

NIETZSCHE

VERSUS

*ABED AZZAM*

PAUL

# **NIETZSCHE VERSUS PAUL**

**INSURRECTIONS: CRITICAL STUDIES IN RELIGION, POLITICS, AND CULTURE**

**INSURRECTIONS: CRITICAL STUDIES IN RELIGION, POLITICS, AND CULTURE**

Slavoj Žižek, Clayton Crockett, Creston Davis, Jeffrey W. Robbins, Editors

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**FOR BALKIS**



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## ABBREVIATIONS

BT	<i>The Birth of Tragedy</i>
UM	<i>Untimely Meditations</i>
DS	“David Strauss, the Confessor and the Writer”
HL	“On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life”
SE	“Schopenhauer as Educator”
WB	“Richard Wagner in Bayreuth”
HH	<i>Human, All Too Human</i> (I & II)
VM	<i>Assorted Opinions and Maxims</i>
WS	<i>The Wanderer and His Shadow</i>
D	<i>Daybreak</i>
GS	<i>The Gay Science</i>
Za	<i>Thus Spoke Zarathustra</i>
BGE	<i>Beyond Good and Evil</i>
GM	<i>On the Genealogy of Morals</i>
CW	<i>The Case of Wagner</i>
TI	<i>Twilight of the Idols</i>
AC	<i>The Antichrist</i>
EH	<i>Ecce Homo</i>

NW	“Nietzsche Contra Wagner”
DD	<i>Dionysus-Dithyramps</i>
WP	<i>The Will to Power</i>
KGW	<i>Kritische Gesamtausgabe Werke</i>
KGB	<i>Kritische Gesamtausgabe Briefwechsel</i>

## INTRODUCTION

In a letter from 1885, Nietzsche himself recognized the difficulties involved in the question about the identity of the essential-Nietzsche and suggested to hand this question over to time and wait until some genius in Socratic knowledge might appear and be able to unearth Mr. F. N.<sup>1</sup> I do not intend in the present work to claim for myself the genius that Nietzsche himself did not own. Rather, I shall turn precisely to explaining how the knowledge of the essential-Nietzsche, or the knowledge of Nietzsche's will to truth/illusion, is impossible, insofar as Nietzsche's way to it cannot reveal it. *Nietzsche Versus Paul* is a study of the Christian embrace of Nietzsche's sought-after truth that ends in its obliteration.

Unquestionably, Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche has been the most influential and outstanding attempt at the excavation of the essential-Nietzsche in the last century.<sup>2</sup> In this "confrontation . . . with all Western thought hitherto" through Nietzsche, Nietzsche's destiny is "not [the destiny] of an individual but [that] of the history of the era of modern times, of the end of the West." For Heidegger, Nietzsche is the last metaphysician, the last Platonist, and the last nihilist.

Nietzsche is a metaphysician insofar as he “thinks his interpretation of the Being of beings as will to power in an essential unity with that determination of Being which arose in the rubric “the eternal recurrence of the same.” Nietzsche is a Platonist insofar as (his) anti-Platonism is one of “the *essential possibilities* of metaphysics.” This is the “last of these possibilities. . . . [it is] that form of metaphysics in which its essence is reversed.” And Nietzsche is a nihilist insofar as his “metaphysics. . . . is the ultimate entanglement in nihilism.”<sup>3</sup>

Deleuze responded thus to Heidegger’s interpretation of Nietzsche: “The eternal return is as badly misunderstood as the will to power. . . . [and] every time we interpret the eternal return as the return of the identical or the same, we replace Nietzsche’s thought with childish hypotheses.” While Heidegger locates Nietzsche at the bosom of the negative term of Platonic metaphysics, Deleuze locates him at the other edge of *philosophy*. For Deleuze, the essence of Nietzsche’s philosophy is the affirmation of difference: “What a will wants is to affirm its difference. In its essential relation with the ‘other’ a will makes its difference an object of affirmation.” Nietzsche’s philosophy, for Deleuze, “forms an absolute anti-dialectics.” And if this philosophy does come to occupy the negative standpoint of the Hegelian dialectics, it does so only through the “great polemical range” it has. The fact that otherness brings difference closer to negative dialectics does not imply that difference should necessarily become reactive. For, the “will to power is not force but the differential element which simultaneously determines the relation of forces (quantity) and the respective qualities of related forces. It is in this element of difference that affirmation manifests itself and develops itself as creative.”<sup>4</sup>

Though Heidegger’s and Deleuze’s attempts at excavating Nietzsche rule out each other, they nevertheless agree, with Nietzsche, that an essential-Nietzsche ought to be sought. I do not aim at taking the side of Heidegger or of Deleuze. Insofar as Heidegger’s thesis takes the anti-Platonic Nietzsche as its horizon, and insofar as Deleuze’s coun-

terthesis still follows this same horizon, my claim is that both readings remain partial readings of Nietzsche. As such, both are possible interpretations of Nietzsche, and therefore, neither can be said to represent the essential-Nietzsche. For the undeniable fact remains that the negative standpoint which Nietzsche's writings take is primarily that of the Antichrist and not that of the anti-Plato. Heidegger rids himself from the Antichrist at the very beginning of his *Nietzsche*: "There is no Christian philosophy. There is no true philosophy that could be determined anywhere else than from within itself. For the same reason there is no pagan philosophy, inasmuch as anything 'pagan' is always still something Christian—the counter-Christian."<sup>5</sup> This is no naive methodological consideration, and certainly not one without consequences. It differentiates the history of philosophy, for which Heidegger's Nietzsche is no less than its culmination, from the history of Christianity. Nonetheless, if Nietzsche says, "*Dionysus versus the Crucified*,"<sup>6</sup> rather than Dionysus versus Plato, and if, as I have proposed, it is the Antichrist that represents Nietzsche's negative standpoint, then the question of Nietzsche's negative dialectics cannot dismiss Christianity so simply. The crucial significance of Christianity becomes apparent in Löwith's criticism of secularization,<sup>7</sup> which begins with his vehement criticism of the "Christian spirit" of Nietzsche's *philosophy*<sup>8</sup> and does not end without including Heidegger in it.<sup>9</sup>

A final judgment about the possibility of fleshing out the essential-Nietzsche cannot be made unless Nietzsche's Antichrist is first examined. The task of unearthing the essential-Nietzsche should take the anti-Christian Nietzsche—rather than the anti-Platonic one—as its central concern. The Antichrist shifts the focus of inquiry from philosophy to Christianity and from the history of philosophy to the history of Christianity. This shift diminishes the primacy of Plato and Hegel for the question about the nature of the Nietzschean negative dialectics as Plato becomes a Christian before Christianity<sup>10</sup> and Hegel becomes a Katechon (delayer).<sup>11</sup> Finally, this shift brings the question

about Nietzsche's negative dialectics close to Paul's dialectics of faith and law. It is the Nietzsche-Paul relationship that makes the case for, and provides the main axis of, this investigation.

The study of the Nietzsche-Paul relationship has been largely neglected. In fact, relatively minor attention has been given to Nietzsche's treatment of Christianity and Judaism.<sup>12</sup> Some of Nietzsche's interpreters mainly relate to Nietzsche's Paul in the context of discussing other themes.<sup>13</sup> To the extent that they treat Nietzsche's relationship to Paul, commentators may be divided into three main camps. One group treats the Nietzsche-Paul relationship in such a way that obscures its true meaning.<sup>14</sup> Following Taubes,<sup>15</sup> a second group of scholars may more recently be seen as attending to the Nietzsche-Paul relationship by virtue of its renewed philosophical interest in Paul.<sup>16</sup> A third group of scholars, beginning with Ernst Bertram, recognizes Nietzsche's underlying hate toward Paul and their kinship as "overcomers of the law" (within the so-called Lutheran Nordic Christianity).<sup>17</sup> Jörg Salaquarda, who is the first to devote his study primarily to the Nietzsche-Paul relationship, deserves special attention.<sup>18</sup> In this inspiring study, Salaquarda shows how, for Nietzsche, Paul becomes "*the* decisive figure . . . in the origin of Christianity." Further, Salaquarda states that Nietzsche "conceives of his relationship to the Apostle [Paul] essentially in terms of neither a mere conflict nor a secret kinship, but rather in terms of a *dialectical overcoming* [*dialektische Aufheben*]." He discovers the "dialectical resemblance" between Nietzsche and Paul, insofar as Nietzsche's Paul is the "revaluator" of noble-morality and Nietzsche is the "revaluator" of (Paul's) slave-morality: "The 'revaluator' Nietzsche confronts the 'revaluator' Paul." This is the confrontation that Salaquarda understands as grounding Nietzsche's revaluation in terms of a Hegelian "*synthesis* . . . [governed by the law] of overcoming-preservation."<sup>19</sup> After Salaquarda, and in a (protestant) theological thesis, Daniel Havemann locates Nietzsche within a nineteenth-century theological tradition and argues that Nietzsche's Paul serves to show in the end that Nietzsche's ques-

tioning and reevaluation correspond to Judeo-Christian history and its morality.<sup>20</sup>

In a direction different from Havemann's theological interest in the Nietzsche-Paul relationship, I develop here Salazar's idea of the Nietzsche-Paul dialectical resemblance and expand its understanding of this dialectics in terms of overcoming-preservation (*Aufhebung*, sublation). On my view, the Nietzschean formula, Dionysus versus the Crucified, locates the legitimacy of the Dionysian in the hands of the Antichrist: the legitimacy of the Dionysian is the legitimacy of the Antichrist, and not the legitimacy of the anti-Plato, of Hegelian negative dialectics, or of their other possibility (for example, differentiated affirmation). In keeping with the formula of the Nietzsche-Paul dialectical resemblance, the legitimacy of the Antichrist resembles the legitimacy of Christ. My present inquiry is one about the Pauline logic of legitimization that guides the Nietzschean idea of the Dionysian.

Insofar as "Dionysus versus the Crucified" makes Nietzsche's last word, this work is directed at the whole of Nietzsche's opus as it culminates in his later writings (1886–1888). As scholars have already reconstructed Nietzsche's path toward this end,<sup>21</sup> I will not account for the development of the Nietzsche-Paul relationship from the early, through the middle, and until the late Nietzsche. The late Nietzsche becomes the focus through which this work observes and analyzes Nietzsche's earlier writings retrospectively.<sup>22</sup>

The procedure of this study is shaped as a reconstruction of the Nietzschean history of Christianity as one revolving around the question (of pessimism) about the meaning of suffering. To be sure, this reconstruction involves ancient Greek religion, Judaism, and Buddhism, but it is in no way a history of religion. First, Nietzsche's starting point is Christianity and not some abstract concept of religion.<sup>23</sup> Second, for Nietzsche, Christianity's embrace of these "religions" through a history of Christianity adheres to a domain different from Christianity's encompassment of a possible concept of religion. The latter brings

about the “essence of religion” alone in the sphere of the psychology of religion that unites the end/telos of Christianity and Buddhism.<sup>24</sup> The history of Christianity, on the other hand, permits Christianity to attract Greek religion, Judaism, and Buddhism to follow the question about the meaning of suffering.

The first and the second chapters discuss the anti-Christian Dionysian origins of Christianity in its Greek and Jewish sources and follow their later decay, which prepares the ground for the advent of the Christian faith. Within the Greek path to Christianity, the life-affirming Dionysian tragedy is born from the religion of thankfulness. Socrates follows it as a turning point, which was (wrongly) interpreted by the life-negating (Christian) Plato. Within the parallel Jewish path, examined in the second chapter, Early Judaism is another life-affirming religion of thankfulness. It degenerates into the life-negating Priestly Judaism, bringing the inversion of noble-morality into slave-morality. The latter establishes the teleological history of suffering humanity within which suffering receives its redemptive value and the noble is concealed: when man becomes the blend of the slave and the noble, the latter becomes deep evil (original sin). In view of the fact that Nietzsche conceives of the Antichrist as primary in relation to the Dionysian, it becomes clear how his revealing of the Dionysian origin (tragic art and paradisiacal science) comes to grant the Antichrist the legitimacy it requires. The identity of origin protects the Antichrist from its inherent negativity, insofar as the origin, as such, rids it from all historical dialectics. My claim is that this Nietzschean strategy resembles Paul’s legitimization of the Christian faith through the original faith of Abraham.

The third chapter continues to follow the Greek and the Jewish paths to Christianity until the moment in which the development of each of these paths renders the Christian faith a demand. Pyrrhonian (Buddhist) skepticism demands faith as such. Here, the Christian faith turns out to be the only faith demanded following its formulation of skepticism as the skepticism about suffering. When Priestly-

Judaism keeps the good negatively defined, Christian love renders it positive by conceiving it as sacrifice. Here, Nietzsche's Buddhist Jesus is another turning point whose (wrong) interpretation realizes Christianity. For Nietzsche, Jesus is an ahistorical, politically disinterested idiot and Christ is a political Anti-Dionysian man. Against the background of Jesus's symbolism and Socrates's irony, Jesus's (Buddhist) religion is an instrument opposed to that of reason. If the first reflects modern Buddhism and the latter reflects genealogy, religion seems to promise the future that reason cannot reach.

In the fourth chapter, I uncover how Nietzsche's reading of Socrates is one guided by his reading of Paul: both Socrates and Paul are disappointed with an ideal, which has been previously assumed to be free from the moral question. Nietzsche's questioning of morality can be seen to stem from his disappointment with the modern ideal of the Hegelian synthesis. At this point, the positive revaluation of Paul signifies the overcoming-without-preservation of noble-morality, and Nietzsche's positive revaluation signifies the overcoming-without-preservation of slave-morality. Thus, the will to power acts through sublimation: the overcoming-preservation of one instinct and the overcoming-without-preservation of another. In sum, genealogy points at the origin as an authentic lie. This is truth/faith located apart from its possible (historical) others whose contact can question its absoluteness dialectically. But Nietzsche's extension of man's historical horizon to the Dionysian does not mean that such a horizon embraces the totality of man's possible instincts. Nietzsche's legitimization of the Dionysian as origin becomes questionable in view of its being legitimized as repressed and not as mere origin.

Chapters 5 and 6 move on to examine Modernity as the last part of Nietzsche's history, as well as its source. For Nietzsche, the genuine character of Modernity should rest on its discontinuity with Christianity. Hence, the modern event of the death of the Christian God should be completed. If God is dead, his shadow (morality) is still there. Morality is the purification of Christianity. Yet, this purification

cannot be an authentic lie: if genealogy reveals Christianity's concealed other, Modernity is an accumulation of history. At any rate, God was also murdered by the ugliest man: man's deep passions seen as ugly in the shameful eye of pessimism. Modern science cannot make the ugly beautiful insofar as it is a hiding place of suffering. But art—as seen from the artist's viewpoint—can redeem the material from its ugliness through that love which sacrifices the other.

Nietzsche's criticism of Modernity shows Modernity's image of itself as worldly to be a false idea. How then does Modernity come to have such an image of itself? Chapter 6 shows how Modernity's idea of its own worldliness is grounded in the principle of self-preservation. But, for Nietzsche, self-preservation is an exceptional case of the will to power. Thus, from the viewpoint of the latter, Modernity, being the embodiment of the principle of self-preservation, should be sacrificed. For Nietzsche, the principle of self-preservation constitutes a superfluous teleology. And Modernity becomes such a superfluous teleology through its notion of the atomic subject, insofar as such a subject is revealed as the place in which man's historical instincts are gathered and insofar as its unity becomes a mere grammatical unity: the sacrifice of Modernity is the sacrifice of the grammatical unity of the subject. From here it appears that Modernity is worldly as Christian. This is the being of the delayer (Katechon) of the coming of the Antichrist. For Nietzsche, the delayer is the German Hegel whose philosophy of history delays atheism.

## **NIETZSCHE VERSUS PAUL**



# 1.

## FROM DIONYSIAN TRAGEDY TO CHRISTIANITY

### Dionysian Tragedy

What is amazing about the religiosity of the ancient Greeks is the enormous abundance of gratitude it exudes: it is a very noble type of man that confronts nature and life in *this* way. Later, when the rabble gained the upper hand in Greece, *fear* became rampant in religion, too—and the ground was prepared for Christianity.

—*Beyond Good and Evil*, 49

My task concerns reconstructing the Nietzschean history of Christianity. This aphorism gives us the best access to this task in terms of its possibility, actors, substance, and movement. Nietzsche unfolds in this aphorism his vivid retrospective observation of the development of Christianity. From the viewpoint of feeling, religion is being enacted by two types of men, noble and rabble. There are, in accordance with this, two types of religion: a noble-religion whose essence is the feeling of gratitude, and a rabble-religion whose essence is the feeling of fear. Moreover, the latent understanding of the history of Christianity in terms of class political history exhibits this history as one leading toward Christianity as the religion of the fearful rabble.

Gratitude is a feeling of satisfaction immediately expressing itself before that which is held to be the cause of this feeling. And ancient Greek religion is the expression of satisfaction before its gods. The feeling of satisfaction, the expression of which Nietzsche speaks here, is not the feeling of satisfaction from an optimal state of life. Nietzsche rather refers to the expression of satisfaction from nature and life given as they are. The enormous abundance of gratitude is an expression of the affirmation of life. Religious thankfulness is the religious expression of the affirmation of life.

But how does satisfaction from life and nature become a matter of expression? More precisely, how does it become a matter of religious expression? Expressing gratitude necessarily involves self-consciousness of one's state of satisfaction. Man first reflects on life so as to be able to conclude that it is satisfactory, and only then can one turn to thank the gods as that which may be held, thought, or imagined to be the cause of the life thought to be satisfactory. Hence, through religious thankfulness, man turns to thank the gods thought to be the cause of a satisfying life. But how does man's thankfulness for life take a religious expression? Nietzsche's answer to this question is that the satisfaction is so great that man's feeling of thankfulness is enormous and abundant, and man therefore cannot think of turning to offer such an intense feeling of thankfulness but to some deity. As Nietzsche writes, "Meaning of religion: the failing and the unhappy should be preserved, and through an improvement of the mood (hope and fear) be kept away from suicide. Or for the noble: a surplus of gratitude and elevation, which is greater than to be offered to humans."<sup>1</sup> The matching between noble and gratitude, on the one hand, and between rabble and fear (and hope), on the other hand, correlates to that which makes the sense of religion. A religion of thankfulness comes into existence at the moment in which the noble's feelings of thankfulness and elevation are great to a degree where offering such feelings to humans is not anymore proportional.

Assuming that ancient Greek religion is the starting point of the history of Christianity entails (from Nietzsche's same retrospective view-

point) that ancient Greek religion establishes the axis around which the history of Christianity evolves through time. How should this axis be defined? Insofar as ancient Greek religion is an expression of the affirmation of life, the history of Christianity is, at the very least, a history of responsiveness. For the *affirmation of life, or yes-saying (Bejahung), is an answer to a question*. In addition, as yes-saying assumes another possibility—the possibility of negating life—the axis around which the history of Christianity revolves is that question in front of which man ends up affirming or negating life.

What is that question? In the “Sinn der Religion”<sup>2</sup> we read that religion emerges on the basis of man’s consciousness of himself as finite (*vis-à-vis* infinity). Following man’s failure and unhappiness, man can commit suicide, and man’s possible suicide is man’s consciousness of himself as finite insofar as such an act of suicide is retained back through man’s repossession of infinity through the hope in, and the fear of, the beyond. Also, man’s feeling of himself as being smaller than to be thanked (for the satisfactory life one lives) is man’s consciousness of himself as finite, insofar as this feeling of smallness leads man to go beyond finitude in thanking the gods. In the moment in which man has religion, man is already at the standpoint in which the value of life is questioned, that is, conceived in terms of possibility in relation, and in comparison, with a totality that is infinity. Religion is that turning point at which the immediacy of life loses its absoluteness. Religion appears in the moment in which “the trust in life is gone: life itself has become a *problem*.”<sup>3</sup> The Nietzschean history of Christianity is the history of the answers given to the question of the value of life: the answers that affirm or negate life by way of attributing to it an absolute or relative value respectively.

“The outstanding element, however, out of which an interpretation of history could arise at all, is the basic experience of evil and suffering, and of man’s quest for happiness. The interpretation of history is, in the last analysis, an attempt to understand the meaning of history as the meaning of suffering by historical action.”<sup>4</sup> How, then, is the

Nietzschean history of Christianity one about the value of life and about the problem of suffering? From this perspective, this history becomes the *history of pessimism*. The history of pessimism is the history of the answers given to the question of the value of life *from the point of view of the problem of suffering*. Pessimism is not the mere reflection on the value of life, but rather the reflection on the value of life as suffering. For Nietzsche, suffering remains a constant of which denial and affirmation are but variables.<sup>5</sup> Through the definition of the history of pessimism as the history of Christianity, it becomes the history of the answers given to the problem of suffering as they revolve around Christianity's answer to this question. In this way, the reconstruction of the Nietzschean history of Christianity comprises three components: (1) Greek and Jewish pre-Christian history *as one leading to Christianity*; (2) Christianity itself; and (3) post-Christian history, or Modernity, as a conclusion of Christianity.<sup>6</sup>

The first expression of pessimism as the reflection on the value of life from the point of view of suffering appears in the moment in which ancient Greek religion gives birth to Dionysian tragedy:

The psychology of the orgy as an overflowing feeling of life and energy within which even pain acts as a stimulus provided me with the key to the concept of the *tragic* feeling. . . . Tragedy is so far from providing evidence for pessimism among the Hellenes. . . . Affirmation of life even in its strangest and sternest problems, the will to life rejoicing in its own inexhaustibility through the *sacrifice* of its highest types—*that* is what I called Dionysian, *that* is what I recognized as the bridge to the psychology of the *tragic* poet.<sup>7</sup>

Dionysian suffering turns into a stimulus to affirm life as suffering. It is on the basis of the appearance of suffering in the Dionysian cult before the joyful Greek consciousness that Dionysian tragedy emerges to represent Greek pessimism as an affirmation of suffering-life.<sup>8</sup> Suffering becomes the standpoint from which the ancient Greeks reflect

on the question of the value of life. And it is on the basis of this reflection that tragedy appears as a form of affirmative art. Dionysian tragedy expresses “a *strong* pessimism . . . [an] intellectual preference for the hard”<sup>9</sup> and shows “how the Greeks got over their pessimism, how they *overcame* it.”<sup>10</sup>

Nietzsche’s usage of the expression “strong pessimism,” referring to Dionysian tragedy, stands behind my definition of the history of Christianity as a history of pessimism, and as one that includes Dionysian tragedy. This definition does not contradict Nietzsche’s statement that tragedy does not provide evidence for pessimism among the Hellenes. The Greeks were pessimists insofar as they had the preference to *reflect upon* suffering-life. Nevertheless, the Greeks affirmed life. The Greeks were not pessimists in the way that Schopenhauer, and the Schopenhauerian Nietzsche in *The Birth of Tragedy*, portrayed them. Their pessimist reflection upon suffering-life did not result in the negation of life.<sup>11</sup> This is the Greek joyful Dionysian solution to the question of pessimism, to the riddle posed by the existence of absurd, pointless, nauseating suffering.<sup>12</sup>

Here, within this reconstruction of Nietzsche’s history of Christianity, Dionysian tragedy stands as *the* model for *all* forms of art. The significance of Dionysian tragedy does not stand on the uniqueness of the form of (Dionysian) tragic art, or as that specific form of art opposing the Apollonian as another form of art, as it appears in Nietzsche’s early *Birth of Tragedy*. Dionysian tragedy is the model for all forms of art, insofar as Nietzsche’s conception of the experience of the *artist as such* can provide a life-affirming Weltanschauung alternative to the life-negating Platonic-Christian one:<sup>13</sup> “The ‘Dionysus’ in the Dionysus versus Apollo of Nietzsche’s first book and the ‘Dionysus versus the Crucified’ in the last line of Nietzsche’s last book do not mean the same thing. The later Dionysus is the synthesis of the two forces represented by Dionysus and Apollo in *The Birth of Tragedy*.”<sup>14</sup>

What are the implications of the appearance of suffering before Greek consciousness in the sphere of art for the history of Christianity?

I mentioned that the Greeks formulate their life-affirming answer to the question of the value of suffering-life in tragedy as the model of art in view of the appearance of suffering in the cult of Dionysius. Does this mean that Dionysian suffering remains absent from the Greeks' everyday political and social reality (the Apollonian reality-dream announced in *The Birth of Tragedy*)? Yes. *Dionysian* suffering does not appear before Greek consciousness in reality. In reality, Dionysian suffering is that which is not. It is that which exists but does not appear. As such, suffering owes its existence to the assumption of the Dionysian in reality, to assuming the totality of being to be more than that which appears.

However, the affirmation of life bridges together the order of appearance and the order of existence. *The Dionysian affirmation brings suffering to appearance in the reality in which it exists.* The Dionysian produces suffering as that which is not (the happiness of satisfaction) and as that which belongs to it as a de facto totality. The origin of the Dionysian is the consciousness of the absence of suffering in a reality whose totality demands its production. The Dionysian affirmation of life, or the affirmation of life as such, does not stop at the limit of the mere acknowledgment of suffering as that which belongs to life. The affirmation of life produces suffering necessarily. The Dionysian brings into life that which is not (suffering) so as to affirm the totality of life. Pain, sacrifice, terror, destruction, and the like act as stimuli of the overflowing feeling of life producing them:<sup>15</sup>

Yes, what is Dionysian? . . . Where must the opposite [to the *yearning for beauty*] and chronologically earlier yearning have originated, the *yearning for the ugly*, the earlier Hellene's good severe will towards pessimism, towards the tragic myth, towards the image of everything fearful, evil, enigmatic, destructive, disastrous at the basis of existence—where must tragedy have originated? Perhaps in *joy*, in strength, in overflowing health, in an excess of abundance?<sup>16</sup>

If that is the case, what are the implications of the fact that Dionysian suffering is that absence made into presence in reality for the interpretation of the Dionysian within the history of Christianity? Insofar as the Dionysian forms the starting point of the history of pessimism, the Dionysian itself lacks any historical understanding of itself. For, as the beginning of a history yet to be, the Dionysian cannot foresee itself within such history. The result is that all historical understating of the Dionysian depends totally on later answers to the problem of pessimism, since such answers possess what the Dionysian lacks, that is, a retrospective view of the Dionysian. From here it follows that the belonging of the Dionysian to an order other than that of history makes the Dionysian susceptible to alternative interpretations that manipulate its original meaning of suffering. In addition, in view of its initial otherness as the origin of its later historical identity, the Dionysian cannot be said to belong to the order of morality either as evil or as good. For the initial oneness of the Dionysian locates it outside the binary logic of good and evil, according to which both good and evil are mutually dependent.

Thus, once introduced to the dialectics of good and evil, the Dionysian necessarily loses its initial extramoral character. As will be detailed, the later moral Platonic-Christian meaning of suffering attributes to the Dionysian affirmation of life the identity of evil, insofar as it attributes to itself the identity of the good. Within Platonic-Christian morality, the Dionysian is transformed into evil in view of its affirmation of life. I mentioned that the affirmation of life as such produces suffering; thus, if suffering is said to be evil, then that which produces suffering (the Dionysian) is evil. To summarize, the Dionysian, which does not know of its (later) other, exists outside the morality of good and evil;<sup>17</sup> and the location of the Dionysian within the morality of good and evil ends necessarily in interpreting the Dionysian as evil.

But the concept of evil with which Platonism refers to the Dionysian is distinct from that of Christianity. On the one hand, Plato's view is that the Dionysian is evil, producing suffering in the form of pure

*illusion* on the stage of tragedy. For Christian slave-morality, on the other hand, the Dionysian is that evil producing suffering as *reality*. Accordingly, it is not the true or untrue nature of the Dionysian that unites the Platonic and the Christian. The third section of this chapter will argue that the unity of these two is inherent in their own inner matter and will attend in greater detail to the different ways in which the Dionysian becomes evil for Platonism and Christianity taken together and separately. But for now, the crucial point is that the Dionysian *Weltanschauung* itself does not mark any limits between reality and the tragic stage. In *The Birth of Tragedy*, Nietzsche expresses this idea in his view of the chorus as the essence of Dionysian tragedy:

*Tragedy emerged from the tragic chorus* and was originally only the chorus. . . . of satyrs, of creatures of nature who live on as it were ineradicably behind all civilization and remain eternally the same. . . . The profound Hellene . . . who has directed his acute gaze down into the middle of that fearful swirling compulsive process of annihilation . . . and is in danger of longing for a Buddhist negation of the will finds consolation in this chorus. . . . The ecstasy of the Dionysian state, with its annihilation of the . . . usual limits and barriers of existence, contains for its duration a *lethargic* element in which all past personal experience is submerged. And so this chasm of oblivion separates the world of everyday reality from that of Dionysian reality. However, as soon as that everyday reality returns to consciousness, it is experienced for what it is with disgust: an ascetic mode which negates the will is the fruit of this condition.<sup>18</sup>

The chorus is on the stage and outside it, being both actor and spectator. This state of being between creates the possibility of exiting everyday Apollonian dream-reality and returning back to reality with a Buddhist asceticism to be overcome in a new Dionysian *Weltanschauung* of reality. The constancy of this view in the late Nietzsche is revealed, first, in Nietzsche's departure from the location of the Diony-

sian in the framework of its dialectics with the Apollonian. This dialectics is captured by the early idea of the entrance of the chorus into the Dionysian tragedy and its exit to another as another reality. Second, in view of his artist's criticism of art as seen from the viewpoint of the spectator, Nietzsche paints the totality of life as tragically Dionysian and as artistically Dionysian. In this way, the affirmation of the illusory culminates in its becoming the *only reference* to truth: "We have abolished the real world: what world is left? The apparent world perhaps? . . . But no! *With the real world we have also abolished the apparent world!*"<sup>19</sup>

### The Problem of Socrates

For Nietzsche, Socrates constitutes the "turning point"<sup>20</sup> from Greek Dionysian tragedy to what I want to call Greek Christianity, that is, to Plato as a Christian before Christianity.<sup>21</sup> If the turning point at which Nietzsche's Socrates is located is one *in between* Dionysian tragedy and Christianity—as possibly Dionysian tragic and not tragic, and as possibly Christian and not Christian—does this mean that Nietzsche's Socrates is extrahistorical? And if that is correct, could one think of this extrahistorical character of Nietzsche's Socrates as that which constitutes the basis for the possibility of the shift in the history of Christianity from Dionysian tragedy to Platonic Christianity?<sup>22</sup>

These questions highlight the significance of Socrates for Nietzsche's history of Christianity. Indeed, Nietzsche's attitude toward Socrates is a focal point of his thought and reflects his views of reason and morality as well as the image of man he envisaged.<sup>23</sup> And as this history revolves around the meaning of suffering, the figure of Nietzsche's Socrates should be approached in relation to the meaning of Socrates's suffering, or the meaning of his death. What is at stake here is the question of the unity of the life and death of Nietzsche's Socrates as seen from the viewpoint of the death of Socrates. This is the unity in which the life of Socrates acquires some meaning in accordance with the meaning attributed to suffering in his death.

Socrates is a philosopher. He is in fact the philosopher par excellence.<sup>24</sup> And in relation to tragedy, Nietzsche gives the following definition of the philosopher as such in *The Twilight of the Idols*, just before he opens the chapter “The Problem of Socrates”: “Can an ass be tragic?—To be crushed by a burden one can neither bear nor throw off? . . . The case of the philosopher.”<sup>25</sup> Nietzsche’s question is rhetorical. He is asserting here that the philosopher as such is an ass, and this is how he cannot be tragic—he cannot be crushed by a burden one can neither bear nor throw off. Nietzsche is positing a contrast between philosophy and tragedy. Additionally, his question “can an ass be tragic?” or, to put it otherwise, “can a philosopher be tragic?” speaks of the philosopher’s attempt to become tragic. From here it also follows that something seems to forbid the philosopher from becoming tragic.

This contrast between philosophy and tragedy points in the direction of Socrates, or more precisely the Socrates of *The Birth of Tragedy*, where Nietzsche criticizes Socrates’s attempts in the field of tragedy.<sup>26</sup> To grasp the meaning of the problem of Socrates the philosopher as a case of an impossible tragedian, the following proposition is useful: what forbids the philosopher as such from becoming tragic is that which makes of the philosopher an ass. Nietzsche’s denotes the philosopher as an ass not to refer to his wisdom as foolish, but rather as “unwisdom.”<sup>27</sup> Besides that, Nietzsche’s characterization of the philosopher as an ass is meant to refer to the yoke or burden that the philosopher carries, as the ass does. In *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Nietzsche refers to wisdom and burden using this same vocabulary: “Brave, unconcerned, mocking, violent—thus wisdom wants us: she is a woman and always loves only a warrior. Ye say to me, ‘Life is hard to bear.’ But why would you have your pride in the morning and your resignation in the evening? Life is hard to bear; but do not act so tenderly! We are all of us fair beasts of burden, male and female asses.”<sup>28</sup>

Nietzsche instructs us that the philosopher is an ass in view of bearing the burden of life. And the burden of life is the burden of suffering: life is hard to bear. Likewise, Socrates the philosopher goes on car-

rying this burden if he does not “believe . . . in a god who could dance,”<sup>29</sup> if he does not believe in Dionysus. Thus, when Socrates the philosopher dies, his death is the death of an ass. *The death of Socrates the philosopher is not a tragic death.* For Nietzsche, the problem of Socrates is the problem of suffering. And the answer that philosophy gives to this problem keeps the burden on the back of the philosophical ass until his nontragic death. That which forbids the philosopher as such from the possibility of being tragic lies in the meaning that philosophy gives to the problem of Socrates, to his suffering, to his illness, and to his death, as a nontragic answer.

For Nietzsche, the problem of philosophy, in connection with the question about the meaning of suffering, is that of the meaning which philosophy *attributes* to the death of Socrates the philosopher. From the perspective of the history of Christianity, Socrates is the turning point from Dionysian tragedy to Christianity insofar as Socrates is the *place* in which a new meaning of suffering, as an alternative to the tragic one, is made possible. Socrates makes Socratism possible.<sup>30</sup> If the death of Socrates is the culmination of the life of Socrates, then the unity of Socrates’s life and death constitutes the phenomenon whose interpretation gives birth to the Platonic-Christian meaning of suffering. This implies that Socrates the man, his life and death, is otherworldly in the sense that it does not belong to the history of Christianity in itself. Socrates is not given to historical understanding as he is and as what he is. Socrates can belong to the history of Christianity in a double form, and only in this double form: as Platonic, which is to say as interpreted by Plato, and as the sign that this interpretation refers to.<sup>31</sup>

This explains how Nietzsche’s figure of Socrates the man is out there, and it is different from its interpretation:

Socrates exercised fascination: he seemed to be a physician, a saviour. Is it necessary to go on to point out the error which lay in his faith in “rationality at any cost”?—It is self-deception on the part of philosophers to imagine that by making war on *décadence* they

therewith elude *décadence* themselves. . . . Socrates was a misunderstanding: *the entire morality of improvement, the Christian included, has been a misunderstanding.* . . . To have to combat one's instincts—that is the formula of *décadence*.<sup>32</sup>

Socrates was no physician and no savior. And interpreting him in this way is self-deception and a misunderstanding. Here appears the gap between Nietzsche's Socrates the man and the subsequent *optimistic* interpretation of Socrates. The truth is, Nietzsche says, the *wisdom* in Socrates's decision to die is its being the right decision after being sick for a long time. For Nietzsche, this is all that truly constitutes the unity of the life and death of Socrates the man. In fact, Nietzsche describes Socrates and his fellow Athenians as decadents who are aware of their *décadence*. But Socrates's fellows and followers misunderstood his death in interpreting it as if it were resulting from the proposition "rationality at any cost." In this way the death of Socrates acquired the following (wrong) meaning:

Socrates . . . appears to us as the first man who was able not only to live according to that instinct of science, but—what is more significant by far—also to die according to it: and so the image of the *dying Socrates*, the man elevated above the fear of death through knowledge and reasoning, is the heraldic shield hung above the entrance gate to science in order to remind everyone of its purpose, namely to make existence appear intelligible and so justified.<sup>33</sup>

In connection with the misunderstanding of the meaning of Socrates's death, the unity of the life and death of Socrates is constituted by the idea that Socrates lived and died according to the instinct of science. It is said that he died as the martyr of science. The death of Socrates teaches rationality at any cost, even at the price of death, and therefore this death is martyrdom, or *testimony* to the idea that Socratic rationality is the sal-

vation from the state of sickness from which Socrates and his fellow Athenians suffered.

Nietzsche asks: “Did he himself [Socrates] grasp that, this shrewdest of all self-deceivers? . . . He said softly to himself: ‘death alone is a physician here. . . . Socrates himself has only been a long time sick.’”<sup>34</sup> Here, Nietzsche seems to be asking: to which party does Socrates himself belong? Does he belong to Nietzsche’s side? Did he himself grasp the gap between himself (that is, Nietzsche’s Socrates the man, being sick for a long time and for whom death alone is a physician)<sup>35</sup> and his misunderstanding? If that is the case, Nietzsche thinks that he should have kept this truth to himself, that he should have said it softly to himself. Nietzsche is not sure whether Socrates’s Socrates is Nietzsche’s Socrates. Nietzsche is unsure whether the problem of Socrates is Nietzsche’s own problem,<sup>36</sup> whether Socrates himself knew the Nietzschean truth of his own death or whether he had deceived himself and misunderstood himself in the same way that the Athenians misunderstood him. For it could be the other way around; Socrates may be keeping his secret from Nietzsche: “What is the meaning of all science anyway, viewed as a symptom of life? . . . Is the scientific approach perhaps only a fear and an evasion of pessimism? . . . And in moral terms, something like faint-heartedness and falsehood? In amoral terms, a sly move? O Socrates, Socrates, might this have been *your* secret? O most secret ironist, might this have been your—irony?”<sup>37</sup>

Up to this point, Nietzsche’s truth about the death of Nietzsche’s Socrates includes the following: it is not a tragic death, it is not martyrdom, and its true meaning remains a secret. Besides that, this death becomes meaningless after Nietzsche disqualifies the meaning so far attributed to it as misunderstanding. The meaninglessness of the death of Nietzsche’s Socrates implies that death simply ended the life of a suffering, sick man called Socrates. Nietzsche evokes continuity between the meaninglessness of the death of Socrates and his life as a sick man. As such, the life of Socrates becomes meaningless.

It is clear that the unity of the life and death of Socrates attained through the meaninglessness of his death produces a gap between his *simple* death and his celebrated scientific life. Accordingly, in keeping with the interpretation of Socrates's life and death from the viewpoint of his death, there remains the possibility of bridging the gap between Socrates's celebrated life and his simple death by way of considering his death a matter of *pure accident*. But Socrates was subjected to a trial for something wrong he did in his life. Socrates went to his death with courage and without fear. The death of Socrates was not inevitable but the choice of an ass to unburden itself: "once he had been summoned before the forum of the Greek state, only one form of sentence was imperative—exile. . . . But that a sentence of death rather than one of exile only was passed seems to have been brought about by Socrates himself, with complete clarity and without the natural horror in the face of death."<sup>38</sup>

The death of Socrates is a simple fact but cannot remain so. Rather, it should have an interpretation. The previously mentioned misunderstanding of Socrates's death is the only interpretation Nietzsche offers. Nietzsche, who cannot penetrate the secret of the ironic Socrates, cannot provide an alternative, *meaningful* interpretation of this death. Thus, Nietzsche concludes that the death of Nietzsche's Socrates is an act of tyranny: "Socrates *wanted* to die—it was not Athens, it was *he* who handed himself the poison cup, who compelled Athens to hand him the poison cup."<sup>39</sup> The fact remains that Socrates's death, rather than his life, *demand*s an interpretation. Nietzsche has no alternative interpretation. The misinterpretation of Socrates does not necessarily belong to Nietzsche's Socrates the man; and yet, it is what this man demanded in the form of a tyrannical dictation.<sup>40</sup>

From the moment of his death until Nietzsche, Nietzsche's Socrates *determines* the history of Christianity as a history of misunderstanding. This is exactly the significance of Nietzsche's Socrates as a turning point in the history of Christianity. Nietzsche's Socrates the man does not belong to Dionysian tragedy. The unity of this man is meaningless. In

addition, as one following Dionysian tragedy and as meaningless, this unity turns the history of Christianity from Dionysian tragedy to Platonic Christianity in its dictation of the Platonic-Christian misunderstanding as its only possible interpretation.

There are two assertions to be made at this point. First, the Nietzschean history of pessimism departs from Socratic science in the same manner in which it departs from Dionysian tragedy. Second, Socratic science does not belong to the Platonic Christian in its totality. These two affirmations imply that despite the Platonic-Christian appropriation of Socratic science, science remains a possible identity of Nietzsche's modern Antichrist, alongside that of the Dionysian. This possibility is grounded in conceiving the life of Socrates apart from his death. When Socratic science is extracted from the context of the problem of suffering, as revealed in the death of Socrates, science can still be thought outside the problem of suffering. Thereby, it is freed from its one and only (tyrannical) interpretation.

Nietzsche does try to reveal science in its original form in the context of the problem of Socrates. I shall discuss his attempt to reconstruct this original character of science, as one parallel to Dionysian tragedy and from the Christian tradition. Nietzsche reads in the Bible what I call paradisiacal science.<sup>41</sup> For the moment, I am assuming that Nietzsche realizes such a task on the basis of the fact that Socrates remained a secret for him, since Nietzsche never quite resolved his preoccupation with Socrates as both a thinker and a personality.<sup>42</sup> Yet, Socratic science and science in paradise have something in common. Both Socrates, as a sign, and Socratic science remain extrahistorical. Socratic science is original in relation to its (misunderstanding) interpretation. Similarly, insofar as science in paradise is prehistorical, it is given as extrahistorical. It is original in relation to its later historical interpretation by the negation of priesthood. Thus, for Nietzsche, if a hermeneutic of the Platonic text does not render the revelation of the original Socratic science possible, a hermeneutics of the Bible seems to render such an original form of science possible.

## Plato: A Christian Before Christianity

That Socrates has functioned as the turning point from the life-affirming Dionysian tragedy to the life-negating Platonic Christianity does not necessarily imply that Platonism and Christianity are identical in the way that each of them negates life. I have already mentioned that Platonism is at odds with the Dionysian in view of its production of evil as pure illusion, while for Christianity the Dionysian is the evil production of suffering as reality. For Nietzsche, though, “the fight against Plato or, to speak more clearly and for ‘the people,’ the fight against the Christian-ecclesiastical pressure of millennia—for Christianity is Platonism for ‘the people’—has created in Europe a magnificent tension of the spirit the like of which has never yet existed on earth.”<sup>43</sup> Platonism and Christianity are identical when taken to be Nietzsche’s enemies, but they differ according to the public they address (or educate): Platonism addresses the philosophers and Christianity addresses the people. Is Nietzsche’s characterization of Platonism and Christianity as his enemies meant to refer to some common ground uniting them? Nietzsche adds that:

The ancient theological problem of “faith” and “knowledge” . . . or, more clearly, of instinct and reason . . . this is still the ancient moral problem that first emerged in the person of Socrates. . . . [who] found. . . [that] one must follow the instincts but persuade reason to assist them with good reasons. . . . Plato . . . wanted . . . to prove to himself that reason and instinct of themselves tend toward one goal, the good, “God.” And since Plato, all theologians and philosophers are on the same track—that is, in moral matters it has so far been instinct, or what the Christians call “faith,” or “the herd,” as I put it, that has triumphed. . . . Reason is merely an instrument.<sup>44</sup>

For Nietzsche, as for Nietzsche’s Socrates, reason is an instrument in the hands of the instincts.<sup>45</sup> And it is from this perspective that the

Platonic truth and the Christian faith are instincts. And, as different from Nietzsche (and Socrates), both Platonism and Christianity conceive of reason as tending with the Platonic instinct (truth) and with the Christian instinct (faith) toward the same goal, toward the good God. And if the goal of the Platonic instinct is identical with that of the Christian faith, then those two can be said to be identical. How, then, does it happen that the same Platonic-Christian instinct (the instinct of the herd) is elevated to truth in Platonism, while being baptized as faith in Christianity? Does this remaining difference between truth and faith point to any substantial difference between Platonism and Christianity beyond their reduction?

