



ALLAN SILVERMAN

THE DIALECTIC
OF ESSENCE



A STUDY OF PLATO'S
METAPHYSICS

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ALLAN SILVERMAN

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PREFACE

THIS IS and is not the book I wanted to write. I wanted to model my work on the books and articles of the various authors from whom I learned so much. I wanted to address the extensive ancient literature on Plato and the central topics of his metaphysics. I have fallen short on both counts. My greatest debts are acknowledged in the body of the book and notes. Were I not so prolix I might have been able to give proper respect to other approaches to Plato's metaphysics. I wanted to discuss more topics, for instance Plato's teleology, and to examine others better. Nonetheless, the book is what it is. Its failings are mine.

Some of the book dates back to a paper written for a *Timaeus* seminar taught by John Dillon at Berkeley in 1979. I have racked up enormous debts over the years, not least to all my teachers and friends at Berkeley. I was fortunate to have been able to work with Gregory Vlastos throughout my studies and to have assisted G.E.L. Owen during his memorable visit as Sather Professor. Donald Davidson kindly gave me a copy of his dissertation. I am also deeply indebted to my colleagues in the Departments of Philosophy and Classics at Ohio State, where I have been since 1985, for their tolerance, encouragement, and philosophy. The departments and the university as a whole have supported my research intellectually and financially. I am grateful to all. The Center for Hellenic Studies provided an ideal environment in which to work through a Junior Fellowship in 1988–89. My thanks go especially to Zeph and Diana Stewart. The idea to write the book took shape while I was a Visiting Professor at Yale in 1993 and 1994. I learned much from conversations with Bob Adams and others in New Haven. The National Endowment for the Humanities supported the actual beginnings of the book with a Fellowship in 1995–96.

Parts of chapters have been read at various places—Northwestern, Purdue, Stanford, The University of Washington, UCLA. I thank the audiences on all those occasions for their comments.

I cannot count the individuals to whom I owe thanks: friends, students, colleagues, hosts, and visitors over the years. But there are some special debts to acknowledge. Bob Batterman, Sylvia Berryman, Lee Franklin, Peter King, George Pappas, Diana Raffman, William Taschek, and Neil Tennant have read or conversed with me about various parts of the book at Ohio State. I was abetted by conversations with June Allison, Dirk Baltzly, Simon Blackburn, Chris Bobonich, Myles Burnyeat, Marc Cohen, John Cooper, Pat Curd, Nick Denyer, John Dillon, Michael Ferejohn, Gail Fine, Charles Griswold, Adam Hayward, Verity Harte, Sally Haslanger, Richard Kraut, Jonathan Lear, M. M. McCabe, Connie Meinwald, Henry Mendell, Julius Moravcsik, Calvin Normore, Richard Patterson, Chris Rowe, Dory Scaltsas, Malcolm Schofield,

Steve Tracy, Bob Turnbull, Nick Wolterstorff, and Steve Yablo. Mark Griffith, Tony Long, and David Sedley have been extraordinarily generous with their time and comments over long years of friendship. Robert Kraut has been a constant sounding board. Alexander Nehamas has supported this endeavor in numerous ways. My greatest debt by far is to Alan Code, an exemplary teacher, friend, colleague, reader, interlocutor, writer, and philosopher. I am sure there are others whom I have failed to mention. My apologies.

The manuscript was vastly improved by the comments of the anonymous readers for Princeton University Press. I was also fortunate to have Ian Malcolm as my editor and David Allen as my copy editor.

I cannot even begin to thank my family. My in-laws, Robert and Kit Corley, generously allowed me to use their cabin in the woods whenever I really needed isolation. My father, who passed away when I was just beginning to write, and my mother have always been there in all of my pursuits. Words fail me when I try to appropriately thank my children, Alexander and Elena, and my wife, Ann. The book is dedicated to them.

ABBREVIATIONS

ARISTOTLE

<i>Categories</i>	(<i>Cat.</i>)
<i>Metaphysics</i> [Ross edition (Oxford, 1924)]	(<i>Meta.</i>)
<i>Posterior Analytics</i>	(<i>A. Po.</i>)
<i>Topics</i>	(<i>Top.</i>)

PLATO

All texts are from the Oxford Classical Texts of Plato, 5 vols., ed. J. Burnet

<i>Apology</i>	(<i>Ap.</i>)
<i>Charmides</i>	(<i>Ch.</i>)
<i>Cratylus</i>	(<i>Crat.</i>)
<i>Crito</i>	(<i>Cr.</i>)
<i>Euthyphro</i>	(<i>Eu.</i>)
<i>Gorgias</i>	(<i>G.</i>)
<i>Hippias Major</i>	(<i>H. Ma.</i>)
<i>Laches</i>	(<i>La.</i>)
<i>Laws</i>	(<i>L.</i>)
<i>Lysis</i>	(<i>Ly.</i>)
<i>Parmenides</i>	(<i>Parm.</i>)
<i>Phaedo</i>	(<i>Phd.</i>)
<i>Phaedrus</i>	(<i>Phdr.</i>)
<i>Philebus</i>	(<i>Phil.</i>)
<i>Protagoras</i>	(<i>Pr.</i>)
<i>Republic</i>	(<i>R.</i>)
<i>Sophist</i>	(<i>Sph.</i>)
<i>Statesman</i>	(<i>Pol.</i>)
<i>Symposium</i>	(<i>Symp.</i>)
<i>Theaetetus</i>	(<i>Tht.</i>)
<i>Timaeus</i>	(<i>Tim.</i>)

Liddell-Scott-Jones, *A Greek-English Lexicon*,
9th ed. (Oxford, 1940) (LSJ)

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THE DIALECTIC OF ESSENCE

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INTRODUCTION

How ought one to live? I take this question to be the starting point for Plato's philosophy, his Platonism. No doubt others before him asked it: Socrates for one. But it is not the mere posing of the question that makes it so special. Rather, it is the manner in which Plato considers it. In his hands it calls for reflection, and reflection of a certain, increasingly systematic variety. Plato thinks that systematic reflection, what he and we call "philosophy," shows that this question can be answered. Indeed, philosophical reflection reveals that philosophy itself, the practice of philosophizing, is the answer to the question.

From this starting point spring his ethics, epistemology, and metaphysics. For Plato, these domains are interdependent. Plato is rightly honored for his synoptic vision, his power to see systematic connections between different parts of life, science, the arts, and philosophy. If the question is, broadly speaking, part of ethical inquiry, his answer requires the development of much of his metaphysics and epistemology.

My aim in this work is to explore Plato's metaphysics. The book has three parts, modeled on what I believe to be the three key elements of his metaphysics: the Theory of Forms; the account of particulars; and the nature of metaphysical theory itself.

At the core of Plato's entire philosophy is the Theory of Forms. For Plato, Forms are both the goal and the grounds of philosophical inquiry. In seeking to answer the question of how ought one to live, Plato thinks that we come

ineluctably to recognize their presence, in part through the realization that they are needed if one is to engage in any inquiry at all.

Thus while I will try to steer clear of most of his ethics and much of his epistemology, I cannot avoid the epistemology entirely. The fact that reflection is a critical component of the best way to live ensures that epistemology will be in play from the outset. The capacity for reflection is distinctive of humans. Reflection presupposes that we take objects or states of affairs, including our own mental states, e.g., beliefs, perceptions, or feelings, as fixed in some sense, so that we may examine and think about them. The assumption that the world is a certain determinate way, constant and fixed to some degree, was as much a part of the Greek worldview as it is of our own. Plato's philosophy is predicated on the notion that the cosmos of which we are an integral part is rationally ordered and (therefore) in principle intelligible to us.¹

But this is not to say that every Greek thinker accepted that the world was fixed and determinate. Perhaps its most problematic aspects are properties such as good and bad, right and wrong, or justice and injustice. Heraclitus, Gorgias, and Protagoras, thinkers whom Plato regarded as rivals, and no doubt countless tragedians, historians, and politicians challenged assumptions about the universality and sameness of ethical notions. Plato sees that reflection is a source of anxiety for humans. For us alone constancy is an issue, since only humans, it seems, have the ability to raise issues about it in our everyday thought and talk. And yet, aware of the challenges posed by reason, Plato concludes that in order to save the phenomenon of reason there must be stable, determinate Forms.

Part and parcel, then, of the reflective inquiry into the question of how ought one to live is this issue of fixity and stability. Socrates claims, against the sophists and others, that there are objective ethical values. Plato recognizes that Socrates' method of argumentation presupposes determinate concepts and beliefs that can be juxtaposed with other beliefs and concepts and judged to be compatible or incompatible, consistent or inconsistent with one another. Because there are these fixed, determinate contents, it is possible for one to deny the *same* judgment or statement that another asserts. *Plato's Doctrine of Forms is the crystallization of his insight that there must be fixity or constancy, both in the world and in our thoughts.* Indeed, I take this intuition to be at the heart of Realism or Platonism, Platonic or otherwise. Forms are the preconditions of an ordered, intelligible cosmos. They are principles of fixity, stability, and changelessness. Forms have a distinctively philosophical legacy. They are universals. They are objective, mind-independent entities. Among their heirs are Frege's sharp borders² and the rules of Wittgenstein's *Investigations*. Let us refer to these fixed entities as "properties." The guiding insight, then, into the Theory of Forms is that properties cannot change their nature or properties. In my view, Plato's *primary* metaphysical goal is to

explore and analyze this bedrock intuition that properties or Forms are the source and principles of stability in nature.

Set against this commitment to stable Forms is the apparent fact that things change. Plato accepts that change is also a phenomenon to be saved and explained. Among the changing things are the ordinary particulars and events of the physical, material, sensible world. Included among the ordinary particulars are the inorganic rocks, metals, and liquids, as well as the various kinds of living things, plants, animals, and humans. For Plato, the domain of nature is a subject of metaphysical inquiry. Therefore, a *second* goal of Plato's metaphysical theory is to explain the nature and characteristics of the particulars of the material world, a critical part of which will be to explain how change is possible.

Humans are a special part of nature. So too are the capacities of humans, especially language and thought. When we understand what it is to be human, we appreciate the need for an account of what the world must be like if there are to be thought and language. Thus in the pursuit of our metaphysical inquiry we have to examine the nature of the cognitive states and the nature of their objects. It turns out that the objects of knowledge, our highest rational capacity and the foundation of all our rational capacities, are the Forms. Thus the culmination of metaphysical and epistemological inquiry returns us once again to Forms. (And since, for Plato, knowledge turns out to be the crucial component in the good life for a human, the inquiry into the question of how ought one to live also culminates in Forms.)

