledge is clearly Aristotelian in inspiration. Thus Thomas is indebted to Aristotle for his view that all of our knowledge begins with sense experience. In denying that our knowledge necessarily ends there in his *In De Trinitate*, q. 6, a. 2 and in drawing out some consequences from this, Thomas goes beyond Aristotle, although he undoubtedly believes that what he is saying is in accord with Aristotelian principles. Thus in seeking to determine whether knowledge in divine science should terminate at the level of the imagination, he begins by noting that it is from the senses that apprehension on the part of the imagination arises, and refers to Aristotle’s statement in *De anima* III, c. 3 (429a 1–2), where the imagination is described as a movement arising from sense perception (*motus a sensu factus*). So too, he cites *De anima* III, c. 7 (431a 14–15) in support of his claim that phantasms are related

4. See Fabro, *La nozione metafisica di partecipazione secondo S. Tommaso d’Aquino* (Milan, 1939; 2d rev. ed., Turin, 1950, which I will cite here); Geiger, *La participation dans la philosophie de S. Thomas* (Paris, 1942; 2d ed., 1953); de Finance, *Être et agir dans la philosophie de Saint Thomas* (2d ed. Rome, 1960); Little, *The Platonic Heritage of Thomism* (Dublin, 1949), which should be used with caution.

5. On this see F. Van Steenberghen, *Maître Siger de Brabant* (Louvain-Paris, 1977), pp. 57–61, 347–57; *Thomas Aquinas and Radical Aristotelianism*, ed. J. F. Wippel (Washington, D.C., 1980), pp. 43–74; *Aquinas Against the Averroists: On There Being Only One Intellect*, trans., comment. R. McNerny (West Lafayette, Ind., 1993).

to the intellective soul as objects. But then he writes that the terminus of our knowledge which is reached in judgment is not always the same. Sometimes the intellect's judgment terminates at the level of the senses, namely, when the properties and accidents of a thing as grasped by the senses suffice for us to express the nature of a thing. This is true of natural things and so in physics our judgments about physical things should conform to what the senses manifest, as, Thomas adds, is clear from *De caelo et mundo* III, c. 7 (306a 16).⁶ But there are certain things about which our judgments do not depend on what is grasped by the external senses, even though these things do not exist in fact apart from sensible matter. This is true of mathematical objects, and so our judgments about them should not terminate at the level of the external senses but at the level of the imagination. And so, as Aristotle points out, our judgment about a mathematical object is not always the same as about a sensible object (see *De anima* I, c. 1 [403a 11–16]).⁷

But there are other things which surpass both what falls under the external senses and what falls under the imagination, namely, those that do not depend on matter in the order of existence (*esse*). Our judgments about such things should not terminate at the level of the external senses or of the imagination; but in discovering such things we do move from things which are first grasped by the senses or imagination so as to reach knowledge of them by using (1) the way of causality, (2) the way of transcendence, and (3) the way of negation. Thomas does not credit Aristotle with this final point, but rather refers to Dionysius's *De divinis nominibus*, as he had already done earlier in this work at q. 1, a. 2 and would do in many other texts.⁸ And so here he has introduced an element taken from Neoplatonism which will be crucial for his philosophical study of divine things in metaphysics.

And yet, even in doing this, he retains his overall preference for the Aristotelian theory of knowledge. For instance, in his *De spiritualibus creaturis*, a. 3, while comparing a theory of plurality of substantial forms in human beings with his own defense of unicity of substantial form, he connects these two views with two different approaches to knowledge. Some, whom he here interchangeably identifies both as Platonists and as Plato, begin with intelligible ideas or natures (*rationes*) in their search for truth, while others (Aristotle) begin with a knowledge of sensible things. After explaining how Avicbron's theory of plurality of forms is in fact

6. Leon. 50.164:71–94.

7. Leon. 50.164:95–165:116.

8. Leon. 50.165:117–132. For Dionysius, and Thomas's Commentary on the same, see *In De divinis nominibus*, Ch. VII.4 (Pera ed., p. 273, n. 321; pp. 274–75, nn. 729–731). For *In De Trinitate*, q. 1, a. 2, see Leon. 50.84:96–85:117.

the logical consequence of the Platonists' and Plato's approach, Thomas expresses his preference for the "true principles of philosophy which Aristotle considered," and then offers a series of arguments against plurality of forms.⁹ Moreover, he also charges here, as he would on many other occasions, that the Platonists mistakenly conclude that what is abstracted by the intellect must correspond to something that is separate in reality.¹⁰ Thus, for instance, in q. 5, a. 3 of his *In De Trinitate* Thomas observes that because Pythagoras and the Platonists did not understand the difference between abstraction whether of the universal from the particular or of form from matter, on the one hand, and distinguishing by negative judgment (*separatio*), on the other, they mistakenly held that mathematical and universals are separate from sensible things.¹¹

Even so, at this point I would like to turn to Aquinas's metaphysics to determine whether there are other significant non-Aristotelian elements in it and, if so, whether they can be referred to as Platonic at least in the broad sense in which I am using this term. I will begin by granting that much of Aristotle's thought is present in Aquinas's metaphysics. Here, as elsewhere, Aquinas's metaphysical vocabulary is Aristotelian. And to mention a few very general notions, Thomas agrees with Aristotle that this science studies being as being. Like Aristotle he contrasts it with more particular sciences in that, unlike them, it does not cut off a part of being and limit itself to the study of the attributes or properties of that part. It studies being taken universally, and as being.¹²