To further elaborate on this issue, it must be clarified how reason becomes an instrument for the Platonic instinct (as truth) as well as an instrument for the Christian instinct (as faith). Nietzsche provides the following insight into this question: "Christianity. . . knows that it is itself a matter of absolute indifference whether a thing be true, but a matter of the highest importance *to what extent* it is believed to be true." Through reason, one seeks to bring one's instinct toward "*happiness*," or, to bring it to meet its goal (the good God in the cases of Platonism and Christianity). But the way sought to bring the instinct as faith to meet its goal is other than the way sought to bring the instinct as truth to meet this same goal: "Truth and the *belief* that something is true . . . [are] two completely diverse worlds of interest, almost *antithetical* worlds—one gets to them by fundamentally different roads." It is *feeling* that differentiates these two roads. In Platonism, only reason brings the instinct as truth to *know*, or meet its goal. In Christianity, it is *primary* feeling, the feeling that something is true, which brings the instinct to meet its goal. Thus, Christianity becomes theology (that is, turns to use reason as its instrument) only after its instinct meets its goal in feeling. In addition, if it is "*belief* as such which is necessary above all else, then one has to bring reason, knowledge, inquiry into disrepute: the road to truth becomes the *forbidden* road." In this moment, Nietzsche adds, faith substitutes the subsequently adopted road of knowledge with the road of

hope: “*hope* is a much stronger stimulant to life than any single instance of happiness which actually occurs.”<sup>46</sup>

But it has been said that the Platonic instinct is identical to the Christian one. If that is the case, how does it happen that the Platonic instinct remains “satisfied” with reason as its only instrument to know its good God, while the Christian instinct turns to hope as an alternative instrument after reason? As Nietzsche anticipates in the above passage, Christianity’s world of interest is not truth at all; for it is belief as such that is necessary above all else. In addition, reason, as an instrument, can also serve instincts other than the Christian one. And as reason is *dialectical*, such other instincts, once they come to confront the Christian instinct, may make their inquiry into actuality and thereby refute the Christian instinct’s claim to truth (to truth as that which results from using the instrument of reason). Thus, the Christian faith turns to hope: “Sufferers have to be sustained by a hope which cannot be refuted by any actuality—which is not *done away with* by any fulfillment: a hope in the Beyond.”<sup>47</sup>

If Platonic philosophy did not assume the common essence of reason and instinct, it could have never become popular in Christianity. For then Christianity would have had to identify Platonic reason as an instrument, and not as truth identical to its faith. On this same basis, it follows that if Christianity had not made this same assumption, Christianity could never have become Platonic. It is then on the basis of the idea of the instrumentality of reason that Nietzsche conceives of the unity of Platonism and Christianity as one based on their agreement upon the idea of the common essence of reason and instinct. This includes the common identity of the Platonic instinct with the Christian one. How does Nietzsche come to construct this identity? I will assume, for the moment, that what constitutes the essence of the Christian faith, for Nietzsche, is the formula “god on the cross.”<sup>48</sup> This formula puts Christianity’s answer to the problem of suffering as follows: suffering is good, suffering is divine. Suffering is the way to salvation in the other-world. The Christian faith then negates life although

it affirms suffering. It does not affirm suffering for itself (it does not affirm life as suffering), but instead affirms suffering with the purpose of affirming the other-world, and thereby negates this-world.

Platonism shares this conception only in part. On the one hand, the common ground of Platonism and Christianity is the negation of life as suffering, as it is presented in the idea of the possibility of overcoming this-world's suffering in the other-world's salvation. On the other hand, insofar as Platonism approaches the problem of suffering in a way different from the way in which Christianity approaches it, Platonism, unlike Christianity, does not attribute any positive value to suffering. I shall seek to prove this claim by referring to Nietzsche's evaluation of Plato's thought on the problem of suffering. Nietzsche says that "judgments, value judgments concerning life, for or against"—whether those of Socrates and Plato against life or those of Nietzsche for life—"can in the last resort never be true: they possess value only as symptoms, they come into consideration only as symptoms—in themselves such judgments are stupidities."<sup>49</sup> The value of these judgments may concern the historian of philosophy or the cultural physician as symptoms of culture's state of health. And in the case in which these judgments are the thought of the problem of suffering, that is, seen as a problem in the value of life, Nietzsche—as a historian or as a physician—turns to examine the possibility that the thinker of such judgments, who "stood—*had* to stand—in . . . [a] negative relation to life," is a decadent.<sup>50</sup>

The mention of Socrates here together with Plato is completely coherent with the discussion of Socrates above, in terms of the possibility of reading the life of Nietzsche's Socrates—that is, science—as being one outside the Platonic dialogue.<sup>51</sup> The case here concerns Plato's thought only and does not concern Nietzsche's Socrates the man. It is the case of Socrates insofar as Socrates is Platonically interpreted, that is, Socrates according to the "*consensus sapientium*"<sup>52</sup> between Socrates and Plato, or philosophy as a tradition, extending before and after Plato, spelling the truth of the person of Plato, or his own instinct: "I, Plato, *am* the truth."<sup>53</sup>

The consensus of wise men of which Nietzsche speaks here is nothing but the instinct of Plato made, by Plato, into the truth. And for Nietzsche, Plato—like Socrates—was born into Greek culture in its late, sick stage. For Nietzsche, this stage demands the acceptance of the option of death as its only proper conclusion. And this, precisely, was Socrates's option.<sup>54</sup> But Plato's option was different. In addition to his view of life as problematic, Plato suggests transcending this-life by way of turning to an alternative world, a turn for which this-life should be corrected. To correct this-life, or to live a good life, is to live the life of the Platonic philosopher, namely, according to the teaching of the Platonic moral metaphysics of good and evil. The Platonic moral metaphysics instructs us to live this-life as body and soul, making the body a slave of the teleology of the experience of the soul. In such a moral metaphysics, this-life of the soul is the experience of recollecting its earlier knowledge in the other-world toward its return to that world, or the world of pure forms (truth, goodness, beauty, and so on): “[The soul] is pure when it leaves the body and drags nothing bodily with it, as it has no willing association with the body in life, but avoided it and gathered itself together by itself and always practiced this, which is no other than practicing philosophy in the right way, in fact, training to die easily. Or is this not training for death?”<sup>55</sup>

The chains and the cave, namely, the body and this-world, become unavoidable evils in face of the possibility that the philosopher dies easily. If easy death means to suffer death less, and if this good death is the end of good life, then good life is easy life, to suffer life less, to live life less: “The soul of the true philosopher thinks that this deliverance must not be opposed and so keeps away from pleasures and desires and pains as far as he can; he reflects that violent pleasure or pain or passion does not cause merely such evils as one might expect, such as one suffers when one has been sick or extravagant through desire, but the greatest and most extreme evil, though one does not reflect on this.”<sup>56</sup>

This-life, as given, is not a mere obstacle before the true end of the good life of the philosopher's soul. This-life, if lived more than “the less”

it should be lived as good life, is the *cause* of the greatest and worst of all evils. Platonic philosophy defines this-life's suffering as pure evil. The Platonic view of suffering, of life as suffering, is different from the view of Dionysian tragedy, whose response to pessimism affirms suffering in its affirmation of life as suffering. Furthermore, this view is different from the view of the Christian faith, which places suffering in the framework of its dialectics of salvation. Platonism gives suffering a negative value according to which nothing good can be attributed either to this-life as given or to suffering, whether those taken alone or together.

What explains the negative character of this-life's evil from Plato's perspective is the way in which Platonic philosophy approaches the problem of suffering. Platonism's approach to the problem of suffering is not direct, but instead starts with the question of how happiness is possible. Plato's "doctrine of identity (happiness = virtue = knowledge). . . . [has the] right way of life . . . [as one that] want[s] happiness, [it does not turn] away from happiness."<sup>57</sup> This Platonic formulation of the possibility of the good life as one that does not ignore (turn away from) happiness, or does not turn happiness into a problem, approaches the problem of suffering negatively, or as the lack of happiness.

The opposition between Dionysian tragedy and Platonic philosophy is a late construction. Dionysian tragedy and Platonic philosophy approach pessimism—the question of the value of life as suffering—from two different points of view. The Dionysian approaches pessimism from the viewpoint of the problem of suffering, ignoring the meaning of happiness, while Platonism approaches the same question from the viewpoint of the problem of happiness, ignoring the meaning of suffering. Happiness for the Dionysian and suffering for Platonism are empty, negative concepts. As such, they lack that content which may place them as terms of an opposition.

The picture of this first encounter changes as soon as Platonism asks: if this-life as suffering is meaningless evil—or good-less evil—what would then be the meaning of that which attributes a (positive) meaning to suffering? It is through this questioning ("Plato's question about

the moral meaning of art”)<sup>58</sup> that Plato conceives of tragic art, and of art in general, as the pessimist alternative and Weltanschauung opposite to his optimism:

If you reflect, first, that the part of the soul that is forcibly controlled in our private misfortunes and that hungers for the satisfaction of weeping and wailing, because it desires these things by nature, is the very part that receives satisfaction and enjoyment from poets, and, second, that the part of ourselves that is best by nature, since it hasn't been adequately educated either by reason or habit, relaxes its guard over the lamenting part when it is watching the suffering of somebody else. . . . I suppose that only a few are able to figure out that enjoyment of other people's suffering is necessarily transformed to our own and that the pitying part, if it is nourished and strengthened on the suffering of others, won't be easily held in check when we ourselves suffer.<sup>59</sup>

This opposition between philosophy and tragic poetry, which Plato claims to be in continuity with the “ancient quarrel” between philosophy and poetry and which Nietzsche claims to be a Platonic construction, is extended to the opposition between philosophy and art in general as a third level of reality.<sup>60</sup> This enmity between philosophy and art concerns the practical (or the moral) aspect of reality.

The insight into the opposition between Platonism and Dionysian tragedy as a Platonic construction shows how Nietzsche's proposition “*Dionysus versus the Crucified*”<sup>61</sup> cannot be fully understood without understanding his conception of Plato as a Christian before Christianity. It is true, as has been previously argued, that the Christian faith goes beyond Platonism in attributing a dialectically positive value to suffering. This addition can explain the opposition between Dionysus and Christ in view of the end that each of these parties pursues through their affirmation of suffering. Were Dionysus and Christ taken without reference to Platonism, the opposition between them should be under-

stood as one between the Dionysian affirmation of suffering for this-world and the Christian affirmation of suffering for the other-world. But such a formulation does not explain how Christ opposes *the Dionysian as art*. It is only after Nietzsche holds Plato to be a Christian that the Dionysian continues to be art within the opposition of Dionysus versus the Crucified. Here, Nietzsche's insight into the historical continuity between Platonism and Christianity becomes highly relevant:

1. The real world, attainable to the wise, the pious, the virtuous man—he dwells in it, *he is it*. (Oldest form of the idea, relatively sensible, simple, convincing. Transcription of the proposition “I, Plato, *am* the truth.”)

2. The real world, unattainable for the moment, but promised for the wise, the pious, the virtuous man (“to the sinner who repents”). (Progress of the idea: it grows more refined, more enticing, more incomprehensible—it *becomes a woman*, it becomes Christian.)<sup>62</sup>

The attainability of the presence of the other-world in which Plato dwells is lost in Christianity. The real world in which Plato lives as his own actual world becomes, in Christianity, a promised future, a hope, a belief in a reality to be. The Christian faith is Plato's instinct as hope. The transformation of Plato's instinct in the Christian belief in the real world to be is the transformation of the kind of certainty matching the possibility of the real world. Plato's *knowledge of his real world* as good is transformed into the Christian's *feeling of her this-world* as sinful.<sup>63</sup> And as soon as Platonic truth becomes Christian hope, it acquires its Christian dogmatic character as eternal, that is, as “Egyptianism. . . and monotonous-theism.”<sup>64</sup>

The transformation of the actuality of the real world, or Plato's instinct, into a promised future in Christianity speaks of the ultimate divorce of Christianity's real world from all actuality. For Christianity, this-world turns into the totality of all actuality. Hence, while Platonism can

approach suffering from the actual, being the other-world, Christianity approaches it from the actual, being this-world. And as for Christianity, this-life as given is nothing other than this-life as suffering; Christianity answers the question of the value of life as suffering when suffering itself, and not its alternative good life, is what constitutes its primary object.

If all this is correct, aside from Platonism the common ground of the Dionysian and Christianity is their direct encounter with the question of suffering. This direct encounter demands that suffering should be given an immediate meaning. For the Dionysian affirmation of life, life is good; and if life is good, and if life is life as suffering, then suffering is good. For the Christian dialectical negation of life, the other-life is good; and if the other-life is good, then the not-other-life (or this-life) is (dialectically) good; and if the not-other-life is this-life as suffering, then suffering is good. Suffering is the condition of salvation. The Nietzschean opposition is one between Dionysius and Christ and not one between Dionysius and Plato; and yet, Platonism plays an integral role in the construction of this opposition. Platonism attributes to suffering the identity of Dionysian art. Once Christianity inherits this definition from Platonism, Christianity cannot perceive suffering as something emerging from the mere given sensible world. Instead, suffering results from the affirmation of this-world as a human construction.

## 2.

### FROM JUDAISM TO CHRISTIANITY

#### Early Judaism

Nietzsche's pre-Christian history includes Judaism as a second path leading to Christianity, in parallel to the Greek one. Nietzsche's historical conception of Judaism results in the division of Judaism into three phases: the biblical era (or Early Judaism), the second temple era (or Priestly Judaism),<sup>1</sup> and Diaspora Judaism.<sup>2</sup> This division derives from Nietzsche's "anti-anti-Semite"<sup>3</sup> spirit (following his distancing from Wagner and Schopenhauer).<sup>4</sup> Nietzsche's family and personal history offers explanations as to why Nietzsche identified strongly with the Jewish minority in his culture and why Jewish-Christian relations in nineteenth-century Germany are central to an understanding of Nietzsche's thought.<sup>5</sup> In addition, Nietzsche's identification with European Jews constitutes an essential part of his antinational, anti-German, "Good European" spirit.<sup>6</sup> Evidence of this spirit is found in his abandonment of German for French heroes, which accompanied his break with the anti-Semitic, and later Christian, Wagner.<sup>7</sup>

In the following reconstruction of Nietzsche's pre-Christian history, I shall pay attention to Nietzsche's treatment of the first two phases of Judaism.<sup>8</sup> My locating of Judaism within Nietzsche's history of

Christianity follows the dual claim that Nietzsche's conception of Judaism cannot be considered in isolation from the rest of his philosophy and that his view of the Jewish question can only be attained from within his general philosophical framework.<sup>9</sup>

The parallels established here between ancient Greek religion and Early Judaism follow the claim that Nietzsche's conception of Early Judaism is a Dionysian one.<sup>10</sup> Comparisons of these two early religions can be made on this basis. The parallelism between the Greek and the Jewish paths to Christianity is not merely formal; it touches, instead, the content of these two religions. From the start, Nietzsche characterizes Early Judaism in the same terms in which he characterizes ancient Greek religion, in terms of a religion of thankfulness:

A people that still believes in itself still also has its own God. In him it venerates the conditions through which it has prospered, its virtues—it projects its joy in itself, its feeling of power on to a being whom one can thank for them. He who is rich wants to bestow; a proud people needs a God in order to *sacrifice*. . . . Within the bounds of such presuppositions religion is a form of gratitude. One is grateful for oneself: for that one needs a God.—Such a God must be able to be both useful and harmful, both friend and foe—he is admired in good and bad alike.<sup>11</sup>

Here, again, it is the feeling of thankfulness that governs religion in its original form. Here, again, the feeling of thankfulness results from one's feeling of satisfaction from a life of joy. And once again, the thankfulness to God is an affirmative answer to the question about the value of life, insofar as this question emerges on the basis of man's consciousness of self-finitude. Despite its self-satisfaction, Early Judaism knows that it does not embrace the totality of its life. Hence, it cannot venerate itself, in that it needs its own God through which it projects its joy in itself. As such, Early Judaism is also similar to ancient Greek religion in being a stage beyond the stage in which life is absolute in its being

immediate. Accordingly, Early Judaism forms the second starting point for the Nietzschean history of Christianity, reflecting on the question of the value of life.

The kind of projection that creates symmetry between the people of God and the people's God is not alien to Greek religion.<sup>12</sup> The point is that the creation of divinity—emerging in Early Judaism as it does in Greek religion—contains the idea that the human is too small to deserve thanks, that the experience of this early Jewish joy of life cannot be conceived in terms of the immediacy of life anymore. The Jewish and Greek feeling of satisfaction is overwhelming to the degree that man cannot be thought to be as man is, and in turn, life cannot be thought to be immediate. It is through man's projection of himself in God that man is elevated to the level of divinity. According to this same line of thought—which understands the emergence of religion on the basis of man's finitude—Nietzsche explains the emergence of religion as such in terms of error:

The metaphysical need is not the origin of religions, as Schopenhauer supposed, but merely a *late offshoot*. Under the rule of religious ideas, one has become accustomed to the notion of “another world (behind, below, above)” —and when religious ideas are destroyed one is troubled by an uncomfortable emptiness and deprivation. From this feeling grows once again “another world,” but now merely a metaphysical one that is no longer religious. But what first led to a positing of “another world” in primeval times was not some impulse or need but an *error* in the interpretation of certain natural events, a failure of the intellect.<sup>13</sup>

Nietzsche's claim that religion is not a need but an erroneous interpretation of nature actually points to the failure of early religious man to grasp nature, and only nature, as the totality of man's world. This view of early religion, in its attempt to grasp the totality of life as one referring to another world beyond this-world (a partial world), is a

view that has already departed from the view of the immediacy of life and therefore that posits the question of the value of life before itself. Nietzsche adds that religion cannot be a metaphysical need. If it were such, it should be said to be inherent in man as such, to be natural. But religion is a product of history and remains historically produced. It does not emerge before man loses the immediacy of life, and it does not appear before man has attained the conditions that put the value of life into question.

Likewise, early religion's interpretation of nature as another-world does not necessarily imply that early religion holds the totality of the world comprising nature and the other-world as two parts that complement each other. The case of Early Judaism shows that early religion's error consists in the projection of man and nature onto God. In the context of Early Judaism, the abundance of man's life results in the emergence of man's failure to identify man as man, nature as nature, and life as life. It is also manifest in man's projection of these results in a concept of a *natural* God:

Originally, above all in the period of the Kingdom, Israel too stood in a *correct*, that is to say natural relationship to all things. Their Yaweh was the expression of their consciousness of power, of their delight in themselves, their hopes of themselves: in him they anticipated victory and salvation, with him they trusted that nature would provide what the people needed—above all rain. Yaweh is the God of Israel and *consequently* the God of justice: the logic of every nation that is in power and has a good conscience about it. These two aspects of a nation's self-affirmation find expression in festival worship: it is grateful for the great destiny which has raised it on high, it is grateful towards the year's seasons and to all its good fortune with livestock and husbandry.<sup>14</sup>

If Yahweh is Early Judaism's God, then Early Judaism is a monotheistic religion. I mentioned that Nietzsche criticizes the claim for the

eternity of the one truth, its duration over time, its “monotono-theism.”<sup>15</sup> Yet Nietzsche’s positive evaluation of Early Judaism does not contradict his negative criticism of monotheism. The object of Nietzsche’s criticism is not the idea of the oneness of truth. Instead, as the difference between the terms “monotheism” and “monotono-theism” shows, Nietzsche’s criticism concerns the validity of the oneness of the (Platonic-Christian) truth over time. After Nietzsche’s modern genealogical consciousness, such a claim cannot be further supported.<sup>16</sup> In this light, Nietzsche’s description of Early Judaism’s ritual worship of its God as a reflection of nature’s seasonal cycles is highly significant to the understanding of Nietzsche’s positive appraisal of the Jewish God, despite its idea of monotheism. This last quotation of Nietzsche, as well as the one above relating to Early Judaism as a religion of thankfulness,<sup>17</sup> indicates that Nietzsche conceives of Early Judaism’s concept of God as a *natural* concept reflecting the totality of life: “The concept of power, whether of a god or of a man, always includes both the ability to help and the ability to harm. Thus it is with the Arabs; thus with the Hebrews. Thus with all strong races.”<sup>18</sup>

God reflects life as experienced in its totality, life in its good and bad circumstances. God is both good and bad, friend and foe. God is referred to in the good and in the bad: *God is one*. Nietzsche’s idea of natural monotheism—the conception of the one God as the reflection of the experience of life as *one* totality—remains similar to Greek polytheism, following its idea of plurality as expressed in the plurality of feelings with which the one and the same deity is addressed. It may be objected here that the monotheist Jewish concept of God differs from Greek polytheism in that it does not embrace plurality as plurality, but as totality. In view of the fact that the natural Jewish God reflects nature in its seasonal cycle, it should be replied that this totality is not absolute. This totality is bound to locality and nativity: “All honor to the Old Testament! I find in it great human beings, a heroic landscape, and something of the very rarest quality in the world, the incomparable naïveté of the *strong heart*; what is more, I find a people.”<sup>19</sup>

For Nietzsche, the early Jewish “Nationalgott” represents the same ideal that the early native God of the Greek polis (“*deus autochthonus*”) represents: Nietzsche’s conception of Early Judaism is similar to his conception of ancient Greek religion as a religion of thankfulness.<sup>20</sup> In the context of this parallelism, Early Judaism’s conception of *its* one God is the first affirmative answer to the question of the value of life on the path leading from Judaism to Christianity.

The terms of this comparison between ancient Greek religion and Early Judaism raise the following question: Does Nietzsche see Early Judaism continuing on the same trajectory as ancient Greek religion? If ancient Greek religion gives birth to Dionysian tragedy, does Early Judaism also do the same? Nietzsche answers: “*tragedy*—an art form and a pleasure that have remained essentially and profoundly foreign to the Jew, in spite of all poetic gifts and his sense for the sublime.”<sup>21</sup>

Here one notes the clarity and the element of comparison that these words of Nietzsche entail, showing that Nietzsche was aware of this question. This awareness demonstrates his latent conception of the parallelism between the Greek and the Jewish paths to Christianity, which this work aims to reconstruct. Thus, one can determine that the Dionysian in Early Judaism remains bound to the poetical and the sublime in the Old Testament: “In the Jewish ‘Old Testament,’ the book of divine justice, there are human beings, things, and speeches in so grand a style that Greek and Indian literature have nothing to compare with it. With terror and reverence one stands before these tremendous remnants of what man once was. . . . —the taste for the Old Testament is a touchstone for ‘great’ and ‘small.’”<sup>22</sup>

### Priestly Judaism

The transformation of Judaism in Christianity is not progress but regression.<sup>23</sup> What is more, Priestly Judaism, as a stage between Early Judaism and Christianity, is a regression from Early Judaism. But in

contrast with the regression of the history of Christianity through its Greek path from ancient Greek religion to Platonic philosophy, this regression remains in the frame of the trajectory of Judaism as religion. This regression does not involve art or philosophy in the manner that the Greek history involves Dionysian tragedy and Platonism. In what context, then, does Nietzsche conceive the regression from Early Judaism to Priestly Judaism? The following discussion shall show that Nietzsche's genealogy of the priest as such composes the history of this regression, which is defined in terms of the inversion of the natural values of noble-morality in the unnatural values of slave-morality.

The fact that this inversion takes place within Judaism does not yet mean that the subject of concern here is the Jewish priest as being Jewish. Instead, and in keeping with the above claim that Nietzsche's conception of Judaism should not be isolated from the general framework of his philosophy, the Jewish priest is meant to represent the priest as such, insofar as the Jews are, by definition, "a priestly people."<sup>24</sup> Put in these terms, the task of describing Nietzsche's genealogy of the priest is the task of accounting for the genealogy of the Jewish people as a priestly people. This task could be approached through Nietzsche's account of the Jewish experience, which makes its regression to unnatural values possible:

The Jews—a people "born for slavery," as Tacitus and the whole ancient world say; "the chosen people among the peoples," as they themselves say and believe—the Jews brought off that miraculous feat of an inversion of values, thanks to which life on earth has acquired a novel and dangerous attraction for a couple of millennia: their prophets have fused "rich," "godless," "evil," "violent," and "sensual" into one and were the first to use the word "world" as an opprobrium. This inversion of values (which includes using the word "poor" as synonymous with "holy" and "friend") constitutes the significance of the Jewish people: they mark the beginning of the slave rebellion in morals.<sup>25</sup>

The Jews possess a dual identity. First, their external-objective identity refers to them as a people born for slavery. Second, their internal-subjective identity refers to them as the chosen people among the peoples. This dual identity of the Jewish people refers to them as both masters and slaves at once. As the chosen people among all peoples, the Jews are nobles; they possess the noble "*pathos of distance*."<sup>26</sup> And being born for slavery, they are slaves. If that is the case, the genealogy of this dual identity points to the genealogy of the conditions according to which the priest as such is prepared to constitute the turning point for the inversion of the values of noble-morality into slave-morality: "The priestly mode of valuation can branch off [easily] from the knightly-aristocratic and then develop into its opposite; this is particularly likely when the priestly caste and the warrior caste are in jealous opposition to one another and are unwilling to come to terms."<sup>27</sup>

The starting point is the division of the aristocracy itself. This division between the priestly and the knightly aristocracies leads the priestly caste in the direction of creating a new, opposing mode of valuation. With this, the terms of an opposition without the possibility of conciliation are there. But why *should* the new priestly mode of valuation specifically lead to slave-morality? In opposition to the "powerful physicality"<sup>28</sup> of the knightly aristocracy affirming life in this-world, the priestly caste is in a state of physical "impotence"<sup>29</sup> that does not allow it to affirm itself in this-world. The priestly caste then occupies the position of the impotent hateful slave: "It is because of their impotence that in them hatred grows to monstrous and uncanny proportions, to the most spiritual and poisonous kind of hatred."<sup>30</sup>

Yet, the occupation of the position of the slave does not guarantee the possibility of creating the values of slave-morality. If it is the case that "the noble, powerful, high-stationed and high-minded. . . . [who out of their] *pathos of distance* . . . seized the right to create values and to coin names for these values,"<sup>31</sup> then becoming a slave means losing all capacity to create values. I recall though that the (Jewish) priest continues to hold together with this new external-objective identity of the

slave the old internal-subjective identity of the noble chosen people. In these same terms, and insofar as the Jews are “the most notable example”<sup>32</sup> of a priestly people in human history, the priest is still empowered with his noble capacity to create values.

So far, the priestly noble mode of evaluation and the priestly slave impotent hatred are the two sources for the constitution of slave-morality. But in turning to examine the priestly noble mode of evaluation, Nietzsche directs his negative criticism toward the priest already at the early stage in which the priest still belongs to the nobility: “There is from the first something *unhealthy* in such priestly aristocracies.”<sup>33</sup> Nietzsche’s criticism of the priest as unhealthy concerns the results of the priestly evaluation as one defined in terms of purity and impurity:

“Pure” and “impure” confront one another for the first time as designations of station; and here too there evolves a “good” and a “bad” in a sense no longer referring to station. . . . “Pure” and “impure” . . . were rather at first incredibly uncouth, coarse, external, narrow, straightforward, and altogether *unsymbolical* in meaning to a degree that we can scarcely conceive. . . . On the other hand, to be sure, it is clear from the whole nature of an essentially priestly aristocracy why antithetical valuations could in precisely this instance soon become dangerously deepened, sharpened, and internalized; and indeed they finally tore chasms between man and man.<sup>34</sup>

This criticism of the implications of priestly evaluation stands in the context of the Nietzschean comparison of the noble evaluation in terms of good and bad with the priestly evaluation in terms of pure and impure as two parallel forms of noble evaluation. Nietzsche claims that good and bad originate from the noble’s reference to himself as good and to the common plebeian as bad.<sup>35</sup> In parallel, the priestly “pure” and “impure” terms of evaluation originate in the same way in which the terms “good” and “bad” originate. However, Nietzsche’s negative view of pure and impure corresponds to the moment subsequent to their

birth. Pure and impure, like good and bad, are subjected to the “rule that a concept denoting political superiority always resolves itself into a concept denoting superiority of soul.”<sup>36</sup> The political points here to the reality that keeps the concept tied to the empirical as its denotation. Besides that, the soul, or the psychological (*seelisch*), points to a later stage in which the concept is freed from its subordination to the empirical by way of its denotation of an inner reality.

Accordingly, in the second psychological stage good and bad lose their original political status and become hegemonic. Good and bad enter into a stage in which the concept of the good comes to denote the speaking I on the basis of its mere speech as I. Additionally, the concept of the bad comes to denote what this same speaking I has as its not-I. The case at this second stage is one in which I and good constitute one inseparable unity; for here, the speaking I is not in the position in which it can choose to use this concept of good and drop another. Here, good and bad form language and language is the language of good and bad.

On the other hand, the priestly pure and impure remains tied to the priest’s *practice* of purity. As such, language loses the validity of its denotation of the priest’s psychology. The priest, in referring to this psychology through the practice of purity, loses all possible contact with political reality. The priests, says Nietzsche, “tore chasms between man and man.”<sup>37</sup> But in what way does the *negatively* presented chasms between man and man differ from the *positively* presented pathos of distance? The chasms here are between man and man living, first, in one mode of political reality—or, later, one mode of psychological reality—and the priest living in a second reality. The chasms between man and man mean the chasms between this-world of man and the other-world (of practice) of the priest. The chasms between man and man correspond to an order other than that of the pathos of distance. The latter refers to the distance between the good man and the bad man. Against this, the chasms between man and man refer to the difference between the *ascetic* pure priest and this-world’s man: between the good man of

good and bad and the good man of good and evil.<sup>38</sup> Or better, if the good man of good and bad is evil, then the chasms between man and man are chasms between good and evil.

For Nietzsche, the dynamic of pure and impure is a dangerous ground: “With the priests *everything* becomes more dangerous . . . but it is only fair to add that it was on the soil of this *essentially dangerous* form of human existence, the priestly form, that man first became *an interesting animal*, that only here did the human soul in a higher sense acquire *depth* and become *evil*.”<sup>39</sup> To understand the meaning of Nietzsche’s allusion to depth and evil here, it is necessary to analyze good and evil by relating them to the priestly slave’s impotent hatred as the second source for the constitution of slave-morality. It can be assumed that the priest acquires the impotent hatred of the slave once the priest acquires the latter’s sociopolitical status. Despite becoming a slave, the priest, as an ex-noble, is equipped with the capacity to create values. The priest, being a priest, is a practitioner of purity. Thus, once the priest acquires the hatred of the slave through the acquisition of the sociopolitical status of the slave, this hatred becomes empowered with new values following the logic of the practice of purity.

The result of this transition is that the slave’s hatred loses its earlier impotence *only* in the sphere of language. On the one hand, the slave’s hatred remains impotent in the sphere of action, while, on the other hand, the slave becomes empowered with the capacity of the priest to create values in the sphere of language. The resulting gap between the acquired potency in language and the remaining impotence in action becomes the background upon which the priest’s logic of pure and impure acquires significance. The model of the priest’s practice of purity becomes that which defines the slave-priest partnership’s mode of action. Insofar as the sphere of the practice of purity is one beyond the reality of this-world, and insofar as the priest-slave action cannot take place in this-world, such action occupies the sphere of the pure. In other words, its sphere becomes that of the future, of the other-world, or better, of both: of the day of judgment, the day in which hatred shall be

resolved in *acting* justice that cannot be acted here and now. In this context, *ressentiment* becomes the basis for the constitution of slave-morality:

The slave revolt in morality begins when *ressentiment* itself becomes creative and gives birth to values: The *ressentiment* of natures that are denied the true reaction, that of deeds, and compensate themselves with an imaginary revenge. While every noble morality develops from a triumphant affirmation of itself, slave morality from the outset says No to what is “outside,” what is “different,” what is “not it-self”; and *this* No is its creative deed. This inversion of the value-positing eye—this *need* to direct one’s view outward instead of back to oneself—is of the essence of *ressentiment*.<sup>40</sup>

On the basis of Nietzsche’s discovery of *ressentiment* as the source of the genealogy of the morality of good and evil, the following paragraphs advance the claim that this genealogy comes to define the history of the problem of suffering as *the teleological history of suffering humanity*. My starting point is an analysis of the definition that Nietzsche gives to the good in the domain of slave-morality. Specifically, Nietzsche writes, “the wretched alone are the good; the poor, impotent, lowly alone are the good; the suffering, deprived, sick, ugly alone are pious, alone are blessed by God, blessedness is for them alone.”<sup>41</sup> In view of this definition of the good, it is suffering *alone* that becomes the center of human life. For, if this good mirrors the life of the slave, and if the existence of the slave depends on the negation of everything else,<sup>42</sup> then suffering alone defines the value of life.

Then, in slave-morality, the question of the value of life from the viewpoint of the problem of suffering takes a new form. Here, suffering is not seen as an integral part of life where the affirmation of the totality of life results in the affirmation of suffering (as in Dionysian tragedy). Moreover, suffering here is not seen as an unwanted part of life that philosophy seeks to avoid (as in Platonism). In contrast with these two perspectives, slave-morality equates the value of life with the

value of suffering. Slave-morality's question is not about the value of life from the point of view of suffering. Slave-morality's question is much more direct: it is one about the value of suffering. As such, as soon as suffering becomes the good (that is, becomes the value of life *par excellence*), the value of life is the value of suffering, such that life is good insofar as it is a life of suffering.

The context within which slave-morality conceives of suffering life is that of teleological history. How? The practice of the purity of the priest opens up the possibility of living this-life in the other good world of the priest: the possibility of the experience of this-life, which is good in view of its denotation of the I of the priest, and which is also other(-world) to this-world in view of its divorce from the political and psychological realities of this-world. If that is correct—if some experience of life beyond this-life is possible—and if this-life is suffering, then suffering is not the condition of the totality of life. In addition, if this-life of suffering and the other-life without suffering are both good, then the good in this-life (suffering) is connected somehow to the good of the other-life. Since this-life is negated, the direction of the totality of life leads from this-life to the other-life. Accordingly, the good of this-life is the sign of the good of the other-life. Suffering is the condition of salvation. And so, the teleological history of suffering is the history of the suffering good man beginning with his *fall* at the hands of evil man and ending with the redemption of the good man and the punishment of evil man in a life beyond this-life, or beyond history.

If this-life is suffering and if this-life is history, then history is the condition of suffering, and therefore, overcoming history is the condition for the overcoming of suffering. Yet, I claimed above that this history is not just the history of suffering, but the history of suffering *humanity*. How can this claim be true? First, to be clear, humanity refers to the noble and the slave as the sum of the human agencies behind the making of this history. As such, suffering in this history is no longer that of the Dionysian man's *own* pain, no more the Dionysian viewpoint that lacks, as the Dionysian sees suffering, the capacity to see the hidden

suffering of the slave.<sup>43</sup> In this view, this history is not the history of mere humanity, but that of suffering humanity. But does this not contradict the fact that slave-morality sees suffering as what belongs to the slave alone, that slave-morality excludes the noble from the “gift” of suffering, and therefore cannot be said to delimit its definition of the history of humanity to suffering? Such an objection remains true only insofar as the noble is still to be seen as the external other of the slave. But, for Nietzsche, the case of the history of suffering humanity is not one about the suffering of the slave and the noble as the mere sum of humanity comprising these two as two atomic agencies external to each other. Instead, the suffering of humanity is the suffering of the priest in whom the human is born. The priest is the being-together (not the synthesis) of the noble and the slave as the one embracing agency that creates the history of suffering.<sup>44</sup> When the priest’s slave-morality accuses the noble of being evil, slave-morality actually accuses the human, or the priest, insofar as the priest is both aristocrat and slave. In sum, the one body of the priest becomes the body of the human, which has the noble—being the agent of evil—*inside* it. The moment in which the will to power becomes historical is the moment in which the will turns against itself. In this domain, evil and depth are discovered as objects of hatred:

[New Christian] love grew out of it [Jewish hatred] as its crown, as its triumphant crown spreading itself farther and farther into the purest brightness and sunlight, driven as it were into the domain of light and the heights in pursuit of the goals of that hatred—victory, spoil, and seduction—by the same impulse that drove the roots of that hatred deeper and deeper and more and more covetously into all that was profound and evil.<sup>45</sup>

In so belonging to this order, they belong to the order to which slave-morality’s *ressentiment* says no. This is the order of slave-morality’s “‘outside,’ what is ‘different,’ what is ‘not itself.’”<sup>46</sup> But if the profound and the outside belong to the same order, then evil is not simply the evil of

the aristocrat standing there outside. To avoid the apparent contradiction of the belonging of the inside (that is, depth) and the outside to the same order, this order may simply be called the order of the different. Evil is deep and depth is evil. The genealogy of the human, described above, is the priest as both aristocrat and slave. Man is both good and evil, both superficial and deep. If the history of man is the history of man's suffering, and if suffering is good, then the evil lying in the depth of man is prehistorical. Evil is the starting point of the history of the suffering man. What is this starting point in terms of slave-morality? Slave-morality, in the example of the Jewish priest (in the example of Christianity's history of suffering humanity), has this origin, where man's *original sin* lies deep in man's evil nature.

### Science in Paradise

Slave-morality's constitution of the teleological history of suffering humanity, in which evil becomes the depth of man as such, bears two important consequences. First, the unity of good and evil, as revealed in the genealogy of slave-morality in the type of Jewish priest (being the human), becomes the ground for slave-morality's creation of what I want to call the *independent economy* of sin and punishment in the sphere of morality.<sup>47</sup> With the internalization of aristocratic evil in the depth of the good slave, slave-morality conceals, once and forever, the genealogy of slave-morality in the reactive *ressentiment*, and thereby conceals the traces of the aristocrat in external reality. This concealment gives the whole dynamics of slave-morality the possibility of becoming independent of the need to make any further reference to all external reality. Slave-morality comes to express itself in terms of sin toward a universal punishing God, guilt, bad conscience, and so forth.<sup>48</sup> Second, Nietzsche's genealogical uncovering of slave-morality's manufacture of evil into man's original sin provides the basis for his attempt to rescue the original form of science from underneath the concept of the original sin. My claim at this juncture is that Nietzsche's anti-Christian strategy is geared

toward providing the modern Antichrist with the identities of the origins, which his genealogy uncovers.

On the Greek path to Christianity, Dionysian art constitutes such a possible identity. On the Jewish path to Christianity, which proceeds in parallel to Dionysian tragedy, what has been made into man's original sin—once reevaluated into its earlier form and content—becomes a second possible identity of Nietzsche's modern Antichrist. I have claimed that Nietzsche fails to rescue an independent positive picture of science through his reading of the life of Socrates. In what follows, I shall show how Nietzsche takes up this task again in his attempt to read science from the story of the fall of man in the Bible's Book of Genesis. Thus, Nietzsche retells his own story of the original sin in *The Antichrist* as follows:

At the beginning of the Bible . . . the old God, all "spirit," all high priest, all perfection, promenades in his garden: but he is bored. Against boredom . . . he invents man. . . . But behold, man too is bored. . . . Consequently God created woman. And then indeed there was an end to boredom. . . . "Woman is in her essence serpent, Heva"—every priest knows that; "every evil comes to the world through woman." . . . "Consequently, science too comes to the world through her." . . . What had happened? . . . Man himself had become God's *greatest* blunder; God had created for himself a rival, science makes *equal to God*—it is all over with priests and gods if man becomes scientific! *Moral*: science is the forbidden in itself—it alone is forbidden. Science is the *first* sin, the germ of all sins, *original* sin. This alone constitutes morality.—"Thou shalt *not* know"—the rest follows.<sup>49</sup>

To better appreciate the uniqueness of this unfolding image of science in paradise, it is worth stating above all that for Nietzsche, it is something other than modern science. Nietzsche has modern science emerging in the face of the problem of suffering. In continuity with

slave-morality's Weltanschauung, modern science recognizes suffering within the bounds of the teleological history of suffering humanity. It does so with the purpose of overcoming suffering, which raises modern science beyond the independent economy of sin and punishment, but also keeps modern science tied to asceticism.<sup>50</sup> Contrary to this vocation of modern science, paradisiacal science does not think suffering as such. It thinks suffering, that is, distress, from the viewpoint of boredom, or in view of boredom being the only kind of distress found in every paradise.

For Nietzsche, an environment where boredom flourishes is the ideal laboratory of science; it is science's paradise. The boring paradise becomes the ideal environment for the end of *priestly* religion. Nietzsche says that God, the priest, and man are equal before boredom. Nietzsche is actually measuring man as God, as priest, and as man before suffering. It is only man, *in becoming woman*, who is able to overcome boredom. Man as woman does not overcome boredom in the sense of eliminating boredom; instead, man makes of boredom the ideal environment for man's science as man's entertainment. This triumph of man is based on man becoming man and woman, and not man becoming man and God or man and priest. In becoming man and woman, man overcomes boredom through science. Of no less importance, man does not need to *copy* himself. Man does not need to re-create himself in the images of God, the priest, and man. Science is the fruit of man becoming man and woman; it is the fruit of man becoming different from himself as man; and, in turn, it is that which makes man's reflection, man's self-image as priest, superfluous.

The interpretation I am offering here emphasizes Nietzsche's idea of man's self-sufficiency. Man's consciousness of finitude does not need to necessarily lead to man's reflection of himself in the image of the priestly God. For Nietzsche, man is rich enough so as to project from himself a plurality other than the singularity of finitude, and thereby to be able to meet the problem of finitude with the proper answer to it.

With the idea of man's consciousness of finitude in paradise, the emergence of science in paradise meets the same condition according to which Greek religion and Early Judaism emerge. Besides, paradisiacal science possesses the same kind of pessimism that Dionysian tragedy possesses. Paradisiacal science emerges on the basis of man's suffering boredom, insofar as boredom is man's (only) distress in paradise. Man in paradise encounters the problem of pessimism, facing the question of the value of life from the point of view of suffering. In addition, as was the case in Dionysian tragedy, paradisiacal science is man's affirmative answer to the question of the value of life as suffering. For man does not simply negate boredom, and (the boring) life together with it, but instead creates from boredom the ideal ground for the emergence of science: "the sound conception of cause and effect" as man's affirmative answer to the question of pessimism.<sup>51</sup>

So far, paradisiacal science joins Dionysian art both as a second source for the affirmation of life and as another possible identity of Nietzsche's modern Antichrist. But the comparison between paradisiacal science and Dionysian art can be further extended. Paradisiacal science acquires the deep identity of evil through priestly religion, in the same way Dionysian art acquired this same identity through Platonism. If Dionysian art is Platonism's evil, and if Priestly Judaism constitutes the example of priestly religion, then paradisiacal science is Priestly Judaism's evil. In accordance with this line of comparison, Nietzsche's task toward the restoration of the original identity of science (for the modern Antichrist) ends at the limits of his uncovering of science in its original state. Here, Nietzsche continues to clarify the genealogical process according to which science is deprived of its paradisiacal reality. And this is also the process through which science becomes prepared to acquire its modern form.