According to Plato, at the end of the day the only way for metaphysical inquiry to proceed is by looking at the cognitive and linguistic capacities of humans, for there is no route of inquiry independent of language and thought. Hence, in developing a metaphysical theory, Plato attempts to give an account of metaphysical theorizing. This surfaces most visibly in the *Parmenides*, which is only fitting, given that this most august predecessor had, it seems, identified what is with what is thought.³ After his Parmenides declares that Forms are necessary if there is to be dialectical inquiry (*Parm.* 135b–c), issues pertaining to the nature of metaphysical inquiry itself become part of metaphysics in the second part of the dialogue. Given various assumptions about what the objects of inquiry are, Plato undertakes to show that there are general principles that hold true about whatever may be, in part by showing that certain forms of inquiry are possible and others impossible.

Thus, Plato investigates what we might call “general” or “analytic ontology,” the aim of which is to set out general principles governing any specific or special ontology which might be proposed. Here we find, though worked out in a less detailed fashion, the family of notions subsequently to be familiar from Aristotle's *Metaphysics*: subject and predicate, universal and particular, part and whole, one and many, same and different, inherence, separation

and others. In so far as a philosopher is studying and proving things about metaphysical inquiry, one is engaged in what is today perhaps considered part of epistemology. In the pursuit of a wholly general ontological account, however, the boundary between metaphysics and epistemology is blurred.

But for Plato, there is a second, more specific arena in which the boundary is blurred. In accounting for the nature and behavior of ordinary particulars, Plato develops a pattern of inference or argument that we, following his successors, call the “One-Over-Many.” We recognize that many items are the same in kind or type: Secretariat and Seattle Slew are both horses; Aristides and Socrates are both just. From such facts Plato infers that there are Forms, e.g., Justice, Beauty, Squareness, Equality. In so far as thought and speech are part of the study of nature, they too should be subject to a One-Over-Many argument. Accordingly, Plato asserts that Knowledge is a Form, and apparently commits himself to Forms of Belief, Perception, Name, and Statement. Moreover, items that his inquiry shows to be necessary not only for thought and speech in general, but for metaphysical or philosophical inquiry in particular, seem worthy of being regarded as Forms. Plato, especially in the *Parmenides* and *Sophist*, attributes a special status to a host of Forms or Kinds whose *raison d’être* is arguably to make possible thought, language, and metaphysical inquiry. Yet, one desideratum we try to satisfy in considering whether the Horse itself or Squareness be Forms is that they be objective and mind-independent entities, items which would “exist” were there no thinkers at all. One is hesitant to say the same about what is required by thought and speech, for in some sense they are not independent, or at least not in the same intuitive fashion. Indeed, Gilbert Ryle, in his epoch-making study of the *Parmenides*,⁴ argued that Plato’s recognition of the “syncategorematic” nature of these properties prompted revolutionary changes in his Theory of Forms. Making sense of Forms such as Unity, Sameness, Difference, and other Forms introduced in the later works, must then be an integral part of the reconstruction of Plato’s metaphysics. This requires one to examine the boundary between epistemology and metaphysics, and to be alert to the difficulties of distinguishing conceptual/epistemological⁵ from metaphysical realism. Tracking Plato’s development of a general metaphysics is the *third* major goal of this work.

The Dialectic of Essence

There are many ways into the labyrinth of Plato’s metaphysics. And while I would like to think that there is only one way out, i.e., the path I will travel, I am pretty sure that there are many. (My fear is that there is none! Perhaps Wittgenstein is right and the only way to deal with the labyrinth of Platonism is to refuse to enter it.) The path I will follow tracks the thread of

ousia, which I shall translate “essence.” There is no hoarier notion in ancient metaphysics.

While Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* is the *locus classicus* among the ancient investigations into *ousia*, almost all of his philosophical ancestors were concerned with the notion in one guise or another. Canonically, Greek philosophy begins with the Ionian inquiries into nature, *phusis*, which yielded different speculative accounts of how the present cosmos, marked by change and multiplicity, came to be “out of” some single and undifferentiated principle, e.g., air or the *apeiron*. Ionian methodology, we might say, was empirical and democratic. Their conclusions were based on observations of the phenomena of the physical world (*istoria*). The phenomena, though not the processes which produced them nor the principle(s) from which they were produced, were widely accepted by their fellow citizens and inquirers. Xenophanes seems to have been the first to question the extent to which humans could in fact have knowledge, or perfect knowledge, of the physical world. Whatever we are to make of his obscure remarks about the limitations of human knowledge, to him we can credit the distinction between perfected knowledge of the true state of affairs and our usual epistemic condition, *dokos*, in which, unawares, we are concerned with mere appearances (B36, B35, B2).

Parmenides and Heraclitus change everything. Both distinguish mere appearances, what the ordinary individual or (half-baked) philosopher mistakenly thinks is fact, from the true, hidden nature of reality. But despite their shared rejection of the Ionian account of nature, Heraclitus and Parmenides espouse vastly different ontologies. Heraclitus is the apostle of change, Parmenides the evangelist of a static reality.

For Heraclitus, the ordinary objects of the physical world seem to be continually changing. The only constant, the underlying commonality, is the pattern of change itself. In the *Theaetetus*, Plato ascribes to him a doctrine of flux in all dimensions: at every moment any particular is both changing location and (ex)changing all of its properties. Plato’s material particulars are distant heirs of Heraclitus’s. Plato’s particulars are subject to change in every respect, although not necessarily in every respect at each moment. Platonic particulars are nothing essentially: there is no property that a particular cannot lose.⁶

Particulars, because they change, can be neither metaphysically nor epistemologically basic for Plato. Nor can change itself be the fundamental principle, since Plato finds change intelligible only if there are stable points or states from which it begins and at which it ends. But Plato does think that change must be possible, and he seeks a metaphysical account that secures its possibility. The key to this account are his Forms, entities which are unchanging and essentially and completely the very entities they are. In conceiving of Forms in this way, Plato owes a profound debt to Parmenides.

Unfortunately, Parmenides' poem is too enigmatic to permit a confident assessment of his account of Being. There are, for us and I think for Plato, two fundamental and related issues of interpretation: the nature of Parmenides' monism and the nature of the Parmenidean "is," the verb which figures in the critical premises of the argument in *The Way of Truth*. According to a tradition that begins no later than Plato's *Sophist*, Parmenides is a numerical monist: there is exactly one item in Parmenides' metaphysical cosmos. What that item is is unclear. It seems to be Mind, Being, or the One. Plato devotes much effort in the *Sophist* and *Parmenides* to separating Being, as the object of thought or language, from one's language and thought about it. As he reads the poem, the Parmenidean One/Being/Mind is incapable of being the object of thought or language.

Others argue that Parmenides is a "kind" monist. They find him committed to exactly one kind of entity, Being, but they allow that there may be many entities of that one kind. Support for this interpretation can be found in the fact that some of his successors, Plato perhaps included, do not think it necessary to defend their assumption of a pluralistic metaphysics. Anaximander, Empedocles, and the Atomists all start their accounts with many different items, each of which is something that is. At issue are the possibilities of change, or generation and destruction.

In large measure, the question of Parmenides' monism turns on the way he conceives of Being. Our best guide to understanding his conception is the way the notion is deployed in the arguments of his poem.⁷ Two broad lines of interpretation distinguish an existential "is" from a predicational "is." The existential reading typically treats Parmenides as a numerical monist. What might be called a "pure existentialist reading" maintains that the "is" of *The Way of Truth* stands simply for existence.⁸ All that can be said of any subject is that it is. For admitting any other "property," even (self-)identity, seems to require that the subject be a plurality of some sort, e.g., that it be *both* an existent *and* self-identical. Once pluralism is accepted, difference and not-being seem to follow. At least the last notion is anathema to Parmenides.

The predicationalists⁹ are in general inclined towards kind monism. A plurality of beings is possible because, according to the predicationalist, what is required in order for something to be is that it satisfy certain standards, namely that it be a "predicational unity." To be a predicational unity is for the candidate being, F, to be "of a single kind," *mounogenes* (B8.4): it must be completely and solely F, and admit of a single account specifying its unique nature as F. But nothing about Being, or the arguments of the poem, restricts the number of items that can be predicational unities.¹⁰

The nexus of notions introduced by Parmenides, and especially by the predicationalist reading of him, e.g., being, existence, essence or nature, sameness, difference, not-being, clearly demands to be untangled. While his immediate successors tackle problems relating to change and generation by

appealing to a plurality of entities and processes that allegedly satisfy Parmenidean strictures, Plato is the first to critique Parmenides' assumptions about Being and how one can theorize about what is. In his dialogues, Plato treats Parmenides as a numerical monist and, on balance, conceives of his "is" along existentialist lines. Of course Plato's purpose is dialectical and thus we should not base our understanding of Parmenides solely or even principally on Plato's use of the fragments. Indeed, the predicational reading is very similar to the notion of Being Plato develops for his Forms. There would, then, be good reason for Plato to suppress this reading of Parmenides in order to highlight his own originality. But regardless of which sense of "is" is at work in Parmenides' poem, the effort to identify the different ways in which essence or properties or predicates can belong to a being (an *on*), whether that *on* be a Form, or a particular, or a linguistic subject, would be continuous with the metaphysical tradition of Parmenides.

Plato's Theory of Forms is his revolutionary contribution to the tradition. For Plato, Forms are the primary bearers of essence.¹¹ Their possession of *ousia* guarantees their stability and allows them to be the source of constancy in nature. They *may* be the only bearers of *ousia*. If other items bear essences, their possession of an essence will depend in some fashion on the Form's possession of that same essence.

In this respect, essence is the thread that leads us through the maze of Plato's dialogues as well as his metaphysics. To select essence over other properties or items, e.g., unity, or sameness, or soul, is to imply (conversationally at least) that it deserves to be privileged.¹² Not only do I believe it to be at the core of his metaphysical theory, I contend that the study of essence is the most useful heuristic for the reconstruction of that metaphysical theory.

In trying to understand the role essence plays in Plato, one begins from its earliest manifestations in the so-called Socratic dialogues. Socrates' distinctive mode of inquiry is the elenchus, at whose heart is what we refer to as a Socratic question. It takes the form of a "What is it?" question (*Ti esti . . . ?*) where in place of the "it" typically is found the name of some ethical property, e.g., What is Justice? or What is Piety? A Socratic question is answered by a definition or *logos*, an account that says what Piety or Justice, or for any property X, what X is. Today we typically regard definitions as (of) linguistic items. While it is appropriate at times to treat definitions as linguistic items, they are, for Plato, primarily ontological items; that is, definitions are of things, not words or concepts. If we are careful, we can toggle easily between the linguistic and ontological senses of "definition." It is critical, however, to recognize that *what the linguistic definition picks out or refers to is the essence or ousia of X*.