Also in agreement with Aristotle, Thomas holds that being is not predicated in exactly the same way, or univocally, of particular instances and of different kinds of being. Nonetheless, being does enjoy a fundamental kind of unity, sufficient for it to be studied by or, to use Thomas's technical language, to serve as the subject of one science. This underlying unity is based on a relationship of various secondary instances of being to the primary instance of being—substance. And so Thomas develops the thought of Aristotle in working out his theory of analogical predication of being, in particular at the predicamental level, that is to say, when he holds that being is predicated of substance and accidents according to an analogy of many to one. (However, in developing his theory of predication of certain names of creatures and God according to an analogy of one to another or at the transcendental level, Thomas goes beyond Aristotle.) Moreover, Aquinas follows Aristotle in dividing being into ten supreme genera or

9. Leon. 24.2.40:275-42:333.

10. Leon. 24.2.40:287-41:296.

11. Leon. 50.149:275-290.

12. For Aristotle see especially *Met.* IV, cc. 1-2, and Thomas's Commentary on the same. See Ch. X above, "Case 1."

predicaments although, unlike Aristotle, he also offers a theoretical justification—one could almost say, a deduction—of the categories as corresponding to ten supreme *modi essendi* in his Commentary on *Metaphysics* V, and a slightly different but parallel derivation in his Commentary on *Physics* III.¹³ He of course accepts Aristotle's fourfold division of the causes. And like Aristotle, he maintains that one should arrive at knowledge of an ultimate final cause at the end of metaphysics, Aristotle's Unmoved Mover which, for Thomas if not for Aristotle, is also the First Efficient and Exemplar Cause of all else.¹⁴

Yet, all of this notwithstanding, closer inspection reveals significant differences between Aquinas and Aristotle on a number of points. First of all, if both thinkers maintain that metaphysics is the science of being as being, they do not understand being in the same way. For Aquinas, being is a complex notion, including both a quidditative aspect and an existential aspect, and expressed by him as "that which is" or *id quod est*.¹⁵

This is significant for at least two reasons. First of all, Aquinas does not seem to think that this complex notion of being can be gained by a process of abstraction alone. Thus at times, especially in his Commentary on *I Sentences*, d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, ad 1, and again in his Commentary on the *De Trinitate*, q. 5, a. 3, he distinguishes two operations of the intellect, a first which he calls an understanding of indivisibles, which he correlates with a thing's essence or nature, and a second, called composition or division (judgment), which he correlates with a thing's *esse*.¹⁶

More significant, but consistent with what we have just seen, Aquinas also holds that this complexity in our notion of being reflects and corresponds to an ontological complexity present in all finite beings, namely, a composition and distinction of two distinct ontological factors or principles, essence and *esse* (*actus essendi*). As is well known, this distinction and composition of essence and act of being in all finite beings has long been regarded as one of the most distinctive and defining characteristics of Aquinas's metaphysics.

Space will not permit me to examine here the many different ways in

13. For discussion of both types of analogical predication see my *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas*, pp. 73–93, 543–72. See pp. 208–28 for his two derivations of the predicaments.

14. See my discussion of this above in Ch. X and my "Concluding Remarks" there.

15. See, for instance, *In De Hebdomadibus*, lect. 2 (Leon. 50.271:57–59: "ita possumus dicere quod ens sive id quod est sit in quantum participat actum essendi"; *Expositio Libri Peryermenias* I, 5 (Leon. 1*.1.31): "Et tamen maxime videbatur de hoc quod dico 'ens', si ens nihil aliud est quam 'quod est' et sic videtur <et> rem significare, per hoc quod dico <'quod', et esse per hoc quod dico> 'est.'"

16. Mandonnet ed., Vol. 1, p. 489; *In De Trinitate*, Leon. 50.147:96–105. For discussion see my *The Metaphysical Thought*, ch. II, section 1 ("Our Knowledge of Being as Real").

which Aquinas argues for such distinction and composition in all other entities, and so I will consider only one of these, that found in his youthful *De ente et essentia*, c. 4. There, after having refuted Avicbron's theory of universal hylemorphism, Aquinas maintains that if created pure spirits or intelligences are not composed of matter and form, there is nonetheless an act-potency composition within them.¹⁷ Then in Stage I of what I view as a three-stage argument, he reasons that, because one can understand a thing's essence without being aware of its actual existence, within such entities essence and *esse* must be distinct.¹⁸

If this stage seems to move too rapidly from a distinction in the order of understanding to a distinction in reality, as I tend to think it does, this is quickly remedied by Stage II. There Thomas reasons that at most there can be one being in which essence and *esse* are identical. He proves this by distinguishing three ways in which something might be multiplied, namely (1) in the way a genus is multiplied by the addition of specific differences, or else (2) in the way different forms of the same kind are received in different instances of matter, or else (3) in that in one instance the form in question subsists in itself, and in all other cases it is received in some subject. After showing that a pure subsisting *esse* could not be multiplied in either of the first two ways, Thomas implicitly accepts the third explanation and explicitly concludes that there can at most be one instance of pure subsisting *esse*. In all other cases there must be a composition of a receiving subject, i.e., essence, and of an act of existing (*esse*) that is received in different subjects, that is, in different essences or natures.¹⁹

But even this does not establish to Thomas's satisfaction that in such beings essence and *esse* are correlated and composed as potency and act. And so in Stage III of the argument he reasons from the distinction of essence and *esse* in all beings, with this one possible exception, to their caused character, and from their caused character to the de facto existence of the uncaused cause of their *esse*, i.e., that one being whose essence is identical with its *esse*, or God. Because a received act of being (*esse*) is act with respect to the potency (the essence) that receives it, Thomas now completes his argumentation by concluding that, with the exception of that one being whose essence is identical with its *esse*, in all other beings essence is related to *esse* as potency to act.²⁰

I might also note that among the various ways Thomas later argues for such distinction and composition of essence and *esse* in beings other than

17. Leon. 43.376:90-93.

18. Leon. 43.376:94-103.

19. Leon. 43.376:103-377:126.

20. Leon. 43.377:127-163. For fuller discussion of this much disputed passage see my *The Metaphysical Thought*, pp. 137-50, along with the references there to other interpretations of this.