The fact that the priest views science as evil makes it necessary to reexamine how Nietzsche sees the connection between knowledge and the Fall as it appears in the Bible.<sup>52</sup> Science is man's original sin, insofar as science provides man with the self-sufficiency according to which man

is emancipated from any need of the services of the priest. Accordingly, the *reactive defensive* response of the priest to the challenge of science is depriving man from the paradise of boredom, which is the condition of science: "Happiness, leisure gives room for thought—all thoughts are bad thoughts. . . . Man *shall* not think."<sup>53</sup>

Nietzsche here claims that the priest's outrage against science comprises two elements. First, "the 'priest in himself' invents [*erfindet*] distress, death, the danger to life in pregnancy, every kind of misery, age, toil, above all *sickness*."<sup>54</sup> This is the reality of that kind of suffering which substitutes for paradisiacal reality and which does not allow man to practice science. Second, the priest provides man on earth with an inverted meaning of suffering: the original sin (paradisiacal science) is the cause of man's suffering. And as this suffering is God's punishment, grace, redemption, or forgiveness constitute man's way of overcoming suffering:

[In] accordance with . . . [the priest's] logic—"sin." . . . The concept of guilt and punishment, the entire "moral world-order," was invented *in opposition to* science. . . . Man shall *not* . . . look prudently and cautiously into things in order to learn . . . he shall *suffer*. . . . And he shall suffer in such a way that he has need of the priest at all times. . . . The concept of guilt and punishment, including the doctrine of "grace," of "redemption," of "forgiveness," . . . [was] invented to destroy the *causal sense* of man: they are an outrage on the concept cause and effect!<sup>55</sup>

Yet these two elements are one and the same thing. When Nietzsche says that the priest in himself invents suffering, he does not mean that the calamities invented by the priest (distress, death, age, sickness, and so on) did not exist in paradise. Nietzsche's point is that the priest discovers in these calamities the possibility of inventing a new value of suffering. And since these calamities exclude boredom, science can cause suffering—or be man's original sin—insofar as for science, boredom is the totality of suffering and thereby is not defined in relation to these

calamities. Paradisiacal science may fight these calamities, but since this science does not define these calamities but rather boredom as its object, science may be categorized as evil. Accordingly, to invent these calamities is to invent—in view of paradisiacal science—their earliest possible meaning, and this is the meaning that the priest was the first to give to them.

To make this point clearer, I want to add here that the opposition between paradisiacal science and priestly religion is distinct from that which exists between modern science and the Christian religion (being the culmination of priestly religion). With respect to the latter opposition, modern science approaches the problem of suffering from that angle which has as its object the calamities invented by priestly religion, with the purpose of overcoming them. The difference between modern science and priestly religion concerns their view of the cause of these calamities. As such, this difference extends to their view of the praxis demanded for the overcoming of these calamities. On the one hand, modern science holds the historical man, and only the historical man, to be the cause of these calamities. Accordingly, modern science attempts to uproot these calamities by overcoming the historical sociopolitical conditions of these calamities. On the other hand, priestly religion conceals what modern science uncovers. Specifically, priestly religion conceals this historical sociopolitical dimension behind an independent economy that makes the individual man responsible for man's misfortune and salvation. And in view of its doctrine of the fall of man, priestly religion may see modern science's approach to the problem of suffering as falling short of providing man with true salvation from suffering. Priestly religion cannot see modern science as evil causing suffering, but only that it works within the limitations set by man's evil. For priestly religion, paradisiacal science alone is the cause of evil. For paradisiacal science alone approaches the problem of suffering having boredom as its object, and it is on this basis that the original essence of paradisiacal science may be manipulated and be made into evil.

This does not mean that modern science is the end of religion. According to Nietzsche's broad definition of science as "the sound conception of cause and effect,"<sup>56</sup> modern science does not seem to escape this definition. Nonetheless, the end of priestly religion effected by modern science is essentially different from its end on the terms offered by paradisiacal science. Modern science marks the end of priestly religion in the overcoming-preservation of its object and objective (wherein suffering is conceived of as the invented calamities and the elimination of these is conceived of as history) in the form of science. Paradisiacal science, on the other hand, can mark the end of priestly religion as its absolute opposition, as that whose object and objective (suffering being boredom and its elimination as entertainment) do not provide the ground needed for their conciliation. In sum, paradisiacal science does not meet the conditions that both priestly religion and modern science meet. In opposition to these two, paradisiacal science, insofar as boredom defines its object and objective, remains incompatible with the meaning of suffering within the history of suffering, the meaning of suffering that priestly religion and modern science share.

To conclude, the priest's invention of life's calamities as the meaning of suffering is the process according to which paradisiacal science is deprived of its paradisiacal reality and attributed the value of evil. Nietzsche's text indicates how the process of the priest's outrage at paradisiacal science prepared science for the acquisition of its modern form.<sup>57</sup> In view of the fact that this process culminates in God's decision to drown man,<sup>58</sup> I propose the following hypothesis. After the Deluge man does not become extinct, man survives; and in this way post-paradisiacal science acquires the characteristics of the survivor. Under these conditions, science cannot work in the framework of the abundance of paradisiacal reality, which, being abundant, allows science to conceive of suffering as boredom. In becoming a survivor, science cannot avoid thinking the reality of calamities invented by the priest as the true object of the problem of suffering. Accordingly, the modern revival of science

carries within it the genealogy of the survivor. For Nietzsche, this genealogy finds its expression in the modern idea of *self-preservation*.<sup>59</sup>

### The Legitimacy of the Antichrist

The name of the Antichrist is a name that Nietzsche (and Co.) proclaims to himself: “we immoralists and anti-Christians.”<sup>60</sup> This being so, I argue that Nietzsche’s anti-Christian strategy seeks to equip the modern Antichrist with the identities of the origins that his genealogy uncovers. Two things are implied by this claim. First, Nietzsche gives logical priority to the Antichrist over Dionysus. Second, despite the priority attributed to it, the Antichrist is legitimized through the Dionysian being an origin. In favor of the first point, Nietzsche’s own words, in his later self-criticism in *The Birth of Tragedy*, speak very clearly:

My instinct at that time turned itself *against* morality with this questionable book, as an instinct speaking on behalf of life, and invented for itself a fundamental counter-doctrine and counter-evaluation of life, a purely artistic, an *anti-Christian* one. What should it be called? As a philologist and man of words I baptized it, not without a certain liberty—for who knows the true name of the Antichrist?—with the name of a Greek god: I called it the *Dionysian*.<sup>61</sup>

This passage points very strongly to the intrinsic relationship connecting the Antichrist with Dionysus. Nietzsche’s Antichrist cannot be read without reference to his Dionysus, and vice versa. Nietzsche refutes the validity of that interpretation of Nietzsche which reads the “anti-” alone, namely, Nietzsche’s anti-Platonism, and dismisses the Dionysian. It also refutes the validity of the counter-interpretation that reads the Dionysian (“differentiated affirmation”) alone and dismisses the Antichrist. Against this background, I take on the challenge of clarifying the significance of the relationship between the Antichrist and Dionysus. Moreover, insofar as Nietzsche used Dionysus in order to

have a direct counter to Christ,<sup>62</sup> I want to add to Salaquarda's view and suggest that the Antichrist is prior to Dionysus in view of Nietzsche's reference to the seeking of his nameless anti-Christian instinct for a name.<sup>63</sup> This name is the Dionysian.<sup>64</sup>

The name is secondary in relation to the instinct. Yet, Nietzsche says that his selection of such a name was not made without a certain liberty: the Dionysian as the name of Nietzsche's anti-Christian instinct is not absolutely arbitrary. Nietzsche's account of the ascetic ideal in the *Genealogy of Morals* underlines the *degree* of liberty that Nietzsche allows himself in the attribution of this name to his anti-Christian instinct:

It will be immediately obvious that such a self-contradiction as the ascetic appears to represent, "life *against* life," is, physiologically considered and not merely physiologically, a simple absurdity. It can only be *apparent*; it must be a kind of provisional formulation, an interpretation and psychological misunderstanding of something whose real nature could not for a long time be understood or described as *it really was*—a mere word inserted into an old gap in human knowledge. Let us replace it with a brief formulation of the facts of the matter: *the ascetic ideal springs from the protective instinct of a degenerating life* which tries by all means to sustain itself and to fight for its existence; it indicates a partial physiological obstruction and exhaustion against which the deepest instincts of life, which have remained intact, continuously struggle with new expedients and devices. The ascetic ideal is such an expedient.<sup>65</sup>

What really matters, here as before, is the instinct. It is the *deep instinct of life* that seeks to appear through a name that may be arbitrary. It may be objected that the Antichrist in Nietzsche's anti-Christian instinct is also nothing more than a name, insofar as anti-Christian is only the adjective of Nietzsche's deep instinct. This may be true. Yet even if the Antichrist is only a name, it cannot be divorced from the Dionysian;

and it is still prior to the Dionysian as a later, freer name. The real significance of this last quotation from Nietzsche's analysis of the ascetic ideal is that it shows the degree to which Nietzsche was not free to adopt the name Dionysus for his anti-Christian instinct. The Dionysian enjoys the depth through its location at the origins of the Nietzschean history of Christianity.

If the Nietzschean hermeneutics of the Antichrist consists of relying on the Antichrist as the place in which the Christian text negates itself, the remaining task is to use the liberty that this text allows and to decide the name of the Antichrist insofar as this text does not spell out the name of the Antichrist.<sup>66</sup> But this liberty is constrained by the need for an origin that can mediate the depth of the anti-Christian instinct. As such, the idea of origin becomes a source of the legitimization of the Antichrist. This thesis appears to be at odds with the claim that, for Nietzsche, genealogy "opposes itself to the search for origins."<sup>67</sup> It is highly persuasive that, in this instance, genealogy does not "confuse itself with a quest for [Christianity's] . . . 'origins.'"<sup>68</sup> The origins of Christianity have been shown to be "something altogether different" [from the] . . . timeless and essential secret<sup>69</sup> of the concept of the good of slave-morality. The accident, to use Foucault's words, of the historical division of the aristocracy, discussed above in this chapter, was the basis for the emergence of this concept. Furthermore, it is obvious that the Nietzschean genealogy is, from the beginning, destructive in its nature: the historical knowledge it makes "is not made for understanding; it is made for cutting."<sup>70</sup>

We are reminded that the origins of Christianity's slave-morality are not merely accidental but also reactive. From here, there remains the possibility that *beyond* destructive genealogy there exists the Dionysian origin to which slave-morality reacts.<sup>71</sup> I have shown so far not only that Nietzsche's genealogy destroys the metaphysical origins of Christianity, but also that its revelation of the Dionysian origin underneath the history of the fragile modern body—to borrow again from Foucault—is an integral part of genealogy. In fact, Nietzsche was more than aware

of the limits of destructive genealogy. Thus, he sought to complete this shortcoming of genealogy by his turn to (Jesus's) Buddhism.<sup>72</sup>

If that is the case, the following question arises: Why does the Antichrist need such legitimacy at all? In calling its destroyer Antichrist, Christianity gives to the Antichrist the negative term of its relation to the Antichrist and preserves the positive term for itself. Against this, Nietzsche's genealogy of slave-morality uncovers this morality as reactive. I have shown that Nietzsche's achievement lies, above all, in illuminating Dionysian art and paradisiacal science as that against which slave-morality reacts. On this basis, if the Antichrist remains dependent on its definition by Christianity as "anti-," it throws into oblivion the positive origin that Nietzsche's genealogy reveals, and thereafter remains bound to Christianity as its mere negative counterpart. Under such circumstances, the Antichrist becomes reactive, insofar as Christianity becomes the only source from which the Antichrist can be read. Alternatively, once the Antichrist assumes the original identities of art and science, the Antichrist dissolves its negativity. Here, Christ is remembered as anti-Dionysian, and therefore the Antichrist becomes the anti-anti-Dionysus: the Antichrist is the return of the unquestionably active Dionysus.

This state of affairs explains the indispensability of the origin of the Antichrist's identity for its legitimacy as active. And although the New Testament prophesizes that the Antichrist shall *come* in the future, Nietzsche does not leave the Antichrist dependent on such a prophecy alone. Thus, the end of Nietzsche's strategy is not about bringing the Dionysian itself; it is rather one about reformulating the coming of the Antichrist as a return. Consequently, it is necessary to dissect the claim that Nietzsche's legitimization of the modern Antichrist—by making reference to the Dionysian as origin before Christianity—follows the steps of Paul's legitimization of the Christian faith by making reference to the faith of Abraham as origin before the Jewish law.<sup>73</sup>

Paul argues for the legitimacy of the Christian faith with reference to the already established legitimacy of the Jewish law. This is the

legitimacy of righteousness as that through which the grace of God is attained.<sup>74</sup> Since the legitimacy of righteousness through the law is based on heritage, the relationship of both the Jewish law and the Christian faith with such a heritage becomes the site for Paul's legitimization of the Christian faith (as against that of the Jewish law): "Are they Hebrews? so am I. Are they Israelites? so am I. Are they the seed of Abraham? so am I."<sup>75</sup> The legitimacy of Paul's faith is the legitimacy of the first seed, that is, of Abraham. This is not the legitimacy of Paul's voice as a born Jew but rather as a new Hebrew, a new Israelite; for Paul extends the boundaries of grace beyond his blood relationships.<sup>76</sup> In this way, he states: "What shall we say then that Abraham our father, as pertaining to the flesh, hath found? For if Abraham were justified by works, he hath whereof to glory; but not before God. For what saith the scripture? Abraham believed God, and it was counted unto him for righteousness."<sup>77</sup>

Christianity (New Israel) can be legitimized, as faith, through the original faith of Abraham. Hence, the Christian faith becomes the promise: "For the promise, that he should be the heir of the world, was not to Abraham, or to his seed, through the law, but through the righteousness of faith."<sup>78</sup> In sum, the idea of Abraham as origin grounds the legitimacy of Paul's Christian faith. As such, the Christian faith is not the negative term of the Jewish law: "Seeing it is one God, which shall justify the circumcision by faith, and uncircumcision through faith. Do we then make void the law through faith? God forbid: yea, we establish the law."<sup>79</sup>

The authority of the faith of Abraham is dependent upon its historical appearance before the law: "Know ye therefore that they which are of faith, the same are the children of Abraham. And the scripture, foreseeing that God would justify the heathen through faith, preached before the gospel unto Abraham, saying, In thee shall all nations be blessed."<sup>80</sup> Yet for Paul, the fact that the Jewish law precedes the Christian faith historically does not mean that the Jewish law does not make the law void and establish the faith of Abraham. Instead, "the covenant,

that was confirmed before of God in Christ, the law, which was four hundred and thirty years after, cannot disannul, that it should make the promise of none effect.”<sup>81</sup> The Jewish law is the temporal negation of Abraham’s faith: “before faith came, we were kept under the law, shut up unto the faith which should afterwards be revealed.”<sup>82</sup>

The Dionysian legitimization of Nietzsche’s Antichrist follows the same logic of legitimization as Paul’s. If the Christian faith appeals to the origin as its legitimizing source, the relationship of Christ and the Antichrist with the idea of the origin becomes the site for Nietzsche’s legitimization of the Antichrist (as against that of Christ). If slave-morality has been discovered to be reactive to the Dionysian, the site of the origin does not belong to the faith of Abraham-Paul anymore. It belongs rather to the Dionysian, and to the Antichrist as Dionysian.

### 3.

## JESUS-CHRIST AND THE TWO WORLDS OF EARLY CHRISTIANITY

### Belief and Atheism, Skepticism and Suffering

How does Nietzsche's history of Christianity continue its development toward early Christianity? Or, put otherwise: Why does the history of pessimism not remain Platonic and priestly Jewish? What (dead) ends did the Greek and the Jewish paths result in? And how did such ends come to constitute the conditions that make the emergence of the Christian faith possible? In Nietzsche's words, the relevant question is one about how such faith becomes demanded:

The faith demanded . . . by original Christianity, in the midst of a skeptical and southern free-spirited world that looked back on, and still contained, a centuries-long fight between philosophical schools, besides the education for tolerance given by the *imperium Romanum*—this faith. . . . resembles in a gruesome manner a continual suicide of reason—a tough, long-lived, wormlike reason that cannot be killed all at once and with a single stroke.<sup>1</sup>

Nietzsche describes the demand for the Christian faith as having two aspects. As seen from the perspective of the philosophically skeptical

world into which the Christian faith was born, this world demands *faith as such* as a way out from *skepticism as such*. And as seen from the perspective of the Christian faith itself, this faith is demanded (or *conditioned*) as Christian: as that specific “paradoxical formula “god on the cross.”<sup>2</sup> I advance here the main claim that the demand for the Christian faith results from the demand for faith as such. The above quotation from *Beyond Good and Evil* assumes man as human, that is, as the unsynthetic unity of the noble and the slave, which was born in the genealogy of the priest. The Christian faith is born in the moment in which faith is demanded by man as both noble and slave, insofar as Nietzsche uses a reflective language to describe this demand: he speaks of *suicide* and *sacrifice* (“a . . . suicide, . . . a sacrifice of all freedom, all pride, all self-confidence of the spirit; at the same time, enslavement and self-mockery, self-mutilation”) resulting from the (inner) conflict between the *apparent* (“the noble taste that seems to *deny* suffering”) and the *deep* (“the Orient, *deep* Orient, . . . Oriental slave”).<sup>3</sup>

Faith as such is demanded as a result of the crisis that man’s world of skepticism has reached. Yet—and against this demand—it is only the demand of the slave to spring from the deep to the apparent in the form of the specific Christian faith that represents itself as realizable. Under these conditions, the constitution of the Christian faith consists in making *suffering the condition of skepticism*. On the one hand, if the crisis of noble skepticism demands faith as such, it demands faiths and not the one specific Christian faith. On the other hand, in order to formulate its faith in apparent language, the Christian faith cannot depend on the negative general characterization that the noble skepticism’s demand for faith as such gives it. To clarify this point, I want to recall Nietzsche’s genealogy of slave-morality within noble-morality: The transformation of the concept of the bad in noble-morality into the concept of the good in slave-morality demands from the slave that he abandon the negative standpoint of the bad and assume the positive position of the priest’s narrating good self. In a similar manner, the constitution of the Christian faith demands from the suffering slave that he abandon

the negative standpoint of the object of skepticism in general and assume suffering as the positive term within the dialectics of skepticism and suffering.

In order to make suffering the condition of skepticism, the Christian faith should make sense of the claim that the noble and tolerant Greco-Roman skepticism is as skeptical about suffering as it is skeptical in general. As Nietzsche stresses above, noble skepticism is not given as skepticism about suffering. Nietzsche describes the noble position as one that is skeptical concerning suffering and as one that “seems to deny suffering.”<sup>4</sup> The noble position is skeptical and only skeptical: its skepticism has no object, and thereby neither affirms suffering nor denies suffering; but rather, as skepticism in general, it *seems* to deny the slave’s “concealed suffering.”<sup>5</sup>

To become that faith which is demanded, the Christian faith holds as true the following proposition: skepticism as such is skepticism about suffering. As soon as this proposition is held to be true, and since skepticism does not affirm suffering, skepticism becomes the denial of suffering. In continuity with this, noble skepticism is divorced from tolerance: noble skepticism becomes the *fixed* intolerance in relation to suffering, in the same manner in which the concept of the good in noble-morality became *fixed* in the concept of evil in slave-morality. And what does it mean to be intolerant of suffering in terms of the (new) language of the *Christian faith*? If skepticism is skepticism about suffering, and if the Christian faith is the faith of suffering (or the faith in the formula “god on the cross”),<sup>6</sup> then skepticism is also skepticism about the faith of suffering. Skepticism is atheism: it is not the “noble and frivolous tolerance, . . . ‘catholicity’ of faith, . . . freedom from faith, that half-stoical and smiling unconcern with the seriousness of faith.”<sup>7</sup>

The picture resulting from this state of affairs is one in which the Christian faith labels not only noble skepticism as atheism but also any faith different from it. It does so, moreover, against the background of the Christian faith’s proof of itself as that which is demanded as Christian and not as faith per se. I mentioned that when the Christian faith

comes to legitimize itself in apparent language, it has the *particular* formula “god on the cross” as its grounding moment. This way, the Christian faith excludes faiths and faith as such from the possibility of being demanded by the crisis of skepticism. In turn, as soon as the Christian faith becomes legitimated (or becomes demanded), it proves skepticism to be illegitimate together with skepticism’s possibilities, its possible demand of a plurality of faiths and of faith as such.

Nietzsche’s characterization of the slave’s Christian faith as absolute, as “unconditional, . . . tyrannical,”<sup>8</sup> results in the identity of faith with the Christian faith: the truth is faith and truth is the Christian faith. The proposition “God exists” is true insofar as the formula “god on the cross” is true, and vice versa. This identity between belief in the existence of God and belief in the formula “god on the cross” results from the fact that the Christian faith is the belief in this formula. And since this formula demands belief in the existence of God, belief in the existence of God, if taken alone, and if taken as part of any belief other than the Christian faith, is not true faith: the true belief in the existence of God should imply the belief in the formula “god on the cross.”

This interpretation of Nietzsche’s view of the advent of Christianity against the background of skepticism may be extended by examining its implications for Christianity’s conception of Judaism. It can now be added that the Christian faith deduces the following: if the commandment “love your neighbor as yourself” is fulfilled, then all the laws of the Torah are fulfilled.<sup>9</sup> I have said that the (Christian) claim to truth becomes identical to the Christian faith. Under these conditions, Christianity cannot accept the Jewish law. But according to its claim to be continuous with Judaism, Christianity should provide its own formulation of the Jewish law. Thus, Christianity can fulfill both the condition of the absolute truth of its faith and the condition of the truth of the Jewish law only by deploying love as what I want to call a minimal form of the Jewish law.<sup>10</sup> From the viewpoint of Christianity, Judaism remains one more faith other than the Christian one. Yet practically, Judaism cannot be said to be another faith. Christianity does not

recognize anything that can be called another faith: for Christianity, faith as such and the Christian faith are one and the same. Accordingly, Judaism is Christianity's *historical other*, which belongs to the order of Christianity's absolute other, or what is not Christian, or skeptical atheism: "As concerning the gospel, they [the Jews] are enemies for your sakes."<sup>11</sup>

However, I made the claim that Christianity considers skeptical atheism as evil causing suffering: the Christian faith "presupposes that the subjection of the spirit *hurts* indescribably; that the whole past and the habits of such a spirit resist the *absurdissimum* which 'faith' represents to it."<sup>12</sup> If that is the case, how does Christianity construct Judaism as a *producer* of suffering? Paul claims that sin exits with the Torah, and sin is the condition of suffering (death).<sup>13</sup> The Torah is the cause of suffering. But, if the Torah, as Torah, is the cause of suffering, then the Jewish practice of the law—as a production of suffering—may be said to maintain its specific otherness to Christianity. Such a conclusion would be true if Christianity holds the proposition that, with the absence of the law, sin and thereby suffering do not exist as a true proposition. For this proposition delimits the production of suffering to the practice of the Jewish law and therefore speaks of Judaism as being the source of suffering. But for Christianity this proposition is not true: Paul claims that sin, and therefore suffering, existed (but did not appear as sin for God) before the Jewish law.<sup>14</sup> Thus, the Jewish practice of the law should not be called Judaism, but skepticism of the truth of the Christian faith, and thereby the other atheist producer of suffering.

In the terms of slave-morality, Nietzsche conceives of the birth of the Christian faith from the crisis of noble skepticism as an inversion of the openness and plurality of the one apparent language of the good noble into the closeness and singularity of the language of the good Christian slave. This is the inversion in which the presence of the many bad unknown others of the noble is substituted by the presence of the one evil known other of Christianity. Thus, in the terms of this continuum between Christianity and Priestly Judaism, Christianity becomes the

antithesis of paradisiacal science in the same manner as Priestly Judaism. The fact remains that for Nietzsche, Platonism, Priestly Judaism, and Christianity represent one party: the party of slave morality. Nietzsche's attack on this party takes all possible forms. One of these forms is that in which Nietzsche argues against the Jewish Plato and thereby does not keep the Greek and Jewish paths to Christianity purely separated: "It has cost us dear that this Athenian [Plato] went to school with the Egyptians (—or with the Jews in Egypt?)."<sup>15</sup>

By saying this, I do not intend to fuse the Greek and the Jewish paths to Christianity. On the contrary, the division between them remains highly important for the examination of the analogies and differences between them. In this course of inquiry, and within the framework of the Greek path to Christianity, Christianity appears to be a return of Platonic dogmatism through the crisis of skepticism. How is that? I have made note of Nietzsche's claim that "skepticism concerning suffering, at bottom merely a pose of aristocratic morality, . . . seems to *deny* . . . [the slave's] abundant *concealed* suffering."<sup>16</sup> I want to add here that Nietzsche has the Pyrrhonian skeptics in mind here. As a cure from the disease of dogmatism, the Pyrrhonian suspends any judgment that goes beyond what appears and is led thereby to the ataraxia. If that is correct, the Pyrrhonian skeptic knows suffering only as it appears: the Pyrrhonian does not know concealed suffering and in turn appears to deny suffering.<sup>17</sup>

Pyrrhonian skepticism does not meet, and cannot meet, the Christian faith. Pyrrhonian skepticism does not know the slave's hidden suffering upon which the Christian faith is erected. Also, Pyrrhonian skepticism does not know the suffering that may result from the Christian faith as dogma, for the Christian faith proves itself to be salvation from suffering, that is, it brings happiness to the believer:

Psychological confusions:—the demand for belief—confused with the "will to truth" (e.g., in the case of Carlyle). But in the same way, the demand for unbelief has been confused with the "will to truth"

(—the need to get free from belief, for a hundred reasons: to be in the right against some “believers”). What inspires the skeptic? Hatred of the dogmatist—or a need for rest, a weariness, as in the case of Pyrrho.<sup>18</sup>

If indeed the road of Pyrrhonian skepticism does not cross that of the Christian faith, in what terms does Pyrrhonian skepticism demand the Christian faith? For the Christian faith, Pyrrhonian skepticism, which deals with the suffering of the dogmatic and ignores hidden suffering, does not embrace the problem of suffering in its totality. Thus, the Christian faith is demanded in view of the Pyrrhonian skeptic’s indifference, or rather in view of skeptical passivity translated into practical denial toward hidden suffering.

At this point, the Nietzschean history of Christianity becomes more interesting. So far, the parallelism between the Greek and the Jewish paths to Christianity includes four stages: Greek religion and Early Judaism, Socrates and Jesus,<sup>19</sup> Platonism and Priestly Judaism, and Dionysian art and paradisiacal science. And here, the case of skepticism adds one more stage to these four stages. This is the stage of Buddhism represented by the Buddhist Pyrrho on the side of the Greek path to Christianity and the Buddhism of Jesus on the side of the Jewish path to Christianity.

Nietzsche writes:

*Sagacious* weariness: Pyrrho. To live a lowly life. . . . No pride . . . to honor and believe what all believe. On guard against science and spirit. . . . A Buddhist for Greece, grown up amid the tumult of the schools; a latecomer; weary; the protest of weariness against the zeal of the dialecticians; the unbelief of weariness in the importance of all things . . . no contest; no will to distinction; to deny the Greek instincts. . . . His life was a protest against the great doctrine of identity (happiness = virtue = knowledge). . . . wisdom does not make

“wise”—The right way of life does not want happiness, it turns away from happiness.<sup>20</sup>

For Nietzsche, the decadence of Greek philosophy, which starts with Socrates, reaches its high point in the Buddhism of Pyrrho.<sup>21</sup> Against this background, Buddhism becomes the high point of three cultures: Greek Antiquity (Pyrrho), Judaism (Jesus), and Modernity (Schopenhauer). This contextualization throws a new light on Nietzsche’s conception of skepticism. The question whether Nietzsche was a skeptic or not yields contradictory answers. On the one hand, Nietzsche becomes a skeptic in view of his vindication of the intellectual honesty of the skeptical philosophers.<sup>22</sup> On the other hand, he becomes dogmatic in view of his mere denial of Christianity.<sup>23</sup> Nietzsche’s relations with skepticism are very complex: Nietzsche’s approval of skepticism would increase along with the strength of his polemic against Christianity and traditional philosophy. Still, there is something intriguingly paradoxical about the fact that he becomes more approving of skepticism even while he himself becomes in various ways less skeptical.<sup>24</sup>

However, one cannot approach Nietzsche’s conception of skepticism apart from his conception of Buddhism. In view of the inseparable connection between skepticism and Buddhism, Nietzsche’s approval of skepticism should be understood in view of his approval of nihilistic Buddhism. From this perspective, Buddhism (and thereafter skepticism) is not approved for itself; rather, it is approved as a high point. Buddhism is approved as that necessary stage in which all judgments are denied and affirmed at one and the same time, and through which Nietzsche sought the overcoming of the history of Christianity.

With this in mind, I want to put forth the following three claims: First, Nietzsche reads into Buddhism that kind of nihilism which characterizes the state of the end of culture—Pyrrho is the end of Greek Antiquity, Jesus is the end of Judaism, and Schopenhauer is the end of Modernity.<sup>25</sup> Second, this kind of Buddhism forms the basis for the

emergence of a new beginning that constitutes the overcoming of this end in terms of a demand—Christianity is demanded beyond Greek Buddhist skepticism and beyond Jesus’s Jewish Buddhism, and Nietzsche’s modern Antichrist is demanded beyond modern European Buddhism. Third, Christianity’s, or more precisely Paul’s, overcoming of the dead ends that the Greek and the Jewish paths have reached becomes Nietzsche’s model for the overcoming of modern Buddhism.<sup>26</sup> Before I turn to a defense of this last claim, Priestly Judaism’s crisis of sin and punishment should first be discussed, since this crisis is the ground for the emergence of Jesus the Buddhist, who is in fact the turning point that makes the realization of the Christian faith possible.

### Sin and Punishment

I have already pointed to the fact that Jewish slave-morality results in what has been termed the independent economy of sin and punishment. How, then, does this economy become the crisis of Christianity’s Jewish world *demanding* the advent of the Christian faith? Recall that the priest, as both aristocrat and slave, becomes the human joining these two agencies in one body. The first is the apparent, discoursing, good suffering slave, and the second is the deep, silenced evil of the original sin. The internalization of the otherness of the aristocrat in the depth of the human means its concealment from the apparent world. And if the aristocrat is concealed, the reactive character of slave-morality is also concealed. According to this concealment, man forgets the natural aristocratic possibility of action, and in turn the reactive form of action becomes man’s only possibility for action.

In view of this end, here arises Nietzsche’s criticism of subjectivity, as brought to the world along with slave-morality, which starts with the subjectivities of God and *his* slave as defined in terms of sin and punishment:

Yaweh the God of “justice”—*no longer* at one with Israel, an expression of national self-confidence: now only a God bound by conditions. The new conception of him becomes an instrument in the hands of priestly agitators who henceforth interpret all good fortune as a reward, all misfortune as punishment for disobedience of God, for “sin”: that most mendacious mode of interpretation of the supposed “moral world-order” through which the natural concepts “cause” and “effect” is once and for all stood on its head. When one has banished natural causality from the world by means of reward and punishment, one then requires an *anti-natural* causality. . . . A God *who demands*—in place of a God who helps.<sup>27</sup>

At this stage, the later Jewish concept of God is not that of Early Judaism anymore, it is not the earlier, natural, one local God of a religion of thankfulness reflecting the Jewish affirmation of life: “The old God *could* no longer do what he formally could. One should have let him go. What happened? One altered the conception of him: at this price one retained him.”<sup>28</sup> The later God of justice is instead the incapable, denatured, conditional, rewarding, punishing, antinatural, demanding, and abstract God serving as “an instrument in the hands of priestly agitators.”<sup>29</sup> According to this later concept of God, Judaism loses its earlier reflective-expressive purpose, it loses the symmetry between man and God according to which man is not God only insofar as man thanks himself through thankfulness to God. Such a symmetrical relationship is substituted by a relationship of cause and effect. On the basis of this new relationship, God and man come to constitute the totality of the world from which the active (aristocrat) has been dismissed. After dismissing the (outer) subjectivity of the aristocrat, the problem of the independence of slave-morality becomes one of finding the cause of suffering, that is, the subjectivity behind suffering. If such subjectivity cannot be attributed to the noble anymore, it should be attributed to the slave. For, in view of slave-morality, the good slave is the legitimate narrator,

or, to use Nietzsche's words, the slave is the legitimate interpreter of the phenomenon of her suffering. However, seeking the cause of suffering means seeking the subject who does evil, when the suffering slave is the object of evil.

Some correction of the concept of God may provide a way out of this contradiction. How is that? It has been said that for slave-morality, man is both slave and aristocrat, both good and evil. As evil, man is the cause (of the effect) of suffering as good. If that is correct, to be both the subject and the object of suffering is to cause suffering in one sense (that is, to be a sinner to God) and to be the object of suffering in another sense, that is, to be punished by God in order to go back to being good. Under these terms, slave-morality retains its claim concerning the truth of the opposition of good and evil as it distributes the active—or suffering-productive—subjectivity of the aristocrat in the completion of the activity of the sinner man and that of the punishing God of justice. Slave-morality attains the independence it has sought: the aristocrat is concealed, and nonetheless the result of her activity (suffering being the condition of the slave's being good) *still exists*:

[When the] Jews . . . faced . . . the question of being or not being, they preferred . . . being *at any price*: the price they had to pay was the radical *falsification* of all nature, all naturalness, all reality. . . . They made of themselves an antithesis to *natural* conditions—they inverted religion, religious worship, morality, history, psychology one after the other in an irreparable way into the *contradiction to their natural values*.<sup>30</sup>

Here Nietzsche's criticism of the metaphysical choice, of the Platonic "egyptianism. . . and monotonous-theism"<sup>31</sup>—appears again. To be, says Nietzsche, is to decide to endure and last beyond the moment: not to "let [God] go"<sup>32</sup> when one should. This criticism of the decadent concept of the metaphysically existing God is highly significant for Nietzsche's

understanding of the continuum between Christianity and Priestly Judaism.<sup>33</sup> This Jewish phenomenon in relation to which Christianity is but “a copy . . . in unutterably vaster proportions”<sup>34</sup> is in continuity and harmony with the above analysis of Christianity’s turn to Platonic philosophy so as to have the proof of the existence of God as sufficient for the proof of the Christian faith.

Also, from this perspective, slave-morality’s formulation of the history of the problem of suffering in terms of teleological history reappears: the history of God and man, in which man acts as sinner and the God of justice reacts as punisher. If that is the case, God’s justice appears to mean here the teleology of sin and punishment whose end is God’s turning the wheel back to the moment before man’s sin, to the moment of creation: the return to the zero-sum in man’s account of sins.

Slave-morality’s economy of sin and punishment results in the two-fold problem of its concepts of God and man. As to its concept of God, the late Jewish God is both metaphysical and historical. As I have demonstrated, the metaphysical character of God results from *preserving* him in the moment in which he should have been let go. From this it follows that the *good* God is not historical, or is not active anymore. Yet, this same God becomes active as he punishes man for being sinful. Accordingly, God is brought back to history through his teleological activity as *reactive* (to evil). Hence, the identity of the metaphysical God and the historical God is the identity of the God of creation and the God of salvation. For one may deduce that punishment is an act of salvation insofar as punishment returns the sinner, and thereby also God, to the primordial state of creation. This means that God can conciliate his metaphysical character, that is, preserve his existence and historical character (his activity in the world of man), only within a teleological history of salvation. Under these conditions, it is in the context of this totality *alone* that God can remain a good God, that is, be explained as good. Once one action of God is stripped away from his teleological history of salvation, this God soon becomes evil, or at best paradoxical. The problem is that slave-morality’s concept of an active God remains

dependent on evil. For the God of justice does not act the good but reacts to the noble good. And if God does not react, does not punish, does not have his action framed within the teleology of sin and punishment, then he is arbitrary, paradoxical, or even evil.

The economy of sin and punishment results in that concept of man which reflects, as it completes, this same concept of God. Here one comes to take note of the fact that it is not only man's activity in the world which cannot be but sinful. Sin is man's one and only means to communicate with God. I posit that this state of things, which can be summed up as the negative character of slave-morality's concept of the good, defines the crisis of the economy of sin and punishment and thereby demands the Christian faith. And it is not Nietzsche who discovers this crisis: Nietzsche's criticism translates Paul's exposition and legitimization of what I want to call, using Paul's language, the human argument against the Jewish law:

But if our unrighteousness commend the righteousness of God, what shall we say? Is God unrighteous who taketh vengeance? (I speak as a man) God forbid: for then how shall God judge the world? For if the truth of God hath more abounded through my lie unto his glory; why yet am I also judged as a sinner? And not rather, (as we be slanderously reported, and as some affirm that we say,) Let us do evil, that good may come? whose damnation is just.<sup>35</sup>

This argument becomes the basis for Paul's criticism of the negative character of the Jewish law, that is, the Jewish law's making sin knowable (positive) and thereby keeping the good latent (negative): "What shall we say then? Is the law sin? God forbid. Nay, I had not known sin, but by the law: for I had not known lust, except the law had said, Thou shalt not covet. But sin, taking occasion by the commandment, wrought in me all manner of concupiscence. For without the law sin was dead."<sup>36</sup>

It is clear then that Paul's problem is one to do with *reality*, or, put in Nietzsche's words, with the noble doing, which is defined from the point of Paul's slave-morality as sin and evil. Yet, Paul's limiting of his argument against the Jewish law shows that one (such as Nietzsche) may read in the Pauline text the fact that Paul assumes that slave-morality (Torah) had already concealed noble-morality. Paul's remaining problem is the after-appearance of noble reality, that is, sin, through the Jewish law in view of the reality-character of the Jewish law. This reality-character of the Jewish law formulates into language its concept of the good. However, for being negative, this concept of the good remains dependent on the positive character of evil, and therefore can only use the words "do not."

From this analysis, which shows the *hermeneutical tightness* of the Nietzschean criticism of Paul's text, it is not difficult to guess how the crisis of the Jewish world of sin and punishment demands the Christian faith as the positive formulation of the Jewish law. Paul finds such positive imperative in *love*: "Love your neighbor as yourself" is the only positive formulation of the Jewish law. Yet, for Paul, as for Nietzsche, this reformation does not imply a cut with the concept of the suffering good of slave-morality. To be positively good is to love. And to love (the other) is to sacrifice (oneself for the other). Hence, and insofar as sacrifice implies suffering, the good man suffers in the *act* of sacrificing-love, and not anymore in the act of sinning. In addition, the good, loving God does not punish man: he rather punishes himself, or he sacrifices himself for man. Under these conditions, sin is not an act but a lack: *the lack of love*. In sum, the loving God, as the loving man, suffers in sacrifice, and does not love one who does not love, or who does not "not covet."

The resulting transformation of Christian love into the positive formulation of the suffering good implies that the good should *appear* in historical reality in the same manner in which the Jewish law (as well as sin) appears in this reality. I want to next direct attention to

Nietzsche's Christology, which takes Jesus to be the possibility of the advent of Christ, who is the realization in the incarnation of the good suffering-sacrificing Christian God.

### Jesus: The Only Christian

If Pyrrho is a Buddhist on Greek soil, Jesus is another Buddhist on Jewish soil: "a soil very little like that of India."<sup>37</sup> In the Greek world, as in the Jewish world, Buddhism seems to emerge as distinct from its terrain. If so, and if Christianity is demanded by the passivity of Greek skepticism and the negativity of the Jewish economy of sin and punishment, then Buddhism should constitute the basis for the possibility of the realization of this demand. In this light, and in view of the fact that Nietzsche did not elaborate on Pyrrho's Buddhism much beyond his unpublished notes from 1888, the case of Jesus's Buddhism shall become the basis for my continued examination of Nietzsche's narration of the emergence of Christianity.

To follow Nietzsche's same first step: in *The Antichrist*, in approaching the figure of Jesus, the target appears to be a criticism of Strauss's idea of the historical Jesus:

The "holy people" . . . produced for its instinct a formula which was logical to the point of self-negation. . . . The little rebellious movement which is baptized with the name of Jesus of Nazareth is . . . the priestly instinct which can no longer endure the priest as a reality. . . . This holy anarchist . . . was a political criminal. . . . This is what brought him to the Cross. . . . He died for *his* guilt.<sup>38</sup>

I want to call the picture presented here Nietzsche's *historical Jesus*. I submit that Nietzsche refers with this picture to the possibility of the historical Jesus as one defined in terms of Strauss's project *The Life of Jesus*: the project of the modern science of history that attempted to construct the truth of Jesus from the viewpoint of the historical facts.<sup>39</sup> In locat-

ing himself within this context, Nietzsche is criticizing the idea of self-sufficiency of Strauss's historical science. More precisely, Nietzsche is here saying the following: If the question is one of historical facts about Jesus, these facts are the teleological truth of history. Thus, the historical Jesus is the teleological meaning of the history of Judaism. This meaning is the end in which all Judaism's logical contradictions are resolved. As teleological, this end is the only possible construction of the history of Judaism. And thus, as historically teleological, Jesus is possible in one, and only one, way: whether "understood or *misunderstood*,"<sup>40</sup> the historical Jesus is the conclusion of the Jewish formula that was logical to the point of self-negation.

If this is indeed so, assuming the unity of the historical facts and their interpretation leads Nietzsche to understand the historical Jesus as a logically deducible political revolt against the Jewish church. Nietzsche's historical Jesus, who represents the purification of Judaism from its remaining contacts with reality, represents the (only possible) synthesis of the unity of the aristocrat and the slave in the priest, and therefore the end of the (logically contradictory) living-together of the aristocratic instinct with that of the slave. Yet this living-together became an internal conflict between the priestly ruling class and the "*Chandala* within Judaism."<sup>41</sup> The center of the opposition between the slave and (what remained of) the aristocrat is moved to the interior of Judaism. This is the opposition between the "*Jewish* [virtual] reality" (the "retained . . . priestly values, priestly words") and the "even *more abstract* form of existence . . . [and] even *more unreal* vision" (the historical Jesus's Christianity as the Jewish self-negation).<sup>42</sup> Yet:

It is quite another question whether he was conscious of any such antithesis—whether he was not merely *felt* to be this antithesis. And here . . . I touch on the problem of the *psychology of the Redeemer*.—I confess there are few books which present me with so many difficulties as the Gospels do. These difficulties are quite other than those which the learned curiosity of the German mind celebrated

one of its most unforgettable triumphs in pointing to. The time is far distant when I too . . . savoured the work of the incomparable Strauss.<sup>43</sup>

According to this terminology, the problem of Nietzsche's historical Jesus is one without difficulties as it is quite other than the problem of the psychology of the Redeemer. But before explaining how his interest in Jesus's psychological type is possible and significant, Nietzsche rejects Strauss's unserious reading of tradition, his applying to the "ambiguous . . . [stories of saints] scientific methods *when no other records are extant*."<sup>44</sup> In view of this criticism, Nietzsche's point is the following: if what is *expected* from the point of view of the Hegelian synthesis is the historical Jesus being the objective realization of the Hegelian idea, as born from the logical contradictions of the Jewish thesis, then one should turn to Judaism, for Judaism is that external source which the Hegelian historian may turn to instead of remaining entangled within the ambiguous tradition.