My inquiry into Plato's metaphysics is guided by three related questions about essence. The first question is:

What items have essences?

The obvious candidates are Forms or particulars.¹³

The second question concerns the ontological relation between the essence and what has an essence:

Can essence be predicated of anything with which it is not identical?

Is an essence (always) identical with whatever possesses it? The answer to this question is terribly complex. Aristotle, in *Metaphysics Zeta* 6, asserts that primary substance is, strictly speaking, identical with its essence.¹⁴ While this suggests that Aristotle's answer to the second question is no, the adjective, "primary," and the phrase, "strictly speaking," leave (vast) room for qualifications. Perhaps essence is predicable of, but not identical with, substances that are not primary; or perhaps when one is not speaking strictly, we can predicate essence of a subject with which it is not identical.

The third question is:

What is the relation between the ontological nature of an essence and the way we learn about and, at the ideal limit, define it?

Can one distinguish the way in which we know and define a Form from the way the Form is? A vivid way to pose this third question is to contrast the syntactic complexity of the linguistic definition of, e.g., Human, say "rational, two-footed animal," with the apparent simplicity or unity of the essence. A Platonic Form is supposed to be simple or unique, a *one* over many. The tension between the unitary nature of the Platonic Form and our understanding of that nature becomes pronounced when Plato develops the Method of Collection and Division in the late dialogues. The weblike or "holistic" structure of the collections and divisions suggests that Plato has either abandoned the unitary nature of the Forms or revised his conception of essence such that Forms are now complex unities.

These three questions shape my account of Plato's metaphysics and my selection of texts and topics. I will ignore many dialogues and even some metaphysical aspects of those dialogues to which my chapters are devoted. For instance, I will not discuss Plato's teleology, the interaction of soul and body, or other aspects of his philosophy of science, including what might be described as his account of efficient causation. Also I will deal only cursorily with the Theory of Recollection in the *Phaedo* and the epistemology of the *Republic*.

On my account, Plato's metaphysics emerges in response to his attempts to answer these three questions. In the *Phaedo*, which I take to be the beginning of his metaphysics, his goals are to develop a special ontology of Forms as the stable bearers of essence, and to distinguish Forms from particulars, items that lack essence. In the next phase, his concern is to investigate what it is for a Form to possess an essence. In the *Parmenides*, this endeavor

prompts his initial efforts to advance a general ontology, a crucial aspect of which is his isolation of Being, Identity, Unity, Sameness, Difference, and other properties that characterize any Form simply in virtue of the fact that it is a Form. In the late dialogues, his continuing investigation into general ontology and the relations between Forms leads to new insights into the difference between the metaphysical and conceptual realms. Here he develops the Method of Collection and Division and the notion of the interweaving of Forms. These allow him to give an account of false statement and to differentiate terms which make distinctions that don't correspond to the way things are in nature from those that do signify real kinds, two clear instances where what we say and what there is come apart. Finally, the account of the interweaving of Forms and the Method of Collection and Division allows him to address the third question about definition and knowledge. According to the general ontology, there can be no *ontological* relation between a Form and a *part* of its essence.¹⁵ Statements such as "Man is animal" are "conceptual truths"; the relations between the Forms are those of compatibility or implication. The only beings of whom Man and Animal are (ontologically) predicated are the individual humans. The relations between Forms are discovered and displayed in the collections and divisions of particulars and the Forms "over" them. Armed with these new weapons, Plato is at last prepared to give an account in the *Timaeus* and *Philebus* of the nature of the particular and the relations between particulars and Forms.

Précis of the Chapters

This book is addressed to the expert who is familiar with the primary metaphysical passages in the dialogues, as well as the secondary literature. But I have tried to make the book accessible to the relative newcomer who might be reading for the first time a book devoted to Plato's metaphysics. The somewhat expansive discussions of the *Phaedo*, *Republic*, and *Parmenides* provide the texts from which I'd like to think my interpretation of Plato's metaphysics falls out rather naturally. Together with more detailed discussions of the late dialogues, the book provides a general introduction to Plato's metaphysics.

Chapter 1 examines in greater detail some of the philosophical issues involved in Plato's account of Forms, particulars, and general metaphysics.

The succeeding six chapters track Plato's metaphysics from its origin in the Socratic dialogues to its conclusion in the *Timaeus*.

Chapter 2 provides the backdrop to the Platonic metaphysics of the *Phaedo*. I look at properties in the so-called Socratic dialogues and how essence emerges in response to Socrates' "What is X?" questions. The metaphysics of these dialogues is adumbrative and problematic. It is unclear whether Socra-

tic properties are simple or related to other properties. Of special interest is the role of a Socratic property as the primary bearer of (its) essence, in virtue of which it “explains” all instances of itself. Socratic properties “self-predicate,” i.e., each seems to be qualified by the very property it is: Piety is pious. In a coda I turn to the *Meno*, a transitional dialogue, to consider its new demands on definitions and the new kinds of properties mentioned there.

In the third chapter, I present my interpretation of Plato’s initial metaphysics of Forms and particulars lacking essence. I begin with the arguments of the *Phaedo*, especially the Hypothesis of Forms commencing at 100 and culminating with the final argument for the immortality of the soul. In the second part of the chapter I turn briefly to the central books of the *Republic*. Mine is, I would like to believe, a fairly orthodox reading of these dialogues. In the final part of the chapter I offer my rational reconstruction of Plato’s account of Forms and particulars in the middle period, to include a defense of the controversial forms-in-us,¹⁶ and my interpretation of the relations of Participation and Being in the middle period. (In an appendix to chapter 2, there is a discussion of Irwin’s and Fine’s alternative account of Plato’s initial metaphysics.)

In the fourth chapter, I examine the *Parmenides*, tracking the argument through the beginning stages of the Second Hypothesis (126–143b8). Here Plato begins the examination of the nature of metaphysics. The critical features of the first two hypotheses concern what must be true of any beings that are to serve as subjects of metaphysical inquiry, beginning from the consideration of how many *archai*, beings or principles, must be posited in order to account for what there is. Special attention is given to the nature of Forms as bearers of essence; what follows from the postulation of two primitives, a one-component and a being-component; and what relations Forms bear to one another. Forms are shown to be both Beings, as they were introduced to be, and partakers, a role that was uncertain in the initial exposition of the theory. In the second part of the chapter I take up the question of separation, the critical feature of the theory according to Aristotle. I argue that (for Plato) Forms are definitionally separate from particulars; that is, since Forms, and not particulars, are bearers of essence, definitions are predicable of Forms and not of particulars. Here I also consider an important rival account, the view that Forms are existentially separate from particulars.

Chapter 5, the longest discussion of a single dialogue, is devoted to the *Sophist* and the interweaving of Forms. I try to show how Forms and metaphysical inquiry emerge into new light *prior* to *Sophist* 254. I then offer my own account of the interweaving of Forms, addressing the questions why there is no Form of Participation and what we are to make of the nature of Being, as well as the nature of statements involving the copula. While the vast literature on the dialogue operates in the background, at the outset of

the chapter I briefly consider Ryle's account of Plato's development, and at the end the culmination of the linguistic turn initiated by Ryle and others, namely Frede's interpretation of *Sophist* 255c12–13.¹⁷

The sixth chapter then takes up the status of “not-beings” in Plato. In general, the goal of the chapter is to consider whether there is an ontological correlate to every linguistic and conceptual notion. The bulk of the chapter is devoted to the treatment of not-beings in the *Sophist*: for instance, the question whether there is a Form of the Not-Beautiful correlated with the predicate “not-beautiful.” Since this question arises in the course of Plato's treatment of false statement, I try to reconstruct Plato's account of this phenomenon. Of all the passages considered in this book, I am least confident about my grip on Plato's argument here (and not confident that Plato himself has a good grip on the problem.) The second part of the chapter addresses the question whether Forms are ontologically related in a manner corresponding to the patterns displayed in the Method of Collection and Division.

In the seventh and longest chapter, I present a detailed account of the nature of particulars. The first part of the chapter looks at the metaphysics of the *Philebus*. In the second part I take up the *Timaeus*.¹⁸ The key question is why Plato offers in each dialogue two accounts of particulars: the “Gift of Prometheus” (14c–19) and the fourfold ontology (23bff.) in the *Philebus*; the initial creation of the cosmos (27dff.) and the restart (47eff.) in the *Timaeus*. The earlier accounts, I will claim, are wedded to the traditional Theory of Forms, even as they push the envelope of that theory. The nature of the Gift of Prometheus and the World Animal itself is fully revealed in their respective dialogues only when the novel and far more detailed second accounts are developed. I consider the metaphysical program of the *Philebus* to be a preliminary take on the nature of particulars. I thus try to show how the fourfold ontology can be assimilated especially to the *Timaeus*'s second account involving the receptacle, geometrical and traditional Forms, and two kinds of causes. According to my reconstruction of the theory of particulars in the *Timaeus*, matter is not a primitive. Platonic particulars, I contend, are composed of matter or body, but matter itself is a construct. Particulars remain dependent beings; they (still) lack *ousia*. They are beholden for their nature both to the natureless medium in which they come to be, the receptacle, and to the form-copies of the geometrical and traditional Forms, which bequeath to them whatever properties they have.