God, the general approach worked out in phase two of the *De ente* argumentation frequently reappears. Thomas often reasons from the uniqueness of the case where essence and *esse* are identical—self-subsisting *esse* or God—to the distinction and composition of these principles in all other beings as, for instance in the first three arguments in SCG II, c. 52; *De spiritualibus creaturis*, a. 1; *De substantiis separatis*, c. 8; *In VIII Phys.*, lect. 8 (n. 1153). While in these later discussions, given the location of this particular argumentation within the particular writing and/or the nature of the work, Thomas does accept the existence of God or of self-subsisting *esse* as already established, the nature of the argumentation does not of itself require this. For this he need only maintain, as he in fact does in the *De ente*, that at most there can be one being in which essence and *esse* are identical and so conclude that in all other entities they must be distinct.²¹

And so, assuming that one recognizes the important role within Aquinas's metaphysics of a composition of essence and a distinct act of existing (*actus essendi*) in all finite beings, it follows that there is considerable difference between his understanding of being and that of Aristotle. Moreover, there is no indication that Aristotle ever conceived of anything like Aquinas's notion of *esse* taken as the *actus essendi* and, as he would eventually describe it in *De potentia* q. 7, a. 2, ad 9 as the "actuality of all acts and the perfection of all perfections." And yet, as C. Fabro has nicely expressed it, "it is the true foundation (*véritable fondement*) for the Thomistic metaphysics of participation," to which I would simply add, "and for Aquinas's metaphysics of essence and *esse* as well."²²

But if one agrees with these claims, one may still ask whether there is anything Platonic or Neoplatonic about Aquinas's distinction between essence and *esse*, or about his notion of *esse* as intensive act, and therefore about his distinctive understanding of being itself. As for the essence-*esse* relationship, already in the *De ente* Thomas attributes some such distinction both to the *Liber de causis*²³ and to Boethius.²⁴ While it is open to

21. For discussion of these arguments see my *The Metaphysical Thought*, ch. V, pp. 150–55.

22. For Fabro see *Participation et causalité selon s. Thomas d'Aquin* (Louvain-Paris, 1961), p. 195: "cette 'notion intensive' de l'*esse*, qui est le véritable fondement de la métaphysique thomiste de la participation." See Ch. V above, n. 60, for the Latin text from *De potentia*, q. 7, a. 2, ad 9.

23. Leon. 43.376:36–40. "Unde in commento nonae propositionis libri De causis dicitur quod intelligentia est habens formam et esse: et accipitur ibi forma pro ipsa quidditate vel natura simplici." For the *Liber de causis* see *Sancti Thomae de Aquino Super Librum de causis expositio*, ed. H. D. Saffrey (Fribourg-Louvain, 1954), p. 57b; *Le Liber de causis*, ed. A. Pattin, (Leuven, no date), p. 69, #90: "Et intelligentia est habens *yliathim* quoniam est esse et forma. . . ."

24. Leon. 43.377:163–166.

question whether Aquinas's distinction and composition of essence and *esse* is really present in either of these texts, and in the case of Boethius this has long been disputed, it cannot be denied that at the beginning of his *De Hebdomadibus* Boethius himself writes: *Diversum est esse et id quod est.*²⁵ And so, without pausing here to discuss the meaning of this axiom in the Boethian text itself, let it suffice for me to note that both Boethius's *De Hebdomadibus* and the *Liber de causis* are Neoplatonic sources, and that Thomas cites both of them in support of his theory.

Moreover, as we have already seen above in Ch. X, in a well-known but difficult passage from his Commentary on *Metaphysics* IV, c. 2, Thomas also attributes a distinction between essence and *esse* to Avicenna, another peripatetic but heavily Neoplatonic source, but then proceeds to criticize Avicenna for having viewed *ens* and unity (*unum*) as if each were "something" (*aliquid*) superadded to the substance or essence of a thing. As regards the first, Aquinas corrects Avicenna. "Although the *esse* of a thing is other than its essence, it must not be thought that it is something superadded in the manner of an accident, but it is, as it were, constituted by the principles of the essence."²⁶

From this comment one may conclude that Aquinas agrees with Avicenna only up to a point, namely, that the *esse* or act of being of a thing is distinct from its essence. But Thomas denies that it is something superadded to essence in the manner of an accident. Moreover, Thomas writes that *esse* is, as it were, constituted by the principles of the essence. By this, I take him to mean that a thing's *esse* or act of being, while distinct from the essence, is received by, determined or specified by, and limited by the essence principle that receives it.

