

ARISTOTLE DICTIONARY



Thomas Kiernan



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Foreword

Aristotle was born at Stagira in Thrace, in the year 384 B.C., son of Nicomachus, a Doctor and personal physician of the King of Macedonia, Amyntas II. At the age of seventeen Aristotle was sent to Athens in continuance of his studies. The profession of medicine had been in his family for many generations, and perhaps because he was brought up in an atmosphere that was closely related to medicine and to the theories of the healing art, such a background could explain his gift, later to be manifested across broad areas of knowledge, for the concrete and the positive, for experiment and analysis.

Upon his arrival in Athens, he became a member of Plato's Academy, and for twenty years he was in the discipleship of Plato until the latter's death in 348-7 B.C. While at the Academy, Aristotle found in Plato a friend and teacher for whom he had the greatest reverence, and although Aristotle's eventual teachings were to be to a large degree grounded on disagreements with Platonic theory, he was, during his apprenticeship, a devoted student of his master.

After Plato's death, Aristotle left the Academy with Xenocrates and journeyed to Assos, where, under the sponsorship of Hermias, ruler of Atarneus, he established a Platonic community in which he put forth the beginnings of his own autonomous teachings. Three years later, after having married Pythias, the daughter of Hermias, he went to Mitylene on the island of Lesbos, where he met Theophrastus, who was to become his most ardent and celebrated disciple.

By this time he had acquired a modest reputation throughout Greece, and in 342 he was summoned to Pella by King Philip of Macedonia in order to take the principal hand in the education of the King's son, Alexander, who was then thirteen years old, and who was subsequently to play so great a role on the political stage of the era as Alexander the Great. When Alexander assumed the reins of the kingdom in 336-5, Aristotle left Macedonia for Athens, by way of Stagira, his birthplace, which had been rebuilt by Alexander in compensation for Aristotle's pedagogical services.

Returning to Athens in 335-4, Aristotle founded his own school, the Lyceum. For ten years he lived and worked there, presenting the great body of his system in the form of lectures. In 323, following the death of Alexander the Great, there was in Greece a great reaction against the Macedonian suzerainty, and Aristotle found himself in peril because of his association with Alexander and because the Lyceum was established under Macedonian protection. He therefore fled to

Chalcis, the birthplace of his mother, where he lived for a year before his death in 322-1.

The circumstances surrounding Aristotle's writings are lodged in a curious paradox. The writings which he designated for general publication—the esoteric works—and which were well known in antiquity, are now for the most part lost and unknown, whereas those which were written for presentation to his students and colleagues—the pedagogical works—and which were relatively obscure in antiquity, are those which have survived. These latter works are, of course, extremely complicated and axiomatic in style due to the fact that they were intended for limited and highly specialized scholarly consumption. On the other hand, those works written for public consumption were of a much more graceful literary style, fluidly oratorical and discursive, and in quite stark contrast to the prosaic severity of his scholastic writings. There remain of his public works only fragments, the most numerous of which belong to the dialogues *Protrepticus* and *Eudemus*. These fragments come out of his earliest writing period, when he was still under the direct influence of Plato. It is evident that in this earliest period—it is generally agreed that his work falls into three main periods—he held without much reservation to the Platonic philosophy.

In his second period Aristotle began to separate himself from Platonic theory, becoming less the poetic philosophizer and more the empirical scientist. He criticized Plato's theory of Forms or Ideas, and took profound issue with the formerly held distinction between matter and form, negating the contention that these two terms constitute a dualism. He maintained, on the other hand, that matter and form are indissolubly united to form what is truly real being.

Aristotle's third period was that of his engagement in the Lyceum, where his genius for the organization of detailed research in the realms of nature and history awesomely manifested itself. The method and spirit of intensely incisive research into the phenomena of nature and history, which Aristotle fathered, represented something completely new in the Greek culture, and of course it still has its ramifications in the contemporary world. And yet there is no evidence from which to conclude that Aristotle, the growing empiricist, ever abandoned the more poetical flight through metaphysical speculation.

The Aristotelian system, or Aristotelianism, is not a radical contradiction of Platonism, as has often been held. Rather it is, if not a continuance of Plato's theories, at least an extension of Platonic thought. Historically speaking, Aristotelianism is the development of Platonism, through critical examination based on empirical evidence and physical fact, into a new metaphysics constructed on synthesis. Plato's metaphysics was a subjective, one-sided flower

of the imagination. Aristotle's was a comprehensive and intricately landscaped garden of empirically supported logic.

T.P.K.

We cannot speak of injustice between master and slave, or between father and child or toward what is part of one's self. Though we can speak of justice between a man and his wife it is not on the same level as between citizens not in the same immediate family. Between citizens justice is partly natural and partly conventional, the natural being valid everywhere and it does not depend on the individual's acceptance or rejection. The conventional varies among individuals and is prescribed for a definite circumstance, such as measures of corn and wine.

What is just and what is equitable are generically the same but the equitable is better. The reason is that every law is laid down in general terms and in accord with what holds for the majority of cases, whereas in concrete circumstances a particular case may be an exception and so the just must be amended. As amended we have the equitable in that particular case. An equitable man is willing to take less than his due even when the law is on his side.

After this analysis of the moral virtues Aristotle proceeds to a study of the intellectual virtues since virtue implies a mean as prescribed by right reason according to some standard. What is *right* reason and what is its *standard*? To answer this we must remember that the soul involves both rational and irrational activities and that the rational part of the soul involves both a scientific or demonstrative power and a calculative or deliberative power. Moreover, the powers that guide us in action and the grasp of the truth are sense, reason and desire. Sense cannot originate action and, of the other two, reasoning has two modes, viz. affirmation and negation, and desire involves pursuit and avoidance. Since moral virtue is a formed power of choice and choice is desire following deliberation, the calculation or reasoning must be true and the desire right and this regards the practical rather than the speculative. So purpose is either desiring reason or reasoning desire about what is to be done or avoided.

The mind arrives at truth by means of art, science, prudence, wisdom and understanding. Scientific knowledge is invariable and its object is necessary, eternal and invariable. Science can be taught. Induction is the process toward universal principles; syllogism (scientific reasoning) starts from these and proceeds to scientific conclusions. Hence, science is a formed habit of demonstration as explained in the *Posterior Analytics*. What is variable includes what man makes and what he does. The habit of making according to right reason is art, the habit of acting according to proper calculation is prudence. Prudence cannot be science because the sphere of prudence is action concerning what is variable; it cannot be art because it deals with doing rather than making. So prudence is a habit of calculative reason which issues in action in the domain of human good and evil. Wisdom is the union of intuitive reason with scientific knowledge concerning the noblest of objects and it is the same for all men,

whereas prudence is relative to the matters of deliberation concerning the variable in matters of practice. Wisdom deals with the general, prudence with the particular facts, for it issues in action. Prudence may be called practical wisdom. Its types relate to the proper management of a household (*oekonomia*), the legislative faculty and statesmanship, either deliberative or judicial. Just as understanding (intuitive reason) deals with primary principles which cannot be demonstrated, prudence deals with particular facts which cannot be scientifically proved.

What is this calculation or deliberation which prudence involves? It is not science or happy guessing or sagacity or just any kind of opinion but rather a correctness of reasoning (*dianoia*) by which we come to right conclusions in the correct manner and at the right time as to what ought to be done concerning the means to an end. It implies the exercise of intelligence, good judgment or discernment and correct reasoning. So intuitive reason is basic to both ultimate scientific truths and the principles of correct conduct. In virtue of our apprehension of the fundamentals of morality we deliberate about the proper means to our end. The conclusions of our deliberation are intuitively understood as the principles of conduct. We understand that the good is to be done, that such and such is good in such and such circumstances and therefore, we understand that it is to be done here and now. Prudence, as a virtue of the practical intellect, does not give us just a knowledge of the good but it produces the good act as ensuring the rightness of the means as moral virtue guarantees the rightness of the end. For, *e.g.* just acts involve both a knowledge that the acts are just and the performance of them by deliberate purpose for their own sake. "It is impossible to be prudent without being morally good," and virtue is a habit implying right reason. So if Socrates held that moral virtues are forms of reason he was partly right, if he meant that they imply reason. He is wrong if he meant simply that all virtues are forms of prudence. And prudence does not rule wisdom but "rules in its interests."

There are three types of moral states to be avoided: vice, whose opposite is virtue, incontinence, the contrary of which is continence, and brutishness, whose opposite is god-likeness. Having discussed virtue and vice he will now consider incontinence and softness and their opposites which are not vices and virtues but dispositions of a different kind. The usual method of dialectical discussion of current opinions is carried out so that all error can be wiped out and truth left in possession of the agora. Continence and hardiness are considered good and praiseworthy; incontinence and softness are bad and blameworthy. This is quite evident but in what sense can a man judge rightly and act incontinently, as some contend taking incontinence to mean "uncontrolled by reason"? The self-

indulgent man is carried along by deliberate purpose to pursue the pleasure of the moment; the incontinent man does not agree that what is pleasant at the moment is always to be pursued but he pursues it just the same. Thus he acts against his knowledge or his firmly adhered-to opinion. How could this be? Well, knowledge may mean knowledge possessed habitually and not now in use or knowledge presently active and effective. It would not be strange to act against knowledge in the first sense but quite odd to do so in the second. Then, too, it is quite easy for someone to have knowledge in the sense of a universal principle and lack the knowledge of a particular instance. Again, one may have knowledge and be asleep or mad or drunk, in which case he may be mouthing demonstrations without actually knowing what they mean. It seems that the incontinent man is in this sort of condition. He knows what he should do or not do but under the influence of passion he is like one asleep or mad or drunk, uncontrolled by reason. When there is a universal judgment forbidding one to taste, a universal judgment that "all sweet things are pleasant" and a particular judgment "this is sweet," present with the appetitive desire for the sweet, then appetite moves the incontinent man to take what is sweet. Here it is the desire that is opposed to right reason and the action follows from the desire. The incontinent man must get out of his ignorance like one gets out of being drunk or asleep. The incontinent man is said to be incontinent *simply* as regards bodily pleasures carried to excess in the pursuit of pleasure and avoidance of pain, but he is considered to be *relatively* incontinent when there is a question of excess as regards victory, honor, wealth and such, which are good and pleasant in themselves. In both cases the act is done contrary to his deliberate choice and under the influence of passion. When excess of pleasure and avoidance of pain is done without desire or with a moderate amount of passion one is called self-indulgent rather than incontinent. He who succumbs to what the generality of men can and do resist is considered soft and luxurious. If one gives way to violent and excessive pleasures or pains we are prone to pardon him. We wonder when someone gives in to and cannot resist what the generality of men withstand, unless the cause be hereditary or a result of disease. People of keen and excitable temperaments are most liable to incontinence. An incontinent man is like one who gets drunk quickly and with a small amount of wine, *i.e.* less than most men. He does what a man of vice does but not with a deliberate purpose. He has knowledge like one drunk but he acts voluntarily, since he knows what he is doing, and, yet, he is not bad or vicious, since his purpose is good. The incontinent man is compared with a state that has good laws but never carries them out; the bad man is compared to a state that carries out its laws but they are bad.

Since moral virtue and vice concern pleasures and pains and since most people consider that happiness implies pleasure, he now takes up an investigation of pleasure and pain. First, we must realize, in contrast with certain common opinions, that pleasure is a concomitant of the natural exercise of a power, and, that no power is impeded by the pleasure proper to its exercise, but only by other pleasures. Secondly, pleasure itself is good and there is no reason why a certain kind of pleasure cannot be the supreme good, since a happy life is a pleasant one. The life of a good man would be no pleasanter than others unless the exercise of his powers were pleasanter. It is not pleasure which is bad but the proper amount of pleasure in the exercise of proper and fitting activities of the natural powers. The highest and best pleasure will be the resultant of the highest and best activity, as he will develop later after an analysis of friendship and love.

All men seem to need friends: the rich rely on them for a display of benevolence and the maintenance of their position; in poverty and all other misfortunes friends are considered the only refuge; when we are young friends keep us from error; when old age takes over we need friends to help us overcome our weakness in carrying out our plans; in the prime of life they help us in noble deeds; friendship is a natural bond between parents and offspring, between hosts and guests, between members of the same group, between citizens of the same State. Friendship is a beautiful and noble thing admired by all.

Friendship is based upon love and love is specified by the different types of the good: the useful, the pleasant and the befitting. In all cases of friendship there must be an awareness and return of mutual affection with the result that it is a relationship between men exclusively. Of the three types of friendship the lowest is based on mutual utility and it endures only so long as there is a mutual profit. Such friends love and wish each other well insofar as each receives some good from the other. When one fails to receive the expected good the friendship is terminated. It exists mainly between elderly people, business associates, host and guest. The second type is founded on the pleasant so that friends find each other a source of pleasure. This is especially the case with young people, who live mainly by pleasure. They are quick to make friends and quick to change them according to the pleasure derived. They fall in and out of love “many times a day.” They enjoy each other’s company and desire to be with each other constantly. The lover delights to look upon the beloved; the beloved likes the attention paid to him. When the bloom of youth is gone the friendship sometimes vanishes, for the one misses the delight derived from the contemplation of the beauty of the beloved and the other misses the attentions. However, the friendship could last if they have developed a love for each other’s character. The most perfect kind of friendship is between those who resemble each other in

virtue. They wish well to each other for the sake of each other and their friendship lasts as long as their virtue. Of course they are useful to each other in the order of virtue and bring pleasure thereby to each other. Such friendships imply mutual trust because each is convinced that the other will never wrong him. True friends desire to live together and will do so whenever possible. Because this type of friendship is between people eminently virtuous, which is not a common state of affairs, one will not have true friendship for many at the same time. Moreover, there is an intensity of love between friends which cannot be felt as regards many simultaneously. Between persons unequal, such as father and son, an elderly and younger person, man and woman, ruler and subject the friendship is based on a proportional love, *i.e.* the better of the two, the more useful and more pleasurable should receive more love than he gives. When love is proportioned to what is deserved there is established the proportional equality which is a necessary condition of friendship.

Every association of individuals gives some occasion for friendship. Partners on a voyage or in a campaign, brothers and comrades, fraternity brothers at a dinner, citizens at a festival, spectators at games are joined for some sort of mutual advantages. All are associations of citizens but the most basic ones are those determined by the various constitutions of States. Of such there are three basic kinds: kingship, aristocracy and timocracy, the perversion of each being tyranny, oligarchy and democracy respectively. Kingship is the best absolutely speaking and tyranny is the worst, because the tyrant seeks his own useful good whereas the king wishes the good of his subjects. Aristocracy degenerates into oligarchy because of the vice of the ruling class, who distribute honors and property not on the basis of merit but for their own personal gain of wealth. Democracy is the least bad of the corrupted forms. Likenesses of these forms of government are found in families: when the father rules for the good of the family there is a kingly type of rule but it may degenerate into tyranny when the father treats his offspring as slaves; the association of husband and wife is aristocratic because the husband rules in proportion to his merit and he intrusts to the wife matters of which she is especially capable. This relationship may degenerate into an oligarchy when the husband takes over complete control in everything. If a woman rules because of wealth or other influences there is also an oligarchy. The association of brothers is a timocracy but it can easily degenerate into a democracy where there is no master or where the head of the household is of a weak character. In these good family associations there is a relative superiority and, hence, a proportional friendship. In the degenerate forms there is little room for friendship.

The friendship between husband and wife is natural for human beings since

they are impelled by nature to join together in couples for the propagation of the species and the nurture and education of the offspring. Such a friendship brings profit and pleasure but it will be based on virtue if each is good and each wills the good of virtue to the other. The conjugal union is the most basic for human beings; children are a special bond holding man and woman together. The conjugal union is more natural than the union of civil society, which is, also, a natural institution since man is by nature a social being.

In friendship a man's relationship with his friends is built upon his relationship with himself since a friend is another self. The good man is of one mind with himself and wishes what is good for himself for his own sake, *i.e.* for the sake of his *self*. He loves himself in the proper sense. He wishes existence for himself; he wishes to live with himself; he sympathizes with himself in sorrow and rejoices with himself in joy. The bad man is self-loving in an improper sense since he desires money, honors, profit and pleasure out of due proportion to his merit. The good man will even surrender wealth, honor, profit and pleasure for the sake of his friends.

Does the happy man need friends? Since he is blessed with a sufficiency of goods and has acquired virtue in a high degree he will not need friends if by friends one means useful people. Also, his life is pleasant and he does not need adventitious pleasure. If happiness is a certain exercise of human powers which is good and pleasant in itself, a happy man will need friends as a source of contemplative pleasure in the good life they lead. Moreover, the solitary life is hard since one finds difficulty in being continuously active by himself. Again, living with good men will give him a sort of practice in virtue. Since the friend is an *alter ego* the good man will delight in the consciousness of the existence of his friend, will have delight by living with him and by conversing with him on noble things. The friend is desirable for him and he ought to have friends in order to be complete. The number of friends should be proportional to the ability of love and the possibility of communal living. The most appropriate number would be one at a time or a few at most.

Before giving a general summary of the good life for man Aristotle enters into a very detailed analysis of pleasure, occasioned by the widespread interest in the opinion of Eudoxus that pleasure is *the* good. The reasons for this opinion were, first, that all things strive after pleasure. What is desirable is good; what is most desirable is the best. The fact that all things incline to pleasure would seem to indicate that it is the best. Secondly, pain is the opposite of pleasure. Pain is the object of aversion for all. So its opposite is desirable for all. Thirdly, that is most desirable which we choose for its own sake. This is the case with pleasure. In opposition, such cannot be the case because pleasure is neither an object of

desire nor an activity nor the objective perfection of an activity. Pleasure may be best understood in comparison with vision, *e.g.* like vision pleasure is something whole and entire at any moment and it is impossible that duration should make pleasure complete. Pleasure is not a motion. Every motion is incomplete at any moment, it requires duration in time and its whither and whence are specifically different. Any sense exercises itself upon its proper object and exercises itself completely when it is in good condition and its object is the best of those within its scope. This exercise is not only the most complete but also the most pleasant, for the exercise of any power is accompanied by pleasure and the most complete exercise gives the most pleasure. So pleasure is a completion of the exercise of a power, not as a habit completes it nor as the object and the power complete the exercise of the power, but as a superaddition to the exercise like the “grace of youth.” Pleasure is the *overtone* of an activity well performed. It accompanies all activities so long as the power operates as it should and in regard to its proper object. Well, why then can’t we be completely capable of continuous pleasure? Perhaps, because pleasure exhausts us and because no human power is capable of continuous exercise. Since pleasure accompanies the exercise of powers properly functioning and since life is an activity, pleasure will complete the life which men desire and it, too, is desirable because men find in it the completion of life.

Pleasures differ in kind, for specifically different things are completed by specifically different things, as seems the case in products of both art and nature. Intellectual pleasures differ from sense pleasures. The several kinds of each are different from each other; since the activities are different their completions are different. The exercise of a power is increased by its proper pleasure, as one is more likely to understand something if the exercise of understanding is pleasant when applied to it; one is more apt to penetrate to the depths of understanding if pleasure is involved. The exercise of one power is impeded by the pleasure proper to another, as when a lover of the flute is hindered from following an argument when he hears someone playing, since he takes more delight in it. Also, when anything gives us intense delight we cannot do anything else at all. The goodness or badness of a pleasure is dependent upon the goodness or badness of the activity of the powers involved. Ultimately the test of the goodness of pleasure is virtue or, more concretely, the virtuous man. Of the good pleasures, the proper pleasures of man will be those of the exercise of his proper activities: intellect and will.

In summary, happiness is not a habit or a trained power. It resides in the exercise of a power that is desirable in itself and completely sufficient in itself and, hence, excellent and noble. The exercise of the trained powers which are

proper to man are most desirable to man and the perfect man finds the exercise of virtue most desirable. That is truly valuable and pleasant which is so to the perfect man. Amusement is not considered as valuable and pleasant in itself but it is a sort of recreation which we need because we cannot work continuously and it is a means to the exercise of our powers. The enjoyment of bodily pleasures is within the reach of everybody, of children as well as slaves; it, too, is a means rather than an end. If happiness is the exercise of virtue it will be the exercise of the highest virtue, the excellence of the best part of which is reason. Hence happiness is the speculative contemplation of the best object by the noblest power in man. Such is the most pleasurable of activities, the most self-sufficient. The necessities of life are needed in suitable quantities as conditions for the exercise of the contemplation of the truth. Above all leisure is required during a complete extent of time. It is reason which is man in the truest sense; the contemplative activity of a life of reason is the best and most pleasant and, therefore, the happiest. The exercise of moral virtue is happiness in a secondary analogous sense and it is this aspect of happiness which requires the necessities of external goods: so that man's happiness be complete for the *whole* man. All this is confirmed by the test of truth in practical matters, *i.e.* the facts of life.

Knowledge of what constitutes human happiness is not enough. We must endeavor to acquire it by our own efforts. This requires a basic natural endowment bestowed on a man by nature or some divine agency. Training in the habits of character must be undergone from the earliest times so that one will not become accustomed to live solely by pleasure of the passions. This demands a body of suitable laws for the guidance of youth in temperate living and the continuance of the development of virtue in adult life. Education in the principles of correct living must be carried on, also, from the beginning so that reason may be perfected, too, as regards proper conduct. A proper organization of law is needed for the well-being of all the citizens of the State but, perhaps, individuals are educated better under a system of private education. For the mastery of any science or art the individual must advance to its general principles and become acquainted with them in the proper method. The molding of character can be done best by one who has knowledge of man and of the State and can discriminate about the utility of laws for the common happiness of the citizens. Such a man would be a statesman in the proper sense of the term. The enquiry into the good life for man will be completed when we inquire into the matter of legislation. This will be accomplished by examining any valuable utterances of our predecessors, by looking into the collection of Constitutions of States, by investigating what tends to preserve or destroy states and the several kinds of constitutions, by deciding what are the causes of good and bad

governments. In conclusion we will be able to decide what system of laws and customs are best suited to each kind of constitution.

POLITICS

Aristotle's incomplete treatise on the political life of citizens united for the common good is presented in 103 chapters divided into 8 Books. His aim seems to be to understand what constitutes the ideal political organization absolutely and relatively, and how the ideal may become a practical reality. The method of investigation is historical, both from the viewpoint of the natural genesis of communities in general and from the actual examples of established governments in particular. It involves conclusions from inductive generalizations and it is dialectical in terms of the evaluation of various theories about the nature and formation of States. The education of citizens is a necessary aspect of the formation of the ideal community and the treatise concludes with a consideration of the proper method of education and the proper subject-matter to be stressed to insure the good life of men in the State. Unfortunately the education procedures are incomplete. The intellectual and moral development, though considered as most important and most essential to the ultimate goal, is merely skimmed over in passing. The treatise is clearly unfinished or else a major portion has been lost in the process of transmission to us. Yet from this and other treatises we do not have too much difficulty in drawing up a satisfactory curriculum involving the liberal disciplines of literature, rhetoric, logic, arithmetic, geometry, astronomy and music as a basis and with natural philosophy, moral philosophy and the divine science of metaphysics composing the superstructure. The educative process is quite clear, too, from the discussions in the *Organon* concerning method and from the actual procedures followed in each investigation he undertakes in separate works. One may consider the *Politics* as a goal to which all the other discussions are suitable means.

It is quite evident that every *polis* is a community of free men whose aim is the highest good of the citizens which constitute it. In the natural order there is a progressive development of communities from the original state of a simple household of husband, wife, children and slaves, through the intermediate stage of villages, composed of many households, to the relatively complete organization which is a State. The family is the fundamental unit established by nature for the alleviation of men's daily needs, and the village was probably, in the beginning, a colony formed by the expansion of the family under the kingly rule of the eldest. The State comes into existence as a group of colonies united

together to supply the necessities of life and it continues in existence for the sake of the good life: human happiness. Hence the State is a natural community of men who are by nature political animals united by the bond of justice. The precise type of organizational unity, of course, results from the constructive artistic ability of the citizens. The family is temporally prior to the State but the State is by nature prior to the family and to the individuals that compose it, since a whole is naturally prior to a part, the end is prior to the means and the perfect (self-sufficing) is prior to the imperfect.

Property is an element of the household and the art of acquiring and utilizing it is a part of the art of managing the household. Included in the property required for the provision of the necessities of life are living instruments, the slaves, who take precedence over all other properties since they are ministers of action rather than just instruments of production, like a shuttle in weaving. The slave belongs to the master wholly, and by nature is the type of being who should be ruled since he participates in the intellectual principle only to the extent of apprehending what he should do as commanded by the master. He is strong in body and well-fitted for servile labor but incapable of the higher activities of reason required for the political life as such. Such a natural slavery is both expedient and right whereas slavery by right of conquest without respecting the natural differences of men is wrong, since it is based on the law of force and violence. The natural type of slavery is really a kind of friendship with a common interest whereas slavery by law or force is an unnatural relation between enemies. Master and slave are, also, related in a way proportional to the relation between soul and body.

The art of managing the household includes, too, the necessary and honorable type of wealth-acquiring, *i.e.* the procurement of the physical necessities of life from nature. Another type of wealth-getting is retail trade and it is justly censured because it involves the accumulation of money for its own sake. Trade which consists in a sort of natural barter is not reprehensible but commercial trading for the sake of money is. The most reprehensible type of such trading is that of usury which makes an unnatural use of an instrument of exchange in order to breed money. The useful aspects of household management involve the knowledge of live-stock, husbandry, including tillage and planting, the keeping of bees, fish, fowl or any animals useful to man, lumbering and mining. In all these pursuits the master controls the slaves with a monarchical rule. His relationship with his offspring is royal by virtue of love and respect; over his wife he exercises a constitutional rule for, although there may be exceptions, the male is generally more capable of command than the female. In these relationships appear the main concern of the management of the family: the

acquisition of human excellence more so than that of wealth. The master ought to have moral virtue in perfection absolutely, the wife, children and slaves should have it relatively to their proper status. Since every family is a unit in the State the perfection of the whole depends upon the perfection of the family; women and children must be educated “with an eye to the constitution.” The children grow up to be citizens and half the free persons in the State are women.

From a consideration of the household Aristotle goes on to an historical investigation of the ideal State. Beginning near at hand he evaluates the communities proposed by Plato in the *Republic* and the *Laws*. In the first, the abolition of private property and the family will harm rather than aid the State by the increase of dissension and the destruction of the affection naturally felt for wives and offspring. Private property is a means to individual happiness and helps in the cultivation of the virtue of liberality. It is quite impractical to advocate a communism of women and children, and Socrates’ principle, *the greater the unity of the State the better* is self-defeating and self-destructive of the very nature of the State. Pluralistic differentiation is essential and the only feasible unity is a proportional one. The self-sufficiency of a State requires lesser rather than a greater degree of unity. Furthermore, that which is common to the greatest number has the least care bestowed upon it. Each one will expect the other to fulfill a common duty. Each citizen will have a thousand sons and yet no son since anybody is equally the son of anybody. How will the guardians control the acts of homicides, unlawful loves and slanders which are especially evil when committed against fathers, mothers and near relatives? In the *Laws* Plato abandons the common status of women, children and property but leaves the Ideal State otherwise quite the same. The increase in the number of the citizens makes it really impractical, there is no limit to private property, no restrictions on the population increase and no provisions for proper foreign relations. The constitution implied is too oligarchical.

The regulation of property seems to be a problem in all states. Phaleas of Chalcedon thought that the citizens of a State ought to have equal possessions which would not be too bad if the possessors were living in neither luxury nor penury. The regulation of moderation in possessions is not the central point. It is the desires of men which must be moderated and this requires an equal education for all, which is not feasible. It is quite impractical to expect all men to be satisfied with numerical equality. Hippodamus of Miletus divided the land into three parts and the citizens into three groups: artisans, husbandmen and warriors. But the artisans were allotted no land, the first portion being given over to the worship of the gods; the husbandmen had no weapons. Hence, both classes could easily become the slaves of the warriors. Only these latter would have an actual

share in government. And, who would cultivate the land of the warriors? If they do it they are husbandmen. If the husbandmen do it they will cultivate their own land and the warrior's land too: how will they supply the quantity of produce needed for two households? Hippodamus, also, reduces the judges to arbiters since he desires them to confer about the decision to be rendered. He proposes such a readiness to change existing laws that laws would lose all requisite force and become enfeebled. The most praiseworthy of existing States, those of Sparta, Crete and Carthage have serious imperfections. The Spartans have trouble controlling the slaves; their women are too influential, they control the wealth and live in a state of intemperance and luxury; there is a gross inequality of property; the legislators are notably open to bribery. The Cretan constitution is like the Spartan, a narrow and faction-ridden oligarchy. It dispenses too much without written law. The Carthaginian constitution is an oligarchy with certain democratic features. It lays too much stress on wealth and is not concerned about positions which involve conflicts of interest being held by the same men. The greatest offices can be bought; wealth is of more account than virtue. Solon is held up for respect because he was considered to have been a good legislator who emancipated the people, established the Athenian democracy and harmonized the various elements in the State. About other legislators little more need be said.

A knowledge of the essence and attributes of different kinds of governments depends upon a knowledge of what makes a citizen a citizen since the state is a composite of individual citizens. One is not a citizen because he lives in a certain place; nor is one a citizen because he has no legal right except that of suing and being sued; nor one too young or too old to perform state duties. His special characteristic is that he shares in the administration of justice and in offices. From the point of view of democracy a citizen is one who has the power to take part in the deliberative or judicial administration of the State. And a state is a body of citizens sufficing for the purpose of life. From another point of view, the State is a partnership of citizens in a constitution. The function of a citizen will be relative to the constitution.

As to the problem whether the virtue of a good man and a good citizen is the same or not one must first investigate what the virtue of a citizen is. If there are many forms of government it is clear that there is not one single political virtue which is perfect virtue, and the good citizen need not be the good man. Every citizen must have the virtue of a good citizen, otherwise the State cannot be a perfect organization of citizens. But they will not have the virtue of a good man unless it is assumed that the citizens be good men as well as good citizens. Taking States under a random consideration the virtue of a citizen is not always

identical with the virtue of a good man. According to Aristotle's concept of the *Ideal State* the virtue of a good man would render him both capable of ruling and being ruled, of administering justice, of living temperately and courageously with his fellow-men and, thus, give him the virtue of a good citizen. Good men are good citizens; good citizens are good men in Aristotle's Utopia. Because mechanics and laborers cannot practice virtue while leading the life of mechanics and laborers they will not be included in the category of citizens. In oligarchies no laborer can be a citizen because the qualifications are too high; a mechanic may be since the actual majority of them are rich.

There are three types of governments, each of which is a true form because the good is the common interest of all. To each true form corresponds a perversion in which the goal is a private rather than a common interest. When the rule is in the hands of one, the good form is kingship and its perversion is tyranny. When the control is in the hands of the few, the good form is aristocracy, and its perverse form is oligarchy. When the rule is in the hands of the many, the true form is a constitutional government and its perversion is a democracy. Absolutely speaking, the best form of government is the kingly and its opposite, tyranny, is the worst. Relatively, democracy seems to be the least offensive of all perverted forms of rule. It is considered as perverted because its goal is not the common good of all but the interest of the needy. Actually the essential distinction between oligarchy and democracy is not based on numbers, for the many could be rich and the few poor, but on the fact that whenever rule is based on wealth there is an oligarchy, when it is based on poverty there is a democracy.

There are five types of monarchy: 1) according to law, which may be called a generalship for life; some are hereditary and others elective; 2) legal and hereditary, almost a tyranny, as found among Barbarians; 3) Dictatorship, a legal and elective tyranny; 4) heroic, exercised over willing subjects but limited to certain functions of general and judge; 5) absolute monarchy similar to the control of the household. The last is, perhaps, the best. It arose somewhat naturally to satisfy the needs of primitive society; it is now out of fashion and objectionable in many ways, such as, it tends to become hereditary and thus incompetent men become rulers and no single man can attend properly to all the aspects of government.

States are composed of many different elements: husbandmen (the food-producing class), mechanics (who practice the arts), traders, serfs or laborers, the military, politicians, wealthy, magistrates and officers (rulers). There may be combinations of these in the same men but the distinction between rich and poor is mutually exclusive. Hence arises the opinion that there are two kinds of

governments: oligarchy and democracy. Of the latter there are five types: 1) based on equality—all share alike in government; 2) based on a low property qualification; he who loses his property loses his rights; 3) all citizens under no disqualification share in government but the law is supreme; 4) every citizen is admitted to government and the law is supreme; 5) the multitude has supreme power even over the laws. This last form easily degenerates into a tyranny of the many. The different kinds of oligarchies are: 1) property qualification is such that poor have no share in the government; 2) a high qualification and vacancies are filled by election; if the election is made out of all qualified persons it tends to aristocracy, if out of a privileged class, oligarchy; 3) son succeeds father; 4) hereditary but magistrates are supreme and not the law; this becomes a dynastic sort of rule. In many States the constitution may not be democratic but because of education and the habits of people it can be administered democratically. Or the constitution may be democratic and administered in an oligarchical spirit. This happens mostly after a revolution. Aristocracy is a government by the best who alone are citizens. In this type the good man is absolutely the same as the good citizen. If the magistrates are chosen according to wealth and merit you have one sub-type and, another, if according to wealth, virtue and numbers. There are two parts of any good government: the actual obedience of the laws and the goodness of the laws which they obey. In actual fact, the admixture of rich and poor is called a constitutional government and the combination of freedom, wealth and virtue is called an aristocracy. A constitutional government arises from a combination of elements found in both democracy and oligarchy. It is a sort of mean between them. In oligarchies they fine the rich if they do not serve as judges and give no pay to the poor; in democracies they pay the poor and do not fine the rich. Democracy requires no or a small property qualification from members of the assembly; oligarchies require a high one. The appointment of magistrates by lot is considered democratic and their election is oligarchical. Assuming a medium position would be the mark of a polity or constitutional government. In a tyranny the arbitrary power of an individual is supreme, he is responsible to no one, governs all alike, against their will with a view to his own advantage.

What is the best constitution for most states and the best life for most men, neither assuming a standard of virtue above the ordinary, nor an exceptional education, nor an ideal state, but a form of government which states in general can attain? It will be neither the rule of the poor nor of the rich but the rule of the middle class, for it is the mean condition in which men are most ready to follow the rational principle. Those who have too much of the goods of fortune are neither willing nor able to submit to authority; those who are very poor are too

degraded and are unable to rule. Those in the middle class do not covet others' goods nor do others covet theirs. When the middle class is also larger and stronger than both the other classes or at least either singly, the state is most likely to be administered well.

All constitutions must make appropriate provisions for three aspects of government: the legislative, executive and judicial. Under the legislative will come matters concerning war and peace, passing laws, electing magistrates and auditing their accounts. How these powers are assigned will depend upon the type of constitution. Under the executive branch are included all the offices whether of priests, political officers, masters of choruses, heralds, ambassadors, superintendents, inspectors, etc., as to how many there should be, how and where set up, the duration of the terms of office, *etc.* The judicial branch is set up as to the number of courts, the source of the judges, the manner of selecting the judges according to the requirements of the constitution.

Revolutions may arise in any kind of state. The universal and chief cause of revolutions is the desire of equality or inequality. Inferiors revolt in order to become equal; equals revolt in order to become superior. The motives of revolutions are the desire for gain and honor or the fear of dishonor and loss. Causes of revolutions are insolence, fear, excessive predominance, contempt, disproportionate increase in some part of the state, election intrigues, carelessness, *etc.* Revolutions are effected either by force or fraud. Revolutions in democracies are generally caused by the intemperance of demagogues resulting in a persecution of the rich or the inciting of the mob by oratory to put power into the hands of the few. In oligarchies the oppression of the people and the internal rivalry of the oligarchs may bring on a revolution. Aristocracies are overthrown when the mass of the people have a notion that they are as good as their rulers or an individual wants to rule alone. In order to guard against the overthrow of a government we must know the causes which destroy constitutions and be on our guard against them. In particular there must be a careful watch over obedience to the laws, more especially in small matters. Guard against the beginnings of change. All citizens must be treated with a proportional equality. Tenure of offices should be restricted. The citizens should be kept aware of the dangers, proximate and remote, which could overthrow the government. Contentions and quarrels should be controlled. The power of individuals and the opportunities for personal aggrandizement should be moderated. A strict supervision should be maintained over all revenues and expenditures; accounts should be audited regularly and publicly. Special qualifications should be demanded for the holding of the highest offices: loyalty to the established constitution, the greatest administrative capacity, virtue and

justice proper to the form of government. In the choice of a general skill should be more important than virtue, if both cannot be found in the same man. In an office of trust more than ordinary virtue is required. What contributes most to the permanence of a constitution is the adaptation of education to the form of government. The best laws will be useless unless the youth are trained by habit and education in the spirit of the constitution. In a democracy the two fundamental principles are government by the majority and freedom. But freedom is not license, *i.e.* acting according to individual fancy. It is relative to the rule of the constitution. Royalty is preserved by the limitation of its powers so that it does not degenerate into a tyranny. Tyranny is preserved by lopping off those who are superior; men of spirit are put to death; common meals, clubs and education are forbidden; anything calculated to inspire courage or confidence in the subjects is outlawed; literary assemblies and meetings for discussion are prohibited; means must be taken to prevent the subjects from becoming friendly with each other; close supervision by means of spies must be maintained over the subjects as regards their place of habitation, their occupations and utterances. Fear of informers prevent people from speaking their minds. Quarrels should be stimulated between friends and different classes of people to prevent unity. Subjects should be kept impoverished, dependent and in need. State projects should be instituted in order to keep everybody at hard work and thus prevent conspiracies. Multiply taxes, keep the state at war. In summary, a tyrant preserves his power by the humiliation of his subjects, the creation of mistrust among them and the prevention of unified action whereby power to overthrow him is accumulated. The tyrant must play the game of being a benevolent ruler by pretending to have a care of the public monies by avoiding all waste and publishing an account of the use of all revenues. He should appear to be dignified, kind and not harsh in order to inspire reverence rather than fear. He should avoid any public display of vice or over-indulgence in pleasures, such as drunkenness. He should adorn and improve the state as if he were its guardian. He should appear to be earnest in the service of the gods since this inspires reverence for him and avoids the condemnation of injustice. Men of merit should be honored by the tyrant personally whereas all punishment should be inflicted by courts of law. In all the forementioned causes of revolutions, reasons for the breakdown of states and the methods for their preservation Aristotle has displayed an extensive knowledge of history and he uses it copiously to illustrate his points. His judgments are conclusions drawn from the facts of historical experience.

In order to set up a democracy one must realize that there are different species of it, depending on the differences of populations and the precise continuation of

the properties and characteristics of a democracy. The basic property of a democratic state is liberty. One principle of it is for all to rule and to be ruled. Justice depends upon numerical equality and thus the poor, because they are more numerous, will have more power than the rich. The will of the majority is supreme. The second principle is that each man lives as he likes, whence arises the claim of men to be ruled by no one, if possible. If this is not possible then they desire to rule and be ruled in turns. Of democracies the best is an agricultural democracy. The next best is the pastoral, then the commercial, and the worst is that in which all share alike, all offices are open to all. This will not last unless well regulated by laws and customs. Extreme poverty should be avoided because it lowers the character of a democracy. Each citizen should be allotted enough out of the public revenue to enable him to purchase a small farm or make a beginning in trade or husbandry. The nobility should, among themselves, give the poor the opportunity of securing work. The poor should be prevented from plundering the rich.

The last two books of the *Politics* investigate the positive aspects of the best form of a state and the educational procedures in order to insure its development and preservation. Assuming that the best form of a constitution would be the one which would assure the living of the best life for all, he repeats his conclusions about the good life found in the *Ethics*. The best life for man would be a contemplative life of wisdom along with the moral virtues and an appropriate amount of both external goods and goods of the body. So the best form of government is one under which every man can act best and live happily. The first consideration in such a state would concern the population. Since a state must be relatively self-sufficient the actual number of the inhabitants cannot be too small nor too large. Just as in the case of all natural and artistic objects there is a relative maximum and minimum. If the population is too small it cannot be self-sufficient; when it is too large constitutional government is rendered impossible and no one is capable of achieving order out of such a multitude. If offices are to be distributed according to merit as judged by the citizens who elect the holders of the offices, the citizens must know each other's character. An impossible situation with a large multitude.

The territory of the state should be as near as possible self-sufficing. In size and extent it should be such as to permit the inhabitants to live temperately and liberally in the enjoyment of leisure. It should be difficult of access to the enemy and easy of egress by the inhabitants. For protective purposes it should be only large enough to be taken in at a single view, well situated as regards sea and land. Communication by sea is desirable for reasons of trade but a port in the center of the city might be detrimental because of the influx of foreigners and

undesirables.

In character the citizens should possess a happy combination of high spirits and intelligence, and, thus, they should be a combination of Europeans and Asiatics. There must be husbandmen to produce food, artisans to construct the instruments of proper living and traders for the barter of necessary goods. These will not be citizens. The class of warriors will be citizens in the strict sense. In their youth they will actually function as such; in middle age they will be rulers and magistrates; in old age some will be selected as priests. They alone will be owners of land and each will have two parcels of it: one plot near the city and one near the frontier to insure an interest in the defense of the total state. Although the land is divided into public and private property there will be a friendly consent about an appropriate common use of private property for the common good.

The land should be in a healthy location with a natural abundance of springs and fountains of pure water. The streets and houses should be laid out according to a plan which would insure both beauty and adequate defense against an enemy. There should be a protective wall around the whole city. When a state is well-prepared defensively no enemy even thinks of attacking it.

By far the most important aspect of a state concerns the education of the citizens in the proper means for the attainment of happiness. Three things make men good and virtuous: nature, habit, rational principle. By nature one must be a man and, then, he learns by habit and instruction. He who would learn to command must first learn how to obey. From youth onward one should be accustomed by habit to obey and to live in accord with the laws of the constitution according to which peace is the goal of war and leisure the goal of toil. The virtues of temperance and courage, prudence and justice will develop gradually under direction and habitual exercise. The care of the body precedes the care of the soul and is ordered to it. Education should deal with development of the body, control of appetites and the development of the intellect. To ensure that the bodies of the future citizens be as fit as possible the age of marriage must be regulated so that those who are too young or too old do not beget children. The offspring of the too young tend to be small and badly developed; those of the too old are defective in body and mind. The age of marriage should be arranged so that both husband and wife are at the prime of life and thus better prepared to produce the best offspring. Women should marry when they are about 18; men when they are about 37. When the male has reached the age of about 55 the couple should cease having a family and should cohabit for the sake of health or some reason other than having children. Women who are with child should be careful of their diet and take a certain amount of exercise every day.

Deformed children should not be permitted to live; when couples have children in excess, let abortion be procured before sense and life begin. After children have been born they should be supplied with milk for food and should be accustomed gradually to the cold and other hardships in order to strengthen the body. Up to the age of five there should be no demand of study or labor lest growth be impeded. Games should be cultivated, loud crying and screaming should be permitted in order to strengthen their voices. A strict supervision by the directors of education must be maintained over the stories told to the young, for all such are designed to prepare the way for the later life. The young should never be allowed to repeat or hear any indecency of speech. All indecent pictures, images and speeches should be banished from the stage. Youth should be kept strangers to all that is bad and, especially, to anything which would suggest vice or hate.

The education of children is the common interest of the state since it is for the good of the state that the children are trained in the way required by the constitution. From the age of seven education should be public, regulated by law and an affair of the state. The usual branches of education are: 1) reading and writing; 2) gymnastic exercises; 3) music and 4) drawing. With the exception of gymnastic exercises these are branches of learning we study with a view to leisure spent in intellectual activity. Reading and writing are also useful in household management and the political life. Drawing is helpful for developing a critical judgment of artistic works and of the beauty of the human form. Gymnastic exercises of the lighter kind should be used in the education of children up to the age of puberty and 3 years after, but the physique must not be developed at the expense of the intellectual training, as in Sparta. Music not only relaxes, amuses and conduces to intellectual enjoyment but has a power of forming character. Therefore, it has a very precise role in the education of the citizen. But should children be taught to play and sing music? It seems impossible for those who do not perform to be good judges of the performance of others. Thus, those who are to be judges must be performers, beginning to practice at an early age and learning to appreciate and delight in what is good. They need not acquire the fantastic marvels of execution displayed by professionals. Any musical instrument intended only to give pleasure to the hearer, and, which requires extraordinary skill of hand should be rejected. Music should be studied for education, purgation and intellectual enjoyment. He promises to explain in his discussion of poetry (*Poetics*) what he means precisely by purgation. Unfortunately, if he kept his promise, we do not have any record of it, as is clear from the analysis of the *Poetics*. Melodies expressive of ethical conduct should be cultivated by children; melodies of action and passionate or

inspiring melodies give pleasure and are conducive to the over-all development of all men.

OECONOMICA

After the incomplete *Politics*, Bekker's edition of the Aristotelian works include a treatise called *Economics*, made up of two books, the first of which contains 6 chapters and the second a continuous recital from page 1345-1353. Though Aristotelian in spirit there is evidence that the Master did not actually compose them. In some Latin versions there is a third book added concerning the duties of a wife in the household.

The science of Economics, as presented here, concerns the prudential management of the household as contrasted with *Politics*, the science of the city. The components of the household are man and property, as developed in the *Politics*. The union of male and female is a natural one whose goal is the propagation of the species and the achievement of the good life of happiness. Husband and wife cooperate, each in his or her own way, to achieve this twofold purpose. Nature has made the male stronger in order to protect the family physically and educate the offspring; the female is better equipped to nurture the children. A man must avoid doing any wrong to his wife. Husband and wife ought not to approach each other with false affectation in their person or their manners, "for if the society of husband and wife requires such embellishments, it is no better than play-acting on the tragic stage." The proper management of the household also includes the apportionment of work, punishment and food for the slaves. As regards wealth, the economist ought to possess four qualities: to be able to acquire it and guard it; to order his possessions and use them properly. The house should be physically arranged for the health and well-being of its inhabitants.

Book Two is mainly concerned with examples of the various means employed by noteworthy men of history to provide themselves with money for the management of various types of economies: the Royal, Satrapic, Political and Personal. As such it seems a little out of place in the present treatise. The third Book is more pertinent since it concerns the duties of a wife regarding the management of the internal affairs of the household.

A good wife should be the mistress of the home, responsible for the care of all within it including the expenditure of funds on such festivities, dress and ornamentation as are approved by her husband. Her excellence derives from self-control, and an honorable and well-ordered life rather than from the costliness of

raiment or an abundance of wealth. In all matters she should aim to carry out the wishes of her husband, dread above all things the gossip of gadding women, endure difficulties with patience and gentleness, and rule the home without complaint and criticism. If there seems to be a reason for charging her husband with wrong let her rather attribute the unpleasantness to his ignorance, sickness or accidental errors. The wife should remember that she is a partner in his life and in the procreation of children than which nothing can be greater or more divine. While praying that her husband may be spared adversity, if trouble should come, she should consider that here a good woman receives her highest praise. In times of stress they should be faithful and dutiful. "To find partners in prosperity is easy enough; but only the best women are ready to share in adversity."

The husband will treat his wife in a similar way since she is the partner of his life and parenthood. He should expect nothing more divine than to beget children by a noble and honored wife, assist her in the proper rearing of them in virtuous living, be faithful to her, love and trust her as his own. To a wife nothing is of more value than honored and faithful partnership with her husband. Between a free woman and her lawful spouse there should be a reverent and modest mingling of love and fear; fear such as is felt between righteous and honorable partners. There is no greater blessing on earth than when husband and wife rule their home in harmony of mind and will, each vying with the other in the effort to contribute most to the happiness of the home and to excel in virtue and righteousness.

The preceding presentation of the contents of the *Aristotelian Corpus* was compiled as an appropriate background for the *Aristotle Dictionary* which follows. As is quite evident to the reader, very little attempt has been made to "interpret" or evaluate the ideas discussed by Aristotle himself or to correlate them with the development of logic, the physical sciences, ethics, aesthetics, politics, metaphysics, *etc.* since his time. This does not mean that there have been no worthwhile contributions made to these areas of intellectual curiosity since the fourth century B.C. Quite the contrary. But I have judged that an analytical presentation of what Aristotle is supposed to have taught about these many subjects would be more suitable to this type of book. The analysis or paraphrase or simple repetition of his words should supply us with an agreeable environment for an appreciation of his definitions, conclusions and 'bold statements' presented in a somewhat out-of-context fashion in a dictionary.

In the dictionary itself references are made to the appropriate *loci* of the quotations in accord with the generally accepted method of giving the precise page, column and lines in the Bekker edition of the Greek published in 1831.

This is of practical value since there have been many translations of the works of Aristotle and most of them include some references to the Bekker *loci*. No matter what the translation, if it has been made in consultation with that monumental work, any reader can find the actual context from which the definitions, *etc.* have been extracted. By way of illustration of the method of reference: if the quotation in the dictionary is followed by DE A 2.7.419a 15-20, that would mean that in the Bekker edition of Aristotle's works in the treatise entitled *De Anima* (peri psyches) Book 2, chapter 7, page 419, column a, lines 15-20 you will find that statement. Actually the pages of the Bekker text are numbered consecutively in the first two volumes of a four volume set, the last two devoted to commentaries and other related works. Hence the absolutely essential parts of the reference numbers are the page numbers, column designation and line reference. Some Aristotelian works are divided merely into chapters rather than books. In that case the first number is the chapter, the next is the page, *etc.*

EXAMPLE

DE A-2. 7. 419a15-20
DE A—De Anima (peri psyches—on the Soul).
2.—Book 2
7. - Chapter 7
419—page 419 in the Bekker edition
a—column a, *i.e.* left hand column of 2
columns
15-20—lines 15-20.