Given the progress of my chapters, perhaps a few remarks about chronology are in order. In all likelihood, Plato wrote the dialogues at different times. I believe, however, that nothing in what I take to be a later dialogue requires that an earlier doctrine be rejected. But chronology does have some implications for me, insofar as I believe that there are developments in Plato's metaphysics. On my account, issues addressed in the later dialogues rely on notions discussed elsewhere, e.g., the so-called first part of the *Par-*

menides looks back to the *Phaedo*. Plato's metaphysics becomes increasingly more sophisticated. I accept the traditional chronology because I think it allows for the most illuminating reconstruction of his metaphysics. Nonetheless, there are good reasons to read the dialogues in a variety of orders, say in the order of the Tetralogies of Thrasyllus, or according to the age of Socrates.¹⁹

Leaving aside the lateness of the *Timaeus*, I adopt a fairly orthodox view about which dialogues belong to the various periods.²⁰ In the early "Socratic" period I include *Apology*, *Crito*, *Euthyphro*, *Charmides*, *Ion*, *Lysis*, *Laches*, *Hippias Minor*, *Menexenus*, *Euthydemus*(?) and the *Protagoras*. The *Hippias Major*, *Gorgias*, and perhaps the *Meno* belong to the end of this period, maybe with the *Gorgias* and more likely the *Meno* verging into the middle period. The middle period works include the *Cratylus*, *Symposium*, *Phaedo*, *Republic*, and perhaps the *Phaedrus*. In the post-*Republic* phase we then find the *Parmenides*, *Theaetetus*, *Sophist*, *Politicus*, *Timaeus*, *Philebus*, and *Laws*, along with the *Critias*.²¹ I omit the dubiously Platonic dialogues as well as the *Letters*. The former have no bearing on my account. As for the *Seventh Letter*, I believe that it is either by Plato or by one sufficiently in tune with his thinking that we should consider most of the doctrinal elements, especially those concerning writing, knowledge, and definition (341–44c), to reflect accurately his late thought.²²

1

AN OVERVIEW OF PLATONIC METAPHYSICS

The Philosophical Background

This study of Plato's metaphysics is inevitably influenced by my views of the topics and debates found in the secondary literature, beginning with Plato's successors, Speusippus and Aristotle, and ending with the last sixty or so years of in particular Anglo-American scholarship. The central issue, I believe, is separation, the notion that Forms are χωριστόν. It is not clear what separation amounts to in Plato's philosophy.¹ The conventional wisdom is that Platonic Forms are separate in that they are transcendent universals, in contrast to Aristotelian Forms which are said to be immanent universals. Transcendence is then parsed as the ability of a Form to be what it is—many would say its ability to exist—apart from all other things. I embrace the kernel of the conventional wisdom. If Plato never labels a Form as χωριστόν, a great part of what it is to be separate is captured by the phrase often and exclusively used to depict a Form, namely αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό (I shall transliterate this phrase).² A Form is separate in that it is what it is *itself by itself* or, better, *in virtue of itself*.

The task is to explain what it is for a Form to be what it is in virtue of itself. Certainly a part of this task is to say in what sense a Form is not what it is in virtue of something else; for this will help to establish what a given Form is separate from. On my account, essence plays the crucial role in the explanation of the separation of Forms. And corresponding to the three

questions about essence (see Introduction), I think that there are three intertwined aspects to Plato's notion of separation or being *auto kath' auto*, all of which are part of the legacy of Parmenides. The first is the separation of Forms from physical particulars. Their separation prompts the development of two ontological predication relations, each appropriate to its own kind of item. The second aspect is the separation of Being and Identity, or Being and Being the Same (as oneself). With their separation Plato comes to have a plurality of Forms, each of which is separate from any other. The third is the separation of mind, or what knows from what is known. The attempt to pry these apart yields the differentiation of the metaphysical from the conceptual realms.

I think that Plato's metaphysics develops in tandem with his views on these three aspects of separation. These views emerge at different times, in response to different worries, if not in response to changes in doctrines. In the next three sections, I want to sketch my account of Forms, particulars, and general metaphysics against the backdrop of these aspects of separation.

Forms

Fundamentally, each Form is separate in virtue of a special ontological relation, Being, which holds between a Form and its essence. (This is part of the answer to the second question; see Introduction) This relation is introduced in the *Phaedo* (see chapter 3), along with a second relation, Participating, with which it is contrasted.³ This is a watershed moment: it is the first time a metaphysician proposes an account utilizing two primitive ontological relations. The contrast suggests that Beings, i.e., Forms, initially are separate from whatever participates.

The fundamental difference between them, on my view of Plato, is that Participation is a characterizing relation whereas Being is not. By *characterizing* I mean that the subject, in virtue of participating in a Form, comes to have a property in an ordinary, naive sense. My pants are red because they partake of Redness. Being, on the other hand, is what I will call a *logicizing* relation. I use "logicizing" to mark the special role this relation plays in specifying the answer, the *logos*, to a "What is X?" question. In contrast to participating, the subject is *not characterized* by the essence to which it is related via Being. I will capitalize the first letter of the verb or participle when I mean to speak of this special relation. The fact that Redness *is* red does not entail that the Form is another red thing like my pants. Being and Participating are the primitive ontological relations in Plato's metaphysics. I will develop an account of these notions and their evolution through the course of the dialogues.

In the *Phaedo*, it seems⁴ that Forms alone are Beings, i.e., that only Forms

Are their respective essences. A Form is an $\alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\ \kappa\alpha\theta'\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\ \delta\upsilon\nu$, a Being that is what is in its own right or in virtue of itself. A Form is simple ($\mu\omicron\nu\omicron\epsilon\iota\delta\epsilon\zeta$) and one ($\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu$). To many it seems that a Form is nothing else besides its essence. How one understands these notions and their interrelations largely determines how one conceives of the nature of Forms (and, correspondingly, the nature of particulars). And if one thinks that Plato's metaphysical theory evolves, this is likely because one thinks that his views on these matters change.

On my interpretation, Being is a primitive ontological relation designed exclusively to capture the special tie between that which possesses an essence and the essence possessed. Put differently, whenever essence is predicated of something, the relation of Being is at work. I will argue that in virtue of Being its essence, a Form is an *auto kath auto on*. Similarly, a Form is mono-eidetic in virtue of the fact that it Is only its essence. Finally, it is one for many reasons: because it is the same one Form over many particulars; because the essence it Is is a unity; and because it alone (among Forms) Is its essence.

My account of the ontological relation of Being stands in contrast not only to the account of those who think that Forms are characterized by the property for which the Form stands,⁵ but also to the account of those who think that the Form is identical with the property it constitutes.⁶ A useful way to portray these differences is to consider the notorious statements of the form "Justice is just" or "Beauty is beautiful." Traditionally, these are referred to as "self-predication statements." If one understands the copula to signal characterization, then one thinks of Beauty as a beautiful thing, an item to be included in an inventory of beautiful things. Characterizing readings come in different flavors. An *approximationist* thinks that only the Form is perfectly beautiful, i.e., is characterized by exceptional beauty as it were, whereas any other item that is properly called "beautiful" is beautiful to some lesser degree. An alternative is to allow that while both Beauty itself and other items are characterized by beauty, Beauty itself is simply and solely beautiful. This second characterizing account emphasizes the *Phaedo's* claims that a Form is *monoeides* and one (*Phaedo* 78b4ff.). Beauty is nothing but beautiful and thus is completely beautiful, differing from other beautiful things in that they are much else besides beautiful. Helen is a woman and beautiful and unfaithful.⁷

Identity accounts, on the other hand, treat self-predications as identity statements asserting that a Form and its essence are identical. That is to say, with respect to Forms, Being and Identity are the same relation.⁸

On my account, Being and Identity are distinct relations. This leaves open, however, the possibility that one can be understood in terms of the other. This is in fact what I shall maintain. Since Being is primitive on my account, I will argue that Identity should be understood in terms of Being

(see chapters 3 and 5). And since Being differs from Partaking, on my account a statement of the form “Beauty is beautiful” admits of three different interpretations. When understood to involve the primitive relation of Being, the statement does *predicate* something of a subject. What it predicates is the *ousia*, the whole of the essence, of that of which it is the essence. I shall henceforth refer to a statement, when so understood, as a “self-predication.” When understood to involve the primitive relation of Partaking, the statement characterizes the Form as having the very property that it Is. So understood, “Beauty is beautiful” says that Beauty itself is a beautiful thing. I shall refer to a statement, when so understood, as a “self-participation.” Finally, when understood to involve Identity, or the “is” of identity, the statement says that Beauty itself is identical with Beauty. Eventually Plato comes to posit a special Form, Sameness, to account for statements of identity. On my account, from beginning to end, every Form self-predicates. By the time of the *Sophist*, Plato can also show that every Form is self-identical, but that only certain Forms self-participate (see chapter 5).

In the *Phaedo* and other middle period dialogues, it is an open question whether Forms can be anything besides their essence. (The same is true of the properties found in the Socratic dialogues.) Thus according to the initial conception of Forms, Being, and Partaking, it *may* turn out that the only true statement one can make about a Form, F, would be of the form “F is F,” however that is understood. If a Form is related to another Form, then it seems a Form either partakes of other Forms or Is other Forms.

Particulars, on the other hand, appear not to be Beings in the *Phaedo* and *Republic*. Every property a particular has, it has in virtue of *participating* in Forms. (As early as the *Phaedo*, then, there is a wide range of Forms, including Forms of the natural kinds.) Moreover, a particular is complex in that it does—and maybe must—partake of many Forms. At this point in Plato’s thinking, there is, then, a gulf between Forms and particulars: Forms Are since of them *ousia* is predicated; particulars partake and of them *ousia* is not predicated. Plato has a “two worlds” account, according to which particulars, in virtue of their lack of essence, are imperfect and dependent on Forms, and Forms, in turn, make particulars what they are. Precisely why particulars are imperfect is hard to determine. They are imperfect, in part, because in some sense they depend on Forms for their properties. They are imperfect, in part, because the ontological relation of Being is seemingly a superior way to be. Finally, they are imperfect, or perhaps manifest their imperfection, in that they change. Their lack of essence also has epistemological consequences. Since what is defined is essence and since Forms alone possess essences, Forms alone are definable. And insofar as knowledge is always and only of essence, i.e., of what is definable, it follows that only Forms can be known. Forms are metaphysically and epistemologically prior to particulars. It seems, therefore, that in the two-world metaphysics of Beings and Partakers, Forms are initially separate from particulars.

At least by the time of the *Parmenides*, however, Plato develops an account of Forms that requires them to stand in relations to various other Forms, in addition to whatever relations they stand in to particulars (or souls or the activities of soul, e.g., thought or speech). These relations fall broadly into two groups: (a) relations obtaining between any Form and Forms of the “greatest” rank such as Sameness, Difference, Being; and (b) relations between Forms which are found in the same category or, better, which appear in reasonably close proximity to each other in some categorization of the world, especially those Forms which appear in the definition of a given Form. I have in mind here the relation between, for instance, the Forms Man, Rationality, Animality, Bipedality, and, more distantly, Chimpanzee, Horse, Pedality, and so on. With respect to the greatest kinds, I will argue that Plato concludes that Forms, too, participate in these other Forms. Since participation is a characterizing relation, I will also argue that he accepts that all Forms have the properties constituted by these greatest kinds. Because this is true of all Forms, the greatest kinds (which, I believe, include Motion, Rest, Unity, Goodness, and Beauty) self-participate as well as self-predicate. Since Forms now participate in other Forms, there is reason to rethink the notion of separation. It can no longer be, if it ever was, simply a function of the fact that particulars partake and Forms do not. Nor can it be that a Form is separate insofar as it can “exist” independently from everything else. For no Form could exist apart from any of the greatest kinds.