Very significant, I think, is the fact that here, in his Commentary on the *Metaphysics*, Thomas does not attribute to Aristotle his own view of the relationship between essence and *esse* as he has expressed it in the passage just quoted. Not only is such a doctrine not present in Aristotle, but Thomas was aware of this. In sum, Thomas's distinction of essence and *esse* is not Platonic in the sense that it is found in Plato himself, or even in the writings of the Neoplatonists in the precise way in which he

25. See Boethius. *The Theological Tractates with an English Translation. The Consolation of Philosophy with an English Translation*, H. F. Stewart, E. K. Rand, and S. J. Tester (Cambridge, Mass., 1978), p. 40. For other texts see *In I Sent.*, d. 8, q. 5, a. 1; ST I, q. 50, a. 2, ad 3; Quodlibet II, q. 2, a. 3. Cf. C. Fabro, *La nozione metafisica di partecipazione*, pp. 101–3. On the dispute concerning the meaning of this in Boethius see my *The Metaphysical Thought*, p. 99, n. 14. For the view that in his Commentary Thomas did distinguish between them in the same way as Boethius see R. M. McInerny, *Boethius and Aquinas* (Washington, D.C., 1990), pp. 161–253. Against this reading see J. L. Schultz and E. Synan, *St. Thomas Aquinas: An Exposition of the "On the Hebdomads" of Boethius* (Washington, D.C., 2001), pp. xxxvii–liv.

26. *In IV Met.*, lect. 2, n. 558, quoted above in Ch. X, n. 38.

himself understands it. But, I think, there is at least some Neoplatonic inspiration behind his development of his own position.²⁷

Aquinas correlates essence and *esse* as potency and act in many passages, such as *De ente*, c. 4, as was also noted above. And this brings us back to his understanding of *esse* as an intrinsic principle of actuality and perfection of every finite being, and hence as the actuality of all acts and the perfection of all perfections. If Aristotle had developed his theory of act and potency in order to account for various types of becoming or change, Thomas has now applied this notion in a new context and in a very new way. By correlating essence and *esse* as potency and act in every finite being, he has provided a metaphysical justification for distinguishing all such beings, including separate substances, from the perfect simplicity of God and from one another.

Moreover, and again unlike Aristotle, Thomas holds that essence, insofar as it receives and specifies *esse*, also limits it. This in turn presupposes that *esse*, simply viewed in itself, is unlimited and, therefore, that when it is realized in limited fashion in particular beings, its limitation is owing to a correlative principle—essence—that receives and limits it while being actualized by it simultaneously. Hence, even though some scholars today question or even deny that for Thomas *esse* is limited by essence, that he does hold this view seems to me to be clear from his texts. Indeed, on many occasions he uses the related notion that unreceived act or that unreceived *esse* is unlimited as a cornerstone for his argumentation for the infinity of self-subsisting *esse* or God.²⁸

But, as W. N. Clarke showed very effectively some fifty years ago, this principle in turn presupposes a notion of infinity that is absent from Aristotle as well as from Plato, namely infinity taken intensively as perfection rather than extensively as indetermination and imperfection and as that beyond which there is always something else. According to Clarke primary credit for this new understanding of infinity should be given to Plotinus, who could therefore refer to his supreme principle, the One, as infinite, although he would not yet apply this to the realm below the *One* or to being. Clarke maintains that this new understanding of infinity as perfection was passed on to medieval Latin thinkers indirectly

27. Fabro, in agreement with Roland-Gosselin, stresses the influence of Avicenna on Aquinas's development of this theory. See *La Nozione metafisica*, p. 116. However, see Ch. II above, n. 32 for R. Wisnovsky's recent effort to show that Avicenna's own distinction between essence and existence owes much to earlier discussions within Islamic Kalam about the relationship between "thing" and "existent," even though these two relationships are not identical. This would suggest that Avicenna's own particular theory may be more indebted to Kalam discussions than to Neoplatonic influences.

28. For my effort to show that this principle is indeed present in Aquinas see Ch. V above.

through different Neoplatonic channels such as Boethius and the *Liber de causis* (props. 20 and 16).²⁹ Although I have difficulty finding it clearly in Boethius himself, I do think that Clarke's proposal is fundamentally correct.

As for Aquinas's view that *esse* or the act of being is the act of all acts and the perfection of all perfections, I am aware of no explicit prior philosophical (or theological) source for this. It has been suggested by Gilson (and by others) that Thomas took this notion from Scripture at Exodus 3:14 where, according to the Latin Vulgate, God refers to himself as *Ego sum qui sum*.³⁰ I would rather argue that it is precisely because Aquinas had already worked out philosophically his understanding of *esse* or the *actus essendi* as intrinsic actuality that he could then claim to recognize it in the text of Exodus. For instance, in SCG I, c. 22, which Gilson cites, Thomas first offers a series of philosophical arguments to prove that in God essence and *esse* are identical. Only at the end of the chapter does he refer to the text from Exodus for additional confirmation. And this is in accord with his usual practice in the first three books of SCG in which, as he writes at Bk I, c. 9, he intends to pursue by following the way of reason those things that faith professes and human reason can investigate about God.³¹

As for philosophical sources, serious efforts have been made to find Aquinas's source(s) for developing his notion of *esse* in one or other Neoplatonic author. Pseudo-Dionysius has been proposed as a likely source or influence, especially by Cornelio Fabro and more recently by Fran O'Rourke, among others.³² One may begin with what is perhaps Thomas's most comprehensive discussion of this in *De potentia*, q. 7, a. 2, ad 9. He opens his reply with this remark: "That which I call *esse* is among all things the most perfect, which is evident from this fact that act is always more perfect than potency." But, he continues, a given form is not understood to be in act except by reason of the fact that it is held to be. And in sup-

29. See his "Limitation of Act by Potency: Aristotelianism or Neoplatonism," originally in *New Scholasticism* 26 (1952), pp. 167–94, reprinted in Clarke, *Explorations in Metaphysics: Being, God, Person* (Notre Dame, 1994), pp. 65–88, esp. 75–79.