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KEY OF REFERENCES

Many of the treatises that constitute the generally accepted Aristotelian canon are commonly designated by Latin titles.

Organon (O. F. Owen) comprising:

CAT-Categories

DE I—De Interpretatione

P A—Prior Analytics

PO A—Posterior Analytics

T-Topics

S E—Sophistici Elenchi

C—Constitution of Athens (J. S. Dymes)

POL—Politics (E. Walford)

ECO-Economics (E. Walford)

RH-Rhetoric (T. Buckley)

P-Poetics (T. Buckley)

N E—Nicomachean Ethics (R. W. Browne)

E E-Eudemian Ethics (T. Taylor)

M M—Magna Moralia (T. Taylor)

H A—Historia Animalium (T. Taylor: H. E. W.)

PHY-Physics (T. Taylor)

DE A-DE Anima (H. E. W.: T. Taylor)

ME-Metaphysics (J. H. M'Mahon)

DE V-De Vita et Morte (Taylor)

DE R-De Respiratione (Taylor)

DE IN—De Incessu Animalium (Taylor)

DE M A—De Motu Animalium (Taylor)

DE C-De Caelo (Taylor)

DE M—De Meteorologia (Taylor)

DE G ET C-De Generatione et Corruptione (Taylor)

DE P A-De Partibus Animalium (Taylor)

DE S ET S-De Sensu et Sensibili (Taylor and H. E. W.)

DE M ET R-De Memoria et de Reminiscentia (Taylor)

DE SOM-De Somniis (Taylor)

DE S-De Somno (Taylor)

DE DIV—De Divinatione per somnum (Taylor)

DE L ET B—De Longitudine et Breuitate Vitae (Taylor)

DE G A—De Generatione Animalium (Taylor)

A

Abstinence He who avoids all pleasures, like a boor, is an insensible sort of person.

N E—2. 2. 1104A24-25

Accent, Fallacy of But concerning accent . . . it is not easy to frame an argument except in writings and poems as, for instance, some defend Homer against those who accuse him of having spoken absurdly: to men ou kataputhetai ombro, for they solve this by accent saying that ou is to be marked with an acute accent.

S E—4.166B1-6

Accident Now those things which are not predicated of a subject I call per se, but those which are so predicated I call accidents.

PO A—1. 4. 73B8-10

I call accidents those that are neither inherent in all nor per se, as musical or white is said to be in an animal.

PO A—1. 4. 73B4-5

But whatever do not signify substance, but are predicated of another subject, which is neither the thing itself, nor something belonging to it, are accidents, as white is predicated of man, since man is neither white, nor anything belonging to white.... Such as do not signify substance it is necessary should be predicated of a certain subject.

PO A—1. 22. 83A24-31

Accident is that which is not any of these, neither definition, nor property, nor genus; yet it is present with a thing and may not be present.

T—1. 5. 102B4-6

That was said to be accident which is neither definition, nor genus, nor property, yet is present with a thing.

T—1. 8. 103B17-19

We must especially have regard to the definition of accident ... we designate that an accident which may be or may not be with a certain thing.

T—4. 1. 120B30-35

Of all things the easiest to establish is the accident, for it is enough to show that it belongs to something.... On the other hand, the hardest to overthrow is the accident . . . it is impossible to subvert it except by showing that it does not belong to something.

T—7. 5. 155A28-38

That is said to be an accident which can be present or not present in a subject, or that in whose definition is included a relation to that in which it is.

PHY—1. 3.186B18-21

Still from these it is manifest that there is nothing to prevent accident sometimes, and relatively from becoming a property, as to sit being accident, when someone alone sits it will then be a property . . . however, it will not be a property simple.

T—1.5. 102B20-26

An accident is denominated as that which is inherent in something, and which it is true to affirm is so, yet not either necessarily, or for the most part.

ME—4.30. 1025A14-15

Whatever may be neither always nor for the most part this I call accident.

ME—5. 2. 1028B31-33

An entity subsists according to accident . . . either because both are inherent in the same entity, or because they are inherent in that entity, or because they are the same with that in which the accidents are inherent, and of which the thing itself is predicated.

ME—4. 7. 1017A8-22

No accident is either always or very frequently produced.

DE DIV—1. 463A2-3

Accident, Fallacy of Fallacies which arise from accident are when something is attributed to a thing because it is attributed to one of its accidents . . . Thus if Coriscus is different from man, he is different from himself, for he is a man.

S E—5. 166B28-33

Accident, Fallacy of, refutation of With respect to those arguments which are from accident, there is one and the same solution for them all, for since it is uncertain when an assertion can be made of a thing because of accident . . . it

must be said that the conclusion is not necessary.

S E—24. 179A26-31

Accidents (misfortunes) Now accidents are whatever things happen against all calculation, and proceed not from criminal principle.

RH—1. 13. 1374B6-7

Accidents, no demonstrative Knowledge of Of accidents, however, which are not per se after the manner in which things per se have been defined, there is no demonstrative science, since it is not possible to demonstrate the conclusion of necessity, because accident may not be present.

PO A—1. 6. 75A18-22

Act Hence from what we have stated it is clear that whatever exists of necessity is in act, so that if eternal natures are prior in existence, act is prior to potency, and some things, as the first substances, are in act without potency, but others are in act with potency, namely those which are prior by nature but posterior in time; lastly there are some which are never in act but are in potency only.

DE I—13. 23A21-26

Vide ENERGY.

Acting Unjustly The voluntary commission of hurt in contravention of law.

RH—1. 10. 1368B6-7

Action (As One of the Categories) Action, for example, ‘cuts,’ ‘burns.’

CAT-4. 2A3; T-1. 9. 103B23

Action If to be able is to be disposed, and if the use of anything is action; to use is to act and to have used is to have acted.

T—4. 4. 124A31-34

Ability to suffer or to act would be a property of being.

T—5. 9. 139A7-8

Both action and passion admit of contraries and more and less, for to make warm is contrary to making cold; to be warm, contrary to being cold . . . they are also capable of more and less, to be heated, more or less, to be grieved, more or less; wherefore to act and to suffer admit the more and less.

CAT—9. 11B1-10

Action is motion.

E E—2. 3. 1220B26-27

Action is always particular.

N E—6. 9.1141B16

Moral purpose then is the origin of action, *i.e.* the original motive, but not the final cause.

N E—6. 2. 1139A31-32

The end or character of an action depends upon the choice made at the moment of performing it.

N E-3. 1. 1110A13-14

It is actions as we have said that determine the character of the resulting moral states.

N E—2. 2. 1103B30-31

He who performs any action, not knowing what the action is, nor to what end it will lead, nor about whom such action is conversant, acts from ignorance essentially, and therefore acts involuntarily.

E E—2. 9. 1225B5-7

An action which is due to ignorance is always non-voluntary; but it is not involuntary, unless it is followed by pain and excites a feeling of regret.

N E—3.2. 1110B18-22

Action always consists in two things: when that for the sake of which the action is exists, and that which acts for the sake of this.

DE C—2. 12. 292B6-7

All things whatsoever which men do not of themselves, they do either by chance, or from compulsion, or by nature.

RH—Bk. 1. 10. 1368B33-36

A man's actions are signs of his habit.

RH—Bk. 1. 9. 1367B31-32

Actions of Man It is not correct to say that the soul is angry ... it is better to say that man pities, or thinks or learns with or by the soul.

DE A—1. 4. 408B11-15

Active intellect (Besides the mind that is potentially all things) there is mind such that it makes all things; and this is like a habit, for example like light; for light also makes colors which are in potentiality to be in some way actual colors. And this (intellect) is separable and impassible, unmixed, since it is in its substance actuality; for that which is act is always more noble than that which suffers.

DE A—3. 5. 430A13-19

Activity Activity implies action and good action.

N E—1. 9. 1099A3

No activity is perfect if it be impeded.

N E—7. 14. 1153B16

Nothing is so pleasant or so lovable as the exercise of activity.

N E—9. 7. 1168A14-15

Actual Every thing is able at one time to be actual, and at another not.

PHY—3. 1. 201B7-8

Actuality and Capacity That which is hot in actuality, is cold in capacity; and that which is cold in actuality is hot in capacity.

DE G ET C—2. 7. 334B21-23

Actuality and Potentiality In all the productions of nature and art what exists potentially is brought into entity only by that which is in actuality.

DE G A—2. 1. 734A30-31

Actually Infinite Nothing is actually infinite.

DE G ET C—1. 3. 318A20-21

Adversity Adversity renders those who are true friends apparent.

E E—7. 2. 1238A19-20

Affection, Examples of ‘To be lanced,’ ‘to be burned’ are affection.

CAT—4. 2A4

Affection Dissimilarity of manners is most apt to interrupt affection.

ECO—Bk. 1. 4. 1344A18

There are two things which principally inspire mankind with care and affection, namely, the sense of what is one's own, and exclusive possession.

POL—Bk 2. 4. 1262B22-23

Affections Vide passions.

Affirmation Affirmation signifies something of something, and this is either a noun or anonymous, but what is in affirmation must be one and of one thing.

DE I—10. 19B5-7

Affirmation is the enunciation of something concerning something.

DE I—6. 17A25

Now each of the above (the ten categories), considered by itself is predicated neither affirmatively nor negatively, but from the connexion of these with each other affirmation and negation arises.

CAT—4. 2A4-7

Still without a verb there is neither affirmation nor negation, for 'is,' or 'will be,' or 'was,' or 'is going to be,' etc., are verbs, ... since in addition to their meaning they signify time.

DE I—10. 19B12-14

Affirmation is prior to negation; just as the hot is to the cold.

DE C—2. 3. 286A25-26

Affirmation and Negation The affirmation and negation are one, which indicate one thing of one, either of a universal, being taken universally, or in like manner if it is not.

DE I—8. 18A13-15

For every affirmation and negation seems to be either true or false.

CAT—4. 2A6

Affirm and Deny To affirm and deny something of many, or many of one, is not one affirmation nor one negation, except that it is some one thing which is manifested from the many.

DE I—11. 20B13-15

Affirmative It is necessary in every syllogism that one of the premises be affirmative and one universal.

Agent Such agents, therefore, as have not a form in matter, these are impassive; but such as have, are passive.

DE G ET C-1. 7. 324B4-6

Agriculture Agriculture should be ranked first because it is just.

ECO—Bk. 1. 1. 1343A27-28

Agriculture contributes much towards fortitude.

ECO—Bk. 1. 2. 1343B2-3

Air Air is naturally moist.

DE S ET S—5. 443B5-6

Thus, since he who says the property of air is that it is breathable, assigns property in potentiality (for a property of this kind is that which is capable of being breathed) but also assigns the property to that which is not; for although an animal should not exist, which is naturally capable of breathing the air, yet the air may exist, though if animal is not it is not possible to breathe; hence a thing of such a kind as that it may be breathed will not then be the property of air.

T—5. 9.138B30-35

Since he who asserts the property of air to be the respirable, asserts the property of a certain thing of similar parts, but assigns such a thing as is verified of a certain air, but is not spoken of all air (for all is not respirable), the respirable would not be the property of air.

T—5. 5. 135A33-135B1

The air which is emitted by expiration is hot, but that which is received by inspiration is cold.

DE R—5. 472B34-35

The air co-impels the natural motion of every thing.

DE C—3. 2. 301B22

The air flows circularly, because it is drawn along together with the circulation of the universe.

DE M—1. 3. 341A1-2

Air produces hearing.

DE A—2. 8. 419B34

The air in itself has no sound, because it is too easily divisible.

DE A-2. 8. 420A7

Wind is not air; vide WIND.

Aliment Aliment belongs to matter.

DE G ET C—2. 8. 335A15-16

All Things are able either to act or suffer, either to be or not to be, either in an infinite, or in some definite time.

DE C—1. 12. 283A7-9

Alliation Alliation is a motion according to quality. Vide: ALTERATION.

DE C—1. 3. 270A27

Alter ego A friend is another I.

M M—2. 15. 1213A13

Alteration For alteration is the mutation of quality.

CAT—14. 15B11

Of motion there are six species: generation, corruption, increase, decrease, alteration, and change of place.

CAT—14. 15A13-14

Ambidexterous Of all animals man is the only one that can use both hands equally.

HA—2. 1. 497B31-32

Ambition It seems that ambition makes most people wish to be loved rather than to love others.

N E—8. 9.1159A12-14

Men are guilty of the greatest crimes through ambition, and not from necessity.

POL—BK. 2. 7. 1267A12-14

Amphiboly (Equivocation) As then in deceptions from equivocation, which mode of paralogism seems to be the most usual, some are manifest to every one,

for almost all absurd sentences are from diction, for instance ‘which of the cows will deliver before?’ ‘Neither, but both from the rear.’

S E—33. 182B13-18

Of refutations which are from equivocation and ambiguity some have a question with several meanings, others a conclusion with different meanings; for instance, ‘he who is silent, speaks.’

S E—19. 177A9-12

Amphiboly, Fallacy of Such arguments as these are from amphiboly: ‘I wish that you the enemy may take’ ... also ‘there must be sight of what one sees’; ‘he sees the pillar, does the pillar have sight?’

S E—4. 166A6-10

Analogous I call it analogous when the relation of the second term to the first is similar to that of the fourth to the third; for then the fourth is used instead of the second or the second instead of the fourth.

P—21. 1457B16-19

Analogy Bone is analogous to the spine, the nail to the horn, the hand to the claw, the feather to the scale, and so on.

H A—1. 1. 486B19-21

According to analogy are things one, as many as are disposed as one thing in relation to another.

ME—4. 6. 1016B34-35

Anger Desire for vengeance on account of apparent contempt.

T-8. 1. 156A32

A desire accompanied by pain of a revenge which presents itself, on account of an apparent slight from persons acting toward one’s self, or some of one’s friends, unbecomingly.

RH—2. 2. 1378A31-33

Is in the irascible part of the soul.

T-2. 7. 113A36-113B1

Anger is productive of heat.

DE P A-2. 4. 650B35

Anger possesses a certain pleasure; since it is accompanied with the hope of vengeance.

E E—3. 1. 1229B31-32

Through the medium of anger and excited feeling arise acts of vengeance.

RH—BK. 1. 10. 1369B11-12

Animal An animal is defined because of the possession of sense perception.

DE S—1. 454B24-25

Animals, in so far as each is an animal, have sensation necessarily, for it is thus that we distinguish what is animal and what is not.

DE S ET S—1. 436B10-12

A man and an ox are both animal and are so named univocally, since not only the name but also the definition is the same; if a man should state in what sense each is an animal the statements would be the same.

CAT—1. 1A8-10

All animals are less wise than man.

DE P A—4. 10. 686B22-24

It seems that animals possess a certain natural power about each of the passions of the soul, with respect to wisdom and folly, fortitude and timidity, mildness and asperity, and other habits of a similar kind.

DE H A—9. 1. 608A13-17

Animals are viviparous, oviparous, or vermiparous.

H A—1. 5. 489A34-35

In some species, there is neither male nor female.

H A—1. 2. 489A12-13

The function of animals is hardly anything other than to produce young which in plants corresponds to seed and fruit.

DE G A—1. 4. 717A21-22

Many animals have no voice: for example, animals that are bloodless.

DE A 2. 8. 420B9-10

Animals therefore are composed from both similar and dissimilar parts; but

the similar are for the sake of the dissimilar parts.

DE P A—2. 1. 646B10-12

Fat animals are barren. For that which ought to pass from the blood into the genital seed, this is consumed into fat and suet.

DE P A—2. 5. 651B13-14

Animals do not live prosperously at the same seasons, nor are they similarly happy in all excesses of heat and cold.

H A—8. 18. 601,23-25

Some animals have gills, and others have lungs, but no animal has both.

DE R—10. 476A6-7

Larger, for the most part, live longer than smaller animals.

DE L ET B—4. 466A13-15

Animate and Inanimate The living being appears to differ from the inanimate being in two respects particularly: movement and feeling.

DE A—1. 2. 403B25-27

Antithesis Vide CONTRADICTION.

Appetite Appetite is a desire for what is pleasant.

RH—BK. 1. 11. 1370A17-18

The appetite is desire, passion and will.

DE A—2. 3. 414B2

Appetite is divided into three things, viz. into will, anger and desire.

E E—2. 7. 1223A26-27

It is evident that this faculty of the soul that is called appetite is the cause of motion.

DE A—3. 10. 433A31

All such things as appear pleasant are produced in action on the impulse of appetite.

RH—BK. 1. 10. 1369B15-16

I call all those appetites irrational which men desire not from any conception which they form: of this kind are all which are said to exist naturally, as those of

the body; thirst or hunger, in the case of sustenance; objects of touch generally, *etc.*

RH—1. 11. 1370A19-24

Appetites attended by reason are all those whatsoever which men exercise from a persuasion.

RH—1. 10. 1370A25

Aporema A dialectical syllogism of contradiction.

T—8. 11. 162A17-18

Arguments In disputation, there are four genera of arguments, the didactic, the dialectic, the peirastic (or tentative), and the contentious.

S E—2. 165A38-39

An argument is most clear in one way, and that the most popular, if it be so concluded as to require no further interrogation.

T—8. 12. 316A35-37

We ought to make universal records of arguments, even if that discussed be particular; for thus it will be possible to make one argument many.

T—8. 14. 164A3-5

There are five reprehensions of an argument per se, the first, indeed, when from the questions asked nothing is concluded, neither the proposition, nor, in short, any thing; all or the greatest part of those from which the conclusion arises, being either false or improbable; and neither things being taken away, nor being added, nor some being taken away, but others added, the conclusion is produced. The second is, if there be not a syllogism against the thesis from such things, and in such a way, as was mentioned before. The third, if there is indeed a syllogism, from certain additions, but these should be worse than those questioned, and less probable than the conclusion. Again, if certain things are taken away, for sometimes men assume more than is necessary, so that the syllogism does not result from these being granted; further, if from things more improbable and less credible than the conclusion, or if from things true indeed, but which require more labor to demonstrate than the problem.

T—8. 11. 161B19-33

Aristocracy A state that is governed by more than one, but by a few only, we call an aristocracy: either because the government is in the hands of the most

worthy citizens, or because it is the best form for the city and its inhabitants.

POL—BK. 3. 7. 1279A34-37

A state governed by the best men, upon the most virtuous principles, and not according to any arbitrary definition of good men, has alone a right to be called an aristocracy. For it is there only that the good man and the good citizen are identified; while in other states men are good only relatively to their own country. Moreover, there are some other states, which are called by the same name, that differ both from oligarchies and free states, wherein they choose men for office, not only according to their wealth, but according to their merit.

Now this polity differs from both of the above and is called an aristocracy; for in those governments wherein virtue is not their common care, there are still men of high worth and approved merit. Whatever state, then, as at Carthage, favors the rich, the virtuous, and the citizens at large, is a sort of aristocracy; but when only the two latter are held in esteem, as at Lacedaemon, and the state is jointly composed of these, it is a virtuous democracy. These are the two species of aristocracies over and above the first, which is the best of all governments. There is also a third, which is to be found whenever any one of what are called free states inclines to the dominion of a few.

POL—BK. 4. 7. 1293B5-21

Aristocracy is a form of government in which those hold office who can conform to the constitutional plan of education. By such education I mean that established by law.

RH—1. 8. 1356B33-35

All aristocracies are free oligarchies.

POL—BK. 5. 7. 1306B23-25

Virtue is the object of an aristocracy.

POL—BK. 4. 8. 1294A10-11

The end of aristocracy is the institutions relating to education and the principles of law.

RH—1. 8. 1366A5-6

It is evident that an aristocracy is to be preferred to a monarchy.

POL—BK 3. 15. 1286B5-6

Aristocrats Those who are naturally framed to bear the rule of freemen, whose

superior virtue makes them worthy of the management of others.

POL—Bk. 3. 17. 1288A9-12

Army He who will not bear arms injures the community.

RH—1. 1373B24

Art Art must be the same thing as a productive state of mind under the guidance of true reason.

N E—6. 4. 1140A10

Art is the reason of the work without matter.

DE P A—1. 1. 640A31-32

Art is form.

ME—6. 9. 1034A24

From Art are generated those things of whatsoever there is a form in the soul.

ME—6. 7. 1032A32-1032B1

Art has to do with creation.

N E—6. 4. 1140A20

The end of art is production and not action.

N E—6. 4. 1140A16

Art imitates nature.

DE M—4. 3. 381B6

Art imitates nature in this respect (i.e. evolving harmonies out of dissimilars). The art of painting by joining in the picture the varicolored elements brings about a representation corresponding to the original object; so also in music.

DE MUNDO—5. 398B11-15

The arrangement of anything through art is merely incidental or accidental, not of the nature.

PHY—2. 1. 193A14-16

Epic poetry and tragic poetry, and comedy and dithyrambic poetry, and the greatest part of the art pertaining to the flute and the lyre, are entirely imitations.

P—1. 1447A13-16

From sense, memory is produced, but from repeated remembrance of the same thing, we get experience, for many remembrances in number constitute one experience. From experience, however, the universal now established in the soul, the one beside the many which is a single unit within them all, the principle of art and science arises: if it is conversant with coming-to-be you have art; if with being, it is science.

PO A—2. 19. 100A3-9

An art comes into being when, out of many conceptions of experience, one universal opinion is evolved with respect to similar cases.

ME—1. 1. 981A5-7

Nothing comes from the carpenter to the matter, *i.e.* of the wood, nor any part of the carpenter's art into that which is made, but the form and species are given to the matter by the motion coming from him; and the soul in which the form is contained and also his knowledge move his hands or some other member with a motion of a certain quality varying according to what is to be created, the hands and the instruments move the matter.

DE G A—1. 22. 730B11-19

A bed, a coat and other things of the same kind in so far as they are by art have no innate impulse to change.

PHY—2. 1. 192B18-19

Art products require the pre-existence of a homogeneous cause, such as the art of a statue which precedes the statue; this cannot be spontaneous or produced automatically.

DE P A—1. 1. 640A28-30

Art and Experience Experience is a knowledge of singulars, whereas art is of universals.

ME—1. 1. 981A15-16

Art (Medical) Art is a cause of health.

RH-BK. 1. 5. 1362A4

Article A sound without signification which shows the beginning or end or distinction of a word.

P-20.1457A6-7

Assembly Of all magistracies a popular assembly is best suited to a democracy.

POL—BK. 6. 2. 1317B28-30

Aspiration All beings are naturally adapted to aspire after good.

M M-2. 7. 1205B35-36

Attorney The pleader's business is nothing more than to prove the matter of fact, either that it is, or is not the case; that it has, or has not happened.

RH—BK. 1. 1. 1354A26-28

Awake To be awake is defined as loosening of sense.

DE S-1. 454B26-27

Axiom What he who intends to learn any thing must necessarily possess, that I call an axiom.

PO A-1. 2. 72A16-17

B

Bad The bad man is continually at war with, and in opposition to, himself.

M M-2.11. 1211B3

Baldness Man is manifestly the most bald of all animals.

DE G A-5. 3. 783B9

Baseness It is pleasure which makes us do what is base.

N E-2.2.1104B9-10

Beauty The chief forms of beauty are order, symmetry and limit, which the mathematical disciplines demonstrate in a special way.

M E-13.3.1078A36-1078B2

Beauty seems to be a certain symmetry of the members.

T-3.1.116B21-22

Beauty is different according to the several ages. The beauty of youth is having a body useful in enduring toils, whether those of the course or of personal exertion, himself being pleasant withal to look upon with a view to delight ... But the beauty of one who has attained life's prime is the fitness adapted to the fatigues of war with an aspect to be looked upon with pleasure tempered by awe. That of the old consists in the body being capable of the fatigues which it needs must undergo and exempt withal from pain by reason that it has none of the afflictions by which an old age is disfigured.

RH-1. 5. 1381B7-15

Some people are beautiful due to their native beauty while others seem to be so due to decorations.

S E-1. 164B20-21

The beautiful consists in magnitude and order.

P-7.1450B36-37

Neither can any very small animal be beautiful ... nor yet a very large animal.

P-7. 1450B37-39

The painter will not allow the foot of a figure, howsoever beautiful, to be out

of proportion with the rest.

POL-3.13. 1284B8-10

Beauty of words consists, as Licymnius observes, in the sound or in the idea conveyed or in their delicacy of application.

RH-3. 2.1405B6-11

Beautiful things, however, are the virtues, and the works proceeding from virtue.

E E-7.15. 1248B36-37

Beauty and Its Appearance Some are beautiful on account of beauty, but others appear so from ornament.

S E-1. 164B20-21

Becoming A just man becomes just by doing what is just and a temperate man becomes temperate by doing what is temperate.

N E-2. 3. 1105A17-19

Bees It remains that bees generate the drones without coition; and that so far as they generate they are females, but that they have among themselves, in the same manner as plants, the female and the male.

DE G A-3.10. 759B28-30

Bees have a foreknowledge of tempestuous weather and rain.

H A-9. 40. 627B10-11

Bees derive their wax from the gum of trees.

DE H A-5. 22. 553B28

Begging the Question If then begging the question is to prove by itself what is not of itself manifest, this is not to prove, since both what is demonstrated and that by which the person demonstrates are alike dubious, either because the same things are assumed present with the same thing, or the same thing with the same things.

P A-2 16. 85A28-29

Being, Analogy of Now, being is spoken of in various senses, indeed, but in reference to one and to one certain nature, and not equivocally; but in like manner also, as everything conducive to health is termed so in reference to health, partly, indeed, in its preservation of that state, and partly in giving rise to

it, and partly in being an indication of health, and partly in being receptive of it ... Thus is entity spoken of in various ways; but every entity in reference to one first cause; for some things because they are substances are styled beings; but others because they are affections of substances; but others because they are a way to substance, either as corruptions or privations, or qualities, or things formative or generative of substance or of those which are spoken of in reference to substance or the negations of any of these or of substance.

ME-3. 1003A33-1003B10

Being Being is multifariously predicated.

PHY-1. 3. 186B12

It is not possible that there should be one genus of beings or that unity or being should be such; for it is necessary that the differences of each genus both exist and that each should be one.

ME-2. 3. 998B22-24

That which is primarily being and not any particular being, but being simply or absolutely, will be substance.

ME-6.1. 1028A30-31

If unity and being be a genus neither will being or unity constitute any difference.

ME-2. 3. 998B26-27

Being is not a genus.

PO A-2 7. 92B14

Being must of necessity be when it is, and non-being, not be, when it is not; but it is not necessary that every being should be, nor that non-being should not be.

DE I-9. 19A23-24

It is better to be than not to be.

DE G ET C-2. 10. 336B28-29

Their being is living for the beings that live.

DE A-2 4. 415B13

Being, Property of Ability to suffer or to act would be a property of a being.

T-5. 9. 139A7-8

Being, as a Copula Signifies a certain composition which is impossible to understand without the composing members.

DE I-3. 16B24-25

Vide ENTITY.

Being and Non-Being It appears that it is possible for the same thing both to be and not to be, for every thing which may possibly be cut or may possibly walk, may also possibly not be cut, and not walk, and the reason is that every thing which is thus possible is not always actual, so that negation will also belong to it, for that which is capable of walking may not walk, and the visible may not be seen.

DE I-12. 21B12-17

Being and Truth As each thing is disposed in regard to being so also is it in regard to truth.

ME-1A. 1. 993B31

Being from Anything The 'being from anything' is said in one way to be that from which a thing is as from matter; and this in a twofold respect, either according to the first genus, or according to the last species.

ME-4. 24.1023A26-28

Belief We believe all things either through syllogism or from induction.

P A-2. 23. 68B13-14

Now there are three causes of a speaker's deserving belief; and these are prudence, moral excellence, and having our interests at heart.

RH-Bk. 2. 1. 1378A6-9

Things which have not yet been done, we do not yet believe to be possible; but it is evident that things which have been done are possible.

P-9.1451B16-18

Belief never belongs to the brute animal, while imagination very often belongs to him.

DE A-3. 3. 428A20-21

Beneficence Beneficence relates either to the safety, and the causes, whatever they are, of the existence of its object, or to his wealth, or to any other goods whose acquisition is not easy.

RH-Bk. 1. 5. 1381A30-31

Black Black is a privation of white.

ME—9. 2. 1053B30-31

Blackness Blackness is as it were a negation of seeing.

DE M—3. 4. 374B12-14

Blame It is ridiculous to lay the blame of our wrong actions upon external causes, rather than upon the facility with which we ourselves are caught by such causes.

N E—3.1.1110BL3-15

Blood

The essential concoction of the blood is suet and fat.

DE P A—2 6. 652A9-10

Blood also is hotter to the touch than water or oil; but is more rapidly congealed than either of these.

DE P A—2. 2. 648B32-33

According to age, the blood is different in quantity and quality.

H A—3. 19. 521A31-32

Boastfulness Exaggerated humility is a form of boastfulness as well as excess.

N E—4.13.1127B26-27

Body That which in every way and in three directions is divisible according to quantity is a body.

ME—4. 6. 1016B27-28

It is the bodies especially that appear to be substances, and particularly the natural bodies, which are, in fact, the principles of the other bodies.

DE A—2. 1. 412A11-12

Body could not be soul: for the body is not one of the things that can be attributed to an object.

DE A—2. 1. 412A17-18

Just as the eye is both pupil and sight, so the soul and the body are the animal.

DE A—2 1. 413A2-3

The fully developed man has the upper parts of the body smaller than the

lower parts ... In infancy, man has the upper part greater than the lower.

H A—2. 1. 500B26-34

Earthly bodies tend downward to the middle.

DE C—1. 2. 289A27

It is evident that the first of bodies is perpetual, and that it has neither increase nor diminution, but is undecaying, unchanged in quality, and impassive.

DE C—1. 3. 270A12-16

It is evident that there cannot be an infinite body.

DE C—1. 6. 273A21-22

It is not possible, therefore, that there can be any simple body beyond the heavens. But if no simple, neither can any mixed body be there; for mixed body existing it is also necessary that there should be simple bodies.

DE C—1. 9. 278B35-279A2

I call those bodies simple which have a principle of motion according to nature, such as fire and earth, and the species of these, and also things allied to these.

DE C—1. 2. 268B27-29

Bond-Slaves The poor were in a state of bondage to the rich, both themselves, their wives, and their children, and were called Pelatae (bond-slaves for hire) and Hektemori (paying a sixth of the produce as rent).

C—2

Bone The nutriment is consumed into the bones.

DEP A—2. 6. 652A12

The bones of males are harder than those of females, and the bones of carnivorous animals than of those that are not carnivorous.

DE P A—2 9. 655A12-13

Two bones, each of which is concave, are connected by an astragalus as a medium, which is convex in each extremity, and which enters into the concavity of each bone and thus conjoins it like a nail.

DE P A—2 9. 654B19-21

There is no bone that is isolated and separated.

H A—3. 7. 516A9-10

Boundary It is necessary that the boundary *from which*, and the boundary to *which* a thing is naturally adapted to be moved should be specifically different.

DE C—1. 8. 277A13-15

Brain Man, however, has the most brain of all animals, in proportion to the magnitude of his body.

DE P A—2 7. 653A27-28

The brain of man, being very large and moist, requires the most abundant defense.

DE P A—2. 14. 658B8-10

The brain is bipartite in all animals.

DE P A—3. 7. 669B21-23

The brain itself, in all animals, has no blood.

H A—3. 3. 514A18

The brain is naturally the coldest of all the parts in the body.

DE P A—2 7. 652A27-28

Nature has fashioned the brain opposite to the seat of the heart, and the heat it contains.

DE P A—2. 7. 652B20-21

Instead of large and few veins, frequent and thin veins surround it; and instead of abundant and thick blood, these veins contain thin and pure blood.

DE P A—2. 7. 652B31-33

Bravery Nor is he a brave man who exposes himself to danger knowingly, in consequence of anger.

E E—3. 1. 1229A24-25

If he should endure danger without fearing it, he will not be brave.

M M—1. 20. 1191A29-30

Breathing Not all animals breathe.

DE A—1. 5. 411A1

Brutality Brutality is not so bad a thing as vice, but it is more formidable.

N E—7. 7. 1150A1-2

Brutality is found chiefly among the barbarians, although it is sometimes the result of disease and mutilation.

N E—7. 1. 1145A30-32

Brutes Brutes lack reason.

N E—7. 7. 1149B34-35

Buffoon The buffoon is the slave of his own sense of humor.

N E—4. 14. 1128A34

C

Castration All castrated animals are changed into the female nature.

DE GA—1.2.716A5-6

Categories These are ten in number: what a thing is, quantity, quality, relation, where, when, position, possession, action, passion.

T—1. 9. 103b21-24

CAT—4. 1b25

Causes All causes are principles.

ME—4. 1. 1013A17

The modes of causes, however, are many in number.

PHY—2. 3. 195A27-28

There are four causes.

ME—11. 4.1070B26

Causes are denominated under four different heads, the first of which we assert to be the substance and the essence of a thing ... and the second cause we affirm to be the matter and the subject, and the third is the source of the first principle of motion; and the fourth, the cause that is in opposition to this,—namely both the final cause and the good.

ME—1. 3. 983A26-32

Causes are four, one indeed as to the essence of a thing, another that which from certain things existing this necessarily exists, a third that which first moves something, and a fourth on account of which a thing exists.

PO A—2 11. 94A20-22

A cause is as the end, this is the final cause, as for instance, health is the end of walking.

ME—4. 2. 1013A32-34

The form and exemplar are regarded as causes.

ME—4. 2. 1013A26-27

After another manner cause is form and paradigm (and this is the definition of the essence of a thing) and the genera of this.

PHY—2.3. 194B26-27

That constitutes a cause from whence is the first principle of change or of rest.

ME—4. 2. 1013A29-31

In one way that is called cause from which, as inherent, anything is produced as for example the brass of a statue.

ME—4. 2. 1013A24-25

Cause, therefore, is after one manner said to be that, from which, being inherent, something is produced.

PHY—2. 3.194B23-24

That which is a cause through itself is always prior to that which is a cause through another.

PHY—8. 5. 257A30-31

There are naturally two causes of action, thought and moral habits, and through these actions all men obtain or fail of the object of their wishes.

P—6.1450A1-3

All things whatever which men do, they necessarily do from seven causes: by chance, compulsion, nature, custom, reason, anger, or appetite.

RH—BK 1. 10. 1369A5-7

It is the cause that is sought in all questions.

PO A—2. 2. 90A6-7

Causes, Four There are four causes, first, the final cause, second, the formal cause (which are as it were one), third, matter and fourth, the efficient cause, or source of the motion.

DE G A—1. 1. 715A4-7

Vide KNOWLEDGE, SCIENTIFIC.

PO A—2. 11. 94A20-22

Cause, First That whence the principle of motion is derived to all things, must be considered as the first cause.

DE M—1. 2. 339A23-24

A different cause subsists where the subject is different, and the first cause

constitutes, as it were, that which imparts motion, and is different according as the subject is different.

ME—11. 4. 1070B26-27

That cause, however, appears to be the first for the sake of which we say a thing is effected.

DE P A—1. 1. 639B14

Cause, Essential Essential cause therefore is definite; but cause, according to accident, indefinite.

PHY—2. 5.196B27-28

Censure How far and in what way a person must deviate from the mean in order to be censurable is a question which it is not easy to decide theoretically.

N E—4.11. 1126B2-3

Celestial Body A celestial body is perpetual, and has no end of its local motion.

DE M—1. 2. 339A24-26

Chance Things proceed from chance which are of such kind that their cause is not definite, and are produced in the absence of any final motive, and that neither invariably nor usually, nor in any prescribed order.

RH—1. 10. 1369A32-34

Chance is a cause of those goods which baffle all calculation.

RH—Bk. 1. 5. 1362A6-7

Not everything which is from chance is also from fortune.

PHY—2. 6.197A37-197B1

Chance, Mind and Nature Even if chance or spontaneity be a cause of the firmament, prior as a cause will be mind and nature.

ME—10. 9. 1065B3-4

Change Everything undergoes a change from its contrary, as from heat into cold.

ME—10. 10. 1067A6-7

Everything which undergoes a change is changed from that which is an entity in potentiality into that which is an entity in act.

ME—11. 2. 1069B15-16

Changes are four in number: either according to quiddity, or quality, or quantity, or to place where; simple generation and corruption according to quiddity; increase and diminution according to quantity; alteration according to quality; motion according to place.

ME—11. 2. 1089B9-13

That which undergoes a change is changed either from a subject into a subject, or from that which is not a subject into a subject, or from a subject into a non-subject or from a non-subject into a subject; but I mean by a subject that which is made manifest by affirmation.

ME—10. 11. 1067B15-18

That which is changed may be changed in a fourfold respect: for it may be changed either from a subject into a subject; or from a non-subject into a non-subject; or from a non-subject into a subject; or from a subject into a non-subject.

PHY—5. 1. 225A3-6

There must be a subject in every change and this, although it is one numerically, in form it is not one.

PHY—1. 7. 190A14-16

Any change in regard to quality, quantity or place must have an end.

DE C—1. 7. 274B13-15

Character The end or character of an action depends upon the choice made at the moment of performing it.

N E—3. 1. 1110A13-14

A person's character depends upon the way in which he exercises his powers.

N E—3. 7. 1114A7

Not every man is good or evil or just or unjust; but also there are shades of character intermediate between these.

ME—4. 22. 1023A5-7

Characteristics, Acquired Children are produced similar to their parents not only in natural things but in acquired also.

DE G A—1. 17. 721B29-30

Choice It is demonstrated that it is possible to do many things willingly without deliberate choice; for we do many things willingly suddenly. But no one deliberately chooses any thing suddenly.

E E—2. 8. 1224A2-4

Deliberate choice consists of deliberative opinion.

E E—2. 10. 1226B9

Anger, therefore, and desire are inherent indeed in brutes, but deliberate choice is not.

E E—2. 10. 1225B26-27

Chorus It is necessary to conceive the chorus to be one of the players, and a part of the whole, and that it cooperates with the players.

P—18. 1456A25-26

Circle A plane surface whose circumference is at all points equidistant from the center.

RH—3. 6. 1407B27-28

The circle ranks among things perfect.

DE C—1. 2. 269A20

Citizen Whoever has a right to take part in the judicial and executive part of government in any state, him we call a citizen of that place: and a state, in one word, is the collective body of such persons, sufficient in themselves for all the purposes of life.

POL—Bk. 3. 1. 1275B17-21

It is not residence which constitutes a man a citizen; for in this point sojourners and slaves are upon an equality with him. Nor will it be sufficient that he have the privileges of the laws, and may plead or be impleaded; for this point belongs to all who have a mutual agreement upon which to associate; for these privileges are theirs also; and withal it very often happens that sojourners have not perfect rights therein, but are obliged to apply to some patron; and this shows that their share in the community is incomplete. In like manner, with respect to boys, who are not yet enrolled, or old men who are discharged from service, we admit that they are in some respects citizens, yet not completely so. But we add some qualification, for the one are not of full age, and the others are past service. Nor is there any difference between them. But what we mean is sufficiently

clear; we want a complete citizen, one in whom there is no such defect as needs to be corrected in order to make him fully so. As to those who are banished or degraded, there may be made the same objections, and the same answers. There is nothing that more characterizes a complete citizen than having a share in the judicial and executive part of the government. With respect to offices, some are fixed to a particular time, so that no person on any account is permitted to fill them twice, or else not till some certain period has intervened; others are not fixed, as that of a jurymen, or a member of the popular assembly.

POL—BK. 3. 1. 1275A7-26

With respect to citizens, although different from each other, yet they have one common care, the safety of the community: and for this reason the virtue of a citizen has necessarily a reference to the state.

POL—BK. 3. 4. 1276B27-31

He who is called a citizen is most truly a citizen of a democracy.

POL—BK. 3. 1. 1275B5-6

For common use, men define a citizen to be one who is sprung from citizens on both sides, not on the father's or the mother's only.

POL—BK. 3. 2. 1275B21-23

A man who is an excellent citizen need not possess that virtue which constitutes a good man.

POL—BK. 3. 4. 1276B34-35

It is a great recommendation to know how to command as well as to obey; and to do both these things well is the virtue of an accomplished citizen.

POL—BK. 3. 4. 1277A25-27

The citizens of the same state ought to be affectionate to each other, or at the least not to treat those who have the chief power in it as their enemies.

POL—BK. 6. 5. 1320A14-16

City A great city and a populous one are not the same thing.

POL—BK. 7. 4. 1326A9-10

The most obvious division of the city is into two parts: the poor and the rich.

POL—BK. 4. 4. 1291B7-8

Classes In every state the people are divided into three sorts: the very rich, the

very poor, and, thirdly, those who are between them.

POL—BK. 4. 11. 1295B1-3

Climate Those nations that dwell in warm climates have a longer life.

E L ET B—1. 465A9

Cloud Clouds are condensed laterally with reference to the course of the sun.

DE M—2. 4. 360A2-3

Cold Cold is a certain nature, and not a privation in those things, the subject of which is hot, according to passive quality.

DE P A—2. 2. 649A18-20

Color Every color is motive of what is actually transparent.

DE A—2. 7. 418A31-418BL

Every color is in a body.

CAT—2. 1A27

Color is in the extremity of bodies.

DE S ET S—3. 439A30

Color is not visible without light, but every color is seen in light.

DE A—2. 7. 418B2-3

Colors are produced by the mixture of the white and the black.

DE S ET S—4. 442A12-13

The light red, the purple, the green, and the blue are between the white and the black; and the other colors are mingled from these.

DE S ET S—4. 442A23-25

Color also may be produced from reflection, when a mirror is of such a kind as not to receive figure but color.

DE M—1. 5. 342B11-13

Combustion Bodies which are more moved, and more swiftly, are more rapidly set on fire.

DE M—1. 3. 341A34-35

Comedy Comedy aims at representing men as worse than in actual life.

P—2. 1448A17-18

Comedy originated from those who sang the phallic verses.

P—4. 1449A11-12

Comedy is an imitation of bad characters, yet it does not imitate them according to every vice.

P—5, 1449A32-33

Comets We have already said that the outermost part of the air which is accustomed to be considered as endowed with fire, when it is moved by a discrete motion, separates off a concretion which is called a comet.

DE M—1. 8. 345B32-35

Commendation Commendation is language exhibiting greatness in the case of virtue.

RH—1. 9.1367B26-27

Commotion A state is liable to commotions, when those parts of it which seem to be opposite to each other approach close to an equality, as the rich and the common people.

POL—Bk. 5. 4. 1304A38-1304B2

Community The most perfect political community must be amongst those who are in the middle rank.

POL—Bk. 4.11. 1295B35

Competence Everybody is competent to judge the subjects which he understands, and is a good judge of them.

N E—1. 1. 1094B27-28

Competition Those contending with each other for superiority do not remain friends.

M M—2. 11. 1211A14-15

Complex Whatever changes is complex.

PHY—1. 7. 190B10-11

Complex Speech Vide SPEECH.

CAT—2. 1A7-19

Composition, Fallacy of The following belong to composition: he who sits can

walk and he who does not write may write. For it does not signify the same if a person speaks separately and conjointly, that it is possible that a person sitting, may walk, and that one not writing may write.

S E—4. 166A23-27

Compulsion All things originate in compulsion which are produced through the instrumentality of the agents themselves contrary to their inclination and reason.

RH—1. 10. 1389B5-6

Compulsory An act is compulsory, if its origin is external to the agent or patient.

N E—3. 1. 1110A1-2

What is not compulsory is pleasant; for compulsion is contrary to nature.

RH—Bk. 1. 11. 1370A10

Conceit Conceited people are foolish and ignorant of themselves, and make themselves conspicuous by being so.

N E—4. 9. 1125A27-28

Conception As in the soul there is sometimes a conception which does not involve truth or falsehood and at other times those which do, so also in speech, for truth and falsehood are involved in composition and division.

DE I—1. 16A9-13

Conclusions Conclusions are infinite, but terms finite.

PO A—1. 32. 88B6-7

Conduct To act rightly in many things, or frequently, is difficult.

DE C—2. 12. 292a28-29

It would be wrong to suppose that there can be a mean state or an excess or deficiency in unjust, cowardly or licentious conduct.

N E—2. 8. 1107A18-20

Wise deliberation will be correctness in matters with reference to a particular end, of which prudence is a true conception.

N E—6. 10. 1142B32-33

Confirmation It is more difficult to confirm than to subvert definition.

T—7. 5. 154A23-24

Conjunction A sound void of signification which neither impedes nor produces one significant sound adapted to be composed from many sounds and which may be placed either at the beginning or the end of the period, unless something requires that it should be placed by itself at the beginning.

P—20. 1456B38-1457A3

Consequent Things are consequent in two ways; either they may be consequent simultaneously or subsequently. Knowledge is a consequent upon learning subsequently; life is so on health simultaneously.

RH—1. 6.1362A28-31

Consequent, Fallacy of The refutation on account of the consequent is from fancying that the consequence reciprocates. For when from the existence of that thing, this necessarily is, they fancy that if this is, the other necessarily is, whence also deceptions from sense about opinion occur. For often men take gall for honey, and since it happens that the earth when it has rained becomes moist, if it be moist, we think that it has rained, yet this is not necessary.

S E—5. 187B1-8

Consequent, Fallacy of, Solution to Those fallacies which prove from the consequent we must show from the argument itself. Now there are two types of such: it is either as universal to particular, as animal to man, for it is taken for granted, if this is joined with that, that also with this; or according to opposition, for if it follows that, the opposite also follows the opposite. Hence also the argument of Melissus, for if what was begotten had a beginning, he requires it to be granted that the unbegotten had not a beginning, wherefore if the heaven is unbegotten, it is also infinite, yet this is not so, for the consequence is vice versa.

S E—28. 181A22-30

Contact Things are said to be in contact with each other when their extremities exist together.

ME—10. 12. 1068B27

Contentious (Argument) An argument will be contentious in so far as its aim is apparent victory.

S E—11. 171B32-33

Contentious arguments are those which infer, or seem to infer, from the apparently, but not really, probable.

S E—2. 165B7—8

Contentious Syllogism Vide SYLLOGISM, CONTENTIOUS.

Continence Continence is not a virtue, but a sort of mixed state.

N E—4. 15. 1228B33-34

Continence is preferable to steadfastness.

N E—7. 8. 1150A38-1150B1

The continent is not the temperate man.

M M—2. 8. 1203B23

Both the incontinent and continent man, therefore, act according to nature simply, yet not according to the same nature.

E E—2. 8. 1224B35-36

Contingent Vide POSSIBLE.

Contingent Propositions In contingent propositions (since contingency is multifariously predicated, for we call the necessary, and the not necessary, and the possible contingent) in all affirmatives, conversion will occur.

P A—1. 3. 25A37-40

Continuous Nothing continuous is without parts.

PHY—6. 1. 231B4-6

It is also evident that every thing which is continuous is divisible into things always divisible.

PHY—6. 1. 231B15-16

Every thing continuous is divisible to infinity.

PHY—6. 8. 239A22

That is called continuous of which the motion is one essentially, and also which it is not possible should be otherwise.

ME—4. 8. 1018A5-8

Color is continuous to light, and light to the sight.

PHY—7. 2. 245A6-7

Continuous Motion There is not any motion that is continuous save that which

is local and to this belongs the motion that is circular.

ME—11. 6. 1071B10-11

Continuum A thing is called continuous when the extremity of either of the parts by which they are in contact and in continuity are one and the same.

ME—10.12.1069A6-7

Contradiction Contradiction is an opposition which has no medium in respect to itself.

PO A—1. 2. 72A12-13

Neither is it possible that there is any mean between a contradiction.

ME—3. 7. 1011B23-24

Of contradiction there is nothing intermediate.

ME—9. 4. 1055B9

Contraries Those things are called contraries, both those which cannot be present in the same subject at the same time, of things that differ in genus; and those things are called contraries which involve the greatest amount of difference, of those that are in the same genus, and things that widely differ of those under the same capacity, and those of which there is the greatest difference, either simply, or according to genus, or according to species.

ME—4. 10. 1018A25-31

Contraries are first principles of entities.

ME—1. 5. 987B2-3

It is impossible that contraries should be inherent in the same subject at the same time.

ME—3. 6. 1011B17-18

All contraries are in the same genus.

DE GET C—1. 7. 324A2

Of contraries also, if one is definite, the other likewise will be definite.

DE C—1. 6. 273A9-10

Contraries act upon, and suffer from each other, and are corruptive of each other.

DE C—2. 3. 286A33-34

It is evident that true opinion can neither possibly be contrary to true opinion, nor true negation to true negation, for those are contraries which concern opposites; but about the same things the same may be verified, but contraries cannot possibly be inherent in the same thing at one and the same time.

DE I—14. 24B6-9

Contrariety The first or chief contrariety consists in habit and privation.

ME—9. 4. 1055A33

I term a difference of genus diversity which makes the very thing to be diverse; therefore, will this constitute contrariety.

ME—9. 8. 1058A7-9

In quality there is also contrariety.