In this light, Nietzsche claims that the scientific method limiting itself to the biographies of Jesus as narrated in the New Testament corresponds to Jesus's psychological problem, to the "psychological type of the redeemer. For it *could* be contained in the Gospels in spite of the Gospels, however much mutilated and overloaded with foreign traits. . . . *Not* the truth about what he did, what he said, how he really died: but the question *whether* his type is still conceivable at all, whether it has been 'handed down' by tradition."<sup>45</sup>

In view of these words, the following claim can be made: the question that lies behind Nietzsche's concern with the psychological type of Jesus is one about the way in which it would be possible to keep the validity of the Nietzschean picture of the historical Jesus and assure together with that the possibility of the Christian construction of the figure of Christ over that of Jesus by making reference to the New Testament's Gospels *alone*. This claim is based on the understanding of Nietzsche's turn to his psychological method after the failure of history

to “read out”<sup>46</sup> Jesus from the Gospels. What is being stressed here is that what remains important for Nietzsche is to have the Gospels—as distinct from any other source—proving the actual existence of Jesus through the Christian tradition, proving that his type is still readable out from the Christian tradition that handed him down.

The importance of this proof lies in the possibility of explaining the resurrection of Judaism in the figure of Paul’s Christ. Nietzsche’s historical Jesus is the Jewish end of Judaism in the Christian-ness of the anarchist Jesus. Thus, the history of Judaism, as one ending in the historical Jesus, does not explain the possibility of the reemergence of the Jewish church in the Christian church. Nietzsche seeks after the *non-Jewish* source that can make such reemergence possible. Indeed, this source is *non-Jewish* and *non-Christian*: it is Nietzsche’s Jesus being the only Christian, for “in reality there has been only one Christian, and he died on the Cross.”<sup>47</sup> This is Jesus according to his *nonhistorical* psychological type. Briefly stated, this psychology is that of an “idiot. . . [of an] instinctive hatred of every reality”:<sup>48</sup>

*Instinctive hatred of reality*: consequence of an extreme capacity for suffering and irritation which no longer wants to be “touched” at all because it feels every contact too deeply. *Instinctive exclusion of all aversion, all enmity, all feeling for limitation and distancing*: consequence of an extreme capacity for suffering and irritation which already feels all resisting, all need for resistance, as unbearable *displeasure* (that is to say as *harmful*, as *deprecated* by the instinct of self-preservation) and knows blessedness (pleasure) only in no longer resisting anyone or anything, neither to evil nor to the evil-doer—love as the sole, as the *last* possibility of life. . . . These are the two *physiological realities* upon which, out of which the doctrine of redemption has grown.<sup>49</sup>

Here it appears that Jesus’s kind of Christian love is twofold: to be loved (as resulting from the instinctive hatred of reality) and to love

(as resulting from the instinctive exclusion of all aversion). Nietzsche's Jesus represents love resulting from the rejection of being either the object of suffering or the subject of suffering. Jesus's kind of love cancels out suffering: it makes suffering meaningless for life and for redemption beyond this-life. In turn, the life and the death of Jesus, that is, the practice of Jesus's love in his life, as in his death, transcend Nietzsche's history of Christianity. Jesus does not have a place in Nietzsche's history of Christianity as the history of the value of life from the viewpoint of suffering. For Jesus's love does not admit suffering, it does not let suffering appear before its eyes. This love does not have even that ground—it does not have the phenomenon of suffering—upon which pessimism is articulated into a problem. The absence of suffering implies the lack of the question requesting an affirming or a negating answer to the question of the value of life:

Jesus . . . cares nothing for what is fixed. . . . The concept, the *experience* "life" in the only form he knows it is opposed to any kind of word, formula, law, faith, dogma. He speaks only of the inmost thing. . . . Everything else, the whole of reality, the whole of nature, language itself, possesses for him merely the value of a sign, a metaphor. . . . Such a symbolist *par excellence* stands outside of all religion, all conceptions of divine worship, all history, all natural science, all experience of the world, all acquirements, all politics, all psychology, all books, all art. . . . Dialectics are likewise lacking, the idea is lacking that a faith, a "truth" could be proved by reasons (—*his* proofs are inner "lights," inner feelings of pleasure and self-affirmations, nothing but "proofs by potency"—).<sup>50</sup>

What has been exhibited here is the portrait of Nietzsche's Buddhist Jesus: Nietzsche's politically and historically *disinterested idiot*. Nietzsche understands "idiot" essentially in terms of its Greek meaning, that is, as the designation for an apolitical man, a private citizen refraining from participation in the business of the state.<sup>51</sup> I declared that my purpose

behind invoking this portrait of Jesus is to show that Nietzsche's Jesus exemplifies the Nietzschean idea of Buddhist passivity, which becomes the grounds for the possibility of the rebirth of Priestly Judaism in the form of the new Jewish church. As such, Jesus does not belong to the Nietzschean history of pessimism in the same sense as Nietzsche's Jesus does not belong either to the party that affirms this-life or to the party that negates it. Yet, this does not mean that this idiot is not precisely what is needed for the resurrection of Jesus as Christ. On the contrary, it is this ahistorical character that makes Nietzsche's Jesus needed and demanded for the resurrection of the Jewish church in the Christian church, as I shall demonstrate.

### Christ: The Anti-Dionysus

Nietzsche's articulation of the historical Jesus makes room for his psychological construction of the psychological type of Jesus. It is Jesus's psychological type, rather than the so-called historical Jesus, that becomes the basis for the construction of Christ. Nietzsche's Christology is established through the possibility of the unity of Jesus-Christ in the unity of Jesus's psychological type and Christ. On these grounds, I claim that this unity is found in Nietzsche's *inversion of Christian Christology*. Nietzsche shows that Jesus the man—that is, Jesus so far known to the Christian as the historical Jesus—is in fact what the Christian considers as the divine Christ. As Nietzsche describes him above, Jesus the man of flesh is ahistorical: he does not sin, punish, or reward,<sup>52</sup> but loves in an otherworldly actuality. This man does not know of the history of the Jewish church or that of the Christian church: "As a psychological possibility, however, this [Jesus's] way of life is utterly unhistoric."<sup>53</sup> If that is the case, the mere idea of Jesus's ahistorical character prevents any historical interpretation from preserving him in his original form: "such a type could not remain pure, whole, free from accretions."<sup>54</sup> Thereafter, "the history of Christianity—and that from the very death on the Cross—is the history of progressively cruder misunderstanding

of an *original* symbolism.”<sup>55</sup> This misunderstanding gives birth to what I want to term the Jewish Christ:

Only the Cross . . . it was only this terrible paradox which brought the disciples face to face with the real enigma. . . . Here everything *had* to be necessary, meaningful, reasonable, reasonable in the highest degree. . . . “*Who* killed him? *who* was his natural enemy?” . . . Answer: *ruling* Judaism, its upper class. From this moment one felt oneself in mutiny *against* the social order. . . . Up till then . . . this warlike trait . . . was *lacking* in his image. . . . Precisely the most unevangelic of feelings, *revengefulness*, again came uppermost. . . . An historic moment appeared in view: the “kingdom of God” is coming to sit in judgment on its enemies.<sup>56</sup>

Here, Nietzsche explains how the Jewish Christ—that is, the historical Jesus—is made possible. He is the “holy anarchist”<sup>57</sup> whose Christianity is Judaism’s self-negation. Besides that, however, the misunderstanding of Jesus gives birth to what I call the Christian Christ: “And now an absurd problem came up: ‘How *could* God have permitted this?’ . . . Answer: God gave his Son for the forgiveness of sins, as a *sacrifice*. . . . From now on there is introduced into the type of the redeemer step by step: the doctrine of a Judgment and a Second Coming, the doctrine of his death as a sacrificial death, the doctrine of the Resurrection.”<sup>58</sup>

Nietzsche faces a difficulty in explaining the possibility of the reemergence of the Jewish church in the form of the Christian, insofar as Nietzsche’s historical Jesus becomes the mere Jewish Christ (Christianity as the mere self-destruction of Judaism). Nietzsche overcomes this difficulty by way of creating continuity between the Jewish Christ and the Christian Christ as these two come to constitute Christ: the complete portrait of the Nietzschean political-historical Christ in the frame of Nietzsche’s inversion of Christology. This takes place on the basis of Nietzsche’s transformation of Jesus the man—

traditionally known as the historical Jesus—into a divine man, into an otherworldly, apolitical, and ahistorical man. And so, what is traditionally known to the Christian as Christ—or the divine son of God who resurrects and is to return—becomes in the hands of Nietzsche historical: Nietzsche’s politically and historically *interested* Christ. This Jewish-Christian Christ is the redemption of Priestly Judaism from the crisis of its economy of sin and punishment through the death of the Jewish Christ and his resurrection as the Christian Christ:

Wherefore, my brethren, ye also are become dead to the law by the body of Christ; that ye should be married to another, even to him who is raised from the dead, that we should bring forth fruit unto God. For when we were in the flesh, the motions of sins, which were by the law, did work in our members to bring forth fruit unto death. But now we are delivered from the law, that being dead wherein we were held; that we should serve in newness of spirit, and not in the oldness of the letter.<sup>59</sup>

What Paul holds to be the body of Christ is what Nietzsche holds to be love in Jesus’s glad tidings. And what Paul holds to be spirit is what Nietzsche holds to be the body of the new Jewish Church. If that is correct, when seen from the perspective of Paul, Nietzsche should further explain how Paul’s interpretation was made possible, and how his own interpretation could not then be made possible. The question facing Nietzsche becomes one about what dictated the interpretation of Jesus as a misunderstanding, that is, about the fact that Jesus is not a mere sign: Jesus is understandable and yet was misunderstood.

Nietzsche’s argument shows that the political-historical Christ would have been impossible without Nietzsche’s Buddhist Jesus as a misunderstood original symbolism. This is that symbolism taken to be mere signs around which the questions “*Who* killed him?”<sup>60</sup> and “How *could* God have permitted this?”<sup>61</sup> were articulated. Each of these two questions leads to one side of Nietzsche’s Christ: the first question leads to

the Jewish Christ and the second to the Christian Christ. When taken together, both questions lead (back) to Jewish history. In light of these quotations, the path of Nietzsche's Jesus back to history appears to have been dictated by his paradoxical death on the cross: "For the Jews require a sign, and the Greeks seek after wisdom: But we preach Christ crucified, unto the Jews a stumbling block, and unto the Greeks foolishness."<sup>62</sup> The early Christian community did not understand this death as being continuous with Jesus's way of life, that "this 'bringer of glad tidings' died as he lived."<sup>63</sup> This Nietzschean claim concerning the unity of the life and the death of Jesus is reflected in his characterization of Jesus's language as a symbolic one: "If I understand anything about this great symbolist, it is that he took for realities, for 'truths,' only *inner* realities, . . . he understood the rest, everything pertaining to nature, time, space, history, only as signs, as occasion for metaphor."<sup>64</sup>

Then, the question is: which is sign and which is reality, the world outside or the inner world? For the early Christian community, reality is outer-reality. Thereby, the death of Jesus turned to be a sign in outer reality: a revelation of God in history. As signs, historical revelations demand an interpretation, an interpretation approached by historical questions, whether as to the history of man (*Who* killed him?), or as to the history of God (How *could* God have permitted this?). On the other hand, Nietzsche, who is also external to the inner world of Jesus, is suspicious about the meaningfulness of the history uniting Judaism and Christianity. Thus, Nietzsche's qualification—"If I understand anything about this great symbolist"—reveals him to have a *limited understanding* of Jesus. This understanding is limited to the fact that the truth of Jesus is his inner world, and that the outer world is for him a sign that is meaningless in itself, and yet this sign remains Nietzsche's clue to approach the inner reality of Jesus.

So, it is through Jesus's *inevitable* political-historical misunderstanding that Nietzsche's Buddhist Jesus comes to constitute the basis for the possibility of the Christian renewal of Judaism in the figure of Christ. This is the figure of the anti-Dionysus insofar as Christ is the renewal

of the anti-Dionysian slave-morality. This does not mean yet that Jesus was needed for the construction of the figure of the anti-Dionysian Christ. For otherwise, one should assert that what was demanded was *anything* that could bring about misunderstanding: the question of how the *Buddhist-idiot* Jesus was demanded for the renewal of slave-morality in Christianity still stands.

I recall here that Nietzsche's inverted Christology introduces the possibility of a true Christianity that substitutes the Christian faith with practice, that is, with Jesus's "way of life."<sup>65</sup> And what is revealed here is Jesus's *deep instinct*: "The profound instinct for how one would have to *live* in order to feel oneself 'in heaven,' to feel oneself 'eternal,' . . . [the instinct through which] the whole of Jewish *ecclesiastical* teaching was denied."<sup>66</sup> If that is the case, and if Dionysian art and paradisiacal science have also been revealed as deep instincts, the following question arises: is this profound instinct of Jesus one more possible identity of Nietzsche's modern Antichrist next to Dionysian art and paradisiacal science? On the one hand, Nietzsche's Jesus could be connected to European Buddhism in the same manner in which Dionysian art and paradisiacal science are connected to modern art and modern science, respectively. On the other hand, there remains the difference that in comparison with the historical character of Dionysian art and paradisiacal science, Jesus is that depth which is given through its irreconcilability with history and thereby cannot be translated in the otherworldly history, that is, cannot appear.

It follows that, for Nietzsche, Buddhism and the Dionysian do not belong to each other: Buddhism, considered in the case of the Greek Pyrrho, the Jewish Jesus, and the modern Schopenhauer,<sup>67</sup> marks an end and thereby a new beginning. This implies that both Buddhists—Jesus and Pyrrho—are neither Dionysian nor anti-Dionysian. If that is correct, and if Buddhism marks an end and a new beginning, who, then, is Nietzsche's Jesus? If the psychological type of Jesus is depth that cannot realize itself in the outer world, it can still bring about the realization of some other instinct: *the Buddhist psychology of Jesus can serve as an*

*instrument and be demanded as an instrument.* One could speculate that the adoption of the psychology of Jesus, *as an instrument*, seems to open doors to new possibilities once this depth steps into the outer world. How is that? Jesus's psychology makes the outer world to be a set of meaningless signs. For that instinct which makes of this psychology its instrument, this fact turns the way into the outer world *of suffering a naive experimental trip.* This is especially the case if the fact that the psychology of Jesus is that depth which had, until now, avoided suffering as subject and as object is taken into consideration.

The question about how Jesus, being a Buddhist, was demanded for the renewal of slave-morality in Christianity has been fully answered in the idea of the instrumentality of Buddhism. Further, Nietzsche's idea of the instrumentality of Buddhism as such has also been established. From this perspective, a new insight into the relationship between Nietzsche and Nietzsche's Paul has been uncovered: both stand at an end marked by Buddhism, whether Greek, Jewish, or European, and both discover the possibility of the instrumentality of Buddhism. I want to note here that the idea of the instrumentality of Jesus, both for Nietzsche's Paul and for the modern Nietzsche, excludes the possibility that Nietzsche's Jesus may be read either as anti-Dionysian or as Dionysian.<sup>68</sup> Also, that Jesus is an instrument and Dionysus is the goal means that the difference between both is one of kind and not of degree. It is fairly obvious that Nietzsche thinks of this instrumentality for the revaluation of values other than those which Paul revaluated. Nevertheless, and given the idea that an instrument remains independent from its user, the idea of the instrumentality of Buddhism as common ground for both is firmly established.<sup>69</sup>

One is led to the task of delving deeper into the identities and differences between Nietzsche and Nietzsche's Paul. Yet, before that, one ought to take note of the following: First, Jesus is a turning point in the same way Socrates was a turning point. Second, Jesus was misunderstood in the same way Socrates was misunderstood. Third, Jesus's religion is an instrument in the same way Socratic reason is an instrument. And

fourth, the depth of Jesus's psychological type is the antipode of superficial reason. Nietzsche, as I said, conceives of reason as superficial par excellence: the instrument of dialectics through which deep instincts break out into that surface which is the outer world and its language. Does this mean that Nietzsche attempts to make of Jesus's true Christianity (that is, of European Buddhism as represented through his conception of Jesus's Buddhism) an instrument to use besides, or apart from, the instrument of reason? The immediate task that this question calls for is a comparison between Nietzsche's Socrates and Nietzsche's Jesus.

### Religion and Reason, Jesus and Socrates

To begin the comparison between Nietzsche's Socrates and Jesus by foregrounding the differences between these two figures, Nietzsche's refutation of Renan's *Life of Jesus* is a good place to start. In *The Antichrist*, Nietzsche rejects his "antipode[s]"<sup>70</sup> (that is, Renan's) conception of the advent of Christianity in terms of progress; and he also rejects his characterization of Jesus as hero and as genius. But what is primarily important here is Nietzsche's rejection of that Jesus "which Renan has wickedly glorified as '*le grand maître en ironie*.' . . . [for in] the meantime, there yawns a contradiction between the mountain, lake and field preacher, whose appearance strikes one as that of a Buddha on a soil very little like that of India, and that aggressive fanatic, the mortal enemy of theologian and priest."<sup>71</sup>

In view of this criticism, Nietzsche substitutes Renan's great ironist with his "great symbolist."<sup>72</sup> This Nietzschean disagreement with Renan reveals the underlying reference of Nietzsche's Jesus to Nietzsche's Socrates: the reference of Jesus the great symbolist to Socrates the great ironist. This irony, which Nietzsche seeks to make his Jesus innocent of, refers to the coexistence of an apparent and a hidden meaning that are independent of each other in view of the reference of each of them to itself.<sup>73</sup> Against this, symbolism refers to the coexistence of a meaningless apparent sign and the hidden meaning to which this sign refers.

Nietzsche's account of Jesus as symbolist renders only one meaning of Jesus possible: the truth of Jesus that has the components of the Jewish-Christian outer world as meaningless signs defining its meaningful inner world. According to this one possibility, the unity of Jesus is the unity of a decadent life and a decadent death. Hence, the question of whether the unity of the life and death of Jesus should be read from the viewpoint of his life or from the viewpoint of his death becomes an unnecessary and superfluous one. Nietzsche succeeds at winning his Jesus as a positively meaningful, practical instrument apart from Paul's interpretation of Jesus. Thus, Jesus becomes that meaningfully independent turning point in the history of Christianity: Jesus is not a mere sign that is meaningful in itself, and that becomes meaningful only in view of Paul's interpretation. Jesus is the turning point from Judaism to Christianity due to his followers' misunderstanding and their manipulation of the symbolism of his inner world.

Against this, Nietzsche's account of Socrates as ironist renders two meanings (one apparent and one hidden) of Socrates possible. I have already shown that Socrates becomes the turning point from Greek tragedy to Platonism under the condition that he be an ahistorical sign, a sign that makes the Platonic interpretation of Socrates's death possible. In this context, Nietzsche sought to secure an independent, non-Platonic meaning of Socratic science. In the end, Nietzsche is led to the conclusion that Socrates's irony was misunderstood: the life of Socrates does not lead to the death of Socrates if a continuity between the redeeming character of the practice of science (the life of Socrates) and the martyrdom of Socrates (his death) is followed. Instead, Socratic science leads to meaningless death, to death as the simple conclusion that science is no medicine. Nietzsche thus wins his Socrates as an ironist only. In sum, Nietzsche's Socrates (as distinct from Plato's Socrates) and Nietzsche's Jesus (as distinct from Paul's Jesus) result in irony and symbolism, respectively: Nietzsche's reading of the Platonic text, of *Plato's apologia* of himself, renders an ironic Socrates possible; and on the other hand, Nietzsche's reading of the Gospels, of the

Christian “sectarians’ . . . apologia of themselves,”<sup>74</sup> renders a symbolic Jesus possible.

Jesus’s symbolism and Socratic irony seem to locate Jesus and Socrates within an order in which they exclude each other. Moreover, of central importance for the comparison of Jesus and Socrates is Nietzsche’s refutation of one more aspect of Renan’s Jesus, namely, his rejection of Renan’s claim that Jesus was a fanatic “*impérieux*,”<sup>75</sup> a rejection that joins his understanding of Jesus’s glad tidings. According to this refutation, and insofar as Nietzsche characterizes Socratic reason as tyrannical,<sup>76</sup> Socrates and Jesus do not simply exclude each other: the relationship of Jesus and Socrates is that of opposition. And that is the opposition between two *instruments*: the one is the decadent, loving, deep, symbolical Buddhism and the second is the decadent, tyrannical, superficial, dialectical reason.

It can be said that these two instruments are reason and religion, insofar as Nietzsche’s conception of Buddhism does not denote Buddhism as a particular religion, but his *modern* concept of religion as such. If European Buddhism is the culmination of the history of Christianity, then Buddhism can denote the concept of religion as such, or “what is usually called a ‘*religion*.’”<sup>77</sup>

This result implies that Nietzsche brings the modern problem of religion into a new dimension. After his uncovering of the fictional character of the opposition between (the Platonic) truth and (the Christian) faith, Nietzsche discovers the true opposition as one between the two instruments of religion and reason, between two ways of praxis, and not between two sets of beliefs. The one is the praxis of dialectics as it appeared in Socrates’s way of life and the second is the praxis of true Christianity, or Buddhism, as it appeared in Jesus’s way of life:

In the . . . psychology of the “Gospel” . . . blessedness . . . is the *only* reality—the rest is a sign for speaking of it. . . . The *consequence* of such a condition projects itself into a new *practice*, the true evangelic practice. . . . The Christian . . . is distinguished by a *different*

mode of acting. Neither by words nor in his heart does he resist the man who does him evil. He makes no distinction between foreigner and native, between Jew and not-Jew. . . . The life of the redeemer was nothing else than *this* practice. . . . —A new way of living, *not* a new belief.<sup>78</sup>

Jesus's kind of practice is then a liberation from the historical: "One could, with some freedom of expression, call Jesus a 'free spirit.'" <sup>79</sup> This practice liberates the true Christian from the Jewish instinct and the Jewish faith, that is, from the reality of the (diseased) Jewish economy of sin and punishment and from the new Christian belief in redemption in Heaven. But is this not also the result of the practice of the dialectical Socratic reason? As has been demonstrated, Socratic dialectics liberates Socrates's fellow Greek men from their certainty about their (diseased) Greek instinct at the moment in which dialectics unfolded before their eyes the historical character of this certainty. Additionally, Nietzsche's true understanding of the problem of Socrates showed that Socratic dialectics leads to the truth of Platonic metaphysics only when misunderstood, just as Jesus's true Gospel leads to the belief of Pauline Christianity when misunderstood.

This being the case, and with the assumption that the Nietzschean comparison between Jesus and Socrates is provoked by his attempt to overcome modern nihilistic Buddhism, the following thesis may put forward: The task of the Antichrist, which is the overcoming of modern nihilism, demands an instrument. The first instrument is reason; the application of the dialectics of Socratic reason ends in Nietzsche's genealogy; genealogy is an instrument that can evaluate and categorize only on the condition that it interrogates ideals as a discourse about the genesis that combats Egypticism.<sup>80</sup> And this genealogy unfolds historical Modernity in the plurality of man's instincts before the Nietzschean genealogical consciousness. Socratic reason ends in a negative dialectics which is destructive, that is, which ends in ironical death. In this light, Jesus's religion appears as a second instrument. This religion delivers

itself to the otherness of the deep instinct after the genealogical consciousness resulting from Socratic dialectics reveals such depth before its eyes. The opposition between Socrates and Jesus enters into a successive order: Overcoming modern nihilism demands the assumption of Jesus's way of life where Socrates's kind of practice ends. The task of overcoming the history of Christianity demands that the practice of Jesus's religion should follow that of Socratic reason: the psychology of Jesus's religion, in opposition to Socratic reason, seems to promise a future; in other words, the deep instinct's adoption of the naive depth of Jesus's psychology makes the free trip into the symbolical meaningless outer world a courageous experience opening new possible doors and horizons.

I conclude, first, that Nietzsche proves the abuse of Socratic reason by Plato and the abuse of Jesus's Christianity by Paul: Nietzsche shows that Platonism is not *the* truth and that Paul's Christianity is not *the* Christianity. Second, Nietzsche proves that Socratic reason and Jesus's Christianity are independent of any instinct/faith that may make use of them. Third, Nietzsche proves that Socratic reason and Jesus's Christianity are instruments. And if Socratic reason and Jesus's Christianity are instruments (that is, may be used again) and if their characterization as decadent may correspond to the modern state of nihilism, then these two turn to represent for Nietzsche's modern Antichrist two *successive* paths to overcome modern nihilism.

## 4.

### PAUL: THE FIRST CHRISTIAN

#### The Saint and the Return of the Priest

The comparison of Socrates and Jesus entails that, for Nietzsche, the idea of the instrumentality of reason and religion is mediated through Socrates and Paul. Therefore, a preliminary comparison between Socrates and Paul becomes necessary. Nietzsche says that Socrates “had initially sided with reason” concerning “the question whether regarding the valuation of things instinct deserves more authority than rationality.”<sup>1</sup> In a similar manner, he writes that Paul had also initially sided with the Jewish law: “In his youth he had himself wanted to satisfy it [*fanatically*].”<sup>2</sup> *Only after this initial stage*, or only “in the end,” Socrates discovered something: “privately and secretly, he laughed at himself, too: in himself he found, before his subtle conscience and self-examination, the same difficulty and incapacity,”<sup>3</sup> that he was like the “noble Athenians” who “were men of instinct and never could give sufficient information about the reasons for their actions.”<sup>4</sup> Similar to Socrates’s *own personal experience* is also Paul’s *later* discovery: “then he discovered in himself that he himself—fiery, sensual, melancholy, malevolent in hatred as he was—*could* not fulfill the law.”<sup>5</sup>

But Socrates and Paul differ in the ways in which they *self-overcome* such self-contradictions. Socrates, on the one hand, overcomes neither reason nor instinct, insofar as he makes of reason the instrument of his instinct: “But is that any reason, he encouraged himself, for giving up the instincts? One has to see to it that they as well as reason receive their due—one must follow the instincts but persuade reason to assist them with good reasons.”<sup>6</sup>

One should take note here of the fact that Nietzsche turns to his Socrates with the following question: “is that any reason . . . for giving up the instincts?”<sup>7</sup> Nietzsche’s question is not: is that any reason for giving up reason? This means that Socrates’s question was not directed at that which he had initially held as perfect, that is, at reason. Against this, Paul’s question is directed at that which he had initially held as perfect, that is, at the Jewish law: If Socrates encouraged himself, Paul suffered, “He suffered . . . from a *fixed question* which was always present to him, and would never rest: what is the Jewish *law* really concerned with? And, in particular, what is the *fulfillment of this law*?”<sup>8</sup> The basic question with which Nietzsche confronts Socrates and Paul is the question concerning the immorality involved in the experience of realizing reason (Socrates) and the law (Paul): that realization—or *fulfillment*—of the perfect ideal whose initial assumption of it being perfect points to the idea of it being moral. With his above criticism of both Socrates and Paul, Nietzsche emphasizes the fact that such an ideal is not at all moral. Moreover, he shows that the idea of the moral character of that which is held to be perfect (reason and law) corresponds to the initial state that exempts it from confronting the moral question.

What constitutes the core of this Nietzschean criticism is Socrates’s and Paul’s *own praxis*, or their involvement in fulfilling the perfect ideal as it results in an *experience of disappointment* with such an ideal. And thereby Nietzsche posits the question about praxis: “what is the *fulfillment of this law*” in the case of Paul? and what is the fulfillment of reason in the case of Socrates?<sup>9</sup> I pointed out that this situation demands a practical

self-overcoming, it demands an *instrument for self-overcoming*. On the one hand, Socrates the “great ironist” makes of reason the instrument of his instinct, and this way dissimulates his having seen “through the irrational element in moral judgment.”<sup>10</sup> On the other hand, the “*mind* . . . [of the] fanatical” Paul—who was not an ironist but “a very tormented, very pitiable, very unpleasant man who also found himself unpleasant”—remains *tortured* by the moral question involved in the practice of the fulfillment of his perfect ideal. This is the “holy God[s] . . . Jewish law, which had received in the person of Paul the highest distinction the Jews were able to conceive.” Paul’s mind cannot think the practical “way out” from his suffering in the same way that Socrates did. For Paul, to make of the law an instrument living together with his instincts means maintaining his suffering, insofar as the “law was the cross to which he felt himself nailed.”<sup>11</sup>

Paul “hated” the law. Thus, “he sought about for means of *destroying* it—and no longer to fulfill it.” If Paul’s objective became the destruction of the law, the instrument he sought is other than the law itself: Paul’s thought leads him to an alternative instrument; it leads him to the revelation of the *reasonable* idea of the instrumentality of Jesus for the destruction of the law—that is, for “the way out . . . [from his] moral despair: . . . it is *unreasonable* . . . to persecute precisely this Christ! For here is the way out . . . the Cross . . . [was] *necessary* for the *abolition* of the law!”<sup>12</sup>

It could be deduced, then, that Nietzsche’s idea of the instrumentality of reason originates from the self-reflection of the mind following one’s disappointment with his initial idea of the perfection of his ideal. This is the perfection that collapses under its exposure to the moral question raised in the moment in which the ideal is brought to the realm of practice. Nietzsche does not come to deal with the idea of the instrumentality of reason in view of his treatment of Socrates: Nietzsche’s uncovering of Socrates’s hidden (later) self-consciousness of the instrumentality of reason results from Nietzsche’s projecting of his image of Paul onto that of Socrates. More precisely, Nietzsche’s earlier reading (in *Daybreak* [1881]) of Paul’s problem of moral despair—involved in his

practice of the law—is not only projected onto “Luther . . . [who] wanted in his monastery to become the perfect man of the spiritual ideal.”<sup>13</sup> It is also projected onto Nietzsche’s later reading (in *Beyond Good and Evil* [1886]) of Socrates. In the case of Paul, Nietzsche explains how to “really read”<sup>14</sup> the well-known story of the conversion of the apostle from Saul to Paul. But in the case of Socrates, Nietzsche says that he is uncovering one of the many secrets of “that great ironist,”<sup>15</sup> whereas he does not speak earlier about Socrates’s secret conversion. If that is the case, there is sound basis to assume that Nietzsche approached the later (1886) and the unknown (Socrates’s secret conversion) with the help of the earlier (1881) and the known (Paul’s overt conversion). If Socrates, Plato, Jesus, and Paul are the main figures in Nietzsche’s attempt to change the course of history, the basic figure among those four is that of Paul.<sup>16</sup>

Nietzsche’s Paul becomes the center of the unity comprising Socrates, Nietzsche, and Paul in Nietzsche’s thought. Nietzsche reads his own (modern) experience and the experience of Socrates of the arousal of the moral question within practice in view of his reading of Paul. My thesis defended hereafter is that the significance of Paul for Nietzsche is constituted by Paul being Nietzsche’s exemplar: Nietzsche’s Paul is the practical positive-maker of slave-morality, whose place Nietzsche sought to occupy as the practical positive-maker of noble-morality, insofar as Nietzsche rejects the Pauline claim concerning Christianity’s inversion of Judaism. In addition, it is in view of this Nietzschean Paul that Socratic reason and Jesus’s Buddhism become Nietzsche’s instruments.

To this end, I want to first emphasize Nietzsche’s self-reflection in the same terms with which he reflects on Paul in the above quotation.<sup>17</sup> As early as 1908, Bernoulli wrote about Nietzsche’s “vision” of the idea of the eternal recurrence of the same that “Nietzsche had experienced . . . in that first summer at Sils his day of Damascus; it was as if the scales were falling from his eyes; he completed the progression from No to Yes; Saul became Paul; the pessimist became optimist.”<sup>18</sup>

In continuity with this insight of Bernoulli's, Nietzsche's reflection on the Nietzsche-Paul relationship includes four points. First, Nietzsche says for Paul "the destiny of the Jews—no, of all mankind—seems to him to be tied to this notion."<sup>19</sup> And in parallel, Nietzsche explains to his reader "Why I am a Destiny": "I know my fate. One day my name will be associated with the memory of . . . a crisis without equal on earth, the most profound collision of conscience, a decision that was conjured up *against* everything that had been believed, demanded, hallowed so far. I am no man, I am dynamite."<sup>20</sup> Nietzsche warns against being interpreted as a "founder of a religion" or as "holy" (like Paul). And in view of this, he prefers to be considered "a buffoon" (like Socrates).<sup>21</sup> Second, Nietzsche wrote about Paul's revelation that "this second of his sudden enlightenment, he possesses the idea of ideas, the key of keys, the light of lights."<sup>22</sup> Similarly, Nietzsche describes his own *Thus Spoke Zarathustra's* "experience of inspiration" in terms of revelation.<sup>23</sup> Third, of Paul Nietzsche writes that he found that "history revolves around him."<sup>24</sup> In parallel, Nietzsche's self-interpretation adds: "The uncovering of Christian morality is an event without parallel, a real catastrophe. He that is enlightened about that, is a *force majeure*, a destiny—he breaks the history of mankind in two. One lives before him, one lives after him."<sup>25</sup> Fourth, and last, if Paul is "the teacher of the *destruction of the law*," Zarathustra is "*the teacher of the eternal recurrence*."<sup>26</sup>

Nietzsche's relationship to Paul cannot be explicated through the oversimplified terms of animosity.<sup>27</sup> And Nietzsche's later works cannot be dismissed, or alternatively be positively evaluated, as polemical.<sup>28</sup> It is only the *Genealogy of Morals* that Nietzsche calls polemical.<sup>29</sup> I can agree concerning the idea of the negative character of the language of Nietzsche's noble-morality. I insist though on the fact that such negativity belongs to the *Antichrist* itself. Yet, it is not polemics that is meant to turn the negative to become positive.<sup>30</sup> I am aiming here to show the identity of the negative character of both the Antichrist and noble-morality, and also to show continually that the *ultimate* positive standpoint of both Nietzsche and Paul belongs to the originally positive origin, that

they belong to Dionysus (Nietzsche) and to Abraham (Paul), insofar as that origin for which polemic becomes irrelevant, or at best secondary.<sup>31</sup>

One should then turn anew to the “interest to work out that particular understanding of Paul from which Nietzsche directed his harsh attack in his late work, since it provides an important resource for the proper interpretation of Nietzsche’s own philosophy of the ‘transvaluation of all values.’”<sup>32</sup> But while Salaquarda states that to pursue such an interpretation further no longer lies within his investigation,<sup>33</sup> this work takes upon itself the task of exceeding these limits of investigation. I have already begun this task by showing how Nietzsche’s Paul is the source according to which Nietzsche uncovers Socrates’s hidden instrumentality of reason. In order to expand this claim, one should further develop Salaquarda’s Nietzsche-Paul “dialectical resemblance” with a criticism of his formulation of this dialectical resemblance in terms of the proposition “the ‘revaluator’ Nietzsche confronts the ‘revaluator’ Paul.”<sup>34</sup> The Nietzschean dialectics “*Dionysus versus the Crucified*”<sup>35</sup> is one between noble-morality and slave-morality.<sup>36</sup> If that is the case, then according to Salaquarda’s proposition, Paul is the revaluator of noble-morality and Nietzsche is the revaluator of slave-morality. This way, and insofar as Priestly Judaism is the revaluator of noble-morality, the proposition in question abolishes the distinction between Priestly Judaism and Paul’s Christianity. Salaquarda reconstructs a Nietzschean “history of morals”<sup>37</sup> whose second phase (antithesis of the natural thesis) is the history of decadent movement, to which Judaism belongs, and which does not succeed in seizing power until the rise of Christianity.<sup>38</sup>

If one admits the diminishing of the significance of the Jewish phase, the thesis fits well with Nietzsche’s conception of Judaism and Christianity as the revaluation of natural values,<sup>39</sup> and his conception of himself as revaluator of all values.<sup>40</sup> One can then conclude together with Salaquarda:

It becomes apparent that he [Nietzsche] describes it [his “revaluation”] in a formal sense as a kind of synthesis akin to that of Hegel.

Nietzsche's *synthesis* is first of all a return to the thesis: the type of the "master morality" is again to become valid. In a second sense, it is a negation of the antithesis: it opposes the values of *décadence* and seeks to overthrow their (exclusive) legitimacy. Thirdly, it is preservation: Nietzsche does not want a *mere* return to the "master morality," but is interested in a forward movement in which the experiences of humanity on its way to the present are to be overcome and yet preserved.<sup>41</sup>

I do agree with those who ascribe the first two impulses to Nietzsche and disagree with the idea of overcoming-preservation (*Aufhebung*), which Salaquarda's idea of the Nietzsche-Paul dialectical resemblance is meant to defend.<sup>42</sup> For he is claiming that Paul's revaluation is the overcoming-preservation of noble-morality and Nietzsche's overcoming-preservation is the revaluation of slave-morality. But the fact is that the Nietzsche-Paul dialectical resemblance stands on an absolutely different ground. First, Nietzsche is not at all interested in a forward movement in which the experiences of humanity on its way to the present are to be overcome and yet preserved. To the contrary, Nietzsche's problem par excellence is that of preserving Christianity after the failure of Hegel's overcoming-preservation. To put it in the terms of the above discussion comparing Paul and Socrates, to overcome and preserve is to have the perfect ideal that has already resolved its historical dialectics and therefore whose practice does not invite the moral question. And if Nietzsche finds himself invited into this question, it should be deduced that Hegel's kind of Modernity is preserved, but could not be overcome. Salaquarda ignores this. Also, he ignores Nietzsche's search for forgetfulness,<sup>43</sup> as well as his criticism of Hegel's preservation of Christianity.<sup>44</sup>

On what ground, then, does the Nietzsche-Paul dialectical resemblance really stand? In contrast to Salaquarda's reconstruction of Nietzsche's history of morals, I insist on the fact that, for Nietzsche, there exists a genuine difference between Judaism and Christianity: the re-

valuation of noble-morality belongs to Priestly Judaism before Paul. The significance of Paul against the background of this achievement of Priestly Judaism is a practical one. This task consists of bringing out the already existing values of slave-morality from the depth of the negative to the surface of the positive. It is in these terms alone that the instrumentality of Jesus for Paul becomes significant: Jesus is Paul's instrument for the sublimation of the Jewish hatred in the Christian love; he is Paul's salvation of slave-morality's concept of the good from its negative character within the Jewish law. This act is by no means an act of overcoming-preservation of noble-morality. This act conceals of noble-morality that which Priestly Judaism could not conceal: the traces of the noble in the problematic economy of sin and punishment. Thus, for Nietzsche, Paul's Christian love is an overcoming-without-preservation and overcoming-preservation at one and the same time: it is the overcoming-without-preservation of noble-morality and the overcoming-preservation of the Jewish law. Presenting reevaluation in terms of overcoming-preservation alone seems to be confusing the Jewish law with noble-morality. Additionally, this confusion forms the background for understanding how this presentation overlooks one more integral component of the Nietzsche-Paul dialectical resemblance: the faith of Abraham as the thesis of Paul. For when recognized, one has to recognize the Jewish law as its antithesis, and thereby discover his reductive equation of the Jewish law and noble-morality.

Beyond this criticism, I want to add that the faith of Abraham is the origin to which Paul's return is a return *and* is not a return. It is not a mere return but rather a forward movement in relation to the Jewish law, that is, insofar as the Christian faith is the overcoming-preservation of the Jewish law. At the same time, it remains nonetheless a mere return in view of noble-morality: the direct relationship between Abraham's faith and the Christian faith is the source of the legitimacy of the Christian faith, apart from any historical dialectics, and apart from any negative standpoint that the Christian faith may occupy within such a historical dialectics. If the Christian faith represents

both the negative term of the Jewish law *and* the negative term of noble-morality, the return of this faith to Abraham legitimizes this faith apart from its overcoming-preservation of the Jewish law.

The second half of this claim now should follow: Nietzsche resembles this Pauline scheme. As I wish to show, Nietzsche's genealogy is about the refutation of the legitimacy of Paul's origin. I have shown that this genealogy reveals the true origin; it reveals noble-morality, which slave-morality had concealed. Thereafter, the destroyer of slave-morality (the Antichrist) makes a return to this newly revealed origin: a return that legitimizes the Antichrist apart from the negativity inherent in its act and its name. In sum, if genealogy reveals the anti-Dionysus in Christ, the Anti-Christ becomes the anti-anti-Dionysus: *the Antichrist is the return of Dionysus*. The legitimacy of this return relies on an interpretation inherent in the Christian myth. Nietzsche does not evaluate Christianity as an objective observer, but as one who was reared within the tradition and obsessed with the truth and value of Christian claims long after he had rejected them.<sup>45</sup> For Nietzsche, the history of Christianity is the practical involvement in fulfilling the perfect ideal. And this history has resulted in an experience of disappointment with such an ideal: "the whole of history is the refutation by experiment of the principle of the so called 'moral world order.'"<sup>46</sup> Still, the myth of the Antichrist constitutes the location in which the Christian text's self-negation becomes that self-overcoming returning back before its earliest constituting moment, that is, the moment of the constitution of slave-morality long before Paul:

What the name of Zarathustra means in my mouth, the mouth of the first immoralist[?] . . . Zarathustra was the first to consider the fight of good and evil the very wheel in the machinery of things: the transposition of morality into the metaphysical realm, as a force, cause, and end in itself, is *his* work. . . . Zarathustra created this most calamitous error, morality; consequently, he must also be the first to recognize it. . . . Zarathustra is more truthful than any other

thinker. His doctrine, and his alone, posits truthfulness as the highest virtue.<sup>47</sup>

And what would the name of Paul mean in Nietzsche's mouth if not the same as Zarathustra? "The self-overcoming of morality, out of truthfulness; the self-overcoming of the moralist into his opposite."<sup>48</sup> If with Nietzsche, and if for the sake of truthfulness, Paul returns back to correct himself in negating himself in his absolute opposition, and not their synthesis, it would be a mistake to say that in this way Paul preserves himself: instead, in this way Paul erases himself. Nietzsche wants a return to Dionysus. Nietzsche does not want to preserve the history of Christianity. As Paul wanted to conceal noble-morality, the new Paul (Nietzsche) wants to forget slave-morality. If that is correct, the Antichrist has been legitimized and has proved the existence of its values in the revealed noble-morality. On this basis, there remains before Nietzsche the task of realizing the out-bringing of those values from the depth of the negative to the surface of the positive. And here, Nietzsche follows Paul and relies on the Buddhism of Jesus as his instrument for the completion of this task.