30. See Gilson, *Introduction à la philosophie chrétienne*, c. 3, pp. 45–58. For a similar view concerning the essence-existence distinction see Gilson's *Thomism: The Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas*, trans. L. K. Shook and A. Maurer (Toronto, 2002), pp. 95–96. Note in particular: "Note well that for Thomas Aquinas the revelation of the identity of essence and existence in God was equivalent to a revelation of the distinction between essence and existence in creatures" (p. 95).

31. Editio Leonina manualis, p. 8: "... primum nitentur ad manifestationem illius veritatis quam fides profitetur et ratio investigat, inducentes rationes demonstrativas et probabiles, quarum quasdam ex libris philosophorum et Sanctorum colligimus. . . ."

32. See F. O'Rourke, *Pseudo-Dionysius and the Metaphysics of Aquinas* (Leiden–New York–Cologne, 1992), pp. 180ff. See p. 181, n. 161, for references to others.

port he notes that a form such as humanity or fireness can be considered in four ways: (1) as existing in the potency of matter; or (2) as existing in the power of an agent; or (3) as in the intellect. But (4) by reason of the fact that it has *esse*, it is made existent in actuality. And so, in light of this evidence, Thomas concludes that what he calls *esse* (*hoc quod dico esse*) is the actuality of all acts and the perfection of all perfections.³³ (This, I would note, is a purely philosophical approach, based on Thomas's observation of the different ways in which form or essence can exist.) It must not be thought, Thomas continues, that to what he calls *esse* anything is added so as to determine it in the way act determines potency: "Therefore it is not determined by something else in the way potency is determined by act but rather as act is determined by potency." And so this *esse* is distinguished from that *esse* insofar as it belongs to this or that nature.³⁴

Finally, as O'Rourke has pointed out, Thomas gives us at least a clue as to one of his sources for his views on this by concluding his reply to this same 9th objection with a reference to Dionysius (presumably to c. 5 of the *De divinis nominibus*) to this effect that, while living beings are more excellent than (merely) existing beings, nonetheless *esse* is more excellent than *vivere*; for living things not only have life, but simultaneously with life they also have *esse*.³⁵

In his *Participation et causalité* Fabro suggests that one may distinguish three elements in accounting for Thomas's understanding of *esse* as intensive act: (1) the concept of act which, while expanded upon and developed by Thomas, is Aristotelian in inspiration; (2) the notion of intensity of act which, suggests Fabro, is typically Platonic in terms of the Platonic notion of a *perfectio separata*; (3) the decisive aspect, missing both in Plato and in Aristotle, of the complete and total assimilation of *esse* to act. Fabro identifies two kinds of sources for this third aspect—one scrip-

33. "Hoc quod dico esse est inter omnia perfectissimum: quod ex hoc patet quia actus est semper perfectio < r > potentia. Quaelibet autem forma signata non intelligitur in actu nisi per hoc quod esse ponitur. Nam humanitas vel igneitas potest considerari ut in potentia materiae existens, vel ut in virtute agentis, aut etiam ut in intellectu: sed hoc quod habet esse, efficitur actu existens. Unde patet quod hoc quod dico esse est actualitas omnium actuum, et propter hoc est perfectio omnium perfectionum" (Marietti edition, p. 192).

34. Ibid. Note especially: "Nec intelligendum est, quod ei quod dico *esse*, aliquid addatur quod sit eo formalis, ipsum determinans, sicut actus potentiam: *esse* enim quod huiusmodi est, est aliud secundum essentiam ab eo cui additur determinandum. . . . Unde non sic determinatur *esse* per aliud sicut potentia per actum, sed magis sicut actus per potentiam. . . . Et per hunc modum, hoc *esse* ab illo *esse* distinguitur, in quantum est talis vel talis naturae."

35. "Et per hoc dicit Dionysius quod licet viventia sint nobiliora quam existentia, tamen esse est nobilius quam vivere; viventia enim non tantum habent vitam, sed cum vita simul habet et esse" (p. 192). For O'Rourke see pp. 180–81. Note his quotation there from Solignac, and also the texts he cites from Fabro.

tural, i.e., Exodus 3:14, which we have already discussed, and the other philosophical, i.e., Neoplatonic speculation regarding being in sources such as Dionysius, the *Liber de causis*, Proclus, and Boethius. He comments that none of these Neoplatonic sources yet contains the Thomistic notion of *esse* as act, for the good reason that the Aristotelian understanding of act is lacking to them.³⁶ He argues that among these sources the *De divinis nominibus* of Dionysius and the *Liber de causis* exercised the greatest influence on Thomas's development of his new and revolutionary understanding of *esse*. He also remarks that both of these ultimately go back to one and the same source, Proclus.³⁷

As Fabro points out, in his Commentary on the *De divinis nominibus* Thomas sees Dionysius as correcting the Platonists on a key point. They posited separate things existing in themselves (forms or ideas) in order to account for individual composite entities which participate in these separate principles. And they distinguished those separate principles from the first principle which they called the Good per se and the One per se. According to Thomas, Dionysius agreed with them in also positing a separate life that exists per se, and a separate wisdom that exists per se, and a separate *esse* etc. But he disagreed with them in that he did not hold that these separate principles were diverse from one another, but united them with one supreme principle, or God.³⁸