CAT—8. 10B12

There is contrariety in relatives.

CAT—7. 6B15

The contraries of change are according to the contraries of place.

DE C—1. 4. 271A3-4

Not all the contraries of body make forms and principles, but those alone which subsist according to the touch.

DE G ET C—2. 2. 329B8-10

The contraries of place are upward and downward, before and behind, on the right hand and on the left.

DE C—1. 4. 271A26-27

Convention ‘By convention’ (we have said that a noun is significant ‘by convention’) because nothing is a noun or name by nature but only when used as a symbol.

DE I—2. 16A27-29

All persons ought to endeavor to follow what is right, and not what is established.

POL—Bk. 2. 8. 1269A3-4

Conversion Nouns and verbs, when transposed, have the same signification as

“man is white” and “white is man.”

DE I—10. 20B1-2

Conversion of Propositions Vide PROPOSITIONS.

Coordinate Genera Vide Genus.

Copulation In all sanguineous animals that are viviparous and pedestrious, the males have organs adapted to such a generative act, yet all of them do not similarly approach to the female.

DE H A—5. 2. 539B19-21

Crustaceous animals copulate ... when the one being supine and the other prone, they apply their tails.

DE G A—1 14. 720B9-11

Fishes copulate in a prostrate position, and are rapidly freed from each other.

DE G A—1. 6. 718A1-2

With respect to insects, those which do not hide themselves copulate in the winter, and are produced when the weather is tranquil and the wind southern; such, for instance, as flies and ants.

DE H A—5. 9. 542B27-30

The mollia copulate with the mouth, thrusting against each other, and expanding their folds.

DE G A—1. 15. 720B15-16

Serpents copulate by involution.

DE G A—1. 7. 718A17

Correlatives Correlatives seem to exist simultaneously by their nature. This is true of the generality of them, for double and half are simultaneous ... and the existence of the master and slave are simultaneous.... It does not however, appear to be true of all relatives, for the object of knowledge may be prior to knowledge since, for the most part, we derive knowledge from things pre-existing.

CAT—7. 7B15-25

Corruptible Whether any thing formerly was but afterwards is not, or may not

exist, we say it is corruptible.

DE C—1. 11. 280B20-22

Corruption Corruption, therefore, is produced in all living beings from a defect of heat.

DE R—17. 478B31-32

The greatest and the most rapid corruptions therefore are produced from war, but others from diseases, and others from sterility.

DE M—1. 14. 351B13-15

Vide: GENERATION.

Courage Courage (is that virtue) by which men are ready to achieve honorable exploits in the midst of danger, conformable to the direction of and in subservience to law.

RH—1. 9. 1366B11-13

He who faces dangers with pleasure, or at least without pain, is courageous.

N E—2. 2. 1104B7-8

It is by habituating ourselves to despise and face alarms that we become courageous, and, when we have become courageous, we shall be best able to face them.

N E—2. 2. 1104B1-3

Courage is a mean state in regard to sentiments of fear and confidence.

N E—3. 11. 1116A10-11

It would seem that experience of particular things is a sort of courage.

N E—3. 11. 1116B3-4

The temperance of a man and of a woman are not the same, nor their courage, nor their justice, as Socrates thought: for the courage of a man consists in commanding, the women's in obedience. And the same is true in all other particulars.

POL—Bk. 1. 13. 1260A21-24

Courageous Man Derives his name from the word 'courage.'

CAT—1. 1A15

Creation Everything that is produced always comes from a being who exists in all reality, in actuality.

DE A—3. 7. 431A3-4

Crimes Crimes are whatever things, not falling out contrary to calculation, proceed from criminal principle; for the things which are done through desire, proceed from criminal principle.

RH—1. 13. 1374B8-10

Criminality For the criminality and injustice of the act stands essentially in the deliberate principle on which it is done.

RH—1. 13. 1374A11-12

Criticism He who knows what is a good or bad tragedy, knows the same in respect to epic poetry.

P—5. 1449B17-18

D

Dancing The arts pertaining to dancing imitate by rhythm, without harmony.

P—1. 1447A26-27

Death We call death the destruction of the heat (of the body).

DE VITA ET MORTE—469B19-20

Old men die without any violent passion happening to them.

DE R—17. 479A20-21

Death and corruption subsist similarly in all imperfect living beings.

DE R—17.478B28-29

Nothing is so fearful as death.

N E—3. 9. 1115A26

If to die were a delectable thing, the lascivious would frequently die through intemperance.

E E—3. 1. 1229B34-36

Decay If the whole body should become fat and suet, it would perish.

DE P A—2 5. 651B2-3

Deeds Deeds are said to be just and temperate, when they are such as a just or temperate person would do, and a just and temperate person is not merely one who does these deeds but one who does them in the spirit of the just and the temperate.

N E—2. 3. 1105B5-9

Defect Defect, which is an evil, has excess as its contrary which is also an evil.

CAT—11. 14A1

Definition A definition shows what a thing is.

PO A—2. 3. 91A1

The definition is proper to what is defined and is predicated in respect of what it is.

PO A—2. 4.91A15-16

Definition is a sentence signifying what a thing is.

T—1. 5. 101B39

Definition is said to be a statement of what a thing is; one kind of definition will be a nominal one another of what the name signifies.

PO A—2. 10. 93B29-31

Another kind of definition is a sentence giving the cause of the existence of something.

PO A—2. 10. 93B38-39

That definition is a discursus or description of the very nature or essence of a thing, and that the essence or formal principle belongs either to substances only, or especially both primarily and simply, is manifest.

ME—6. 5. 1031A12-14

A definition is of that which is universal.

ME—6. 10. 1035B34-1036A1

Every definition is universal.

PO A—2. 13. 97B26

Definitions then are not hypotheses, for they are not asserted to be or not to be.

PO A—1. 10. 76B35

Definition is a sentence that is composed from the things that are differences, and from the last of these that is drawn up in accordance with a correct classification, at least.

ME—6. 12. 1038A28-30

In definition one thing is not predicated of another.

PO A-2. 3. 90B34-35

Hence it is evident that the easiest thing of all is to destroy a definition; but to confirm it is the hardest.

T—7. 5. 155A17-18

In the definition of everything there is a necessity that the definition of substance be included.

ME—6. 1. 1028A35-36

If any one were to define *what* a certain man is, he would define it appropriately by giving the species or the genus; and he will do it more clearly by the former than the latter. Whatever else he may introduce is, in a manner, foreign to the purpose.

CAT—5. 2B34-36

Degenerate Very degenerate men are prescient, and clearly see future events in dreams, as not being sent by divinity.

DE DIV—2. 483B15-16

Deliberation Deliberation is a certain syllogism.

DE M ET R—2. 453A13-14

Wise deliberation necessarily implies the exercise of reason.

N E—6. 9. 1142B12

Wise deliberation is, as we conceive, the principal function of the prudent man.

N E—6. 10. 1142B31-32

We deliberate not about ends but about the means to ends.

N E—3. 5. 1112B11-12

The matters about which we deliberate are practical matters lying within our power.

N E-3. 5. 1112A30-31

The business of deliberation is partly exhortation, partly dissuasion.

RH—BK. 1. 3. 1358B8-9

There is never any deliberation about such as either has or will have an existence of necessity; such again, as it is impossible should exist or be produced; neither in fact is there about every one even of contingent subjects; for of goods which may or not accrue, some exist naturally, others are produced by chance, on the subject of which it is not worth while to deliberate; but evidently deliberation is of those about which men resolve, of which character are all such as are of a nature to be referred to ourselves, and the first principle of whose creation is in our power; for in deliberation we carry on our investigation until we ascertain whether the achievement be possible to us or not.

RH—1. 4. 1359A32-1359B2

A slave can have no deliberative faculty, a woman but a weak one, a child an imperfect one.

POL—Bk. 1.13.1260A12-14

Democracy When the husbandmen and those only who possess moderate fortunes have the supreme power, they will govern according to law; for as they must get their livings by their labor, they have but little leisure for public business: they will therefore establish fit laws and call public assemblies when there is a necessity; and they will readily let every one partake with them in the administration of public affairs, as soon as they possess that fortune which the law requires as a qualification. For to exclude any class would be a step towards oligarchy, and for all to have leisure to attend unless they have a subsistence would be impossible. This form of government, then, is one species of democracy. Another species is distinguished by the prevailing mode of electing magistrates, in which every one is eligible to whose birth there are no objections, provided he is able to find leisure to attend. For this reason, in such a democracy the supreme power is vested in the laws, as pay is not given. A third species is where all freemen have a right to a share in the government, but where they will not accept it for the cause already assigned; for which reason here also the supreme power will be in the law. A fourth species of democracy is the last established in point of time in the states. For as the cities have been enlarged far beyond their original size, and as the public revenue has become considerable, the populace, on account of their numbers, are admitted to share in the management of public affairs, and even the poor are at leisure to attend to them, as they receive pay; nay, they have the greatest leisure of all, as they are not hindered by having any care of their own property, as is the case with the rich, who on this account often take no part in the public assembly and the courts of justice; thus the supreme power is lodged in the poor, and not in the laws.

POL—Bk. 4. 8. 1292B25-1293A10

Democracy is a form of government in which men apportion out the magistracies to themselves by lot.

RH—1. 8. 1365B31-32

A democracy is a state where the freemen and the poor, being the majority, are invested with the power of the state.

POL—K. 4. 4. 1290B17-19

Among equals it is neither advantageous nor right that one person should be

lord over all, either where there are no established laws, but where his will is the law, or where there are laws: neither is it right that one who is good should have rule over those who are good; or one who is not good over those who are not good.

POL—BK. 3. 17. 1287B41-1288A4

The most pure democracy is that which is called so principally from the equality which prevails in it.

POL—BK. 4. 4. 1291B30-31

There are two things which seem to be the limits of a democracy, that the people in general are supreme, and enjoy freedom.

POL—BK. 5. 9.13110A28-30

In a democracy the poor ought to have more power than the rich, as being the greater number, and that which is decreed by the majority is supreme.

POL—BK. 6. 2. 1317B8-10

A democracy considers only the poor.

POL—BK. 3. 7. 1279B8-9

The last and worst form is that which gives a share to every citizen.

POL—BK. 6. 4.1319B1-3

A democracy is a government in the hands of men of low birth, poverty, and vulgar employments.

POL—BK. 6. 2. 1317B40-41

A kingdom may degenerate into a tyranny, an aristocracy into an oligarchy, and a state into a democracy.

POL—BK. 3. 7. 1279B4-6

A democracy is where it is in the hands of those who are worth little or nothing.

POL—BK. 3. 8. 1279B18-19

Where the majority live by tillage or pasturage.

POL—BK. 6. 4. 1318B9-10

Democracy, Its End The end of democracy is liberty.

RH—1. 8.1366A4

Demagogue Where the power is not vested in the laws, there demagogues abound.

POL—Bk. 4. 4. 1292A10-11

The one flatter the few when they are in power. The others are those demagogues who have a share in the oligarchy and flatter the people.

POL—Bk. 5. 6.1305B34-36

Demonstration For there are three things in demonstrations, one, the demonstrated conclusion, and this is that which is per se inherent in a certain genus; another are axioms, but axioms are they from which the demonstration is made; the third is the subject genus, whose properties and essential accidents demonstration makes manifest.

PO A—1. 7. 75A39-75B2

I call demonstration a scientific syllogism, and I mean by scientific that according to which, from our possessing it, we know.

PO A—1. 2. 71B17-19

Demonstration is from what is more certain and is prior.

P A—2.16. 64B32-33

Demonstration is when a syllogism consists of things true and primary or of such a kind as assume the principle of the knowledge concerning them through certain things primary and true.

T—1. 1. 100A27-29

The beginning of every demonstration is the definition, of the quiddity; wherefore those definitions are said to be dialectical and useless by which accidents cannot be perceived or conjectures easily made about them.

DE A—1. 1. 402B25-403A2

But I term demonstrative even those common opinions from which all derive their demonstrations; for instance, that everything must needs be either an affirmation or negation, and that it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be at the same time, and whatsoever other such propositions there are.

ME—2. 2. 996B27-31

(In a demonstration) the conclusion is not in the form of a question nor does it

follow from a concession, but it must follow necessarily even if the respondent does not acknowledge it.

PO A—2. 5. 91B16-18

Every demonstration proves a predicate of a subject.

PO A—2. 3. 90B33-34

Without affirmative there is no negative demonstration.

PO A—1. 25. 86B38-39

Denial The proposition which removes something from something.

DE 1-6. 17A25-26

Dense A thing is said to be dense from having its parts near each other.

CAT—8. 10A21

Derivatively Things are said to be named derivatively which derive their name from some other name different in termination.

CAT—1. 1A12

Desire Desire is the appetite for what gives pleasure.

DE A—2. 3. 414B5-6

The active exercise of the desire augments its native strength, until the desires, if they are strong or vehement, actually expel the reasoning power.

N E—3. 15. 1119B9-10

Desire is contrary to moral purpose.

N E—3. 4. 1111B15-16

It seems that some desires are universal and others are individual and acquired.

N E—3. 13. 1118B8-9

There are three things which influence us to desire them, viz. the noble, the expedient, and the pleasant.

N E—2. 2. 1104B30-31

The object of desire, then, and the object of the will, are either real or apparent good.

E E—7. 2. 1235B25-28

It appears that they experience pain and pleasure; and if these two emotions exist in them, it follows necessarily that there is desire.

DE A-3. 11. 434A2-3

The desires devoid of reason are anger and appetite.

RH—BK. 1.10.1369A4

Deviation A small deviation to those who depart from truth becomes in its progress ten thousand times greater.

DE C-1. 5. 271B8-9

Dialectic The dialectic problem is a theorem tending either to choice and avoidance, or to truth and knowledge, either per se, or as cooperative with something else of this kind, about which the multitude either hold an opinion in neither way, or in a way contrary to the wise, or the wise to the multitude, or each of these to themselves.

T—1. 11. 104B1-5

A dialectic proposition is an interrogation, probable either to all, or to the most, or to the wise.

T—1. 10. 104A8-9

Dialectic propositions are both those which resemble the probable and which are contrary to those which appear probable, being proposed through contradiction and whatever opinions are according to the discovered arts.

T—1. 10. 104A12-15

This is peculiar, or especially appropriate to dialectic, for being investigative, it possesses the way to the principles of all methods.

T—1. 2. 101B2-4

Dialectic science is merely tentative of the knowledge of those things that philosophy has already actually reached.

ME—3. 2. 1004B25-28

This mode of arguing (i.e. purely verbal) is not appropriate to dialectic, wherefore a thing of this kind must be altogether avoided by dialecticians, viz. arguing against a name, unless any one should be otherwise incapable of discussing the proposition.

T—1. 18. 108A33-35

Dialectical arguments are such as collect contradiction from probabilities.

S E-2. 165B3-4

If then a dialectical question be the seeking of an answer either to a proposition or of one part of a contradiction ... there would not be one answer to them, for neither is there one question.... "What is it?" is not a dialectical question, for a choice should be given by the question to enunciate this or that part of the contradiction.

DE I-11. 20B22-29

It is the business of the dialectician to understand through common propositions those from which is made a real refutation or an apparent one, or a dialectical one or a contentious.

S E-9. 170B8-11

Diction Of all diction, the following are the parts: the letter, the syllable, the conjunction, the noun, the verb, the article, the case, and the sentence.

P-20.1456B20-21

Didactic Didactic arguments are those which syllogize from the proper principles of each discipline, and not from the opinions of him who answers.

S E-1. 2. 165B1-2

Difference Differences in animals are manifested in their kind of life, their actions, their nature, as well as in their parts.

H A-1. 1. 487A11-12

Difference also is of the number of those things not in a subject.

CAT-5. 3A23

Vide GENUS.

Difficulty Difficulty is defined in reference either to the pain, or length of time.

RH-BK. 1. 6. 1363A24

Disagreement Any trifling disagreement becomes the cause of seditions.

POL-BK. 5. 3. 1303A20-21

Disposition Disposition is styled an arrangement of that which has parts either according to place or to potentiality, or according to species.

Disputation It is requisite still, not to dispute with every one, nor to exercise ourselves against any casual person, for it is necessary to employ bad arguments against some, since against him, who altogether tries to seem to elude us, it is just indeed, by all means, to try to draw a conclusion, yet it is not proper readily to engage with casual persons, since depraved disputation will necessarily occur; for even those who practice themselves, cannot forbear disputing contentiously.

T-8. 14. 184B8-15

Diversity Things that are diverse in genus are at a wider interval from one another than those that are diverse in species.

ME-9. 10. 1059A14

Diverse are those things called of which either the species are numerous, or the matter, or the definition of the substance.

ME-4. 9. 1018A9-11

Division Concerning division the arguments are these: five is two and three, therefore odd and even.

S E-4. 66a33-34

Division and Union Division too and union are the same ... but their essence is not the same.

PHY-4. 13. 222A19-20

Divisible In every thing continuous and divisible, there are excess, defect, and a medium.

E E—2. 3. 1220B21-22

That which is divisible amounts either to magnitude or multitude.

ME—10. 10. 1066B4-5

All magnitude and all time are always divisible; so that they cannot be primarily in that in which they are.

PHY-6. 10. 237B20-21

Doctrine All doctrine, and all intellectual discipline, arise from pre-existent knowledge.

PO A-1. 1. 71A1-2

Dog It is by the teeth that we can recognize whether dogs are young or old.

HA-2. 2. 501B11-12

Double Question, Fallacy of Those arguments which arise from making two questions one, when it escapes notice that there are many and one answer is given as if there were only one question. *e.g.* ‘whether is the earth sea, or the heaven?’

S E-5. 67B38-168A1

Double Question, Fallacy of, Response to Against those which make many questions one, we must employ definition immediately in the beginning, for the interrogation is one to which there is one answer, so that neither many things must be affirmed or denied of one thing, nor one of many, but one of one.

S E-30. 181A36-39

Doubt It will contribute towards one’s object, who wishes to acquire a facility in the gaining of knowledge, to doubt judiciously.

ME-2. 1. 995A27-28

Downward Motion towards the center.

DE C—1. 2. 268B22

Drama Both tragedy and comedy at first originated from extemporaneous efforts.

P-4. 1449A9-10

Dramatic Ability A gift of nature and rather outside the province of art.

RH-3. 1. 1404A15-16

Dream A dream is a certain phantasm, and that during sleep.

DE SOM-3. 482A15-18

We do not perceive a dream by sense, nor yet by opinion.

DE SOM-1. 458B9-10

As in moisture, if any one vehemently agitates it, at one time no image appears, but at another, it appears, indeed, yet perfectly distorted, and different from what it really is; but when the moisture is still, the image is pure and apparent; thus, also, in sleep, the phantasms and the other motions which happen from sensible perceptions, at one time, when the said motion is greater, are entirely obliterated; but at another time, being disturbed, visions and monstrous

appearances, and unpleasant dreams, are produced.

DE SOM-3. 461A14-22

Dreams will not be sent from divinity ... They are nevertheless divine; for nature is divinely arranged, but not itself divine.

DE DIV-2. 463B13-15

He is a judge of dreams according to the most consummate art, who is able to survey similitudes; for every one is capable of forming a judgment of dreams which manifestly indicate future events.

DE DIV-2. 64B5-7

Dreaming That this passion, therefore, which we call dreaming, is neither the passion of one who opines, nor of one who acts dianoetically, is evident.

DE SOM-1. 459A8-9

Drought The same places of the earth are not always wet or dry, but they are changed according to the generations and failures of rivers.

DE M-1. 14. 351A19-21

E

Ear Large ears, protruding ears indicate loquacity and stupidity.

H A-1. 11. 492B2-3

Earth As far as we know about the earth, the horizon changes with our change of location, which shows that the earth is round and bulging.

DE M-2. 7. 365829-31

The earth also has necessarily a spherical figure.

DE C-2. 14. 297A9

Some parts of the sea always receding, and others always acceding, it is evident that the same parts of the earth are not always some of the sea, and others continent, but all these are changed in time.

DE M-1. 14. 351A21-26

It is evident that the earth is immovable.

DE C-2. 14. 296B25-26

Earthquake Neither water nor earth is the cause of earthquakes but wind, rushing into the earth from the external evaporation.

DE M-2. 8. 366A3-5

When a violent earthquake happens, the shock neither ceases immediately, nor entirely; but at first, indeed, it continues for forty days; and afterwards shakes the same places for one or two years.

DE M-2. 8. 367B32-368A1

The greater part too, and the greatest of earthquakes, happen at night; but those which are produced in the day happen about noon.

DE M-2. 8. 366A12-14

Easily Done Easy things are such as are done either without pain or in a short time.

RH-1. 6. 1363A23

Eclipse A privation of light from the moon through the interposition of the earth.

PO A-2. 2. 90A15-17

Since the moon is eclipsed through the interposition of the earth, the periphery of the earth which is of a spherical figure will be the cause of this.

DE C-2. 15. 297B28-30

If the earth were not spherical the eclipses of the moon would not have such segments as they now have.

DE C-2. 14. 297B24-25

Education It will be found to be education and morals that are almost the whole which go to make a good man, and that the same qualities will make a good citizen or good king.

POL-BK. 3. 18. 1288A41-1288B2

It is evident that laws should be laid down concerning education, and that it should be public. POL-BK. 8. 1. 1337a22-24

POL-BK. 8. 1. 1337A22-24

As a state contains a multitude, it ought to be brought to unity and community, as we have already said, by education.

POL-BK. 2. 5. 1283B38-37

Eel Eels are neither generated from copulation, nor do they bring forth eggs, nor has any eel ever been caught which had either any genital seed or an egg.

DE H A-6. 16. 570A3-4

Efficient Cause But with regard to generations, and actions, and every kind of change, we are in a way of understanding each when we understand the first principle of motion.

ME-2. 2. 998B22-23

Vide CAUSE.

Egg Among the seeds that are complete, we call egg that which contains two parts: one that serves first of all to form the animal, and the other wherein it finds its nutriment, once it is generated.

H A—1. 5. 489B8-8

Elderly, Habits and Passions of Doubtful, indecisive, cynical, suspicious, cowardly, illiberal, timid, tenacious of life, selfish, despise appearances, live in memory, weak in anger, but keen, live more by calculation, are apt to pity,

querulous.

RH-2. 13. 1389B13-1390A28

Election In a free state the whole community should not elect at the same time, but some out of the whole, or out of some particular rank; and this either by lot, or vote, or both. And they should elect either out of the whole community, or out of some particular persons in it, and this both by lot and vote.

POL-BK. 4. 15. 1300A34-36

To elect a proper person in any line is the business of those who are skilled in it; as in geometry, it is the part of geometricians, and of steersmen in the art of steering. But even if some individuals do know something of particular arts and works, they do not know more than the professors of them; so that, even upon this principle, neither the election of magistrates, nor the censure of their conduct, should be intrusted to the many.

POL-BK. 3. 11. 1282A8-14

Nor is it right for any one about to be elected to office to solicit a place; for every person who is fit to hold office, whether he chooses it or not, ought to be elected.

POL-BK. 2. 9. 1271A10-12

Elements An element is called that from which, as an inherent first principle and indivisible in species, something is compounded into a different species.

ME-4. 3. 1014A26-27

An element is that whereunto as inherent in a thing, as matter, a compound is divided, as for instance, of the syllable AB, A and B are the elements.

ME-6. 17 1041B31-33

The elements change into each other.

DE G ET C-2. 6. 332A1-2

It remains that they must be generated from each other.

DE C-3. 6. 305A32

It is necessary that the elements should be finite in number.

DE C-3. 4. 303A2-3

The elements, such as fire, air, water, and earth, are inodorable.

DE S ET S-5. 443A9-11

Air is nearer to fire than all the rest of the elements, and water is nearer to earth.

DE M—1. 2. 339A18-19

Since the bodies of all animals, and likewise of all plants, are composed from the four elements, in some of them earth predominates, as in plants; in others, water, as in aquatic animals; and in others air or fire, as in pedestrious and winged animals.

DE R—13. 477A27-30

Elenchus Vide REFUTATION.

Emotion By the emotions I mean desire, anger, fear, courage, envy, joy, love, hatred, regret, emulation, pity, in a word whatever is attended by pleasure or pain.

N E—2. 4. 1105B21-23

The irrational emotions seem to be as truly human as the reason itself and therefore we are as truly responsible for our emotions as for our reasoning.

N E—3.3. 1111A34-1111B2

Thought, love, and hate are not qualities of the mind, but of the man that possesses the mind, in so far as he possesses it.

DE A—1. 4. 408B25-27

Vide PASSIONS.

End The end is that for the sake of which a thing is done.

E E—2. 11. 1227B38

That with a view to which we act is the end; an end is that for the sake of which everything else is done.

RH—1.7. 1363B16-17

All things in nature have an end or are the conditions of things that have an end.

DE A—3. 12. 434A31-32

There are different kinds of ends: some are actions, others are products of the

actions.

N E-1. 1. 1094A3-5

The end or character of an action depends upon the choice made at the moment of performing it.

N E—3. 1. 1110A13-14

No one deliberately chooses the end, but things which contribute to the end.

E E-2. 10. 1226A7-8

The end is some good of the soul and not an external good.

N E-1. 8. 1098B19-20

End of Man Every one individually and all men in general have some end at which directing every aim, they both choose and avoid; and this, to speak summarily, is happiness and its constituents.

RH-1. 5.1360M-7

Encomium Encomium is language extolling what one has actually done.

RH-1. 9. 1367628-29

Endurance It is endurance of painful things, as has been said, that entitles people to be called courageous.

N E-3. 12. 1117A32-33

It is the mark of a lofty mind to show no signs of depression under great sufferings and injuries.

ECO-BK. 1. 7. (BK. 3. LOEB. P. 405)

Energy It is evident that energy, or activity, is prior to potentiality.

ME-8. 8. 1049B5

That also energy is both superior and more excellent than potentiality, however excellent, is evident.

ME-8.9.1051A4-5

Energy is an end.

ME-8. 8. 1050A9

Corporeal activity has no communication with the actuality of intellect.

DEGA-2. 3. 736B28-29

Felicity, however, is either a habit, or an energy, since energy is better than disposition, and the best energy is the energy of the best habit.

E E-2. 1. 1219A28-33

Vide ACT.

Entelechy The soul is the first entelechy of a natural body that has life potentially.

DE A—2. 1. 412A27-28

The soul is the entelechy of the body.

DE A—2. 1. 412A21

Enthymeme Now an enthymeme is a syllogism from likelihoods (probabilities) or signs.

PA-2. 27. 70A10-11

A rhetorical syllogism.

RH-1. 2. 1356B4

Enthymemes are adduced from probabilities and signs.

RH—BK. 1. 2. 1357A32-33

Are the very body of persuasion.

RH-1. 1. 1354A14-15

Entity One signification of entity is ‘the what a thing is’ or quiddity, and this certain particular thing; and another is quality or quantity, or each of the rest of the things that are so predicated.

ME-6. 1. 1028A11-13

Entity is denominated partly as that which subsists according to accident, and partly as that which subsists essentially. ME-4.7.1017a7-8

ME-4. 7. 1017A7-8

Enunciation One first enunciative sentence is affirmation; afterwards negation, and all the rest are only by conjunction. It is necessary however that every enunciative sentence should be from a verb, or from the case of a verb.

DE I-5.17A8-11

Envy Men envy those with whom they are at rivalry.

Those who are ambitious are more given to envy than those who are devoid of ambition.

RH—Bk. 2. 10. 1387B31-32

Vide JEALOUSY.

Epic Poetry Concerning the poetry which is narrative and imitative in meter, it is evident that it ought to have dramatic fables (plots) in the same manner as tragedy, and should be conversant with one whole and perfect action, which has beginning, middle and end, in order that, like one whole animal, it may produce its appropriate pleasure.

P-23. 1459A17-21

It requires revolutions, discoveries, and disasters. Besides which, the thought and the diction should be well formed.

P-24. 1459B11-12

Epic The epic differs from tragedy in the length of the composition and in the meter.

P-24. 1459B17-18

It is the peculiarity of the epic to possess abundantly the power of extending its magnitude.... In the epic, many events may be introduced which have happened at the same time, which are properly connected with the subject, and from which the bulk of the poem is increased.

P-24. 1459B22-28

The epic is an attendant on tragedy.

P-5. 1449B9-10

The epic differs from tragedy in that it has a simple metre, and is a narration. It also differs in length.

P-5. 1449B11-12

Epicheirema A dialectical syllogism.

T-8.11.182A16

Episode The episode is the whole part of the tragedy between two complete odes of the chorus.

P-12. 1452B20-21

Episodic I call the plot episodic, in which it is neither probable nor necessary that the episodes follow each other.

P-9.1451B34-35

Of simple plots and actions, the episodic are worst.

P-9. 1451B33-34

Equable Motion That the heaven is moved with an equable motion is evident.

DE C-2. 6. 289A8-9

Equality Nature has made all men equal, and therefore it is just, be the administration good or bad, that all should partake of it.

POL-Bk 2. 2. 1261A39-1261B2

Equitable One who in his moral purpose and action aims at doing what is equitable, and does not insist upon his rights to the damage of his neighbors, but is content to take less than is his due, although he has the law on his side, is equitable.

N E-5. 14. 1137B35-1138A2

That which is equitable is just.

N E-5. 14. 1137B8-9

Equity Equity is that idea of justice, which contravenes the written law.

RH-Bk. 1. 13. 1374A25-27

Equity, also, is the having a sympathy for human failings; and the having an eye, not to the law, but to the lawgiver; and not to the language, but to the intention of the lawgiver. And not to the conduct, but to the principles of the agent; not to his conduct in one particular, but to its whole tenor. Not what kind of person he has been in this instance, but what he has always shown himself or generally at least. The having, too, a remembrance of the good one has received, rather than of the ill; of the good one has received, rather than what one has done; though injured, to endure it patiently; to prefer a decision by argument, rather than by recourse to action; a wish to proceed to arbitration, rather than to judicial decision, for the arbitrator looks to what is equitable, the judge to what is law; and in order to this it was that arbitration was introduced, in order, namely, that equity might prevail.

RH-1. 13. 1374B10-22

Equity is the common characteristic of all that is good in our relation to our neighbors.

N E-8. 12. 1143A31-32

Equivocally Things are said to be named equivocally when the definition agreeing with the name is different for each although they have a common name.

CAT-1. 1A1

Equivocation, Fallacy of Such arguments as these are from equivocation: those who know, learn, for grammarians learn those things they recite; for to learn is equivocal, signifying both to understand by using science and also to acquire science.

S E-4. 165B30-34

Eristic Vide SOPHISTIC and CONTENTIOUS.

Err If we think that a thing was done at a certain time, and this opinion is false, then memory deceives us, and we err.

DE M ET R-2. 452B24-26

Error There is error both in deficiency and excess.

M M-1. 17. 1189B28-29

Erudition It is the province of an erudite man to be able sagaciously to judge what is well or ill said by the teacher.

DE P A-1. 1. 639A4-6

Esse Esse is not the substance of any thing. PO

PO A-2. 7. 92B13-14

Essence The essence is the cause of being for all things.

DE A-2. 4. 415B11-12

It is not possible that essence, or quality, or a participated property should be infinite.

PHY-1. 2. 185A34-185B2

Each essence is able to generate many such things as itself.

E E-2. 6. 1222B16-17

Essences, Knowledge of The accidents are a great aid in coming to know the essence of each thing; for when we are able to know the accidental appearances, whether some or all, then we can speak well concerning the substance.

DE A-1. 1. 402B21-25

Essences, Natural All natural essences are either bodies, or are generated together with bodies and magnitudes.

DE C-3. 1. 298B3-4

Essential The essential is expressed in many ways; in one way, the very nature of each thing or the formal cause; ... secondly, whatsoever things are inherent in the essence; and, thirdly, a thing that has primarily been a recipient in itself, or a certain part of things that belong to itself; fourthly, that of which there is not any one other cause; fifthly, as many things as are inherent in some one particular thing alone, and as far forth as it is alone.

ME-4. 18. 1022A24-35

Essential Attributes (per se) But I call those 'per se' which are inherent in what a thing is, as line is in triangle, and point in line, also those things which are inherent in their attributes in the definition declaring what a thing is, as the straight and the curved are inherent in a line ... what are in neither way inherent I call accidents.

PO A-1. 4. 73A34-73B5

Essential Good Essential is final good.

E E-1. 8. 1218B10

Eternal It follows that the object of science is necessary. It is therefore eternal; for all such things as are necessary in themselves are eternal, and that which is eternal admits neither of generation nor of corruption, *i.e.* it has neither beginning nor end.

N E-6. 3. 1139B22-24

If, therefore, there are certain things that are eternal and immovable, there is in them nothing compulsory or contrary to Nature.

ME-4. 5. 1015B14-15

Eternity The end of the whole heaven, and the end which comprehends the infinite time and infinity of all things is eternity.

DE C-1. 9. 279A25-27

Ethics Scientific exactitude is impossible in reasoning upon particular ethical cases.

N E-2. 2. 1104A5-7

Eunuch No eunuch becomes bald.

H A-9. 50. 632A4

Every 'Every' does not signify the universal but it signifies that the universal (term) is universally applied.

DE I-7. 17B11-12
DE 1-10. 20A12-14

Evil That which is evil is by the constitution of Nature subsequent to that which we term potentiality.

ME-8. 9. 1051A18-19

Evil is in its nature infinite.

N E-2. 5. 1106B29

Evolution The evolution is for the sake of the thing and it is not the case that the thing is for the sake of evolution.

DE P A-1. 1. 640A18-19

Excess Let excess be defined to be, as much and yet more: the thing exceeded, however, to be that comprised within the excess.

RH—BK. 1. 7. 1363B7-9

All excess whether of folly, cowardice, incontinence, or savagery is either brutal or morbid.

N E-7. 6. 1149A4-7

Existence That for the sake of which a thing exists is in the smallest degree evident, where matter mostly abounds.

DE M-4. 12. 390A3-4

Animals, too, only exist on earth and on water; but not in air or fire, because the former are the matter of bodies.

DE M-4. 4. 382A6-7

Exodus The exodus is the whole part of the tragedy, after which there is no

further melody of the chorus.

P-12. 1452B21-22

Exordium The business of exciting attention is common to all the divisions of a speech, wherever it may be necessary.

RH-Bk. 3. 14. 1415B9-10

Experience Repeated acts of memory about the same thing done constitute the force of a single experience.

ME-1. 1. 980B29-981A1

Experience accrues to men from memory.

ME-1. 1. 980B28-29

All experience harmonizes with the truth N E-1. 8. 1098B11

The peculiar principles in every science are many, hence it is the province of experience to deliver the principles of everything, for instance, I say that astronomical experience gives the principles of astronomical science, for from phenomena being sufficiently observed, astronomical demonstrations have thus been invented, so also is it in every other art and science.

P A—1. 30. 48A17-22

Expert One is designated an expert because he possesses knowledge in a particular branch.

CAT-8. 10A35

Expiration and Respiration It is impossible at one and the same time to expire and respire.

DE R-1. 471A17-18

Extremes Among the extremes, if a person errs on the side of excess, he may be called passionate and his vice passionateness, if on that of deficiency, he may be called impassive and his deficiency impassivity.

NE-2. 7. 1108A6-9

Eye In general, the white of the eye is identical in all men But the part called black presents numerous differences.

H A—1. 10. 491B34-492A2

Only in man, or rather especially in man, does the color of the eyes vary so

much. The other animals have one color only.

H A—1. 10. 492A5-6

Eyebrows Extended toward the temples, they indicate a spirit of mockery, imitation, and raillery.

H A—1. 9. 491B16-18

Low eyebrows indicate an envious nature.

H A—1. 9. 491B17-18

When the eyebrows are straight, it is a sign of great gentleness.

H A—1. 9. 491B15

When they curve toward the nose, it is a sign of coarseness.

H A—1. 9. 491B15-16

Eyelashes Of those animals that have hair man alone has eyelashes in each eyelid.

DE P A-2. 14. 658A14-15

F

Faculties There are three faculties in the soul which determine action and truth, viz. sensation, reason, and appetite or desire.

N E—6. 1. 1139A17-18

I call those faculties in respect of which we are said to be capable of experiencing these emotions, *e.g.* capable of getting angry or being pained or feeling pity.

N E—2. 4. 1105B23-25

Fallacy There are two types of fallacies, some depend on language and some are apart from language. Those which depend on language are six in number: equivocation, amphiboly, composition, division, accent and figure of speech.

S E—4. 165B23-27

The fallacies apart from language are seven: from accident; on account of what is asserted simply or not simply but in a certain respect, or place or time or relation; ignorance of the issue; fallacy of consequent; *petitio principii*; placing non-cause for the cause; double or leading questions.

S E—4. 166B20-27

False He speaks falsely who, when either things are or when they are not, makes assertions about them in a contrary way to that in which they actually subsist.

ME—8. 10. 1051B4-6

The false is denominated in one way as a false thing; and, in regard of this, partly in the fact of its not being composed, or in the impossibility of its being in a state of composition.

ME—4. 29. 1024B17-19

That which is false does not exist, nor does it amount to deception, but ignorance.

ME—8. 10. 1052A1-3

False Argument An argument is called false in four ways: one when it appears to conclude, yet does not do so, which is called a contentious syllogism; another when it concludes indeed, that which does not pertain to the proposed problem, and this happens especially in arguments leading to the impossible; or it

concludes pertinently to what is laid down, yet not after an appropriate method, and this is when a non-medical argument appears medical, or the non-goemetrical to be geometrical, or the non-dialectic to be dialectic, whether the result be false or true. Another way, if it concludes through falsities, and of this the conclusion will be sometimes false, and sometimes true, as the false is always concluded through falsities, but it is possible that the true may be so even from things not true, as was said also before.

T-8. 12. 162B3-15

False Cause, Fallacy of That is (a fallacy) which is from what is not a cause, being assumed as a cause, is when what is causeless is taken as if the refutation were produced on account of it. Now such a thing happens in syllogisms leading to the impossible, since in these it is necessary to subvert some one of the posita; if then it be reckoned in necessary interrogations for the impossible to result, the refutation will often appear to arise on account of this, as that the soul and life are not the same, for if generation be contrary to destruction, a certain generation will be to a certain destruction; but death is a certain destruction and is contrary to life, so that life is generation, and to live is to be generated but this is impossible, wherefore soul and life are not the same.

S E-5. 167B21-31

Falsehood Falsehood in itself is base and censurable.

N E—4. 13. 1127A28-29

False Subsistence That which subsists as false is nonentity.

ME-5. 4. 1027B18-19

Fame When one is considered by all to be endowed with virtue or to possess what all desire or the generality, or the good or the prudent.

RH-1. 5. 1361A25-27

Familiars That certain persons clearly perceive future events, and that familiars especially foresee things pertaining to familiars happens because familiars are particularly solicitous about each other.

DE DIV-2. 464A27-29

Family A family is that society which nature has established for daily support, and those who compose it are called by Charondas ‘Feeders at the same manger,’ and by Epimenides the Cretan ‘Users of the same hearth.’

POL—BK. 1. 1. 1252B12-15

But as in every subject we should first begin with examining into its component parts, and as the first and smallest parts of a family are the master and slave, the husband and wife, the father and child, let us first inquire into these three relations, what each of them is, and what they ought to be; that is to say, the despotical, the conjugal, and thirdly the paternal; though these two latter relations have no peculiar established name. Let these then be considered as the three distinct parts of a family. Now there is a duty which some identify with the government of a family, while others regard it as constituting its most important part; I mean that of providing for its maintenance. Now we must inquire philosophically how the matter stands. But let us first speak of the master and the slave, that we may both understand what things are absolutely necessary, and also see if we can get to learn any thing better on this subject than what is already laid down. Some persons have thought that the power of the master over his slave is a certain science, and that the government of a family and a slave, political and regal government, are all the same things, just as we said at the beginning; but others think that despotic government is contrary to nature, and that it is custom only which makes one man a slave and another free, but that in nature there is no difference between them; for which reason that tie must be unjust, for it is founded in force.

POL—Bk. I. 3. 1253B5-23

Since every family is part of a state, and each of those individuals is part of a family, and the virtue of the parts ought to have regard to the virtue of the whole; it is necessary to instruct both the wives and children of the community, as to the nature thereof, inasmuch as it is of some consequence to the virtue of the state that the wives and children herein should be virtuous.

POL—Bk. I. 13. 1260B13-18

Fear A sort of pain or agitation, arising out of an idea that an evil, capable either of destroying or giving pain, is impending on us.

RH—Bk. 2. 5. 1382A22-23

Fear is sometimes defined as an anticipation of evil.

N E—3. 9. 1115A9

Those animals whose blood is very watery, are more timid; for fear refrigerates.

DE P A015-2. 4. 650RB27-28

Fearlessness There are two ways in which men become dead to apprehension, either from never having experience, or from being possessed of resources against calamity.

RH—Bk 2. 5. 1383A27-28

Feel To feel is to experience some affection.

DE A—2. 11. 423B31-424A1

Feet In all animals the number of feet is always even.

H A—1. 5. 489B22-23

Felicity Felicity is the energy of a worthy soul.

E E—2. 1. 1219A33-34

It is acknowledged, therefore, that felicity is the greatest and most excellent of human goods.

E E—1. 7. 1217A21-22

Happiness is a certain action; for it is good action.

PHY—2. 6. 197B4-5

It is evident that all men consider felicity as subsisting in three lives, the political, the philosophical, and the voluptuous.

E E—1. 5. 1218A27-29

There are some things the lack of which must mar felicity, *e.g.* noble birth, a prosperous family, and personal beauty.

N E—1. 9. 1099B2-3

Vide HAPPINESS.

Female That which generates in itself and from which is made what is generated.

DE G A—1. 2. 716A21-23

The female contributes the matter for generation and this is the substance of the menses.

DE G A—1. 19. 727B31-32

The animal that makes the emission in itself is called the female.

H A—1. 3. 489A11-12

In the female, there is less blood on the surface of the body, but within it there is more.

H A—3. 19. 521A21-22

Females are naturally libidinous, incite the males to copulation, and cry out during the act of coition.

DE H A—5. 2. 540A11-13

Woman is more compassionate than man, and has a greater propensity to tears.

DE H A—9. 1. 608B8-9

The female, when born, more rapidly acquires youth, acme, and old age than the male.

H A—7. 3. 583B26-27

The haughtiness of women has been the ruin of many tyrannies.

POL—BK. 5.11.1314B26-27

The female is more dispirited, more despondent, more impudent, and more given to falsehood, than the male. She is likewise more easily deceived, and more apt to remember; and again the female is more vigilant, less active, and in short less disposed to motion, and receptive of less nutriment than the male.

H A—9. 1. 608B11-15

She is, also, more envious, more querulous, more slanderous, and more contentious.

DE H A—9. 1. 608B9-11

It is easy to find persons who will share prosperity, but, except a very few and very good ones, women are not willing to share misfortunes.

ECO-BK. 1.7. (BK. 3. LOEB, P. 405)

Female Excellencies The excellencies of females in regard to person are beauty and stature; in regard to mind, temperance and industry without meanness.

RH—1. 5. 1361A6-8

Ferocity Females, therefore, when they have brought forth are first more ferocious, but the males are ferocious at the time of copulation.

DE H A—6. 18. 571B10-12

Fertility Fat men and women are less fertile than thin, since the residue is concocted and changed into fat.

DE G A—1. 18. 726A3-5

Fibres Fibres are solid and terrene; so that they become as it were the nourishers of heat in the blood, and cause anger to become fervid.

DE P A—2. 4. 650B36-651A2

Figures Figures are infinite.

DE S ET S—4. 442B21

Figure of Speech, Fallacy of Those arguments occur from figure of speech when what is not the same is interpreted after the same manner, as when the masculine is interpreted feminine, or the feminine as masculine ... or again quantity as quality or quality as quantity.

S E—4.166B10-13

Final We speak of a thing as absolutely final, if it is always desired in itself and never as a means to something else.

NE—1. 5. 1097A33-34

Finite That which is composed from things finite both in multitude and magnitude, is also finite in multitude and magnitude.

DE C—1. 5. 271B21-22

Finite Body That it is necessary, therefore, that every body which is moved in a circle should be finite, is evident.

DE C—1. 5. 273A4-6

Fire Fire is the excess of heat.

DE G ET C—2. 4. 331B25

The nature of fire is dry.

DE S ET S—4. 441B10

Fire tends upward in a right line.

DE C—1. 2. 269A17

Fire has no weight.

DE C—4. 4. 311B27

The corruption of fire is extinction and consumption.

DE R—8. 474B13-14

First Known Those things are first evident and manifest which are more confused and then they become more known by their elements and principles.

PHY—1. 1. 184A21-23

First Principles There are various ways of discovering first principles; some are discovered by induction, others by perception, others by what may be called habituation, and so on.

N E—1. 7. 1098B3-4

Fish All fishes scatter their eggs.... For if all the eggs were preserved, fishes of every kind would be too numerous.

DE H A—6. 13. 567A31-567B3

Flame Flame is the boiling of a dry wind.

DE M—1. 4. 341B21-22

Flesh This is the principle and the body of animals.

DE P A—2. 8. 653B21-22

The flesh of man is softer than that of other animals.

DE P A—2. 16. 660A11-12

It is impossible that the flesh can be the organ of the other senses.

DE P A—2. 8. 653B29-30

Men who have hard flesh are ill endowed with intelligence: those who have soft flesh on the contrary are well endowed.

DE A-2. 9. 421A25-26

Flowers Man, as I may say, is the only animal that perceives and is delighted with the smell of flowers, and things of this kind.

DE S ET S—5. 444A31-33

Fluid Every animal without exception has a fluid of which it cannot be deprived, either naturally, or by violence, without dying immediately; and there is also a part wherein this fluid is contained.

H A—1. 4. 489A20-21

Flying No animal is capable of flight simply.

H A—1. 1. 487B21

Among animals that fly, some have feathers, like the eagle and the hawk; others have membranes, like the bee and the cockchafer; others have wings resembling leather, like the flying-fox and the bat.

H A—1. 5. 490A5-8

Folly When a man does not arrange his life with a view to a certain end, it is an indication of great folly.

E E—1. 2. 1214B10-11

Fondness We are all most fond of such things as have cost us trouble.

N E—9. 7. 1168A21-22

Foolhardiness The foolhardy person may be regarded as an impostor, and as one who affects a courage that he does not possess.

N E—3. 10. 1115B29-30

Foot I use the term foot for a member employed for movement in place.

DE IN—5. 706A31-32

Forehead Men who have a high forehead are slower than others.

H A—1. 9. 491B12

Those whose forehead is wide have extraordinary faculties.

H A—1. 9. 491B13

Those who have a narrow forehead are very quick.

H A—1. 9. 491B13

Those whose foreheads are round are hot tempered.

H A—1. 9. 491B14

Foresight The cause, too, why certain persons in an ecstasy foresee future events is because the proper or appropriate motions did not disturb, but are expelled.

DE DIV—2. 464A24-26

Forgetful Very young persons and old men are forgetful.

DE M ET R—1. 450B5-6

Form By form I mean the essence or very nature of the thing.

ME—6. 10. 1035B32

I mean by form the essence or very nature of each thing, and the first substance.

ME—6. 7. 1032B1-2

Form, therefore, is nature.

PHY—2. 1. 193A30-31

It is according to form that we know all things.

ME—3. 5. 1010A25

Form is one principle, as, for instance, order, or music, or some one of other things which are thus predicated.

PHY—1. 7. 190B28-29

Form of Man The form of man always appears in flesh and bones, and in such like parts.

ME—6. 11.1036B3-4

Fortitude The third kind exists through unskilfulness and ignorance ... the fourth species subsists from hope . . . the fifth is that which arises from the impulse of the irrational passions.

E E—3. 1. 1229A18-21

Fortuitous There is no science through demonstration of that which is fortuitous.

PO A—1. 30. 87B19

Fortunate Nobody who is fortunate can become miserable; for he will never do what is hateful and mean.

N E—1. 11. 1100B33-34

Fortune Simply considered, it is not the cause of anything.

PHY—2. 5. 197A10-11

Fortune is a cause by accident in things which rarely happen, according to the deliberate choice of those things which subsist for the sake of something.

PHY—2. 5. 197A5-6

Fortune itself is unstable; since none of the things which proceed from it can either have a perpetual or a frequent subsistence.

PHY—2. 5. 197A31-32

Fortune is indefinite.

PHY—2. 5. 197A8-9

Good fortune is the accession and actual possession, either of all, of most, or the greatest of those goods of which chance is the cause.

RH—Bk 1. 5. 1361B39-1362A2

Good fortune is something of necessity different from happiness, as every external good of the soul is produced by chance or by fortune; but it is not from fortune that any one is just or wise.

POL—Bk. 7. 1. 1323B26-29

Freedom Where the government is not vested in the laws, then there is no free state.

POL—Bk. 4. 4. 1292A32

Free Man We say a free man exists who is such for his own sake, and not for the sake of another.

ME—1. 2. 982B24-26

Free Will The first principle of things that are practical is free-will in the agent.

ME—5. 1. 1025B23-24

Friend One who participates in another's joy at good fortune, and in his sorrow at what aggrieves him, is his friend.

RH—Bk 2. 4. 1381A3-6

A true friend is one who is a true friend only on account of virtue.

E E—7. 12. 1244B16-17

A friend is to be preferred to things, and not things to a friend.