The relationship between noble-morality and slave-morality is one between irreconcilable oppositions. On this basis, the Nietzsche-Paul dialectical resemblance includes an overcoming-preservation *and* an overcoming-without-preservation. With this in mind, the Christian overcoming-preservation of Judaism should be formulated in terms of sublimation (and not in terms of the Hegelian *Aufhebung*). My point is that the logic of the Hegelian *Aufhebung* assumes that universal totality according to which the movement of overcoming-preservation does not, and cannot, keep anything (such as noble-morality) outside (the Spirit). On the other hand, the logic of (the Nietzschean) sublimation relegates the movement of overcoming-preservation within the boundaries of an instinct: sublimation expresses the refinement of some instinct. Hence, sublimation acknowledges the possibility that something (such as noble-morality) can remain outside its limits. The result is then that

the Christian faith is the *sublimation* of the Jewish law *and* the *repression* of noble-morality.<sup>49</sup>

Nietzsche points to the birth of the Christian love from the Jewish hatred as sublimation.<sup>50</sup> Moreover, one could add that since Salazar-da's point of view had looked for the idea of overcoming-preservation elsewhere—that is, between slave and noble moralities—it missed the *fictional* moment of self-negation in the sainthood of Paul:

Let us ask what precisely about . . . [the] phenomenon of the saint has seemed so enormously interesting. . . . It was the air of the miraculous that goes with it—namely, the immediate *succession of opposites*, of states of the soul that are judges morally in opposite ways. It seemed palpable that a “bad man” was suddenly transformed into a “saint,” a good man. The psychology we have had suffered shipwreck at this point: wasn't this chiefly because it had placed itself under the dominion of morals, because it, too, *believed* in opposite moral values and saw, read, *interpreted* these opposites into the text and the facts? What? The “miracle” merely a mistake of interpretation? A lack of philology?<sup>51</sup>

Nietzsche corrects the mistake involved in the interpretation of how a bad man is suddenly transformed into a saint, a good man: the immediate succession of opposites, the succession bad man and good man, the succession Saul and Paul is fictional—self-negation is fictional. Under the totality of the will to power (that is, the totality composed of overcoming-preservation and overcoming-without-preservation), the fictional character of the negation (in Saint Paul's self-negation) does not refer Paul's self to the Jewish instinct. Rather, the self here refers to the will to power underlying the Jewish instinct: “with Paul the priest again sought power . . . his requirement was power.”<sup>52</sup> Hence, insofar as power refers to instincts other than Paul's Jewish instinct, the Christian overcoming-preservation of Judaism is reduced to a preservation and a fictional overcoming. For overcoming as such is found in the noble

instinct. And if the Christian overcoming-preservation does not apply to both slave and noble moralities, then the overcoming-without-preservation (that is, negation) of *the Jewish instinct* is fictional. Or, to put it otherwise, if the Christian overcoming-without-preservation of noble-morality does not erase the fictional character of its overcoming-preservation of Judaism, then the will to power cannot be reduced to the terms of the Hegelian *Aufhebung*: the will to power involves both an overcoming-preservation and overcoming-without-preservation.

To *re*attain power an instrument is needed: “Paul willed the end. . . . [His requirement was *power* and] *consequently* he willed the means.”<sup>53</sup> As anticipated, Jesus was Paul’s instrument: Saul dies with Christ and Paul is resurrected with him. The instrument makes the conversion possible. More precisely, this instrument conceals the sublimation and presents it as self-negation. In sum, the grounds for Nietzsche’s interpretation of (Paul’s) sainthood is the will to power: if “life itself is *will to power*”<sup>54</sup>—if it is also true that *the* meaning of asceticism is a will to nothingness<sup>55</sup>—then the phenomenon of the saint cannot be taken to transcend this law of life.

### Illusory Innocence and Decadence

According to the Nietzschean genealogy of slave-morality, Paul, the first Christian, resolved the crisis of Priestly Judaism’s economy of sin and punishment, which Nietzsche tries to imitate. Yet, Nietzsche’s attempt to overcome Christianity turns his criticism into a negative one: Nietzsche finds the Christian rehabilitation of slave-morality’s concept of the good to be problematic. How, then, do these two contradictory aspects come together?

It is already clear that the Nietzschean genealogy of the priest is the place in which the unity of man—or of the aristocrat and the slave—is realized as the birth of the human in the history of Christianity. Seen from the perspective of Nietzsche’s “artistic conscience,”<sup>56</sup> or his artist’s “good conscience,”<sup>57</sup> this fact is translated into the Nietzschean

proposition “in man, . . . [whose Dionysian imperative is to] have it [suffering] higher and worse than ever, . . . *creature* and *creator* are united.”<sup>58</sup> Accordingly, the aesthetic action of the will to power in this-world is translated into the horrible, ugly cruelty and torture of evil in the language of slave-morality. This basic Nietzschean text turns to Pauline Christian love with the reminder that to love, in this-world, is to act out one’s will to power. Despite this, Christian morality masks this evil, which is necessarily involved in Christian love as good, or, better, as its only positive virtue: “*God on the cross*—is the fearful hidden meaning behind this symbol still understood?—Everything that suffers, everything that hangs on the Cross, is *divine*. . . . We all hang on the Cross, consequently *we* are divine. . . . We alone are divine.”<sup>59</sup>

Christianity does not denote Christian love (of the transcendent other) as evil cruelty, but instead as good sacrifice, as the good self-cruelty and self-torture. Does this not mean that Christian love corresponds to the order of life-affirmation, that Christianity affirms suffering in order to return back to this-world? The above argument leads toward a primary positive answer to this question, which Nietzsche affirms:

The Jews are the counterparts of *décadents*: they have been compelled to *act* as *décadents* to the point of illusion, they have known, with a *non plus ultra* of histrionic genius, how to place themselves at the head of all *décadence* movements (—as the Christianity of *Paul*—) so as to make of them something stronger than any party *affirmative* of life. For the kind of man who desires to attain power through Judaism and Christianity, the *priestly* kind, *décadence* is only a *means*: this kind of man has a life-interest in making mankind *sick* and in inverting the concepts of “good” and “evil,” “true” and “false” in a mortally dangerous and world-calumniating sense.<sup>60</sup>

And yet, Nietzsche adds this later *ultimate* criticism: “Ultimately the point is to what *end* a lie is told. That ‘holy’ ends are lacking in Christianity is *my* objection to its means. Only *bad* ends: the poisoning, slandering,

denying of life, contempt for the body, the denigration and self-violation of man through the concept of sin—*consequently* its means too are bad.”<sup>61</sup>

The ultimate focus of Nietzsche’s criticism of slave-morality is his demand for what I shall call an *authentic lie*: the lie that does not produce the illusion of the other world that becomes, as illusion, the negating alternative of this-world. Seen from this perspective, the Christian lie is confusing. On the one hand, it produces the illusion that it is of the kind of the Dionysian, that is, that it ends tragically.<sup>62</sup> And on the other, there remains the danger, which does realize itself, that priestly men would act as decadents to the point of illusion: to use decadence to that extreme in which the priestly man becomes *naïve* and forgets that the will to power was acting as decadent, therefore turning to have decadence as an end. And for Nietzsche, this is the problem of the Priestly, which starts by affirming life but ends by negating it.

This Nietzschean conception of the *naïvety of faith* (as opposed to his genealogical consciousness) becomes the keyword for my understanding of Nietzsche’s rejection of slave-morality’s illusion. Seen first apart from the problem of the unauthentic priestly lie, naïvety can represent Nietzsche’s idea of health. Thus, in view of Nietzsche’s history of Christianity until this point, it can be asserted that Nietzsche’s idea of early Greek religion and of Early Judaism refers to the idea of healthy naïvety in *local particularities*. This is the idea of the existence of one sole faith that remains true in view of its reference to itself alone, a self-reference that equates the naïve faith with an unquestionable absolute truth. Local, particular life is solitary. This naïve life can be seen as lacking all contact to other external faiths. Thus, the faith of local life is not brought to question or justify itself in the framework of some philosophical-historical dialectics external to it, and consequently does not fall under the danger of losing its innocent naïvety. Likewise, Nietzsche does not conceive of this naïvety as given. Rather, it is a naïvety attainable through (dialectical) struggle.

For the young Nietzsche, this idea of naïvety is represented in Apollonian art. Contrary to Schiller, Nietzsche rejects the idea of a stage of

the unity of man with nature as if it were a simple and self-evident unavoidable state: a state necessarily found at the beginnings of all cultures.<sup>63</sup> This claim becomes clearer by turning to the genealogy of the Christian in the *Genealogy of Morals*. The genius of Christianity, according to Nietzsche, consists in its bringing of humanity's growing consciousness of debt to a halt. Christianity's paradoxical relief of humanity is one in which God sacrifices himself for the guilt of mankind. God pays himself since he is "the only being who can redeem man from what has become unredeemable for man himself—the creditor sacrifices himself for his debtor, out of *love* (can one credit that?), out of love for his debtor!"<sup>64</sup>

Everything that precedes the definitive ordering of rank of the different national elements in every great racial synthesis, is reflected in the confused genealogies of their gods. The advent of the Christian God, as the maximum God attained so far, was therefore accompanied by the maximum feeling of guilty indebtedness on earth. Presuming we have gradually entered upon the *reverse* course, there is no small probability that with the irresistible decline of faith in the Christian God there is now also a considerable decline in mankind's feeling of guilt; indeed, the prospect cannot be dismissed that the complete and definitive victory of atheism might free mankind of this whole feeling of guilty indebtedness toward its origin, its *causa prima*. Atheism and a kind of *second innocence* belong together.<sup>65</sup>

On the one side, Nietzsche anticipates the result of modern atheism to be a kind of second innocence after universality's eradication of local particularities, that is, after "its triumph over the independent nobility."<sup>66</sup> On the other, Nietzsche sees that Christianity only "afforded temporary relief" to the problem of humanity's growing bad conscience of debt: "Now to him that worketh is the reward not reckoned of grace, but of debt. But to him that worketh not, but believeth on him that justifieth the ungodly, his faith is counted for righteousness."<sup>67</sup>

This points back to Jesus as an instrument in the hands of Nietzsche and Paul. For Nietzsche, Jesus (or Buddhism or modern atheism) is the instrument toward a new naivety, a new Dionysius, transcending the totality of the history of Christianity, that is, transcending its maximum God. For (Nietzsche's) Paul, Jesus (or the resurrecting God after his suffering on the cross) was only a temporarily successful instrument toward a new naivety (new faith) transcending the totality of the history of Judaism, that is, transcending its accumulating debt and punishing God. This attempt is temporary due to the fact that it lasted for the time between Paul and Nietzsche. For Nietzsche's genealogy of slave-morality uncovers the concealed aristocratic other underneath its proposition of good and evil as well as the concealed Jewish God in Priestly Judaism's and Christianity's sublimated continuum. Thus, Nietzsche's genealogy shows that the Christian faith has become an unauthentic lie. If the Nietzschean genealogy reveals the historical dialectics that the Christian faith conceals, this faith's atheism in the Jewish God cannot anymore be said to be the innocence of a single and sole faith.

Yet, the Nietzschean genealogy of the Christian faith shows this faith to have attained an illusory naivety in view of the unauthenticity of its lie. This is the illusion of naivety that the only-ness and sole-ness of the universal produce. This fact recalls the birth of Christianity from skepticism, skepticism that demanded the Christian faith as much as it demanded faith as such, or skepticism that demanded the identity of the Christian faith with faith as such. This identity represents the Christian faith as both universal and particular. And here, Nietzsche denotes as illusionary the apparent simplicity of the Christian faith's universality: Nietzsche claims that the Christian God is universal and yet complex, yet a maximum God.

The Nietzschean genealogy of the Christian faith in slave-morality demonstrates this fact. This genealogy shows that the illusion of the simplicity of the Christian faith results from the external absence of Christianity's others. But this absence is not genuine but the mere concealment of these others—that is, the plurality (of the complex as against

the simple) concealed in the depth of the Christian soul. And in fact, this illusion is nothing but the illusion that Christianity is a return to the naivety of the local particularity. But it should be kept in mind that Nietzsche's negative criticism does not fall on illusion as such, but on unauthentic illusion. For once this unauthentic illusion is believed, then this-world's reality, or the otherness that constitutes the totality of the real man as subject and as object, is believed to be sin, and nothingness is believed to be the true object of man: to believe in the Christian faith—or to act as decadents to the point of illusion, to the point of the possible and of the necessary—is not nihilism; rather, it *leads* to nihilism. Nietzsche then rejects that illusion which claims itself to be a universal synthesis, that illusion which claims to have overcome historical dialectics and its other within this dialectic. This rejection takes place when, on the one hand, the belief in such untrue illusion brings man back to innocence *and* when, on the other hand, genealogy reveals the fact that such illusion is still involved in historical dialectic.

I have already demonstrated how Jesus's religion and Socratic reason are opposite instruments. Naivety beyond the history of Christianity demands Jesus (Buddhism) as its instrument. Genealogy, on the other hand, demands Socratic dialectics as its instrument. Within history, and on the edge of history, the Nietzschean genealogy is noninnocence *par excellence*: it binds suspicion in motivations and interests.<sup>68</sup> And through its usage of the exposing-revealing Socratic dialectics,<sup>69</sup> Nietzsche's genealogy keeps revealing before modern consciousness the *history* that "we no longer see because it [*the slave revolt in morality*]"—has been victorious."<sup>70</sup>

### The Limits of Genealogy

Following Paul, Nietzsche's return to the Dionysian is a return to a naive origin: a return to the authentic lie being the one faith/truth lying beyond historical dialectic,<sup>71</sup> where the Dionysian is now seen as innocent rather than as flawed by original sin.<sup>72</sup> And returning to the

sought-after origin raises the question about the proper praxis toward it. Thus, under which condition does the idea of the praxis of Nietzsche's Paul come to complete the idea of the strategy of his Paul? This question brings into focus the above-discussed opposition between the instrumentality of reason and the instrumentality of (Jesus's) religion. More specifically, the following idea should be considered here: it is through his own *experience of disappointment* that Nietzsche reads the idea of instrumentality in Socrates's and Paul's experiences of disappointment. If Nietzsche did indeed go through such an experience, then his reading of Socrates and Paul seeks to find the proper instrument for a way out from such experience. And as Nietzsche's reading of Socrates follows his reading of Paul, the instrumentality of religion reaches beyond the instrumentality of reason. The problem that shall occupy the remaining pages of this chapter concerns the limits of the instrumentality of reason, which in turn demand the instrumentality of religion.

The first point to be treated in the context of this problem is a short elucidation of the idea of Nietzsche's experience of disappointment. One way in which to read such an experience is from the point of view of Nietzsche's biography, as growing from deep religiosity toward strong atheism.<sup>73</sup> For it is true that the "man who says *God is dead* and the man who now rejects a doctrine he used to hold are in truth not one and the same. The one who says *God is dead* is the one for whom God used to be alive, used to be a Thou, and we know that for Nietzsche in his youth He was certainly that. So we are witnessing a tragedy, that of denial."<sup>74</sup> Or, more accurately, we are witnessing a disappointment. Second, and more importantly, Nietzsche's disappointment is founded in his departure from his earlier Schopenhauer-Wagner world. And that would be the dominant script for his life, according to which he viewed his life on the model of Saul-Paul with the sudden departure in the middle of the first Bayreuth Festival (1876) marking the satisfying dramatic moment of conversion.<sup>75</sup> Third, what remains primarily decisive in this context is Hegelian philosophy being the background of Nietzsche's thought. If Hegelian philosophy had invented its historical others in order to

overcome-preserve them, and if such overcoming-preservation had failed, what remains after Hegel is Modernity's embracing of such otherness. It is here that, for Nietzsche, the moral question becomes demanding. It is here where the modern ideal synthesis collapses to give way to Nietzsche's question about the legitimacy of the moral judgment of the modern subject before its other.

The picture that Nietzsche's genealogy unfolds before modern consciousness thereby shows that man is the totality of man's instincts. But the history of man does not reveal the totality of man's instincts. History reveals before historical consciousness only those instincts that the historical narration points to as being part of history. Thus History renders the idea of the plurality of man's instincts, yet it can reveal this plurality only partially—in view of the limits of its historical horizon—and thus cannot divine man's future. For the future is open for the realization of instincts of which we are not historically conscious (that is, instincts that at least were never realized in genealogically known history).

Extending the horizon of the historical consciousness by exploring the forgotten regions of the history of the human soul may bring the knowledge of man's future to a higher degree of certainty. But one cannot be fully certain about man's future insofar as the idea of the plurality of man's instincts does not exclude the possibility that this plurality can be infinite. Thus, seeking a practical way toward a future beyond nihilism cannot rely on the possibility of its legitimacy as *the mere denied depth* (of the deep instinct). Nietzsche's genealogy, being the extension of man's historical horizon (or his discovery of the Dionysian), becomes bound to the task of uncovering the denied depth of man *as repressed*, or as that which once appeared on the surface and was later repressed into the depth of man: for Nietzschean genealogy it is thus not entirely right to say there are no facts, only interpretations. There are facts, but only insofar as they inhere in interpretations.<sup>76</sup>

Nietzsche's turn indeed legitimizes the possibility of the Dionysian and delegitimizes slave-morality as man's sole possible perspective. Still,

this turn reduces the horizon of what is legitimate: it produces a gap between what ought to be legitimized (mere depth) and what seems to be practically legitimized. One cannot but become suspicious of the legitimacy of Nietzsche's Dionysus as one rooted in the idea of the legitimacy of the deep as such. This suspicion has grown from the moment in which Nietzsche is witnessed reducing the problem of *modern* atheism to Christian atheism through his following the path of Pauline logic and practice, which delimits the history of man to the concept of overcoming and its following derivations (or *Aufhebung*, sublimation, and repression).

At this point, I want to keep developing this cardinal criticism of Nietzsche to a further stage,<sup>77</sup> and turn to ask how Nietzsche is led on this path. Nietzschean genealogy exposes the possibly seen horizon of human experience as a plurality of instincts before consciousness. In this view, genealogy only delegitimizes tyranny before plurality. But the consciousness of plurality is that *temporality* from which the question of the future challenges Modernity:

In an age of disintegration that mixes races indiscriminately, human beings have in their bodies the heritage of multiple origins, that is, opposite, and often not merely opposite, drives and value standards that fight each other and rarely permit each other any rest. Such human beings of late cultures and refracted lights will on the average be weaker human beings: their most profound desire is that the war which they *are* should come to an end.<sup>78</sup>

If it is assumed that Nietzsche's view of Modernity is that of an end—that is, of an age of disintegration—these words could be taken to reflect Nietzsche's genealogical consciousness. This is the consciousness that sees the (modern) body comprising the heritage of multiple origins. One comes to realize that Nietzsche's problem, emerging from his genealogical consciousness, appears in the resulting self-reflection of the

two types of man that he describes. This problem relates to the *equality* among the instincts that have gathered along man's genealogical experience. Moreover, this equality results in the lack of a principle that is *authentic* as well as unified or simple (and not a mere illusion of a synthesis) and that alone can make judgments and evaluations possible. Genealogical consciousness demands an order that *necessarily* involves self-negation: "sabbath of Sabbaths. . . . [on the side of the] weak [type of man] . . . [and] self-control, self-outwitting. . . . [on the side of the] powerful"<sup>79</sup> type of man.

It can here be claimed that it is this Nietzschean genealogical consciousness that leads Nietzsche toward the elaboration of his Pauline practical solution, the solution according to which the genealogical spectrum of man's instincts is ordered (that is, narrated, in the form of repressed deep history of [Pauline] overcoming). The Nietzschean history of Christianity becomes the history of (Socratic) reason. The history of reason is the history of the teleology of reason insofar as this teleology is that of the instrument which had revealed man's instincts along history, and which ends by revealing its instrumental essence in the end of its history, in the moment in which it reveals before genealogical consciousness, *at the same time*, all those instincts that this instrument served. Genealogical reason reveals the dialectical claims of all man's instincts, and thereby becomes that practical solution which rejects them in view of their historical character. Genealogical reason overcomes the condition of the plurality of equal, indiscriminate, and nonunique instincts by way of negating them all as purely historical (that is, as justified only in the past moment in which they were justifiable and as unjustified at this moment). This is the moment in which reason justifies man's instincts altogether, and thereby negates them altogether. In order to connect Nietzsche's opposition between Socratic irony and Jesus's symbolism with his rejection of irony,<sup>80</sup> it can be asserted that the limits of genealogy constitute the end of (Socratic) irony: the end of the possibility that one meaning (instinct)

appears on the surface when another meaning (instinct) remains latent, in the moment, moreover, in which genealogical reason brings all possibly knowable instincts to the surface.

As a result of its negation of all historical instinct, genealogical reason not only negates the actual instinct claiming for absoluteness, but also negates all past instincts revealed in man's repressed depth insofar as those are historical instincts. Genealogical reason ends the delegitimizing results of both slave-morality and noble-morality. Accordingly, Nietzsche—insofar as he delimits the legitimacy of the Dionysian within history rather than within metaphysics—does not secure for the Dionysian its legitimacy in nature as such: Nietzsche locates the Dionysian within what may be called natural culture and natural state. This is the status of the origin: the starting point of human culture in which the singularity of the Dionysian is pre-given. The initial state of human culture is historical and yet does not result from, or involve, historical dialectics.<sup>81</sup>

It now appears how the idea of origin *protects* the Dionysian Antichrist from the destructive impact of the realization of the teleology of the instrumentality of reason in genealogical consciousness. It has thus been shown how Nietzsche's genealogical consciousness leads Nietzsche into the path of Paul: First, the overcoming of noble-morality (Paul) and slave-morality (Nietzsche) is realized through the negation of all laws (Paul)<sup>82</sup> and all instincts (Nietzsche). Second, this negation does not necessarily result in a return to nature as such.<sup>83</sup> Third, this negation can result instead in a return to the original culture: to Abraham (Paul) and to Dionysius (Nietzsche). For the origin as such does not suffer the relativity from which all laws suffer. It is true that, for Nietzsche, truth is discovered in a process of self-recognition.<sup>84</sup> Nietzsche's attack on Socratism indicates that Nietzsche sought truth without any kind of justification (or dialectics). However, as I explain here, the legitimacy of (Dionysian) art as an innocent origin clarifies how Nietzsche's truth can be aesthetically justified without being discursively

justified. In the *Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life*, Nietzsche's idea of the destructive character of history does not differ from his later idea of the destructive character of genealogy:

When the historical sense reigns *without restraint*, and all its consequences are realized, it uproots the future because it destroys illusions and robs the things that exists of the atmosphere in which alone they can live. Historical justice . . . always undermines the living thing and brings it down: Its judgment is always annihilating. . . . [This is what] one can learn in the case of Christianity . . . under the influence of a historical treatment.<sup>85</sup>

On behalf of this, Nietzsche makes the “demand that man should above all learn to live and should employ history only in *the service of the life he has learned to live*.”<sup>86</sup> But in this essay, Nietzsche neither tells us anything directly about life nor conceals it from us.<sup>87</sup> If that is the case, Nietzsche (who could not give a definition of life *before* the use of history) turns the order of the young Nietzsche on its head: after the use of genealogy, life shall be lived in the form of a new naivety.

## 5.

### SCIENCE AND ART AFTER THE DEATH OF GOD

#### God is Dead

Once Nietzsche discovers Christianity as an unauthentic lie with the help his *modern* genealogical consciousness, a tight linkage between Christianity and Modernity comes to the fore, thereby making room for the formulation of the following points. First, the Nietzschean criticism of Christianity is not independent, but connected to his criticism of Modernity. Nietzsche's criticism of Modernity constitutes the starting point, according to which he proceeds to criticize Christianity within a history culminating in Modernity. Second, the Christian-modern continuum, which this history establishes, points to the discovery of Christianity's lack of naive simplicity as one belonging to Modernity. The case is that modern genealogical consciousness conceives of Modernity as an *accumulation* of the whole history of Christianity. And this fact renders the simple naivety of the *purification* of Christianity in Modernity *as morality* questionable. Or, put in its reversed form, it is due to Nietzsche's discovery of the nonauthenticity of the lie of modern morality that Nietzsche is brought to uncover Christianity's concealment of the noble-slave dialectics, a concealment that renders impossible a genuine synthesis of this dialectics along the Christian-modern

continuum. Third, insofar as Modernity—as the accumulation of the whole history of Christianity—contradicts the idea of the simple naivety of the purification of Christianity in modern morality, such purification is not the synthesis of the noble-slave dialectics. It is rather the conclusion of Christianity in Modernity. Moreover, the *naïve belief* in modern morality as a simple synthesis of the history of Christianity is the path of Modernity to pure asceticism.

If it is assumed that, for Nietzsche, Modernity includes both the purification of Christianity and the accumulation of the whole of its history, the definition of Modernity becomes one that turns around the question of the continuity-discontinuity relationship between Modernity and Christianity. This relationship of continuity *and* discontinuity excludes the identity of Modernity with Christianity, something that Nietzsche's own words explicitly affirm.<sup>1</sup> In addition, and from the perspective of the purification of Christianity in Modernity, this continuity-discontinuity relationship is developmental: Christianity is concluded in Modernity. But such a conclusion does not reduce this continuity-discontinuity relationship to an antithetical relationship according to which Modernity is the antithesis of Christianity. For Modernity is also the accumulation of the history of Christianity. Besides its conclusion of Christianity in morality, Modernity includes the (possibility of the) immoral Dionysian, that is, the anti-Christian. In sum, Modernity has a continuity-discontinuity relationship with the Christian and a continuity-discontinuity relationship with the anti-Christian, that is, the Dionysian. But if Modernity's continuity with Christianity (morality) means its antithetical discontinuity with the Dionysian, Modernity's discontinuity with Christianity does not necessarily mean that Modernity is identical with the Dionysian.

It is Modernity's *discontinuity* with Christianity that defines Modernity *as other* to both the Dionysian and the Christian. This turns the discontinuity of Modernity with Christianity to the touchstone for a definition proper to Modernity. The development of this initial definition of Modernity should be furthered in the frame of the Nietzschean his-

tory of Christianity. How should this task be approached? So far, the reconstruction of the Nietzschean history of Christianity saw the question of the value of life from the viewpoint of suffering as its axis. Accordingly, in turning to Modernity as part of this history, it should be asked how Nietzsche sees Modernity answering this question, insofar as this answer marks Modernity's discontinuity with Christianity. Additionally, the Nietzschean history of Christianity identified science and art as being discontinuous with Christianity, and more precisely as anti-Christian Dionysian. The definition of Modernity within the Nietzschean history of Christianity (or according to Modernity's continuity-discontinuity relationships with the Dionysian and the Christian) may be formulated as the following question: what would be the definition of Modernity according to Nietzsche's view of the discontinuity of *modern science* and *modern art* with Christianity, in view of the answer that these two give to the problem of suffering?

My approach to this question starts with the examination of the continuity-discontinuity relationship between Christianity and Modernity as it is marked by "the greatest recent event—that 'God is dead': that the belief in the Christian god has become unbelievable."<sup>2</sup> This great event of the unbelief in the Christian God not only marks, as it may seem, the relationship of discontinuity between Modernity and Christianity, but also marks its relationship of continuity, particularly as Nietzsche adds that this event is only "beginning to cast its first shadows over Europe."<sup>3</sup> Nietzsche's *cheerful*<sup>4</sup> announcement from *The Gay Science* that "God is dead"<sup>5</sup> is an event that has not fully ended. In addition, this event is a prophecy:<sup>6</sup> It is announced by a madman (wearing the mask of Diogenes of Sinope)<sup>7</sup> to men who are God's murderers and yet do not know of what they did.<sup>8</sup> The incompleteness of this event points in the direction of the task that Nietzsche sets before himself: "to vanquish his [God's] shadow, too."<sup>9</sup>

If that is correct, and if the *event* of the death of God speaks of "historical atheism"<sup>10</sup> in the Christian God,<sup>11</sup> then the task of atheism is not yet completed: modern man is not cheerful and gay, which is as it should

be after this event. The task of Modernity is to overcome the Christian God completely. Modernity cannot remain continuous-discontinuous with Christianity. If God is dead, the modern reproduction, or secularization, of Christianity—being the remaining shadow of God—is a nonauthentic lie insofar as this lie is a dead lie.

As the event of the death of God takes place under these circumstances (that is, not being fully completed), modern man kills God and yet keeps his shadow. Put another way, modern man kills God in order to keep his shadow. Thus, God's *own shadow* is the cause of the death of God. Which is then the shadow of God? Following the conversation between the "retired Pope" and Zarathustra, God's own pity is the cause of his death: God died "choked on his all-too-great pity." Yet, it is also clear from Zarathustra's questioning of the old pope, who "was blind in one eye," that he takes the old pope's testimony to be apparently true, or better yet as an incomplete testimony. In this conversation, Zarathustra repeats that God might have died in more than one way: "Surely it might have happened that way—that way, and also in some other way." Nietzsche's intention in making Zarathustra thus question the pope is not one directed at the possibility that some other cause, *besides* God's pity, has also brought him to his death. Nietzsche wants to say that the old pope, despite his close relationship to God (being his servant), does not know completely of *how* God died. The pope does not know of this *how* more than "what they say."<sup>12</sup> As I shall demonstrate next, it is a fact that the old pope is one-eyed, which explains his lack of complete knowledge about how God died.

The case is that God did not only die choked on his all-too-great pity, for God was also murdered by "the Ugliest Man."<sup>13</sup> This is the man whom Zarathustra meets immediately after meeting the old pope:

Zarathustra. . . . saw something sitting by the way. . . . And all at once a profound sense of shame overcame Zarathustra for having laid eyes on such a thing [who said]: . . . "Zarathustra! Zarathustra! Guess my riddle! Speak, speak! What is *the revenge against the witness?* . . .

But when Zarathustra had heard these words . . . *pity seized him*; and he sank down all at once. . . . But immediately he rose. . . . [and said:] “*you are the murderer of God!* Let me go. You could not *bear* him who saw *you*—who always saw you through and through, you ugliest man! You took revenge on this witness!”<sup>14</sup>

God’s pity remains the reason behind his death: pity choked and killed God. The killing of God is the riddle that was hidden from the old pope. But why could the old pope not know of this despite his close relationship to God? I mentioned that the answer lies in the fact that the old pope was one-eyed. How is that? Nietzsche clarifies this problem in his other writings, starting with *The Antichrist*. This is where Nietzsche “give[s] a few examples of what these petty people [early Christians] *have put into the mouth* of their master [Jesus].”<sup>15</sup> The following is one of these examples: “‘And if thine eye offend thee, pluck it out; it is better for thee to enter into the kingdom of God with one eye, than having two eyes to be cast into hell fire: Where their worm dieth not, and the fire is not quenched.’ (Mark ix, 47–48)—It is not precisely the eye that is meant.”<sup>16</sup>

Although later, in the *Twilight of the Idols*, Nietzsche writes that “fortunately no Christian follows this prescription,”<sup>17</sup> the old pope (to consider the allegorical spirit of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*) seems to be an exceptional case here. Yet here, Nietzsche clarifies that it is not precisely the eye that is meant. What is meant is man’s “passions. . . . [and] desires,”<sup>18</sup> which this Christian point of view fights with “methods [that] seem like those of a dentist whose sole cure for pain is to pull out the teeth.”<sup>19</sup> According to this, Nietzsche is here drawing a contrast between the old pope and the ugliest man. But this contrast is not meant to make of the old pope the most beautiful:

We no longer admire dentists who *pull out* teeth to stop them hurting. . . . On the other hand, it is only fair to admit that on the soil out of which Christianity grew the concept “*spiritualization* of

passion” could not possibly be conceived. For the primitive Church, as is well known, fought *against* the “intelligent” in favor of the “poor in spirit”: how could one expect from it an intelligent war against passion?—Church combats the passion with excision in every sense of the word: its practice, its “cure” is *castration*. It never asks: “How can one spiritualize, beautify, deify a desire?”—It has at all times laid the emphasis of its discipline on extirpation (of sensuality, of pride, of lust for power, of avarice, of revengefulness).—But to attack the passions at their roots means to attack life at its roots: the practice of the Church is *hostile to life*.<sup>20</sup>

It is clear, then, that Zarathustra’s old pope, as one may deduce from his profession (or his practice, his cure), is one who follows the teachings of the primitive church. The primitive church does not fight passion by way of spiritualization but by way of castration. Thus, the old pope, after plucking out his eye, is totally unaware that passion can be possibly ugly *or* beautiful. In continuity with this, and when Zarathustra rejects the Christian God (for “he [God] wreaked revenge on his. . . never finished . . . pots and creations for having bungled them himself”),<sup>21</sup> the old pope can imagine another form of piety after the death of his Christian God: “O Zarathustra, with such disbelief you are more pious than you believe. Some god in you must have converted you to your godlessness. Is it not your piety itself that no longer lets you believe in a god?”<sup>22</sup> Nietzsche here identifies one kind of atheism. This is atheism as the negation of God *as Christianity’s* God. Within this concept of atheism, there remains the possibility that modern man may become a-Christianly religious.<sup>23</sup> This is the possibility “that the religious instinct . . . [is] in the process of growing powerfully,”<sup>24</sup> which may bring modern man to make even an ass into his God.<sup>25</sup>

Nietzsche’s previously quoted words now demand more attention: “on the soil out of which Christianity grew the concept spiritualization of passion could not possibly be conceived.” As anticipated, Christianity’s spiritualization of passion refers to an aspect of Christianity other

than that of castration. This is in fact the order of the beautiful and the ugly. Christian spiritualization refers to Christianity's beautifying of man. And, in turn, Christian spiritualization makes reference to the ugliness of man. Thus, insofar as the ugliest man is the murderer of God, Christian spiritualization leads to a second Nietzschean conception of atheism, according to which the death of God is an act of murder.

It is clear enough that Zarathustra's ugliest man is the murderer of God. Yet, to conceive of this second conception of atheism, I further recall my discussion of the idea that the cause standing behind man's murdering of God is man's *bad conscience*. I claim here, accordingly, that the ugliness of man represents man's feeling of bad conscience, and thereby that the ugliest man is the later *modern* man, within the *cumulative* history of Christianity, holding "the maximum feeling of guilty indebtedness."<sup>26</sup> I base this claim on the following two considerations: First, the eye, which the old pope does not have, is the eye that the ugliest man together with God, as the "witness [of man's ugliness, . . . the witness who] saw [his ugliness]. . . . through and through,"<sup>27</sup> possesses. This is the *eye of pessimism*. It is the eye that sees the ugly instead of the beautiful "pure forms":<sup>28</sup> "In the Manu Law-Book . . . only the most spiritual human beings are permitted beauty, beautiful things. . . . On the other hand, nothing is more strictly forbidden them than ugly manners or a pessimistic outlook, an eye that *makes ugly*. . . . 'The world is perfect' — thus speaks the instinct of the most spiritual, the affirmative instinct."<sup>29</sup>

Being antithetical to Christianity, according to its purposes,<sup>30</sup> the Manu Law-Book points in the direction of noble-morality. And accordingly, it leads to a second consideration: considering his talk with Zarathustra against "the little people . . . [and] the preacher . . . who himself came from among them,"<sup>31</sup> the ugliest man descends from a noble origin.<sup>32</sup> This noble man has the eye that makes ugly, or the eye that, like the eye of God, sees man's passions in man's *depth*: "he [God] saw man's depths and ultimate grounds, all his concealed disgrace and ugliness."<sup>33</sup> And, following my previous analysis, to see the passions in the depth of man means to see them with a bad eye, that is, as evil. Accordingly,

and in view of his noble origin, the ugliest man, who should affirm evil, suffers from bad conscience, the conscience of his passions being the original evil depth.

One should ask here whether the idea of the ugliest man's bad conscience as his conscience of his passionate original evil depth contradicts the fact that pity was the cause of the death of God. Zarathustra answers this question negatively as soon as he departs from the ugliest man: "How poor man is after all, . . . how ugly, how wheezing, how full of hidden shame! I have been told that man loves himself: ah, how great must this self-love be! How much contempt stands against! This fellow too loved himself, even as he despised himself: a great lover he seems to me, and a great despiser."<sup>34</sup>

God does not return in Zarathustra, as Tillich sees it.<sup>35</sup> If the death of (the son of) the Jewish God made a New Testament possible (that is, renewed the reflection of God-man through the Christian love), the *modern* death of the Christian God is the ultimate end of such reflection; and consequently, it is the birth of a new alternative conception of love.<sup>36</sup> On the one hand, and according to God's love, man's depth, man's passion, or man's original sin is pitiful. And when God pities man, God knows one solution: God sacrifices himself, he dies choked on his all-too-great pity. It is according to this Christian way of reasoning that the old pope, as seen above, could read a new testament, a new piety born from Zarathustra's atheism. Still, according to (the ugliest) man's new self-love, man's depth, man's passion, man's ugliness is not pitiful or sinful but shameful: The new ugliest man kills God because of God's pity, or pity through which this God does not reflect man anymore.

Nietzsche's idea of bad conscience, as represented through man's conscience of his ugliness in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, resembles the same idea in the *Genealogy of Morals*. Toward the end of *Zarathustra*, the higher men "are merry. . . . From them too their enemy retreats, the spirit of gravity. . . . They have learned to laugh at themselves. . . . Nausea is retreating from [them]. . . . All stupid shame runs away, they unburden themselves."<sup>37</sup> In parallel, man's killing of God, in the *Genealogy of*

*Morals*, results in man's liberating himself from the accumulated debt to God. Man succeeds at overcoming the (bad) conscience of guilt. And after having killed God, man's bad conscience becomes the self-conscience of ugliness, it becomes man's genealogical consciousness for which the history of God is the history of ugly truths (that is, dialectical truths governed by the arbitrariness of the passions accumulated in man's depth). Man thereafter succeeds at connecting atheism with naivety: man substitutes the eye that *makes ugly* with the *naïve laughing eye*, which, as such, makes beautiful; Nietzsche points out that man could not become conscious of the beautiful and the good without becoming conscious of the ugly and evil.<sup>38</sup> I stress that man's becoming conscious of the ugly is bound to the feeling of shamefulfulness and not to the feeling of guilt: shamefulfulness follows guilt. Hence, it is not exactly true that "with the guilt that he has taken upon himself, the ugliest man returns innocence to existence."<sup>39</sup> Instead, the ugliest man promises (beautiful) innocence, as he becomes shameful and not guilty anymore.

The event of the death of God marks a *complete identity* between the continuity and the discontinuity between Christianity and Modernity. On the one side, Modernity is discontinuous with Christianity in view of its murder of the Christian God. On the other, Modernity is continuous with Christianity in view of this same act of murder. It is God's pity—or slave-morality's pity—that Nietzsche uncovers as the only cause of the death of God. What remains after the death of God is one and the same thing: his own shadow, his own pity. The way in which modern science and modern art come to reproduce the shadow of God is the subject of the following sections.

## Modern Science

In *The Gay Science*, and immediately after his elucidation of the "meaning of our cheerfulness"<sup>40</sup> resulting from the death of God, Nietzsche follows the remaining shadow of God by way of turning directly to the realm of modern science. Here, Nietzsche's starting argument is directed

at a criticism of the constancy of modern science's idea that in "science convictions have no rights of citizenship. . . . [o]nly when they decide to descend to the modesty of hypotheses." Nietzsche continues to unfold the meaning of this idea: "more precisely, . . . a conviction may obtain admission to science only when it *ceases* to be a conviction."<sup>41</sup> So he concludes:

Would it not be the first step in the discipline of the scientific spirit that one would not permit oneself any more convictions? Probably this is so: only we still have to ask: *To make it possible for this discipline to begin*, must there not be some prior conviction—even one that is so commanding and unconditional that it sacrifices all other convictions to itself? We see that science also rests on a faith; there simply is no science "without presuppositions."<sup>42</sup>

Since science is still making its first steps within the ongoing history of Christianity, it should depend on this history: science must borrow some prior conviction from the history it has just entered and, at the same time, sacrifice all other convictions. It follows that the validity of this criticism of modern science is grounded in the assumption that modern science works within the framework of genealogical consciousness. Nietzsche can claim that modern science may borrow one faith from many only insofar as modern science is newly born into a reality of a plurality of possible faiths. And these faiths belong to the history (of Christianity), which genealogical consciousness revealed, and which modern science has just entered. Nietzsche's argument against modern science loses its validity without this assumption, for otherwise Nietzsche cannot mark the difference between science's hypothesis as a pre-given faith and as an independent hypothesis.

Against this background, Nietzsche turns to question science's purification (that is, sacrifice) of the accumulated historical faiths before its genealogical consciousness into "a [one] faith."<sup>43</sup> Here, Nietzsche's question does not concern the problem as to whether science should

realize this act of purification or not. Additionally, it does not concern the problem as to whether such an act puts the truth-value of scientific inquiry into question. For Nietzsche, this act speaks of a governing active will moving scientific inquiry from the stage of putting its hypothesis to the stage of proving its truth. That is, in short, science's *will to truth*. Accordingly, and as Nietzsche affirms that there is simply no science without presuppositions, modern science's formulation of such a hypothesis must rely on its contextualization within the history of Christianity.

After this stage, in which it has been made possible for this discipline to begin, Nietzsche takes the question about the latter autonomy of modern science in relation to the history of Christianity as one depending only on the meaning of its will to truth. Nietzsche's question turns out to be directed at the meaning of science's *action* of affirming its one faith: "‘truth at any price.’ . . . ‘At any price’: how well we understand these words once we have offered and slaughtered one faith after another on this altar!"<sup>44</sup>

The question whether *truth* is needed must . . . have been . . . affirmed to such a degree that the principle, the faith, the conviction finds expression: "Nothing is needed *more* than truth." . . . This unconditional will to truth—what is it? Is it the will *not to allow oneself to be deceived*? Or is it the will *not to deceive*? For the will to truth could be interpreted in the second way, too—if only the special case "I do not want to deceive myself" is subsumed under the generalization "I do not want to deceive." But why not deceive? But why not allow oneself to be deceived?<sup>45</sup>

Nietzsche's introduction of the idea of faith in modern science is not meant only to conclude that there is simply no science without presuppositions. The Nietzschean claim that science has its beginning in faith renders a genuine questioning of the value of truth possible. Once truth is read as faith, the value of truth becomes comparable to the value of

untruth. For otherwise, the value of truth remains self-referential: truth or nothing. And consequently, the (lack of) value of untruth also makes its reference to truth alone: untruth or truth. Nevertheless, once faith becomes the grounds from which both truth and illusion emerge, the values of truth and untruth are subjected to the same criteria of usefulness. Nietzsche's critical question becomes the following one: will as will to truth or as will to illusion? And since "both truth and untruth [are] constantly proved to be useful,"<sup>46</sup> then,

"will to truth" does *not* mean "I will not allow myself to be deceived" but—there is no alternative—"I will not deceive, not even myself"; *and with that we stand on moral ground. . . .* Thus the question: "Why science?" leads back to the moral problem: *Why have morality at all* when life, nature, and history are "not moral"? No doubt, those who are truthful in that audacious and ultimate sense that is presupposed by the faith in science *thus affirm another world* than the world of life, nature, and history; and insofar as they affirm this "other world"—look, must they not by the same token negate its counterpart, this world—*our world*?<sup>47</sup>

If that is the case, Nietzsche's criticism of modern science, thus formulated, is reduced to a criticism of morality. Yet, before moving on to see how Nietzsche conceives of "*morality as a problem*," a further account of the continuity-discontinuity relationship of science and Christianity until this point is needed. Nietzsche says that after the death of the Christian God, modern science does not affirm the Christian faith itself but "a faith": "a *metaphysical faith*." Nietzsche does not consider faith in science as identical to the Christian faith: this faith "rests [on], . . . take[s] . . . [its] fire, too, from the flame lit by . . . [the] Christian faith which was also the faith of Plato." And here he adds: "But what if this should become more and more incredible, if nothing should prove to be divine any more unless it were error, blindness, the lie—if God himself should prove to be our most enduring lie?"<sup>48</sup> In this view, and in

harmony with the above conclusion that the shadow of God (pity) constitutes the identity of the continuity and discontinuity of Modernity with Christianity, the following claim can be made. For Nietzsche, Christianity's faith in the Christian God is, *by itself*, an authentic illusion, while modern science is Christianity without Christianity's faith in the Christian God being such an authentic illusion. More explicitly, one finds underneath Nietzsche's previously quoted words—"if God himself should prove to be our most enduring lie"—the penetrating claim that the successful case (which is not without an end) of the life and the death of the Christian God proves that *it is the will to illusion which moves history*. And insofar as, in Modernity, the Christian God is not an authentic lie *anymore*, that is, insofar as the Christian God has become a dead truth, science's metaphysical faith in the divinity of truth cannot be said to be an authentic lie. Again, Nietzsche holds as truth that lie which transcends the dialectics of history (that is, which proves the illusion that it is the sole and only truth, through its vital exercise of its will to power). The Christian God was just such a Nietzschean truth, or such an authentic lie. The death of the Christian God proves that history is the history of the will to illusion. Since God is dead, the truth—or the authentic lie—of the Christian God is not possible anymore.<sup>49</sup> Accordingly, modern science's will to this God is a will to truth, and not a will to the Nietzschean illusory truth. Modern science's will to truth is a nonauthentic lie. In sum, the continuity-discontinuity relationship between Christianity and modern science is one between the Christian faith being an authentic lie and the faith in science being a nonauthentic lie.