While I think that the issue of the separation of Form from Form is tractable in the case of the greatest kinds, the advent of the Method of Collection and Division (in the *Phaedrus*) poses severe problems. For instance, the Form, the Human itself, seems to be related to the Animal itself and to Bipedality itself, and so, given that Forms either Are or participate in other Forms, we have to explore Plato’s Method of Collection and Division to see in what sense Forms can be separate from other Forms which appear in their definitions or divisions.

We can complete this task only after we have studied the evolution of Being and Partaking through the course of the dialogues. By the time of the *Parmenides* and *Sophist*, there will be reason to wonder whether Being and Participating have been altered beyond recognition. Since Being and Participating will turn out to be principles necessary, by Plato’s lights, for any specific metaphysical theory, this aspect of his theory is properly considered to be general metaphysics or analytic ontology. Before turning to general metaphysics, let us consider the other element in his special ontology.

Particulars

Plato’s account of particulars is part of the second great branch of metaphysics, speculative cosmology. Speculative cosmology enumerates and an-

alyzes the entities in one's ontology, with the goal of isolating some primitive elements and then explaining how the rest are "constructed" from them. Speculative cosmology is thus concerned with the kinds of things that there are, their manner and mode of composition, and how they come to be composed or made. Here we can think of Plato constructing the cosmos in the *Timaeus*, enrolling himself in the ranks of the Ionians and the post-Parmenidean natural philosophers who wrote *On Nature* (Περὶ Φύσεως).

The fact is that prior to the *Timaeus*, Plato says comparatively little about the nature of particulars. Given the novelty of the account of Forms, and given that Forms are primary and explanatory of some or all aspects of particulars, perhaps this is not surprising. (A second factor, of course, is his interest in what are broadly speaking ethical and epistemological inquiries, both of which concern the soul.) Plato, like the Socrates of the early dialogues, evinces a naive view of ordinary material objects. They live, die, change their properties and go about a variety of tasks. No explanation is given of how they can be subject to the kinds of change they apparently undergo beyond the claim that they participate in Forms. What it is that participates, and in what sense a particular endures or persists through its changes, is not discussed.⁹

I think Plato says enough in the *Phaedo* to allow us to reconstruct an account of particulars and their interaction with Forms. The key is found in the passage in which Plato posits the two metaphysical relations of Being and Partaking. In developing his Hypothesis of Forms, Plato introduces a third item (or a fourth if we count the soul), the forms-in-us. The forms-in-us are property-instances, e.g., the large-in-Socrates, the beautiful-in-Helen. I shall refer to them as "form-copies."¹⁰ Form-copies serve as intermediaries between the Forms of which they are copies and the particulars to which they belong. Forms, then, on my account, are not present in particulars. Rather, *instances of Forms* are present: a particular is large, for instance, when it comes to have a form-copy of Largeness. It comes to have this form-copy in virtue of partaking of Largeness itself. I do *not* maintain that Plato has a well-developed account of form-copies in the *Phaedo*. I take seriously the idea that, at this stage in his thought, the doctrine of Forms, and its corollary of form-copies, is a hypothesis whose implications Plato has yet to work out. My aim, therefore, will be to offer a rational reconstruction of the metaphysics of the *Phaedo*. Of special concern will be the problem of distinguishing or separating a form-copy from the Form whose copy it is, and both form-copies and Forms from particulars.

My reconstruction, based on the account of the relations of Being and Participating, rests on three metaphysical principles which, I believe, Plato treats as *archai* of his general metaphysical program. The first two are broadly Parmenidean, since they concern Forms and essences (*ousiai*):

Parmenidean Principle One: Each essence is (Is) the essence of exactly one Form.

Parmenidean Principle Two: Each Form has (or Is) exactly one essence.

The third principle is broadly Heraclitean. It concerns particulars and essence:

Heraclitean Principle: No particular has (or Is) an essence.

Often it is said that Platonic particulars are subject to Heraclitean flux. I believe that the doctrine of flux amounts to the thesis that there is no property which a Platonic particular cannot lose. The flux of particulars, then, is best understood in light of the dependence particulars have with respect to Forms, form-copies, and eventually the medium in which these form-copies occur, the receptacle.

Between these three principles we can locate much of the notorious Platonic separation of the Forms. On my understanding, separation has little to do with existential issues, i.e., the question of whether Platonic Forms exist uninstantiated. I am prepared to affirm that Forms are existentially independent, but only because I think that existence, if it makes sense as a notion at all to Plato, flows from essence. Hence, anything that possesses an essence exists. Thus, for me, the traditional separation debate turns on the question of whether a Form's possession of an essence depends on a particular's instantiation of the Form. This question in turn can be refined to read: Does the Form's possession of its *ousia* depend on a particular's possession of an *ousia*? The answer is no. Since particulars on my interpretation lack *ousiai*—the Heraclitean Principle—a Form is separate from particulars. And since anything that possesses or is identical with an *ousia* exists, the Forms are separate and, I shall say, existentially independent.

But this is not the last word on separation. For if Plato insists to the end that particulars, strictly speaking, do not have essences, there does seem to be another class of items of which essence is predicated, namely the form-copies. On my account, then, the answer to the first question, of what items is *ousia* predicated, will be Forms and form-copies. (About souls, see chapter 3.) Since I understand separation in terms of the predication of essence, it follows that Forms are not definitionally separate from their form-copies. On the other hand, Forms and their form-copies are not identical; for no property is identical with an instance. In trying to understand the relation between Forms and form-copies, the second question, "Is essence always identical with that of which it is predicated?" is critical. On my account, the answer to this question must be no, since Forms and form-copies are not identical. In order to explain how this position is possible, it will be necessary to show that the two primitive ontological relations, Being and Participating, can differentiate Forms, form-copies, and particulars, and allow Forms to be ontologically and explanatorily basic. This will be one of the more controversial claims of the book.

The heart of my reconstruction is the thesis that Being is a primitive relation in Plato's metaphysics. By "primitive" I do not mean to suggest that

Plato does not study (what) Being (is). Nor do I mean to suggest that everything else in the metaphysics can somehow be deduced from it. Rather, I mean to indicate that the relation (and eventually the Form) of Being is not explained by appeal to another more basic relation or principle. Its nature, and the nature of other primitives in the theory, such as Participating or the receptacle, is displayed in the ways in which the theory attempts to save various phenomena.

The predication of essence of some subject is the foundational ontological “act” in Plato’s metaphysics. It embodies Plato’s fundamental intuition that to be is to be something; only insofar as a Form is (Is) what it is can it be the same as itself and different from everything else. It follows that Being is somehow prior to Identity. As I understand this claim, I want to insist that Being and Identity are two distinct Forms, that Being is prior, and that nonetheless in some sense identity of Form and essence can be understood in terms of Being. It is damnably difficult to articulate their relation.¹¹ The fundamental maneuver in my account involves the reciprocal predication of essence. Identity will be defined, in the case of Forms, as the reciprocal predication of Form and (its) essence. Thus, a Form, X, and its essence, Y, are identical if and only if X Is Y and Y Is X, where the “Is” signifies the predication relation of Being.¹² Once we have defined the identity of Form and essence in this fashion we can answer the second question, “Can essence be predicated of anything with which it is not identical?” as well as distinguish Forms from their form-copies. The answer is yes, for essence will be predicable of form-copies via the relation of Being. However, the reciprocal predication of the form-copy and the essence does not go through. Since identity is defined in terms of this reciprocal predication, form-copy and essence are not identical, and hence Form and form-copy are not identical either.

While the *Phaedo* and the other middle period dialogues permit only a speculative reconstruction of Plato’s account of particulars, we have much more to go on by the time of the late dialogues. Beginning with the *Philebus* and then especially the *Timaeus*, Plato devotes great effort to their analysis. Between the middle period works and these late dialogues, we find development of a general metaphysical framework and an account of how properties are related to one another. Of special importance is the Method of Collection and Division, where particulars are apparently that from which collection begins and into which division ends. Over each particular there range a number of (hierarchically arranged) Forms from numerous divisions. Plato aims to explain how a particular can manifest or possess the different properties which collection and division require.

The *Timaeus* presents the most explicit account of particulars to be found in Plato and constitutes the final theory of particulars. The *Philebus*’s four-fold ontology of Limit, Unlimited, Mixture, and Cause is a coarser metaphysical account of particulars, though it is analogous in important respects

(see chapter 7). The critical addition provided in the *Timaeus* is the receptacle, one of whose functions is to serve as space. There Plato also develops a theory of geometrical or quasi-mathematical Forms, which I take to be successors to the limits of the *Philebus*. The geometrical Forms allow for the “geometrization” of the receptacle, whereby space is converted into place(s). They also afford Plato the means to account for body, which famously turns out to be a compound of two basic kinds of triangles. However, these geometrical Forms, I will argue, do not replace the (traditional) Forms of, e.g., Fire itself or Man itself. Rather, the two kinds of Forms complement each other. The geometrical Forms provide for the material and quantitative properties of particulars. The traditional Forms account for the qualitative features. Together, the two kinds of Forms, along with the receptacle, furnish Plato the means finally to develop an account of complex particulars that persist through space and time. Plato takes care to point out that in neither case do the Forms themselves directly interact with the receptacle. Once again, it is form-copies, here labeled *mimemeta*, which enter and exit space. A particular turns out to be a collection of form-copies of both the geometrical and traditional Forms occupying or occurring in a region of the receptacle. Since the receptacle itself is neither *qualitatively nor quantitatively* essentially anything at all, and since a particular is ultimately just a collection of form-copies “in” the receptacle, a Timaeian particular itself is neither qualitatively nor quantitatively essentially anything at all. Thus I maintain that from beginning (*Phaedo*) to end (*Timaeus*) a Platonic particular is a wholly dependent entity, an image of some sort; that is, an entity all aspects of whose being are determined by its relation to the medium in which it is located and to the Forms ultimately responsible for the form-copies that are its properties.¹³