E E—7. 2. 1237B30-34

The greatest as it seems of all external goods.

N E—9. 9. 1189B9-10

Friends, Two Two friends have a greater power both of intelligence and of action than either of the two by himself.

N E—8. 1. 1155A15-16

Friendliness Let the bearing friendly feeling be defined to be ‘the wishing a person what we think good, for his sake and not for our own, and, as far as is in our power, the exercising ourselves to procure it.’

RH—2. 4. 1380B35-1381A1

Friendship One species, indeed, is defined on account of virtue; another on account of the useful; and another on account of the delectable.

E E—7. 2. 1236A31-33

Friendship is a kind of virtue or implies virtue.

N E—8. 1. 1155A4

Friendship resembles a moral state.

N E—8. 7. 1157B29

Friendship is measured by desert, and a certain equality.

E E—7. 4. 1239A8-9

No one honors wealth for itself but for something else, but friendship is honored for itself.

T—3. 1. 117A1-4

If people are friends, there is no need of justice between them.

N E—8. 1. 1155A26-27

It is indispensable to life.

N E—8. 1. 1155A4-5

The species of friendship are companionship, intimacy, relationship (kinship).

RH—BK. 2. 4. 1381B33-34

It appears that friendship and justice have the same occasions and the same sphere.

N E—8. 11. 1159B25-26

Friendship looks for what is possible, not for what is proportionate or due to the merit of the friend.

N E—8. 16. 1163B15-16

It is only the friendship of the good which cannot be destroyed by calumnies.

N E—8. 5. 1157A20-21

Perfect friendship is in some sense an excess.

N E—8. 7. 1158A12

Friendship is the greatest good which can happen to any state, as nothing so much prevents seditions.

POL—BK. 2. 4. 1262B7-9

Future It is not possible to remember the future.

DE M ET R—1. 449B10-11

Nor is that which will be, and that which is about to be, the same thing.

DE DIV—2. 463B28-29

G

Generation Of things that are being produced, some are produced by nature, and others by art and others by chance.

ME—6. 7. 1032A12-13

All things which are produced either by nature or art involve matter, for it is possible for each of them both to be and not to be and this capability is the matter in each.

ME—6. 7. 1032A20-22

One thing is generated from another . . . by something in act, which is either of the same genus or the same species.

DE G ET C—1. 5. 320B17-20

A thing is generated from that which is not.

DE G ET C—1. 3. 319A26

Simple generation is from that which is simply non-being.

DE G ET C-1. 3. 317B5

Only substances are said to be generated in the strict sense.

PHY—1. 7. 190A32-33

Of every substance there is generation.

ME—10. 2. 1060B18-19

Generations take place from opposites.

DE I—14. 23B14

Generation is into contraries, and from contraries.

DE G ET C-2. 5. 332B21-22

It is indeed universally evident that every thing is naturally adapted to be generated from everything.

DE G ET C-2. 5. 332B27-28

It is impossible that there be a production of anything if nothing may pre-exist.

ME—6. 7. 1032B30-31

Those elements which are changed from one into one, are generated from one thing being corrupted; but those which are changed from two into one, are generated from more than one thing being corrupted.

DE G ET C—2. 4. 331B35-36

It is evident that what is called form or substance is not generated but that the union which is said to take place according to this is generated, and that in everything which is produced matter is inherent and the one part is matter but the other form.

ME—6. 8. 1033B16-19

It is not possible that things more rare and more dense can be generated, if there is not a vacuum in the indivisibles.

DE G ET C—1. 8. 326A23-24

The principles of generation are male and female; the male as the efficient cause, the female as the material.

DE G A—1. 2. 716A4-6

The male supplies the form and motive principle but the female the body and the matter.

DE G A—1. 20. 729A9-11

Among those that have the faculty of generation, are distinguished the animal that makes the emission in itself, and the animal that makes it in another.

HA—1. 3. 489A10-11

Others generate animals, indeed, not such as are homogeneous; and these are such as are generated not from the coition of animals, but from putrid earth and excrements.

DE G A—1. 1. 715A24-25

To say that the world is generated, and that it is at the same time perpetual, is among things that are impossible.

DE C—1. 10. 279B17-18

Neither is it possible that any body can be generated beyond the world.

DE C—1. 9. 278B24

Generation, Mutual Fire and air, water and earth, are generated from each other

and each of these exists in each in potentiality.

DE M—1. 3. 339A36-339B1

Generation and Corruption Generation is the corruption of non-being; and corruption is the generation of non-being.

DE G ET C—1. 3. 319A28-29

Every generation is a corruption of another and every corruption a generation of another.

DE G ET C—1. 3. 319A5-6

The passage to non-being simply is simple corruption; the passage to being simply, is simple generation.

DE G ET C—1. 3. 318B9-11

It is impossible that generation amounts to motion, for nonentity would be produced by accident . . . neither does corruption constitute motion, for motion or rest is a thing that is contrary to motion, but corruption is contrary to generation.

ME—10. 11. 1067B30-1068A1

Genus Genus is that which is predicated of many things differing in species.

T—1. 5. 102A31-32

Genus and difference are apparently consequent so long as there is species.

T—4. 2. 123A18-19

Further, do we regard genus as that which first is inherent in definitions, which is predicated in the case of the essence of a thing the differences of which are called qualities.

ME—4. 28. 1024B4-6

Genus is styled so partly when there may be a continuous generation of things that possess the same species.... And it is that also from which things derive their being as the first disposing cause towards existence.

ME—4. 28. 1024A29-32

When I say genus, I understand, for example, bird and fish. These two animals have a difference of genus; and each one, in its particular genus, has other differences, since there are several species of fish and birds.

H A—1. 1. 486A23-25

I call bird a genus, but man a species, and I also denominate every thing a species which, according to universal definition, has no difference.

DE P A—1. 5. 645B24-26

In every genus of things, there is that which is in act, and that which is in capacity.

PHY-3. 1. 201A9-10

Genus (Pl. Genera) The differences of different genera and of things not arranged under each other are diverse also in species, as of 'animal' and 'science.' For the differences of 'animal' are 'quadruped,' 'biped,' 'winged,' 'aquatic,' but none of these forms the difference of 'science,' since 'science' does not differ from 'science' in being 'biped.' But as to subaltern genera there is nothing to prevent the differences being the same, as the superior are predicated of the genera under them.

CAT-3. 1B16-21

Gentlemen It belongs to a gentleman not to live in dependence on another.

RH—BK 1. 9. 1367A32

Geometrician The geometrician carries on speculations relative to man neither as far forth as he is man, nor as far forth as he is indivisible, but as far forth as he is a solid.

ME—12. 3. 1078A25-26

Geometry For neither are the lines that fall under the cognisance of the senses the same as the geometrician describes them; for nought of the things that are perceived by the senses is in this way strictly straight or round, for the circle touches the rule not in a point.

ME-2. 2. 997B35-998A3

Giving It is easier to abstain from taking than to give.

N E-4. 1. 1120A17

Goats Goats however when they are fat are less prolific.

DE H A-5. 14. 548A1-2

God In this way is God disposed as to existence and the principle of life is inherent in God; for the energy or active exercise of mind constitutes life and

God is this act and essential act belongs to God as his best and everlasting life.

ME—11. 7. 1072B26-28

God is happy and blessed not by reason of any external good but in himself and by his nature.

POL—7. 1. 1323B23-26

God and nature make nothing in vain.

DE C—1. 4. 271A33

It is clear, therefore that God is in the whole universe and moves everything, so, likewise God is in us and moves us.

E E—7. 14. 1248A25-27

God, who is the end of life, and in the contemplation of whom felicity consists, does not govern imperiously. And, as it is elsewhere shown, he is not in want of any thing.

E E—7.15.1249B13-16

He who bids the laws to be supreme makes God supreme.

POL—Bk. 3. 18. 1287A28-30

All men believe that there are gods.

DE C—1. 3. 270B5-6

Good For the good is what all desire.

RH—1. 7. 1365A1

The good has been well defined as that at which all things aim.

N E—1. 1. 1094A2-3

Let good be defined to be: whatever is an object of choice for its own sake; and for the sake of which we choose something else; what every thing aims at, or every thing which has perception, or which has intelligence; or every thing would aim at were it possessed of intelligence; whatever intelligence would award to each; whatever the intelligence conversant with every instance awards to each, that to each individual is his good; that which being present one is well disposed and independent.

RH—1. 6. 1362A21-27

Good is multifarious, in fact as many as being.

E E—1. 8. 1217B25-26

Good in food is what produces pleasure; in medicine, what produces health; in the soul, it is a certain quality; sometimes it is what happens at a certain time, as what happens at the right time; frequently also quantity, as the right amount. So then, the term ‘good’ is equivocal.

T-1. 15. 107A5-12

There are three kinds of things good for man, namely, what is external, what belongs to the body, and to the soul.

POL—Bk. 7. 1. 1323A25-26

The good of man is an activity of soul in accordance with virtue or, if there are more virtues than one, in accordance with the best and most complete virtue.

N E—1. 6. 1098A15-17

All objects of determined choice are good.

RH—Bk. 1. 6. 1363A19

All men participate of a certain portion of good.

E E—7. 2. 1238B13-14

Virtue is a kind of good.

T—6. 4. 142B14

A person is not good, if he does not take delight in noble actions.

N E—1. 9. 1099A17-18

Good is finite.

N E—2. 5. 1106B30

Goods have been divided into three classes, namely, external goods as they are called, goods of the soul and goods of the body.

N E—1. 8. 1098B12-14

It is clear then that there will be two kinds of goods, some being absolute goods, and others secondary.

N E—1. 4. 1096B13-14

When one thing is a consequence of another, but that other thing is not a consequence of it; then that of which the other is a consequence is the greater good.

RH—Bk 1. 7. 1363B27-30

Ideal good is indeed immovable.

E E—1. 8. 1218A22

The highest good is clearly something final.

N E-1. 5. 1097A28

Some philosophers have held that . . . there is an absolute good which is the cause of goodness.

N E—1. 2. 1095A26-28

Good, Simply What is simply good is more desirable than what is good for someone; as to get well is better than to be cut. For the former is simply good, the latter to those who need an operation.

T-3. 116B8-10

But that is simply (honorable) which, when nothing is added, you may declare to be honorable or the contrary.

T-2. 11. 115B29-30

Goodwill Goodwill may be said to be the germ of friendship.

N E-9. 5. 1167A3-4

Government Government is a certain ordering of the state, which respects the magistrates as to the manner in which they are regulated, where the supreme power shall be placed.

POL—Bk. 4. 1. 1289A19-22

It is evident that every form of government or administration (for the words are of the same import), must contain the supreme power over the whole state, and that this supreme power must necessarily be in the hands of one person, or of a few, or of the many; and that when the one, the few, or the many direct their policy to the common good, such states are well governed: but when the interest of the one, the few, or the many who are in office is alone consulted, a perversion takes place; for we must either affirm that those who share in the community are not citizens, or else let these share in the advantages of government.

POL—Bk. 3. 7. 1279A25-32

There are four forms of government: democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy, and

monarchy.

RH—BK. 1. 8. 1365B29-30

When governments alter, they alter into the contrary species to what they before were and not into one like their former.

POL—BK. 5. 12. 1316A18-20

It is a general maxim in democracies, oligarchies, monarchies, and indeed in all governments, not to let any one acquire a rank far superior to the rest of the community, but rather to endeavor to confer moderate honors for a continuance, than great ones for a short time.

POL—BK. 5. 8. 1308B10-15

Domestic government is a monarchy (for every house is ruled by one head), but a political government is composed of freemen and equals.

POL—BK. I. 7. 1255B19-20

A government has never, or very seldom, been established where the supreme power has been placed amongst those of the middle rank.

POL—BK. 4. 11. 1296A37-38

Every legislator ought to establish such a form of government, as from the present state, and disposition of the people who are to receive it, they will most readily submit to, and persuade the community to partake of.

POL—BK. 4. 1. 1289A1-3

It is evident that all those governments which have the common good in view are rightly established and strictly just; but that those which have in view only the good of the rulers are all founded on wrong principles, and are widely different from what a government ought to be; for they are tyrannical; whereas a state is a community of freemen.

POL—BK. 3. 6. 1279A17-21

This is a proof of a well-constituted government, if it admits the people to a share, and still remains unaltered in its form of polity, without any popular insurrection worth notice on the one hand, or growing into a tyranny on the other.

POL—BK. 2. 11. 1272B30-33

Governments are preserved, not only by having the means of their corruption at a great distance, but sometimes also by its being very near them. For those

who are in continual fear keep a stricter hand over the state.

POL—BK. 5. 8. 1308A24-27

An oligarchy and a tyranny are of all governments of the shortest duration.

POL—BK. 5. 12. 1315B11-12

It is evident that a government according to written laws is not the best.

POL—BK. 3. 15. 1286A14-16

The most perfect government is that which is formed of many parts.

POL—BK. 2. 6. 1266A4-5

Grammarian The grammarian derives his name from the word grammar.

CAT—1. 1A14

Grammatical Art A certain grammatical art is in a soul as in a subject, but it is not predicated of a subject.

CAT—1. 1A25

Gravity Gravity is both that which involves any weight and that which possesses a superabundance of weight.

ME—9. 1. 1052B28-29

All things, even air itself, have gravity in their own place except fire.

DE C—4. 4. 311B8-9

All things have gravity except fire, and levity except earth.

DE C—4. 4. 311B5

Gravity, Infinite It is impossible that there should be bodies which have infinite gravity and levity.

DE C—1. 6. 274A16-17

It is necessary that the gravity of an infinite body should be also infinite.

DE C—1. 6. 273B26-27

Greatness If a man has often succeeded in the same thing, this is a feature of greatness.

RH—BK. 1. 9. 1368A13-14

Growth No being decays or grows, in Nature, without self-nourishment.

H

Habit Habit is considered to be a disposition according to which that which is disposed is disposed well or ill; and this either according to itself, that is, essentially, or in relation to another; as, for example, health is a certain habit, for it is a disposition of this sort.

ME-4. 20. 1022B10-12

Habits are dispositions also, but dispositions not necessarily habits, for those who have habits are also, after a manner, disposed according to them, but those who are disposed are not altogether possessed of the habit.

CAT-8. 9A10

Habit differs from disposition in that it is a thing more lasting and stable.

CAT-8. 8B27

In habit originates every thing which men do because they have often done it before.

RH-BK. 1. 10. 1369B6-7

Habit is denominated, in one way, as a certain act of the possessor and the possessed, just as it were a certain action or motion.

ME-4. 20. 1022B4-5

Habits are such things as are the causes of these things being inherent in us rationally, or irrationally; such for instance as fortitude, temperance, timidity, and intemperance.

E E-2. 2. 1220B18-20

Neither does any one of the other sciences deliver to him who learns it the use and the act, but only the habit of that science.

M M-2. 10. 1208A33-34

It is easier to change habit than to change nature.

N E-7. 11. 1152A29-30

Habitation Places in a low, were inhabited posterior to those in an elevated situation.

DE M—1. 14. 352A2-3

Habitus As one of the categories.

Vide POSSESSION.

Hail Hail is ice.

DE M-1. 12. 347B36

Hair The color of the hair varies when the animal becomes old. In man the hair whitens with age.

H A-3. 11. 518A7-8

Halo Halos cannot be produced opposite to the sun.

DE M-3. 6. 377B34

Happiness An activity of perfect life in accord with perfect virtue.

E E-2. 1. 1219A38-39

The definition (of happiness) is in harmony with the view of those who hold that happiness is virtue or excellence of some sort; for activity in accordance with virtue implies virtue.

NE-1.9.1098B29-31

Happiness is something final and self-sufficient, being the end of all action.

N E-1. 5. 1097B20-21

Let happiness be defined to be good fortune in conjunction with virtue; or independence of life; or the life which is most pleasant, accompanied by security; or abundance of property and slaves, with power to preserve and augment it.

RH-Bk. 1.5. 1360BY14-17

A person is incapable of happiness if he is absolutely ugly in appearance, or low born, or solitary and childless, and perhaps still more so, if he has exceedingly bad children or friends, or has had good children or friends and has lost them by death.

N E-1. 9. 1099B3-6

Some people hold that happiness is virtue, others that it is prudence, others that it is wisdom of some kind, others that it is these things or one of them

conjoined with pleasure or not dissociated from pleasure, others again include external property.

N E—1. 9. 1098B23-26

Much external assistance is necessary to a happy life; but less to those who are of a good, than to those who are of a bad, disposition.

POL—BK. 7.13. 1331B41-1332A2

Happiness consists in the perfect practice of virtuous activities.

POL—BK. 7. 8. 1328A37-38

It belongs more frequently to those whose morals are most pure, and whose understandings are best cultivated, and who preserve moderation in the acquisition of external goods, than to those who possess a sufficiency of external good things, but are deficient in the rest. POL—BK. 7. 1. 1323b2-5

POL—BK. 7. 1. 1323b2-5

Happiness requires leisure.

N E—10. 7. 1177B4

What is the highest of all practical goods? As to its name there is, I may say, a general agreement. The masses and the cultured classes agree in calling it happiness, and conceive that ‘to live well’ and ‘to do well’ is the same thing as ‘to be happy.’

N E-1. 2. 1095A16-20

But to be happy, and to live blessedly and well, will especially consist in three things which appear to be most eligible. For some say that prudence is the greatest good, but others virtue, and others pleasure.

E E-1. 1. 1214A30-33

A happy life must arise from an uninterrupted course of virtue.

POL—BK. 4. 11. 1295A38-37

The masses define it as something visible and palpable, e.g., pleasure, wealth, or honor.

N E-1. 2. 1095A22-23

Ordinary or vulgar people conceive it to be pleasure and accordingly approve a life of enjoyment.

N E—1. 3. 1095B16-17

Perfect happiness is a species of speculative activity.

NE—10. 8. 1178B7-8

Happiness, its Constituent Parts Noble birth, many and excellent friends, wealth, good and numerous offspring, a good old age; and moreover personal excellencies as health, beauty, strength, stature, athletic prowess, fame, honor, good fortune, and virtue, and its constituents: prudence, courage, justice, temperance.

RH—1. 5. 1360B18-24

Happy Life It is admitted that a happy life must be an honorable one, and a pleasant one too.

POL—BK. 8. 5. 1339B18-20

Happy Man We may safely then define a happy man as one whose activity accords with perfect virtue and who is adequately furnished with external goods, not for a casual period of time but for a complete or perfect lifetime. But perhaps we ought to add, that he will always live so, and will die as he lives.

NE-1. 11. 1101A14-17

The happy man should live well and do well, as happiness, it has been said, is in fact a kind of living and doing well.

NE-1. 8. 1098B20-22

Harmonics and Optics There is the same mode of reasoning in the sciences of harmonics and optics for neither are the speculations of either carried on as far forth as the power of vision or as far forth as voice is concerned, but as far forth as lines and numbers are the objects of inquiry.

ME—12. 3. 1078A14-16

Harmony A ratio of numbers in sharp and flat.

PO A—2. 2. 90A8-19

Hatred The efficient causes of hatred are anger, vexatiousness, calumny. RH—Bk. 2. 4. 1381b37-1382a2

RH-BK. 2. 4. 1381B37-1382A2

Have (to Have) ‘To have’ is predicated in many ways, either as habit and disposition or some other quality, for we are said *to have* knowledge and virtue;

or as to quantity, as the size which anyone has; or as things about the body, as a garment . . . or as in a part, as a ring in the hand; or as a part, as a hand or foot; or as in a vessel, as a bushel has wheat; or as a possession, for we are said to have a house or land. A man is also said to have a wife ... by this we mean nothing else than that she lives with a man.

CAT—15. 15B15-32

Head Man is the only animal, as we have said, that, in his perfection, has this part in relation with the axis of the universe.

H A—1. 15. 494A33-494B1

Heads Plants that have heavy heads live longer than those that have not.

DE LET B—6. 467A34-467B1

Health The excellence of the body is health and that in such a degree as for us to be exempt from sickness while we have the free exercise of the body.

RH—1. 5. 1361B3-4

Neither health nor sickness can subsist in beings lacking life.

DE S ET S—1. 436A18-19

Heart The heart is the only one of the viscera, and in short is the only part of the body which is subject to any grievous malady.

DE P A-3. 4. 667A32-34

Those whose senses are dull have a hard and dense heart; but those that are more sensitive have a softer heart.

DE P A—3. 4. 667A13-14

Heat Heat is a certain passive quality of sense.

DE M—1. 3. 341A15

Heat is a certain category and form.

DE G ET C—1. 3. 318B16-17

All heat naturally tends upwards.

DE M—1. 4. 342A15-16

Heat is motive.

DE G A—2. 1. 732A20

The hot and the cold generate when they vanquish the matter.

DE M—4. 1. 379A1

Boiling water heats more than flame.

DE P A—2. 2. 48B26-27

Heat contributes to the erectness of the body.

DE P A—3. 6. 669B3-6

Heaven We call heaven the essence of the ultimate circulation of the universe; or that natural body which exists in the ultimate circulation of the universe.

DE C—1. 9. 278B11-14

It is necessary that there should be only one heaven, and not many.

DE C—1. 8. 277A10-11

We see that the heaven is circularly moved.

DE C—1. 5. 272B14

In the whole of past time, according to successive tradition, no change appears to have taken place, either in the whole of the extreme heaven, or any of its proper parts.

DE C—1. 3. 270B13-16

It is evident that beyond the heavens there is neither place, nor a vacuum, nor time.

DE C—1. 9. 279A11-12

Heavy What moves to the center naturally.

DE C—1. 3. 269B23

Highmindedness In respect of honor and dishonor the mean state is highmindedness, the excess is what is called vanity, the deficiency littlemindedness.

N E-2. 7. 1107B21-23

It seems then that highmindedness is, as it were, the crown of the virtues.

N E—4. 7. 1124A1-2

Hind The hind appears to excel in prudence.

H A—9. 5. 611A15-16

History History and poetry differ in this, that one speaks of things which have happened, and the other of such as might have happened. P—9. 1451a38-1451b2

P—9. 1451A38-1451B2

Honor Honor is an evidence of your having a character for beneficence.

RH—Bk. 1. 5. 1361A27-28

Whoever is prudent will not fail to remember with how much honor it becomes him to requite his parents, his wife, and his children, in order that he may gain the name of one who is just and upright in distributing to each their due.

ECO—Bk. 1. 8. (Bk. 3. LOEB, p. 409)

Cultivated and practical people identify happiness with honor, as honor is the general end of political life.

N E—1. 3. 1095B22-23

Excessive honors are also a cause of sedition.

POL—Bk. 5. 3. 1302B10-11

Honor the Gods To honor the gods . . . is honorable simply.

T—2. 11. 115B33

Honorable By the honorable I mean a thing of such a kind as that which is divine, and that which is more excellent, such as soul and intellect.

M M—1. 2. 1183B21-23

That is honorable which, while it is an object of choice on its own account, is commendable also; or which, being good, is pleasant, simply because it is good.

RH—Bk 1. 9. 1366A33-36

The upward is more honorable than the downward; the before than the behind; and the right than the left.

DE IN-5. 706B12-13

Homonymous Things are termed homonymous, of which the name alone is common, but the definition is different.

CAT—1. 1A1

Homonyms Vide Equivocal.

Hypothesis Of thesis, that which receives either part of contradiction, as for instance, I mean that a certain thing is, or that it is not, is hypothesis.

PO A—1. 2. 72A18-20

Definitions then are not hypotheses (for they are not asserted to be or not to be) but hypotheses are in propositions. Now it is only necessary that definitions should be understood, but this is not hypothesis, except some one should say that the verb to hear is hypothesis. But they are hypotheses from the existence of which, in that they are, the conclusion is produced.

PO A—1. 10. 76B35—39

It is manifest that when there is a false and not impossible hypothesis, the consequence of the hypothesis will also be false and not impossible.

PA—1. 15. 34A25-26

I

Ice Water congealed or condensed.

ME-7. 2. 1043A9-10

Ideas The assertion that ideas are models or exemplars, and that other things participate in them is to speak quite at random and to assert what is mere poetic metaphor.

ME-12. 5. 1079B25-26

Ideas, Platonic Farewell to the ideas for they are inane figments and even if they were they are irrelevant. For demonstrations concern those things which first fall under the senses.

PO A—1. 22. 83A32-35

Ignorance Ignorance, considered not according to negation but according to a disposition of mind, is deception produced through a syllogism.

PO A—1. 16. 79B23-24

Ignorance is the error which makes people unjust and generally wicked.

N E-3. 2. 1110B28-30

He who performs any action not knowing what the action is nor to what end it will lead nor about whom such action is conversant acts from ignorance essentially, and therefore acts involuntarily.

E E-2. 9. 1225B5-7

An action which is due to ignorance is always nonvoluntary; but it is not involuntary unless it is followed by pain and excites a feeling of regret.

N E-3. 2. 1110B18-22

The corruption of ignorance is reminiscence and discipline.

DE L ET B—2. 465A22-23

Ignoratio Elenchi Other fallacies arise from a lack of definition of what a syllogism is or an argument; to refute is to contradict one and the same thing.

S E-5. 167A21-25

Ignoratio Elenchi, Fallacy of It is possible to resolve all fallacies into ignorance

of what refutation is.

S E—6. 168A17-18

Illiberality Illiberality is incurable; for it seems that old age and impotence of any kind makes men illiberal.

N E—4. 3. 1121B12-14

Imagination A movement caused by sensation in action.

DE A—3. 3. 429A1-2

Imagination is a movement that could not take place without sensation nor elsewhere except in thinking beings.

DE A-3. 3. 427B15-16

Imagination is quite different from sensation and thought. It is not produced, it is true, without sensation, and without it there is no conception. But it is easily evident that imagination and conception are not identical.

DE A-3. 3. 427B14-17

Memory pertains to that part of the soul to which, also, imagination pertains; and those things are essentially objects of memory which are objects of imagination.

DE M ET R—1. 450A22-24

Animals have imagination just as well as man.

DE A-3. 10. 433A11-12

Imagination is not always present.

D E A-3. 3. 428A8

Imagination that extends to will is found exclusively in animals endowed with reason.

DE A—3. 11. 434A5-7

Imagination depends only on us and on our will.

DE A-3. 3. 427B17-18

Imitation In the arts, all of them produce imitation in rhythm, words, and harmony.

P—1. 1447A21-22

Imitation consists in these three differences, namely, in the means, the object, or the manner.

P—3. 1448A24-25

It is necessary either to imitate those who are better than we are, or those who are worse, or such as are like ourselves.

P—2. 1448A4-5

Immortality The actuality of good is immortality, and this is perpetual life.

DE C—2. 3. 286A9

Immortality appears to be a certain affection or accident of life.

T—4. 5.126b35-37

Implication Vide INFERENCE.

Impossible The impossible and the false do not signify the same thing.

DE C—1. 12. 281B2-3

Impotentiality Impotentiality is a privation of potentiality, and a certain removal of a first principle of such a sort, as has been mentioned, either entirely so, or from being by nature adapted to have such, or already to have such when it has been naturally fitted thereto also. ME—4. 12. 1019b15-18

ME—4. 12. 1019B15-18

Impulse Irrational impulse is that through which desire aspires after certain things, as good and delectable, without reason.

E E—7. 14. 1247B24-26

Inartificial The proofs which are called inartificial, because they are peculiar to judicial oratory, are five in number, namely: laws, witnesses, deeds, torture, oaths.

RH-BK. 1. 15. 1375A22-25

Incontinence The incontinent are not unjust but they act unjustly.

N E—7. 9. 1151A10-11

It is not possible that the prudent man can be incontinent.

M M-2. 6. 1204A11-12

Incorruptible We call that incorruptible, which is, indeed, but which cannot not

be, or which once will not be but exists now.

DE C—1. 11. 280B27-28

That is most properly said to be incorruptible, which is indeed, but cannot be corrupted, so as to exist now, and afterwards not.

DE C—1. 11. 280B31-33

Increase Increase is from the upward.

DE C-2. 2. 284B27-28

Indignation Slaves, sorry fellows, and men devoid of ambition are not liable to feelings of indignation, since there is nothing of which they think themselves worthy. RH—BK. 2. 9. 1387b12-14

RH—BK. 2. 9. 1387B12-14

Individual That which can not be predicated of many.

DE I—7. 17A40

Of all beings then, some are of such a nature as not to be truly predicated universally of anything else, as Cleon and Callias, that which is singular (individual) and that which is sensible, but others are predicated of these.... That some things therefore are naturally adapted to be predicated of nothing is clear, for of sensibles each is almost of such a sort as not to be predicated of any thing except accidentally, for we some times say that that white thing is Socrates.

P A—1. 27. 43A25-35

Individuals partake also of genus and species.

T-4. 1. 121A37-38

Individuals, and whatever is one in number, are predicated of no subject, but nothing prevents some of them from being in a subject.

CAT—2. 1B5-8

Induction Induction is a progression from singulars to universals.

T—1. 12. 105A13-14

Induction, then, and the syllogism through induction consists in showing one extreme of the middle through the other extreme; as if A is the middle of AC, and we show through C that A is with B, for thus we make inductions. ... Induction proceeds through all.

P A-2. 23. 68B15-29

It never happens that we have a preexistent knowledge of particulars, but along with induction we receive the science of particulars as it were by recognition; since some things we immediately know, as the angles are equal to two right angles if we know that what we see is a triangle.

P A—2. 21. 67A21-26

In some way also induction is opposed to syllogism, for the latter demonstrates the extreme of the third through the middle, but the former (demonstrates) the extreme of the middle through the third.

P A—2. 23. 68B32-35

The proving that such or such is the fact in many and similar cases is called in the other art (dialectic) induction, in this (rhetoric) it is called example.

RH—1. 2. 1356B12-15

For we accept all things either through syllogism or induction.

P A-2. 23. 68B13-14

Induction and Likeness Speculation concerning the similar (likeness) is useful for induction and for hypothetical syllogisms and for the statement of definitions. For induction, because by the induction of similar particulars we deem it proper to infer the universal, since it is not easy to form induction when we are ignorant of similars.

T—1. 18. 108B7-12

Induction, in Rhetoric (In rhetoric) the example is an induction.

RH—1. 2. 1356B5

Induction, Its Role in Science Vide SCIENCE (KNOWLEDGE), PROCESS OF ACQUIRING.

Induction-Demonstration-Universals It is clear that if any one of the senses be deficient the corresponding knowledge is deficient since we learn either by induction or by demonstration. Now demonstration is from universals, but induction from particulars, it is impossible to investigate universals except through induction, since things which are said to be from abstraction will be known through induction . . . it is impossible for those who have not sense to make an induction, for sense is conversant with singulars, as the science of them cannot be received, since neither (can it be received) from universals without

induction, nor through induction without sense.

PO A—1. 18. 81A38-81B9

Inequality Not only an inequality of possessions, but also of honors, occasions seditions, though in a contrary way in either case; for the vulgar will be seditious if there be an equality of goods, but those of more elevated sentiments, if there is an equality of honors; whence it is said: When good and bad do equal honors share.

Homer *Iliad* 9.319.

POL—Bk. 2. 7. 1288b38-1267a2

Inexperience Men are brave from the contrary to experience.

M M—1. 20. 1190B32-33

Inference From true propositions we cannot infer a falsity, but from false premises we may infer the truth, except that not the why but only the fact is inferred; the why cannot be established from false premises.

P—2. 2. 53B7-10

It is also manifest that we may infer a true conclusion from false premises.

P A—2. 15. 64B7-8

Infinite The infinite either is that which it is impossible to pass through, in respect of its not being adapted by nature to be permeated, or it is that which possesses a passage without end, or that which is scarcely so, or that which by nature is adapted to have, but has not, a passage or termination.

ME—10. 10. 1066A35-1066B1

The infinite is devoid of parts and indivisible.

ME—10. 10. 1066B17

Neither a square, nor a circle, nor a sphere, can be infinite, as neither can a line which is a foot in length.

DE C—1. 5. 272B19-21

If therefore every sensible body has an active or passive power, or both, it is impossible that there should be an infinite sensible body.

DE C-1. 7. 275B4-6

Neither is an infinite right line perfect; since, if it were, it would have a

beginning and end.

DE C—1. 2. 269A21-22

An infinite time has no end.

DE C—1. 7. 275A22-23

The infinite has the power of a principle, and the greatest power in quantity.

DE C—1. 5. 271B14-15

It is not possible that the infinite can be moved.

DE C-1. 7. 274B29-30

It is impossible that an entity that exists in actuality should be infinite for it must needs be quantity.

ME—10. 10. 1088B18-19

The infinite has infinite power.

DE C—1. 7. 275B20-21

The infinite as infinite is unknowable.

PHY—1. 4. 187B7-8

Infinite Body If there is in existence an infinite body, it will be infinite in every direction.

ME—10. 10. 1066B33-34

It is evident that there is not an infinite body in act.

PHY—3. 7. 207B10-12

Infinite Mutation There is not any infinite mutation.

PHY—6. 10. 241A26-27

Infinite Progression in Causes That there is at least some first principle and that the causes of entities are not infinite, either in a progress in a straight forward direction, or according to form, is evident.

ME—1A. 2. 994A1-2

Infinite Distance An object cannot be seen at an infinite distance.

DE S ET S—7. 449A21-23

Infinities It is impossible to cross over infinities.

Inflexion There are, however, four modes of inflexion at the joints. For it is necessary that the inflexion both of the fore and hind legs should either be at the concave part; or, on the contrary, at the convex part; or conversely, not at the same part, but that the fore legs, indeed, should be inflected at the convex part, and the hind legs at the concave part; or in a way contrary to these, that the fore legs should have their concavity towards the anterior part, and their convexity behind, but the hind legs should have their convexity at the anterior part, and their concavity behind, so that their convexities should be diametrically opposite, and the concavities external.

DE IN—13. 712A1-8

Injured To be injured is to suffer injustice at the hands of a willing agent; for commission of injustice has been previously defined to be a voluntary act.

RH—1. 13. 1373B27-29

Injustice For the criminality and injustice of the act stands essentially in the deliberate principle on which it is done.

RH—1. 13. 1374A11-12

There is a difference between an act of injustice and that which is unjust. A thing is unjust by nature, or by ordinance; but this very thing, when it is being done, is an act of injustice.

N E—5. 10. 1135A8-11

The suffering of injustice is not voluntary.

N E—5. 11. 1136B5-6

A man cannot commit injustice in an absolute or strict sense against what is his own.

N E—5. 10. 1134B9-10

Injustice is not a part of vice but the whole of vice.

N E-5. 3. 1130A9-10

Vide JUSTICE.

Insatiability The wickedness of man is insatiable. For though at first two obols might be sufficient pay, yet when once it has become customary, they continually want something more, until they set no limits to their expectations;

for it is the nature of our desires to be boundless, and many live only to gratify them.

POL—Bk. 2. 7. 1267A41-1267B5

Insects Are not generated from animals, but are produced spontaneously.... Some indeed are generated from the dews . . . others, again, are generated in putrid mud and dung, but others in wood . . . some likewise are generated in the hairs, but others in the flesh, and others in the excrements of animals.

DE H A—5. 19. 551A1-6

Instant Neither is it possible for the same instant always to remain.

PHY—4. 10. 218A21-22

Instruction All teaching and all learning grasped by reason proceeds from previous knowledge.

PO A—1. 1. 71A1-2

Instruction is imparted to all by means of advancing through those things that are less known to Nature to things that are more known.

ME—6. 4. 1029B4-5

Intellect The intellect continues in perfection up to fifty years.

POL—Bk. 7. 16. 1335B32-35

Chance and fortune, therefore, are posterior both to intellect and nature.

PHY—2.6. 198A9-10

The mere intellect has no motive power.

N E—6. 2. 1139A35-36

Intelligence Intelligence is one and continuous, like thought.

DE A—1. 3. 407A8-7

Intelligence is critical, *i.e.* it makes distinctions.

N E—6. 11. 1143A9-10

It appears to be in the soul like a sort of substance and incapable of destruction. What would appear especially as if it could destroy it, is the decline that weakens man in old age.

DE A—1. 4. 408B18-20

The intelligence, applied to indivisibles only, cannot err.

DE A-3. 6. 430A26-27

The intelligence commands resistance on account of the future result, but the desire commands the need of being satisfied at once.

DE A—3. 10. 433B8-9

Of sanguineous animals, those that have a cold and thin blood are more intelligent than those that have hot and thick blood.

DE P A—2. 2. 648A2-4

Intelligence in Man It is more rational to judge that (man) is gifted with hands as a result of his intelligence rather than that being endowed with hands is the cause of his superior intelligence.

DE P A—4. 10. 687A9-10

Intemperate The intemperate is more depraved than the incontinent man.

M M-2. 6. 1203A17-18

Intercourse Intercourse either is not an end or it is for the sake of friendship.

P A—2. 22. 68B5-6

Internationalism It seems that friendship or love is the bond which holds states together.

N E—8. 1. 115A22-23

Interrogate He who is about to interrogate should discover a ground whence he may argue; secondly, he should interrogate and arrange the several particulars to himself; thirdly and lastly, he should advance them against another person.

T—8. 1. 155B3-7

Intervals The intervals are six in number by which animals are naturally adapted to be limited, viz. the upward and downward, behind and before, and besides these the right and the left.

DE IN-4. 705A26-28

Intuition Of those habits which are concerned with learning, by which we ascertain truth, some are always true, but others admit the false, as opinion and reasoning; but science and intuition are always true, and no other kind of knowledge except intuition is more accurate than science, but the principles of demonstration are more known, and all science is connected with reason, there

could not be a science of principles: but since nothing can be more true than science except intuition, intuition will be concerned with principles. . . .

PO A—2. 19. 100B5-15

Investigation We investigate four things: *that* a thing is so, *why* it is so, if it is, *what* it is.

PO A—2. 1. 89B23-25

Involuntary Acts done under compulsion, or from ignorance, are involuntary.

N E—3. 1. 1109B35-1110A1

He who performs any action not knowing what the action is, nor to what end it will lead, nor about whom such action is conversant, acts from ignorance essentially and therefore acts involuntarily.

E E-2. 9. 1225B5-7

Is ‘Is’ produces an affirmation always and completely in every case.

P A—1. 3. 25B22-23

When ‘is’ is the third element in predication there can be oppositions doubly; thus in the proposition “man is just” the verb ‘is’ is the third element.

DE I—10. 19B19-21

Without a verb there is neither affirmation nor negation for ‘is’ or ‘will be’ or ‘was’ or ‘is going to be’ and so forth are verbs . . . since they signify time.

DE I—10. 19B12-14

J

Jealousy Pain at the apparent success of some worthy person.

T—2. 2. 109B35-36

Judge In particular subjects it is a person of special education, and in general a person of universal education, who is a good judge.

N E-1. 1. 1095A1-2

As to whether a thing is important or trifling, just or unjust, whatever questions of this nature the legislator has not determined, on these the judge must somehow or other make up his mind for himself, and not take instructions on them from the parties at issue.

RH—1 1. 1354A26-31

Judgment From judgment proceed whatever appear to be useful, either as an end or as conducing to the end, when it is by reason of their usefulness that they are realized in action.

RH—1. 10. 1369B7-9

Judicial Decisions Judicial decisions are made off hand; so that it is difficult under these circumstances to assign what is just and expedient.

RH-BK. 1. 1. 1354B3

Just That which is just then is, in a sense, a mean, as the judge is a mean.

NE-5. 7. 1132A24

The just is something equal.

E E—7. 9. 1241B12-13

A just man becomes just by doing what is just.

N E-2. 3. 1105A17-18

Just Act Actions in accordance with virtue are not *e.g.* justly or temperately performed because they are in themselves just or temperate. It is necessary that the agent at the time of performing them should satisfy certain conditions, *i.e.* in the first place that he should know what he is doing, secondly that he should deliberately choose to do it and to do it for its own sake, and thirdly that he should do it as an instance of a settled and immutable moral state.

N E-2. 3. 1105A28-33

Justice Now justice is the virtue by which each has his own as the law prescribes.

RH—1. 9. 1366B9-10

Now justice is a social virtue; for it is the rule of the social state, and the very criterion of what is right.

POL—Bk. I. 2. 1253A37-38

Justice is essentially human, *i.e.* it affects the mutual relations of men as men.

N E—5. 13. 1137A30

All men have some natural inclination to justice, but they proceed therein only to a certain degree; nor can they universally point out what is absolutely just. For instance, what is equal appears just, and is so, but not to all, only among those who are equals; and what is unequal appears just, and is so, but not to all, only amongst those who are unequals. This relative nature of justice some people neglect, and therefore they judge ill; and the reason of this is, that they judge for themselves, and almost every one is the worst judge in his own cause. Since then justice has reference to persons, the same distinctions must be made with respect to persons, which are made with respect to things.

POL—Bk. 3. 9. 1280A9-19

Justice, indeed, and the other virtues are entirely and in every respect eligible.

M M—1. 2. 1183B39-1184A1

Justice, then, is complete virtue although not complete in an absolute sense but in relation to one's neighbors.... It is in the highest sense complete virtue, as being an exercise of complete virtue. It is complete too, because he who possesses it can employ his virtue in relation to his neighbors and not merely by himself.

N E—5. 3. 1129B25-33

Collective justice will be the mean between profit and loss.

N E—5. 7. 1132B18-19

Free states and aristocracies are mostly destroyed by a departure from justice in the administration itself.

POL—Bk. 5. 7. 1307A5-7

Justice, therefore, and friendship are either the same thing, or the one has something nearly allied to the other.

E E—7. 1. 1234B31

K

Kindness That conformable to which he who has it is said to confer a benefit on one who needs it, not in return for anything nor in order that anything may accrue to him who so confers it, but that some benefit may arise to the object.

RH—2. 7. 1385A17-19

King If it is an individual who shall happen so far to excel in virtue as to surpass all other persons in the community, then it is right that he should be king and lord of all.

POL—BK. 3. 17. 1288A15-19

A king desires to be the guardian of his people, that those who have property may suffer no wrong, and that the people in general may live free from tyranny.

POL—BK. 5. 10. 1310B40-1311A2

Nothing then remains but what indeed seems natural, and that is, for all persons quietly to submit to one who is thus eminently virtuous, and to let such men be perpetually kings in the respective states.

POL—BK. 3. 13. 1284B32-34

A king is ambitious of honor. POL—BK. 5. 10. 1311a5

POL—BK. 5. 10. 1311A5

The object of a king is virtue. POL—BK. 5. 10. 131a6-7

POL—BK. 5. 10. 1311A6-7

Kingdom Now we usually call a state which is governed by one person for the common good, a kingdom.

POL—BK. 3. 7. 1279A32-34

In the case of hereditary kingdoms, we must add one cause of destruction, namely, that many who enjoy it are proper objects of contempt, and that they are insolent.

POL—BK. 5. 10. 1313A10-12

A kingdom is very seldom destroyed by any outward attack. But it has the greatest number of causes of subversion within.

POL—BK. 5. 10. 1312B38-40

Kingships The first is that of the heroic times; which was a government over a free people, with limited rights in some particulars: for the king was their general, their judge, and their high priest.

The second, that of the barbarians, which is an hereditary despotic government, regulated by laws.

The third is that which they call Aesymnetic, which is an elective tyranny.

The fourth is the Lacedaemonian; and this, in a few words, is nothing more than an hereditary generalship: and in these particulars they differ from each other.

POL—Bk. 3. 14. 1285B20-29

Know All men by nature are actuated with the desire to know.

ME—1. 1. 980A22

To know is predicated in a threefold manner: either as universal knowledge or proper or actual exercise.

P A—2. 21. 67B3-5

It is not only however requisite that he who is to possess knowledge through demonstration should know in a greater degree first principles, and believe rather in them than in the thing demonstrated, but also that nothing else should be more credible or more known to him than the opposites of the principles, from which a syllogism of contra-deception may consist, since it behooves him who possesses knowledge singly to be unchangeable.

PO A—1. 2. 92A37-72B4

Knowledge If a man conceives things which cannot be otherwise, as if he grasps the definitions through which demonstrations are formed he will not opine but he will know.

PO A—1. 33. 89A16-19

The knowledge of what a thing is, is identical with the knowledge of the why, and this is either simply or relatively as regards an attribute.

PO A-2. 2. 90A31-34

There is a difference between knowledge of the fact and knowledge of the reasoned fact. Within the same science, they differ in two ways: if the syllogism is not formed through immediate things (since the primary cause is not assumed which is prerequisite in knowledge of the reasoned fact) and when the premises

are immediate yet not through the cause but through that which is more known of the things which reciprocate.

PO A—1. 13. 78A22-28

We judge that we know something when we know the first causes and the first principles even down to the basic elements.

PHY-1. 1. 184A3-5

Knowledge, as a genus, is explained by reference to something else for it is said to be knowledge of something, but individual instances of knowledge are not relative.

CAT-8. 10B25FF

This treatise is embarked on for the sake of acquiring knowledge; nor do we consider we know until we grasp the reason why for this is to grasp the prime cause.

PHY-2. 3. 194B17-20

Is in the soul as in a subject but it is predicated of a subject, *viz.* ‘grammar.’

CAT—2. 1B1

We call that by which we know sometimes knowledge, sometimes intelligence, for we say that we know by one of them.

DE A—2. 2. 414A5-6

We can know what a thing is neither by definition nor by demonstration.

PO A—2. 7. 92B38

Knowledge is a consequent on learning subsequently.

RH-BK. 1. 6. 1362A30-31

Upon the whole, a proof of a person’s having knowledge is even the ability to teach; and for this reason we consider art, rather than experience, to be a science; for artists can, whereas the handicraftsmen cannot convey instruction.

ME—1. 1. 981B7-9

Knowledge is a principle of power.

RH-BK. 1. 11. 1371B27-28

The object of knowledge would appear to be prior to knowledge, since, for the most part, we derive knowledge from things preexisting.... It is true that there can be no knowledge if the object of knowledge does not exist. It is equally true

that an object may exist even though knowledge of it does not exist. CAT-7. 7b24-32

CAT-7. 7B24-32

One may ask, for example, how the intelligence knows evil or black. It knows them in a sense by their contraries.

DE A-3. 6.430B21-23

He who knows what justice is, is not immediately just.

M M-1. 1. 1183B15-18

We do not wish to know what fortitude is, but we wish to be brave; nor what justice is, but to be just.

E E-I. 5.1216B21-24

Knowledge, Demonstrative If therefore demonstrative knowledge is knowledge of the necessary it must be obtained through a necessary middle term otherwise one will know neither why it is nor that it must necessarily be.

PO A-1. 6. 75A2-15

Knowledge, Reasoned To know why a thing is is to know it through its cause, wherefore the middle must be inherent in the third and the first in the middle.

PO A-1. 6.75A35-37

Knowledge, Scientific It is impossible to have scientific knowledge through demonstration without a knowledge of first immediate principles....

PO A-2. 19. 99B20-22

We think that we know scientifically when we know the cause; there are four causes: one as to the essence of the thing, another that which from certain things existing, this necessarily exists (material cause), the third, that which moves something (efficient) and a fourth, that on account of which (final cause).

PO A-2. 11. 94A20-22

Knowledge (Science) It is necessary to say that knowledge is conception of the knowable.

T-6. 8. 146B5

Knowledge, Scientific, and Opinion The object of scientific knowledge and science differs from the object of opinion, and from opinion, because science is universal and subsists through things necessary, and what is necessary cannot

subsist otherwise than it does: some things however are true and subsist otherwise. It is evident then that science is not conversant with these (or else things which are capable of subsisting otherwise, could not possibly subsist otherwise). Yet neither is intellect conversant with such (I call intellect the principle of science) nor indemonstrable science, and this is the notion of an immediate proposition. But intellect, science and opinion, and what is asserted through these, are true wherefore it remains that opinion is conversant with the true or false which may be otherwise; opinion in fact is the grasp of a proposition which is immediate but not necessary ... opinion is unstable. He thinks that he has an opinion when he thinks that a connection may be otherwise.

PO A-1. 33. 88B30-89A7

Knowledge, Scientific and Sense It is not possible to have scientific knowledge through sensation, for, although, there is sensible perception of such a thing as this and not of this particular thing, yet it is necessary to have a sensible perception of this particular thing, somewhere and now. But it is impossible sensibly to perceive the universal and in all things, for it is not this particular thing, nor now otherwise it would not be universal, since we call the universal that which is always and everywhere.

PO A-1. 31. 87B28-33

As science stands to the object of science so is sense to the object of sense.

T-1. 17. 108A9-10

Knowledge of Particulars For we know nothing of those things which fall under the senses once they have passed out of range, even though we perceived them before, except by means of universal and proper knowledge, which we are not actually using.

P A-2. 21. 67A39-67B3

Knowledge, Preexistent The preexisting knowledge required (for learning and teaching) is of two kinds: in some cases we must presuppose that they are; in other cases we must understand the meaning of the term; in others we must understand both.

PO A-1. 1.71ALL-13

L

Labor Such males as are more laborious, sooner grow old, on account of the labor they sustain.

DE L ET B-5. 466B13-14

Language Language is the cause of learning.

DE S ET S-1. 437A12-13

Law Law, now, I understand, to be either peculiar or universal; peculiar, to be that which has been marked out by each people in reference to itself, and this is partly unwritten, partly written. I call that law universal which is conformable merely to the dictates of nature; for there does exist naturally an universal sense of right and wrong, which, in a certain degree, all intuitively divine, even should no intercourse with each other, nor any compact have existed.