In what way does Nietzsche take modern science to be a nonauthentic lie? For Nietzsche,

Science today has absolutely *no* belief in itself, let alone an ideal above it—and where it still inspires passion, love, ardor, and *suffering* at all, it is not the opposite of the ascetic ideal but much rather *the latest and noblest form of it*. . . . Today there are plenty of modest and worthy laborers among scholars, too, who are happy in their little nooks. . . .

They are happy there . . . where so much that is useful remains to be done, . . . where it is not the latest expression of the ascetic ideal.<sup>50</sup>

Nietzsche's main point here is that modern science is not for itself. Modern science does not own an independent faith. Thus, if modern science is not an ideal in itself, it should be read as being subjected to some other ideal above it, that is, subjected either to the ascetic ideal or to art as the ascetic ideal's true antithesis.<sup>51</sup> Otherwise, science remains "a *hiding place* of every kind of discontent, disbelief, gnawing worm, *despectio sui* [self-contempt], bad conscience, . . . [a place where scholars are] *sufferers* who refuse to admit to themselves what they are, with drugged and heedless men, who fear only one thing: *regaining consciousness*."<sup>52</sup> Following this description, one is reminded of the ugliest man. Disbelief, self-contempt, and bad conscience bring up the portrait of the ugliest man,<sup>53</sup> for in being such a hiding place, modern science conceals the ugliness of the murderer of God.

Nietzsche does not see such concealment in a positive light. This concealment (of the ugly) is different from the concealment produced by the making-beautiful eye of art. Instead, this concealment is reached through modern (scientific) work [*Arbeit*]. In *Beyond Good and Evil*, Nietzsche criticizes the kind of concealment of the "proud of itself, stupidly proud, . . . modern, noisy, time-consuming industriousness ('Arbeitsamkeit'), . . . [of the] German middle-class Protestants. . . . [and of the] German scholar. . . . [which] educates and prepares people, more than anything else does, precisely for 'unbelief.'" What is highly important for my discussion here is not this criticism taken alone, but Nietzsche's contextualization of this criticism. This criticism stands between Nietzsche's exultation of religious self-consciousness and of religious concealment. On the one hand, the latter refers to piety as the most "potent means for beautifying man, . . . [to] the *homines religiosi*[s]. . . . impassionate and exaggerated worship of 'pure forms,' . . . [their] cult of surfaces. . . . [born from] the profound suspicious fear of an incurable pessimism" And on the other hand, the former refers to "religious

life[s] . . . self-examination . . . [which] requires a leisure class, or half-leisure, . . . leisure with a good conscience, from way back, by blood, to which the aristocratic feeling that work *disgraces* is not altogether alien.”<sup>54</sup>

Nietzsche holds the kind of concealment that modern work (including modern science’s work) represents to be other to both a genuine concealment and a genuine self-consciousness. Accordingly, with its kind of concealment, modern science is *totally alien* to Nietzsche’s question: what is the meaning of all will to truth? That is, first, through its lack of a genuine self-consciousness, modern science cannot begin to raise this question. Second, through its lack of a genuine concealment, modern science cannot begin to answer this question. Thus, the understanding of this total alienation is the understanding of what Nietzsche means by the meaning of all will to truth.

Nietzsche is making two claims. First, modern science is alienated within its happiness—the happiness that its faith in the useful produces. Second, scholars are sufferers who refuse to admit to themselves what they are. My claim is that what Nietzsche means by the meaning of all will to truth is nothing but the meaning that modern science gives to the problem of suffering. For Nietzsche, the problem of modern science is the problem of its alienation from the question about the meaning of suffering. This claim does not mean that modern science ignores the problem of suffering. Instead, modern science reduces its concept of suffering to the context of usefulness. Once the useful becomes the answer given to the question of suffering, the realm of the meaning of suffering is altogether abolished. For the end of modern scientific technology is the useful application of its knowledge so as “if possible [at all]—‘to abolish suffering.’” And since “there is no more insane ‘if possible’”<sup>55</sup> than this, modern science creates for itself the illusion that suffering could be subjected to the treatment of the realm of usefulness. With such an idea, modern science does not assume what Nietzsche assumes. It does not assume that suffering is inherent in man as such. It thus follows that this assumption demands that suffering be attributed a meaning by modern science. It also follows that ignorance of this

assumption leads to the idea that the question about the meaning of suffering may be avoided.

Thus, modern science—which cannot truly avoid this question—has to conceal its suffering. Modern science, which appeared to lack the possibility of providing any new meaning of suffering, should be located within the history of suffering. This location should be made by way of referring science to the already existing opposite ideals of suffering, namely, the ascetic ideal or the Dionysian ideal. The case of modern science shows that Modernity cannot be said to be a true synthesis of the historical dialectics of the Christian ascetic and the Dionysian ideals. This end reasserts once more the fact that the opposition between these two ideals is irreducible; soothing that opposition brings Nietzsche to demand that modern science should complete its atheist attempt to overcome the Christian dogma by way of subjecting itself to art.

Before such a completion may take place, the fact remains that modern science's idea of truth shows itself to be that of a nonauthentic lie. In order that some faith be read as an authentic lie, it should be proved to be beyond the dialectics of the history of Christianity. The above discussion has shown that modern science cannot fulfill this condition before it subjects itself to art. Christianity successfully concealed its Dionysian other. And this concealment was revealed through Nietzsche's criticism of modern science's overcoming-preservation of the Christian dogma. Unlike Christianity's genuine concealment of the Dionysian, modern science becomes the hiding place of (the ugliness of) the Dionysian other. And under these conditions, modern science can only *escape* historical dialectics. Modern science's forgetfulness of its Dionysian other can be realized only in its purification of Christianity as asceticism. Asceticism stands beyond historical dialectics as a "*will to nothingness*."<sup>56</sup> Yet despite its achievement of such naivety, modern science's will to truth fails to meet life. The idea of being beyond, which Nietzsche demands from an authentic lie, is absolutely the opposite of the idea of being beyond historical dialectics, which modern science creates for itself, as the first affirms this-world while the latter affirms the other-world.

The conclusion that modern science's purification of Christianity from its dogma does not fulfill the condition that modern science's truth be an authentic lie can be further verified. Namely, science's resulting asceticism should be explored further by turning to Nietzsche's unification of the problem of science and that of morality. This unity is reflected in the unity of modern science's overcoming of the Christian dogma and modern morality's (pity's) causing the death of the Christian God. Modern morality is a nonauthentic purification of Christianity. A consideration of the truth of this claim requires a short examination of the Nietzschean conception of the unity in question from the viewpoint of modern morality, or better pity.

For Nietzsche, pity signifies the highest point in the course of the history of Christianity. Pity, as reflected in Schopenhauer's philosophy, is the cause of the death of the Christian God and Zarathustra's "last temptation."<sup>57</sup> The problem, Nietzsche holds, is that the pitying-man identifies suffering in the fellow man as other.<sup>58</sup> Accordingly, pity is grounded in the assumption of an *external* division of man, that is, a pitying-man and a pitied-man. For his part, Nietzsche does not take this external division to be true. For Nietzsche, the plurality of man, as well as man's being both a subject and an object of some action, is internal to the one body.<sup>59</sup> Thus, Zarathustra teaches: "if a friend does you evil [Übles], then say: 'I forgive you what you did to me; but that you have done it to *yourself*—how could I forgive that?'"<sup>60</sup> Zarathustra's point here is the following: insofar as man is plural from within, the act of forgiveness from the side of the external sufferer is meaningless. For the I of the sufferer is found underneath the skin of the person who has caused the sufferer's suffering. Therefore, keeping the idea of forgiveness—which does not erase suffering—becomes the source for accounting for suffering. Consequently, the false idea of the possibility of forgiveness may result in *resentiment*. The idea of possible forgiveness assumes the caused suffering to be an (evil) act made by an external causer of suffering, where the sufferer can only imagine revenge (as the opposite of forgiveness). The idea of possible forgiveness assumes the idea of

possible accountability regarding suffering. But if such forgiveness cannot be realized, given the internal aspect of suffering, man should turn to *ressentiment* against himself, being the source of a suffering *that is impossible to combat*.

Thus, Zarathustra adds: "Thus speaks all great love: it overcomes even forgiveness and pity." The idea of pity is like that of forgiveness: "what in the world has caused more suffering than the folly of the pitying?"<sup>61</sup> The act of pitying (or being together *with* the sufferer in suffering [*Mitleiden*, *Compassion*]) bridges the division between the pitying and the pitied as they become one *in the pitied*. Pity doubles suffering in its donating to suffering. How, then, does pity come to meet its end (that is, abolish suffering)?<sup>62</sup> Pity's only way out from the *accumulation* of suffering is death: "Thus spoke the devil to me once: 'God too has his hell: that is his love of man.' And most recently I heard him say this: 'God is dead; God died of his pity for man.'" <sup>63</sup>

Pity's conception of love is that of Christianity: "the religion of pity."<sup>64</sup> Pity is the reproduction of slave-morality and of its concepts of good and evil. If pity stands on the ground of the belief of the simple unity of the subject (as assumed by the external division of man into a pitying subject and a pitied other), then pity involves an opposition between altruism and egoism governed by the principle of a free will. The pitying one is that man who *freely* decides to activate *good altruism*, and thereby levels himself above *evil egoism* to join the "faith in the community as the *savior*, . . . in the herd."<sup>65</sup> To be more precise, given the being-alone of the pitied-man before the pitying-man's act of pitying, the latter does not exactly join such a community, but rather *constitutes* it.<sup>66</sup> What is highly interesting about this moment is the new concept of the good produced by the modern purified slave-morality as compared with its traditional concept of the good. Before, slave-morality attributed its concept of the good to God and to the passive "*free to be weak . . . lamb*."<sup>67</sup> In its modern version, as pity, the act of demonstrating a free will remains preserved for the pitying-man: the pitied-man, being passive, is excluded from such possibility.

Under the condition that pity has man as a simple atomic unity, one can imagine a scale at the top of which stands an atomic human agency that only pities and does not become pitied, while at its middle stands an agency that is both pitying and pitied, and at its lowest level stands the agency that can only be pitied. But from the perspective of Nietzsche's destruction of the atomic subject—according to which the body of the individual is plurality—there exists no such thing as the absolutely-pitying or the absolutely-pitied. For Nietzsche, the scale of pity described above becomes a circle in which all individual bodies are both pitying and pitied. Nietzsche's immoral speech, as expressed in his concept of "converse pity,"<sup>68</sup> directs itself at the potential immorality of the pitying in man and not at that of both the pitying and the pitied. Accordingly, Nietzsche, who identifies the potentiality of immorality in both the absolutely-pitying and the absolutely-pitied, dismisses the latter one.<sup>69</sup>

Nietzsche turns his speech to the absolutely-pitying to reverse her concept of pity. Nietzsche's reverse concept of pity, his new concept of great love as the reverse of the Christian love that suffers in the pitied, pities its own depth. It pities the ugly instinct that is not evil anymore. Nietzsche's egoistical great love suffers in the creator: "All great love is even above all its pity; for it still wants to create the beloved. 'Myself I sacrifice to my love, and *my neighbor as myself*'—thus runs the speech of all creators. But all creators are hard."<sup>70</sup>

Nietzsche's new Gospel of hard love substitutes the pitying and the pitied in the moral man for the beautiful diamond and the ugly coal in the immoral man: "'Why so hard?' the kitchen coal once said to the diamond. 'After all, are we not close kin?' . . . This new tablet, O my brothers, I place over you: *become hard!*"<sup>71</sup> Once again, the Christian love—love your neighbor as yourself—fulfills the laws of the old tablets of the Old Testament in being that positive formulation through which the negative formulation of the Old Testament is overcome. Nietzsche, after his destruction of slave-morality's concepts of good and evil, does not have man's instincts as evil anymore, but rather as ugly. They remain ugly,

for in them the sum-truth revealed before genealogical consciousness is seen. This sum-truth is the foolish fatality of the passions,<sup>72</sup> in which the eye sees the meaninglessness of suffering. It has been shown that the ugly stands consciously naked (as man and woman in paradise) before two feelings: pity and shame. The logic of pity redeems the ugly under the threat of referring it back to evil. Shame, alternatively, keeps the ugly negative. For shame seeks to keep the ugly hidden from the eyes of its witnesses: the pitying God and the shameful Zarathustra. Nonetheless, when the ugliest man murdered God, he remained naked before Zarathustra's naked eye as his only remaining redeemer.

If Paul sacrificed, through the body of Jesus, his body and the body of the neighbor to redeem the spirit of the Jewish law from its negativity, so does Zarathustra's love: myself I sacrifice to my love, and my neighbor as myself. Through the body of the ugliest man, Zarathustra sacrifices his *most deep self* and the neighbor's self to redeem the ugly body from its negativity. What this analysis of Nietzsche's criticism of pity intends to underline is his demand that modern science should have "a 'faith' . . . so that science can acquire from it a direction, a meaning, a limit, a method, a *right* to exist."<sup>73</sup> Science needs a faith, that is, an authentic lie. It is only art that can provide science with this lie, for in "art . . . [it is] precisely the *lie* [that] is sanctified and the *will to deception* has a good conscience."<sup>74</sup> To give science its good conscience: this is the task of art. For hitherto, the task of science has been to overcome bad conscience: "*Alongside* the bad conscience, all science has grown so far, break, you lovers of knowledge, the old tablets!"<sup>75</sup>

## Modern Art

Modern science has been made ready to receive from art its good conscience. Still, until this moment, the question of whether modern art is ready to embrace science remained an open one. If one is to approach this question following the idea of the intimacy between modern science and the ascetic ideal, this question should be formulated in the fol-

lowing manner: “What is the meaning of ascetic ideals . . . in the case of artists[?]” Immediately after his posing of this question, Nietzsche concludes that the meaning sought here is “*nothing whatever!* . . . Or so many things it amounts to nothing whatever!” And insofar as “the artists . . . [do not] deserve attention in themselves. . . . [for they] have at all times been valets of some morality, philosophy, or religion, . . . [Nietzsche arrives] at the more serious question: What does it mean when a genuine *philosopher* pays homage to the ascetic ideal?”<sup>76</sup> Nietzsche’s argumentation of these two questions shows that his concern is, primarily and mainly, the case of Schopenhauer the philosopher and Wagner the Schopenhauerian artist.

Nietzsche asserts that, “Kant . . . considered art and the beautiful purely from that of the ‘spectator,’ . . . [and defines the beautiful as that] ‘which gives us pleasure *without interest.*’” And “Stendhal. . . emphasizes another effect of the beautiful: ‘the beautiful *promises* happiness’; to him the fact seems to be precisely that the beautiful *arouses the will* (‘interest-edness’).”<sup>77</sup> Here, Nietzsche contrasts the viewpoint of the artist (Stendhal) as creator with that of the philosopher (Kant) as spectator. At the same time, Nietzsche locates Schopenhauer between these two points of view.<sup>78</sup> On the one hand, Schopenhauer’s will is “interested in” Kantian aesthetics, insofar as this aesthetics promises it the standpoint of the spectator it longs for. On the other hand, the location of Schopenhauer between the creator and the spectator does not mean that Schopenhauer belongs to two opposites—the creator and the spectator—which do not themselves belong to each other. Nietzsche’s strategy behind this location of Schopenhauer is to unfold the manner in which the creator and the spectator become *united in the creator*.

For Nietzsche, Schopenhauer is an example of the “great philosopher,” insofar as there is “something typical [of the great philosopher] in him.” By typical, Nietzsche means to refer to the philosopher “in itself [as] it just stands there, stupid to all eternity, like every ‘thing-in-itself.’” When translated from Kant’s language back into Nietzsche’s own language, there remains nothing but the animal in the philosopher:

“Every animal—therefore *la bête philosophe*, too—instinctively strives for the optimum of favorable conditions under which it can expend all its strength and achieve its maximal feeling of power.”<sup>79</sup>

At this point, when “we no longer trace the origin of man in the ‘spirit,’ in the ‘divinity,’ [when] we have placed him back among the animals,”<sup>80</sup> the apparent alienation of the philosopher, as spectator, from being an animal demands an explanation. Nietzsche explains that the philosopher’s animal instinct is asceticism, that is, there where he attains “an optimum condition for the highest and boldest spirituality.”<sup>81</sup> How does this explain the fact that Schopenhauer and Kant, “like all philosophers,” end by judging the beautiful from the point of view of the spectator? For Nietzsche, sublimation guarantees the possibility that the philosopher can become a spectator:

The sight of the beautiful obviously had upon him [Schopenhauer the philosopher] the effect of releasing the *chiefenergy* of his nature (the energy of contemplation and penetration), so that this exploded and all at once became the master of his consciousness. . . . Sensuality is not overcome by the appearance of the aesthetic condition, as Schopenhauer believed, but only transfigured and no longer enters consciousness as sexual excitation.<sup>82</sup>

The beautiful has become the meeting point of the artist’s instinct and the philosopher’s (sublimated) instinct. Since it is the creating-artist who initiates this meeting place, the philosopher’s releasing of the energy of the instinct owes its debt to the artist. For Nietzsche, art encompasses philosophy, while philosophy does not encompass art. Philosophy is interpretable from the viewpoint of art, but art is not interpretable from the viewpoint of philosophy. Indeed, reading art from philosophy, insofar as the philosopher’s instinct is ascetic, affirms art from the viewpoint of the spectator only. To put it in another way, since the philosopher “does *not* deny ‘existence,’ but rather affirms *his* existence and *only* his existence,”<sup>83</sup> it becomes impossible for the philoso-

pher to affirm the creating artist's existence. For the realm of the spectator, being the realm of the philosopher's affirmation, assumes the distance needed for contemplation and penetration between the eye and its object. Philosophy excludes the creative activity of the artist, insofar as this activity demands that there be no distance of the artist from the object. Furthermore, if art is a valet of some morality, philosophy, or religion, then the contest is one between Nietzsche's philosophy and the history of philosophy until Schopenhauer:

Philosophy began as all good things begin: for a long time it lacked the courage for itself. . . . is it not clear that for the longest time . . . [philosophy] contravened the basic demands of morality and conscience (not to speak of *reason* quite generally . . .)—that if a philosopher *had* been conscious of what he was, he would have been compelled to feel himself the embodiment of “nitimur in vetitum”—and consequently *guarded* against “feeling himself,” against becoming conscious of himself? . . . Our entire modern way of life . . . has the appearance sheer *hubris* and godlessness. . . . We violate ourselves nowadays, no doubt of it, we nutcrackers of the soul, ever questioning and questionable, as if life were nothing but cracking nuts; and thus we are bound to grow day-by-day more questionable, *worthier* of asking questions, perhaps also *worthier*—of living?<sup>84</sup>

Here stands *the* question that Nietzsche directs to Modernity: what is the meaning of the will to truth *as self-consciousness*? On the one hand, the history of philosophy—which Nietzsche unfolds here—is the hidden *ugly* history of “*suffer[ing and sacrificing]* for truth.”<sup>85</sup> Accordingly, Nietzsche demands that the philosopher be guarded against feeling himself, against becoming conscious of himself. On the other, modern philosophy represents exactly the opposite of what has been the good conscience of philosophy: modern self-consciousness as the opposite of guarding against becoming conscious. But if philosophy is self-violation, whether in its past or at present, then the form in which philosophy

violates itself in Modernity goes through its self-consciousness. Nietzsche's mere exposition of this fact is the self-consciousness of philosophy. This is its historical self-consciousness. This is philosophy's sin, or its striving for the forbidden. This is, in the end, philosophy's overcoming-preservation of itself. And, for Nietzsche, this is the *fate of Modernity*, its pathos.

I identified above this self-consciousness as Nietzsche's modern genealogical consciousness. Until this moment, art, insofar as it preserved a place for the spectator, seems to have guarded against the all-destructive impact of the dialectics involved in this self-consciousness. In art, philosophy becomes unconscious sublimation. Yet, Nietzsche's philosophy of art has now brought the unconscious to the sphere of genealogical self-consciousness. As an authentic lie, the sublimation of the philosopher's instinct—through the standpoint of the spectator—is not possible anymore. Under these conditions, Modernity is as chaotically meaningless as its history:

The *historical sense* . . . has come to us in the wake of the enchanting and mad *semi-barbarism* into which Europe has been plunged by the democratic mingling of classes and races: only the nineteenth century knows this sense, as its sixth sense. The past of every form and way of life, of cultures that formerly lay right next to each other or one on top of the another, now flows into us "modern souls," thanks to this mixture; our instincts now run back everywhere; we ourselves are a kind of chaos. . . . *Measure* is alien to us.<sup>86</sup>

As anticipated, and here through its historical sense, Modernity *reflects itself in its history* as semibarbarism mixture, chaos, the unmeasured, all that is not the "perfection and ultimate maturity of every culture and art,"<sup>87</sup> and in sum, that which lacks definitive form: the creature. Before this creature, Nietzsche introduces the creator, or the artist. And accordingly, the totality of Modernity's history becomes part of the division of the unity of man as creature and creator. Thus, there remains

before philosophy the possibility of taking the standpoint of the creating artist:

I taught them all *my* creating and striving, to create and carry together into One what in man is fragment and riddle and dreadful accident; as creator, guesser of riddles, and redeemer of accidents, I taught them to work on the future and to redeem with their creation all that *has been*. To redeem what is past in man and to re-create all “it was” until the will says, “Thus I willed it! Thus I shall will it”—this I called redemption and this alone I taught them to call redemption.<sup>88</sup>

In view of the accidental character, the meaninglessness, of man’s history, art meets the demand of unifying the division of man into creature and creator: “In man *creature* and *creator* are united: in man there is material, fragment, excess, clay, dirt, nonsense, chaos; but in man there is also creator, form-giver, hammer hardness, spectator divinity, and seventh day.”<sup>89</sup> For Nietzsche, man’s overcoming of man through man is what constitutes the legitimacy of Modernity. This legitimacy is deduced from the ontology of man as defined by the history of Christianity. That is, that the existence of man is the existence “of an animal soul turned against itself, taking sides against itself.”<sup>90</sup> Departing from this view, Nietzsche gives the otherness of man toward himself in this division a meaning, a direction. This direction is governed by the law of overcoming. But the end of the law of overcoming is not man: “man is a bridge and no end.”<sup>91</sup> If man to man, and if the modern philosophical man did not overcome his historical man, then this overcoming is not about philosophy’s overcoming of religion or art; rather, it is about the overcoming of man himself.

It is through *tragic* art—the redeemer of accidents—that the “overman”<sup>92</sup> can come to meet that which is not history (that is, the eternal recurrence of the same according to which the will says, “thus I willed it and thus I shall will it”). Tragic art is given the task of overcoming

history (to work on the future). It redeems man's history, through the re-creation of all that has been, what is past in man, all it was, from its meaninglessness (that is, from its being a fragment and a riddle and a dreadful accident).

If "since Copernicus, man seems to have got himself on an inclined plane—now he is slipping faster and faster away from the center into . . . nothingness,"<sup>93</sup> then delivering the problem of the division of man to art constitutes Nietzsche's attempt to return man to the center:

The existence on earth of an animal soul turned against itself, taking sides against itself, was something so new, profound, unheard of, enigmatic, contradictory, *and pregnant with a future* that the aspect of the earth was essentially altered. . . . From now on, man . . . gives rise to an interest, a tension, a hope, almost a certainty, as if with him something were announcing and preparing itself, as if man were not a goal but only a way, an episode, a bridge, a great promise.<sup>94</sup>

The findings of Nietzsche's criticism of Modernity give renewed support to two main theses. First, the possibility of Modernity's overcoming-preservation of Christianity cannot be Nietzsche's goal, insofar as he criticizes it as it is already realized in Modernity. Modernity's overcoming-preservation of Christianity is exactly the continuity-discontinuity relationship between Christianity and Modernity, under the condition that the continuous and the discontinuous form an identity. For Nietzsche, modern morality is the overcoming-preservation of Christianity. Second, from the perspective of the idea of overcoming-without-preservation, Nietzsche has even broken the unity of Modernity's overcoming-preservation of Christianity; and, as demonstrated, Modernity's overcoming-without-preservation of Christianity resulted in asceticism. For Nietzsche, asceticism is not genuine overcoming. It is rather otherworldliness. If that is correct, there remains ahead the task of examining what remains from Modernity's worldliness, that is, examining preservation within Modernity's overcoming-preservation.

## 6.

### BEYOND MODERN TEMPORALITY

#### The Teleology of Self-Preservation

The impact of Nietzsche's genealogical criticism of Modernity implies that, until Nietzsche, Modernity held a false self-consciousness of being affirmative of life. If this is the case, Modernity should be in some form worldly, a form according to which the ascetic character of modern science-morality remained so far hidden. To approach the form in which Modernity appears to be worldly, it is time to recall that, for Nietzsche, paradisiacal science remained a survivor after the priest waged a war against it. Now science, which has become modern, remains bound to the context of its continuous-discontinuous relationship with Christianity. Modern science seems to keep *living* as a survivor in spite of being discontinuous or because of being continuous with Christianity. This fact becomes clear as soon as characteristics of science as a survivor find their expression in the place in which Nietzsche locates Modernity's conception of the affirmation of life in the idea of self-preservation:

The wish to preserve oneself is the symptom of a condition of distress, of a limitation of the really fundamental instinct of life which aims at *the expansion of power* and, wishing for that, frequently risks

and even sacrifices self-preservation. . . . That our modern natural sciences have become so thoroughly entangled in this Spinozistic dogma (most recently and worst of all, Darwinism with its incomprehensibly one-sided doctrine of the “struggle for existence”) is probably due to the origins of most natural scientists: in this respect they belong to the “common people.” . . . But a natural scientist should come out of his human nook; and in nature it is not conditions of distress that are *dominant* but overflow and squandering, even to the point of absurdity. The struggle for existence is only an *exception*, a temporary restriction of the will of life. The great and small struggle always revolves around superiority, around growth and expansion, around power—in accordance with the will to power which is the will of life.<sup>1</sup>

Nietzsche assumes that the law of life is one. Accordingly, the will of life, or the affirmation of life, is governed by this one law. Although life may find its expression in the different spheres of nature and culture, the law of life-affirmation does not recognize the division between the human condition and the natural condition. So if the human condition and the natural condition appear to present different wills of life, such a difference should be reduced to the one law of will of life, to the really fundamental instinct of life according to which one condition should embrace and explain the second. Further, Nietzsche criticizes the modern natural scientist’s reduction of the natural condition to the human condition. From the viewpoint of his human nook, the modern natural scientist projects his condition of distress on nature. The modern scientist makes of the wish to preserve oneself the one law of the will of life that extends from the human condition of distress in order to embrace and explain the will of life in nature.

Nietzsche does not criticize this (Spinoza’s modern) attitude by introducing one will of life suitable for the human condition and another will of life suitable for the natural condition.<sup>2</sup> Instead, Nietzsche gives nature priority. The natural scientist should come out of his human nook

and realize that the will of life is a will to power for which the will to survive forms only an *exception*. From this viewpoint, the human condition, as reflected in the modern condition of distress, ceases to be the end of some possible teleology of the human condition, or of both the unity of the human and the natural conditions. If, for Nietzsche, the end of the will of life is power, then the instinct of self-preservation should be subjected to the economy of waste of the will to power.<sup>3</sup> It appears that Nietzsche brings the relationship between the will to power and the will to self-preservation to the limit of *sacrifice*: life's fundamental instinct whose aim is the expansion of power might sacrifice self-preservation.

Nietzsche's claim that the will to power constitutes the only fundamental instinct of life acquires its far reaching implications for Modernity. This claim is the ultimate destruction of Modernity's idea of progress, that is, the idea that man, and thereafter the modern man, constitutes the crown of creation.<sup>4</sup> What is of much more significance at this stage is the fact that this Nietzschean claim is pointing to the role that Nietzsche assigns to Modernity within his history of Christianity. Nietzsche claims that if the will to power is the will of life, then the exceptionality of self-preservation in this frame belongs to the order of the *temporal*: "The struggle for existence is only an *exception*, a temporary restriction of the will of life."<sup>5</sup> If so, and if the instinct of self-preservation defines Modernity, by way of being the instinct through which Modernity legitimizes and affirms (its) life, then Nietzsche's concept of the will to power seems to demand that (temporal) Modernity itself should be sacrificed.

This resulting demand to sacrifice Modernity seems to me to be in absolute harmony with Nietzsche's previously discussed demand that Modernity should be overcome. Such harmony would lead to the task of answering the next question: what is the overcoming of Modernity as the sacrifice of self-preservation? The answer may be formulated as follows: *overcoming Modernity (as self-preservation) is the overcoming of the preserved self through a true return to nature*. This short answer rightly follows the

logic of Nietzsche's criticism of self-preservation. Yet, it still demands a deeper analysis in order to verify the extent to which it affirms the main claim concerning Nietzsche's attempt to provide man with an authentic lie as an alternative to Modernity's uncovered nonauthentic lie.

For Nietzsche, a *true* return to nature is not that of Rousseau's return: it is an overcoming, a *progress*, a *going-up*, rather than a going-back. Going-up to nature is the attainment of the *unity* of nature: the *faith* that only what is separate and individual may be rejected, that in the totality everything is redeemed and affirmed. If some separate and individual faith affirms itself and thereby *dialectically* denies other faiths, the Dionysian faith of Nietzsche or of the Nietzschean Goethe becomes the faith of faiths: the highest of all possible faiths through its *natural* unification of all individual faiths.<sup>6</sup>

For Nietzsche, the return to nature is the overcoming of the shadow of God: "when all these shadows of God [humanizations of the world] cease to darken our minds . . . we [will] complete our re-definition of nature . . . [and] may begin to 'naturalize' humanity in terms of a pure, newly discovered, newly redeemed nature."<sup>7</sup> Second, Nietzsche says that if "we still have to vanquish his [God's] shadow,"<sup>8</sup> "let us [also] beware of thinking that the world is a living being."<sup>9</sup> The unity of nature, which Nietzsche sought, is the unity of the dead: "The living is merely a type of what is dead."<sup>10</sup> Thus, "the will to power which is the will of life,"<sup>11</sup> is the will of the dead world. Further, Nietzsche states that this pure nature does not "have any instinct for self-preservation or any other instinct. . . . There are only necessities. . . . and the whole musical box repeats eternally its tune."<sup>12</sup> It results that this unity of dead nature is a unity without end: the circle of the eternal recurrence of the same.

Turning back to Nietzsche's interpretation of Goethe's "grand attempt to overcome the eighteenth century through a return to nature"<sup>13</sup> illuminates how the totality of the *faith* in the eternal recurrence of the same becomes the totality of the faith in *eternity*, which, as such, rejects the timely, *temporal*, separate, and individual. The legitimacy of the eternal recurrence of the same is that of the *naïve faith in eternity* vis-à-vis the

illegitimacy of the dialectical faith in the historical. It is this aspect that shows the idea of the eternal recurrence in harmony with the idea of overcoming. The faith in the eternal recurrence of the same dictates a necessity; therefore, this faith overcomes or rejects. Its love of its fate (“amor fati”)<sup>14</sup> is not passivity depending on metaphysical necessity; rather, this love makes its faith: “how one becomes what one is.”<sup>15</sup>

Goethe’s eighteenth century, like Nietzsche’s nineteenth century, is a timely Modernity whose overcoming is demanded by that necessity dictated by the faith in the eternal recurrence of the same. Necessity is the overcoming of the superfluous. By way of overcoming, the unity of nature is meant to substitute the unity of the world from the viewpoint of humanization, or the unity of the teleology of self-preservation as a superfluous teleology:

Physiologists should think before putting down the instinct of self-preservation as the cardinal instinct of an organic being. A living thing seeks above all to *discharge* its strength—life itself is will to power; self-preservation is only one of the indirect and most frequent *results*. In short, here as everywhere else, let us beware of *superfluous* teleological principles—one of which is the instinct of self-preservation (we owe it to Spinoza’s inconsistency). Thus method, which must be essentially economy of principles, demands it.<sup>16</sup>

Overcoming, as a true return to nature *and* as the overcoming of the preserved self, is the overcoming of the superfluous. If the teleology of the instinct of self-preservation is superfluous, then the preserved-self itself, insofar as it constitutes the end of this teleology, becomes superfluous. More precisely, what becomes superfluous is the *unity* of the preserved-self, the unity of the preserved-self in being the *grammatical unity of the subject*,<sup>17</sup> which is said to be the modern end of the teleology of the history of Christianity. The preserved-self of the modern subject appears before Nietzsche’s genealogical consciousness as the place in which

man's instincts are accumulated without being brought into (a synthetic) unity. Thus, if a unity is attributed to this subject, this unity cannot be but the mere grammatical unity of the subject. As such, the principle of the will to power rejects the idea of preservation. Moreover, if the (preserved-)self is not a carrier of the will to power (that is, is not a simple instinct), it becomes superfluous from the viewpoint of the necessity of the will to power. Thus, Nietzsche warns: "I fear we are not getting rid of God because we still believe in Grammar."<sup>18</sup> This is God as a place of accumulation: "the Christian God, as the maximum God attained so far."<sup>19</sup>

### The Modern Katechon

Modernity maintains the duality of this-world and the other-world, while the legitimacy of Modernity's worldliness is grounded in this duality. More precisely, the *historical meaning* of Modernity's worldliness is delimited within Christian political theology, or the meaning of man's activity within eschatological time extending from after the resurrection of Jesus-Christ and before the coming of the Antichrist. For Christianity, the death and the resurrection of Jesus-Christ mark the beginning of salvation, which ought to find its completion in his second coming. Jesus-Christ is not the end of history as such, but rather the end of the history of the Jewish law and the beginning of the history of the Christian faith. Eschatological time is the time in which the Christian faith lives, becomes a *time of hope* awaiting Christ. At the same time, this time is a *time of fear* insofar as the Christian text promises catastrophe before salvation. For Christ shall not return before the appearance of the Antichrist.

It is possible to avoid the contraction resulting from the dual nature of Christian time once the Christian believer becomes satisfied with individual salvation that *inner* faith can guarantee. Yet in this way, the contradictory duality of fear and hope is translated from the frame of time to that of space. On the ground of the inner character of the Christian

idea of salvation, this-world's space can be divided into an individual sphere and a collective one. This is where the first one is meant to correspond to the order of the time of hope and the second to the order of the time of fear. The unity of these two spheres assigns to the inner sphere the task of furthering the hoped-for salvation and to the second one the task of postponing the feared catastrophe.

This formulation is one way to observe the birth of the Delayer (Katechon, κατέχων) of the coming of the Antichrist in the Pauline text.<sup>20</sup> Paul's speech on the Katechon allows supposing that Paul, like the recipients of his letter, the Thessalonians, seems to have known the identity of the Katechon.<sup>21</sup> The reader should have noticed that my aim here is one directed at the interpretation of Paul's Katechon in relation to Nietzsche's criticism of Modernity's worldliness from the viewpoint of the principle of life-affirmation. This aim brings the prominent understanding of the Katechon to the focus of our attention, namely, the otherworldly political one.<sup>22</sup>

This political identity of the Katechon is also revealed in view of its in-between location within the symmetry of good and evil, or between Christ and the Antichrist. This is the symmetrical concealment—the existence without appearance—of both sides of the opposition of good and evil in Paul's *Christian now* standing between the past coming of Christ and his future second coming. On the one hand, from the moment of his first coming, Christ is there but shall remain inner until he returns to appear. And on the other, also in this now, the mystery of iniquity is already at work and the Antichrist might be revealed only in his time. In sum, the Katechon's mere occupation of the political outer-sphere, until he be taken out of the way, assures the keeping latent of the already existing Christ and Antichrist. On the basis of our Nietzschean-oriented reading of the Pauline text, this state of things echoes my analysis of Nietzsche's conception of the concealment of the Dionysian as man's deep evil. Besides that, the Pauline concealment of Christ echoes Nietzsche's criticism of Christianity's "truly *grand* politics of revenge, of a farseeing, subterranean, slowly advancing, and premeditated revenge."<sup>23</sup>

The examination of the Nietzschean idea of the modern as Katechon calls his conception of the modern now to the focus of attention. To correspond to the idea of the Katechon, the modern now ought to be defined as the sphere in which the Katechon appears. This appearance can take place under the condition that this sphere is given its legitimacy by the truth of the Christian faith that lies *beyond and underneath* the temporality of the Katechon's sphere. In other words, first, the truth of the Christian faith stands underneath the Katechon's temporality in being its (concealed) grounding metaphysics (of good and evil). Second, it is beyond this temporality in being its past (the death and resurrection of Christ) and in being its future (the second coming of Christ).

The idea of the modern Katechon first appears in Nietzsche's early writings in the context of his praising of Wagner. Here, Nietzsche's Katechon are the Germans: "If the Germans have for a century been especially devoted to the study of history, this shows that within the agitation of the contemporary world they represent the retarding, delaying, pacifying power [*die aufhaltende, verzögernde, beruhigende Macht*]." <sup>24</sup> For Nietzsche, such devotion becomes problematic in being conservative, in being "a coming to rest within oneself, a peaceful being for oneself and relaxation," *in the context of Modernity*, or within the agitation of the contemporary world. In continuity with this, the German Katechon is the delayer of the Antichrist, being *possibly pregnant*, or concealed, in the modern agitation, "all revolutionary and reform movements, . . . everything revolutionary and innovative." At the same time, this German Katechon is the preservation of Christianity. For this "history . . . [is] a disguised Christian theodicy, . . . [therefore it] serve[s] as an opiate."<sup>25</sup>

Two interesting features appear in this Nietzschean portrait of the modern Katechon. The first is the reactive character of the modern Katechon in relation to the revolutionary character of modern times. The case of this reactive character is not that of Christian morality's kind of reaction. The latter "direct[s]. . . . [its creative] value-positing eye . . . outward."<sup>26</sup> The former directs its conservative eye inward. Thus, this

fact speaks of the cleanliness of the modern Katechon's conservatism, of its being preservation-without-overcoming. The second feature is the gap between modern Katechonism, being a coming to rest within oneself, a peaceful being for oneself and relaxation, on the one side, and being "power,"<sup>27</sup> on the other. Here, although the first aspect of this gap points to the inner and the second points to the outer, the case of this gap is by no means one of contradiction. On the contrary, those two aspects preserve the primary characteristics of the Pauline Katechon. The otherworldly (political) power is the preservation of what has been achieved so far, that is, the preservation of inner salvation.

Against the reactive character of the delaying German history, as one emerging against the background of modern agitation, Nietzsche draws his image of Wagner as its alternative. But one should not rush to the conclusion that the early Nietzsche has Wagner as the Antichrist. Instead, amid the modern agitation, Wagner "unites what was separate, feeble and inactive . . . he possesses an *astrigent* power. . . . a spirit who only brings together and arranges: for he is one who unites what he has brought together into a living structure, a *simplifier of the world*."<sup>28</sup>

In his later writings, *German* history continues to signify Nietzsche's conception of the Katechon. And what becomes variable is Nietzsche's view of Wagner together with his view of the Germans.<sup>29</sup> The latter is anticipated in the passage just quoted. The fact that German history represents the idea of the modern Katechon may lead to the result that "some might perhaps turn into a commendation of them [the Germans]."<sup>30</sup> On the one hand, the latter Nietzsche, who had turned against Wagner, does not only preserve the possible commendation of the German Katechon. Nietzsche actually turns his above-discussed argumentation, in *Richard Wagner in Bayreuth*, upside down. The honoring and hope-promising German resistance to Wagner is a sign that they still possess some degree of health amid European decadence: "The Germans, the *delayers* par excellence in history, are today the most retarded civilized nation in Europe: this has its advantages—by the same token they are relatively the *youngest*."<sup>31</sup>

For Nietzsche, this would be the only advantage resulting from the fact that the Germans represent the Katechon. Indeed, on the other hand, Nietzsche continues to see the German delayers in a negative way. Accordingly, Nietzsche's return to "the old problem: 'What is German?'"<sup>32</sup> remains the most important location for the elucidation of this conception of the modern German Katechon:

We Germans are Hegelians even if there never had been any Hegel, insofar as we (unlike all Latins) instinctively attribute a deeper meaning and greater value to becoming and development than what "is." . . . It would be. . . . [another] question whether *Schopenhauer*, too, with his pessimism—that is, the problem of the *value of existence*—had to be precisely a German. I believe not. . . . The decline of the faith in the Christian god, the triumph of scientific atheism, is a generally European event. . . . Conversely, one might charge precisely the Germans . . . that they *delayed* this triumph of atheism most dangerously for the longest time. Hegel in particular was its delayer par excellence, with his grandiose attempt to persuade us of the divinity of existence, appealing as a last resort to our sixth sense, "the historical sense."<sup>33</sup>

Nietzsche's uses of the expression delayer to denote, besides Hegel, Kant, Leibniz, Goethe, German music, and Charlemagne.<sup>34</sup> His conception of the modern Katechon is mainly bound to German Modernity.<sup>35</sup> Aphorism 357 from *The Gay Science* presents, however, Nietzsche's most comprehensive elucidation of his conception of the Katechon. Fundamentally, this aphorism speaks of the idea that "Schopenhauer. . . . [the] pessimist. . . . [the] good European"<sup>36</sup> is the Antichrist (of scientific atheism), and that the German Hegel is his Katechon.<sup>37</sup> By calling Hegel a Katechon, Nietzsche automatically deprives Hegel's philosophy of what it is considered to be, of its being the second coming of Christ insofar as this philosophy claims itself to be the making concrete of the Spirit. Such a result is anticipated in my claim according to which Nietzsche's

philosophy stands against the background of the Hegelian failure to bring the history of the spirit into a genuine synthesis. Here Nietzsche arrives at the conclusion resulting from this failure. If Hegel is not the second coming of Christ, then Hegel is a Katechon. For, structurally, Hegel is back into the now between the first Christ and the second one.