Thomas finds Dionysius holding that the first existent, which is God, causes every thing that exists in any way whatsoever (n. 628). He also holds that all things therefore in some way come together in God (*conveniunt in Deo*) because, as Thomas explains, every form which is received in something is limited and rendered finite according to the capacity of that which receives it. Thus a given white body does not possess the whole of whiteness according to the total power (*posse*) of whiteness. But if there were a separate whiteness, nothing would be lacking to it of that which pertains to the power (*virtus*) of whiteness. But all things other than the First Being have a received and participated *esse* and therefore do not possess it according to the total power of being (*virtus essendi*). Only God, who is *ipsum esse subsistens*, possesses it according to its total *virtus* (n. 629). Fabro cites Aquinas's justification for applying the name being (*ens vel qui est*) to God. If a cause is named from its effect, it is most

36. Pp. 198–99. Note that Fabro connects point 2 (the Platonic notion of *perfectio separata*) with a text from Aristotle's *Metaphysics* II, c. 1 (993b 24), which Thomas cites in connection with his "Fourth Way" in ST I, q. 2, a. 3. If one accepts the authenticity of Bk II, it seems to me that one should regard this text as a remaining trace of Platonism within Aristotle.

37. Pp. 222–23.

38. For this in Thomas see *In De divinis nominibus* V, n. 634, p. 235. See Fabro, *Participation et causalité*, pp. 224–25.

fittingly named from its principal and most worthy effect. But among all other effects, *esse* itself is more primary and principal. Therefore God is fittingly named “being” (*ens*).³⁹ Fabro concludes that the principal source for the Thomistic notion of intensive *esse* is, therefore, Dionysius, although he goes on to explore this in the *Liber de causis* and in Thomas’s late Commentary on the same; but I will pass over that here.⁴⁰

O’Rourke also heavily, even more heavily than Fabro, emphasizes the influence of Dionysius on Aquinas’s understanding of *esse* as intensive act. Moreover, he stresses much more the importance of the notion of *virtus essendi* in Thomas’s development of his own position.⁴¹ We have just noted Aquinas’s reference to this in his Commentary on *De divinis nominibus*. And this is not the only context in which Thomas assigns a *virtus essendi* or a *potestas essendi* to *esse* taken as the act of being. One of the most striking, I think, is to be found in his argumentation for divine perfection in SCG I, c. 28. As will be recalled from our discussion above in Ch. V, there Thomas reasons that if there is something to which the total power of being (*tota virtus essendi*) pertains, no excellence among those that can belong to any thing can be lacking to it. But *esse* according to its total power (*secundum totam essendi potestatem*) belongs to that thing which is identical with its *esse*. Because God is identical with his *esse*, as was proved above (c. 22), adds Thomas, it follows that nothing of the power of being is lacking to him, and therefore that no excellence or perfection is lacking to him.⁴² In brief, there do seem to be significant Neoplatonic influences on Aquinas’s identification of *esse* as intensive act.

Now I would like to conclude by mentioning briefly two other major features of Aquinas’s metaphysics which are clearly indebted to Platonism when taken broadly—his theories of participation and of divine exemplar ideas. For Thomas participation is an essential part of his way of addressing the problem of the One and the Many at the most fundamental metaphysical level. Thus in his Exposition on the *De Hebdomadibus* of Boethius he writes that “to participate is, as it were, to take a part [of something]. And therefore, when something receives in particular fashion that which belongs to another in universal (or total) fashion, the former is said to participate in the latter.”⁴³

39. See n. 633. Thomas continues by quoting Dionysius: “et ipsum per se esse est senius, (idest primum et dignius) eo quod est per se vitam esse et eo quod est per se sapientiam esse et eo quod est per se similitudinem divinam esse.” See Fabro, pp. 228–29.

40. See Fabro, *La participation et causalité*, pp. 231–44.

41. Op. cit., pp. 167–74. On p. 172 he cites two texts where Dionysius does use this expression, although they do not appear in C. V, but in C. VIII, 1 (332, 334).

42. See the first argument offered in c. 28. For the Latin see Ch. V above, n. 18.

43. In *De Hebdomadibus*, lect. 2 (Leon. 50.271:70–73): “Est autem participare quasi par-

Hence for Aquinas participation is a way of explaining how a given kind of perfection or characteristic can be shared in (participated in) by a number of different subjects. And then he distinguishes between what we may call logical participation (whereby man participates in animal or an individual man participates in the species of man) and real participation. He divides real participation into what Fabro calls predicamental participation and transcendental participation. Under predicamental participation Thomas mentions matter as participating in form and a subject or substance as participating in an accident. Under transcendental participation he notes that an effect is said to participate in its cause, and especially when it is not equal to the power of that cause. Thus air may be said to participate in the light of the sun because it does not receive it with the same brightness whereby it is realized in the sun. It is here, under transcendental participation, that I would place participation of beings in *esse*, which is of greatest importance to Aquinas's metaphysics. And in light of his discussions in different texts, I find him dividing participation of beings in *esse* into three types. First there is participation in *esse commune*, which he explicitly introduces in this context when discussing the relationship between *esse* and *id quod est* in immaterial created or caused beings. Any such subsisting form, whether a subsisting Platonic form, if one should grant its existence for the sake of discussion, or an Aristotelian separate substance, only participates in *esse commune* and, therefore, is not perfectly simple in itself but composed of itself, that is, of form (or essence) and of *esse*.⁴⁴