RH-1. 13. 1373B4-11

Law is either proper or common. Proper law I call that by whose written enactments men direct their city; the general or common law, whatever unwritten rules appear to be recognized among all men.

RH-1. 10. 1368B7-9

The law is an agreement, and as the sophist Lycophron says, a pledge between the citizens of their intending to do justice to each other, though not sufficient to make all the citizens just and good.

POL-BK. 3. 9. 1280B10-12

It would be most admirably adapted to the purposes of justice, if laws properly enacted were, as far as circumstances admitted, of themselves to mark out all cases, and to abandon as few as possible to the discretion of the judge. And this because, in the first place, it is easier to get one or a few of good sense, and of ability to legislate and adjudge, than to get many: and next, legislative enactments proceed from men carrying their views a long time back: (or, from men who have reflected on the subject for a long time) while judicial decisions are made off hand; so that it is difficult for persons deciding under these circumstances to assign what is just and expedient; and, what is most of all to the point is this, that the award of the legislator is not particular nor about present circumstances, but about what is future and general; whereas the member of a

popular assembly and the judge decide on points actually present and definite; and under their circumstances feelings of partiality and dislike and personal expediency will, in many instances, antecedently have been interwoven with the case, and to such a degree that one is no longer able, adequately, to contemplate the truth, and that personal pleasure or pain throws a shade over the judgment. In regard, then, the other particulars ... it is right to leave the judge a discretion in as few as possible; but questions of fact, whether it has or has not taken place, will or will not happen, does or does not exist; all such it is necessary to abandon to the discretion of the judges; since it is not possible that the legislator ever should foresee them.

RH-1. 1. 1354A31-1354B16

All laws ought to be framed, and are framed by all men, with reference to the state, and not the state with reference to the laws.

POL-BK. 4. 1. 1289A13-15

It is as much a man's duty to submit to command, as to assume it, and this also by rotation: for this is law, for order is law; and it is more proper that the law should govern than any one of the citizens.

POL-BK. 3.16.1287A16-18

The universal law is derived from particular facts.

N E-6. 12. 1143B4-5

The administration of justice is the determination of what is just and unjust.

N E-5. 10. 1134A31-32

A law derives from custom all its power to enforce obedience, and this requires long time to establish; so that to make it any easy matter to pass from the established laws to other new ones is to weaken the power of law.

POL-BK. 2. 8. 1269A20-24

Nor is it moreover right to permit written laws always to remain unaltered; for as in all other sciences, so in politics it is impossible that every thing should be expressed in writing with perfect exactness; for when we commit a thing to writing, we must use general terms; but in every action there is something particular in itself, which these may not comprehend; and hence it is evident that certain laws will at certain times admit of alterations.

POL-BK. 2. 8. 1269A8-13

It is impossible that the same laws should be fitted to all sorts of oligarchies and democracies; for of both these governments there are many species and not one only.

POL-Bk. 4. 1. 1289A22-25

He who intrusts man with supreme power gives it to a wild beast, for such his appetites sometimes make him. Passion, too, influences those who are in power, even the very best of men; for which reason the law is intellect free from appetite.

POL-Bk. 3.16.1287A30-32

Law, Moral The moral law is far superior to the written law.

POL—Bk. 3. 16. 1287B5-6

Law, Natural A law of nature cannot be altered by habituation.

N E-2. 1. 1103A19-20

Lawful Whatever is lawful is in some sense just.

N E-5. 2. 1129A34

Leadership If there is any one superior to the rest of the community in virtue and abilities for active life, him it is proper to follow, and him it is right to obey; but he must have not virtue alone, but also the power according to which he may be capable of acting.

POL-Bk. 7. 3. 1325B10-12

Learn To learn is accompanied by pain.

POL-Bk. 8. 5. 1339A28-29

Learning All teaching and all learning grasped by reason proceeds from previous knowledge.

PO A-1. 1. 71A1-2

Learning, Not Recollection In like manner is the reasoning in the Meno that learning is reminiscence, for it never happens that we have a preexistent knowledge of particulars, but along with induction we receive the science of particulars as it were by recognition; since some things we immediately know, as the angles are equal to two right angles if we know that what we see is a triangle. Also, in like manner as regards others.

P A-2. 21. 67A21-26

Legal Justice The law looks only to the degree of the injury, it treats the parties as equals, and asks only if one is the author and the other the victim of injustice.

N E-5. 7. 1132A4-6

Legislation The people may be allowed to have a vote in whatever bill is proposed, but may not themselves propose any thing contrary to it.

POL-BK. 4. 14. 1298B30-32

Legislator The legislator, and he who is truly a politician, ought to be acquainted not only with that which is most perfect in the abstract, but also that which is the best suited under any given circumstances.

POL-BK. 4. 1. 1288B25-27

Leisure Nature requires not only that we should be properly employed, but that we should be able to enjoy leisure honorably.

POL-BK. 8. 3. 1337B30-32

Letter A letter is an indivisible sound ... from which an intelligible sound is adapted to be produced.

P-20. 1456B22-23

Liberal Of all virtuous people none are so much beloved as the liberal; for they are benefactors, and their benefaction consists in their giving.

N E-4. 1. 1120A21-23

Liberality Liberality appears to be the mean concerning properties.

N E-4. 1. 1119B22-23

Liberality consists in the moral state of the giver.

N E-4. 2. 1120B7-9

Liberality tends to benefit in pecuniary matters.

RH-1. 9.1366B15-16

Disregard of self is a characteristic of liberality.

N E-4. 2. 1120B6-7

Liberty The very foundation of a democratical state is liberty.

POL-BK. 6. 2.1317A40-41

Libido Hairy men are more libidinous, and have a greater quantity of seed than

such as are smooth.

DE G A-4. 5. 774B1-2

Licentious He who enjoys every pleasure and never abstains from any pleasure is licentious.

N E-2. 2. 1104A22-24

Licentiousness Licentiousness as a whole is not so voluntary, as nobody desires to be licentious.

N E-3. 15. 1119A32-33

Licentiousness deserves more severe reproach than cowardice; for it is easier to train oneself to meet its temptations as they frequently occur in life.

N E-3. 15. 1119A25-27

Temperance and licentiousness have to do with pleasures of such a kind as the lower animals generally are capable of, and it is hence that these pleasures appear slavish and brutish.

N E-3. 13. 1118A23-25

The licentious man then desires all pleasures, or the greatest pleasures, and is led to prefer these to anything else. He feels a double pain, *viz.* the pain of failing to obtain them and the pain of desiring them, as all desire is attended by pain.

N E-3. 14. 1119A1-4

Life

By life we understand these three facts: self-nourishment, developing, and decaying.

DE A-2. 1. 412A14-15

Life consists, as we said, in perceiving or understanding.

N E-9. 9. 1170A18-19

Life is the permanency of the soul.

DE R-18. 479A29-30

It follows necessarily that every living being has a nourishing soul and that it has it from birth to death: for it follows of necessity that what is once born grows, develops, and dies.

DE A-3. 12. 434A22-25

The preservation, therefore, of the vital heat is necessary to the existence of life.

DE V-4. 469B18-19

Life is a consequent on health simultaneously.

RH-Bk. 1. 8. 1362A31

Life and Nourishment No being is nourished without having life also.

DE A-2. 4. 415B26-27

Light Light is the actuality of the transparent in so far as it is transparent.

DE A-2. 7. 418B9-10

Light is always reflected.

DE A-2. 8. 419B29-30

What moves away from the center.

DE C-1. 3. 269B24

Why does light pass through a lantern? for necessarily that which consists of smaller particles passes through larger pores, if light is produced by transit....

PO A-2. 11. 94B28-29

Lightness The relatively light and lighter exist, when of two things possessing gravity, and equal in bulk, the one naturally tends downward swifter than the other.

DE C-4. 1. 308A31-33

Lightning Lightning is produced after the percussion, and posterior to the thunder; though it appears to be prior to it, because the sight apprehends its object prior to the hearing.

DE M-2. 9. 369B8-9

Like It is quite absurd to say that like is not affected by like.

DE A-1. 5. 410A24-25

Limit A termination is called the last of each thing, and beyond which, as first, it is not possible to assume anything, and within which, as first, are comprised all things, and that, likewise, which may be a form of magnitude, or of that which is in possession of magnitude, and which is the end of everything.

ME-4. 17. 1022A4-6

Line That which is divisible in one direction is a line.

ME-4. 8. 1016B26

A line is a continuous quantity for you may take a common term at which its parts meet, the point.

CAT-6. 5A1-2

Of magnitude indeed, that which is divisible in one way is a line.

DE C-1. 1. 268A7-8

Lips Nature formed the tongue of man both for the sake of savors and of speech; thus, also, she fashioned his lips both for the sake of speech, and the defence of the teeth.

DE P A-2. 16. 659B35-660A2

The lips, however, of men are soft and fleshy, and are capable of being employed to a twofold purpose, viz, for the defence of the teeth, as in other animals; and for a still better purpose, that of well-being.

DE P A-2. 16. 859B30-33

Locomotion The principle from which locomotion originally arises is the soul.

DE A-2. 4. 415B9-10

Two causes of locomotion are intelligence and appetite.

DE A-3. 10. 433A9

Logic Logic and rhetoric are both in an equal degree conversant about contraries.

RH-BK. 1. 1. 1355A35

Longevity The cause why quadrupeds are long-lived is their not having bile, but why birds live long, their being of a dry constitution or something else.

PO A-2. 17. 99B5-7

Love To love is a certain act of pleasure, and is good.

M M-2. 11. 1210B6-7

This is a criterion of the commencement of love, when persons feel pleasure not only in the presence of the object, but are enamoured also of it when absent, on memory.

RH-BK. 1. 11. 1370B22-24

Love is more a question of friendship than intercourse.

P A-2. 22. 68B4

He therefore who loves is beneficent, as far as he loves.

M M-2. 11. 1210B12

Lovers Lovers sometimes, because they cannot endure the misery of the objects of their love, destroy both themselves and those whom they love. For they suffer more from their calamities than from their own.

E E-7. 12. 1246A22-23

Loved To be loved is preferable in love to sexual intercourse.

P A-2. 22. 68B3-4

It would seem to follow that it is better to be loved than to be honored.

N E-8. 9. 1159A25-26

M

Magistrates It is necessary that in small states the magistrates should be few, in large ones many. POL–Bk. 6. 8. 1321b8-10

POL–Bk. 6. 8. 1321b8-10

Magnanimity Magnanimity is that virtue which is apt to confer important benefits. RH–BK. 1. 9.1366b17

RH–BK. 1. 9.1366b17

Magnificence Magnificence is the virtue which produces grandeur in expenditures.

RH–BK. 1. 9.1366b18-19

Magnitude Body will be the only perfect magnitude; for it is alone bounded by three things: and this is all.

DE C–1. 1. 268a22-24

That which is increased must necessarily have a certain magnitude, for growth is an increase and diminution is a lessening of the magnitude there.

DE G ET C–1. 5. 320b30-32

A right line and a circumference are the only simple magnitudes.

DE C–1. 2. 268b19-20

No magnitude is produced from intelligible elements.

PHY–4. 3. 209a15-16

Majority It is very right that the many should have the greatest powers in their own hands. For the people, the council, and the judges are composed of them, and the property of all these collectively is more than the property of any person, or of a few who fill the great offices of the state.

POL–Bk. 3. 11. 1282a38-41

Male By a male animal is understood that which can generate in another.

DE G A–1. 2. 716a20-21

The animal that makes the emission in another is called the male.

HA–1. 3. 489a12

The female always affords matter, and the male a fabri-cative power.

DE G A-2. 4. 738B20-21

But the male, as we have before observed, is more disposed to give assistance in danger, and is more courageous than the female.

DE H A-9. 1. 608B15-17

By nature and generally males live longer than females and the cause is because the male is warmer than the female.

DE L ET B-5. 466B14-16

The males of the human species have a larger brain than the females.

DE P A-2. 7. 653A28-29

Man The definition of man is the definition of his soul.

M E-6. 11. 1037A28-29

A man and an ox are both animal and are so named univocally, since not only the name but also the definition is the same.

CAT-1. LA8-9

Man is the only animal that is erect, because his nature and essence are divine.

DE P A-4.10. 686A27-28

Man is an animal naturally formed for society.

POL-Bk. 3. 6. 1278B1E9

It is evident that a state is one of the works of nature, and that man is naturally a political animal, and that whosoever is naturally, and not accidentally, unfit for society, must be either inferior or superior to man; just as the person reviled in Homer,

‘No tribe, nor state, nor home hath he.’

POL-Bk. I. 2. 1253A1-5

Man is naturally a social being.

N E-1. 5. 1097B11

The function of man then is an activity of soul in accordance with reason, or not independently of reason.

N E-I. 6. 1098A7-8

Man is generative of actions.

M M-1. 11. 1187B5-7

‘Man’ is predicated of the individual man; ‘animal’ is predicated of ‘man’; it will, thus, be predicated of the individual man, too; for the individual man is both ‘man’ and ‘animal.’

CAT-3. 1B7-11

Man, Individual Lastly, some are neither in, nor predicated of, any subject, as ‘a certain Man’ and ‘a certain horse,’ for nothing of this sort is either in or predicated of a certain subject.

CAT-2. 1B3-5

Man, Good We call a man good when he is of perfect virtue.

POL-BK. 3. 4. 1278B33-34

Man, Peculiarity of The inability to experience smell without inhaling is a peculiarity of the human race.

DE A-2. 9. 421B14-15

Man, Universal ‘Man’ is predicated of a subject, *i.e.* of the individual man, yet is in no subject.

CAT-2. LA21

Mankind The greatest part of mankind is desirous of riches rather than honor.

POL-BK. 6. 4. 1318B16-17

Manners Manners are a quality of the soul acquired by custom.

E E-2. 2. 1220A39-1220B1

Marriage It is conducive to temperance not to marry too soon.

POL-BK. 7. 16. 1335A22-23

The proper time for a woman to marry is eighteen, for a man, thirty-seven, a

little more or less.

POL-Bk. 7. 16. 1335A28-29

Marrow It is the concocted excrement of the sanguineous nutriment, contained in the concavities of the bones and spine, and distributed for the nutrition of them.

DE P A-2. 6. 651B22-24

Master There would seem to be one sort of knowledge proper for a master, and another for a slave; that of the slave is such as the slave taught at Syracuse; for there a fellow at a stipulated sum instructed the boys in the routine business of a household slave.... The knowledge of the master, on the other hand, is the proper use of his slaves, for the office of a master lies in the employment, not in the mere possession of them.

POL-Bk. 1. 7. 1255B22-33

Mathematician About what sort of entities are we to assert that the mathematician is engaged: for surely he is not engaged about those things that are here—that is, about sensibles—for none of these constitutes the description of entity which the mathematical sciences investigate. Neither is the science now under investigation—I mean Metaphysics—conversant about mathematical entities, for no one of these possesses a separable subsistence. Nor is it a science belonging to substances cognisant by the senses, for these are corruptible.

ME-10. 1. 1059B9-14

But as the mathematician institutes for himself an inquiry regarding abstract quantities—for he conducts his speculations by removing out of his consideration all sensible natures, such as gravity and lightness, and hardness, and its contrary, and further, heat and cold and other sensible contrarieties, but he merely leaves remaining quantity and continuity. (He speculates into things) so far forth as they are quantities and continuous.

ME-10. 3. 1061A28-35

Mathematics Mathematics speculates about a certain portion of matter, appropriating it to itself, as, for instance, about lines, or angles or numbers or something else pertaining to other quantities: not however as far forth as they are entities, but so far forth as each of them is that which is continuous in one, or two, or three dimensions.

ME-10. 4. 1061B21-25

The mathematical sciences are concerned with forms and do not regard one certain subject, for though the geometrical questions concern a certain subject yet not so far as they are geometrical are they in a subject... to know what a rainbow is pertains to the natural philosopher, but why it is pertains to the optician either simply or mathematically.

PO A-1. 13. 79A7-13

Mathematics uses definitions for its premises, never just accidents and in this the mathematical sciences differ from dialectical reasonings.

PO A-1. 12. 78A10-13

Mathematical Accuracy Mathematical accuracy of language is not to be required in all things, but in those things that do not involve any connexion with matter.

ME-2. 3. 995A14-18

Mathematical Entities That, indeed, therefore, neither are mathematical entities in a greater degree existences than bodies, and that they are not antecedent in their essence to those objects that fall under the notice of the senses, but are so merely in point of definition, and that it is not possible that they should be made to involve a separate subsistence in any place, has been declared with sufficient clearness.

ME-12. 2. 1077B12-14

Mathematical Philosophy And of mathematical science some are conversant about entities that are immovable, it is true, yet, perhaps, not separable, but subsisting as in matter.

ME-5. 1. 1026A14-15

Matter (Ule) I call matter that which essentially is termed neither quiddity, nor quantity, nor anything else of those things whereby entity is defined.

ME-6. 3. 1029A20-21

Matter is unknown in itself. Now matter is partly sensible and partly intelligible; that which is sensible is such as brass and wood, and such as is movable; but intelligible matter is that which is inherent in things that are sensible, but not so far forth as they are sensible, as mathematical entities.

ME-6. 10. 1038A8-12

Matter All sensible substances involve matter; I mean by matter that which is

not this certain particular thing in act, but in potentiality is this certain particular thing.

ME-7. 1. 1042A25-28

Matter exists in potentiality because it may advance on to form; but when it exists in act, then it exists in form.

ME-8. 8.1050A15-16

Of that which is being produced must there now necessarily exist something; and if, in short, it is undergoing corruption, there will subsist a certain entity; and if it is being produced there must needs be that from which it is produced and by which it is generated, and that this process does not go on to infinity.

ME-3. 5. 1010A17-32

Matter therefore as a principle is the cause in generated natures of the ability to be, and not to be.

DE G ET C-2. 9. 335A32-33

Matter, however, so far as matter, is passive.

DE G ET C-1. 7. 324B18

Matter, indeed, is non-being according to accident.

PHY-1. 9. 192A4-5

Matter is a medium insensible, and inseparable.

DE G ET C-2. 6. 332A35-332B1

Matter has immediately a contrary.

DE L ET B-3. 465B29-30

Matter and Form Because the matter of singulars is a thing that is different, both your matter and form, and that which imparts motion and species differ in number from mine, though according to the formal principle of the universal they are the same.

ME-11. 5. 1071A27-29

Matter and Generation It is necessary, therefore, that matter and generation should be prior in time, but that the essence and form of every thing should be prior in reason.

DE P A-2. 1. 646A35-646B2

Maxim The maxim is an assertion ... on some general subject, but not every general subject but respecting as many subjects as moral conduct is concerned about and as are objects of choice or avoidance in acting ... both the conclusions of enthymemes and their premises, after the syllogistic form has been done away with, become maxims.

RH-2. 21. 1394A21-28

Maximum and Minimum Since it is not possible for an animal or plant to be infinitely big or small neither can the parts or the whole be.

PHY-1. 4. 187B16-18

Mean Where there is excess and deficiency, there is also a mean.

N E-4. 10. 1125B18-19

Virtue is a mean state, so far at least as it aims at the mean.

N E-2. 5. 1106B27-28

The mean state is everywhere laudable, but we ought to incline at one time towards the excess and at another towards the deficiency; for this will be our easiest manner of hitting the mean, or in other words of attaining excellence.

N E-2. 9. 1109B23-26

Everybody who understands his business avoids alike excess and deficiency; he seeks and chooses the mean, not the absolute mean, but the mean considered relatively to ourselves.

N E-2. 5. 1106B5-7

The mean states then in life are three, viz. friendliness, truthfulness, and wittiness.

N E-4. 14. 1128B4-7

Those who seek for what is just seek for a mean; now the law is a mean.

POL-Bk. 3. 16. 1287B3-5

Measure of Things Every moral state has its own honors and pleasures, nor is there any point perhaps so distinctive of the virtuous man as his power of seeing the truth in all cases, because he is, as it were, the standard and measure of things.

N E-3. 6. 1113A31-33

Media All media, and the things of which they are media, are contained in the

same genus.

ME-9. 7. 1057A19-20

It is necessary that media should derive their being from contraries.

ME-9. 7. 1057A19

Meditation Meditations preserve the memory by reminiscence.

DE M ET R-1. 451A14-16

Memory From sense, therefore, as we say, memory is produced.

PO A-2. 19. 100A3

For no memory is a habit, but rather an action.

T-4. 5. 125B18-19

Memory, therefore, is neither sense for understanding but is either a habit or passion of some one of these, when time intervenes.

DE M ET R-1. 449B24-25

Memory will be of the intelligible accidentally, but essentially of that which is first sensitive.

DE M ET R-1. 450A13-14

Those animals only that have a perception of time remember, and this by that power by which they perceive.

DE M ET R-1. 449B29-30

Many animals besides man have equally the faculty of remembering and learning.

H A-1. 1. 488B25-26

Those also, who are very young, and very old, labor under a defect of memory, on account of motion.

DE M ET R-2. 453B4-5

Memory and Reminiscence To remember, however, differs from reminiscence, not only in time, but because many other animals participate of the former, but no one of the know animals, as I may say, participates of the latter, except man.

DE M ET R-2. 453A6-9

Those who are of a slow genius excel in memory, and those who are of a rapid

genius and docile, excel in reminiscence.

DE M ET R-1. 449B7-8

Metaphor The greatest number of elegancies arise from metaphor.

RH-Bk. 3. 11. 1412A17-19

Our metaphors should not be far-fetched.

RH-Bk. 3. 2. 1405A35-37

Metaphysics There is a certain science which makes as the object of its speculation being as being and the things which are essentially inherent in this.

ME-3. 1. 1003A21-22

It is the province of this science (first philosophy) to investigate being so far forth as it is being and respecting quiddity or the nature of a thing and respecting those things that universally are inherent in it, so far forth as it is being.

ME-5. 1. 1026A30-32

Metaphysics, or the First Philosophy, is conversant about entities which both have a separate subsistence and are immovable.

ME-5. 1. 1026A15-16

Meteorology Is concerned with events that are natural, though their order is less perfect than that of the first of the elements of bodies; they take place in the region nearest the movement of the stars; they include the milky way, comets and meteors and all affections which we consider common to the air and water; we will expound, moreover, how many parts and species of earth there are and how many their affections; finally we will contemplate the causes of the motions of the winds and of the earth and all things resulting from such ... and of the falling of thunder-bolts and of whirlwinds and firewinds and the other affections of bodies resulting therefrom....

D M-1. 1. 338A26-339A5

Method of Reasoning Vide REASONING, METHOD OF.

Middle-Aged, Dispositions of Moderate, spirited with coolness, possessing all the virtues found in excess or defect in the young and those in old age.

RH-2. 14. 1390A29-1390B13

Mind What is called the mind of the soul (and by mind I mean that by which the

soul thinks and judges) is actually nothing of the existing things before it knows.
DE A-3. 4. 429A22-24

Because the mind is not actually any of the real things before it thinks, it cannot be reasonably considered as blended with the body; if it were it would acquire warmth or cold or even have an organ like the senses.
DE A-3. 4. 429A23-26

The thinking part while being impassible must be receptive of form and potentially such as its object without being it.
DE A-3. 4. 429A15-16

Because everything is a possible object of thought, mind, in order to know must be simple, *i.e.* unmixed with any other.
DE A-3. 4. 429A18-19

Mind does not at one time know and at another time not; when separated it is just what it is and nothing more; this alone is immortal and eternal.
DE A-3. 5. 430A20-23

The actual perception by mind of mind itself doth subsist in this way throughout all eternity.
ME-11. 9. 1075A10

The mind is perhaps something too divine, something impassible.
DE A-408B29-30

The mind is in its prime about the age of forty-nine.
RH-Bk. 2. 14. 1390B11

Mind (Nous) It was well to call the mind the location of forms; but this applies only to the intellective soul and the forms are present only potentially.
DE A-3. 4. 429A27-29

Mind and Body It is impossible for the mind and body both to labor at the same time.
POL-Bk. 8. 4. 1339A9-10

Mingling Those things are mingled, which have a contrariety of agents.
DE G ET C-1. 10. 328A31-32

Among things divisible and passive, such as are easily bounded are capable of being mingled; for these are easily divided into small parts.

DE G ET C-1. 10. 328A31-34

Mobile A thing is movable in so far as it involves a capability of having motion impressed upon it, and that which imparts motion does so from act.

ME-10. 9. 1066A29-30

Modesty Although modesty is not a virtue, yet a modest person is praised as if he were virtuous.

N E-2. 7. 1108A31-32

Moisture Hot moisture is the cause of increase, and of life.

DE L ET B-5. 466B21-22

When the moisture gradually descends it is called a drizzle, but when in larger parts rain.

DE M-1. 9. 347A11-12

All things receive increase from moisture.

DE P A-2. 2. 647B26-27

Monad That which is indivisible according to quantity, and so far forth as it is a quantity (I mean what is in every direction indivisible, and is without position), this is called a unit or monad.

ME-4. 6. 1016B24-25

Monads when composed can neither produce body nor possess gravity.

DE C-3. 1. 300A18-19

Monarchy There is a fifth species of kingly government, which is where one person has a supreme power over all things whatsoever, in the manner that every tribe and every state is supreme over those things which belong to the public; for as the master of a family has a kingly rule in his own house, so a king is master of his own state, and over one or more tribes.

POL-BK. 3. 14. 1285B29-33

Those who are accustomed by nature to submit themselves to the political rule of a family eminent for virtue, are adapted to kingly government. POL-BK. 3. 17. 1288a8-9

POL-BK. 3. 17. 1288A8-9

Monarchy is that form (of government) in which one man is supreme; and of monarchies those which are held by conformity to some limitations are kingdoms, but the unlimited are tyrannies.

RH-1. 8. 1365B37-1366A2

A monarchy is a tyranny where one person has a despotic power over the whole community.

POL-BK. 3. 8.1279B16-17

It is a common preservative of all monarchies not to make one person too great.

POL-BK. 5. 11. 1313A19-20

It seems absurd to suppose that one person can see better with two eyes, and hear better with two ears, or do better with two hands and two feet, than many can do with many; for we see that absolute monarchs now furnish themselves with many eyes, and ears, and hands, and feet; for they intrust those who are friends to themselves and their government with part of their power. If they are not friends to the monarch, they will not do what he chooses; but if they are friends to him, they are friends also to his government: but a friend is an equal, and like his friend: if then he thinks that such should govern, he thinks that those who are his equals and like himself should govern. These are nearly the objections which men usually urge in dispute against kingly power.

POL-BK. 3. 16. 1287B26-35

Monarchy, Absolute When the whole state is wholly subject to the will of one person.

POL-BK. 3. 16. 1287A9-10

Money Money is a sort of medium or mean; for it measures everything and consequently measures among other things excess or defect.

N E-5. 8. 1133A20-21

Money therefore is like a measure that equates things, by making them commensurable.

N E-5. 8. 1133B16-17

Money has not a natural but a conventional existence because it is in our power to change it, and make it useless.

N E-5. 8. 1133A30-31

As regards the giving and taking of money, the mean state is liberality, the excess and deficiency are prodigality and illiberality.

N E-2. 7. 1107B8-10

Money-Making The life of money-making is in a sense a life of constraint, and it is clear that wealth is not the good of which we are in quest.

N E-I. 3. 1095A5-7

Moon The moon evidences ... that she is spherical.

DE C-2. 11. 291B18-19

Morality The pleasure or pain which follows upon actions may be regarded as a test of a person's moral state.

P-2. 1448A1-5

The motion of the moon is downward, but slow.

DE M-1. 3. 341A22-23

Since the objects of imitation are men in action, and these men must be either of a higher or a lower type (for moral character mainly answers to these divisions, goodness and badness being the distinguishing marks of moral differences), it follows that we must represent men either as better than in real life, or as worse, or as they are.

N E-2. 2. 1104B3-5

Moral Purpose Moral purpose is the origin of action, *i.e.* the original motive but not the final cause.

N E-6. 2. 1139A31-32

The moral purpose then may be defined as desiderative reason or intellectual desire.

N E-6. 2. 1139B4-5

Moral purpose implies reason and thought.

N E-3. 4. 1112A15-18

It seems to be a general law that our moral purpose is confined to such things as lie within our own power.

N E-3. 4. 1111B29-30

It is clear that moral purpose is something voluntary.

N E-3. 4. 1111B6-7

Nothing that is past can be an object of the moral purpose. purpose.

N E-6. 2. 1139B6-7

Moral Virtue He who is to govern ought to be perfect in moral virtue (for his business is entirely that of a master artificer, and reason is the master artificer), while others want only that portion of it which may be sufficient for their station.

POL-Bk. I. 13. 1260A17-20

Morphe That which is nourished is figure and form conjoined with matter.

DE G ET C-2. 8. 335A15-18

Vide FORM.

Motion If the categories are divided by substance, quality, place, action, passion, relation, quantity, there must needs be three motions: of quality, quantity and of place; but according to substance there does not exist any motion on account of there being nothing contrary to substance; nor is there a motion of relation.

ME-10. 12. 1088A8-11

Of motion, there are six species: generation, corruption, increase, diminution, alteration, and change of place.

CAT-14. 15A14

There are four kinds of motion: transition, change of state, decay, increase: the soul must necessarily have either one of these motions, or several, or all of them.

DE A-1. 3. 406A12-14

All such things as subsist from nature appear to contain in themselves a principle of motion and permanency: some according to place, others according to increase and diminution ; and others according to change in quality.

PHY-2. 1. 192B13-16

The act of that which exists in potentiality so far forth as it exists in potentiality.

ME-10. 9.1065B16

The actuality of that which is potential so far forth as it is potential constitutes

motion.

ME-10. 9.1065B33

Motion is continuous.

E E-2. 3. 1220B28

Motion is one when it is indivisible, and indivisible according to time. ME-4.
6. 1016a6

ME-4. 8. 1018A8

Every motion is imperfect.

ME-8. 6. 1048B28-29

The motion in a right line is the motion of simple bodies.

DE C-1. 2. 269A25-26

There is one natural motion of every simple body.

DE C-1. 2. 289A8-9

There is one motion of each of the simple bodies.

DE C-1. 3. 270B28-29

Motion follows that which is moved.

DE G ET C-2. 10. 337A25-26

The motion in a right line is upward and downward.

DE C-1. 2. 268B20-21

Every motion is in time.

PHY-6 2. 232B20

Motion is divisible in a twofold respect; in one way by time; in another, according to the motions of the parts of that which is moved.

PHY-6. 4. 234B21-23

All things cease to be moved when they arrive at their proper place.

DE C—1. 19. 279B1-2

If any thing moves being immovable, that indeed will touch the thing movable, but itself will not be touched by any thing.

DE G ET C-1. 6. 323A31-32

It is evident, therefore, that local motion is either solely or especially present with those animals which effect the mutation according to place with two or four marks (or members).

DE IN—7. 707A18-18

All things are perpetually in motion.

DE L ET B—3. 465B25-26

Motion has not a subsistence separate from things.

PHY—3. 1. 200B32-33

All motion is a certain mutation.

PHY—5. 1. 225A34

Motion and Magnitude We measure magnitude by motion and motion by magnitude.

PHY—4. 12. 220B28-29

Motion, Alternate That also which is moved progressively proceeds alternately from the right and left part; for thus the body becomes restored to its former situation.

DE IN-8. 708B16-19

Motion, Apparent When we have beheld for some time a body in motion, such as a river, and especially if it flows rapidly, things at rest will appear to us to be moved.

DE SOM—2. 459B18-20

The land appears to be moved to those that are sailing, in consequence of the sight being moved by something else.

DE SOM—2. 460B26-27

Moved Requires Mover and Goal Everything which has motion impressed upon it is put in motion by something and in the direction of something.

ME—10. 6. 1083A17-18

Movement Movement is a sort of act, but an incomplete act.

DE A—2. 5. 417A16-17

Every moving object can move in two respects: either by another, or by itself.

DE A—1. 3. 408A4-5

It is necessary that that which is moved in a circle from whatever point it begins should similarly arrive at all the contrary places.

DE C—1. 4. 271A24-25

To be moved by violence is the same thing as to be moved contrary to nature.

DE C—3. 2. 300A23

Movement partakes in its nature of plurality.

ME—3. 2. 1004B29

The function of movement to change position is performed by the feet, the wings, and the corresponding organs.

H A—1. 3. 489A26-29

Some animals, however, are moved while they sleep, and do many things which pertain to wakefulness, but not without a phantasm or sense-perception; for a dream is as it were a sense-perception.

DE S—2. 456A24-26

Mover, First Since that which has motion impressed upon it and which imparts motion exists as a medium, there is therefore something which, not having motion impressed upon it yet imparts motion which is a thing that is eternal, being both substance and act; but in this way it imparts motion—I mean that which is desirable and that which is intelligible imparts motion whereas they are not moved themselves.

ME—11. 7. 1072A24-27

Of necessity must this Immovable First Mover constitute an entity.

MF—11. 7. 1072B10

It will happen that the first mover in all things which are moved is immovable.

PHY-8. 5. 258B5-6

There is something which always moves the things that are in motion, and the first imparter of motion is itself immovable.

ME-3. 8. 30-31

We shall assert that the first mover is necessarily without parts and has no magnitude.

PHY—8. 10. 267B25-26

The first mover produces a perpetual motion, and in an infinite time. It is evident, therefore, that it is indivisible, without parts, and has no magnitude.

PHY—8. 10. 267B24-26

The air is the first mover with respect to that which is moved.

PHY-7. 2. 245A8

Mover The mover may be of two kinds—motionless, or mover and moved at the same time.

DE A—3. 10. 433B13-14

Moving Body It is impossible that the body which is moved in a circle should have either gravity or levity.

DE C—1. 3. 269B29-31

No body non-movable can have a soul without sensation.

DE A—3. 12. 434B3-4

Moving Cause The moving cause is prior in nature to that which is being moved.

ME—3. 5.1010B37-1011AL

Multiple The multiple is according to number in respect to one, but such as is not defined.

ME—4. 15. 1020B34-35

Multitude Multitude is styled that which is divisible in potentiality into what is not continuous.

ME—4. 13. 1020A10-11

Multitude is a certain quantity if it may be numerable, but magnitude if it may be measurable.

ME—4. 13. 1020A8-1

Such things as are many in number involve a connexion with matter.

ME—11. 8. 1074A33-34

The multitude are less liable to corruption; as water is from its quantity, so are the many less liable to corruption than the few.

POL—Bk. 3. 15. 1286A31-33

The multitude fancy that they are able to use dominion and power and wealth, but they do not rightly form this opinion.

M M—2. 3. 1199_B18-20

Mutation All mutation is finite.

DE C—1. 8. 277_A15-16

It is difficult by leaping to produce a continued mutation.

DE IN—14. 712_A31-32

Mutation, Infinite This much, therefore, has been said by us to prove that there is neither any infinite mutation nor any continued motion, except that which is in a circle.

PHY—8. 8. 265_A10-12

Mutation of Contrariety When therefore the mutation of contrariety is according to quantity, it is increase and diminution; when according to place, it is motion.

DE G ET C—1. 4. 319_B31-33

Mute That which even with the concurrence of the tongue has of itself no sound but becomes audible in conjunction with things which have a certain sound.

P—20. 1456_B28-30

N

Name The name signifies the existence or the non-existence of this particular thing.

ME—3. 4. 1006A28-29

Vide NOUN.

Names as Symbols Since we cannot discourse by adducing the things themselves we use names as symbols of things.

SE—1. 1. 165A6-9

Narration In deliberative speeches narration occurs least of all.

RH—Bk. 3. 18. 1417B11-12

Natural What happens regularly is natural.

DE G A—1. 19. 727B29-30

NaturalBodies All natural bodies and magnitudes are essentially movable according to place.

DE C—1. 2. 288B13-15

Natural Distribution Nature, in the same manner as a wise man, always distributes to every thing that which it is able to use.

DE P A—4. 10. 687A10-12

Natural Knowledge, Way of The naturally constituted way of acquiring knowledge of nature is to proceed from what is more knowable to us and advance to what is more knowable by nature.

PHY—1. 1. 184A15-18

Natural Objects in Motion We must suppose that those that exist by nature are, all or some of them, in motion; which is evident by induction.

PHY—1. 2. 185A12-14

Naturally (by Nature) All those things exist naturally whose cause is internal and ordinate; for they turn out either invariably or generally in the same way.

RH—1. 10. 1369A35-1369B2

Nature Nature is merely one certain genus of entity.

ME—3. 3. 1005A34

The very nature of a thing is the essence of that thing.

ME-6. 4. 1030A3

The very nature of a thing appertains to those things the discourse respecting which is a definition.

ME—6. 4. 1030A6-7

Nature is styled the substance of things that exist by nature.

ME—4. 4. 1014B36-37

Of those things which exist some are by nature others are through other causes. By nature indeed, are animals and their parts, plants and simple bodies such as, earth, fire, air, water. For these and others of the like we say exist by nature.

PHY—2. 1. 192B8-12

The earliest nature, and that termed so with precision, is the substance—I mean of those things possessing the principle of motion in themselves.

ME—4. 4. 1015A13-15

The very nature of everything is that which is denominated as subsisting essentially or absolutely.

ME—6. 4. 1029B13-14

Nature is twofold, one kind being as matter, but another as form.

PHY—2. 8. 199A30-31

Nature is called, in one way, the production of things that are by Nature ... and in another, as that from which, as being inherent, that which is being naturally produced is primarily formed.

ME-4. 4. 1014B16-18

Nature is the origin of the earliest motion in each of the things in itself subsisting by Nature, so far as it is this very thing.

ME—4. 4. 1014B18-20

Those things are said to be by nature as involve growth through another body by means of contact, and growth along with or growth beside as embryos.

ME—4. 4. 1014B20-22

The first principle of motion, in those things that by Nature subsist, is Nature, inherent as a first principle in a manner either potentially or actually.

ME—4 4 1015A17-19

Nature is a principle of motion and mutation.

PHY—3. 1. 200B12

Moreover, is that styled Nature from which, as its primary matter, there either is or arises anything of the things that subsist by Nature, being without regular motion, and unchangeable from the power which belongs to itself, as of a statue ... the brass is called the nature.

ME-4. 4. 1014B28-30

Nature, however, is the primary matter.

ME-4. 4. 1015A7

We must first presuppose that in nature nothing acts on or is acted upon at random, nor may anything be made from anything else at random unless we assume that it is accidental.

PHY—1. 5. 188A31-34

Nature makes nothing in vain but always the best possible in each kind of living thing according to its essence.

DE IN—2. 704B15-17

Nature produces nothing in vain, but with a view to that which is better.

DE IN—12. 711A17-19

Nature does nothing contrary to nature.

DE IN—11. 711A7

The cause, however, why serpents are without feet is, that nature does nothing in vain, but looking in all things to that which is best, gives to every thing that which it is capable of receiving, and preserves its peculiar essence and characteristic property.

DE IN—8. 708A9-12

Nature does nothing casually.

DE C—2. 8. 290A31

Nature always makes the best of possible things.

DE C—2. 5. 288A2-3

Nature is accustomed to avoid the infinite, for the infinite lacks an end and nature always seeks an end.

DE G A—1. 1715B14-16

All things generated by nature are either contraries, or from contraries.

PHY—1. 5. 188B25-26

All corruptible and generable natures are changeable in quality.

DE C—I. 12. 283B19-20

Nature always contrives as an auxiliary against the excess of every thing, the association of its contrary that the one may equalize the excess of the other.

DE P A—2. 7. 652A31-33

Everywhere nature returns to another part what she has elsewhere received.

DE P A—2. 14. 658A34-35

Whatever is contrary to nature is not right.

POL—Bk. 7. 3. 1325B9-10

There is nothing which nature avoids so much as what is painful or desires so much as what is pleasant.

N E-8. 6. 1157B16-17

Necessary That which does not admit of being otherwise than it is.

ME-4. 5. 1015A33-35

What is compulsory is styled necessary.

ME—4. 5. 1015A28

That is necessary without which it is not possible for what is good either to subsist, or to arise, or to cast aside any evil, or that any evil should be exterminated.

ME-4. 5. 1015A22-24

Necessary is defined as that without which, as a cooperating cause, it is not admissible for a thing to exist.

ME-4. 5. 1015A20-21

The necessary subsists simply, indeed, in things eternal.

DE P A—1. 1. 639B23-24

What is necessary to be through itself and necessarily accepted is neither an hypothesis nor a postulate.

PO A—1. 10. 76B23-24

Necessity Wherefore what is must be when it is, and what is not, must not be when it is not; but it is not necessary that every being should be, nor that non-being should not be, since it is not the same thing for every being to be from necessity when it is, and simply to be from necessity, and in like-manner as to non-being.

DE I—9. 19A23-27

Necessity seems to be a something that is inevitable (correctly so), for it is contrary to the motion according to free-will, and according to the power of reasoning.

ME—4. 5. 1015A31-33

Necessity is twofold; it may be in accord with a thing's nature or with violence and against its nature.

PO A-2. 11. 94B37-95A1

All things that will be, it is necessary should be generated, and hence there will be nothing casual nor fortuitous, for if it were fortuitous it would not be of necessity.

DE I—9. 18B14-17

It is evident, therefore, that the necessity which is in natural things is that which is denominated as matter, and the motions of this.

PHY—2. 9. 200A30-32

Necessity, Hypothetical Hypothetical necessity is in everything generated as well as in art productions.

DE P A—1. 1. 639B24-25

Neck A long neck is weak.

DE P A—4. 12. 693A4

Negation Negation is the enunciation of something from something.

DE I—8. 17A25-28

Nerves Some bones are bound together by nerves.

DE P A—2. 9. 654B25

Night The air of the night is more undisturbed, because the night is more tranquil.

DE DIV—2. 464A14-15

Nihilo, Ex Entity is spoken of in a twofold point of view; so that it is admissible in a way that something should arise from that which has no being, and that it is in a way not admissible that it should be so; and that the same thing at the same time should be an entity and a nonentity, but not according to the same entity; for in potentiality, no doubt, is it admissible at the same time for the same thing to be contraries, but in actuality not so.

ME—3. 5. 1009A32-36

Nobility It is worthy of a sensible and generous nobility to divide the poor amongst them, and to induce them to work by supplying them with what is necessary.

POL—BK. 6. 5. 1320B7-9

Noble I understand by noble, in speaking of animals, the one that comes of a well-endowed stock.

H A—1. 1. 488B18-19

Nobleness Nobleness is a characteristic of all the virtues.

N E-4. 4. 1122B7

Non-Being It will be true to say that non-being belongs to certain things.

DE G ET C—1. 3. 317B3

None “Every” or “none” signifies nothing else than that affirmation or negation is applied of the name universally.

DE I—10. 20A12-14

Non-Existence If any thing is corruptible in an infinite time, it will possess the power of not existing.

DE C—1. 12. 281B20-21

Noon Noon is generally the most tranquil part of the day.

DE M-2. 8. 366A14-15

Noun A noun is a sound signifying by convention, without time, no part of which is separately significant.

DE I—2. 16A19-20

A composite sound significant without time of which no part is of itself significant.

P—20. 1457A10-12

Nothing is a noun or name by nature but only when used as a symbol.

DE I—2. 16A29

Nouns and Verbs Nouns and verbs of themselves resemble conceptions without composition and division ... which are neither true nor false.

DE I—1. 16A13-16

Nouns and verbs, indeed, when transposed, have the same signification.

DE I—10. 20B1-2

Noun, Indefinite ‘Not-man’ is not a noun ... since it is neither a sentence nor a denial. Let it be an indefinite noun because it exists in respect of every thing alike, both of that which is and of that which is not.

DE I—2. 16A30-33

Nourishment There are three things: the being nourished, that by which it is nourished, and that which nourishes it.

DE A—2. 4. 416B20-21

Nouveau Riche The having recently become rich is as it were an in-expertness in wealth.

RH—BK. 2.16. 1391A17

Now The *now*, or an instant, is not a part of time.

PHY—4. 10. 218A6

Number A discrete quantity. There is no common boundary at which the parts meet.

CAT—6. 4B23-30

Neither therefore does number constitute a cause in respect of production, nor

does it as number exist at all, nor as such number as is of the nature of a monad, nor as matter, nor as the formal principle, and the form itself of things. But undoubtedly, neither does it constitute that on account of which a thing exists—I mean the final cause of things.

ME-13. 5. 1092B23-25

Has order in respect to another number but not position.

CAT—6. 5A30

We call number infinite, because there is not a greatest number.

DE C—1. 5. 272A1-2

That numbers do not constitute substances, and that they are not causes of form, is plain.

ME-13. 5. 1092B16-17

Nutriments It is necessary that every thing which is increased should receive nutriment.

DE P A-2. 3. 650A2-4

Nutrition Nutrition is indeed the same with increase, but in definition different.

DE G ET C—1. 5. 322A22-24

This function in particular distinguishes this faculty of the soul from all other faculties.

DE A—2. 4. 416A20-21

Nutriments All things are nourished by that which is sweet, either simply or mingled.

DE S ET S—4. 442A2

O

Obesity Those that are very fat become rapidly old; for they have but little blood, in consequence of the blood being consumed into fat.

DE P A—2. 5. 651B8-10

Objection Objection is a proposition contrary to a proposition; it differs, however, from a proposition because objection may be partial, but proposition cannot be so at all, or not in universal syllogisms. Objection indeed is advanced in two moods, and through two figures; in two moods because every objection is either universal or particular, and by two figures, because they are used opposite to the proposition and opposites are concluded in the first and third figure alone.

P A-2. 26. 69A37-69B5

Objects It will not be possible to perceive at one and the same time objects which are not contrary.

DE S ET S—7. 448A4-5

Obscenity It is as much the business of the legislator, as any thing else, to banish every indecent expression out of the state.

POL—Bk. 7. 17. 1336B2-3

Obstinacy People who are self-opinionated, or ignorant, or boorish, are all obstinate. Self-opinionated people are so from motives of pleasure or pain.

N E—7. 10. 1151B12-14

Offense There are three ways in which people may hurt each other in society. An action done in ignorance is called a mistake. When the hurt done is contrary to expectation, it is a mishap. When the action is the result of deliberate purpose, the agent is unjust and wicked.

N E—5. 10. 1135B11-24

Old Those who are advanced in life are apt to view things in an unfavorable light.

RH—Bk. 2. 13. 1389B19-20

Old Age A good old age is an old age slow in approach, unattended by pain.

RH—Bk. 1. 5. 1361B26-27

Oligarchy An oligarchy (is a form of government) in which those only who, from the valuation of property, are entitled (to hold office).

RH—1. 8. 1365B33

The first is when the greater part are men of moderate means, and have not too large property; for this gives each man of property leisure for the management of public affairs: and, as they are a numerous body, it necessarily follows that the supreme power must be in the laws, and not in the individuals; for in proportion as they are far from a monarchical government and have not sufficient fortune to neglect their private affairs, while they are too many to be supported by the public, they will of course determine to be governed by the laws, and not by each other. But if the men of property in the state are fewer than in the former case, and if their property is large, then an oligarchy of the second sort will take place; for those who have power will claim a right to lord it over the others. And, to accomplish this, they will associate themselves with some who have an inclination for public affairs, and as they are not yet powerful enough to govern without law, they will make a law for that purpose. And if they set themselves, as being fewer, to gain greater fortunes, the oligarchy will then alter into one of the third sort, because they keep the offices of state in their own hands by a law, which directs the son to succeed upon the death of his father. But as soon as they extend their strength further by means of their wealth and powerful connexions, such a dynasty nearly approaches to a monarchy, and the men will be supreme, and not the law; and this is the fourth species of an oligarchy, and it corresponds to the last-mentioned kind of democracy.

POL—BK. 4. 6. 1293A12-34

When the people in general do not partake of the deliberative power, but certain persons chosen for that purpose, who govern according to the law, this also is an oligarchy.

POL—BK. 4. 14. 1298A40-1298B2

An oligarchy is a state where the rich and those of noble family, being few, possess it.

POL—BK. 4. 4. 1290B19-20

An oligarchy is where the supreme power of the state is lodged with the rich.

POL—BK. 3. 8. 1279B17-18

The purest and best-framed oligarchy is one which approaches most nearly to what we call a free state.

POL—Bk. 6. 8. 1320B21

An oligarchy is liable to a revolution both in time of war and peace.

POL—Bk. 5. 6. 1306A19-20

An oligarchy will be destroyed when they create another oligarchy within it.

POL—Bk. 5. 6. 1306A12-13

Oligarchy, Its End The end of oligarchy is wealth.

RH—1. 8. 1366A5

Oligarchy and Democracy An oligarchy and a democracy differ in this form from each other, namely, in the poverty of those who govern in the one, and the riches of those who govern in the other; for when the government is in the hands of the rich, be they few or be they more, it is an oligarchy; when it is in the hands of the poor, it is a democracy.

POL—Bk. 3. 8. 1279B40-1280A3

One Universally, whatever things do not involve division, so far forth as they have it not, so far are they styled one.

ME-4. 6. 1016B3-5

One is called that which subsists as such according to accident in one way, and in another, that which subsists essentially.

ME—4. 6. 1015B16-17

Of things denominated one essentially some are styled so on account of their being continuous.