It bears mention that Plato never explicitly appeals to matter (ύλη) as the metaphysical core of the particular. Nonetheless, some have thought that he does treat matter as a metaphysical primitive.¹⁴ The *Philebus* and *Timaeus* both offer candidates for matter, an aspect of the unlimited in the former, and the ur-bodies or trace elements of chaos in the latter. While I think that in the middle period Plato assumes that there is a bodily element to particulars, and indeed allows it implicitly to play a role in his account of participation, I will argue that in the *Timaeus*’s final theory, matter is a construct, not a primitive. It is the inevitable result of the geometrization of the receptacle. Accordingly, I deny that there is ur-matter in chaos. For that matter, I deny that Plato assumes there was a chaotic state prior to the Demiurgic introduction of Form into the cosmos. The construction of the cosmos is a myth. Chaos is what we are left with when we rationally deconstruct the world.¹⁵

From beginning to end, Plato conceives of particulars as fundamentally dependent on Forms. But the *Phaedo*’s disregard, if not disdain, for material particulars is absent from the *Philebus* and *Timaeus*. While particulars never

enjoy a status equal to that of Forms, in the late dialogues Plato accords them more respect. An especially important aspect of the rehabilitation of particulars is that mathematics is brought down to their level. In the middle period dialogues, Plato appeals to mathematics as a model for Forms. This is particularly true for the epistemology.¹⁶ The very fact that Phileban mixtures and Timaeian particulars embody or are (partially) constituted from limit and geometrical elements improves their epistemic status. Their mathematized structure also enhances their stability. Unlike the *Philebus's* unlimiteds, its mixtures are less prone to change and decay (with respect to being the mixture that each is). And the geometrical structures of Timaeian particulars vouchsafe them the (degree of) stability appropriate to their resistance to dissolution. Their stability is also exhibited in the fact that we can now collect them and arrive at divisions based on these collections. “Built” to retain some material integrity and able to persist through certain changes in their properties, particulars are now the “empirical” starting points in an epistemology of science. By looking at them we can come to posit Forms, and by looking at their relations to other collections we can begin to map out the relations between Forms. In this fashion Platonic science at the end of his day is not disrespectful of the material world.

For all that, however, there remain gaps in the account. First, it might be objected that the necessity appropriate to Forms is simply lacking in particulars. This I concede, and it is one reason why Plato never gives up on Forms. This is apparent in at least two different contexts in the late dialogues, the discussion of quotidian and pure sciences in the *Philebus* (59c2–6), and finally in the *Timaeus's* insistence (51b7–c5), even in the midst of the discussion of the geometrical Forms and the receptacle, that there is still need for the traditional Forms. Second, there is the need to place in each particular not just the form-copy of Human, but also a form-copy of each of the Forms mentioned in the definition. It will remain a problem for a Platonic account to justify or explain the coincidence of these form-copies, just as it will be problematic to explain why just the right qualitative form-copies appear precisely at the right moment with the right geometrical constructions.

These are very general problems with the construction of the special metaphysics of particulars proposed by Plato at the end of his career. I am not prepared to claim that they are satisfactory as a theory, or even that he found them to be so. I take at face value that Plato thought that the *Timaeus*, and any account of the physical cosmos, was at best a likely story. The problems are endemic to the nature of the subject matter.

Metaphysics and Epistemology

The study of metaphysics is an account of what there is, including the relations, categories, and principles which govern the things that are. In so far as

the relations, categories, and principles also figure as part of what there is, a primary task of a general metaphysician is to assimilate these principles into the theory itself. To embed the categories, relations and principles within the theory has proved formidably difficult, and not simply because of level confusions, be they of the contemporary or ancient variety. Plato no doubt anticipated only some of the difficulties, and perhaps appreciated only to a limited extent how deep they are. But Plato was the first to consider the nature of the enterprise of offering accounts of what there is. He was, I think, the first metaphysician.

A general study of metaphysics would give us a detailed framework of the conditions and problems to be addressed by any proposed special metaphysics. Special metaphysics attempts to specify the items in the ontology that satisfy the conditions of a general metaphysical theory. Plato certainly offers us a special metaphysical theory. Aristotle offers another. The differences between their respective theories reflect some differences over general metaphysical principles. But they are distinguished more by their differences over the nature of the specific items each proposes as satisfying the general conditions.¹⁷

I have claimed that in his initial conception Plato isolates essence as the focal point of his special metaphysics and assigns it exclusively to Forms, a kind of entity specifically introduced to be the bearer of essence. In virtue of bearing an essence, a Form is what it is in its own right; it is definable and knowable, separate from particulars, and metaphysically and epistemologically prior to particulars. In the *Parmenides*, after a review of potential problems for this special metaphysical theory, he begins to work out the implications of what it is for something to have an essence or, equivalently, of what it is for something to be what it is in its own right. He concludes that there are certain conditions that must be satisfied by any *auto kath' auto* Being. From the First Hypothesis, we learn that what Is must be a suitable object of thought and talk. A "Parmenidean one," being utterly simple, cannot satisfy this condition. Having concluded that one's metaphysics cannot commence from a single *arche*, Plato shows that it can begin from two. The most basic premise of his general metaphysical account appears in the Second Hypothesis. It is that any Form must both Be and be One: each Form must partake of One and Being; each Form must be a "One-Being." Because each Form is a One-Being, each Form is, in some fashion, complex. On the other hand, the Being-component and the One-component of any given Form cannot be found apart in nature. Nonetheless, further metaphysical reflection demonstrates that One and Being can be *distinguished in thought*. This is, I believe, a second watershed in Plato's thought. By distinguishing the character of what we are thinking about from the character of our thought about it, Plato drives a wedge between Being and being known. For the first time in the dialogues, Plato explicitly separates the conceptual and metaphysical order. Continuing the same pattern of reasoning, he concludes that there must be a third Form, Difference, and a fourth, Sameness.

The *Sophist*, *Philebus*, and other late dialogues reveal Plato at work on the project of showing how general metaphysical principles are, or are not, to be incorporated into his special theory and the theories constructed by rival metaphysicians. In chapters 4, 5, and 6, I examine the critical texts detailing the roles played by Sameness, Difference, Motion, Rest, Being, and Unity within Plato's metaphysical theory. Of particular concern is how the names and statements of our language represent, and thus can serve as a guide to, what there is (or is not). Plato's awareness of the problems pertaining both to the complexity of Forms and our representation of this complexity will also require us to revisit the notion of separation and the relations of Being and Participating. I will do this as part of an attempted reconstruction of Plato's metaphysics. But at this level of theorizing there is little to differentiate metaphysical doctrine from philosophy of language or epistemology.

Problematic though it may be, we do have some intuitions to guide us here, since this is a problem for all theories it seems, not just Plato's. A principal claim in these chapters is that Plato is struggling to distinguish the differences between ontological and linguistic predication. There is a tradition, stemming from *Republic* 596, that Plato inferred from the presence of a general term in the language a universal or Form to serve as the referent of that general term. Whatever its status in the *Republic*, this semantic One-Over-Many is not embraced in the later works. The *Statesman* differentiates "cuts" from kinds, thus indicating that some terms, though they might mark distinctions in thought, do not name Forms or anything else in nature (see Introduction). One must decide how to treat terms for cuts: Are there ontological items to which they refer? My answer is no.

A more telling problem for my interpretation of the metaphysics involves statements, *logoi*. Two broad issues about statements worry the late Plato. The first concerns the relation(s) between predication statements involving Being and Participating versus statements of identity and nonidentity. The latter statements introduce two new Forms to the late dialogues, Sameness and Difference. In light of the intimate connection between Being and Sameness exhibited in the self-predication statements of the middle period (not to mention Parmenides' poem), it is incumbent upon the interpreter to say how Plato conceives of the different kinds of statements involving Sameness and Being. This is familiar ground to anyone who has read the *Sophist* or the secondary literature on the dialogue. Typically, discussion focuses on distinguishing statements of identity from predicative statements, and then spreading the Form of Being out over the two.¹⁸ I will approach Being differently. I begin from the two primitive ontological relations, Being and Participating. Given that Being was introduced into the Theory of Forms in tandem with Participating, it seems to me to be noteworthy that only Being remains a Form. Why is there no Form of Participation in the *Sophist*? Once we see what role participation plays in Plato's account, we will then be in a position to understand the role of Being and the other greatest kinds.

The tension in the *Sophist* itself between Being and Identity is not dispelled in the scholarly literature. According to some, Being, at least as a metaphysical relation, is effectively displaced in favor of Sameness and Difference.¹⁹ In this context, the nature of a Form, previously developed in terms of Being or essence, is unpacked as the relations between the Form to be defined and all other Forms from which it differs and to which it bears some relation of sameness. Hence Plato's interest in the collections and divisions in these late dialogues: their complete exfoliation yields the requisite differences and similarities between Forms from which one "constructs" the essence of each Form.

A more popular tack has been to develop two kinds of linguistic predications involving Being, or "Being," using the claim at *Sophist* 255c12–13 as guidance. Frede's is the classic development of this approach.²⁰ I will argue that Frede's analysis of 255c12–13 ultimately does not adequately distinguish Being from Identity, self-predication from self-participation, and the two different ways being is said (to be).

The second and related worry concerns the fully unpacked definitions of a given Form (see my third question in the Introduction). Here we are involved in the most controversial aspects of the separation of the metaphysical from the epistemological. The problem is to decide in what fashion the parts of a Form's definition are predicable of the Form itself. I will argue that, with respect to this kind of statement, metaphysical and linguistic predication part ways, in that there are no underlying metaphysical predications involving a Form and *just a part* of a definition. The only *metaphysical* predication involving Being is one where *the whole of the essence*, the essence itself, is predicated of its subject. The "partial" predications, as it were, are spawned by the Method of Collection and Division. But these divisions are not maps of the ontological relations between Forms. They are heuristic or conceptual tools. They are guides, perhaps even necessary guides, to the understanding of a Form.

If the late Plato, then, were pressed to say what kind of copula is at work in certain statements about Forms, e.g., "Man is animal," he might well affirm that the *linguistic* predication involves a strong form of "Being." Ontologically, Forms remain "ones," specially related only to their respective essences. The truths concerning a Form and a part of its definition are all conceptual truths. Here we see the inchoate distinction between conceptual and metaphysical realism.

On the other hand, there are items in the Platonic metaphysics that are both human and animal, namely the particular humans that partake of the Forms Human itself and Animal itself. Wherever a form-copy of Man is found, there too a form-copy of Animal is found. Thus Socrates will have form-copies of Man, Rationality, and Animality in him. He is a human because he partakes of the Form, Human itself, not because of his participation in Animality, Rationality, and Bipedality, or some geometrical Forms. On the

other hand, it is true that in all and only humans is there this collocation of these particular Forms, both the geometrical Forms and those found in the division of Man. In the light of these statements involving parts of definitions and the relations between Forms in collection and divisions, I forge a connection between the later Theory of Forms and the late account of particulars.