Hegel is not the overcoming-preservation of Christianity. He is the preservation-without-overcoming of Christianity. Nietzsche's confronting of Hegel the Katechon with Schopenhauer the Antichrist leads to Nietzsche's Schopenhauer appropriating the idea of self-overcoming from Hegel:

As a philosopher, Schopenhauer was the *first* admitted and inexorable atheist among us Germans: This was the background of his enmity against Hegel. The ungodliness of existence was for him something given, palpable, indisputable. . . . [and the] unconditional and honest atheism is simply the *presupposition* of the way he poses his problem, . . . being the most fateful act of two thousand years of discipline for truth that in the end forbids itself the *lie* in faith in God. You see what it was that really triumphed over the Christian god: Christian morality itself. . . . Looking at nature as if it were proof of the goodness and governance of god; interpreting history in honor of some divine reason . . . that is *all over* now, that has man's conscience *against* it. . . . In this severity, if anywhere, we are *good* Europeans and heirs of Europe's longest and most courageous self-overcoming.<sup>38</sup>

Nietzsche's substitution of the Hegelian self-overcoming with that of Schopenhauer's overcoming-preservation reduces the earlier to the status of preservation-without-overcoming—indeed, “for without Hegel there could have been no Darwin.”<sup>39</sup> This is, in the end, Modernity's *unauthentic lie*. This is the unbelievable idea of a moral world order, or as the young Nietzsche had anticipated, “history . . . [as] a disguised Christian theodicy, . . . written with [out] . . . justice and warmth of feeling.”<sup>40</sup>

In sum, for Nietzsche, there has been no second return of Christ and there shall be no such return. So far, Modernity reached with Hegel the stage of the Katechon's preservation-without-overcoming and with Schopenhauer the stage of overcoming-preservation. From the point view of Nietzsche, there remains another stage that Schopenhauer's anti-Christian atheism had not achieved. This is the overcoming-without-preservation of Christianity:

*Schopenhauer's question immediately comes to us in a terrifying way: Has existence any meaning at all? It will require a few centuries before this question can even be heard completely and in its full depth. What Schopenhauer himself said in answer to this question was—forgive me—hasty, youthful, only a compromise, a way of remaining—remaining stuck—in precisely those Christian-ascetic moral perspectives in which one had renounced faith along with the faith of God.<sup>41</sup>*

If Schopenhauer is the overcoming-preservation of Christianity, he is the Antichrist only partially. More precisely, Schopenhauerian atheism represents the Antichrist in relation to Hegelian Katechonism insofar as Hegelian Katechonism is the delayer of atheism as such. Hegel delays both the atheism of Schopenhauer and the atheism of Nietzsche (or the atheism of Zarathustra meeting the old pope and the atheism of Zarathustra meeting the ugliest man). Thus, *within* Schopenhauer's overcoming-preservation, overcoming appears to be his mere posing of the question about the meaning of existence, where preservation turns to be his hasty Christian-ascetic moral answer.

Here Nietzsche provides us with an important differentiation between the temporality of preservation within Schopenhauer's overcoming-preservation and the temporality of preservation within the Hegelian delaying preservation-without-overcoming. From the beginning, the temporality of the Hegelian Katechon is one meant to preserve the legitimacy of the Christian Weltanschauung through its delaying of

atheism. On the other hand, the starting point of (Nietzsche's) Schopenhauer is atheism, insofar as he assumed the ungodliness of existence and has the unconditional and honest atheism as his presupposition. The temporality of Schopenhauer's preservation of the shadow of the Christian God turns out to be a later result, a hasty answer, and accordingly a way of remaining stuck.

Nietzsche's Schopenhauer does not provide the legitimacy of the modern Antichrist. This legitimacy, like the legitimacy of the Katechon, is pregiven within the hermeneutics of the determinism of Christian history. This is the case insofar as it is "the most fateful. . . . The event [of the death of the Christian God] after which this problem [of the *value of existence*] was to be expected for certain—an astronomer of the soul could have calculated the very day and hour for it."<sup>42</sup> Schopenhauer's question merely opened up a new sphere of temporality. For Nietzsche, this is the temporality of the *many* following centuries, insofar as "it will require a few centuries before this question can even be heard completely and in its full depth."<sup>43</sup> This is *the temporality of atheism as such*, insofar as the next centuries will remain stuck where Schopenhauer remained stuck, in Christianity's ascetic moral perspectives in which faith is *renounced* along with the faith of God. Out of these words it can be determined that the overcoming-without-preservation, after Schopenhauer's overcoming-preservation, is preserved for some alternative faith, which cannot be (dialectically) renounced: *an authentic faith beyond the history of Christianity*, as a history that includes the two—the Hegelian as well as the Schopenhauerian—phases of the temporality of German-European Modernity.

So far, the development of the Nietzschean history of Christianity has reached its highest point. This is the point at which the "higher man" (*höhere Mensch*) appears as the *last* man on the stage of this history. In this connection, Nietzsche's rejection of the modern idea of progress should be recalled: "'Progress' is merely a modern idea, that is to say a false idea." This rejection should not entail the result that the history of Christianity is not a developmental history: "The European of

today is of far less value than the European of the Renaissance; onward development is not by *any* means, by any necessity the same thing as elevation, advance, strengthening.”<sup>44</sup>

For Nietzsche, the end of the history of Christianity in Modernity is development without progress. What, then, would be Nietzsche’s concept of development that forbids the deduction of the idea of development as progress? My claim remains that Nietzsche defines the development of the history of Christianity as the history of the overcoming-preservation of slave-morality *and* the constant concealment of noble-morality. In using the European of today and the European of the Renaissance, Nietzsche refers to the higher man and the overman [*Übermensch*], respectively. The higher man is the conclusion of the history of Christianity, or its purification in being the ultimate realization of slave-morality’s good man: “But now this God has died. You higher men, this God was your greatest danger. It is only since he lies in his tomb that you have been resurrected. Only now the great noon comes; only now the higher man becomes—lord.”<sup>45</sup> This is the last moment of the overcoming-preservation of Christian slave-morality, of the moment of pity, modern Buddhism, nihilism, pessimism, the wondering free spirit, skepticism, laughter, dance, and the good European.

The modern higher man has become the lord of the stage of the history of Christianity. This is not Nietzsche’s ultimate lord. The higher man is rather a temporal lord. As *such*, “man is a bridge and no end.”<sup>46</sup> Thus, the higher man, or the last man, is himself a bridge. Besides that, the transformation of the higher man into a lord is a reflection of the transformation of Zarathustra. *Zarathustra* (IV) directs his speech “On the Higher Man” to the higher men as he excludes from his audience the ass that was in their company.<sup>47</sup> He excludes the masses to whom *Zarathustra* (I) had turned with such a speech.<sup>48</sup>

The task of temporal Modernity, meant to be realized through the (last) higher man, becomes the overcoming of man so as to reach the overman. If that is correct, the *decisive question* that emerges here is

the following one: is the overman's transcending of man one of overcoming-preservation? Zarathustra says: "You higher men, do you suppose I have come to set right what you have set wrong? . . . No! No! Three times no! Ever more, ever better ones of your kind shall perish—for it shall be ever worse and harder for you. Thus only—thus alone, man grows to the height where lightning strikes and breaks him: lofty enough for lightning."<sup>49</sup>

Zarathustra's answer is negative. If the overman is to appear after the higher man, the overman is not to preserve the higher man. And if the higher man is to overcome himself, the higher man is to perish: the overman represents Nietzsche's nondualistic vision of human perfectibility.<sup>50</sup> Indeed, a positive answer to the above question would necessarily end in a contradiction. If the overman is more valuable than the higher man, and if the overman is the overcoming-preservation of the higher man, it should be concluded that the history of Christianity is a history of progress. This conclusion is avoidable only if the overman is considered as a break, or as an overcoming-without-preservation. Also, this conclusion is avoidable only if the history of Christianity did not preserve the overman (that is, if it had always concealed the overman, even if the overman had appeared along its course), as it is the case of the man of the Renaissance.

### Jerusalem or Athens

I have so far demonstrated my stated claim that the development of the history of Christianity comprises both the overcoming-preservation of slave-morality and the concealment of noble-morality. The chronological order of this history has been found to consist in three parts: the pre-Christian Greek-Jewish, the Jewish-Christian, and the modern. And these three parts correspond to one structure consisting in the (pre-Christian) Dionysian, the (Priestly Jewish Christian) Christ, and the (modern) self-preservation. Taken together, these findings have

located Nietzschean thinking in the bosom of Pauline theology, insofar as these three parts match its triangle consisting of Christ, the Antichrist, and the Katechon.

This is, in short, the Nietzsche-Paul dialectical resemblance: (1) Nietzsche's revaluation of slave-morality, as a return to the Dionysian through its overcoming-without-preservation of slave-morality, which dialectically resembles Paul's revaluation of noble-morality, as in turn a return to Abraham's faith through its overcoming-without-preservation of noble-morality; (2) Modernity's overcoming-preservation of Christianity, which dialectically resembles Paul's overcoming-preservation of Judaism; (3) Nietzsche's truth, as an authentic lie through its situating beyond historical dialectics (if that of slave and noble moralities and if that of Modernity and Christianity), which dialectically resembles Paul's truth, as faith through its situating beyond historical dialectics (if that of slave and noble moralities and if that of Christianity and Judaism); (4) Nietzsche's modern Katechon as seen from the perspective of the Antichrist, which dialectically resembles Paul's Roman Katechon as seen from the point of view of Christ. The Christian tradition, and the Christian tradition alone, grounds the historical and the logical legitimacy of the Nietzschean Antichrist's revaluation of slave-morality.

This end raises a crucial question about the significance of the Dionysian, or, better, of Ancient Greek tradition, as it comes to fill the content of the idea of origin within the Christian structure. The matter of this question is the inspection of the reality vis-à-vis the virtuality of Nietzsche's Dionysian ideal and its Greek horizon as seen from within the Pauline structure. The Dionysian does not seem to be able to transcend its Christian structure. For also when Nietzsche claims noble-morality's values to be natural values, Paul also claims slave-morality's values to be natural values.<sup>51</sup> And as Nietzsche ends by legitimizing the repressed, the truth of the Greek origin becomes relative to the historical horizon opened by the genealogy of Christianity.<sup>52</sup> Besides, for Nietzsche, the Dionysian remains secondary in relation to the Antichrist.

At the last line, Nietzsche's ideal has been shown to be the naive authentic lie as such, and not some specific Dionysian authentic lie. For Nietzsche, this lie is meant to provide the overman with the possibility of "go[ing] *back* to the innocent conscience of the beast of prey."<sup>53</sup>

I opted in this investigation for a path of inquiry into Nietzsche's history of Christianity, or Nietzsche and the Antichrist, in view of my criticism of Heidegger's and Deleuze's inquiry, which delimits itself to the horizon of the history of philosophy, or Nietzsche and the anti-Plato, and as an alternative to it. I do not mean that such criticism should direct itself to some Christian source for the idea of the history of philosophy.<sup>54</sup> Instead, I wish to point to the fact that the horizon of the history of philosophy is pregiven, and consequently, from the start, does not allow the interpretation of Nietzsche's thought beyond the boundaries set by such a horizon. Likewise, the path of inquiry I applied uncovers an open historical horizon of Christianity. Christianity left the name of the Antichrist open to speculations. On the one hand, Christianity binds its name, Christ, with the eternal truth: "we are bound to give thanks always to God for you, brethren beloved of the Lord, because God hath from the beginning chosen you to salvation through sanctification of the Spirit and belief of the truth."<sup>55</sup> And, on the other hand, Christianity binds the name of the Antichrist with any Christian-other, "for all men have not faith,"<sup>56</sup> that is, those who follow "all de-ceivableness of unrighteousness"<sup>57</sup> of the Antichrist. For Christianity, the Antichrist is *the deceiver as such*, whom "all men" believe to be God.<sup>58</sup> And for Nietzsche, the Antichrist is exactly that any deceiving Christian-other, truth as deception, as an authentic *lie*: to use *Thus Spoke Zarathustra's* style and language, Zarathustra's *deceiving* Evangelium.

It is clear by now that the Antichrist acquires in this case the identity of the Dionysian in view of its need of a legitimizing origin *and* in view of the Dionysian becoming such an origin on the basis of the limits of the historical horizon that Nietzsche's genealogy opened. Yet, if the idea of the eternal recurrence of the same is taken to stand at the center of Nietzsche's Dionysian philosophy,<sup>59</sup> it would be as speculative

as it would be excessive to refer the idea of the eternal recurrence of the same to Solomon's *wisdom* in Ecclesiastes. I am not intending to lead the reader in such a direction. My intention has been to show that Modernity's way to Athens (philosophy) goes through Jerusalem (theology).<sup>60</sup>

A closer criticism of this misleading fictional fixation of the horizon of man's history—as it becomes the history of philosophy—further supports this claim. The question about the significance of the Greek Dionysian origin should then be examined through an assessment of its unity, which could reflect its independence from its location within the structure of the history of Christianity. This is, in the end, the unity of the idea of the eternal recurrence of the same, insofar as it becomes Nietzsche's "faith of faiths." I recall here the criticism of Nietzsche's idea of the eternal recurrence as self-contradictory,<sup>61</sup> which implies that the reconstruction of the unity of this idea (as metaphysics) is merely a possible interpretation.<sup>62</sup>

It is helpful at this point to unfold a discussion of Löwith's thesis, insofar as Löwith treats the idea of the eternal recurrence from the point of view of *Nietzsche's Philosophy* together with his criticism of the Christian components in Nietzsche's thought.<sup>63</sup> Löwith's findings speak of the fact that the idea of the eternal recurrence of the same splits into two *irreconcilable* cosmological and anthropological parts. On the one hand, the cosmological part describes the goal-less revolution of the universe. On the other, the anthropological part portrays a superhuman act of the human will that consummates the self-overcoming of nihilism.<sup>64</sup> Löwith finds the second, anthropological part problematic, since it contradicts the positivistic presence of physical energy in the first part. For him, the teaching of the eternal recurrence is a self-made legislation and religion that reflect Nietzsche's desire to raise finite existence to an eternal "significance."<sup>65</sup>

Löwith understands Nietzsche's religiosity as being Christian and un-Greek.<sup>66</sup> I totally agree with Löwith's view of the Christian character of Nietzsche's thought. But I remain suspicious of Löwith's mislead-

ing assumptions since they lead him to conclude that “the Christian pathos . . . caused Nietzsche to speak as an ‘Antichrist’ and no longer as a philosopher.” In taking the viewpoint of Nietzsche’s Dionysian philosophy as his starting point, Löwith condemns Nietzsche’s departure from the path of philosophy and his taking of the Christian path. Löwith makes philosophy a constant and Christianity a variable. Also, Löwith’s philosophical approach creates an *absolute opposition* between Christianity and atheism as such. For Löwith, Nietzsche cooks on the eternal fire of the ancient criticism (of Celsus and Porphyry) of Christianity, but spoils it all by adding much of the pepper of Christian historical dialectics.<sup>67</sup>

From Löwith’s perspective, this is the historical dialectics of modern atheism. Its source, according to Löwith, is Paul’s differentiation between knowledge—as the wisdom of this-world—and the true wisdom of faith, in relation to which the wisdom of this-world is foolishness before God.<sup>68</sup> The history of postchristian (*nachchristliche*), or modern, philosophy (Descartes, Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Jaspers) becomes a history of the ambiguity of atheism in the (church’s) God of revelation and faith in the God of philosophy.<sup>69</sup>

Löwith, like Nietzsche, finds salvation (without Christian-modern ideas such as willing and overcoming) in the return to an authentic *Greek* origin. According to Löwith, Greek philosophy is as “little atheist” as modern philosophy. However, from the viewpoint of Greek philosophy there is no opposition between faith and knowledge. The Greek holding-true (*Fürwahrhalten*) of the doxa and the true knowledge of the episteme are different from faith as pistis.<sup>70</sup> Doxa and episteme, or the popular religion of the polis and theology/philosophy,<sup>71</sup> build a continuum, insofar as the latter seeks a higher knowledge.

Löwith misunderstands Nietzsche’s problem with the capacity of modern atheism to provide an authentic lie, if as truth or as faith. The problem with which Nietzsche is concerned is not one inside the polis. Nietzsche’s problem is not one between knowledge as such and faith as such. Rather, Nietzsche’s problem is one about the dialectics between

the many equals: polis and polis, faith and faith, instinct and instinct, or knowledge and knowledge. Thus, if Nietzsche's atheism is Christian and not Greek, Löwith should have concluded, as I do, that (1) Nietzsche's Christian legitimization of the modern Antichrist brought him to the idea of the legitimacy of the origin as such; (2) Nietzsche's innocent "I am" has the original faith of Abraham as its constitutive model; and (3) insofar as Nietzsche's visible historical horizon could not extend beyond the repressed Greek Dionysus, Nietzsche *becomes* a questionable Dionysian philosopher. Heidegger goes beyond Löwith. For him, Nietzsche's (anti-Platonic) *philosophy* is not merely problematic (in view of its contamination by Christianity) as Löwith has it, but rather it is the necessary "completion" of the history of metaphysics, after which Heidegger can *return* to Parmenides's *alētheia* and "think."<sup>72</sup> Ironically, Nietzsche's becoming a (Dionysian) philosopher turned out to be the trap into which Löwith and Heidegger both fell—through their immediate identification of the idea of the original innocent "I am," or the authentic lie, with ancient Greece.

## NOTES

### Introduction

1. “Es ist schwer zu erkennen, wer ich bin; warten wir hundert Jahre ab—vielleicht gibt es bis dahin irgend ein Genie von Menschenkenner, welches Herrn F. N. ausgräbt.” KGB, 3,3, Briefentwurf an Heinrich von Stein (Mitte März 1885), 27.
2. Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, ed. David Farrell Krell, 4 vols. (New York: Harper Collins, 1991). See also Alfred Denker et al., eds., *Heidegger und Nietzsche, Heidegger-Jahrbuch 2* (Freiburg: Verlag Karl Alber, 2005), Wolfgang Müller-Lauter, *Heidegger und Nietzsche* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2000).
3. Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, 1:4, 3:3, 3:164, 4:148, 4:203. See also EH, “Why I Am a Destiny.”
4. Gilles Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), xi, 9, 195, 197.
5. Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, 1:5.
6. EH, “Why I Am a Destiny,” 9; WP, 1052.
7. See Karl Löwith, *Meaning in History: The Theological Implications of the Philosophy of History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949).
8. See Karl Löwith, *Nietzsche’s Philosophy of the Eternal Recurrence of the Same*, trans. J. Harvey Lomax (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).

9. See, for example, Karl Löwith, "Phänomenologische Ontologie und Protestantische Theologie," in *Sämtliche Schriften*, ed. Klaus Sticheweh and Marc B. de Launay, 9 vols. (Stuttgart: J. B. Metzlersche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1981–1986), 3:1–32.
10. See BGE, preface; TI, "What I Owe to the Ancients," 2.
11. See GS, 357.
12. See Waever Santaniello, *Nietzsche, God, and the Jews: His Critique of Judeo-Christianity in Relation to the Nazi Myth* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1994), 2.
13. See Daniel Havemann, *Der "Apostel der Rache": Nietzsches Paulusdeutung* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2002), 4.
14. Arnold defends Paul, against Nietzsche's attack, in rejecting the idea of Paul's decadence: see Eberhard Arnold, *Unchristliches und Antichristliche im Werdegang Friedrich Nietzsches* (Eilenberg: B. Beckers, 1910). Jesinghaus outlines Nietzsche's image of Paul briefly without intensive analysis: see Walter Jesinghaus, *Nietzsche und Christus* (Berlin: W. Summer, 1913), 34–36. Jaspers locates Jesus at the center of Nietzsche's criticism of Christianity, whereas Paul hardly appears within his account of the Nietzschean criticism of Christianity's (Jewish) falsification of Jesus: see Karl Jaspers, *Nietzsche and Christianity* (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1961), 26–36. And Kaufmann does not go further than acknowledging that "Paul is for Nietzsche 'the first Christian'; the discoverer of faith as a remedy against the incapacity of what one deems to be right action": Walter Kaufmann, *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist*, 4th ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), 344. As for Benz, Paul is nothing more than Nietzsche's most hated Christian: see Ernst Benz, *Nietzsches Ideen zur Geschichte des Christentums und der Kirche* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1956), 36.
15. Jacob Taubes, *The Political Theology of Paul* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004).
16. Taubes reaffirms that, for Nietzsche, Paul is *the* man who determined the values of the Occident, and that Nietzsche's transvaluation of values is an attempt to occupy Paul's place (*ibid.*, 79). Taubes understands this inversion in terms of truth being the possession of "the few" and of the tragic meaning of suffering being the opposition of the Christian meaning of suffering (*ibid.*, 80–84). He further considers Nietzsche's relationship with Paul in terms of envy and jealousy (*ibid.*, 79, 86), and claims that Nietzsche's thinking of the possibility of transcending the

laws of the Pauline world rests on the assumption of the possibility of the exception as miracle: see *ibid.*, 84–85. In this connection, see also Carl Schmitt, *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1985). In this work, I will rather consider and defend the proposition that Nietzsche’s idea of the possibility of exception is not that of the miracle but that of the origin, which is, at one and the same time, a Pauline idea. See also Alain Badiou, *Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003); for Badiou, Paul was an antidialectician (*ibid.*, chap. 6), the same as Deleuze’s Nietzsche was an antidialectician (Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, 195), and thus “Nietzsche is Paul’s rival far more than his opponent” (Badiou, *Saint Paul*, 72). Further in this series, see Giorgio Agamben, *The Time That Remains: A Commentary on the Letter to the Romans* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005); Slavoj Žižek, *The Puppet and the Dwarf: The Perverse Core of Christianity* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2003); Slavoj Žižek, Eric L. Santner, and Kenneth Reinhard, eds., *The Noughber: Three Inquiries in Political Theology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005); Dominik Finkelde, *Politische Eschatologie nach Paulus: Badiou—Agamben—Žižek—Santner* (Vienna: Verlag Turia + Kant, 2007); John Caputo and Linda Martín Alcoff, eds., *St. Paul Among the Philosophers* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009).

17. See Ernst Bertram, *Nietzsche: Versuch einer Mythologie* (Bonn: H. Bouvier, 1965), 62–71. Bertram, along with Fritz Wenzel after him, does not delve further into an analysis of the various aspects and significance of this relationship. See Fritz Wenzel, *Das Paulusbild bei Lagarde, Nietzsche und Rosenberg: Ein Beitrag zum Jesus-Paulus-Problem* (Breslau: R. Nischkowsky, 1937), 37–41. Carl Bernoulli, however, who also follows Bertram, explores the Nietzsche-Paul relationship through a discussion of Nietzsche’s criticism of Paul: Carl A. Bernoulli, *Franz Overbeck und Friedrich Nietzsche: Eine Freundschaft* (Jena: E. Diederichs, 1908); quoted in Jörg Salaquarda, “Dionysus Versus the Crucified One: Nietzsche’s Understanding of the Apostle Paul,” in *Studies in Nietzsche and the Judeo-Christian Tradition*, ed. James C. O’Flaherty, Timothy F. Sellner, and Robert M. Helm (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985), 103. Bernoulli establishes “love” as the common and deciding factor of this relationship and the intimate connection between Paul’s vision on the way to Damascus and Nietzsche’s “vision” of the idea of the eternal recurrence of the same in Sils-Maria (see *ibid.*).

18. See *ibid.*, 102–103. This paper is a slightly modified version of Jörg Salaquarda, “Dionysos gegen den Gekreuzigten: Nietzsches Verständnis des Apostels Paulus,” *Zeitschrift für Religion und Geistesgeschichte* 26 (1974): 97–124. And this German version was again published in Jörg Salaquarda, ed., *Nietzsche* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1980); see also Havemann, *Apostel der Rache*, 11.
19. Salaquarda, “Dionysus Versus the Crucified,” 106, 116, 127, 124–125.
20. Havemann adds that Nietzsche’s own understanding of his criticism renders this criticism a part of the Judeo-Christian tradition; See Havemann, *Apostel der Rache*, 257. And through this location of Nietzsche within theology, Havemann (guided by Nietzsche’s criticism) turns to his primary object, which is the systematic-theological examination of the Pauline doctrine of justification: see *ibid.*, 261–283.
21. See Salaquarda, “Dionysus Versus the Crucified,” 103–110; Havemann, *Apostel der Rache*, 2 and 3.
22. It is important that I add two more methodological notes. First, this work focuses on Nietzsche’s published works, and shall be using the *Nachlaß* to clarify, supplement, and expand upon the interpretation of Nietzsche’s published works. Nietzsche’s *Nachlaß* consists of notes that he decided not to publish. And this includes the posthumously published *Will to Power*, of which three-quarters is notes that were never intended to be published. See Bernd Magnus, “Nietzsche’s Philosophy in 1888: *The Will to Power* and the ‘Übermensch,’” *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 24 (1986): 79–98. Second, to accentuate what the reader should have already noted, this inquiry is one about Nietzsche and Nietzsche’s Paul. It is not about Paul (as it is not about Socrates, Plato, or Jesus). Further, my interests are not meant to be a postsecular revision of Paul (à la Badiou, Agamben, Žižek, and the like). Throughout this work, Paul shall appear through, and only through, a Nietzschean lens. Besides, this study may have theological implications, yet my interests are by no means theological (as appears to be the case in Havemann’s study). In this respect, and from the viewpoint of Catholic theology, see Ulrich Willers, *Friedrich Nietzsches Antichristliche Christologie: Eine Theologische Rekonstruktion* (Innsbruck: Tyrolia, 1988). See further Craig Hovey, *Nietzsche and Theology* (Edinburgh: T and T Clark, 2008).
23. For views in this direction, see, for example, Julian Young, *Nietzsche’s Philosophy of Religion* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Tyler T. Roberts, *Contesting Spirit: Nietzsche, Affirmation, Religion* (Princeton:

Princeton University Press, 1998); Tim Murphy, *Nietzsche, Metaphor, Religion* (New York: State University of New York Press, 2001).

24. See BGE, 47; GM, 3:17. See also my discussion of reason and religion toward the end of the third chapter.

## I. From Dionysian Tragedy to Christianity

1. "Sinn der Religion: die Mißrathenen und Unglücklichen sollen erhalten werden, und durch Verbesserung der Stimmung (Hoffnung und Furcht) vom Selbstmord abgehalten werden. Oder bei den Vornehmen: ein Überschuß von Dank und Erhebung, welcher zu groß ist, als daß er einem Menschen dargebracht werden könnte." KGW, 7.2:25 [300].
2. Ibid.
3. GS, preface for the second edition, 3.
4. Karl Löwith, *Meaning in History: The Theological Implications of the Philosophy of History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949), 3.
5. Francesca Cauchi, "Nietzsche and Pessimism: The Metaphysics Hypostatized," *History of European Ideas* 13 (1991): 254.
6. See Karl Jaspers, *Nietzsche and Christianity* (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1961), 46–62.
7. TI, "What I Owe to the Ancients," 5.
8. See Ivan Soll, "Pessimism and the Tragic View of Life: Reconsiderations of Nietzsche's *Birth of Tragedy*," in *Reading Nietzsche*, ed. Robert C. Solomon and Kathleen M. Higgins (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 104–131.
9. BT, "Attempt at a Self-Criticism," 1. Underline mine. Italics in original.
10. EH, "Why I Write Such Good Books, The Birth of Tragedy," 1.
11. See also EH, "Why I Write Such Good Books, The Birth of Tragedy," 1; BT, "Attempt at a Self-Criticism."
12. Julian Young, *Nietzsche's Philosophy of Art* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 109.
13. See BGE, 225.
14. Walter Kaufmann, *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist*, 4th ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), 129.
15. See TI, "What I Owe to the Ancients," 5.
16. BT, "Attempt at a Self-Criticism," 4.

17. This also corresponds to Nietzsche's definition of the noble's other as "bad" in noble-morality. Further analysis of the relation of tragedy (as evil, reality, illusion, and so on) to Platonism, Christianity, and their intersection follows in this chapter and the next.
18. BT, 7.
19. TI, "How the 'Real World' at Last Became a Myth," 6.
20. BT, 15.
21. See next section below.
22. There are two further questions to add to this one. First, what is the relationship between this turning point and Jesus as a turning point from Judaism to Paul's Christianity? And second, what is its relationship to Nietzsche's modern Antichrist as another turning point marking the end of the history of Christianity? In the following, I attend to Socrates as standing between the Dionysian and Platonism, and offer an extensive analysis of Socrates, Jesus, and Nietzsche as turning points in chapter 3.
23. Kaufmann, *Nietzsche*, 391; also see Werner Dannhauser, *Nietzsche's View of Socrates* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974). For a criticism of Kaufmann's one-sided view of Nietzsche's admiration of Socrates, see Thomas Jovanovski, "Critique of Walter Kaufmann's 'Nietzsche's Attitude Towards Socrates,'" *Nietzsche Studien* 20 (1991): 329–358. For an alternative reading to Kaufmann's, see E. Sandvoss, *Sokrates und Nietzsche* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1966): If Kaufmann's motives were to introduce to the English reader a humanistic view of Nietzsche (as an alternative to the Nazi one), Sandvoss identifies what he calls Nietzsche's tragic ideology (together with Marxist and Freudian ideologies) with Nazism.
24. On Nietzsche's treatment of Socrates as the best exemplar of the philosophical rationalist, see Daw-Nay Evans, "Socrates as Nietzsche's Decadent in *Twilight of the Idols*," *Philosophy and Literature* 34 (2010): 340–347.
25. TI, "Maxims and Arrows," II.
26. See BT, 12–15.
27. TI, "The Problem of Socrates," 2.
28. Za, I, "On Reading and Writing."
29. Ibid.
30. See Kaufmann, *Nietzsche*, 393–396.
31. In anticipation of my discussion in the third and the fourth chapters, I want to note here that such a characterization of Nietzsche's Socrates is comparable to that of Nietzsche's Jesus: Socrates the man, his life and

- his death, is structurally identical to Jesus the man, his life and his death, as two signs for two interpretations—Plato’s interpretation of Socrates and Paul’s interpretation of Jesus. This is the gap between Socrates the man and his successors, a gap that is structurally similar to the gap between Jesus and Christ, or, between the only Christian and his successor Christians, starting with Paul, the first Christian.
32. TI, “The Problem of Socrates,” 11; see also GS, 340; TI, “The Problem of Socrates,” 1. Against this Nietzschean interpretation of Socrates’s last words—“Crito, we owe a cock to Asclepius; make this offering to him and do not forget”—see Laurel A. Madison, “Have We Been Careless with Socrates’ Last Words?: A Rereading of the Phaedo,” *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 40 (2002): 421–436.
  33. BT, 15.
  34. TI, “The Problem of Socrates,” 12.
  35. Ibid.
  36. Martha K. Woodruff, “The Music-Making Socrates: Plato and Nietzsche Revisited, Philosophy and Tragedy Rejoined,” *International Studies in Philosophy* 34 (2002): 182; Reginald J. Hollingdale, *Nietzsche: The Man and His Philosophy* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1965), 95.
  37. BT, “Attempt at a Self-Criticism,” 1.
  38. BT, 13.
  39. TI, “The Problem of Socrates,” 12.
  40. See *ibid.*, 10.
  41. See chapter 2.
  42. Jovanovski, “Critique of Kaufmann,” 330.
  43. BGE, preface.
  44. *Ibid.*, 191.
  45. For more on Nietzsche’s conception of Socrates’s idea of the instrumentality of reason, see chapter 3.
  46. AC, 23.
  47. *Ibid.*
  48. BGE, 46. This discussion concerns Platonism and not Christianity itself. And yet, Nietzsche’s conception of the Christian faith is needed here in order to examine its identity with Platonism. This conception shall be examined at length in chapter 3.
  49. TI, “The Problem of Socrates,” 2.
  50. *Ibid.*

51. See Hermann Josef Schmidt, *Nietzsche und Sokrates: Philosophische Untersuchungen zu Nietzsches Sokratesbild* (Meisenheim am Glan: Anton Hain, 1969), 360.
52. TI, "The Problem of Socrates," 1–2.
53. TI, "How the 'Real World' at Last Became a Myth," 1.
54. In a similar manner, Nietzsche also demands that Early Judaism should have admitted the death of its God, after this God had lost his vitality, instead of opting for its later, decadent, pre-Christian form. See AC, 16–17. Further, see chapter 2.
55. Plato, "Phaedo," in *Plato Complete Works*, ed. John M. Cooper (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997), 71.
56. *Ibid.*, 73.
57. WP, 437.
58. KGW, 4.2:19 [99].
59. Plato, "The Republic," in *Complete Works*, 1210.
60. *Ibid.*, 1211, 1206.
61. EH, "Why I Am a Destiny," 9.
62. TI, "How the 'Real World' at Last Became a Myth," 1–2.
63. See AC, 23.
64. TI, "'Reason' in Philosophy," 1.

## 2. From Judaism to Christianity

1. In Nietzsche's writings, the distinction between Early Judaism as Dionysian life-affirmation and Priestly Judaism as Christian life-negation is projected in "the discerning distinction between the terms 'Israel' and 'the Jews' or 'Judaism.'" Israel Eldad, "Nietzsche and the Old Testament," in *Studies in Nietzsche and the Judeo-Christian Tradition*, ed. James C. O'Flaherty, Timothy F. Sellner, and Robert M. Helm (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985), 48.
2. On this division, see, for example, Michael F. Duffy and Willard Mittelman, "Nietzsche's Attitude Towards the Jews," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 49 (1988): 302. And on its expression of Wellhausen's influence on Nietzsche and the historical imprecision involved in it, see Yirmiyahu Yovel, *Dark Riddle: Hegel, Nietzsche, and the Jews* (Cambridge: Polity, 1998), 152–163. See also Julius Wellhausen, *Prolegomena zur Geschichte Israels* (Berlin: Reimer, 1883).

3. Yovel, *Dark Riddle*, 124.
4. On the young Nietzsche's explicit anti-Semitism, see Duffy and Mittelman, "Nietzsche's Attitude," 302–303. On how Nietzsche became the "Godfather of fascism" and on his nineteenth-century "race language" together with his metaphorical language in relation to Nazi anti-Semitic interpretation, see, respectively, Jacob Golomb and Robert S. Wistrich, "Nietzsche's Politics, Fascism and the Jews," *Nietzsche Studien* 30 (2001): 305–321; and Peter Putz, "Nietzsche und der Antisemitismus," *Nietzsche Studien* 30 (2001): 295–304. Indeed, "the threefold distinction of Jews is a necessary weapon as Nietzsche becomes more politically involved. Affirming ancient Hebrews and contemporary Jews, while deriding Judeo-Christianity as that tradition rooted in *ressentiment*, serves two primary functions. First, it flips anti-Semitic Christian theology on its head (in Nietzsche's scheme, Christians are "not the true people of Israel"; Jesus is a Jew but not a Christian). Second, it opposes anti-Christian anti-Semitism which derided original Israel (and the entire Judeo-Christian tradition as well). In a word, one could say that if one was to oppose anti-Semitism in nineteenth-century Germany in both its Christian and anti-Christian forms, one would end up with the exact position that Nietzsche has." Weaver Santaniello, *Nietzsche, God, and the Jews: His Critique of Judeo-Christianity in Relation to the Nazi Myth* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1994), 140–141.
5. Santaniello, *Nietzsche and the Jews*, 4.
6. See HH, 475.
7. See Thomas H. Brobjer, "Nietzsche's Changing Relation with Christianity: Nietzsche as Christian, Atheist, and Antichrist," in *Nietzsche and the Gods*, ed. Weaver Santaniello (New York: State University of New York Press, 2001), 148.
8. In view of its correspondence to post-Christian era, my discussion shall neglect the third Diaspora phase. For a further discussion of Nietzsche and Diaspora Judaism, see Harry Neumann, "The Case Against Apolitical Morality: Nietzsche's Interpretation of the Jewish Instinct," in O'Flaherty, Sellner, and Helm, *Nietzsche and the Judeo-Christian Tradition*, 29–46; Sander L. Gilman, "Heine, Nietzsche and the Idea of the Jew," in *Nietzsche and Jewish Culture*, ed. Jacob Golomb (London: Routledge, 1997), 76–100; Josef Simon, "Nietzsche on Judaism and Europe," in Golomb, *Nietzsche and Jewish Culture*, 101–116.

9. Jacob Golomb, "Nietzsche on Jews and Judaism," *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 67 (1985): 139; see also Duffy and Mittelman, "Nietzsche's Attitude," 301.
10. See Yovel, *Dark Riddle*, 153–154; Golomb, "Nietzsche on Jews and Judaism," 157–160.
11. AC, 16.
12. See, for example, HH, 111.
13. GS, 151.
14. AC, 25.
15. TI, "Reason" in Philosophy," 1.
16. Further, see chapter 3.
17. See AC, 16.
18. WP, 352.
19. GM, 3:22.
20. KGW, 3:3:5 [30]; WP, 427.
21. GS, 135.
22. BGE, 52.
23. See AC, 17.
24. GM, 1:7.
25. BGE, 195.
26. GM, 1:2; BGE, 257.
27. GM, 1:7.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid., 1:2.
32. Ibid., 1:7.
33. Ibid., 1:6.
34. Ibid.
35. See *ibid.*, 1:3–5.
36. Ibid., 1:6.
37. Ibid.
38. See *ibid.*
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid., 1:10.
41. Ibid., 1:7.
42. See *ibid.*, 1:10.
43. Further, see chapter 3.

44. For an alternative view of the priest as “masses-communicator” or mediator, see Daniel Havemann, “Evangelische Polemik: Nietzsches Paulusdeutung,” *Nietzsche Studien* 30 (2001): 177.
45. GM, I:8.
46. *Ibid.*, I:10.
47. See Adi Ophir, *The Order of Evil: Towards an Ontology of Morals* (New York: Zone Books, 2005), 444–445.
48. Further, see chapter 3.
49. AC, 48.
50. Further, see chapter 5.
51. AC, 49.
52. Jacob Taubes, *The Political Theology of Paul* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), 77.
53. AC, 48.
54. *Ibid.*
55. *Ibid.*, 49.
56. *Ibid.*
57. *Ibid.*, 48–49.
58. *Ibid.*, 48.
59. I treat this point more extensively in chapter 6.
60. TI, “Morality as Anti-Nature,” 3.
61. BT, “Attempt at a Self-Criticism,” 5.
62. Adrian Del Caro, “Nietzschean Self-Transformation and the Transformation of the Dionysian,” in *Nietzsche, Philosophy and the Arts*, ed. Salim Kemal, Ivan Gaskell, and Daniel W. Conway (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 89.
63. See Jörg Salaquarda, “Der Antichrist,” *Nietzsche Studien* 2 (1973): 99–103, 127–131.
64. For an alternative view, see Reto Winteler, “Nietzsches *Antichrist* Als (Ganze) *Umwertung Aller Werte*: Bemerkungen zum ‘Scheitern’ Eines ‘Hauptwerks,’” *Nietzsche Studien* 38 (2009): 229–245.
65. GM, 3:13. Underline mine. Italics in original.
66. In the same manner, Agamben notes that “Nietzsche, in cloaking himself in the garments of the Antimessiah, is actually only reciting a script written by Paul.” Thus, Agamben suggests that *The Antichrist* can be read as harboring a parodic intention to become an ironic reading of the Pauline Katechon (unless one admits that the calling of the Antichrist is in fact the calling of Christ). I rather put forward the claim that Nietzsche’s

- Antichrist is, historically, Nietzsche's, or Christianity's, *hermeneutical* destiny, after Nietzsche's Katechon (Hegel) has been "taken out of the way" of the Antichrist (and not necessarily before the advent of Christ). See Giorgio Agamben, *The Time That Remains: A Commentary on the Letter to the Romans* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), 111–112. For more on Nietzsche's Katechon, see chapter 6.
67. Michel Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," in *The Foucault Reader*, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon, 1984), 77.
  68. *Ibid.*, 80.
  69. *Ibid.*, 78.
  70. *Ibid.*, 88.
  71. Alternatively, for a criticism of Nietzsche's idea of erotic origin, see William Desmond, "Rethinking the Origin: Nietzsche and Hegel," in *Hegel, History, and Interpretation*, ed. Shaun Gallagher (New York: State University of New York Press, 1997).
  72. For more on this issue, see chapter 3.
  73. I emphasize again that I am delivering Paul's argumentation in order to render the figure of Nietzsche's Paul clearer and more understandable. The theses I am conveying to the reader relate in no way to Paul directly. Consequently, the present construction of the figure of Abraham as origin is valid for the figure of Nietzsche's Paul alone. There are theological exegeses of the Pauline text that render such views of Nietzsche's Paul possible; see, for example, the interesting work of Benjamin Schliesser, *Abraham's Faith in Romans 4* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007). See also Nancy Calvert-Koyzis, *Paul, Monotheism and the People of God* (London: T and T Clark, 2004). At the same time, I am absolutely aware of the strong echoes of Protestantism in the figure of Nietzsche's Paul (for example, *sola fide* and *sola gratia*). Although such a Protestant background for Nietzsche strengthens my claims at this stage and later, it does not yet present the totality of sources that contributed to the formation of Nietzsche's view of Paul, as will become clearer in subsequent chapters.
  74. See, for example, Romans 3:21.
  75. 2 Corinthians 11:22.
  76. See, for example, Galatians 3:28.
  77. Romans 4:1–3.
  78. Romans 4:13.
  79. Romans 3:30–31.