ME—4. 6. 1015B36-1016AL

A thing is called one according to accident, for instance Coriscus and musical, and the musical Coriscus.

ME—4. 6. 1015B17-18

Those are more one which by nature are continuous than those things that are continuous by art.

ME-4. 6. 1016A4

In another way a thing is called one in respect of the subject being in species indifferent or destitute of a difference.

ME—4. 6. 1016A17-18

One and Many In every genus of things the one is naturally prior to the many and the simple to the composite.

DE C—2. 4. 286B16-17

Oneness Those are styled one the definition of whatsoever of which, denominating the essence of them, is indivisible, as far as regards another definition signifying the being of the thing, for every actual definition is essentially indivisible?

ME-4. 6. 1016A32-35

Those things are styled one, also, of which the genus is one, differing by opposing differences.

ME—4. 6. 1016A24-25

Some things are one according to number, but others according to species, and others according to genus, and others according to analogy.

ME—4. 6. 1016B31-32

Ontology In every respect is the science of ontology strictly a science of that which is first or elemental, both on which the other things depend and through which they are denominated.

ME—3. 2. 1003B18-18

If there is something that is eternal and immovable, and that involves a separate subsistence, it is evident that it is the province of the speculative, that is, of the ontological, science to investigate such.

ME—5. 1. 1026A10-11

Operations All operations are either from art, or from potentiality, or the understanding.

ME—6. 7. 1032A27-28

Opinion Opinion is conversant with the true or false, which yet may have a various subsistence ... for both opinion is unstable, and its nature is of this kind.

PO A—1. 33. 89A2-3

It is clearly impossible to opine and know the same thing at the same time.

PO A—1. 33. 89A38-39

It is evident that true opinion can neither possibly be contrary to true opinion nor true negation to true negation, for those are contraries that subsist about

opposites.

DE I—14. 24B7-9

The sphere of opinion is universal; it embraces things which are eternal or impossible as much as things which lie within our own power.

N E—3. 4. 1111B30-33

Vide PROBABILITY.

Opinion and Knowledge No one thinks that he opines, but that he knows, when he thinks it impossible for a thing to subsist otherwise than it does, but when he thinks that it is indeed thus, yet that nothing hinders it being otherwise, then he thinks that he opines; opinion as it were being conversant with a thing of this kind, but science with what is necessary.

PO A—1. 33. 89A6-10

Opinion and Science If the opinion is vehement, in consequence of being stable, and not to be shaken, it in no respect differs from science.

M M-2. 8. 1201B5-7

Opposition One thing is said to be opposed to another in four ways, either as relative, or as contrary, or as privation and habit, or as affirmation and negation.

CAT—10. 11B16

Opposition, Correlative Whatever things are relatively opposed are said to be what they are with reference to opposites, or are in some manner referred to them, as the double of the half.

CAT—10. 11B17

Opposition, Contrary Those which are opposed as contraries are by no means said to be what they are with reference to each other, but are said to be contrary to each other. ‘Good’ is the contrary of ‘bad’; white, the contrary of black.

CAT—10. 11B35

Opposition, Contrary with a Medium In the case of those opposed contrarily in which it is not necessary that one should be inherent, there is something intermediate, *e.g.* black, white; good, bad.

CAT—10. 12A2-4

Opposition, Contrary Without a Medium Such contraries are of that kind

(without a medium) that one of them must necessarily be in those things, in which it can be naturally, or of which it is predicated; these have nothing intermediate. *e.g.* health, sickness; odd, even.

CAT—10. 12A1-5

Opposition, Privation and Habit Privation and habit are predicated of something identical, as sight and blindness of the eye, and universally in whatever the habit is naturally adapted to be produced, of such is either predicated. We say then, that each of the things capable of receiving habit is deprived of it, when it is not in that, wherein it might naturally be, and when it is adapted naturally to possess it; thus we say that a man is toothless, not because he has no teeth, and blind, not because he has no sight, but because he has them not when he might naturally have them, for some persons from their birth have neither sight nor teeth, yet they are neither called toothless nor blind.

CAT—10. 12A25-32

Opposition, Affirmation and Negation Whatever things are opposed as affirmation and negation it is necessary that one should be true and the other false.

CAT—10. 13B1-3

Opposites Things that are opposite are called contradiction, and contraries, and relations, and privations, and habit, and those things from which ultimate things arise, and those into which they are resolved; as for instance the generations and corruptions of bodies, and whatsoever things it is not admissible at the same time should be present in that which is receptive of both.

ME-4. 10. 1018A20-23

Oration An oration is constituted of three things, of the speaker, and of the subject about which he speaks, and of the person to whom.

RH—Bk. 1. 3. 1258A38-1358B1

The greatest number of the divisions of a speech are exordium, statement, proof, peroration.

RH—Bk. 3. 13. 1414B7-11

The necessary divisions are the statement and the proof.

RH—Bk. 3. 13. 1414A30-31

Oration, Delivery of The points in reference to which they conduct their

inquiries are three, namely, the loudness of the voice, the fitness of its tones, and its rhythm.

RH—Bk. 3. 1. 1403B29-30

Orator The time proper to the deliberative orator is the future. The time proper to a judicial pleader is the past. To the demonstrative orator the present time is the most appropriate.

RH—Bk. 1. 3. 1358B14-20

All orators effect their demonstrative proofs by allegation either of enthymemes or examples and in no other way whatever.

RH—Bk. 1. 2. 1356B6-7

Orator, Ceremonial The aim of the ceremonial (demonstrative) orator is honor and disgrace; and these also refer other considerations to these two.

RH—1. 3. 1358B27-29

Orator, Judicial The aim of the judicial (forensic) orator is justice and injustice; but he also embraces by the way those other considerations.

RH—1. 3. 1358B25-27

Orator, Political The aim of the deliberative (political) orator is the expedient and inexpedient; for he who recommends, advises you to adopt a better measure; but he who dissuades, diverts you from the worse; the other considerations either of justice and injustice of honor and disgrace, he adjoins by the way in addition to these two.

RH—1. 3. 1358B20-25

Nearly all the questions on which the political (deliberative) orator harangues are five: questions of finance (ways and means), of war and peace, national defence, imports and exports and legislation. RH—1. 4. 1359b16-23

RH—1. 4. 1359B16-23

Oratory Three kinds of oratory are: the deliberative, judicial and demonstrative.

RH—Bk. 1. 3. 1358B6-8

Order Of all things there is order, and every time and life are measured by a period; except that all are not measured by the same period, but some things by a less and others by a greater.

DE G ET C—2. 11. 338B12-14

Ox-Flies Ox-flies are generated from wood.

DE H A—5. 19. 552A29

P

Pain Pain, however, is consequent to every thing which is done from compulsion.

M M—1. 12. 1188A2-3

It is pain which makes us abstain from doing what is noble.

N E—2. 2. 1104B10-11

Anger is attended by pain, hatred is not.

RH—BK. 2. 4. 1382A11

Palpitation The palpitation of the heart happens, as I may say, in man alone, because man alone entertains the hope and expectation of something future.

DE P A-3. 6. 669A19-21

Parados The parados is the first speech of the whole chorus.

P—12.1452B22-23

Paralogisms Besides all the above-named syllogisms, there are paralogisms, which consist of things peculiar to certain sciences, as happens to be the case in geometry, and those sciences allied to it.

T—1. 1. 101A5-8

Pardon The people should be allowed the power of pardoning, but not of condemning.

POL—BK. 4. 14. 1298B35-37

Paronym Things are called paronyms which, though differing in case, have their appellation from some thing.

CAT—1. 1A12

Part

A part is said to be in one way that into which any quantity whatsoever may be divisible.

ME-4. 25. 1023B12-13

Those things into which the species of animal may be divided without quantity also are called parts of this species. Wherefore they say that species are parts of genus, We further call those things parts into whatsoever anything is divided, or those things whereof the whole is made up; moreover those things contained in the definition are also parts of the whole. Wherefore the genus is called part of the species and in other respects the species is called a part of the genus.

ME—4. 25. 1023B17-25

A part measures.

PHY—4. 10. 218A6-7

Parts, Dissimilar All the dissimilar parts are composed of similar parts; the hand, for example, is composed of flesh, nerves, and bone.

H A—1. 1. 486A13-14

Participate To receive the definition of what is participated.

T—4. 1. 121A11-12

Partridge With respect to partridges, if the females stand opposite to the males when the wind blows, they become pregnant; and they frequently become pregnant even from the voice of the male, if they happen to be enflamed with the desire of coition.

DE H A—5. 5. 541A26-28

Passion As one of the categories. Passion, for example, ‘to be cut,’ ‘to be burned.’

CAT—4. 2A3-4

Admits of contraries and more and less.

CAT-9. 11B1-10

Passion is denominated, in one way, as quality according to which a thing admits of alteration.

ME—4. 21. 1022B15-18

The principle of all passions is condensation and rarefaction.

PHY-8. 7. 260B7-8

Passion being victorious causes the reasoning power to be at rest.

M M-2. 6. 1202A6-7

Hence it would seem that passion, when well disposed, is rather the principle of virtue than reason.

M M—2. 7. 1208B28-29

Vide: ACTION.

Passions of the Soul Spoken words are symbols of passions of the soul.

DE I—1. 16A3

Just as letters are not the same for all neither are speech sounds and yet the passions of the soul are the same in all and the things signified are the same.

DE I—1. 16A5-8

Passions (Emotions) Passions are all emotions whatsoever, on which pain and pleasure are consequent, by whose operation, undergoing a change, men differ in respect to their decisions: for instance, anger, pity, fear.

RH—2. 2. 1378A19-23

Passions and Actions I call passions and actions, generation, increase, copulation, wakefulness, sleep, progressive motion, and such other particulars as belong to animals.

DE PA—1. 5. 845B33-35

Past Memory is of the past.

DE M ET R—1. 449B15

Patriot The true patriot in a democracy ought to take care that the majority are not too poor.

POL—BK. 6. 5. 1320A32-34

Peculiarities The speculation of peculiarities is posterior to that of things common.

PHY—3. 1. 200B24-25

Peirastic Peirastic arguments are those which are conclusive from things appearing to the respondent, and which are necessary for him to know, who pretends to possess science.

S E—2. 165B4-6

Perceive To perceive sensibly is not similar to learning, but to contemplation.

DE S ET S—4. 441B22-23

Perception The sensible object is prior to the actual sensing.

CAT—7. 7B35

It is not possible to perceive two things by one sense at one and the same time, unless they are mingled.

DE S ET S—7. 447B15-18

Percussion There is no percussion without movement.

DE A-2. 8. 419B13

Perfect Perfect is denominated that beyond which it is not possible to assume anything or any one single portion.

ME—4. 16. 1021B12-13

Perfection Nothing is perfect which has not an end: and the end is a bound.

PHY-3. 6. 207A14-15

The perfect is naturally prior to the imperfect.

DE C—1. 2. 269A19-20

Period I call a period a form of words which has independently in itself a beginning and ending, and a length easily taken in at a glance.

RH—3. 9. 1409A35-1409B1

A period either consists of clauses or is simple.

RH—BK. 3. 9. 1409B13

Peroration The peroration is composed of four things—of getting the hearer favorable to one's self, and ill-disposed towards the adversary; and of amplification and extenuation; and of placing the hearer under the influence of the passions; and of awakening his recollection.

RH—BK. 3. 19. 1419B10-13

Perpetual Motion It is necessary that perpetual motion should be inherent in a divine nature.

DE C-2. 3. 288A10

Perpetuity It is impossible that a thing which once was not should afterwards be perpetual.

DE C—1. 12. 283B7-8

The genus of men, animals, and plants always is.

DE G A—2. 1. 731B35-732A1

Per Se Entities are said to subsist (exist) essentially whatsoever signify the figures of predication (categories); for as often as they are predicated, so often do they signify to be. Since, therefore, of the things that are predicated some signify what a thing is, or quiddity, and others quality, and others quantity, and others relation, and others action or passion, and some the place where, and others the when, to each of these the to be signifies the same thing.

ME-4. 7. 1017A22-27

Universals are per se but accidents are not per se but are predicated of singulars.

ME-4. 9. 1017B35-1018A2

Perspiciuity Proper words produce perspicuity.

P—22. 1458A18-19

Persuasion, Rhetorical Enthymemes are the very body of persuasion.

RH—1. 1. 1354A14-15

Persuasion We ought to be able to persuade on opposite sides of a question.

RH—Bk. 1. 1. 1355A29-30

The true and better side of the question is always naturally of a more easy inference and has, generally speaking, a greater tendency to persuade.

RH—Bk. 1. 1. 1355A36-38

Of means of persuading by speaking there are three species: some consist in the character of the speaker; others in the disposing the hearer a certain way; others in the thing itself which is said, by reason of its proving, or appearing to prove the point.

Persuasion by Example The common means of persuasion are example and enthymeme; example is of the nature of induction, which is a principle of reasoning. Of examples there are two species: for one is the quoting of real matters of fact which have actually taken place; another is the fabricating of them yourself; and of this method one species is illustration, the other fable, like those of Aesop and the African legends (Libyan).

RH-2. 20. 1393A23-30

Persuasiveness Men of no education have more persuasive influence over the mob than men of high acquirements.

RH—Bk. 2. 22.1395B26-27

Petitio Principii Men appear to beg what was in the beginning in five ways, most evidently, indeed, and primarily, if any one begs the very thing which ought to be demonstrated; this, however, does not easily escape notice, as to the thing itself, but rather in synonyms, and wherein the name and the definition signify the same thing. Secondly, when what ought to be demonstrated particularly, any one asks for, universally, as when endeavoring to show there is one science of contraries, he demands it to be altogether granted, that there is one of opposites, for he seems to beg together with many things, that which he ought to demonstrate per se. Thirdly, if any one proposing to demonstrate the universal, begs the particular; as if when it is proposed, that there is one science of all contraries, some one should require it to be granted, that there is one of certain contraries; for he also seems to beg per se separately, that which he ought to show, together with many things. Again, if a person dividing the problem begs the thing proposed for discussion; as if when it is necessary to show that medicine belongs to the healthy, and the diseased, he should claim each of these, to be granted separately. Or if some one should beg one of these, which are necessarily consequent to each other, as that the side of a square is incommensurate with the diameter, when he ought to show that the diameter is incommensurate with the side.

T-8. 13. 162B34-163A13

Vide BEGGING THE QUESTION.

Petitio Principii, Fallacy of Those fallacies which are from petitio principii arise in as many ways as it is possible to beg the original question; they seem, however, to confute from inability to perceive what is the same and what is

different.

S E-5.167A36-39

Phantasm The phantasm arising from the motion of sensible perceptions, when it presents itself to him who is asleep, so far as he is asleep, is a dream.

DE SOM-3. 462A29-31

Phantasms occur in dreams similar to images in water.

DE DIV-2. 464b8-9

It is not unreasonable to suppose that some of the phantasms which present themselves in sleep are the causes of the actions which we perform when awake.

DE DIV-1. 463A21-23

Those that are asleep have a greater perception of small inward motions than those that are awake. But these motions produce phantasms, from which future events about things of this kind are foreseen.

DE DIV-2. 464A16-19

Philosopheme Now a philosopheme is a demonstrative syllogism.

T-8. 11.162A15-16

Philosopher He that labors under perplexity and wonder thinks that he is involved in ignorance. Therefore, also, the philosopher —that is, the lover of wisdom—is somehow a lover of fables, for the fable is made up of the things that are marvelous.

ME-1. 2. 982B17-19

Philosophizing, Value of To philosophize is better than to acquire money, yet it is not more desirable to one in want of necessities.

T-3. 2. 118A10-11

Philosophy It is correct, also, that philosophy should be styled a science, speculative of the truth.

ME—1A. 1. 993B19-20

With regard to philosophy we must discuss these problems according to their truth; as regard dialectic, opinion suffices.

T—1. 14.105B30-31

The value of philosophical teaching cannot be measured in money.

Philosophy, Speculative Wherefore, according to this view of things, there would be three speculative philosophies; namely, the mathematical, the physical, the theological.

ME—5. 1. 1026A18-19

Philosophy (Metaphysics) Philosophy . . . contemplates everything so far forth as it is entity.

ME—10. 4. 1061B25-27

Physicist (Natural Philosopher) The entire attention of the physicist (natural philosopher) is engaged about those things that contain in themselves the principle of motion and rest.

ME—10.1. 1059B16-18

Physics (Natural Philosophy) To physics or natural science one ascribes the speculation of things as far forth as they partake of motion.

ME—10. 3. 1061B6-7

The investigation regarding sensible substance is the work of the physical and second philosophy; for not only is it necessary for the natural philosopher to afford information respecting matter, but also respecting that substance which is according to the definition, even still more.

ME-6. 11. 1037A14-17

Physics Since physics happens to be conversant about a certain kind of entity (for about such a sort of substance is it concerned in which is contained in itself the principle of motion and rest) it is evident that it is neither practical nor productive.

ME—5. 1. 1025B19-21

Physical science is conversant about things that are inseparable, to be sure, but not immovable.

ME—5. 1. 1026A13-14

Pity A sort of pain occasioned by an evil capable of hurting or destroying, appearing to befall one who does not deserve it, which one may himself expect to endure, or that some one connected with him will; and this when it appears near.

RH-2. 8. 1385B13-16

Placability Placability is a subsiding and appeasement of anger.

RH—Bk. 2. 3. 1380A7-8

Place The first immovable boundary of that which contains is place.

PHY—4. 4. 212A20-21

That there is such a thing, therefore, as place, appears to be evident from alternate mutation.

PHY—4. 1. 208B1-2

Place in a certain respect subsists together with the thing which it contains.

PHY—4. 4. 211A29-30

Place is not destroyed when the things which it contains are corrupted.

PHY—4. 1. 209A1-2

Place (a Continuous Quantity) Place is of the number of continuous things, for the parts of a body occupy a certain place, which parts join at a certain common boundary, wherefore also the parts of place, which each part of the body occupies, join at the same boundary as the parts of the body, so that place will also be continuous, since its parts join at one common boundary.

CAT—6. 5A18-21

Plane Every plane figure is either right-lined, or contained by a circumference.

DE C—2. 4. 286B13-14

Planets Each of the planets is moved with many motions.

DE C—2. 12. 293A1-2

Plant Plants live without having locomotion or sensibility, and many animals have not the use of intelligence.

DE A—1. 5. 410B25-26

Of plants, some only live for the space of a year, but others for a long time.

DE L ET B—1. 464B24-26

Plants are always renovated; and, therefore, they live for a long time.

DE L ET B—6. 467A12

The upward and downward parts are not only in animals, but also in plants.

DE IN-4. 705A29-31

In plants the male is not separated from the female.

DE G A-2. 4. 741A3-4

Platonic Forms It would seem impossible for the substance to be separate from that of which it is the substance, therefore in what way can the ideas, when they are substances of things, exist separately from them.

ME-1. 9. 991B1-3

The assertion that these forms are exemplars and that the rest of entities participate in them is to speak vain words and to utter poetic metaphors.

ME-1. 9. 991A20-22

Pleasure Pleasure is a psychical fact, and whatever a man is said to be fond of is pleasant to him.

N E—1. 9. 1099A8-9

Pleasure is a certain motion of the soul, and a settlement of it, at once rapid and perceptible, into its own proper nature.

RH-Bk. 1.11.1369B33-35

It is better to define it as an activity of the natural state of one's being.

N E—7. 13. 1153A14

Pleasures are an impediment to thoughtfulness.

N E—7.12.1152B16

Pleasure leaves the will free.

N E—3. 15. 1119A24

Pleasure is something which is whole and perfect.

N E—10. 3. 1174B7

It seems to be pleasure which most frequently deceives people, for pleasure appears to be good, and although it is not, the result is that they choose what is pleasant as if it were good, and avoid pain as if it were evil.

N E-3. 8. 1113A33-1113B2

Through pleasure, indeed, we act basely.

M M—1. 8. 1185B34-35

Pleasures are desirable, but not if they are immoral in their origin.

N E—10.2.1173B25-26

To make a good use of pleasures and pains is to be a good man, and to make a bad use of them is to be a bad man.

N E—2. 2. 1105A12-13

Pleasure is fostered in us all from early childhood, so that it is difficult to get rid of the emotion of pleasure, as it is deeply ingrained in our life.

N E—2. 2.1105A1-3

Bodily pleasures too, as being violent, are pursued by people who are incapable of finding gratification in other pleasures.

N E—7. 15. 1154B2-3

The same thing is never constantly pleasant to us.

N E—7. 15. 1154B20-21

Pleasure perfects life.

N E—10. 4. 1175A15-18

Pleasure is felt not by Man only but by the lower animals.

N E-2. 2. 1104B34-35

Plot The plot is the principal part and as it were the soul of tragedy.

P—6. 1450A38

A fable (plot) has an appropriate magnitude when the time of its duration is such as to render it probable that there can be a transition from prosperous to adverse, or from adverse to prosperous fortune, according to the necessary or probable order of things as they take place.

P—7. 1451A10-15

The plot, since it is an imitation of action, should be the imitation of one action, and of the whole of this, and the parts of the transactions should be so arranged, that any one of them being transposed, or taken away, the whole would become different and changed.

P—8. 1451A30-34

It is necessary that a plot which is well-constructed should be rather single

than twofold, and that the change should not be into prosperity from adversity, but on the contrary into adversity from prosperity, not through depravity but through some great error.

P—13.1453A12-16

I call the action simple from which taking place, as it has been defined, with continuity and unity, there is a transition without either reversal or discovery.

P-10. 1452A14-18

A plot is complex, from which there is a transition, together with discovery, or reversal, or both.

P—10. 1452A18-18

Solutions of fables ought to happen from the fable itself, and not from the machinery.

P-15. 1454A37-1454B2

In every tragedy there is a complication and unravelling.

P—18. 1455B24

Poet It is evident that a poet ought rather to be the author of plots than of metres, inasmuch as he is a poet from imitation, and he imitates actions. Hence, though it should happen that he relates things which have happened, he is no less a poet.

P—9. 1451B27-30

It is requisite that the poet should speak in his own person as little as possible: for so far as he does so he is not an imitator.

P-24. 1460A7-8

It is not the province of a poet to relate things which have happened, but such as might have happened, and such things as are possible according to probability, or which would necessarily have happened.

P—9. 1451A36-38

Poetry The style of poetry and that of prose is distinct.

RH—Bk. 3. 1. 1404A28

Two causes appear to have produced poetry in general. For to imitate is congenial to men from childhood.... Imitation, harmony, and rhythm being natural to us, the earliest among mankind, making a gradual progress in these things from the beginning, produced poetry from extemporaneous efforts.

P—4. 1448B4-24

Poetry is more philosophic, and more deserving of attention, than history. For poetry speaks more of universals, but history of particulars.

P—9. 1451B5-6

Point That which is indivisible in every direction is a point, if it involves a position.

ME—4. 6. 1016B25-26

Not every thing is either infinite or finite: as, for instance, passive quality or a point.

PHY—3. 4. 202B31-32

Pole It is evident therefore that the unapparent pole is the upward part of the heaven. DE C—2. 2. 285b22-23

DE C—2. 2. 285B22-23

Police As many persons stir up seditions that they may enjoy their own manner of living, there ought to be a particular officer to inspect the manners of all those whose lives are contrary to the interests of their own state.

POL—Bk. 5. 8. 1308B20-22

Polis When many villages join themselves perfectly together into one society, that society is a state (polis), and contains in itself, if I may so speak, the perfection of independence; and it is first founded that men may live, but continued that they may live happily. For which reason every state is the work of nature, since the first social ties are such; for to this they all tend as to an end, and the nature of a thing is judged by its tendency. For what every being is in its perfect state, that certainly is the nature of that being, whether it be a man, a horse, or a house; besides, its own final cause and its end must be the perfection of any thing; but a government complete in itself constitutes a final cause and what is best.

POL—Bk. I. 2. 1252B27-1253A1

Political Justice Political justice subsists by law and not by nature.

M—1. 34. 1195A7-8

Political justice is partly natural and partly conventional.

N E—5. 10. 1134B18-19

Political Science It is the political science or faculty which determines what sciences are necessary in states, and what kind of sciences should be learnt, and how far they should be learnt by particular people.

N E-1. 1. 1094A27-1094B2

The end of political science is the greatest good: justice.

POL—Bk. 3. 12. 1282B16-17

Politician The lawgiver and the politician should know well what preserves and what destroys the democracy of the people or the oligarchy of the few.

POL—Bk. 5. 9. 1309B35-37

The political character wishes to be conversant with beautiful actions.

EE—1. 4. 1215B3

Politics In politics, there is the government of the many, and the government of the few.

POL—Bk. 4. 3. 1290A15-18

Polity When the citizens at large direct their policy to the public good, it is called simply a polity.

POL—Bk. 3. 7. 1279A37-39

A polity is the ordering and regulating of the state, and all of its offices, particularly of that wherein the supreme power is lodged; and this power is always possessed by the administration.

POL—Bk. 3. 8. 1278B8-11

There are three kinds of polity. The polities are kingship, aristocracy, and a third depending on a property qualification, which it seems proper to describe as timocratic.... Of these, kingship is the best and timocracy the worst.

N E—8.12.1160A31-36

Poor In an oligarchy it is necessary to take great care of the poor, and to allot them public employments which are profitable.

POL—Bk. 5. 8. 1309A20-22

Position (as One of the Categories) To be situated, like ‘lying down’ or ‘seated.’

CAT-4. 2A2

Possession (as One of the Categories) To possess, as ‘to be shod,’ ‘armed.’

CAT—4. 2A3

Possession (to Have) Possession has many meanings: the action of a thing according to the nature of that thing or according to the impulse of it; as that in whatever anything is inherent as being receptive; as a thing that embraces the things that are comprised; that which hinders in accordance with its own force anything from motion or action is said to possess this very thing.

ME—4. 23. 1023A8-23

Possession It is impossible to have wealth or anything else without taking the trouble to have it.

N E-4. 2. 1120b18-19

Possibilities By possibilities I mean such things as may be effected by our own actions.

N E-3. 5. 1112B26-27

Possible To be possible and the possible I define to be that which, not being necessary, but being assumed to exist, nothing impossible will on this account arise, for we say that the necessary is possible equivocally.

P A—1. 13. 32A18-21

To be possible is predicated in two ways, one, that which happens for the most part and yet falls short of the necessary—for instance, for a man to become hoary, or to grow, or to waste, or in short whatever may naturally be, for this has not a continued necessity, for the man may not always exist, but while he does exist it is either of necessity or for the most part—the other way (the possible) is indefinite, and is that which may be possibly thus and not thus; or in short what occurs casually....

P A—1. 13. 32B4-13

Posterior and Prior Things which are posterior in generation are prior according to nature, and that which is last in generation is first by nature.

DE P A-2. 1. 646A25-27

Potentiality That thing the existence of which is potential admits of both being and not being.

ME—8. 8. 1050B11-12

It must be assumed that what is in potentiality is different from what is in act.

DE S ET S—6. 445B30-31

Vide: POWER.

Potentiality (Power) Potentiality is called the first principle of motion or change in another thing, or so far forth as it is another thing.

.ME—4.12.1019A15-16

Power The precise definition of the first potentiality would be a principle capable of bringing about a change in another thing, or so far forth as it is another.

ME-4. 12. 1020A4-6

Furthermore, power is the capacity of accomplishing this particular thing well, or doing so according to free-will.

ME—4. 12. 1019A23-24

Wherefore, is a thing powerful in respect of having a certain habit and first principle, and in respect of involving the privation of this, if it is admissible that it should involve privation.

ME—4. 12. 1019B8-10

No power pertains to that which has been, but to that which is, or will be.

DE C—1. 12. 283B13-14

If we take the various natural powers which belong to us, we first acquire the proper faculties and afterwards display the activities.

N E—2.1.1103A26-28

Let the regulation be made by the law, that no one shall have too much power by means either of his fortune or his friends.

POL—Bk. 5. 8. 1308B16-18

Power is not in the man who is member of the assembly or council, but in the assembly itself, and in the council and people, of which each individual of the whole community forms a part, as senator, adviser, or judge.

POL—Bk. 3. 11. 1282A34-37

Power, Supreme As to the fact that the supreme power ought to be lodged with the many, rather than with those of the better sort, who are few, there would

seem to be some doubt, though also some truth as well.

POL—BK. 3. 11. 1281A40-42

Practicable Good Practicable good likewise may be divided into that which is essentially good, and into that which is good with reference to something else which is essentially good.

E E-1. 7. 1217A35-37

Practical Science Of practical science the end is a work.

M E—1A. 1. 993B21

Praise Praise invariably implies a reference to a higher standard.

N E-1. 12. 1101B12-14

Predicated Some things are predicated of a certain subject yet are in no subject as ‘man’ is predicated of a subject, *i.e.* of some certain man, yet is in no subject.

CAT—2. 1A20-21

Predicated of All We say it is predicated of all when no instance of the subject can be found of which the term cannot be asserted.

P A—1. 1. 24B28-30

Predicated of None We say ‘to be predicated of none’ when no instance can be found of which it can be said.

P A—1. 1. 24B30

Predicates When one thing is predicated of another it will be predicated either in respect of what a thing is (the quiddity) or how it is, or how much, or a relative or an agent or a patient or where or when. Moreover, those which signify substance signify that the thing of which they are predicated is that which it is, or something belonging to it; but whatever do not signify substance, but are predicated of another subject, which is neither the thing itself nor something belonging to it, are accidents, as white is predicated of man.

PO A—1. 22. 83A21-28

Predication When one thing is predicated of another, as of a subject, whatever things are said of the predicate, may be also said of the subject.

CAT—3. 1B10

Pregnancy Pregnant women, also, are subject to all-various desires, and to a rapid change of their desires; which some call longing.

Premise The premises out of which enthymemes are deduced will be some of them necessary, but the greatest part contingent.

RH—Bk. 1. 2. 1357A30-32

Premiss Vide: PROPOSITION.

Present The present now is the boundary of the past and future time.

PHY—4. 13. 222A33-222B2

Present in a Subject I mean by a thing being in a subject, that which is in anything not as a part but which cannot subsist without that in which it is.

CAT—2, 1A22-24

A certain grammatical art is in a soul as in a subject but it is not predicated of a subject.

CAT—1. 1A25

A certain whiteness is in a subject, the body, for every color is in a body, but it is predicated of no subject.

CAT-2. 1A27

Primary What is primary and what is absolute, or simple, are strictly necessary.

ME—4. 5. 1015B11-12

Principle That is a principle from whence the first of a thing not inherent is produced, and whence motion and change have first been naturally fitted to commence, as for example the child from the father and the mother.

ME—4. 1. 1013A7-9

Principle is either the principle of a certain thing, or of a certain number of things.

PHY—1. 2. 185A4

Common to all first principles is the being the original from whence a thing either is, or is produced, or is known.

ME—4. 1. 1013A17-19

It is necessary that all principles should neither be produced from each other, nor from other things.

That is called a principle from whence each thing would proceed in the best manner.

ME—4.1.1013A1-2

Whence a thing is know first, this is called a principle of that thing.

ME—4. 1. 1013A14-15

That is a principle from whence is produced the first of a thing that is inherent.

ME—4. 1. 1013A4

Of principles, however, there is no other cause, since they are eternal.

PHY—8. 1. 252B4-5

I call those principles in each genus, the existence of which it is impossible to demonstrate.

PO A—1. 10. 76A31-32

It is impossible to demonstrate the proper principles of each thing, for they will be the principles of all things, and the science of them the mistress of all (sciences).

PO A—1. 9. 76A16-18

Some principles are from necessity, but others contingent.

PO A—1. 32. 88B7-8

That is called a principle from whence anything has had motion imparted to it in the first instance.

M E—4. 1. 1012B34-35

A principle is greater in power than in magnitude.

DE C—1. 5. 271B12

That is a principle according to the free impulse of which things in motion are moved, and things undergoing a change are changed.

ME—4. 1. 1013A10-11

Just as a geometer by no means disputes with one who denies the principles of his science . . . so one who seeks physical principles does not dispute with one who denies physical principles.

Principles, Derived From Experience Vide: EXPERIENCE.

Principles, First First principles are known through themselves, but what are subordinate to them are known through them.

P A-2. 16. 64B35-36

The first principle of that which may be known constitutes, in regard to each genus, the one.

ME-4. 6. 1016B20

A first principle must not be predicated of a subject; for then there would be a first principle of a first principle; for the subject is a principle and prior to its predicate.

PHY—1. 6. 189A30-32

But so far forth as we obtain a knowledge of each thing by means of the definitions, and so far as first principles are the genera of definitions, it is necessary also that first principles be the genera of things capable of definition.

ME—2. 3. 998B4-6

The most firm first principle of all is that concerning which there can be no possibility of deception, for such must needs be that which is most known ... and it must needs be independent of hypothesis . . . this principle is: for the same thing to be present and not be present at the same time in the same subject and according to the same is impossible. This is the most firm of all first principles.

ME—3. 3. 1005B11-23

Principles of Evil Actions The principles by whose motion men deliberately choose to hurt and do evil in contravention of law are depravity and moral weakness.

RH—1. 10. 1288B12-14

Prior A thing is said to be prior to another in four respects: first and most properly, in respect of time ... next, when it does not reciprocate according to the consequence of existence.... Thirdly, the prior is that predicated according to a certain order, as in the instance of science and discourses.... Moreover, the better and more excellent appear to be prior by nature.

CAT—12. 14A-B

That which in any respect is the cause of the existence of another may be said to be prior in this manner.

CAT—12. 14B12

Prior Analytics It is first requisite to say what is the subject concerning which and why the present treatise is undertaken, namely that it is concerning demonstration and for the sake of demonstrative science.

P A—1. 1. 24A10-11

Prior and Better Known The prior and better known are such in two ways: for what is prior in nature, is not the same as that which is prior in regard to us, nor what is more known (simply) the same as what is more known to us. Now I call things prior and better known to us those which are nearer to sense and things prior and more known simply, those which are more remote from sense; and those things are most remote which are especially universal, and those nearest which are singular, and these are mutually opposed.

PO A—1. 2. 71B33-72A5

Prior and Posterior Prior is that which is nearer a certain first principle defined either simply and by nature, or relatively, or according to place, or by certain things . . . other things prior and posterior are so in accordance with time.... Some things are prior and posterior according to motion, for that which is more immediate to the first moving power is prior . . . some things are prior according to potentiality, for that which is more potential is prior . . . also things are prior according to some order, as in a dance; in another way a thing is prior in knowledge as if it were absolutely prior; according to reason things that are universal are prior, but according to sense the singular are prior.

ME-4. 11. 1018B9-34

Privation Privation is considered in one way if something does not have those things which by nature can be possessed, even if it itself is not fit by nature to have them; as for example a plant is said to be deprived of eyes. Another way, that is termed privation if a thing be by nature fit to have a thing and yet does not have it, as a blind man deprived of sight; further is that privation, if a thing be by nature adapted to possess a quality, and when it is so adapted by nature to have it, it does not have it; further the violent removal of a thing is called a privation . . . moreover privation is found in the non-possession of a thing in every way.

ME—4. 22. 1022B22-1023A4

Privation is non-being per se.

Probability Probability is what usually happens. It belongs to the contingent and variable. RH—1. 2. 1357a34-36

RH—1. 2. 1357A34-38

Probabilities are those which appear to all, or to most men, or to the wise, and to those either to all or to the greater number, or to such as are especially renowned and illustrious.

T-1. 1. 100B21-23

Probability and sign are not the same, but the probable is what men know to have generally happened or not, or to be or not to be; this is a probability, for instance: that the envious, hate or that lovers show affection.

P A-2. 27. 70A3-7

Problems Of problems, some are universal but others particular.

T—2. 1. 108B37-38

The things with which syllogisms are conversant are problems. T—1. 4. 101b16

T—1. 4. 101B16

Procreation The most natural act for living beings which are complete and not abortive or produced by spontaneous generation is to produce another being like themselves.

DE A-2. 4. 415A26-28

The seed is prolific which resembles hail, and males are generated from it more than females; and thin seed, and which is without globules, is prolific of females.

H A-7. 1. 582A29-32

Produced That which has been produced must needs exist when first it has been produced.

ME—2. 4. 999B11-12

Production All things that are produced are produced by means of something, and from something, and become something.

ME-6. 7. 1032A13-14

Prologue

The prologue is the whole part of the tragedy, prior to the entrance of the chorus.

P-12. 1452B19-20

Proof Proof should be demonstrative.

RH—Bk. 3. 17. 1417B21

Property Property is that which does not show what a thing is, but is present to it alone, and is predicated convertibly with it. As it is the property of a man to be capable of grammar, for if he is a man he is capable of grammar, and if he is capable of grammar he is a man; since no one calls property that which may possibly be present with something else.

T—1. 5. 102A18-23

By property we understand all such things as have their value measured by money.

N E—4. 1. 1119B26-27

Property is assigned either per se and always, or with relation to something else and sometimes.

T—5. 1. 128B18-17

The use of property consists in spending and giving.

N E-4. 1. 1120A8-9

Property is necessary for states, but property is no part of the state.

POL—Bk. 7. 8. 1328A33-35

Property, Private It is very pleasant to oblige and assist our friends and companions, and strangers, which cannot be unless property be private; but this cannot result where they make the state too entirely one. And further, they destroy the offices of two principal virtues, modesty and liberality—modesty with respect to the female sex, for it is right to abstain from her who is another's; and liberality, as it relates to private property, without which no one can appear liberal, or do any generous action; for the office of liberality consists in imparting to others what is our own. This system of polity does indeed recommend itself by its good appearance, and specious pretences to humanity;

and the man who hears it proposed will receive it gladly, concluding that there will be a wonderful bond of friendship between all its members, particularly when anyone censures the evils which are now to be found in society, as arising from property not being common; as for example, the disputes which happen between man and man, upon their contracts with each other; the judgments passed to punish perjury, and the flattering of the rich; none of which arise from properties being private, but from the corruption of mankind. For we see those who live in one community and have all things in common, disputing with each other oftener than those who have their property separate; but we observe fewer instances of strife, because of the very small number of those who have property in common, compared with those where it is appropriated. It is also but right to mention not only the evils from which they who share property in common will be preserved, but also the advantages which they will lose; for viewed as a whole, this manner of life will be found impracticable. We must suppose then that the error of Socrates arose from the fact that his first principle was false; for we admit that both a family and a state ought to be one in some particulars, but not entirely so; for there is a point beyond which if a state proceeds towards oneness, it will be no longer a state.

POL—Bk. 2. 5.1263B5-34

Proportion Justice then is a sort of proportion; for proportion is not peculiar to abstract quantity, but belongs to quantity generally, proportion being equality of ratios and implying four terms at least.

N E—5. 6. 1131A29-32

Proportionate That which is just then is that which is proportionate, and that which is unjust is that which is disproportionate. It follows that this disproportion may take the form either of excess or defect.

N E—5. 7. 1131B16-18

Proposition A proposition is a sentence which affirms or denies something of something, and this is universal, or particular, or indefinite.

P A—1. 1. 24A18-17

I denominate universal, the being present with all or none; particular, the being present with something or not with something or not with every thing; but the indefinite, the being present or not being present, without the universal or particular (sign).

P A—1. 1. 24A18-20

It is necessary that every proposition contain a verb or the tense of a verb, for the definition of man, unless 'is' or 'was' or 'will be' or something of this kind, be added is not yet a proposition.

DE I—5.17A9-12

Not every sentence is a proposition, but only that in which there is truth or falsehood . . . as a prayer is a sentence but it is neither true nor false.

DE I—4. 17A2-5

Every proposition is either of that which is present, or is present necessarily or contingently.

P A—1. 2. 25A1-2

Every proposition and every problem shows either genus, property, or accident.

T—1. 4. 101B17-18

Some propositions are ethical, others physical, but others logical.

T—1. 14. 105B20

Proposition, Composite All other (propositions) are one by conjunction . . . those propositions are complex (composite) which indicate many facts or are without conjunction . . . a composite proposition is compounded of simple propositions.

DE I—5. 17A8-24

Propositions, Contradictory To every affirmation there is an opposite negation, and to every negation an opposite affirmation. And this is a contradiction: the affirmative and negative proposition with the same subject and predicate.

DE I—8. 17A31-35

Wherefore I say that affirmation is opposed to negation contradictorily when the affirmation signifies the universal and the negation what is not universal, as 'every man is white,' 'not every man is white.'

DE I—7. 17B16-19

We ought to consider these as opposite affirmations and negations: It is possible—it is impossible; it is contingent—it is not contingent; it is impossible—it is not impossible; it is necessary—it is not necessary; it is true—it is not true.

DE I—12. 22A11-13

Propositions, Contradictory Opposition of I say they are opposed contradictorily which refer ‘to all’ and ‘not to all’ and ‘to some’ and ‘to none.’

P A—2. 8. 59B8-10

Propositions, Contrary Now if anyone universally enunciates of a universal that something is and is not inherent, these propositions will be contrary.

DE I—7. 17B3-5

Contrarily opposed (propositions) are the universal affirmative and universal negative, as “every man is white,” “no man is white,” “every man is just,” “no man is just.”

DE I—7. 17B20-23

Propositions, Contrary Opposition of They are contrarily opposed as ‘to all’ and ‘to none’; ‘to some’ and ‘not to some.’

P A—2. 8. 59B10-11

Propositions, Conversion of It is necessary that the universal negative proposition of what is present should be converted in its terms; for instance, if ‘no pleasure is good,’ ‘neither will any good be pleasure.’ But an affirmative proposition we must of necessity convert not universally, but particularly, as if ‘all pleasure is good’ it is also necessary that ‘a certain good should be pleasure’; but of particular propositions we must convert the affirmative proposition particularly, since if ‘a certain pleasure is good,’ so also ‘will a certain good be pleasure’; a negative proposition need not be thus converted, since it does not follow if ‘man is not present with a certain animal’ ‘that animal also is not present with a certain man.’

P A—1. 2. 25A5-13

Proposition, Demonstrative A demonstrative proposition differs from a dialectical in this, that the demonstrative is an assumption of one part of the contradiction, for a demonstrator does not interrogate, but assumes; but the dialectical is an interrogation of contradiction. As regards forming a syllogism from either proposition, there will be no difference between the one and the other, since he who demonstrates and he who interrogates syllogizes by positing that something is or is not present with something.

P A—1. 1. 24A22-27

A proposition is demonstrative if it is true and obtained through principles

derived from the beginning.

P A—1. 1. 24A30-24B10

Proposition, Dialectical The dialectical proposition is an interrogation of contradiction to him who inquires; but to the one who syllogizes, it is an assumption of what seems and is probable.

P A—1. 1. 24B10-12

Proposition, Dialectical Differs from a demonstrative proposition.

Vide: PROPOSITION, DEMONSTRATIVE.

Proposition, Necessary By necessary propositions I mean those out of which a syllogism is adduced.

RH—Bk. 1. 2. 1357B4-5

Proposition, Negative It is necessary that the universal negative proposition of what is present should be convertible in its terms.

P A—1. 2. 25A5-6

A negative proposition need not be converted.

P A—1. 2. 25A12

A negative contingent proposition is not convertible.

P A—1. 17. 36B35-36

For the other propositions are converted, but the negative is not converted.

P A-2. 53A7-8

Proposition, Particular Affirmative The particular affirmative proposition is proved through the first figure and the third, in one mood in the first but in three moods in the third.

P A—1. 26. 42B35-38

Proposition, Particular Negative The particular negative is proved in all the figures, but in the first in one mood, in the second in two moods, in the third in three moods.

P A—1. 26. 42B38-40

Propositions, Rules for Conversion of A universal negative is universally convertible; but either affirmative proposition, particularly . . . but the particular

negative never converts.

P A—1. 3. 25A28-36

Proposition, Simple Simple propositions are either a simple affirmation or a simple denial . . . a simple proposition enunciates a simple fact or the parts of which form a simple whole.... A simple proposition asserts or denies something of something. A simple proposition is a significant expression regarding the presence or absence of something in a subject, according to the divisions of time.

DE I—5. 17A8-24

The affirmation and negation are simple which signify one thing of one, either of a universal taken universally, or otherwise as, “Every man is white,” “not every man is white,” “man is white,” “man is not white,” “no man is white,” “some man is white,” if ‘white’ signifies the same.

DE I—8. 18A13-17

Proposition, Syllogistic Wherefore a syllogistic proposition will be simply an affirmation or negation of something concerning something.

P A—1. 1. 24A28-30

Proposition, Universal Affirmative An universal affirmative is proved through the first figure alone and in one mood, only.

P A—1. 26. 42B32-33

Proposition, Universal Negative The universal negative (is proved) both through the first (figure) and the second; through the first in one mood; through the second in two moods.

P A—1. 26. 42B34-35

Prosperity Man, as being human, will require external prosperity.

N E—10. 9. 1178B33

Prosperous Watch should be kept in turn over those who are most prosperous in the city.

POL—BK. 5. 8. 1308B24-25

Prudence Prudence is an intellectual virtue, by conforming to which men have the faculty of actually determining on the subjects of the good and evil, which pertain to happiness.

RH—BK. 1. 9. 1388B20-22

Prudence is the antithesis of intuitive reason.

N E—6. 9. 1142A25

Prudence is a practical virtue.

NE—6 8. 1141B18

The sphere of prudence as of opinion is that which is variable.

N E—8. 5. 1140B27-28

Prudence consists not merely in knowledge but in capacity for moral action.

N E—7. 11. 1152A8-9

While virtue ensures the correctness of the end which is in view, prudence ensures the correctness of the means to it.

N E—6.13.1145A5-6

It is impossible for a man to be prudent unless he is good.

N E—6.13. 1144A36-1144B1

Prudence when alone is not perfect.

M M—1. 2. 1184A34-35

Prudence not only produces prosperity and virtue, but we also say that the prosperous do well, in consequence of prosperous fortune producing successful conduct.

E E-7. 14. 1246B37-1247A1

Prudence, in the strict sense, is generally taken to relate to one's own individual interests.

N E—6. 8. 1141B29-30

Public It is necessary that the freemen and the bulk of the people should have absolute power in some things; but these are such as are not men of property, nor have they any reputation for virtue. And so it is not safe to trust them with the first offices in the state, both on account of their injustice and their ignorance; from the one of which they are likely to do what is wrong, from the other to make mistakes. And yet it is dangerous to allow them no power or share in the government; for when there are many poor people who are excluded from office, the state must necessarily have very many enemies in it. It remains, then, that they should have a place in the public assemblies, and in determining causes.

POL—Bk. 3. 11. 1281B24-31

Public Office Men of family, independence, and fortune, with great propriety contend with each other for office; for those who hold office ought to be persons of independence and property: for a state can no more consist of all poor men, than it can of all slaves.

POL—Bk. 3. 12. 1283A16-19

A pretension to offices of state should be founded on those qualifications which are part of itself.

POL—Bk. 3. 12. 1283A14-16

If once you are obliged to look among the wealthy for men who have leisure to serve, the evil follows, that the greatest offices, of king and general, will soon become venal. For this principle makes riches of more account than virtue, and causes the state to grow more avaricious: for whatever those who have the chief power regard as honorable, the opinion of the citizens necessarily follows in their wake; and where the first honors are not paid to virtue, there the aristocratic form of government cannot flourish firmly.

POL—Bk. 2. 11. 1273A35-1373B1

Public Opinion The opinion of the multitude is to be neglected, though they nearly direct their attention to, and speak about every thing.

E E-1. 3. 1214B34-1215A2

Punishment Punishments are in a sense remedial measures.

N E-2. 2. 1104B16-17

Purpose We only purpose what may, as we think, be possibly effected by our own action.

N E—3. 4. 1111B25-26

Putrefaction All other things putrefy except fire.

DE M—4. 1. 379A14-15

Q

Quality By quality, I mean that according to which certain things are said to be what they are, *i.e.* such and such.

CAT—8. 8B25

One species of quality is called habit and disposition. Habit differs from disposition in that it is more lasting and stable. Knowledge and virtue are habits, for knowledge seems to be of those things which are more stable and removed with difficulty. . . . But those are termed dispositions which are easily moved and quickly changed, as heat, cold, disease, health and such things.

CAT—8. 8B26-36

Another kind of quality is that according to which we say that men are prone to pugilism or to the course, or to health, or to disease, in short, whatever things are spoken of according to natural powers, or weakness.

CAT-8 9A13

The third kind of quality consists of passive qualities and passions such as sweetness, bitterness, sourness and all their affinities, besides, warmth and cold and whiteness and blackness. Now that these are qualities is evident from the fact that their possessors are called such and such from them. (They are called passive qualities and passions) not from the fact that the possessors themselves suffer anything but from the fact that each of the above-mentioned qualities produces passion in the senses.

CAT—8. 9A28-9B10

The fourth kind of quality is figure and form which belong to a thing, besides straightness and curvedness and the like.... Thus a triangle or a square is said to be a thing of a certain quality.

CAT—8. 10A12

Quality is styled in one way the difference of substance.

ME—4. 14. 1020A33

Whatever besides quantity that inheres in substance.

ME—4.14.1020B6-7

Such things as supervene immediately upon birth from certain passions

difficult of removal are called qualities.

CAT—8. 9B35

Quality admits of contraries, as justice is contrary to injustice, and whiteness is contrary to blackness and the like. ... This does not happen in all cases for to the yellow or the pale or such like colors, though they are qualities, there is no contrary.