Plato's account of particulars, I said, culminates in the complex metaphysics of the *Timaeus*. The key to its account is the postulation of the receptacle as that in which form-copies of different (kinds of) Forms manifest themselves. Participation, in the case of particulars, is simply the transittings of form-copies through the receptacle. In the end, then, the natureless receptacle for Plato is the ultimate participant or "haver" of properties (though it remains unaffected by the transittings of form-copies through it). Parallel to the receptacle in the *Timaeus* is the Form of Being in the *Sophist*. On my account, there is a sense in which Plato at the end utilizes Participation for all the relations between subjects, both particulars participating in Forms and Forms participating in Forms. Participation was introduced as a characterizing relation: subjects that partake are qualified by the property in which they partake. This leaves us then with a special tale to tell about Being itself. For Plato does say that Being itself is a Form and says explicitly that all the other Forms (kinds) partake of Being. What then are we to say about Plato's final thoughts on this score? I will argue that Plato restricts the subjects that can partake in Being itself to Forms.²¹ However, I think that the partaking in Being is a *sui generis* phenomenon, that is, a kind of partaking unlike that found in particulars, or even that found in the case of Forms partaking of other Forms.

Recall the paradigm of the One-Over-Many argument. We want to account for the fact that my socks and shirt are the same color, namely white. We explain that my shirt and socks both partake of the same Form, Whiteness itself, and in virtue of their respective partakings they become the same thing, namely white. Not so when a Form partakes of Being: when a Form partakes in Being it does not become qualified in the same way as any other Form that partakes in Being. Were we to view the partaking of Being in the typical manner, we would be compelled to treat Being itself as Existence and view any Form's partaking in Being as the manner in which it comes to exist. Instead, I want to argue that by partaking in Being each Form becomes "essenced." It becomes similar to other Forms *not* in being the same essence, but rather in becoming essenced. *Partaking in Being thus becomes the essencing relation, whose special function is to construct or constitute each Form as a logical subject.*

The *Sophist's* discussion of Being, along with the *Parmenides'* discussion of Unity (see chapter 4, section 1), is "first philosophy" or general metaphysics. In both cases, we see how difficult it is to incorporate the principles

of one's theory within the theory itself. In asserting that a given Form comes to be the very Form that it is by partaking in Being, Plato seems at once to need some Form that is the subject of the partaking and to create that subject Form by dint of its partaking of Being. Regardless of what we make of this surd in his general metaphysical theory, I will argue that it is only after partaking in Being that a Form can partake in Sameness and Difference. Only after a subject has acquired an essence can it be the same as itself and different from any other essenced item. These partakings in Sameness and Difference, or any other Form, do not, however, occur in time. They are rather moments in conceptual space and time, the result of a distinction drawn in thought that privileges Being over any other Form. It is in virtue of partaking in Being that a Form is a Form. Thus, instead of Being and Partaking as two relations, Plato elevates one of them, Being, into a Form like Sameness or Difference. Everything that stands in any relation to something else partakes. In the case of Forms, however, they partake in Being and thus acquire their own essences. These Forms can then enter into relations with other Forms and also with particulars. Particulars and Forms alike, when they partake of other Forms, or when partaken of, are characterized by what they partake of. Partaking in Being alone remains a noncharacterizing relation.

A very different kind of entity also deserves a place in a discussion of Plato's metaphysics: soul. Souls clearly figure in an inventory of what there *is* in Plato. Indeed, they are primitive items in his metaphysics. I will offer no general account of the nature of soul, mainly because such an account would overextend an already lengthy work. Besides requiring extensive discussion of Plato's ethics and epistemology, the doctrines of immortality and transmigration pose special problems in metaphysics. Suffice it to say that souls are parts or constituents of certain particulars. However, on numerous occasions I will make mention of soul(s) in my reconstruction of Plato's metaphysics. In the *Phaedo*, the desire to prove the immortality of individual souls will influence Plato's development of the notion of form-copies. Souls also figure in the discussion of the Forms of Motion and Rest in the *Sophist*, and of cause in the *Timaeus*. More importantly for my purposes, souls are critical players in situations where ontology and language part ways: the account of linguistic expressions which do not name Forms, and the account of not-being and false statement in the *Sophist*.

Plato's account of not-being in the *Sophist* is the culmination of an investigation into what there is and how we can think and speak about it. I'd like to believe he began the investigation with Socrates. For that is where I want to begin.

2 SOCRATIC METAPHYSICS?

Socrates

The division of Plato's writing into periods reflects our assessment of his literary purposes and philosophical development, as well as any stylistic or historical information we possess. One of the first questions we confront is whether in the early "Socratic" dialogues Plato aims to present the views of Socrates himself or his own views through the mouthpiece of a fictionalized Socrates. In his landmark studies, Vlastos argues that in these dialogues we can find the doctrines of Socrates himself. I agree, though none of the conclusions of the chapter turn on whose doctrines are being expressed.¹ One of the positions staked out by Vlastos is that Socrates does not have a metaphysical theory.² I share the opinion that Plato's Socrates is not interested in *articulating* a metaphysical theory. He refrains from developing metaphysical doctrines independent of the particular subject matter under discussion. Rather, Socrates is interested in caring for the soul so that it might be in the best state possible,³ since that condition will allow one to live in the way one desires, namely, happily.⁴ He investigates how one ought to live in order to be happy. Preoccupied with inquiry into this most important ethical question, he *uses* both metaphysical and epistemological theses in search of answers to his questions.

We can allow that Plato's Socrates is not a metaphysician, provided that we recognize that it is, to be sure, hard to specify what counts as ontological

theorizing versus merely using ontological doctrines. The difficulty is compounded in Plato's case, since even when we think that he has begun metaphysical inquiry, there is reason to hesitate in ascribing a *theory* to him. Nonetheless, it is by way of contrast with the *Phaedo* and other middle-period dialogues that we segregate the Socratic dialogues from the later works as lacking a theory of Forms, or as presenting a Socrates who is not interested in metaphysical theorizing.⁵ Aristotle's famous remark that Socrates first sought the universal but did not separate it reinforces (guides?) this impression.⁶

Vlastos points out that the interlocutors in the Socratic dialogues share some of Socrates' beliefs about the ontological status of the items under discussion.⁷ They do not protest the presupposition that Justice or Virtue is something, but they dissent from his views about what, e.g., Virtue is, or whether Courage and Wisdom are the same. Vlastos insists that merely having beliefs about items and relations that qualify as metaphysical does not make one a metaphysician. What makes one a metaphysician is reflective inquiry into these relations qua relations, as well as the nature and status of the various items employed in one's ethical theorizing.⁸

The discussants in the Socratic dialogues, according to Vlastos, offer up ordinary unreflective beliefs about properties and relations, even while they are engaged in (philosophical) inquiry into the nature of ethical properties. Socrates, pursuing his inquiries, subjects them to a pattern of questions and a series of demands for which they seem unprepared. In this context, he *introduces* notions that are key in Plato's metaphysics. First and foremost among them is the "What is X?" question and the notion of a *logos* which answers that question. Here the notoriously multivalent expression "logos" means definition or the account that specifies the essence, *ousia*, of some thing (X).⁹ Talk about whether or not Euthyphro's prosecution of his father is a pious act might be said to be ordinary and unreflective. It is not so easy to say the same about talk about definitions; the criteria an adequate definition must satisfy; essences; or the properties which accompany essences, *pathe*.

When conducting his examinations Socrates appeals to notions which he does not explain. He does not subject the principles of the elenchus itself to elenctic examination. He does not question whether he is justified in declaring beliefs to be false based on the inconsistency of his interlocutor's beliefs. The presuppositions of the "What is X?" question are never raised. His failure to take up questions of method fuels the notion that he shuns metaphysics.

When Socrates begins to concentrate on definitions themselves, the metamorphosis into the "Socrates" of the middle dialogues also begins. In this chapter, I will be satisfied to set out some problematic elements of the early metaphysics. Plato's middle-period metaphysics did not emerge *ex nihilo*. It was, I believe, a reaction to difficulties that Plato perceived in the meta-

physics of Socrates and his philosophical predecessors. The task is complicated in a special fashion by Socrates' method and his interest in moral properties. Socrates wants to know what Virtue is and he pursues this knowledge through the elenchus. It turns out that Virtue is the very knowledge he seeks. Thought of as the verbal account that answers the "What is Virtue?" question, Virtue is, roughly, a set of connected propositions. Thought of as what knows these propositions, Virtue is a psychological state of the soul, the state of knowing all goods and evils. This blending of the epistemological—what is known—and the metaphysical—what knows— generates special difficulties in accounting for the differences and relations between the properties of Virtue, Piety, Courage, and the other virtues. It also complicates our account of how this psychic state causes agents and their actions to be virtuous. I confine my inquiry to what Socrates says about definitions and properties and will therefore consider the notions of explanation or "logical" causation, self-predication, the relations of properties to one another, and how properties belong to particulars. Thus I approach the early dialogues as a source of information about Plato's *initial* thoughts on properties, particulars, explanation, and other elements of his ontological theory. Finally, I will examine the metaphysics of the first part of the *Meno*. Its expanded range of properties and deliberate reflection of the nature of definition herald the development of the middle period Theory of Forms.