This text is important because in it Thomas speaks of participating in *esse commune*, i.e., in the act of being viewed universally rather than as realized in any one particular being. Speaking this way carries with it a certain risk, since some might conclude that Thomas is therefore identifying *esse commune* and *esse subsistens*. Thomas explicitly rejects any such identification—for instance, in SCG I, c. 26. *Esse commune* is not some-

tem capere. Et ideo quando aliquid particulariter recipit id quod ad alterum pertinet universaliter, dicitur participare illud. . . ." Compare with *In I Met.*, lect. 10, p. 46, n. 154; *In II De caelo*, lect. 18, p. 233, n. 463 (both quoted in Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought*, p. 96, n. 7). For fuller discussion of Thomas's theory of participation see the whole of ch. 4 there.

44. Leon. 50.273:216–249. Note in particular: "Si ergo inveniuntur aliquae formae non in materia, unaquaeque earum est quidem simplex quantum ad hoc quod caret materia, et per consequens quantitate quae est dispositio materiae. Quia tamen quaelibet forma est determinativa ipsius esse, nulla earum est ipsum esse, sed est habens esse; puta secundum opinionem Platonis, ponamus formam immaterialem subsistere quae sit idea et ratio hominum materialium, et aliam formam quae sit idea et ratio equorum, manifestum erit quod ipsa forma immaterialis subsistens, cum sit quiddam determinatum ad speciem, non est ipsum esse commune, sed participat illud. Et nihil differt quantum ad hoc si ponamus alias formas immateriales altioris gradus quam sint rationes horum sensibilium ut Aristoteles voluit; unaquaeque enim illarum, in quantum distinguitur ab alia, quaedam specialis forma est participans ipsum esse, et sic nulla earum erit vere simplex."

thing that exists apart from actually existing entities except in the order of thought. If God were to be identified with *esse commune*, God would exist only in the intellect.⁴⁵

Secondly, on other occasions Thomas speaks of beings as participating in *esse* in the way in which an effect participates in a higher order cause. According to this usage one may speak of creatures as participating in God, or in *esse subsistens*, although Thomas often qualifies this by adding that creatures do so by way of imitation or by likeness or assimilation. In an interesting text in his Commentary on *The Divine Names*, he observes that *esse commune* is related to God and to other existents in very different ways. First, other existents depend on *esse commune*, but God does not; rather, *esse commune* depends on God. Second, other existents are contained under *esse commune*, but God is not. Rather, *esse commune* falls under his power. Third, other existents participate in *esse [commune]*, but God does not. Rather, *esse creatum* is a certain participation in God (*participatio Dei*) and a likeness of him. And so when Dionysius refers to *esse [commune: inserted by Thomas]* as “having God,” he means that it participates in his likeness (*ut participans similitudinem Eius*).⁴⁶ So in this text we read both that other existents participate in *esse commune* and that it (i.e., individual existents in which it is realized) is a certain participation and likeness of God. Also, in *De spiritualibus creaturis*, a. 1, he writes: “And since every thing participates in the First Act by assimilation insofar as it has *esse*, the participated *esse* in each thing must be related to the nature which participates [in] it as act to potency.”⁴⁷ He speaks in similar fashion in Quodlibet 12, q. 4, a. 1: “Something is rendered fully in act (*maxime fit actu*) by the fact that it participates by likeness in the First and Pure Act; but the First Act is self-subsisting *esse*.”⁴⁸

Finally, without belaboring the point, I would note that sometimes Thomas refers to a created nature or essence as participating in its own *esse*, meaning thereby the act of being that is intrinsic to it. See *In I Sent.*,

45. Ed. Leon. man., p. 27. “Multo igitur minus et ipsum esse commune est aliquid praeter omnes res existentes nisi in intellectu solum. Si igitur Deus sit esse commune, Deus non erit aliqua res nisi quae sit in intellectu tantum.” For some who have mistakenly made this identification, such as K. Kremer (*Die Neuplatonische Seins Philosophie und ihre Wirkung auf Thomas von Aquin* [Leiden, 1966], pp. 357–72), see my *The Metaphysical Thought*, p. 111, n. 44. Note the references there to criticisms of Kremer on this point by Fabro and by Aertsen.

46. Marietti ed., p. 245, n. 660.

47. Leon. 24.2.13:381–385: “Et cum quaelibet res participet per assimilationem primum actum in quantum habet esse, necesse est quod esse participatum in unoquoque comparetur ad naturam participantem ipsum sicut actus ad potentiam.”

48. Leon. 25.2.404:16–25: “Sciendum ergo quod unumquodque quod est in potentia et in actu, fit actu per hoc quod participat actum superiorem; per hoc autem aliquid maxime fit actu, quod participat per similitudinem primum et purum actum; primum autem actus est esse subsistens per se. . . .”

d. 19, q. 5, a. 2: "Every thing participates in its created *esse* by which it formally exists, and each intellect participates in the light by which it judges directly about a thing."⁴⁹