CAT-8. 10B12-15

What is white may be more or less white than another and the beautiful is said to be more or less beautiful than another. And one and the same is said to be more or less, as a body which is white is said to be whiter now than what it was before; and what is hot may be more or less hot.

CAT—5. 3B38-42

VIDE ALSO CAT—8.10B25

Whatever is changed in quality is so changed by sensibles.

PHY—7. 3. 245B2

Quality (as One of the Categories) Examples of quality are like ‘white,’ ‘grammatical.’

CAT—4. 1B25-28

Quality and Quantity Every city is made up of quality and quantity: by quality I mean liberty, riches, education, and nobility, and by quantity the excess of its population. POL-Bk. 4.12.1296b17-19

POL-Bk. 4. 12. 1296B17-19

Quantity Quantity is said to be that which is divisible into things that are inherent, of which either or each is adapted by nature to be a certain thing and a certain particular thing of this sort.

ME—4. 13. 1020A7-8

Quantity is not substance but rather that wherein qualities are inherent primarily, that is substance.

ME—6. 3.1029A15-16

Of quantity, one kind is discrete, and another continuous; the one consists of parts, holding position with respect to each other, but the other of parts which have not that position.

CAT-6. 4B20

It is the special peculiarity of quantity to be called 'equal' and 'unequal.'

CAT—6. 6A26

Quantity does not appear capable of the greater and the less.

CAT—6. 6A19

Nothing is contrary to quantity. CAT-6.

CAT—6. 5B12

Quantity (as One of the Categories) To speak generally ... examples of quantity are like 'two cubits,' 'three cubits.'

CAT—4. 1B25

Quantity, Continuous Quantity is either discrete or continuous; the one (continuous) consists of parts holding position with respect to each other ... continuous as line, surface, body, time and place ... a line is continuous for you may take a common term at which its parts meet, namely, a point, and of a surface, a line. Of the same sort are time and place, for the present time is joined both to the past and to the future. Again place is of the number of continuous things for the parts of a body occupy a certain place, which parts join at a certain common boundary, wherefore also the parts of place, which each part of the body occupies, join at the same boundary as the parts of the body, so that place will also be continuous, since its parts join at one common boundary.

CAT—6. 4B20-5A1-15

Quantity, Discrete Parts have within them no relative position to each other. Discrete quantity is as number and speech ... of the parts of number there is no common term by which its parts conjoin, as if 5 be a part of 10, 5 and 5 conjoin at no common boundary....

CAT—6. 4B25

Quantity of Quality So denominated by accident. If a man were to explain the quantity of whiteness, he will define it by the surface for as the quantity of the surface so is the quantity of the whiteness.

CAT—6. 5B1

Quarrel Men quarrel concerning something of moment.

POL—Bk. 5. 4. 1303B18

Questions There are four kinds of questions we ask: whether a thing is so, why

it is so, if it exists, what it is.

PO A—2. 1. 89B23-25

R

Rabies Of the diseases of dogs, rabies makes them mad; and those who are bitten (by mad dogs) are infected with rabies except man.

DE H A—8. 22. 604A5-7

Rain Rain and dew are the same.

DE M—1. 11. 347B17

Water, therefore, when generated, causes the winds to cease, and when they cease rain is from these causes produced.

DE M—2. 4. 361A3-4

Rainbow The rainbow indeed is formed in the day ... and it is produced in the night, but seldom. The reason is, that in darkness colors are concealed.

DE M—3. 2. 327A21-25

Rare A thing is said to be rare from the fact that its parts are distant from each other.

CAT—8. 10A22

Ratio Always that which is higher is to that which is under it as form to matter.

DE C—4. 3. 310B14-15

There is no ratio of the infinite to the finite.

DE C—1. 8. 274A5-6

Ratiocination Deliberation and ratiocination are identical.

N E—6.1.1139A12-13

Reason Reason is the principle, as well in the productions of art, as in things which have a natural subsistence.

DE P A—1. 1. 639B14-16

All correction, rebuke and exhortation is a witness that the irrational part of the soul is in a sense subject to the influence of reason.

N E—1. 13. 1102B33-1103A1

Reasoning Reasoning is an argument in which certain things being laid down,

something different from the posita happens from necessity through the things laid down.

T—1. 1. 100A25-27

I call those forms of reasoning properly logical or rhetorical, in reference to which I use the expression places; such are those which apply with equal advantage to questions of justice, and natural philosophy, and of the philosophy of social life, and to numerous other subjects which differ in species.

RH—BK. 1. 2.1358A10-14 RH—BK.

Reasoning, Method of The method of proceeding in all (problems) both in philosophy and in every art and discipline, is the same, for we must collect about each of them those things which are with, and the subjects which they are with, and be provided with as many as possible of these, considering them also through three terms in one way subverting, but in another constructing according to truth (we reason) from those which are truly described to be inherent, but as regards dialectic syllogisms (we must reason) from probable propositions.

P A—1. 30. 46A3-10

Reasonings, Peculiar I call peculiar reasonings all those reasonings which arise out of propositions conversant with each species and genus of subjects.

RH—BK. 1. 2. 1358A16-17

Recessives Children resemble their ancestors from whom nothing has come but the resemblances occur after many births as in the case of the woman of Elis who slept with an Ethiopian; she did not bear an Ethiopian daughter but the son born of her daughter was an Ethiopian.

DE G A—1. 18. 722A8-11

Recognition Recognition of something may involve the previously known and also knowledge acquired at the same time, as of things falling under the universal of which he already has knowledge; for someone knew before that every triangle has angles equal to two right angles, but that this which is in a semi-circle is a triangle, he knew at the same time by induction.

PO A—1. 1. 71A17-21

Recollection Recollection comes from the soul, and extends to the movements or remains of movements in the sense organs.

DE A—1. 4. 408B17-19

The recollection of time is twofold. For sometimes we do not remember it with measure, as that we did a certain thing on the third day, and sometimes we remember it with measure.

DE M ET R—2. 452B29-453A2

Recreation A person who is fond of amusing himself is one who carries his recreation to excess.

N E—7. 8.1150B18-19

Rectilinear A rectilinear body when revolving in a circle will never occupy the same place.

DE C—2. 4. 287A15-16

Reflection Among all animals, man alone has the prerogative of reflection.

H A—1. 1. 488B24-25

Reflex The reflex is that which consists of periods.

RH—Bk. 3. 9. 1409A34-35

Refrigeration Refrigeration is necessary to the preservation of the animal life; to guard against extinction by excess of heat.

DE R—8. 474B23-24

Refutation A refutation (elenchus) is a syllogism of contradiction.

P A—2. 20. 66B11

A refutation is a syllogism with a contradiction of the given conclusion.

S E—1. 165A2-3

Rejection There are three things which influence us to eschew them, viz. the shameful, the injurious, and the painful.

N E-2. 2. 1104B31-32

Relation (as one of the Categories) Like ‘double,’ ‘half,’ ‘greater than’ are relations.

CAT—4. 1B26-27

Relatives They are denominated, some of them, as a twofold to a half, and a threefold to a third, and in general, a multiple to a submultiple, and excess to that which is exceeded.

ME-4. 15. 1020B26-28

Relatives may have contraries as virtue is contrary to vice, each of them being relatives, and knowledge is contrary to ignorance. But contrariety is not inherent in all relatives, since there is nothing contrary to double, triple and things of this sort.

CAT—7. 6B15-18

All relatives, if properly designated, have a correlative.

CAT—7. 7A23

Habit, disposition, perception, knowledge and position are relatives . . . habit is said to be the habit of some one, knowledge the knowledge of something, and position the position of something, and so of the rest.

CAT—7 6B3-5

He who knows any one relative definitely, will also know what it is referred to, definitely.

CAT—7. 8A35-36

Some things are termed relatives, which are said to be what they are, from belonging to other things, or in whatever other way they may be referred to something else.

CAT—7. 6A23-25

Relatives (Admit of Variation of Degree) Relatives appear to admit of more and less, for the like and unlike are said to be so more and less and the equal and unequal are so called more or less, each of them being a relative, for the similar is said to be similar to something and the unequal, unequal to something. Yet, not all relatives admit of more and less, for double is not called more or less double, but all relatives are styled so by reciprocity as the servant is said to be servant of the master, and the master, master of the servant; and the double, double of the half, also the half, half of the double.

CAT—7. 6B20-30

Relative to Absolute, Fallacy of Other fallacies arise from some particular thing being said to be simply when it is so in a certain respect.

S E—5. 166B37-167A1

Relaxation Relaxation is not an end.

N E—10. 6. 1178B35-1177A1

Religion The fortunate are lovers of the gods, and are disposed toward the deity with a sort of confidence, in consequence of the goods which have accrued to them from fortune.

RH—BK. 2. 17. 1391B2-4

Remembering Man alone has the gift of reminiscence.

H A—1.1. 488B26

Remembrance From repeated remembrance of the same thing we get experience, for many remembrances in number constitute one experience.

PO A—2. 19. 100A3-5

We rapidly remember those things which frequently employ our thoughts.

DE M ET R-2. 452A28-29

Reminiscence When, therefore, we exercise reminiscence, we are moved according to some one of prior motions, as long as we are moved, after which the recollection of what we investigate occurs.

DE M ET R—2. 451B16-18

Reminiscence differs from learning again, because he who exercises the former may in a certain respect be moved by himself to that which is posterior to the principle; but when he cannot accomplish this by himself, but through another, he no longer remembers.

DE M ET R—2. 452A4-7

Renown We call, however, those arts burdensome, which are alone exercised for the sake of obtaining renown.

E E-1. 4. 1215A29-30

Resemblance For the most part, indeed, females more resemble their mother, but males their father.

DE H A—7. 6. 586A4-6

Resistance Resisting substances suffer something; but those which do not resist suffer nothing.

DE M—3. 1. 371A24-25

Respect No one person can be entitled to unlimited respect.

N E—9. 2. 1164B30-31

Respiration Nature caused animals to employ the power of respiration for the purpose of perceiving the odors of food.

DE S ET S—5. 444A25-27

Respiration is not common to all animals.

DE P A-3. 1. 662A16-18

Rest Rest is contrary to motion.

CAT—14. 15B1

Rest in its nature partakes of unity.

ME-3. 2. 1004B28-29

There is an activity not only of motion but of immobility, and pleasure consists rather in rest than in motion.

N E—7. 15. 1154B26-28

Restitution The restitution of a depraved nature is depraved; but of a good nature is good.

M M—2. 7. 1205B12-13

Retaliation Retaliation also is just.

M M-1. 34. 1194A28

Retaliation brings a feeling of relief.

N E—4. 11. 1126A21-22

Revolt Commotions arise in aristocracies partly because there are so few persons in power.... They will happen also when some great men are disgraced by those who have received higher honors than themselves, but to whom they are in no ways inferior in abilities; or when an ambitious man cannot get into power.... And also when some are too poor, and others too rich, which will most frequently happen in time of war.... They arise also when some person of very high rank might still be higher if he could rule alone.

POL—Bk. 5. 7. 1306B22-1307A3

Revolution Revolutions are brought about in two ways, either by violence or fraud.

POL—Bk. 5. 4. 1304B8

The people do not easily change, but love their own ancient customs; and it is by small degrees only that one thing gains place from another; so that the ancient

laws remain in force, while the power is with those who bring about a revolution in the state.

POL—Bk. 4. 5. 1292B17-21

Democracies will be most subject to revolutions from the dishonesty of their demagogues.

POL—Bk. 5. 5. 1304B20-21

An oligarchy is also subject to revolutions when the nobility spend their fortunes in luxury.

POL—Bk. 5. 6. 1305B39-40

Rhetoric Rhetoric is a faculty of considering all the possible means of persuasion on every subject.

RH—Bk. 1. 2. 1355B26-27

The means of persuasion alone come properly within the sphere of the art, other things are merely additions.

RH-1. 1. 1354A13-14

It is plain that it is concerned with the means of persuasion, and as this is a sort of proof (because we are then most persuaded when we conceive that the point has been proved) but the proof of rhetoric is enthymeme ... and the enthymeme is a sort of syllogism.

RH—1.1. 1355A3-8

There are three types of rhetoric: deliberative (political), judicial (forensic) and demonstrative (ceremonial).

RH—1. 3. 1358B6-8

Its business is not absolute persuasion, but to consider on every subject what means of persuasion are inherent in it.

RH—Bk. 1. 1. 1355B9-10

Rhetoric is the counterpart of logic (dialectic), since both are conversant with subjects of such a nature as it is the business of all to have a certain knowledge of, and which belong to no distinct science.

RH—1. 1. 1354A13

Rhetoric is made up of the science of logic and of that branch of the science of social life which recognizes the subject of morals. RH—Bk. 1. 4. 1359b9-11

RH—BK. 1. 4. 1359B9-11

Rhetoric is made up of the science of logic and of that branch of the science of social life which recognizes the subject of morals; and it partly resembles logic, partly the declamations of the sophists: and in exact proportion as one shall attempt to get up logic or rhetoric, not as they are general faculties but as distinct sciences, he will unwittingly do away their nature by his encroaching, in the act of so tricking them out, upon sciences of certain definite subject-matter, and not of words and forms of reasoning.

RH—1. 4. 1359B9-16

Rhetoric supplies itself from subjects which are usual matters of deliberation.

RH—BK. 1. 2. 1356B36-1357A1

Rhetoric is useful, because truth and justice are in their nature stronger than their opposites.

RH—BK. 1. 1. 1355A20-22

Deliberative is more difficult than judicial rhetoric.

RH—BK. 3. 17. 1418A21-22

Of demonstrative the business is partly praise, partly blame.

RH—BK. 1. 3. 1358B10-11

All reasonings of the orator are derived from four sources, and these four are probability, example, proof positive, and signs.

RH—BK. 2. 25. 1402B12-14

Rhetoric, Propositions of Positive proofs, probabilities and signs are the types of proof available to the rhetorician generally.

RH—1. 3. 1359A7-8

Rhythm The diction ought to be measured, yet without metre; for what is destitute of measure is displeasing and indistinct. But by number all things are measured; and in modeling the diction, the number is rhythm, of which the metres are certain divisions. Hence the sentence should possess rhythm, though not metre; for then it will become verse; and its very rhythm should be without preciseness.

R H—3. 8. 1408B27-31

Rich In an oligarchy it is necessary, if any of the rich insult the poor, to let their

punishment be severer than if they insulted one of their own rank.

POL—BK. 5. 8. 1309A22-24

In democracies it is necessary that the rich should be protected, not only by not permitting their lands to be divided, but not even the produce of them.

POL—BK. 5. 8. 1309AL4-16

Riches It should seem that some boundary should be set to riches, though in practice we see the contrary taking place; for all those who get riches add to their money without end.

POL—BK. I. 9. 1257B32-34

Nature is stable and firm, but not riches.

E E—7. 2. 1238A12-13

Rights Private individuals have the right of indicting any officers of state they like for violating the laws, while such as are so indicted have also an appeal to the court of justice, if the Council finds them guilty.

C—45

Rivalry Where there is rivalry, there is also victory.

RH—BK. 1. 11. 1371A6

River All rivers, however, which do not flow into others, are seen to end in the sea; but no one is seen to end in the earth; for though they disappear, yet they again emerge.

DE M—2. 2. 356A22-24

Rough (A thing is said to be rough) because of the fact that one part rises above another.

CAT—8. 10A24

S

Sagacity (Ready Wit) Sagacity is a certain happy extempore conjecture of the middle term, as if a man perceiving that the moon always has that part lustrous which is toward the sun, should straightway understand why this occurs, viz. that it is illuminated by the sun.

PO A—1. 34. 89B10-13

Same “The same,” to speak in general terms, may appear to be divided in three ways, since we are accustomed to call something ‘the same’ either in number, in species or in genus: in number, when the names are many but the thing one, as a garment and a vestment; in species, when the things being many are without specific difference, as man with man, and horse with horse . . . they are the same in genus which are under the same genus as man and horse.

T—1. 7. 103A6-14

Those (things) which being derived from the same genus are by division mutually opposed, are said to be mutually simultaneous.

CAT—13. 14B33

Sameness It is evident that sameness is a certain unity of the being of either many things, or when one employs anything as many.

ME-4. 9. 1018A7-9

Science In every kind of theoretical investigation and every way of teaching, whether the more noble or the more ignoble, there appears to be two notions of proficiency: the one is called science while the other is a sort of skill, or education.

DE P A—1. 1. 639A1-4

Science, therefore, is conversant with that which may be scientifically known, and this is evolved in conjunction with demonstration and reason.

M M—1. 34. 1196B37-1197A1

We consider that we have scientific knowledge as opposed to a sophistical way of knowing through accidentals when we consider that we know the cause on account of which a thing is, that it is the cause of that thing, and that the latter cannot be otherwise.

PO A—1. 2. 71B9-12

Science is universal, and subsists through things necessary, and what is necessary cannot subsist otherwise than it does.

PO A—1. 33. 88B31-32

Science and intellect are always true, and no other kind of knowledge, except intellect, is more accurate than science.

PO A—2. 19. 100B7-9

All sciences communicate with each other according to common principles, and I mean by common those which men use as demonstrating from these, but not those alone which they demonstrate, nor that which they demonstrate, and dialectic is common to all sciences.

PO A—1. 11. 77A26-29

The scientific knowledge of each thing is had when we know the essence of each thing.

ME—6. 6. 1031B6-7

Sciences are distinguished into the speculative, the practical and the productive.

T—8. 1. 157A10-11

It is evident that there is no science of those things that are in a state of flux.

ME-12. 4. 1078B16-17

The most accurate of the sciences are those respecting things that are primary.

ME—1. 2. 982A25-26

It may be said that all science is capable of being taught, and that that which is an object of science is capable of being learnt.

N E-6. 3.1139B25-26

Is in the soul as in a subject, but it is predicated of a subject, viz. ‘grammar.’

CAT—2. 1B1

But some things are both predicated of and are in a subject, as ‘science’ (knowledge) is in the soul but is predicated of a subject, grammar.

CAT—2. 1A34

Sciences are conversant about all things that are universal.

ME—2. 6. 1003A14-15

Science is a mode of conceiving universal and necessary truths.

N E-6. 6. 1140B31-32

The corruption of science is oblivion and deception.

DE L ET B—2. 465A23

Science is impossible without reasoning.

N E—6. 6. 1140B35

Science and demonstrative syllogism are not concerned with indefinites (or possibles) because the middle (term) is irregular, but to those things which may naturally exist.

P A—1. 13. 32B18-20

Science then may be defined as a demonstrative state of mind, *i.e.* a state in which the mind exercises its faculty of demonstration.

N E—6. 3. 1139B31-33

Science therefore is productive of pleasure.

M M—2. 7. 1206A7-8

Science and Its Object The more valuable and honorable the object of a science, the more valuable and honorable the science.

RH—1. 7. 1364B7-8

Science, Demonstrative For all demonstrative science is concerned with three things; those which it lays down as existing, the subject genus whose essential properties the science considers; and common things called axioms, from which as primaries they demonstrate; and thirdly, the attributes the signification of which the science assumes.

PO A—1. 10. 76B11-16

If then to know is what we have laid down, it is necessary that demonstrative science should be from things true, first, immediate, more known than, prior to and the causes of the conclusion, for thus there will be the appropriate first principles of whatever is demonstrated.

PO A—1. 2. 71B19-23

Science (Knowledge), Process of Acquiring From sense, memory is produced,

but from repeated remembrance of the same thing, we get experience, for many remembrances in number constitute one experience. From experience, however, the universal now established in the soul, the one beside the many, which is a single unit within them all, the principle of art and science arises: if it is conversant with coming-to-be, art; if with being, it is science. We conclude that these states of knowledge are neither innate in a determinate form nor are they produced from other habits more known, but from sensible experience, as when a flight occurs in battle, if one soldier makes a stand, another stands, and then another, until the fight is restored ... when one of the individuals has made a stand, the first universal is formed in the soul, for the singular is indeed perceived by sense, but the content is of the universal, of man, not the man Callias. Again, the intellect stops in the individuals until they constitute the universal as from such an animal to animal, *etc.* It is clear, therefore, that primary things become necessarily known to us by induction, for thus sensible perception produces the universal....

PO A-2. 19. 100A3-100B5

Scientific Knowledge It is manifest that they (the philosophers) went in pursuit of scientific knowledge for the sake of understanding it, and not on account of any utility that it might possess.

ME—1. 2. 982B20-21

Neither is it possible to have scientific knowledge through sensation.

PO A—1. 31. 87B28

Science, Man of Neither is everyone who possesses science to be questioned about everything, nor is every question to be answered, but only those which concern the science in question.

PO A—1. 12. 77B6-9

Scientist We are said to be scientists because we possess a particular branch of knowledge.

CAT—8. 11A35

Sea The sea will never become dry. For that which before ascended, will again descend into the sea.

DE M-2. 3. 356B25-26

Security The definition of security is the having possession there and in such manner that the enjoyment of the property is one's own.

Sedition On account of profit and honor men rouse themselves against each other.... The other causes are haughtiness, fear, eminence, contempt, envy of those whose fortunes are beyond their rank. There are also other things which in a different manner occasion revolutions, as contention, neglect, want of numbers, and too great disparity of circumstances.

POL—Bk. 5. 2. 1302A38-1302B3

Inequality is always the occasion of sedition.

POL—Bk. 5. 1. 1301B28-30

Some raise seditions through desire of equality. Others do the same by not being content with equality, but aiming at superiority.

POL—Bk. 5. 2. 1302A26-28

They pursue their aim justly, when those who are inferior raise sedition for the sake of equality; unjustly, when those who are equal do so for superiority.

POL—Bk. 5. 2. 1302A29-31

Those who have been guilty of crimes will be the cause of sedition through fear of punishment.

POL—Bk. 5. 3. 1302B21-22

Seed Seed is surplus.

DE L ET B—5. 466B8

Seed is the principal and the efficient of that which proceeds from it.

DE P A—1. 1. 641B29

Seed is twofold, *from which*, and *of which*.

DE P A—1. 1. 641B33

Self-Knowledge When we wish to know ourselves, we shall obtain this knowledge by beholding our friends.

M M—2. 15. 1213A22-23

Self-Love A good man ought to be a lover of self, as by his noble deeds he will benefit himself and serve others.

N E—9. 8. 1169A11-13

Self-Sufficient We define the self-sufficient as that which, taken by itself, makes life desirable, and wholly free from want and this is our conception of happiness.

N E—1. 5. 1097B14-16

The man who is sufficient to himself, will also be in want of friendship.

M M—2. 15. 1213B1-2

Semen Semen is a superfluity of useful and ultimate nutriment.

DE G A—1. 18. 726A26-27

Semivowel That which has an audible sound with percussion.

P—20. 1456B27-28

Sensation Sensation consists in being moved and in experiencing something; and it appears to be a sort of alteration that the being undergoes.

DE A—2. 5. 416B33-35

Sensation appears to be a kind of qualitative change.

DE A—2. 4. 415B24

Sensation arises from externals.

DE A—1. 4. 408B16-17

The object of sensation is prior to the sense. If the sensible is removed, sensation ceases; but if sensation ceases that does not destroy the sensible object.

CAT—7. 7B35-40

Nothing suffers without sensation.

DE C-2. 9. 290B33

Sensation of particular things is always true, even in animals.

DE A—3. 3. 427B12-13

Sensation is effected through the sanguineous parts.

DE P A—2. 10. 656B-19-20

Where there is sensation, there is pleasure and pain.

DE A—2. 2. 413B23

Sense The sense is that which receives the sensible forms without matter.

DE A—2. 12. 424A17-19

Each sense is in the organ in so far as the organ is special.

DE A—3. 2. 426B8-9

Each sense is related to its own particular class of sensible qualities.

DE A—3. 2. 426B7-9

Sense is a ratio.

DE A-3. 2. 426B3

Sense is produced by the medium which is between sense and the sensible object being moved, that is to say it is produced by contact and not effluvia.

DE S ET S—3. 440A18-20

There are only five ordinary senses, I mean sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch.

DE A—3. 1. 424B22-23

All the possible senses are possessed without exception by animals that are neither incomplete nor mutilated.

DE A—3. 1. 425A9-10

In order to live, it is not only necessary that the animal feels when it touches objects, it is necessary that it feels them from a distance; and that is what happens, if it can feel through an intermediary because then this intermediary is affected and set in motion by the object that feels and the being is then set in motion by the intermediary.

DE A—3. 12. 434B26-29

Sense is not deceitful in what falls within its own peculiar province, but imagination is not the same with sense.

M E—3. 5. 1010B2-3

Sense is a certain knowledge.

DE G A—1. 23. 731A33-34

It is impossible for an animal to exist without sense.

DE P A-2. 1. 647A21

The first sense that belongs to all animals is touch.

DE A-2. 2. 413B4

The most developed sense in man is touch; in the second place, taste. In respect of the other senses, he is inferior to many animals.

H A—1. 15. 494B16-18

Without sense neither sleep nor wakefulness is present.

DE S—1. 454B28-29

We are easily deceived about the senses, when we are disturbed by any passions.

DE SOM—2. 460B3-4

By nature, then, indeed, are animals formed endowed with sense; but in some of them memory is not innate from sense, and in others it is.

ME—1. 1. 980A27-980B22

Sense Object Sense itself is not of itself, but there is something else different from and independent of sense which must needs be prior to sense, for the moving cause is prior in nature to that which is being moved.

ME—3. 5. 1010B35-1011A1

Senses and Their Relationship to Induction and Demonstration Vide
INDUCTION - DEMONSTRATION - UNIVERSALS.

Sensible Sensibles can be taken in a three-fold manner: and within these three, two are indeed directly (per se) sensible and the other is indirectly sensible (per accidens); of the directly sensible one is proper to each sense and the other common to all. I say that the proper sensible is what cannot be sensed by another sense and about which error is impossible, as color as regards vision; common sensibles are motion, rest, number, figure, and magnitude (size). The indirectly sensible is considered, as for instance a certain white thing is the son of Diares; this is accidentally or indirectly sensed.

DE A—2. 6. 418A8-22

The act of the sensible object and the act of sensation are one and the same act.

DE A—3. 2.—425B25-26

Every thing sensible subsists in matter.

DE C—1. 9. 278A11

If animal is destroyed, sense is destroyed. But the sensible will remain, such as, body, warm, sweet, bitter and all the rest which are sensibles.

CAT—7. 8A4-5

All things sensible are in a process of corruption, and are in motion.

ME—2. 4. 999B4-5

All sensibles have contrariety, as in color, white is contrary to black; and in sapsors, the sweet to the bitter.

DE S ET S—4. 442B17-19

That every thing sensible is magnitude, and that what is indivisible is not sensible, is evident.

DE S ET S—7. 449A20-21

Sensibility Sensibility cannot be exercised without the body.

DE A-3. 4. 429B5

When there is sensibility, there is appetite.

DE A-2. 3. 414B1-2

Sensible Perception They (animals) have an innate power, of judging, which they call sensible perception.

PO A—2. 19. 99B35

Sensoria The sensoria of the touch and the taste are near the heart.

DE S ET S-2. 439A1-2

Sensorium The sensorium is the recipient of sensibles.

DE P A—2. 1. 647A28

The sensorium of the odorable is in the head.

DE S ET S—5. 445A25-26

The sensorium of smelling is very reasonably situated between the eyes.

DE P A—2. 10. 656B31-32

Sensual Pleasures Those who set themselves to live well often confine their view to the enjoyment of sensual pleasures; so that as this also seems to depend upon what a man has, all their care is to get money, and hence arises the second

species of money-getting; for as their enjoyment is in excess, they seek means proportionate to supply this excess of enjoyment; and if they cannot do this merely by the art of dealing in money, they will endeavor to do it by other ways, and apply all their powers to a purpose which is not according to nature.

POL—Bk. I. 9. 1258A2-10

Sentence A sentence is voice significant by compact, of which any part separately possesses signification, as indeed a word, yet not as affirmation or negation.

DE I—4. 16B26-28

A composite significant sound of which certain parts of themselves signify something . . . it is one in a twofold way: it is either that which signifies one thing or that which becomes one by conjunction.

P—20. 1457A23-28

Sentiments The parts of these are to demonstrate, to refute, and to excite the passions; such as pity, or fear, or anger, and such like; and besides these, to amplify and extenuate.

P—19. 1456A37-1456B2

Separation Form and matter are not separated from the thing, but place may be separated from it. PHY—4. 2. 209b22-24

PHY—4. 2. 209B22-24

Servility In many instances human nature is servile.

ME—1. 2. 982B29-30

Sesquialter The sesquialter in relation to the subsesquialter is according to number in relation to a definite number.

ME—4. 15. 1021A1-2

Sex In the woman, every thing is by nature similar to what appears in man; the only difference consists in the womb.

H A—1. 14. 493A24-25

Nature has made one sex stronger and the other weaker.

ECO—Bk. 1. 3. 1343B30

Sex Determinant Men and women vary in the production of males and females . . . the cause for which may be in the proportion or lack of proportion of what

comes from the woman and the man or some other like cause.

DE G A—1. 18. 723A27-31

Shame A kind of pain and agitation about evils present, past, or to come, which appear to tend to loss of character.

RH—Bk. 2. 6. 1383B13-15

Shame is occasioned by voluntary actions alone.

N E—4. 15. 1128B28

Shame is occasioned by misconduct.

E—4. 15. 1128B22

Sheep Sheep are the most stupid of all animals.

DE H A—9. 3. 610B23-24

Shoulders Man does not walk unless he moves his shoulders.

DE IN—10. 709B25-26

Sight What pertains to sight is the visible and the visible is color and colored objects.

DE A—2. 7. 418A26-27

The sight is of an aqueous nature; since this is the most easily preserved of all diaphanous substances.

DE P A-2. 10. 658A37-656B2

The eyes of a man have a sort of rampart and sheath, I mean the eyelids; and unless he moves his eyelids and opens them, he sees nothing.

DE A—2. 9. 421B28-30

We see according to a straight direction.

DE P A-2. 10. 656B30

The sight when it extends itself to a great distance is convolved through imbecility. And this perhaps is the cause of the twinkling of the fixed stars, and that the planets do not twinkle.

DE C—2. 8. 290A17-19

Sign A sign seems to be a demonstrative proposition, necessary or probable, for that which when it exists a thing is, or which when it has happened, before or

after, a thing has happened, this is a sign of a thing happening or being.

P A—2. 27. 70A7-10

Vide SYMBOLS.

Similar Similar are those things styled both which everywhere undergo the same affection and undergo more of the same affections than of the diverse, and of which the quality is one, and in as many of the contraries as a change is possible, that which possesses more of these, or the more important amongst these, is similar to that thing.

ME—4. 9. 1018A15-18

Similar and Dissimilar Things are said to be similar and dissimilar in respect of qualities alone.

CAT—8. 11A15

Simile The simile is useful in prose, though seldom, since it carries with it the air of poetry.

RH—BK. 3. 4. 1406B24-25

Simple (Undivided) The undivided has two meanings: potentially and actually.

DE A—3. 6. 430B6-7

Simple or Composite It is necessary then that every body should be either simple or composite.

DE C—1. 5. 271B17-18

Simple Bodies That it is necessary that some motion should belong to all simple bodies is evident.

DE C—3. 3. 302B7-8

Simple (Incomplex Manner of Speaking) Vide SPEECH.

CAT—2. 1A17-19

Simultaneous Things are called simultaneous simply and most properly, whose generation occurs at the same time.

CAT—13. 14B23

Simultaneous, by Nature But by nature those are simultaneous, which reciprocate according to the consequence of existence, although one is by no means the cause of the existence of the other, as in the double and the half.

Singular We speak of the singular as one in number.

ME-2. 4. 999B34-1000A1

Skull The entire skull is a completely dry bone, round, and covered with a skin that has no flesh. In women, there is one joint only, that is circular. In men, there are three joints.

H A—1. 8. 491B1-4

Slave He is by nature formed a slave, who is fitted to become the chattel of another person, and on that account is so, and who has just reason enough to perceive that there is such a faculty as reason without being indued with the use of it.

POL—BK. I. 5. 1254B20-23

A slave is an instrument in many arts: and as an estate is a multitude of instruments, so a slave is a living instrument.

POL—BK. I. 4. 1253B29-32

As other men become worse when they get nothing for being better, and when no rewards are given for virtuous or vicious actions, so it is with slaves.

ECO—BK. 1. 5. 1344B4-8

It is impossible to be friends with a slave qua slave, but not with a slave qua man.

N E—8. 13. 1161B5-6

Slavery It is clear that some are free by nature, and others are slaves, and that in the case of the latter the lot of slavery is both advantageous and just.

POL—BK. I.5. 1255ALL-2

Sleep Sleep is a certain passion of the sensitive part, being, as it were, a certain bond and immobility.

DE S—1. 454B8-10

Sleep is the restriction of the first sensorium, so that it is not able to actualize its function.

DE S—3. 458A28-29

Sleep is not, as we have said, any impotency whatever of the sensitive part.

DE S—3. 456B9-10

Sleep is especially produced from food.

DE S—3. 457B7-8

In sleep we neither see, nor hear, nor, in short, have any sensible perception.

DE SOM—1. 458B33-459A1

It is evident that those who are awake, are awake, and those who are asleep, are asleep, by that power by which they are sentient.

DE S—1. 454A4-7

It is necessary that all sleep should be capable of awakening.

DE S-1. 454B14

Sense is possessed by animals even when asleep.

DE G A-5. 1. 779A13

Nor is every thing which is seen in sleep a dream. For, in the first place, it happens to some persons that they sensibly perceive after a certain manner sounds and light, sapor and the touch, yet feebly, and, as it were, at a distance. Thus, when asleep, we frequently seem to ourselves to see a certain light; but, when awake, we immediately know that it was the light of a lamp which caused this appearance.

DE SOM—3. 462A17-25

Sleeptalking Some, also, answer in their sleep, when they are interrogated. For it is possible, simply, both to be awake and asleep.

DE SOM-3. 462A25-26

Slight There are three species of slight: contempt, spite and contumely.

RH—BK. 2. 2. 1378B13-15

Smooth (A thing is said to be smooth) from the fact that its parts lie along a straight line (i.e. evenly).

CAT—8. 10A24

Snow It is a constitutive property of snow to be white.

CAT—10. 12B36

Society He who first established civil society was the cause of the greatest

benefit; for as man, thus perfected, is the most excellent of all living beings, so without law and justice he would be the worst of all; for nothing is so savage as injustice in arms; but man is born with a faculty of gaining himself arms by prudence and virtue; arms which yet he may apply to the most opposite purposes.

POL—Bk. I. 2. 1253A30-35

If human society cannot subsist without actions at law, it certainly cannot exist without the infliction of penalties.

POL—Bk. 8. 8. 1322A5-7

Animals that form societies are those that have to perform an identical and common task; but all the animals living in groups do not form societies for this purpose. On the contrary, man, bees, wasps, ants, cranes form societies of this kind; and of these societies, some have a chief, while others have not.

H A—1. 1. 488A8-13

Society, Civil If civil society was founded for the sake of preserving and increasing property, every one's right in the state would be in proportion to his fortune; and then the reasoning of those who insist upon an oligarchy would be valid; for it would not be right that he who contributed one mina should have an equal share in the hundred, along with him who brought in all the rest, either of the original money or of what was afterwards acquired. Nor was civil society founded merely in order that its members might live, but that they might live well (for otherwise a state might be composed of slaves, or of the animal creation; which is far from the case, because these have no share in happiness, nor do they live after their own choice); nor is it an alliance mutually to defend each other from injuries, or for a commercial intercourse; for then the Tyrrhenians, and Carthaginians, and all other nations between whom treaties of commerce subsist, would be citizens of one state. For they have articles to regulate their imports, and engagements for mutual protection, and alliance for mutual defence; yet still they have not all the same magistrates established among them, but they are different among different people; nor does the one take any care that the morals of the other should be as they ought, or that none of those who have entered into the common agreements should be unjust, or in any degree vicious, but only that they shall not injure another confederate. But whosoever endeavors to establish wholesome laws in a state, attends to the virtues and the vices of each individual who composes it; and hence it is evident that the first care of a man who would found a state truly deserving that name,

and not nominally so, must be to have his citizens virtuous; for otherwise it is merely an alliance for self-defence, differing only in place from those which are made between different people.

POL—Bk. 3. 9. 1280A25-1280B10

Socrates There are two improvements in science which one might justly ascribe to Socrates: I allude to his employment of inductive arguments and his definition of the universal, both belonging to the principle of science.

ME—12. 4. 1078B27-30

Solecism In a certain respect, a solecism is similar to those so called elenchi.

S E—1. 14. 174A5-6

Solution A right solution is the detection of a false syllogism.

S E—18. 176B29-30

Sophism A contentious syllogism.

T—8. 11. 162A16-17

Sophist The art of the sophist is to appear to be wise without really being so; and the sophist makes money from a feigned wisdom.

S E—1. 1. 165A19-23

The character of sophist does not consist in the faculty (for the logician possesses this as well as he) but in his fixed design of abusing it.

RH—1. 1.1355B17-18

Sophistical Refutation, Its Objects We must assume how many are the objects which they aim at who contend and strive in disputations, and these are five in number: an elenchus (refutation), fallacy, paradox, solecism, needless repetition.

S E—1. 3.165B12-22

Sophistry For the sophistical art is a certain apparent, but not real wisdom.

S E—11. 171B33-34

The sophistical art is a certain art of making money from apparent wisdom.

S E—11. 171B27-29

Soul It may be asked whether all passions of the soul are without exception common to the body that has the soul, or is any one peculiar to the soul itself.

DE A—1. 1. 403A3-5

In most cases, the soul does not appear to experience or do anything whatever without the body.

DE A—1. 1. 403A5-6

All the modifications of the soul appear to take place only in conjunction with the body.

DE A—1. 1. 403A15-16

The modifications of the soul are inseparable from the physical matter of living things.

DE A-1. 1. 403B17

Thus we may say that all the philosophers define the soul in three respects: movement, sensibility, and immateriality.

DE A—1. 2. 405B10-12

The soul appears to move the living thing by a sort of will and thought.

DE A—1. 3. 406B25-27

It is not correct to say that the soul is angry ... it is better to say that man pities, or thinks or learns with or by the soul.

DE A—1. 4. 408B11-15

It is impossible for anything to be superior to the soul and dominate it; and that is still more impossible in the case of the mind.

DE A—1. 5. 410B12-14

Is it through the soul entirely that we think, act or suffer in each of these cases? Or is each different phenomenon related to different parts?

DE A—1. 5. 411B1-3

It would appear rather that it is the soul that supports the body. As soon as it leaves the body, the latter ceases to breathe, and is soon corrupt.

DE A—1. 5. 411B7-9

We see plants, and even certain insects, living very well after division; as if they had a soul identical in species, if not identical in number. Each of the parts has, in this case, sensation and movement for some time.... In each of the parts there exist all the parts of the soul identical with each other in their species, as in the entire soul, identical in so far as inseparable, identical with the entire soul, as if it were divisible.

DE A—1. 5. 411B19-27

Necessarily, the soul cannot be substance, except as form of a natural body that has life potentially.

DE A-2. 1. 412A19-21

In the life of the soul there are sleep and awakening.

DE A-2. 1. 412A24

It is evident that the soul is not separate from the body.

DE A-2. 1. 413A4

The soul is the principle of the following faculties and is defined by them: nourishment, sensibility, thought and movement.

DE A-2. 2. 413B11-13

The soul must therefore be reason and form, and not matter or object.

DE A—2. 2. 414A13-14

It is not a body, it partakes of the body. That is why it is in the body, and in the body made in such a way.

DE A-2. 2. 414A20-21

It is clear that the soul is an act and formula of what has the capacity of being a certain kind of thing.

DE A-2. 2. 414A27-28

The soul is the cause and the principle of the living body.

DE A—2. 4. 415B7-8

The soul is the plan and actuality of what is in potentiality.

DE A—2. 4. 415B14-15

The soul is a cause in as much as it is a final cause.

DE A—2. 4. 415B16-17

All bodies formed by Nature are the instruments of the soul.

DE A—2. 4. 415B18-19

The soul is the cause in so far as it is the principle from which arises movement.

DE A—2. 4. 415B21-22

It is the force capable of conserving what possesses it, whatever it is.

DE A—2. 4. 416B17-19

Soul is the substance and act of a certain body.

ME-7. 3. 1043A35-36

The soul is as it were all the things that are.

DE A-3. 8. 431B21

The soul in animals is distinguished by two faculties: judgement, which is the work of thought and sensation, and the locomotion with which the soul is endowed.

DE A-3. 9. 432A15-17

The soul has two parts, one irrational and the other possessing reason.

N E-1. 13. 1102A27-28

The qualities of the soul are three, viz. emotions, faculties, and moral states.

N E—2. 4. 1105B19-20

There are two parts of the soul, the rational and the irrational.

N E—6. 1. 1139A3-5

Prudence, virtue and pleasure are in the soul.

E E-2. 1. 1218B34-35

The soul of man may be divided into two parts; that which has reason itself, and that which has not but is capable of obeying its dictates. POL—Bk. 7. 14. 1333a16-18

POL—Bk. 7. 14. 1333A16-18

It is absurd to assert that soul is composed from the elements.

DE G ET C-2. 7. 334A9-10

The soul will at the same time perceive by one and the same thing, but not by the same reason.

DE S ET S—7 .449A16-19

Every living thing has a soul.

DE V—6. 470A19

It is impossible that the nutritive soul should exist without heat.

DE R—8. 474A25-26

The liberation of the soul is entirely without sensation.

DE R-17. 479A22-23

Soul, Traditional Definitions of First, it is the greatest cause of movement, because it is self-moving; next, it is a body composed of the most minute particles; lastly, it is corporeal but less than any other body.

DE A—1. 5. 409B18-21

Soul, in Physics It is the part of the physicist (natural philosopher) to institute an inquiry concerning a certain soul, such as is not unconnected with matter.

ME—5. 1. 1026A5-6

Soul and Body Every living thing is composed of soul and body, and of these one is by nature the governor, the other the governed.

POL—Bk. I. 5. 1254A34-36

Sound A thing moved in that which is not moved produces a sound.

DE C—2. 9. 291A16-17

Sound is double; one is an act and the other only a potential.

DE A—2. 8. 419B5

Sound appears to be the motion of something which is borne along.

DE S ET S—6. 446B30-447A1

Sound is the movement of what can be moved by smooth bodies when they are struck.

DE A-2. 8. 419B19-20

Transcendent sounds are injurious to the bulks of inanimate bodies. Thus the sound of thunder divides stones and the strongest bodies.

DE C—2. 9. 290B34-291A1

Sound and Silence Sound and silence are known from a comparison with each other.

DE C-2. 9. 290B27-28

Species Neither do gravity and levity, which tend to the same thing, differ in species.

PHY-5. 4. 228B29-31

Species and Genus Of secondary substances, species is more substance than genus.

CAT-5.2B8

Speculation Happiness is coextensive with speculation.

N E-10. 8. 1178B32

Speculative There are pleasures which are independent of pain or desire, as *e.g.* the activities of the speculative life.

N E—7. 13. 1152B36-1153A1

Speculative Sciences It is evident that there are three kinds of speculative sciences: the physical (physics), mathematical, (mathematics) and the theological (theology)... The most excellent is the genus of speculative sciences, and of these the one mentioned last possesses the greatest amount of excellence, for it is conversant about that one among entities which is more entitled to respect than the rest.

ME—10. 7.1064B1-6

Of speculative science the end is truth.

ME—1A. 1. 993B20-21

Speculative Science, Excellence of Each science is termed more excellent and more inferior according to its appropriate object of scientific knowledge.

ME—10. 7. 1064B5-8

Speech Is more a property of a man than the exercise of the body.

RH—1. 1. 1355B1

Letters are formed partly by the tongue, and partly by the compression of the lips.

DE P A—2. 16. 660A5-7

Forms of speech are either simple or complex. Examples of the latter are such as ‘the man runs,’ ‘the man wins’; of the former, ‘man,’ ‘ox,’ ‘runs,’ ‘wins.’

CAT—2. 1A17-19

There are three points respecting a speech: one, the sources of the means of persuasion; second, the style, third, the proper arrangement of the parts of the speech.

RH-3. 1. 1403B6-8

Speech (a Discrete Quantity) That speech is a quantity is evident, since it is measured by a short and a long syllable; I mean a speech produced by the voice, since its parts concur at no common limit, for there is no common limit at which the syllables concur, but each is distinct by itself.

CAT—6. 4B32

Speed Speed is both that which involves any motion whatever and an excess of motion, for there is a certain speed even of that which is slow.

ME—9. 1. 1052B29-30

Sperm Not just anything rises from a certain sperm but like from like and not according to chance.

DE P A—1. 1. 641B27-28

Sphere A sphere is of all figures the most useful for that motion which is produced in the same place. DE C—2. 8. 290b1-3

DE C—2. 8. 290B1-3

Spontaneity One can think spontaneously, when one wishes: but one cannot feel spontaneity, for of necessity there must be a thing to feel.

DE A-2. 5. 417B24-25

Spontaneous Generation There are animals that are born spontaneously, and not from beings of the same genus as themselves.

H A—5. 1. 539A21-23

Stammering In those persons whose tongue is not very much detached ... they stammer and stutter.

DE P A—2. 17. 660A25-27

Standard of Action We make pleasure and pain in a greater or lesser degree the standard of our actions.

N E—2. 2. 1105A3-5

Stars The motion of the stars is indeed swift, but remote.

No one of the stars is moved either with an animated or a violent motion.

Stasimon The stasimon is the melody of the chorus.

State Although the good of an individual is identical with the good of a state, yet the good of the state, whether in attainment or in preservation, is evidently greater and more perfect.

Every state is a society, and every society is established for the sake of some good end (for an apparent good is the spring of all human actions); it is evident that all societies aim at some good or other: and this is more especially true of that which aims at the highest possible end, and is itself the most excellent, and embraces all the rest. Now this is that which is called a state, and forms a political society.

In the order of nature, the state is prior to the family or the individual; for the whole must necessarily be prior to the parts; for if you take away the whole body, you cannot say a foot or a hand remains, unless by equivocation, as if any one should call a hand, made of stone, a hand; for such only can it have when mutilated.

Now I am willing to admit that the state ought to be one as much as possible (for this is the principle which Socrates adopts), and yet it is evident that if it goes on till it becomes too much one, it will be no longer a state, for the state naturally supposes a multitude; so that if we proceed in this manner, from a state it will become a family, and from a family it will become an individual: for we should say that a family is one to a greater degree than a state, and a single person than a family; so that even if this end could be obtained, it should never be put in practice, as it would annihilate the state. For not only does a state consist of a large number of inhabitants, but they must also be of different sorts: for were they all alike there could be no state; for a confederacy and a state are two different things; a confederacy is valuable for its members, though all those who compose it are men of the same calling; for this is entered into for the sake

of mutual defence, just as the addition of another weight makes the scale go down. The same distinction will prevail between a state and a tribe, when the people are not collected into separate villages, but live as the Arcadians. Now these things by which a state should become one are of different sorts; and it is the preserving a just and equal balance of power, which is the safety of states, as has already been mentioned in our treatise on Ethics. Now among freemen and equals this is absolutely necessary; for all cannot govern at the same time, but either by the year, or according to some other regulation or time. By this means, it follows that every one in his turn will be in office; as if the shoemakers and carpenters should exchange occupations, and not always be employed in the self-same calling. But as it is better that these should continue in their respective trades, so also in civil society, where it is possible, it would be better that the government should continue in the same hands; but where it is not, there it is best to observe a rotation, and let those who are their equals by turns submit to those who are magistrates at the time, since they in turn will alternately be governors and governed, as if they were different men; by the same method different persons will execute different offices. Hence it is evident that a state cannot naturally be one in the manner that some persons propose; and that what has been said to be the greatest good of states, is really their destruction; though the good of anything tends to preserve it. For another reason also it is clear that it is not for the best to endeavor to make a state too much one, because a family is more sufficient in itself than a single person, and a state than a family; and indeed it can lay claim to the name of a state only when this sufficiency results to the members of the community. If then this sufficiency is preferable, a state which is less one, is better than that which is more nearly so.

POL—Bk. 2. 2. 1281A14-1261B15

Since a state is a collective body, and, like other wholes, composed of many parts, it is evident that our first point must be to inquire what a citizen is. For a state or city is a certain number of citizens.

POL—Bk. 3. 1. 1274B38-41

It is evident that when we speak of a state as being the same, we refer specially to the government there established; and it is possible to call it by the same name or any other, whether it be inhabited by the same men or by different ones. But whether or no it is right or not right to dissolve the community, when the state passes into an altered form of constitution, is another question.

POL—Bk. 3. 3. 1276B10-15

It is impossible that a state should consist entirely of excellent citizens.

POL—Bk. 3. 4. 1276B37-38

It is evident, then, that a state is not a mere community of place, nor established for the sake of mutual safety or traffic; but that these things are the necessary consequences of a state, although they may all exist where there is no state; but a state is a society of joining together with their families, and their children, to live well, for the sake of a perfect and independent life; and for this purpose it is necessary that they should live in one place, and intermarry with each other. Hence in all cities there are family meetings, clubs, sacrifices, and public entertainments, to promote friendship; for a love of sociability is friendship itself; so that the end for which a state is established is that the inhabitants of it may live happily; and these things are conducive to that end. For it is a community of families and villages, formed for the sake of a perfect independent life; that is, as we have already said, for the sake of living well and happily. The political state therefore is founded not for the purpose of men's merely living together, but for their living as men ought; for which reason those who contribute most to this end deserve to have greater power in the state than either those who are their equals in family and freedom, but their inferiors in civil virtue, or those who excel them in wealth, but are below them in worth.