80. Galatians 3:7–8.
81. Galatians 3:17.
82. Galatians 3:23.

### 3. Jesus-Christ and the Two Worlds of Early Christianity

1. BGE, 46.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. See Romans 13:8–10.
10. For a collection of theological perspectives on this issue, see, for example, James D. G. Dunn, ed., *Paul and the Mosaic Law* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1996).
11. Romans 11:28. For an alternative view, see Jacob Taubes, *The Political Theology of Paul* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), 51.
12. BGE, 46.
13. See, for example, Romans 7:7–13.
14. See Romans 5:13–14.
15. TI, “What I Owe to the Ancients,” 2; see also WP, 143, 202.
16. BGE, 46.
17. For a view of Pyrrhonian skepticism as a kind of negative nihilism, see Andrea Christian Bertino, “Nietzsche und die Hellenistische Philosophie: Der Übermensch und der Weise,” *Nietzsche Studien* 36 (2007): 95–130.
18. WP, 455.
19. See the discussion on Jesus hereafter.
20. WP, 437. Underline mine. Italics in original.
21. See KGW, 83:14 [87].
22. See AC, 12; see also Leslie Paul Thiele, “Out from the Shadows of God: Nietzschean Scepticism and Political Practice,” *International Studies in Philosophy* 27 (1995): 55–72; Robert Hull, “Skepticism, Enigma and Integrity: Horizons of Affirmation in Nietzsche’s Philosophy,” *Man and World*

- 23 (1990): 375–391; Glen T. Martin, “A Critique of Nietzsche’s Metaphysical Scepticism,” *International Studies in Philosophy* 19 (1987): 51–59; Philip J. Kain, “Nietzsche, Skepticism, and Eternal Recurrence,” *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 13 (1983): 365–388; Bernd Magnus, “Nietzsche’s Mitigated Skepticism,” *Nietzsche Studien* 9 (1980): 260–267; Adi Parush, “Nietzsche on the Skeptic’s Life,” *Review of Metaphysics* 29 (1976): 523–542.
23. See Richard Bett, “Nietzsche on the Sceptics and Nietzsche as Sceptic,” *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 82 (2000): 80.
24. *Ibid.*, 86. See also Jessica N. Berry, *Nietzsche and the Ancient Skeptical Tradition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
25. Further, see the discussion of Jesus below and the discussion of Schopenhauer in chapter 6.
26. For an alternative view of it (as a return), see Michael Skowron, “Nietzsches Weltliche Religiosität und ihre Paradoxen,” *Nietzsche Studien* 31 (2002): 1–39.
27. AC, 25.
28. *Ibid.*
29. *Ibid.*
30. *Ibid.*, 24.
31. TI, “‘Reason’ in Philosophy,” 1.
32. AC, 25.
33. In this context, what becomes important with respect to showing Nietzsche’s anti-anti-Semitic spirit in addition to his negative view of Priestly Judaism is the distinction of Nietzsche’s concept of Jewish decadence as “a product of tragically adverse political circumstances over which Jews historically had no control [from] . . . the physiological form of degeneration Nietzsche finds at the origin of Christianity and Buddhism.” Tim Murphy, “Nietzsche’s Narrative of the ‘Retroactive Confiscation’ of Judaism,” in *Nietzsche and the Gods*, ed. Weaver Santaniello (New York: State University of New York Press, 2001), 16.
34. AC, 24.
35. Romans 3:5–8.
36. Romans 7:7–8.
37. AC, 31. In relation to the problem of the Buddhism of Jesus as a historical problem, Schweitzer, in his reading of the histories of Jesus from the end of the nineteenth century (before and after Nietzsche’s *Antichrist*), denies the claim that Buddhism influenced Jesus: “But it is un-

proved, unprovable, and unthinkable, that Jesus derived the suggestions of the new and creative ideas which emerge in His teaching from Buddhism. The most that can be done in this direction is to point to certain analogies. For the parables of Jesus, Buddhist parallels were suggested by Renan and Havet.” Albert Schweitzer, *The Quest of the Historical Jesus: A Critical Study of Its Progress from Reimarus to Wrede* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 291. Renan himself writes: “[Jesus’s preaching on the lake] was gentle and pleasing. . . . His style had nothing of the Grecian in it. . . . Nothing in Judaism had given him the model of this delightful style. He created it. It is true that we find in the Buddhist books parables of exactly the same tone and the same character as the Gospel parables; but it is difficult to admit that a Buddhist influence has been exercised in these. The spirit of gentleness and the depth of feeling which equally animate infant Christianity and Buddhism suffice perhaps to explain these analogies.” Ernest Renan, *The Life of Jesus* (New York: Prometheus, 1991), 99.

38. AC, 27.

39. See David Friedrich Strauss, *The Life of Jesus Critically Examined* (Norwich, UK: SCM Press, 1973); Hans Frei, “David Friedrich Strauss,” in *Nineteenth Century Religious Thought in the West*, ed. Ninian Smart, John Clayton, Steven Katz, and Patrick Sherry, 3 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 1:215–260; Jörg Lauster, “Aufgeklärtes Christentum? Nietzsches Kritik der theologischen Aufklärungsrezeption,” *Nietzscheforschung* II (2004): 359–365.

40. AC, 27.

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid.

43. Ibid., 28.

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid., 29.

46. Ibid. See also Morgan Rempel, *Nietzsche, Psychohistory, and the Birth of Christianity* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2002).

47. AC, 39.

48. Ibid., 29.

49. Ibid., 30.

50. Ibid., 32.

51. Salaquarda, “Dionysus Versus the Crucified: Nietzsche’s Understanding of the Apostle Paul,” in *Studies in Nietzsche and the Judeo-Christian Tradition*,

- ed. James C. O'Flaherty, Timothy F. Sellner, and Robert M. Helm (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985), 107. Before this enlightening interpretation of Salquarda, other interpreters related Nietzsche's idiot Jesus to Dostoevsky's *The Idiot*; see Kaufmann, *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist*, 4th ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), 340–341; Karl Jaspers, *Nietzsche and Christianity* (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1961), 22; Paolo Stellino, "Jesus als 'Idiot'—ein Vergleich zwischen Nietzsches *Der Antichrist* und Dostojewskijs *Der Idiot*," *Nietzscheforschung* 14 (2007): 203–210. For more on the Nietzsche-Dostoevsky relationship, see, for example, Havemann, *Der "Apostel der Rache": Nietzsches Paulusdeutung* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2002), 165–170; Anton Uhl, "Suffering from God and Man: Nietzsche and Dostoyevsky," in *Nietzsche and Christianity*, ed. Claude Geffré and Jean-Pierre Jossua (Edinburgh: T and T Clark; New York: Seabury Press, 1981), 32–41.
52. See AC, 33.
  53. Jaspers, *Nietzsche and Christianity*, 25.
  54. AC, 31.
  55. *Ibid.*, 37.
  56. *Ibid.*, 40.
  57. *Ibid.*, 27.
  58. *Ibid.*, 41.
  59. Romans 7:4–6.
  60. AC, 40.
  61. *Ibid.*, 41.
  62. 1 Corinthians 1:22–23.
  63. AC, 35.
  64. *Ibid.*, 34.
  65. *Ibid.*, 33.
  66. *Ibid.*
  67. See, for example, GM, preface, 5.
  68. See Elvira Burgos, "Jesus y 'El Crucificado' en la filosofía de Nietzsche," *Revista de Filosofía* 6 (1993): 79–87. Alternatively, for views on Jesus (or his unconditional love) as tragic-Dionysian, semi-Dionysian, or sharing with Dionysus a common religious dimension on the basis of understanding the tragic in terms of (self-)sacrifice, see Robin A. Roth, "Verily, Nietzsche's Judgment of Jesus," *Philosophy Today* 34 (1990): 364–376; Nobert Schiffrers, "Analyzing Nietzsche's 'God is Dead,'"

- in Geffré and Jossua, *Nietzsche and Christianity*, 65–77; Yirmiahu Yovel, *Dark Riddle: Hegel, Nietzsche, and the Jews* (Cambridge: Polity, 1998); Paul Valadier, “Dionysus Versus the Crucified,” in *The New Nietzsche: Contemporary Styles of Interpretation*, ed. David B. Allison (New York: Dell, 1977), 247–261.
69. On Nietzsche’s contra positioning of historical Christianity with Jesus’s religion as a salutary provocative challenge for Christians, see Hans Küng, “Nietzsche: What Christians and Non-Christians Can Learn,” in O’Flaherty, Sellner, and Helm, *Nietzsche and the Judeo-Christian Tradition*, 341–352. And on the relationship between Nietzsche and Jesus in terms of identification or imitation, see Johann Figl, “‘Dionysos und der Gekreuzigte’—Nietzsches Identifikation und Konfrontation mit zentralen religiösen ‘Figuren,’” *Nietzscherforschung* 9 (2002): 147–162; Eugen Biser, “The Critical Imitator of Jesus: A Contribution to the Interpretation of Nietzsche on the Basis of a Comparison,” in O’Flaherty, Sellner, and Helm, *Nietzsche and the Judeo-Christian Tradition*, 86–99; Biser, “Nietzsche’s Relation to Jesus: A Literary and Psychological Comparison,” in O’Flaherty, Sellner, and Helm, *Nietzsche and Christianity*, 58–64.
70. See BGE, 48. On Nietzsche contra Renan’s historical objectivity, priesthood, and declined French taste, see GM, 3:26; TI, “Expeditions of an Untimely Man,” 2, 6. About Nietzsche’s criticism of Renan’s historical method, see Gary Shapiro, “Nietzsche Contra Renan,” *History and Theory* 21 (1982): 193–222.
71. See AC, 17, 29, 31.
72. *Ibid.*, 34. Renan writes: “His [Jesus’s] exquisite irony, his arch and provoking remarks, always struck home. They were everlasting stigmas, and have remained festering in the wound. . . . A god alone knows how to kill after this fashion. Socrates and Molière only touched the skin. He carried fire and rage to the very marrow. But it was also just that this great master of irony should pay for his triumph with his life. . . . He ran into danger of his own free will.” Renan, *Life of Jesus*, 172–173; see also *ibid.*, 62, 156. In comparison, Strauss writes (against Schleiermacher): “Thus to surpass the historical appearance of Christ, is to rise nearer, not to his nature, but to the idea of humanity in general; and if we are to suppose that it is still Christ whose nature is more truly expressed, when with the rejection of the temporal and national, the essential elements of his doctrine and life are further developed: it would not be difficult, by a similar abstraction, to represent Socrates, as the one who

in this manner cannot be surpassed. As neither an individual in general, nor, in particular, the commencing point in an historical series, can present the perfect ideal." David Strauss, *The Life of Jesus Critically Examined* (Norwich, UK: SCM Press, 1973), 885.

73. See Ernst Behler, "Nietzsche's Conception of Irony," in *Nietzsche, Philosophy and the Arts*, ed. Salim Kemal, Ivan Gaskell, and Daniel W. Conway (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 13–17.
74. AC, 31. Underline mine.
75. *Ibid.*, 32.
76. See TI, "The Problem of Socrates," 10.
77. GM, 3:17.
78. AC, 33.
79. *Ibid.*, 32.
80. Eric Blondel, "The Question of Genealogy," in *Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality: Essays on Nietzsche's "On the Genealogy of Morals,"* ed. Richard Schacht (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 310–311.

#### 4. Paul: The First Christian

1. BGE, 191.
2. D, 68.
3. BGE, 191.
4. *Ibid.*
5. D, 68.
6. BGE, 191.
7. *Ibid.*
8. D, 68.
9. *Ibid.*
10. BGE, 191.
11. D, 68.
12. *Ibid.*
13. *Ibid.*
14. *Ibid.*
15. BGE, 191.
16. For an alternative view, see Hermann Josef Schmidt, *Nietzsche und Sokrates: Philosophische Untersuchungen zu Nietzsches Sokratesbild* (Meisenheim am Glan: Anton Hain, 1969), 369.

17. See D, 68.
18. See Salaquarda, "Dionysus Versus the Crucified: Nietzsche's Understanding of the Apostle Paul," in *Studies in Nietzsche and the Judeo-Christian Tradition*, ed. James C. O'Flaherty, Timothy F. Sellner, and Robert M. Helm (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985), 103n15.
19. D, 68.
20. EH, "Why I Am a Destiny," I. For an alternative view, see Werner Stegmeier, "Schicksal Nietzsche?: Zu Nietzsches Selbsteinschätzung Als Schicksal der Philosophie und der Menschheit (Ecce Homo, Warum Ich ein Schicksal Bin)," *Nietzsche Studien* 37 (2008): 62–114.
21. EH, "Why I Am a Destiny," I. See also TI, "The Problem of Socrates," 5. Such contextualization shows Nietzsche's deep awareness of the unity Paul-Socrates-Nietzsche, which implies further that my interpretation here is not one doing "mischief with" Nietzsche. EH, "Why I Am a Destiny," I. Alternatively, on Nietzsche as a religious reformer, see Alan Watt, "Nietzsche's Theodicy," *New Nietzsche Studies* 4 (2000): 45–54. My view is that the case is not that Nietzsche did not desire the destruction of Christianity on the basis of the claim that the pessimism and decadence of Christianity provide the counterforce necessary to maintain the vitality of the Dionysian. See Georges Goedert, "The Dionysian Theodicy," in O'Flaherty, Sellner, and Helm, *Studies in Nietzsche and the Judeo-Christian Tradition*, 319–340. I argue here that the Dionysian, once it has transcended the history of Christianity, does not necessarily need Christianity. Besides that, insofar as destruction constitutes the essence of the Dionysian, the latter does not need Christianity to maintain its vitality. And, after all, Nietzsche relates to Christianity as already destroyed by Modernity. See, for example, AC, 38; BGE, 58. From this viewpoint, it is also not the case that Nietzsche's "opposition to Christianity as a reality is inseparable from his *tie* to Christianity as a postulate." Karl Jaspers, *Nietzsche and Christianity* (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1961), 6. In his reading of Nietzsche, Jaspers, like Goedert, goes as far as to say that through his enmity to Christianity, Nietzsche "want[s] . . . even Christianity to endure." *Ibid.*, 91. Jaspers in the main has Nietzsche's Jesus as the so-called Nietzsche's Christian postulate. I have already shown that this is no postulate: Nietzsche's Jesus reflects the idea of the instrumentality of Buddhism for the overcoming of the history of Christianity.
22. D, 68.

23. See EH, "Why I Write Such Good Books, Thus Spoke Zarathustra," 3.
24. D, 68.
25. EH, "Why I Am a Destiny," 8. As Grau says, the view that reduces Nietzsche's dissolution of Christianity and the significance of its rejection to the personality of the thinker whose vehement attack on traditional values could easily be explained psychologically by the course of his life and suffering expressed often enough by defenders of the faith overlooks the fact that the philosopher felt his own destiny to be the consequence of a thoroughly disastrous development of the Western spirit. Gerd-Günther Grau, "Nietzsche and Kierkegaard," in O'Flaherty, Sellner, and Helm, *Nietzsche and the Judeo-Christian Tradition*, 226. In these terms, my elaboration of the Nietzsche-Paul relationship is meant to disclose Nietzsche's concept of atheism as Christian insofar as Nietzsche's criticism of Christianity could be defined in terms of self-destruction and self-overcoming. It is indeed "ironic to see Nietzsche come so close to the strategy of Protestant reformers who also raise Jesus above whatever degenerate practices were later adopted in his name. This is another instance of Nietzsche's revolution being both informed and constrained by the religion he rejects. The arch-enemy of Christianity is a very Christian (and even Protestant) heretic." Yirmiahu Yovel, *Dark Riddle: Hegel, Nietzsche, and the Jews* (Cambridge: Polity, 1998), 166.
26. Za, III, "The Convalescent," 2; see also TI, "What I Owe to the Ancients," 5.
27. See Ernst Benz, *Nietzsches Ideen zur Geschichte des Christentums und der Kirche* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1956), 36.
28. See Daniel Havemann, "Evangelische Polemik: Nietzsches Paulusdeutung," *Nietzsche-Studien* 30 (2001): 175–186. From a methodological point of view, Nietzsche here (1881) is directly connected to the later Nietzsche. In *The Antichrist*, as in this aphorism (D, 68) and in opposition to his other writings (for example, GS, 353), Nietzsche distinguishes between Jesus and Paul. This means that it is not only "until *The Antichrist* that Nietzsche achieves an unequivocal differentiation of the roles of Jesus and Paul in the origin of Christianity." Salaquarda, "Dionysus Versus the Crucified," 104; see also, Havemann, "Evangelische Polemik," 182.
29. See GM, preface, 5; EH, "Why I Write Such Good Books, Beyond Good and Evil." Havemann claims that in *The Antichrist*, Nietzsche at-

- tacks the Christian-priest morality through his attack on Paul insofar as Paul is the “*Typus Paulus*,” representing the priest type. Havemann, “Evangelische Polemik,” 179. Havemann’s general thesis is that Nietzsche locates himself, consciously, in the position of the sinner inside Christian morality so as to create a polemic through which he can bring his moral criticism to language. See *ibid.*, 177, 179, 186.
30. Actually, Havemann adds to Salaquarda’s argument (Salaquarda, “Der Antichrist,” *Nietzsche Studien* 2 [1973]: 130–131) in attributing to the Antichrist that polemical character which endows Nietzsche’s criticism with the positive character it sought. This way, Havemann reaches the conclusion that “*the attack, the polemic itself is the revaluation.*” Havemann, “Evangelische Polemik,” 186. See also Günter Figal, “Aesthetically Limited Reason: On Nietzsche’s *The Birth of Tragedy*,” in *Philosophy and Tragedy*, ed. Miguel de Beistegui and Simon Sparks (London: Routledge, 2000), 139–151; Willie Esterhuysen, “Nietzsche’s ‘Death of God’: A Nihilistic Consequence of Christianity,” *International Studies in Philosophy* 29 (1997): 89–108.
  31. For Havemann such a positive standpoint would rather be justice (*Gerechtigkeit*) since it is a relation-concept (*Verhältnissbegriff*) rather than a moral virtue, see Havemann, “Evangelische Polemik,” 183.
  32. Salaquarda, “Dionysus Versus the Crucified,” 126.
  33. *Ibid.*
  34. *Ibid.*, 120, 127.
  35. EH, “Why I Am a Destiny,” 9.
  36. For an alternative view that sees Nietzschean dialectics as one taking place between Christ and the (plebeian) Socrates, see Kaufmann, *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist*, 4th ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), 407.
  37. Salaquarda, “Dionysus Versus the Crucified,” 120–126.
  38. *Ibid.*, 123.
  39. See BGE, 46, 195; GM, 1:7–8.
  40. See, for example, GM, 3:27.
  41. Salaquarda, “Dionysus Versus the Crucified,” 124–125.
  42. As Salaquarda adds: “The first two impulses, return to the thesis and negation of the antithesis, are undisputed by Nietzsche scholars and have been examined continuously. Simultaneously problematic and interesting is the third impulse, however—that of “overcoming preservation.” *Ibid.*
  43. See GM, 2:1.
  44. See further chapter 6. See also Schmidt, *Nietzsche und Sokrates*, 367.

45. Weaver Santaniello, *Nietzsche, God, and the Jews: His Critique of Judeo-Christianity in Relation to the Nazi Myth* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1994), 1.
46. EH, “Why I Am a Destiny,” 3. Underline mine.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
49. See Ken Gemes, “Freud and Nietzsche on Sublimation,” *Journal of Nietzsche Studies* 38 (2009): 38–59.
50. See GM, 1:8.
51. BGE, 47; see also HH, WS, 85.
52. AC, 42. Underline mine. Italics in original.
53. Ibid.; see also D, 68.
54. BGE, 13.
55. GM, 3:28.
56. BGE, 225.
57. Aaron Ridley, “What Is the Meaning of Aesthetic Ideals?,” in *Nietzsche, Philosophy and the Arts*, ed. Salim Kemal, Ivan Gaskell, and Daniel W. Conway (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 146.
58. BGE, 225. Further see chapter 5.
59. AC, 51.
60. Ibid., 24.
61. Ibid., 56.
62. D, 113.
63. BT, 3. For an analysis of Nietzsche’s conception of the naive in relation to Schiller’s aesthetics, see Brent Kalar, “The Naive and the Natural: Schiller’s Influence on Nietzsche’s Early Aesthetics,” *History of Philosophy Quarterly* 25 (2008): 359–377.
64. GM, 2:21.
65. Ibid., 2:20.
66. Ibid.
67. Romans 4:4–5. Underline mine.
68. Adi Ophir, *The Order of Evil: Towards an Ontology of Morals* (New York: Zone Books, 2005), 394–397.
69. See TI, “The Problem of Socrates,” 5.
70. GM, 1:7.
71. In this same line of interpreting Nietzsche, see Ken Gemes, “Postmodernism’s Use and Abuse of Nietzsche,” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 62 (2001): 337–360.

72. Martha C. Nussbaum, "The Transfigurations of Intoxication: Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, and Dionysus," in Kemal, Gaskell, and Conway, *Nietzsche, Philosophy and the Arts*, 63.
73. See Thomas H. Brobjer, "Nietzsche's Changing Relation with Christianity: Nietzsche as Christian, Atheist, and Antichrist," in *Nietzsche and the Gods*, ed. Weaver Santaniello (New York: State University of New York Press, 2001), 137–158.
74. Yves Ledure, "The Christian Response to Nietzsche's Critique of Christianity," in *Nietzsche and Christianity*, ed. Claude Geffré and Jean-Pierre Jossua (Edinburgh: T and T Clark; New York: Seabury Press, 1981), 46.
75. Julian Young, *Nietzsche's Philosophy of Art* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 29.
76. David C. Hoy, "Nietzsche, Hume, and the Genealogical Method," in *Nietzsche as Affirmative Thinker*, ed. Yirimiahu Yovel (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1986), 33.
77. See chapter 6.
78. BGE, 200.
79. Ibid.
80. See Behler, "Conception of Irony," in Kemal, Gaskell, and Conway, *Nietzsche, Philosophy and the Arts*, 17–18.
81. See GM, 2:6–17.
82. See Romans 2:12–15.
83. See Romans 3:21–31.
84. See Roland Haves, "Socratism and the Question of Aesthetic Justification," Kemal, Gaskell, and Conway, *Nietzsche, Philosophy and the Arts*, 92–127.
85. UM, HL, 7. Underline mine. Italics in original.
86. Ibid., 10.
87. Robert Scharff, "Nietzsche and the 'Use' of History," *Continental Philosophy Review* 7 (1974): 76.

## 5. Science and Art After the Death of God

1. See, for example, GM, 3:27.
2. GS, 343.
3. Ibid. Underline mine.
4. See *ibid.*

5. Ibid., 108.
6. See Walter Kaufmann, *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist*, 4th ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), 96–100.
7. See Charles Bambach, “Nietzsche’s Madman Parable: A Cynical Reading,” *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 84 (2010): 441–456. See further R. Bracht Branham, “Nietzsche’s Cynicism: Uppercase or Lowercase?,” in *Nietzsche and Antiquity*, ed. Paul Bishop (New York: Camden House, 2004), 170–181; Anthony K. Jensen, “Nietzsche’s Unpublished Fragments on Ancient Cynicism: The First Night of Diogenes,” in Bishop, *Nietzsche and Antiquity*, 182–191.
8. See GS, 125.
9. Ibid., 108.
10. Michael Skowron, “Nietzsches Weltliche Religiosität und ihre Paradoxien,” *Nietzsche Studien* 31 (2002): 5. For further on the development of the modern historical, vis-à-vis the logical, criticism of religion, see Elizabeth Heinrich, *Religionskritik der Neuzeit: Hume, Feuerbach, Nietzsche* (Freiburg: Alber Thesen, 2001). For an alternative view seeing the death of God as polemical, see Edith Dusing, “Die Tod Gottes: Problematik bei Nietzsche und Hegel,” *Perspektiven der Philosophie* 29 (2003): 229–282.
11. See GS, 343; see also Georges Goedert, “Nietzsches Antichrist als Überwindung der moralischen Weltordnung,” *Perspektiven der Philosophie*, 27 (2001): 197–221.
12. Za, IV, “Retired.”
13. Ibid., IV, “The Ugliest Man.”
14. Ibid.
15. AC, 45.
16. Ibid.
17. TI, “Morality as Anti-Nature,” I.
18. Ibid.
19. HH, WS, 83.
20. TI, “Morality as Anti-Nature,” I.
21. Za, IV, “Retired.”
22. Ibid.; see also BGE, 53.
23. See Johann Figl, “‘Tod Gottes’ und die Möglichkeit ‘neuer Götter,’” *Nietzsche Studien* 29 (2000): 82–101; Karl Löwith, “Der Atheismus Als Philosophisches Problem—1960,” in *Sämtliche Schriften*, ed. Klaus Sticheweh and Marc B. de Launay (Stuttgart: J. B. Metzlersche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1981–1986), 3:303–304.

24. BGE, 53.
25. See Za, IV, "The Awakening," "The Ass Festival."
26. GM, 2:20.
27. Za, IV, "The Ugliest Man."
28. BGE, 59.
29. AC, 57.
30. See *ibid.*
31. Za, IV, "The Ugliest Man."
32. Nietzsche's explicit reference to the noble origin of the ugliest man contradicts, in principle, the possibility of interpreting Zarathustra's Ugliest Murderer of God as Socrates. For such an interpretation compels the interpreter to dismiss two facts: that the murderer of God is a noble man together with Nietzsche's emphasis on the plebeian origin of Socrates. See Weaver Santaniello, "Socrates as the Ugliest Murderer of God," in *Nietzsche and the Gods*, ed. Weaver Santaniello (New York: State University of New York Press, 2001), 73–84. I do not find it to be possible to identify the "higher men" (*höhere Menschen*), whom Zarathustra meets in the fourth part of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, with any historical personalities whatsoever. See *ibid.*, and W. Wiley Richards, *The Bible and Christian Tradition: Keys to Understanding the Allegorical Subplot of Nietzsche's Zarathustra* (New York: Peter Lang, 1991). On the other hand, such an aspect cannot just be ignored. See, for example, Kathleen M. Higgins, "Reading Zarathustra," in *Reading Nietzsche*, ed. Robert C. Solomon and Kathleen M. Higgins (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 132–151; Higgins, *Nietzsche's Zarathustra* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987); Martin Heidegger, "The Word of Nietzsche: 'God Is Dead,'" in *The Question Concerning Technology, and Other Essays*, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1977), 53–112; Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, ed. David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper Collins, 1991), 1:151–161. I suggest that these "men" are explicitly *modern figurative* personalities. Indeed, the fourth part of *Zarathustra* represents through the figures of the higher men many masks of decadence. Giuliano Campioni, "Der höhere Mensch nach dem Tod Gottes," *Nietzsche Studien* 28 (1999): 337. And I would further note only that a careful reading reveals the identities of these personalities as follows: the soothsayer represents modern nihilism (see Za, II, "The Soothsayer"; IV, "The Cry of Distress"); the two kings represent the remains of aristocracy in modern times (see Za, IV, 3; BGE, 258); the conscientious in

spirit represents modern science (see Za, IV, “The Magician,” “The Song of Melancholy,” “On Science”); the magician represents modern art (see Za, IV, “The Leech,” “On Science”); the voluntary beggar represents modern Buddhism (see Za, IV, “The Voluntary Beggar”); the shadow represents the wandering free spirit (see Za, IV, “The Shadow”); and, in addition, and as the above analysis has already made clear, the retired old pope represents the remains of (dogmatic) Christianity in Modernity, where the ugliest man represents modern pessimism.

33. Za, IV, “The Ugliest Man.”
34. Ibid.
35. Paul Tillich, “The Escape from God,” in Santaniello, *Nietzsche and the Gods*, 177.
36. For an alternative view of the death of God as resulting in the fulfillment of modern man’s need of love, see Robert Pippin, “Love and Death in Nietzsche,” in *Religion After Metaphysics*, ed. Mark A. Wrathall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 7–28.
37. Za, IV, “The Awakening,” I. Underline mine.
38. Kaufmann, *Nietzsche*, 253.
39. Löwith, *Nietzsche’s Philosophy of the Eternal Recurrence of the Same*, trans. J. Harvey Lomax (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 47.
40. GS, 343.
41. Ibid., 344.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid., 345, 344.
49. See Gianni Vattimo, “After Onto-Theology: Philosophy Between Science and Religion,” in Wrathall, *Religion After Metaphysics*, 29–36; Richard Rorty, “Anti-Clericalism and Atheism,” in Wrathall, *Religion After Metaphysics*, 37–46.
50. GM, 3:23.
51. See *ibid.*
52. See *ibid.*
53. See Za, IV, “The Ugliest Man.”

54. BGE, 58, 59.
55. Ibid., 225.
56. GM, 3:28.
57. See Za, IV; see also Adi Ophir, *The Order of Evil: Towards an Ontology of Morals* (New York: Zone Books, 2005), 249–250; David Cartwright, “The Last Temptation of Zarathustra,” *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 31 (1993): 49–69.
58. See, for example, BGE, 225.
59. See, for example, *ibid.*, 19, 200.
60. Za, II, “On the Pitying.”
61. *Ibid.* See also BGE, 225; D, 134.
62. See BGE, 225.
63. Za, II, “On the Pitying.”
64. KGW, 5.1:7 [26].
65. BGE, 202.
66. See Ophir, *Order of Evil*, 272–273.
67. GM, 1:13.
68. BGE, 225.
69. Such a dismissal can be explained by Nietzsche’s antisocialism, which he joins to his criticism of the modern bourgeois averaging of man expressed in his criticism of pity; see, for example, BGE, 202.
70. Za, II, “On the Pitying.”
71. *Ibid.*, III, “On Old and New Tablets.”
72. See TI, “Morality as Anti-Nature,” 1.
73. GM, 3:24.
74. *Ibid.*, 3:25. See also Babette Babich, *Nietzsches Wissenschaftsphilosophie: “Die Wissenschaft unter der Optik des Künstlers zu sehen, die Kunst unter der des Lebens”* (Bern: Peter Lang, 2011).
75. Za, III, “On Old and New Tablets.”
76. GM, 3:1, 3:5.
77. *Ibid.*, 3:6. Otherwise, on Nietzsche’s (and Schopenhauer’s) “misunderstanding” of Kant’s “disinterested delight,” see Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, 1:107–114.
78. GM, 3:6.
79. *Ibid.*, 3:7.
80. AC, 14.
81. GM, 3:7.
82. *Ibid.*, 3:8.

83. Ibid., 3:7.
84. Ibid., 3:9.
85. Ibid., 3:8.
86. BGE, 224.
87. Ibid.
88. Za, III, "On Old and New Tablets."
89. BGE, 225.
90. GM, 2:16.
91. Za, III, "On Old and New Tablets."
92. Ibid.
93. GM, 3:25.
94. Ibid., 2:16.

## 6. Beyond Modern Temporality

1. GS, 349.
2. On the continuum of the Spinoza-Nietzsche immanent "will to life," see Hans-Jürgen Gawoll, "Nietzsche und der Geist Spinozas: Die existentielle Umwandlung einer affirmativen Ontologie," *Nietzsche Studien* 30 (2001): 44–61; Yirmiahu Yovel, "Nietzsche and Spinoza: 'Amor Fati' and 'Amor Dei,'" in *Nietzsche as Affirmative Thinker*, ed. Yirmiahu Yovel (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1986). And on the Nietzsche-Darwin relationship, see, for example, Dirk Robert Johnson, "Nietzsche's Early Darwinism: The 'David Strauss' Essay of 1873," *Nietzsche Studien* 30 (2001): 62–79; Patrick Forber, "Nietzsche Was No Darwinian," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 75 (2007): 369–382.
3. See, for example, GS, 349.
4. See, for example, WP, 684.
5. GS, 349.
6. "Progress in my sense.—I too speak of a 'return to nature,' although it is really not a going-back but a *going-up*—up into a high, free, even frightful nature and naturalness, such as plays with great tasks, is *permitted* to plays with them. . . . To speak in a *parable*: Napoleon was a piece of 'return to nature' as I understand it. . . . But Rousseau. . . . I see only one who experienced it [the French Revolution] as it had to be experienced—with *disgust*. . . . Goethe . . . not a German event but a European one: a grand attempt to overcome the eighteenth century through a return to

nature, through a going-up to the naturalness of the Renaissance. . . . A spirit thus *emancipated* stands in the midst of the universe with a joyful and trusting fatalism, in a *faith* that only what is separate and individual may be rejected, that in the totality everything is redeemed and affirmed—*he no longer denies*. . . . But such a faith is the highest of all possible faiths: I have baptized it with the name *Dionysus*.” TI, “Expeditions of an Untimely Man,” 48–49.

7. GS, 109.
8. *Ibid.*, 108.
9. *Ibid.*, 109.
10. *Ibid.*
11. *Ibid.*, 349.
12. *Ibid.*, 109.
13. TI, “Expeditions of an Untimely Man,” 49.
14. EH, “Why I Am So Clever,” 10.
15. *Ibid.*, title.
16. BGE, 13.
17. See, for example, *ibid.*, 12.
18. TI, “‘Reason’ in Philosophy,” 5.
19. GM, 2:20; see also Michael Lackey, “Killing God, Liberating the ‘Subject’: Nietzsche and Post-God Freedom,” *Journal of the History of Ideas* 60 (1999): 737–754.
20. “Now we beseech you, brethren, by the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ, and by our gathering together unto him, That ye be not soon shaken in mind, or be troubled, neither by spirit, nor by word, nor by letter as from us, as that the day of Christ is at hand. Let no man deceive you by any means: for that day shall not come, except there come a falling away first, and that man of sin be revealed, the son of perdition; Who opposeth and exalteth himself above all that is called God, or that is worshipped; so that he as God sitteth in the temple of God, shewing himself that he is God. Remember ye not, that, when I was yet with you, I told you these things? And now ye know what withholdeth that he might be revealed in his time. For the mystery of iniquity doth already work: only he who now letteth will let, until he be taken out of the way. And then shall that Wicked be revealed, whom the Lord shall consume with the spirit of his mouth, and shall destroy with the brightness. Even him, whose coming is after the working of Satan with all power and signs and lying wonders, And with all deceivableness of

- unrighteousness in them that perish; because they received not the love of the truth, that they might be saved. And for this cause God shall send them strong delusion, that they should believe a lie: That they all might be damned who believed not the truth, but had pleasure in unrighteousness.” 2 Thessalonians 2:1–12.
21. Among the many theological interpretation of the concealed identity of the Katechon, see, for example, Paul Metzger, *Katechon: II Thess 2,1–12 im Horizont Apokalyptischen Denkens* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2005); Charles E. Powell, “The Identity of the ‘Restrainer’ in 2 Thessalonians 2:6–7,” *Bibliotheca Sacra* 154 (1997): 320–332; Martin Berger, “Die Katechon-Vorstellung 2 Thess 2,6f: Dietrich Bonhoefer’s Interpretation im Kontext der Rezeptionsgeschichte,” *Protokolle zur Bibel* 5 (1996): 33–56; Paul S. Dixon, “The Evil Restraint in 2 Thess 2:6,” *Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society* 33 (1990): 445–449; Roger D. Aus, “God’s Plan and God’s Power: Isaiah 66 and the Restraining Factors of 2 Thess 2:6–7,” *Journal of Biblical Literature* 96 (1977): 537–553. And for a brief account of the history of the Katechon interpretations (until Schmitt), see Felix Grossheutschi, *Carl Schmitt und die Lehre vom Katechon* (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1996), 30–56.
  22. See also Mark 12:13–17; Romans 13:1–7.
  23. GM, 1:8.
  24. UM, WB, 3. With respect to Nietzsche’s relation to the Germans in general, see Andreas Rupschus, “Nietzsche und sein Problem mit den Deutschen,” *Nietzsche Studien* 40 (2011): 72–105.
  25. UM, WB, 3.
  26. GM, 1:10. Underline mine.
  27. Ibid.
  28. Ibid., 4.
  29. For an alternative emphasis, see Werner Stegmaier, “Ohne Hegel kein Darwin”—Kontextuelle Interpretation des Aphorismus 357 aus dem V. Buch der *Fröhlichen Wissenschaft*,” *Nietzscherforschung* 17 (2010): 65–82.
  30. UM, WB, 3.
  31. CW, “Postscript.”
  32. GS, 357.
  33. Ibid.
  34. See WP, 101.
  35. See also BGE, preface; AC, 61.
  36. GS, 357.

37. So far, research has neglected Nietzsche's view of Hegel as Katechon. With respect to the study of Carl Schmitt, Meuter reports that Schmitt's reception of Nietzsche's conception of Hegel as the Katechon of atheism was ambivalent; see Günter Meuter, *Der Katechon: Zu Carl Schmitts fundamentalistischer Kritik der Zeit* (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1994), 330; see also Metzger, *Katechon*, 24. Besides that, Nietzsche's thesis that German Hegelianism is the Katechon in the way of atheism had been adopted by (Schmitt's friend) Hans Freyer; see Hans Freyer, *Weltgeschichte Europas* (Wiesbaden: Dieterich, 1948); Grossheutschi, *Carl Schmitt und Lehre vom Katechon*, 98–102.
38. GS, 357.
39. Ibid.
40. UM, WB, 3.
41. GS, 357. Underline mine. Italics in original.
42. Ibid.
43. See also *ibid.*, 108.
44. AC, 4; see also TI, "Expeditions of an Untimely Man," 37; EH, "Why I Write Such Good Books, The Birth of Tragedy," 1; EH, "Why I Write Such Good Books, Thus Spoke Zarathustra," 6; EH, "Why I Write Such Good Books, Why I Am a Destiny," 5.
45. Za, IV, "On the Higher Man," 2.
46. Ibid., III, "On Old and New Tablets," 3.
47. See *ibid.*, IV, "On the Higher Man," 1, 5.
48. See *ibid.*, I, "Zarathustra's Prologue," 3–5. This is of course an interpretation inner to *Zarathustra*. Alternatively, Higgins chooses to refer *Zarathustra* IV to Lucian and to Apuleius: Lucian, "Lucius; or, The Ass," in *Lucian*, trans. M. D. MacLeod, vol. 8 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967); Apuleius, *The Transformations of Lucius, Otherwise Known as the Golden Ass* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1951). See Kathleen M. Higgins *Nietzsche's Zarathustra* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987), chap. 7; Higgins, "Zarathustra" IV and Apuleius: Who Is 'Zarathustra's' Ass?," *International Studies in Philosophy* 20 (1988): 29–53.
49. Za, IV, "On the Higher Man," 6.
50. Bernd Magnus, "Nietzsche and the Project of Bringing Philosophy to an End," in Yovel, *Affirmative Thinker*, 54. I want to note here that Magnus understands such a duality as one between man (sublimation) as such and animal (instinct) as such. From my perspective, such a duality

should be primarily formulated as one between one man and another man, insofar as this formulation encompasses the duality between sublimations and instincts.

51. See, for example, Romans 2:14–15.
52. In this line of interpretation, see Erik D. Lindberg, “Nietzsche Contra Hegel: The Death of Tragedy and the Birth of the Unconscious,” *Symposium* 2 (1998): 77–100.
53. GM, I:II.
54. See Karl Jaspers, *Nietzsche and Christianity* (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1961), 51–55.
55. 2 Thessalonians 2:13; see also HH, WS, 85.
56. 2 Thessalonians 3:2.
57. 2 Thessalonians 2:10.
58. See 2 Thessalonians 2:9–10; Revelation 13. For more on the Antichrist as deceiver, see Gregory C. Jenks, *The Origins and Early Development of the Antichrist Myth* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1991), chap. 4; W. Bell Dawson, “The Meaning of the Antichrist in the Greek of the New Testament,” *Evangelical Quarterly* 16 (1944): 53–71.
59. See BGE, 295; Walter Brogan, “Zarathustra: The Tragic Figure of the Last Philosopher,” in *Philosophy and Tragedy*, ed. Miguel de Beistegui and Simon Sparks (London: Routledge, 2000), 152–168. See also Riedel’s (uncritical) article: Manfred Riedel, “Europe’s Origin: Nietzsche and the Greeks,” *New Nietzsche Studies* 4 (2000): 141–155.
60. See Jacob Taubes, *The Political Theology of Paul* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), 4–5.
61. See, for example, Karl Löwith, *Nietzsche’s Philosophy of the Eternal Recurrence of the Same*, trans. J. Harvey Lomax (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 82–107.
62. Nietzsche sought to prove the idea of the eternal recurrence even scientifically; see, for example, Arthur Danto, “The Eternal Recurrence,” in *Nietzsche: A Collection of Critical Essays*, ed. Robert C. Solomon (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1973), 316–321. For views on the idea of the eternal recurrence and the will to power as “poetic symbols,” see, for example, Gregory B. Smith, *Nietzsche, Heidegger, and the Transition to Postmodernity* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), chap. 9. In this line of interpretation, see also Eric Blondel, “Nietzsche: Life as a Metaphor,” in *The New Nietzsche: Contemporary Styles of Interpretation*, ed. David B. Allison (New York: Dell, 1977), 142–149; Jacques Derrida,

- “The Question of Style,” in Allison, *New Nietzsche*, 150–175; and Sarah Kofman, “Metaphor, Symbol, Metamorphosis,” in Allison, *New Nietzsche*, 201–214. For a criticism of reading Postmodernity into Nietzsche, see Robert B. Pippin, “Nietzsche’s Alleged Farewell: The Premodern, Modern, and Postmodern Nietzsche,” in *The Cambridge Companion to Nietzsche*, ed. Bernd Magnus and Kathleen M. Higgins (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 252–277.
63. Löwith, *Philosophy of the Eternal Recurrence*. See also Zeynep Talay, “A Dialogue with Nietzsche: Blumenberg and Löwith on History and Progress,” *History of European Ideas* 37 (2011): 376–381.
64. See Löwith, *Philosophy of the Eternal Recurrence*, 82–107.
65. *Ibid.*, 86–87.
66. “At the end of an exhausted Christianity, he [Nietzsche] sought ‘new sources of the future,’ and found them in recollection of that ancient world as it was before Christianity. . . . If one compares Nietzsche’s arguments with those of Celsus and Porphyry, it is not difficult to notice how little has been added to the ancient arguments against Christianity, with the exception of the Christian pathos that caused Nietzsche to speak as an ‘Antichrist’ and no longer as a philosopher. . . . He was through and through so Christian and anti-Christian, so Protestant and protesting, so demanding and hoping, that only *one* question drove him on: his yearning for the *future* and his *will* to create it. . . . No Greek philosopher thought so exclusively in the horizon of the future, and none took himself to be a historical destiny. . . . The will to power is equally *un-Greek*. . . . For the Greeks the visible circular motion of heavenly spheres revealed a cosmic logos and a divine perfection. For Nietzsche the eternal recurrence is ‘most terrible’ idea and the ‘greatest gravity,’ because it contradicts his will to a future redemption. Nietzsche wanted to ‘overcome’ the temporality of time in favor of the eternity of the eternal recurrence. . . . All these superlatives of ‘highest’ and ‘last’ willing and willing back, creating, and re-creating, are just as antinatural as they are un-Greek. They derive from the Judeo-Christian tradition. . . . Nietzsche lived and thought to the end the metamorphosis of the biblical ‘Thou shalt’ into the modern ‘I will,’ but he did not accomplish the decisive step from the ‘I will’ to the ‘I am’ of the cosmic child of the world, which is innocence and forgetting. As a modern man, he was so hopelessly separated from an original ‘loyalty to the earth’ and from the feeling of an eternal security under the vault of heaven, that his effort

- to ‘translate’ man ‘back’ into nature was condemned to failure from the outset.” *Ibid.*, 119–121. Underline mine. Italics in original.
67. See also Karl Löwith, *From Hegel to Nietzsche: The Revolution in Nineteenth Century Thought*, trans. David E. Green (New York: Anchor, 1967), 365–369.
  68. Karl Löwith, “Der Atheismus Als Philosophisches Problem—1960,” in *Sämtliche Schriften*, ed. Klaus Stichweh and Marc B. de Launay (Stuttgart: J. B. Metzlersche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1981–1986), 3:299.
  69. *Ibid.*, 300.
  70. *Ibid.*, 299.
  71. Karl Löwith, “Atheismus als Philosophisches Problem—1967,” in *Sämtliche Schriften*, 3:332.
  72. See Martin Heidegger, “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking,” in *Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings*, ed. David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1993), 427–449. For a sympathetic view of the idea of origin by Heidegger and Löwith, see Roberto de Amorim Almeida, *Natur und Geschichte: Zur Frage nach der Ursprünglichen Dimension Abendländischen Denkens vor dem Hintergrund der Auseinandersetzung zwischen Martin Heidegger und Karl Löwith* (Meisenheim am Glan: Verlag Anton Hain, 1976). For a similar incorporation of Christianity as a second source beside the Greek one, and within the same Heideggerian paradigm, see Didier Franck, *Nietzsche and the Shadow of God*, trans. Bettina Bergo and Philippe Farah (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 2012).

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