In sum, I conclude that it is evident that Aquinas's theory of participation, especially participation of beings in *esse*, is heavily indebted to Platonism in the broad sense in which we are taking it here. I would also note that this theory is closely intertwined with another non-Aristotelian view in Aquinas, namely, the dependence of every created or participated being on God as upon its exemplar cause, and the role of divine ideas in Aquinas's account of divine knowledge and divine causality. Limitations of space will not permit me to develop these points in detail here. In his Commentary on I *Sent.* at d. 36, q. 2, a. 1 Thomas refers to the forms of things existing in God as ideas, which are operative forms. And he quotes from Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, c. 5: "We describe as exemplars the substantial reasons of existing things which preexist in God in uniform fashion and which theology refers to as predefinitions and as divine and good wills which are predeterminative and productive of existing things."⁵⁰ In q. 2, a. 3 he cites this same Dionysian definition to support his claim there that there are divine ideas for all things that are known by God.⁵¹

Another major source for Thomas's views on divine ideas is, of course, St. Augustine. Thus in *De veritate*, q. 3, a. 1 he quotes from Augustine's *Book of Eighty-Three Questions* (q. 46) to the effect that the term "ideas" may be translated into Latin as "forms" or "species." After noting different ways in which the term "form" can be understood, he notes that in one sense (the third) an idea signifies a form in imitation of which something is made. And in replying to obj. 5 he again cites the same Augustinian source with reference to divine ideas: "While they neither come to be nor pass away, everything which can come to be or pass away is said to be formed in accord with them."⁵² Without belaboring this farther, it should be clear that Aquinas's theory of divine ideas is

49. Mandonnet ed., Vol. 1, p. 491: "quaelibet res participat suum esse creatum, quo formaliter est, et unusque intellectus participat lumen per quod directe de re iudicat." See my *The Metaphysical Thought*, p. 121, n. 71, for references to ST I, q. 44, a. 1; *De spiritualibus creaturis*, a. 1; *De substantiis separatis*, c. 8. Also see pp. 110–22 for more on these three ways of participating in *esse*.

50. Mandonnet ed., Vol. 1, p. 839. Note: "Unde dicit Dionysius, loquens de ideis in V cap. *De div. nom.*, 'Exemplaria dicimus substantificas rationes existentium in Deo uniformiter praexistentes, quas theologia praedefinitiones vocat, et divinas et bonas voluntates existentium praedeterminativas et productivas.'" Cf. *In De divinis nominibus*, c. V, n. 282 (for Dionysius's text), and nn. 663–66 (Thomas's Commentary).

51. *Ibid.*, p. 844.

52. Leon. 22.1.99:160–163; 101:315–317: "Cum ipsae neque oriuntur neque intereunt, secundum eas tamen formari dicitur omne quod orire et interire potest."

heavily indebted to Neoplatonism both through Augustine and through Dionysius. Indeed, so true is this that Gilson maintained that the theory of plurality of divine ideas was unnecessary for Thomas's own thought, and simply a concession he made to the authority of Augustine.⁵³

In concluding both this chapter and this volume, it seems clear to me that there are important Platonic and/or Neoplatonic elements in Aquinas's metaphysical thought, more indeed than I have been able to discuss here, and that they had an impact on his development of some of the most original aspects of that thought.⁵⁴ But one may still ask: Is his metaphysics primarily Aristotelian, with important elements added from the Platonic-Neoplatonic tradition? Or is it primarily Platonic and Neoplatonic, with its language and important elements taken from Aristotle? Both positions have had their defenders.

I would first suggest that, while it is always helpful to identify a great thinker's sources, if one is dealing with an original thinker one should not try to reduce his thought to his sources. One must always allow for such a thinker's originality. Aquinas was surely an original philosopher. One of his greatest gifts was his ability to take positive elements from those who had gone before him and to incorporate them into a greater synthetic whole. In the case of his metaphysics his debts to Aristotle and to the Platonic-Neoplatonic tradition are very great. Which influence is greater is difficult to determine, and one's answer may well depend upon the importance one attaches to the role of each of these elements within Aquinas's personal metaphysics.

My own view is that Aquinas's metaphysics is an original creation in which he has reworked important elements from both the Aristotelian and the Platonic-Neoplatonic traditions in developing his personal thought.

53. See *Introduction à la philosophie chrétienne* (Paris, 1960), pp. 173–83; 218. For my own view that Thomas does take the divine ideas very seriously see my "Thomas Aquinas on the Divine Ideas," *The Etienne Gilson Series* 16 (Toronto, 1993). Also see V. Boland, *Ideas in God According to Saint Thomas Aquinas: Sources and Synthesis* (Leiden, 1996), especially Part I on the sources. And now see the valuable Ph.D. dissertation recently completed at the Catholic University of America by Gregory Doolan, entitled "St. Thomas Aquinas and Divine Exemplarism" (2003).

54. For instance, one might well consider the two influences on Thomas's doctrine of the transcendentals. Some space would be required to discuss this adequately because it would be necessary to consider each of the transcendentals and then to weigh the Platonic and Aristotelian influences on his conception of each of them. In some cases the answer will be complex. For instance, in discussing truth insofar as it exists in the intellect, Thomas seems to be heavily influenced by Aristotle. But in presenting it as truth of being and hence as one of the transcendentals, the Platonic-Neoplatonic influence also surfaces. On this see my Ch. II above. Also see J. Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy & the Transcendentals*, on all of the transcendentals, and pp. 416–27 for his findings on the influence of earlier sources on Aquinas.

But in most instances, I submit, he has reworked them. As they reappear in his thought many of them have been changed or at least taken on new life and new meaning. I am not comfortable with describing his metaphysics either as primarily Aristotelian or as primarily Platonic-Neoplatonic. The only appropriate label I can think of to describe it is Thomistic, if by this we simply mean the thought of Thomas himself as it is found in his own texts.

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