POL—Bk. 3. 9. 1280B29-1281A8

The best is that in which a man is enabled to choose both to govern and to be governed with regard to virtue during his whole life.

POL—Bk. 3. 13. 1284A1-3

A state is not made up of one, but of many parts; one of which is those who supply provisions, called husbandmen; another called mechanics, whose employment is in the manual arts; the third sort are hucksters, I mean by these buyers, sellers, petty traffickers, and retail dealers; the fourth are hired laborers, or workmen; the fifth are the men-at-arms; to which may be added those who are members of the council. The seventh sort are those who serve the public in expensive employments at their own charge; and these are called the opulent. The eighth are those who in like manner execute the different offices of the state. The offices of a senator, and of him who administers justice to litigants, alone now remain.

POL—Bk. 4. 4. 1290B38-1291A38

The union of the rich and the poor makes up a free state.

POL—Bk. 4. 8. 1294A16-17

State and Individual It is evident that that very same life which is happy for each individual is happy also for the state and for every member of it.

POL—Bk. 7. 3. 1325B14-18

Statesman There are three qualifications necessary for those who intend to fill the first departments in government. First of all, an affection for the established constitution; in the second place, abilities wholly equal to the business of their office; in the third, virtue and justice correspondent to the nature of that particular state in which they are placed.

POL—Bk. 5. 9. 1309A33-37

Statesmanship Wisdom and statesmanship cannot be identical.

N E—6. 7. 1141A28-29

Statement (True or False) A statement is said to be true or false inasmuch as it asserts that what is, is or what is not, is not.

CAT—5 4B10

Strength Strength is the capability of moving another at will.

RH—Bk. 1. 5. 1361B15

Style The subject of style is clearly reducible to an art.

RH—Bk. 3. 1. 1404A16

The written style ought to be easily read and understood.

RH—Bk. 3. 5. 1407B11-12

But purity in speaking your language is the foundation of all style; and this depends of five particulars: first, on the connective particles; in using terms distinct and not vague; in terms not ambiguous; in using proper genders of nouns; in the proper numbers of nouns.

RH—3. 5.1407A19-1407B11

Style will possess the quality of being in good taste, if it be expressive at once of feeling and character, and in proportion to the subject matter.

RH—Bk. 3. 7. 1408A10-11

The style needs be either continuous, and united by means of connectives... or reflex, and like the antistrophic odes of the old poets. Now the continuous style is the old style... the reflex is that which consists of periods. I call a period a

form of words which has independently in itself a beginning and ending, and a length easily taken in at a glance. RH—3. 9. 1409a24-1409b1

RH—3. 9. 1409A24-1409B1

Style, Excellence of Let excellence of style be defined to consist in its being clear... and neither low, nor above the dignity of the subject, but in good taste.

RH—3. 2. 1404B1-5

Style, Frigidity of Frigidity, as dependent on the style, consists in four points: in the use of compound words... the employment of foreign idioms... the employment of epithets either too long, out of place or too frequent ... improper metaphors.

RH-3. 3. 1405B34-1406B20

Subalternata Genera Vide GENUS.

Sublimity The following expedients contribute to sublimity of style: using the definition in place of the noun; avoiding either if out of taste; illustration by metaphor and epithets; by using the plural for the singular; assigning to each word a distinct particle; using connectives; by negative qualities.

RH-3. 6. 1407B26-1408A10

Subsistence There is therefore a subsistence for the sake of something in things which are produced by and exist from nature.

PHY—2. 8. 198B10-12

A being subsists just as long as it is nourished.

DE A—2. 4. 416B14-15

Whatever has a separate has also an essential subsistence.

ME-4. 18. 1022A35-36

Substance Substance, in its strictest, first, and chief sense, is that which is neither predicated of any subject, nor is in any, as an individual man or horse.

CAT—5. 2A11

Substance, being one and the same in number, can receive contraries. It is by changing that substance admits of contraries ... the modification takes place through a change in substance.

CAT—5. 4A10; 5. 4B17-19

It belongs also to substance that there is no contrary to them.... This is not the peculiarity of substance, but of many other things, as for instance of quantity.

CAT-5. 3B24

Substance appears not to admit of more or less. I mean ... that substance is not said to be more or less that very thing that it is; as if the same substance be man, he will not be more or less man neither as regards himself at different times nor as regards other men.

CAT—5. 3B33-35

Substance is spoken of in four ways: for both the essence or the formal cause, and the universal and the genus seem to be substance in each thing and the fourth of these is the subject. But the subject is that of which other things are predicated, while it itself is no longer predicated of any other thing ... substance appears especially to be the primary subject.

ME—6. 3. 1028B33-1029A2

Substance assumes, as we have said, three things: form, matter, and the composition, the result of these two elements.

DE A—2. 2. 414A14-16

Substances are three in number, and one of these is matter ... another of these substances is Nature ... Further, the third substance is that which subsists from these, and is ranked as a singular.

ME—11. 3.1070A9-12

We assert first of all that substance is a particular genus of beings and that in substance we must distinguish, in the first place, matter, that is, what is not by itself such and such a special thing: next, form and species; and it is after them that the thing is specially named; and, in the third place, the composition that results from these first two elements.

DE A—2. 1. 412A6-9

Substances are three in number; one is cognizant by sense ... and one part of this is eternal, and the other subject to decay. But another substance is immovable.

ME—11. 1. 1069A30-33

In some manner is matter denominated substance, but in another way form, and in a third, that which results from both or is a compound of both.

ME—6. 3. 1029A2-3

As regards substance, both simple bodies, as for instance, earth and fire and water and such like are called substances; and, in general, bodies are styled so; and animals consisting of these, and those things that are of the nature of demons, and the parts of these. Now, all these are called substances because they are not predicated of a subject, whereas other things are predicated of these.

ME—4. 8. 1017B10-14

Now substance seems to subsist in bodies most evidently; wherefore we say that both animals and plants and the parts of them are substances; and we say the same of natural or physical bodies, as fire and water and earth and everything of this sort; and as many as are either parts of these or are composed of these, either partly or entirely, as both the heaven and its parts, stars and moon and sun.

ME—6. 2. 1028B8-13

Every natural body endowed with life is substance.

DE A—2. 1. 412A15

That wherein qualities are inherent primarily.

ME—6. 3. 1029A15-16

It is not that which is predicated of the subject, but is that of which other things are predicated.

ME—6. 3. 1029A7-8

Nothing else is separable except substance since all others are said to be predicated of substance as of a subject.

PHY—1. 2. 185A31-32

Now substance happens to be called substance in two ways: both as the ultimate subject which is not predicated of anything else; and as that which may be this particular thing; but such is the form and species of each thing.

ME-4. 8. 1017B23-26

In another way is that styled substance whatever may be the cause of being, and may be inherent in such as are not predicated of a subject.

ME-4. 8. 1017B14-16

To speak generally, examples of substance are like man or horse.

CAT-4. 1B24-25

It is true of substances and differences that they are predicated univocally. For all these are predicated either of individuals or of species. There is no predication of first substance for it cannot be referred to any subject. Of second substances the species is predicated of the individual; the genus is predicated of the species and individuals.

CAT—5. 3A33-37

A universal substance does not subsist.

ME—6. 10. 1035B28-29

That, indeed, there exists a certain Eternal Substance, and a Substance that is Immovable, and possesses actually a subsistence separable from sensibles, is evident.

ME—11. 7. 1073A3-5

Substance, According to Plato Plato considered both forms and mathematical entities as two substances, and, as a third, the substance of sensible bodies.

ME—6. 2. 1028B19-21

Substance and Form Substance and form are each of them a certain energy (act).

ME-8. 8. 1050B2-3

Substance as Subject of Change In all cases other than substance it is necessary that there be a subject of becoming; for when quantity or quality or relation, or time or place is said to change a subject is necessary, since substance alone is not predicated of another subject, but everything else of substance.

PHY-1. 7. 190A33-190B1

Substance, Primary Primary substances are more especially termed substances because they underlie all others and all others are either predicated of them or are in them.

CAT—5. 2B15-17

In primary substances, no one is more substance than another; indeed, a certain man is no more a substance than a certain bull.

CAT—5. 2B26

As regards then the primary substances, it is unquestionably true that they

signify a particular thing.

CAT—5. 3B10

Neither is the primal substance in a subject, nor is it predicated of any.

CAT—5. 3A8-9

Substance, Secondary But secondary substances are they in which as species those primary substances (i.e. individuals) are inherent.

CAT—5. 2A12

Secondary substances are those in which as species those primarily-named substances are inherent, that is to say, both these and the genera of these species.

CAT-5. 2A14

Species and genera alone are termed secondary substances, since they alone declare the primary substances of the predicates.

CAT-5. 2B30

Substances, Sensible Sensible substances—I mean such as are singulars; of these there is neither definition nor demonstration, because they involve matter, the nature of which is such as to admit of the possibility both of being and not being; wherefore all the singulars of such are things subject to decay and corruption.

ME—6. 15. 1039B27-31

Substantial Nature The substantial nature can be known by an analogy. Just as bronze is to the statue, or wood to a bed, or the matter and what lacks form before receiving form to the thing which has form, so is the substantial nature to what is the individual substance and being.

PHY—1. 7. 191A7-12

Suffering That which acts and that which suffers are contraries.

DE G ET C—1. 7. 342A11-12

Suicide Nor is any one of those who kill themselves in order to avoid pain, as many do, to be called brave.

E E—3. 1. 1229B39-40

Sun That body which revolves around the earth, or which is hid by night.

ME-6. 15. 1040A30-31

The sun is circularly moved.

DE M—2. 4. 359B34

The sun always tends to the west and east.

DE M-2. 4. 381A8-9

The sun which especially seems to be hot, is seen to be white, and not of a fiery color.

DE M—1. 3. 341A35-36

The sun not only draws upward that moisture of the earth which emerges above the rest, but by the heat which it causes dries the earth itself.

DE M-2. 4. 360A6-8

The sun both causes blasts of wind to cease and co-excites them.

DE M-2. 5. 361B14

Superfluity Nature does nothing superfluous.

DE P A—4. 11. 691B4

Superpartiens Superpartient (superpartiens) in relation to superpartient is according to the indefinite in the same manner as the multiple is in relation to one.

ME—4. 15. 1021A2-3

Supreme Good Happiness is the supreme good.

N E—1. 6. 1097B22

Surface That which is divisible in a twofold respect is a surface.

ME—4. 6. 1016B26-27

Syllable A syllable is a sound without signification.

P—20. 1456B34-35

Syllogism A syllogism, indeed, is a discourse in which certain things being laid down, something else, different from what are laid down, follows from the fact that they are. I say “from the fact that they are” since it follows from them and it follows from them without the need of any extrinsic term to make the consequence necessary.

PA—1. 1. 24B18-22

A syllogism is a demonstration from necessary propositions.

PO A—1. 4. 73A24

A syllogism then is a discourse in which, certain things being laid down, something different from the posita happens from necessity through the things laid down.

T—1. 1. 100A25-27

It is evident, from what we have stated, that if the terms subsist towards each other there is necessarily a syllogism, and if there be a syllogism, the terms must thus subsist.

P A—1. 5. 28A1-2

A syllogism demonstrates something of something through a medium (middle term).

PO A—2 4 91A14-15

If both propositions are assumed contingent there is no syllogism.

P A—1. 17. 36B26-27

When both premises are assumed indefinite, or particular, there will not be a syllogism.

P A—1. 21. 40A1-2

When the negative is single, there will be a syllogism by conversion.

P A—I. 18. 38A3-4

Every syllogism consists of three terms.

PO A-1. 19. 81B10

Syllogism, Ad Impossible In the syllogism which leads to the impossible, one premise is laid down falsely.

P A—1. 29. 45B8-11

Syllogisms and Inductions, Means of Acquiring The instruments by which we shall be well supplied with syllogisms and inductions are four: the securing of propositions, second, to be able to distinguish in how many ways each thing is predicated, third, to discover differences of things, and fourth, the consideration of the similar (likeness).

T—1. 13. 105A21-25

Syllogism, Contentious A contentious syllogism is one which is constructed from apparent but not real probabilities, and which appears to consist of probabilities, or of apparent probabilities.

T—1. 1. 100B23-25

Syllogism, Demonstrative Science and demonstrative syllogism are not concerned with indefinites (or possibles) because the middle (term) is irregular, but to those things which may naturally exist.

P A—1. 13. 32B18-20

Syllogism, (Dialectic) Dialectic syllogism is that which is collected from probabilities.

T—1. 1. 100A30

Syllogism, Imperfect An imperfect syllogism is one which requires either one or more additions implied by the subject terms but not expressed through propositions.

P A—1. 1. 24B24-26

Syllogism not Produced When a syllogism is not produced, both terms being affirmative or negative (and particular), nothing, in short, results of a necessary character.

P A—1. 7. 29A19-21

Syllogism, Ostensive In the ostensive syllogism both premises are laid down according to the truth.

P A—1. 29. 45A8-11

Syllogism, Perfect Wherefore I call a perfect syllogism that which requires nothing else besides the assumed premises for the necessary consequence to appear.

P A—1. 1. 24B22-24

When three terms so subsist, with reference to each other, that the last is in the whole of the middle, and the middle either is, or is not, in the whole of the first, then it is necessary that there should be a perfect syllogism of the extremes.

P A—1. 4. 25B32-35

Syllogism, Premises of It is clear that a syllogism consists of two premises and no more.

P A—1. 25. 42A32-33

Syllogism, First Figure of Of the figures, the first is especially adapted to science, for both the mathematical sciences carry out their demonstrations by this, as arithmetic, geometry, optics and practically all the sciences that investigate causes since either entirely or for the most part the syllogism of the why is through this figure. Wherefore also, it will be especially adapted to science, for it is the highest property of knowledge to contemplate the ‘why’; in the next place, it is possible through this figure alone to investigate the science of what a thing is.

PO A—1. 14. 79A17-24

Syllogism, Rules of First Figure of Major premise universal.
Minor premise affirmative.

P A—1. 4. PASSIM

Syllogism, Second Figure of When the same is present with every one on the one hand and with none, on the other; or to all or none of each, a figure of this kind I call the second.

P A—1. 5. 26B34-36

Syllogism, Second Figure Lastly, it appears that an affirmative syllogism is not found in this (second) figure, but all are negative, both the universal and the particular.

P A—1. 5. 28A7-9

Syllogism, Rules of Second Figure of
Major universal; one premise negative.

P A—1. 5. PASSIM

Syllogism, Terms of It appears that every demonstration will be by three terms and no more.

P A—1. 25. 41B36-37

It is evident that every demonstration and every syllogism will be through three terms only.

P A—1. 25. 42A30-31

Syllogism, Third Figure of When with the same thing one is present with every, but the other with no individual, or both with every, or with none, such I call the third figure; and the middle in it, I call that of which we predicate both.

P A—1. 6. 28A10-14

Syllogism, Rules of Third Figure Minor premise affirmative; conclusion

particular.

P A—1. 6. PASSIM

Syllogize He who exercises reminiscence syllogizes.

DE M ET R-2. 453A9-10

Symbols Spoken words are symbols of passions of the soul; written words are symbols of spoken words.

DE I-1. 16A3-4

Symphony A particular sort of mixture of the sharp and the flat.

ME—7. 2. 1043A10-11

Synonyms Those are called synonyms of which both the name is common, and the definition is the same.

CAT-1. 1A6

T

Tabula Rasa The intellect is potential such as what it thinks is in it as in a tablet on which nothing is written.

DE A 3. 4. 429B30-430A2

Tall Men Very tall men walk bent, and with the right shoulder inclining to the anterior, but the left hip more inclining to the posterior part, and with the middle of the body hollow and incurvated.

DE IN-7. 707B18-21

Taste The taste is a certain touch.

DE S ET S-4. 441A3

Taste is a kind of touch; it is the sense of nutrition; and food is something that can be touched.

DE A-3. 12. 434B18-19

Teaching All teaching and all learning grasped by reason proceeds from previous knowledge.

PO A-1. 1. 71A1-2

Teeth Man has such and so many teeth principally for the sake of speech.

DE P A-3. 1. 661B14-15

Temperance Temperance is a virtue by which men carry themselves so, in respect to the pleasures of the body, as the law directs.

RH-1. 9. 1366B13-15

Temperate A temperate man becomes temperate by doing what is temperate.

N E-2. 3. 1105A18-19

Temperance and courage are destroyed by excess and deficiency but preserved by the mean state.

N E-2. 2. 1104A25-27

The temperate man is one who has no depraved desires.

M M-2. 6. 1203B17

It is by abstinence from pleasures that we become temperate, and when we have become temperate, we are best able to abstain from them.

N E-2. 2. 1104A33-35

Tendency It is impossible for a thing to tend to that place at which nothing that is moved can arrive.

DE C-1. 8. 274B17-18

Term I call that a term into which a proposition is resolved, as for instance, the predicate and that of which it is predicated, whether to be or not to be is added or separated.

P A-1. 1. 24B16-18

Term ‘Included in’ or ‘Predicated of’

For one term to be ‘included in another’ as a whole is the same as for the other to be ‘predicated of the whole of the other.

P A-1. 1. 24B26-28

Term, Extreme The extreme is that which is itself in another and in which another also is.

P A-1. 4. 25B36-37

Term, Middle I call that the middle which is itself in another whilst another is in it and which also becomes the middle (term) by position.

P A-1. 4. 25A35-36

Term, Middle (in Second Figure) The middle term (in the second figure) I call that which is predicated of both extremes.

P A-1. 5. 26B36-37

Terminus It is necessary that the terminus *from which* and the terminus *to which* a thing is naturally adapted to be moved should be specifically different.

DE C-1. 8. 277A13-15

Thesis Of an immediate syllogistic principle, I call that the thesis, which it is not possible to demonstrate, nor is it necessary that he should possess it who intends to learn anything.

PO A-1. 2. 72A14-16

A thesis is also a problem, yet not every problem is a thesis.

T-1. 11. 104B29-30

A thesis is a paradoxical opinion of some one celebrated in philosophy, as that contradiction is impossible, as Antisthenes said, or that all things are in motion, according to Heraclitus, or that being is one, as Melissus asserted.

T-1. 11. 104B19-22

Thinking Thinking and reflecting are not identical.

DE A-3. 3. 427B25-26

Thinking with Image The soul never thinks without an image (phantasm).

DE A-3. 7. 431A16-17

Thirst Thirst is desire for cold and liquid.

DE A-2. 3. 414B11-12

Thought Thought, it may be said, resembles a rest and a cessation rather than a movement.

DE A-1. 3. 407A32-33

Thought deteriorates because some other thing deteriorates internally.

DE A-1. 4. 408B24-25

Accuracy of thought may be more clearly seen in smaller than in larger animals.

H A-9. 7. 612B19-21

Thunder Why does it thunder? Because sound is produced in the clouds.

ME-6. 17. 1041A24-25

The sound of fire extinguished in the clouds.

PO A-2. 1. 94A4-5

The extinction of fire in a cloud.

PO A-2.8. 93B7-8

In the clouds a separation of the pneumatic substance taking place, and falling against the density of the clouds, produces thunder.

DE M-2. 9. 369A35-369B1

Thunder falls downward.

DE M-1. 4. 342A12-13

Thunder and Lightning Thunder and lightning are divided, not by sound, but because the pneumatic substance is at the same time secreted, which produces the blow and the sound.

DE M-3. 1. 371B11-13

Time A continuous quantity, none of the parts of time has an abiding existence, and what does not abide does not have position. It would be more appropriate to say that the parts have a relative order, in so far as one is prior to another.

CAT-6. 5A25

A continuous quantity. Its parts have a common boundary.

CAT-6. 4B24; 6. 5A7-8

All time is divisible.

DE S ET S-6. 448A30-448B1

No part is, in consequence of time being divisible.

PHY-4. 10. 218A5-6

Time does not appear to be composed from instants.

PHY-4. 10. 218A8

It is evident that time is not motion.

PHY-4. 10. 218B18

Time is not without mutation.

PHY-4. 11. 218B21

It is impossible for time to exist without motion.

DE G ET C-2. 10. 337A23-24

It is also evident why time is not said to be swift and slow; but much, a few, and long and short; for as far as it is continued, it is long and short; but so far as it is number, it is much and few.

PHY-4. 12. 220A32-220B3

No time is insensible.

DE S ET S-7. 448B16

That time, therefore, is the number of motion according to prior and posterior,

and that it is continued, for it is of the continuous, is evident.

PHY-4. 11. 220A24-26

Time is a certain number.... Time is that which is numbered, and not that by which we number.

PHY-4. 11. 219B5-7

All time is one, simular, and at once.

PHY-4. 14. 223B10-12

The same time also is every where at once.

PHY-4.18. 220B5-6

A verb ... signifies time.

DE I-3. 16B6

Time and Motion We not only, however, measure motion by time, but time by motion, because they are bounded by each other.

PHY-4. 12. 220B15-18

To Be Neither 'to be' or 'not to be' is a sign of a thing; nor is 'being' taken all by itself; for it itself is nothing, however it cosignifies a certain composition which cannot be understood without the composing members.

DE I-3. 16B22-25

Topics, Use of the Treatise on It will be consequent upon what we have stated to describe to what an extent and for what subjects this treatise is useful. It is so for three: mental exercise, discussion and philosophical science. That it is useful for mental exercise appears evident from these, that possessing method, we shall be able more easily to argue upon every proposed subject. But for discussion, because having enumerated the opinions of many, we shall converse with them, not from foreign, but from appropriate dogmas, confuting whatever they appear to us to have erroneously stated. Again, for philosophical science, because being able to dispute on both sides we shall more easily perceive in each the true and the false.

T-1. 2. 101A25-36

Torture Torture is a kind of evidence, and appears to carry with it absolute credibility, because a kind of constraint is applied.

RH-BK. 1. 15. 1376B31-32

Touch Touch is the sense of alimmentation.

DE A-2. 3. 414B7

In respect of the sense of touch, it is placed in a like part, for instance, in the flesh, or in some thing that replaces it.

H A-1. 3. 489A17-19

All animals without distinction have equally the fifth sense, that which is called touch.

H A-4. 8. 533A17-18

It is the only sense that all living things without exception possess.

DE A-2. 3. 414B3

Without touch it is impossible for a living thing to exist.

DE A-3. 13. 435B4-5

Tragedy Tragedy aims at representing men as better than in actual life.

P-2. 1448A17-18

The Dorians lay claim to the invention of tragedy and comedy.

P-3. 1448A29-30

Tragedy is an imitation of a worthy or illustrious and perfect action, possessing magnitude, in pleasing language, using separately the several species of imitation in its parts, by men acting, and not through narration, through pity and fear effecting a purification from such like passions.

P-6. 1449B24-28

It is necessary that the parts of every tragedy should be six, from which the tragedy derives its quality. These are fable (plot) and character, diction and thought, spectacle and harmony.

P-6. 1450A7-10

The greatest is the combination of the incidents.

P-6. 1450A15

Tragedy is an imitation, not of men, but of actions.

P-8. 1450A16-17

The action and the fable (plot) are the end of tragedy. Without action, tragedy

cannot exist. P-6. 1450a22-24

P-6. 1450A22-24

Tragedy originated from those who led the dithyramb.

P-4. 1449A10-11

Tragedy is the imitation of a perfect and whole action, and of one which possesses a certain magnitude.

P-7. 1450B23-25

Tragedy is not only an imitation of a perfect action, but also of actions which are terrible and piteous.

P-9. 1452A1-3

The parts of tragedy are as follows: prologue, episode, exode, and chorus, of the parts of which one is the parados, but the other is the stasimon.

P-12. 1452B15-17

Tragedy is an imitation of better things. P-15. 1454b8-9

P-15. 1454B8-9

Things in tragedy ought to be rendered apparent without teaching.

P-19. 1456B5

Tragedy has every thing which the epic possesses. To which may be added that it possesses perspicuity, both when it is read, and when it is acted.

P-26. 1462A14-17

Tragic Hero Is one who neither excels in virtue and justice, nor is changed through vice and depravity into misfortune, from a state of great renown and prosperity, but has experienced this change through some error.

P-13. 1453A7-10

Transition There is not a transition into another genus, as from length into superficies, and from superficies into body.

DE-1. 1. 268A30-268B2

Transposition It is evident that when a noun and verb are transposed the same affirmation and negation result.

DE I-10. 20B10-12

Tree That one part of a tree contains in capacity the whole tree, is evident from experience.

DE L ET B-6. 467A29-30

True That which is true involves an affirmation in the case of composition, and a negation in the case of division; but that which is false involves the contradiction of this division.

ME-5. 4. 1027B20-24

That which subsists as true is entity.

ME-5. 4. 1027B18

True in Every Instance I call that ‘of every’ which is not in a certain thing and in another thing is not, nor which is at one time and at another not; as if animal is predicated of every man, if it is truly said that this is a man, it is true also that he is an animal, and if now the one is true, so also is the other.

PO A-1. 4. 73A28-31

True and False A statement is said to be true or false inasmuch as it asserts that what is, is or what is not, is not.

CAT-5. 4B10

In those things which are and have been the affirmation and negation must of necessity be true or false; and in universals taken universally, one is always true and the other false, and also in singulars . . . but in the case of universals not universally taken there is no such necessity.

DE I-9. 18A28-32

Of things enunciated without any connexion, none is either true or false; as “man,” “white,” “runs,” “conquers.” For every affirmation or negation seems to be either true or false.

CAT-4. 2A8

Nouns and verbs of themselves resemble conceptions without composition and division, as ‘man’ or ‘white’ ... which are neither true nor false.

DE I-1. 16A13-18

For not in things themselves are the false and the true—as that which is good is true, but that which is bad is false—but in the understanding; and the truth and falsehood concerning simples and essence are not in understanding either.

ME-5. 4. 1027B25-28

Neither is it possible that all assertions be false, nor all true, as well on account of many other difficulties which would be uttered in consequence of this position, supposing that they are false, neither will one who makes this very assertion speak what is true; but if all assertions are true, the person who says that all are false will not speak falsely.

ME-10. 6. 1063B30-35

True or False The person that says that all things are true renders the statement contrary to this true also; wherefore he makes his own affirmation not true; for the contrary says that it is not true; but he that says that all things are false, even himself falsifies his own position.

ME-3. 8. 1012B15-18

True and Primary Things true and primary are those which have certitude not through others but through themselves, as there is no necessity to investigate the 'why' in scientific principles, but each principle itself ought to be certain by itself.

T-1. 1. 100A30-100B21

Truth The apprehension of truth is the function of both the intellectual parts of the soul.

N E-6. 2. 1139B12

It belongs to the same faculty of mind to recognize both truth and the semblance of truth.

RH-BK. 1. 1. 1355A14-15

Mankind has a tolerable natural tendency toward that which is true.

RH-BK. 1. 1. 1355A15-16

Truth is noble and laudable.

N E-4. 13. 1127A29-30

Truth and Falsehood Truth and falsehood are involved in composition and division.

DE I-1. 16A13

Tyranny A tyranny is a monarchy where the good of one man only is the object of government. POL-BK. 3. 7. 1279b6-7

POL-BK. 3. 7. 1279B6-7

A tyranny then is a monarchy where one person has a despotic power over the whole community.

POL–BK. 3. 8. 1279B16-17

A tyranny is not according to nature, nor is the perversion of any other government whatsoever; for they are all contrary to it.

POL–BK. 3. 17. 1287B39-41

Tyranny is the worst excess imaginable, as being a government the most contrary to a free state.

POL–BK. 4. 2. 1289B2-3

Where one rules over his equals and superiors, without being accountable for his conduct, and whose object is his own advantage, and not the advantage of those whom he governs.

POL–BK. 4. 10. 1295A19-22

The extreme of a democracy is a tyranny.

POL–BK. 5. 10. 1312B5-6

Tyranny, Its End The end of a tyranny is the protection of the tyrant's person. person.

RH-1. 8. 1366A6

Tyrant His only object is pleasure. POL–BK. 5.10. 1311a4

POL–BK. 5. 10. 1311A4

A tyrant is ambitious of engrossing wealth.

POL–BK. 5. 10. 1311A5-6

A tyrant should endeavor to engage his subjects in a war, that they may have employment and may be for ever dependent upon their general. POL–BK. 5. 11. 1313b28-29

POL–BK. 5. 11. 1313B28-29

It is the part of a tyrant to place no confidence in friends, as every one desires to dethrone him.

POL–BK. 5. 11. 1313B30-31

Neither slaves nor women conspire against tyrants; but when they are treated

with kindness both of them are of necessity favorers of tyrants.

POL-BK. 5. 11. 1313B35-37

Tyrants always love bad men.

POL-BK. 5. 1. 1314A1-2

A tyrant should rather admit strangers than citizens to his table and familiarity, for the latter are his enemies.

POL-BK. 5. 11. 1314A9-11

U

Ultimate The end, together with the final cause, is a thing that is ultimate.

ME-4. 6. 1021B29-30

Understanding, Object of Inasmuch as the object of the understanding is not a different thing from the understanding itself, in the case of as many things as do not involve a connexion with matter they will be the same thing; and the act of perception will be identical with the object of perception.

ME-11. 9. 1075A3-5

Unity and Being Unity is predicated in as many ways as entity; and entity signifies partly this particular thing and partly quantity, and partly quality.

ME-6. 4.1030B10-12

Universal Of things, some are universal but others singular and by universal I mean whatever may naturally be predicated of many things, but by singular that which may not.

DE I-7. 17A38-40

By universal I mean whatever can be predicated of many.

DE I-7. 17A39-40

I call that universal which is both predicated 'of every' and 'per se' and so far as the thing is.

PO A-1. 4. 73B26-27

We speak of the universal as that which is common to these (i.e. singulars).

ME-2. 4. 1000A1

That which is universal is common, for that is said to be universal which by nature is fitted to be inherent in many things.

ME-8. 13. 1038B11-12

It is evident that nothing of those things that are universals can possess an existence apart from singulars.

ME-6. 16. 1040B26-27

Without universals it is not possible to attain to scientific knowledge; but the

abstraction of them from singulars is a cause of the difficulties that ensue in regard to ideas.

ME-12. 9. 1086B5-7

Things universal are common. For we call those things universals, which are inherent in many things.

DE P A-1. 4. 644A27-28

That which is universal is a certain whole, since it comprehends many things as parts.

PHY-1. 1. 184A25

After a certain manner each body is many; but the all, or universe of which these are parts, is necessarily perfect.

DE C-1. 1. 268B9-10

The universal follows the particular.

DE I-13. 23A18

Universal-Particular The universal is more know in the order of reason; the individual in the order of sense.

PHY-1. 5. 189A5-7

Universal, Process of Acquiring Knowledge of Vide SCIENCE, (KNOWLEDGE), PROCESS OF ACQUIRING.

Universal Statement Wherefore in all syllogisms we must have a universal; a universal statement is established only when all the premises are universal; a particular in this way also, and from one particular. PA-1. 24. 41b22-24

PA-I. 24. 41B22-24

Universally I mean universally enunciates of a universal as 'every man is white,' 'no man is white.'

DE I-7. 17B5-6

Universe That the body of the universe therefore is not infinite, is manifest.

DE C-1. 7. 276A16-17

Univocally Things are said to be named univocally which have in common both the name and the definition corresponding with the name.

CAT-1. 1A6

Unjust The unjust is the unequal.

M M-1. 34. 1193B20

Unjust Man Firstly, he who breaks the laws is considered unjust, and, secondly, he who takes more than his share, or the unfair man.

N E-5. 1. 1129B32-34

Upper Class That which marks the upper classes is their fortune, their birth, their abilities, or their education, or any such like excellence which is attributed to them.

POL-Bk. 4. 4. 1291B28-30

Upward Motion away from the center.

DE C-1. 2. 268B21-22

That which is upward in bipeds is towards the upward part of the universe.

DE IN-5. 706B3-4

That part whence nutriment and increase are imparted to animals and plants is the upward part.

DE IN-4. 705A32-33

Usury Usury is most reasonably detested, as the increase of our fortune arises from the money itself, and not by employing it to the purpose for which it was intended. For it was devised for the sake of exchange, but usury multiplies it. And hence usury has received the name of 'produce'; for whatever is produced is itself like its parents; and usury is merely money born of money; so that of all means of money-making, this is the most contrary to nature.

POL-Bk. I. 10. 1258B2-8

V

Venality In every state, it is necessary, both by the laws and every other method, that matters be so ordered as to shut out venality from state offices.

POL-Bk. 5. 8. 1308B31-33

Vengeance It is more natural to man to take vengeance than to forgive.

N E-4. 11. 1126A30

Venial They are venial, if they are mistakes committed not only in ignorance but from ignorance; but if they are not committed from ignorance but in ignorance, and from an emotion which is neither natural nor human, they are not venial.

N E-5. 10. 1136A5-9

Verb A verb is that which, besides something else, signifies time; of which no part is separately significant, and it is always indicative of those things which are asserted of something else.

DE I-3. 16B6-8

A composite sound significant with time, of which no part is of itself significant.

P-20. 1457A14-16

Verbs taken by themselves are names and signify something but do not assert whether something is or is not.

DE I-3. 16B19-22

Vice Pleasures and pains are the causes of vicious moral states, if we pursue and avoid such pleasures and pains as are wrong, or pursue and avoid them at the wrong time or in the wrong manner, or in any other of the various ways in which it is logically possible to do wrong.

N E-2. 2. 1104B21-24

Both vice and virtue are necessarily voluntary things.

E E-2. 11. 1228A7-8

It follows that our vices must be voluntary.

N E-3. 7. 1114B24

Vulgarity and meanness are vices.

N E-4. 4. 1122A30-31

Vicious Every vicious person is ignorant of what he ought to do, and what he ought to abstain from doing.

N E-3. 2. 1110B28-29

Village The society of many families, which was instituted for lasting and mutual advantage, is called a village, and a village is most naturally composed of the emigrant members of one family, whom some persons call ‘clansmen,’ the children and the children’s children.

POL-BK. I. 2. 1252B15-18

Virility Most (men) are capable of generating till they are sixty years old, and if they are capable after this period they possess a generative power till they are seventy years old.

DE H A-7. 8. 585B5-7

Virtue It is a mean state as lying between two vices, a vice of excess on the one hand and a vice of deficiency on the other, and as aiming at the mean in the emotions and actions.

N E-2. 9. 1109A20-23

Virtue is a kind of good.

T-6. 4. 142B14

To speak summarily then, virtue is the best habit.

M M-1. 4. 1185A38

The virtues are not faculties. For we are not called either good or bad, nor are we praised or blamed, as having an abstract capacity for emotion.

N E-2. 4. 1106A6-9

Every virtue or excellence has the effect of producing a good condition of that of which it is a virtue or excellence, and of enabling it to perform its function well.

N E-2. 5. 1106A15-17

There are three dispositions, two being vices, viz. one the vice of excess and the other that of deficiency, and one virtue, which is the mean state between them.

N E-2. 8. 1108B11-13

Virtue and vice are both alike in our own power.

N E-3. 7. 1113B6-7

Virtue, if regarded in its essence or theoretical conception, is a mean state, but, if regarded from the point of view of the highest good, or of excellence, it is an extreme.

N E-2. 6. 1107A6-8

The virtues we acquire by first exercising them, as is the case with all the arts, for it is by doing what we ought to do when we have learnt the arts that we learn the arts themselves.

N E-2. 1. 1103A31-34

The virtues are in some sense deliberate purposes, or do not exist in the absence of deliberate purpose.

N E-2. 4. 1106A3-4

Virtue cannot be exercised, without the pleasure arising from virtuous conduct.

M M-2. 7. 1206A24-25

Virtue does not follow pleasure, but pleasure follows virtue.

M M-2. 11. 1209B37

All virtue is pre-elective, or the object of deliberate choice.

E E-3. 1. 1228A23-24

Actions in accordance with virtue are pleasant in themselves.

N E-1. 9. 1099A14-15

Virtue is the instrument of intellect.

E E-7. 14. 1248A29

By human virtue or excellence we mean not that of the body, but that of the soul.

N E-1. 13. 1102A16-17

But of virtue, there are two species, the one, indeed, being ethical, but the other dianoetical (or pertaining to the discursive energy of reason).

E E-2. 1. 1220A4-5

Virtue or excellence being twofold, partly intellectual and partly moral, intellectual virtue is both originated and fostered mainly by teaching. N E-2. 1. 1103a14-16

N E-2. 1. 1103A14-16

It is necessary that ethical virtue should be conversant with certain media, and should be a certain medium.

E E-2. 3. 1220B34-35

It is clear that no moral virtue is implanted in us by nature.

N E-2. 1. 1103A19

Moral virtue tends to produce the best action in respect of pleasures and pains, and vice is its opposite.

N E-2. 2. 1105A10-13

Virtue will aim at the mean; I speak of moral virtue, as it is moral virtue which is concerned with emotions and actions and it is these which admit of excess and deficiency and the mean.

N E-2. 5. 1106B15-18

Virtuous actions are noble and have a noble motive.

N E-4. 2. 1120A23-24

It is easy to prove that it is not through external goods that men acquire virtue, but through virtue that they acquire them.

POL-BK. 7. 1. 1323A40-41

Without virtue it is not easy to bear the gifts of fortune in good taste.

N E-4. 8. 1124A30-31

Virtue is greater than what is not positive virtue.

RH-1. 7. 1364A31-32

Those who use general terms deceive themselves, when they say that virtue consists in a good disposition of mind, or in doing what is right, or something of this sort. They do much better who enumerate the different virtues as Georgias did, than those who thus define them.

POL-BK. I. 13. 1280A25-28

Virtue is a power (faculty) tending to provide us with goods and preserve them to us; a power moreover, capable of benefiting in many and important cases; of benefiting every object in every respect. RH-1. 9. 1366a36-1366b1

RH-1. 9. 1366A36-1366B1

The constituent parts of virtue are justice, courage, temperance, magnificence, magnanimity, liberality, placability, prudence, wisdom. RH-BK. 1. 9. 1366b1-3

RH-BK. 1. 9. 1366B1-3

Valor, justice, and wisdom have in a state the same force and form as in individuals; and it is only as he shares in these virtues that each man is said to be just, wise, and prudent.

POL-BK. 7. 1. 1323B33-36

Virtue, Moral Moral virtue is the outcome of habit.

N E-2. 1. 1103A17

Moral virtue is concerned with pleasures and pains.

N E-2. 2. 1104B8-9

Vision Vision is produced only when the sensible organ experiences some affection.

DE A-2. 7. 419A17-18

It is the most deep-set eyes that, in every animal, have the most penetrating vision.

H A-1. 10. 492A9-10

Those whose nature is, as it were, loquacious and melancholy, see all-various visions.

DE DIV-2. 483B16-18

Voice The voice is a sound expressing something. It is not a simple sound of the breathed-in air, like a cough.

DE A-2. 8. 420B29-31

Voice and sound are very different things.

H A-4. 9. 535A27-28

The voice is a sound produced by a living being.

The voice of girls is more acute than that of boys.

DE H A-7. 1. 581B10-11

Void It must be admitted that there is neither a void body, nor that two magnitudes are in the same place, nor that any thing is increased by that which is incorporeal.

DE G ET C-1. 5. 321B15-16

Voluntary It would seem to follow that it is voluntary if the agent originates it with a knowledge of the particular circumstances of the action.

N E-3. 3. 1111A22-24

Men are voluntary agents in whatever they do wittingly and without compulsion. RH-BK. 1. 10. 1368b9-10

RH-BK. 1. 10. 1368B9-10

Voluntary actions we perform either with or without deliberate purpose—with it, if we perform them after previous deliberation, and without it, if without such deliberation.

N E-5. 10. 1135B8-11

The voluntary is that which possesses the principal authority in virtue.

M M-1. 12. 1187B33-34

It appears, therefore, that the voluntary subsists in virtue and vice.

M M-1. 9. 1187A28-29

Vote When the people are masters of the vote, they become masters of the government.

C-9

Vowel That which has an audible sound without percussion.

P-20. 1456B25-26

W

Waking Because the blood is especially without separation after the introduction of nutriment, sleep is produced till the purest part of the blood is separated to the upper, and the most turbid to the lower parts. And when this happens the animal awakes, being liberated from the weight of the nutriment.

DE S-3. 458A22-25

Walking In quadrupeds it is with the right part that walking begins.

H A-2. 1. 498B6-7

War Since Nature makes nothing either imperfect or in vain, it necessarily follows that she has made all these things for the sake of man. For this reason the art of war is, in some sense, a part of the art of acquisition; for hunting is a part of it, which it is necessary for us to employ against wild beasts, and against those of mankind who, being intended by nature for slavery, are unwilling to submit to it. On this occasion, such a war is by nature just.

POL-BK. I. 8. 1256B20-26

Water Water is more generated in the winter and by night than by day.

DE M-2. 4. 360A2-3

All flowing waters are fontal waters.

DE M-2.1. 353B19-20

Such things, therefore, as consist of water alone, these are fixed or congealed by cold.

DE P A-2. 2. 649A30

Hard and cold water is either the cause of sterility, or of the procreation of females.

DE G A-4. 2. 767A35

Wealth The constituents of wealth are: plenty of money, being master of lands and seats, with the possession of personal property of live stock and slaves, such as are remarkable for number, stature, and comeliness; and all these should be secure and respectable and useful.

RH-1. 5. 1381A12-17

Weight It is evident that not every body has either levity or gravity.

DE C-1. 3. 269B19-20

When When, as ‘yesterday,’ ‘the day before.’

CAT-4. 2A1-2

Where Where, like “in the market place,” ‘in the Lyceum.’

CAT-4. 2A1

Whole A whole is styled, first, that from which is absent no part of those things whereof the whole by nature is said to consist; and secondly, that which contains the things contained, so that they form one certain thing.

ME-4. 26. 1023B26-28

The whole and the part tend naturally to the same thing, as for instance, all the earth and a small clod.

DE C-1. 3. 270A3-5

Wicked It appears then that the wicked man has not a friendly disposition even to himself, as there is nothing lovable in him.

N E-9. 4. 1166B25-26

The wicked man may be compared to a State which carries out its laws, but whose laws are bad.

N E-7. 11. 1152A24

Wife The well-ordered wife will justly consider the behavior of her husband as a model of her own life.

ECO-BK. 1. 7. (LOEB P. 401 BK. 3)

Neither splendor of vestments, nor preeminence of beauty, nor the amount of gold, contributes so much to the commendation of a woman, as good management in domestic affairs, and a noble and comely manner of life.

ECO-BK. [1. 7]. BK. 3. (LOEB ED. P. 401)

Will The will is an appetite.

DE A-3. 10. 433A23

The will is a voluntary thing.

M M-1. 13. 1188A35

Every thing which a man wills is voluntary.

E E-2. 8. 1224A1

Neither are will and deliberate choice the same.

E E-2. 10. 1225B32

Will and opinion especially pertain to the end.

E E-2. 10. 1226A16

Wind Wind is a certain quantity of dry exhalation, from the earth, moved about the earth.

DE M-2. 4. 361A30-31

Wind is rather the motion of air, since the same air remains both when it is moved and when it is stationary, so that, in short, wind is not air, for else there would be wind when the air is not moved, since the same air remains stationary which was wind.

T-4. 5. 127A4-8

Wind for the most part is produced after showers of rain, in those places in which it happens to rain, and the blasts of wind cease when it rains.

DE M-2. 4. 360B26-29

It is requisite to think that wind always accompanies and precedes thunder; but it is not visible, because it is without color. Hence it is moved before it strikes.

DE M-3. 1. 371B7-9

Tranquil winds are produced from two causes. For they either arise from cold, extinguishing the exhalation, as when thick ice is produced; or from the exhalation wasting away through suffocation.

DE M-2. 5. 361B24-27

Winds, however, do not seem to be hot, because they move the air which is full of a cold and abundant vapor, just as the breath which is blown through the mouth.

DE M-2. 8. 367A33-367B1

Wine Wine is not beneficial either to children or nurses.

DE S-3. 457A14-15

Wine is pneumatic.

DE S-3. 457A16-17

Wing They would be of no use to birds if they were erect.

DE IN-11. 710B32-711A1

Wisdom Wisdom, therefore, is a science conversant about certain causes and first principles.

ME-1. 1. 981B27-29

Of the sciences that which is desirable for its own account, and for the sake of knowledge, we consider to be wisdom in preference to that which is eligible on account of its probable results, and that which is more qualified for preeminence we regard as wisdom, rather than that which is subordinate.

ME-1. 2. 982A14-17

But as far as wisdom has been defined a science of first causes, and of that which is especially capable of being scientifically known, so far such would be a science of substance.

ME-2. 2. 996B13-14

All other sciences may be more requisite than this one (wisdom) but none is more excellent.

ME-1. 2. 983A10-11

It may be defined as the capital science of the most honorable matters.

N E-6. 7. 1141A16-17

Wisdom will be the union of intuitive reason and science.

N E-6. 7. 1141B2-3

It is evident that wisdom is a virtue.

M M-1. 34. 1197B10-11

This (wisdom) alone of the sciences is free, for this alone subsists for its own sake.

ME-1. 2. 982B26-27

Wisdom in Physics I admit there is a certain wisdom that is physics, but it is not the first.

ME-3. 3. 1005B1-2

Wisdom, Practical Practical wisdom does not concern the governed, but only

true opinion; the latter indeed are like flute makers, while he who governs is the musician who plays on the flutes.

POL-Bk. 3. 4. 1277B28-30

Wise Man In the first place we go on the supposition that the wise man is acquainted with all things scientifically, as far as that is possible, not, however, having a scientific knowledge of them singly. In the next place, a person who is capable of knowing things that are difficult and not easy for a man to understand, such a one we deem wise (for perception of the senses is common to all, wherefore it is a thing that is easy and by no means wise). Further one who is more accurate, and more competent to give instruction in the causes of things, we regard more wise about every science.

ME-1. 2. 982A8-14

Wish It will perhaps be best to say that in an absolute or true sense it is the good which is the object of wish, but that in reference to the individual it is that which appears to be good.

N E-3. 6. 1113A22-24

Nobody wishes what he does not think to be good.

N E-5. 11. 1136B7-8

Wit, Quick Vide SAGACITY.

Woman Vide FEMALE.

Wonder For from wonder men, both now and at the first, began to philosophize, having felt astonishment originally at the things which were most obvious, indeed amongst those that were doubtful....

ME-1. 2. 982B12-14

Wonderful It is necessary in tragedies to produce the wonderful.

P-24. 1460A11-12

Words Spoken words are symbols of passions of the soul; written words are symbols of spoken words.

DE 1-1. 16A3-4

Words We must employ but sparingly, and in very few places, exotic and compound words and those newly coined.

HR-Bk. 3. 2. 1404B28-29

World The world is sensible.

DE C-1. 9. 278A10

The whole world is composed from all its proper matter.

DE C-1. 9. 279A7-8

It is impossible that there should be more worlds than one.

DE C-1. 8. 276B21

There neither now are many worlds, nor were, nor can be produced; but this world is one, alone, and perfect.

DE C-1. 9. 279A9-11

Worm It is a worm when, from a complete animal, another animal equally complete issues.

H A-1. 5.489B8-9

Worship Whatever, either from defect or excess, prevents us from worshipping and contemplating God, is bad.

E E-7. 15. 1249B19-21

Worth Men are worthy and good in three ways; and these are, by nature, by custom, by reason.

POL-BK. 7. 13. 1332A39-40

He is a man of worth who considers what is good because it is virtuous, as what is simply good.

POL-BK. 7. 13. 1332A22-23

A man, when he is perfectly worthy, is said to be beautiful and good; since the epithets the beautiful and the good are given to virtue.

M M-2. 9. 1207B24-25

Writing The demonstrative style is most adapted to writing. For its purpose is perusal.

RH-BK. 3. 12. 1414A17-18

Wrong, to To injure deliberately.

T-2. 2. 109B34-35

Y

Youth The young are not proper students of political science, as they have no experience of the actions of life which form the premises and subjects of the reasonings.

N E-1. 1. 1095A2-4

It would seem that the friendship of the young is based upon pleasure; for they live by emotion and are most inclined to pursue what is pleasant to them at the moment.

N E-8. 3. 1156A31-33

Youth, Excellencies of Accomplished in respect to personal excellence as stature, comeliness, strength, ability in the games; and as to that of the mind, temperance and courage; these all are the excellencies of youth.

RH-1. 5. 1381A1-5

Young The young are in the highest degree apt to pursue the pleasures of love above all desires about which the body is concerned and in these they are incontinent.

RH-Bk. 2. 12. 1389A2-6

Young, Passions of Ardent, inconstant, irritable, ambitious, sanguine, credulous, hopeful, rash, bashful, high-spirited, with a sense of honor, social, excessive, mischievous, facetious.

RH-2. 12. 1388B31-1389B12

Z

Zodiac

All the planets are moved in the zodiac, and not the sun alone.

DE M-1. 8. 345A21-22

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