The Craft Analogy

In the *Apology* (20c–23b), Socrates tells us it was his desire to understand Apollo's oracle that led him to subject others to elenctic examination. He concludes that the unexamined life is not worth living (38a5–6) and that to spend one's day in inquiry into the virtues is the greatest good for humans (38a1–2). The greatest good he identifies with happiness (εὐδαιμονία).¹⁰

Socrates asks what is Piety (*Euthyphro*), Justice (*Republic* 1), Temperance (*Charmides*), Courage (*Laches*, *Protagoras*) and, more generally, Virtue (*Meno*, *Protagoras*). He seeks to understand their relation to one another, their teachability, learnability, and what effects they have on those who possess them. Most of his interlocutors have both true and false beliefs about most ethical matters. Some, like the poets, prove to lack knowledge altogether about the topics treated in their poems. Others, especially craftspeople, turn out to be experts and to have knowledge about their crafts and craft products, even though they mistakenly profess knowledge of matters external to their craft. At times it seems that Socrates assimilates knowledge of all kinds to craft knowledge (τέχνη).¹¹ Nowhere do we learn exactly what to make of this notion. A true craftsman, according to the *Gorgias* (465a and 501a2–3), can give an account (λόγον . . . δοῦναι) of his subject matter and

craft, and in general one who knows can articulate what she knows (*Laches* 190c6, 194b). This ability to give an account is tested in the crucible of the Socratic elenchus.¹²

The craft analogy exerts a powerful influence on Socrates' conception of ethics.¹³ For my purposes, it is important to note four features of the analogy. The first is the decidedly practical aspect of most crafts. Craft products are everywhere used and tested in everyday life. How fast and seaworthy is the ship? Does the pot crack? Second, there is an overarching or final determinate product of each craft. Unless and until there is a pair of shoes, one cannot be said to have exhibited the craft of shoemaking. There are also steps or stages in its production, and intermediate stages or products that contribute to, or are constituents of, the final product. The expert in a craft must consider, if not fully understand, these subcrafts and their products.¹⁴ Third, the craft analogy promises that the expert can judge whether another knows the craft and whether a product is well made. The master produces a standard against which one can judge the work of others, and she is a final arbiter where there is disagreement. Lastly, crafts are repeatable activities, both as a whole, in their stages, and with respect to their products, so that others may learn them and practice the same craft. In sum, crafts are public, repeatable, learnable, and testable activities.

Socrates, perhaps a practicing sculptor,¹⁵ attempts then to understand the virtues as though they were themselves the product of some craft. Just as the craft of shoemaking requires knowledge of component materials and stages, the elenchus exhibits the need for the ethical expert to understand relations between instruction, behavior, moral education, pleasure, and the other components of the craft of living, as well as the systematic connections between the various virtues and how knowledge ramifies throughout the moral domain of individual action. The connection between knowledge of goods and evils and, say, the thesis that one should never do harm, is to be considered as part of one craft.¹⁶

The craft analogy also contributes to our understanding of how various ethical properties are exemplified or instantiated in their "products" or bearers. The idea is simple enough: Socrates considers us, ordinary people, both the raw material and the potentially finished product of the ethical craft. The virtues are to be regarded as the appropriate properties realized in the finished product when it is well made. Just as any well-made house has true lines and solid, level walls, roofs, and floors, so too the well-crafted person has the appropriate virtues. These properties are in the person and they are the same in every case, just as true or level is the same in every wall. On the other hand, people will differ in their pursuits and stations, just as houses and ships differ in design, size, and composition. If the analogy holds, the well-crafted person will exhibit his virtue in everyday experiences and prove himself when tested.

There is one great disparity between the products of productive crafts and the virtues: in a productive craft, house building, for example, the product, the house, the producer, the house builder, and his craft knowledge, house building, differ from one another. The virtues, however, are in the expert and are in fact identical with the knowledge(s?) that “makes” them. All virtue for Socrates seems to be nothing but the knowledge of all goods and evils.¹⁷ This knowledge, which both constitutes and explains what the virtue is, is a state of soul, and it is a necessary condition or cause of (all) virtuous behavior.¹⁸ This *single* state of soul is found in all virtuous people and only virtuous people, *and it is the same in all of them*. Socrates does not say how knowledge of all goods and evils causes the virtuous person to act in the way that she does. In the Socratic dialogues, Plato says little about the nature of such a cause or about the nature of the souls who enjoy it.¹⁹

Socratic Properties

The craft analogy permeates the early dialogues and Plato’s earliest discussions of properties. Consider Socrates’ initial conversation with Euthyphro. Socrates is under indictment for corrupting the youth by making new gods and not believing in the old ones. Euthyphro is at the Agora to indict his father for the murder of a possibly murderous client. Socrates is amazed: “Do you, by Zeus, think that you know so accurately (οὐτωςὲν ἀκριβῶς οἶεἰ ἐπίστασθαι) about the gods and things holy and unholy?” (4e4–5). The challenge to show that he has accurate knowledge intimates the precision associated with crafts. Possession of this precise knowledge qualifies Euthyphro to be the teacher of whom Socrates will be a student. And because he is wise, Euthyphro can make Socrates wise and pious if he will but teach him, thus allowing Socrates to escape the indictment (4e–5a). Accurate knowledge causes one to be pious, and enables one both to say what is and is not pious, and to make others pious too.

When Socrates asks what is piety, he professes to be a student. But he immediately specifies the kind of answer he wants: “What sort of thing do you say the pious and impious is, concerning both murder and everything else? Or is not the pious, itself by itself, the same in every action, and the impious in turn, is it not the opposite of all the pious, itself like (*omoion*) itself; and every thing which is to be impious, does it not have some one form with respect to its impiety?” (5d1–5). A page later Socrates demands that “He teach him not one or two of the many pious things, but that very form by which all pious things are pious (ἐκείνο αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος ᾧ)” (6d9–11). And then he repeats the demand a third time: “Teach me that form (ἰδέαν), what it is, in order that looking to it and using that paradigm (αὐτῇ παραδείγματι) I can say of any action of yours or another’s that is

such (as it) (τοιούτου) that it is pious, and whatever is not such, say that it is not (pious)” (6e3–6).

We see in this early exchange critical features of Socratic properties. Socrates assumes that one who knows a virtue, here Piety, can teach another what it is because there is just one thing that: a) is found wherever there is pious action; b) is that by which, or that which makes, the pious actions pious;²⁰ and c) itself is a paradigm such that one who knows it can thereby recognize pious actions.²¹ Socrates implies that the expert knows what the *eidos* is. The fact that Euthyphro would be able to say what Piety is, were he to know it, entails that having knowledge enables one to give an account. The expert, it seems, determines whether the account applies in any particular case. Were Piety not one thing, knowing what *an* answer is would not *guarantee* that the expert could use what she knows as a paradigm to determine in each and every case whether an action is or is not pious.

The causal aspect of Piety or any ethical property is difficult to pin down because the virtues are forms of knowledge, the knowledge of goods and evils directed at different kinds of situations. Although it is plausible to claim that having knowledge of Piety causes pious behavior, we do not want to say that the characteristics which things have cause them to have those characteristics. However, we do say that in the case of Piety, for instance, when we learn the account of Piety, we come to know what piety is, and that *the acquisition of knowledge of piety* makes one pious and makes one act piously. So knowledge of the *eidos* is causative in the special way in which learning this knowledge makes the learner pious. Were Piety not causative in this special sense, it would not guarantee that Socrates, assuming that he learns the answer, would become pious. Like an expert craftsperson teaching an apprentice, the moral expert can use his knowledge to cause another to have the same knowledge and thus be knowledgeable, i.e., pious or virtuous.

A second difficulty hindering our understanding of the causal nature of Socratic properties stems from the fact that the Socratic property of Piety seems itself to be pious. (Compare *Pr.* 330c5, where the Just is just or *H. Ma.* 292e6–7, where the Fair is always fair.) The language of likeness (ὅμοιον), resemblance (τοιούτου), and paradigm reinforces the impression that a Socratic property is characterized, and characterized in the same way as the actions and persons it is used to judge. Just as the paradigmatic pot thrown by the master “explains” why the apprentice’s pot is of the style and shape that it is, a Socratic property “explains” why its bearers are qualified in an appropriate way by appeal to the fact that it itself is *qualified in the same way* that whatever has it is qualified. Justice is just and Courage is courageous and so too is whatever Courage or Justice is present to.²²

It is convenient, and conventional, to describe this phenomenon as self-predication. (In my terminology it self-participates. However, since we do not yet have the distinction between Being and Partaking, in this chapter I

will use the expression “self-predicates” in the manner in which Vlastos introduced the notion (see chapter 1). The notion of self-predication in the early dialogues is thus bound up with our understanding of the explanatory nature of Socratic properties.²³ Since the issue arises when we find that the essence (and *logos*) is predicated of the property X, about which we have asked “What is X,” we must first consider what is specified in the answer to this question.

The questions posed by Socrates are general and the answers must say what, in general, in all cases, is Courage, or Justice, or Piety. Socrates wants to know what the nature or essence of the property is.²⁴ In the case of moral properties, what is specified is some state of soul, the psychological state of knowledge. Since many people could have this same knowledge, this psychological state is a universal. On this line of interpretation, the *logos* answering “What is X?” specifies an ontological item, the *ousia* or the essence of X (*Euthyphro* 11a7, *Meno* 72b1).²⁵

Since it is the property whose essence we seek, we can treat self-predication initially as the thesis that the essence attaches—I mean this to be an utterly neutral relation—to the property itself. And since this property is the same in all instances, and makes an instance be such as it is, e.g., an instance of Piety, we can add that the essence attaches as well to the bearers of that property. The (ontological) definition is thus predicable of both the property/form and every instance of the property/form.²⁶ In the linguistic mode, this says that the linguistic definition of a property/form F is linguistically predicable of F and of all particulars which have F.²⁷ Hence the kind of cause assigned to the Socratic property is appropriately termed “logical,” after the *logoi* the dialogues are in search of.

In the Socratic dialogues, Plato says little about the relation between the essence and the property whose essence it is. Furthermore, he does not distinguish the way in which a particular instance of some property possesses the essence from the way the property does. Particulars come to be pious when Piety comes to be present to them. The definition of Piety, or any virtue, permits us to *classify* psychic states, people, and actions as pious. With the etiology left unspecified, there is less reason to find odd the notion that Justice is what makes Socrates just because it itself is just. It does not make itself just; it simply is just. In this respect, Socrates’ use of verbs of “making,” as well as the instrumental datives and prepositional phrases of agency, is a harbinger of what Aristotle considers a “formal because.” The single, self-same, and universal entity by virtue of which all pious things are pious is a state of the soul, namely knowledge of what piety is. Of course the knowledge that is piety does not cause itself to be present in the soul of the pious person. Training, upbringing, and teaching are the cause of this state. Yet, since the knowledge of the expert qua teacher can cause one to become

knowledgeable, there is a sense in which knowledge of piety does cause knowledge of piety.

Socrates is unconcerned to dilate upon the metaphysical bond that unites the property whose definition is sought and its bearer.²⁸ Socratic properties are in their instances, present to them, added to them, and the instances receive them, have them, and so on.²⁹ Plato uses a host of verbs and prepositions to refer to this relation, but there seems to be no difference signaled by his use of ἔστιν, “is,” to say that Justice *is* just, versus the use of, e.g., προσ-γίγνεσθαι, “comes to be present to,” to say that Protagoras is just. Since Socrates maintains that essence is predicable of both the property and the particular, there is strictly speaking no difference between the predications, provided that we can distinguish the particular instance of justice from the (complex) particular of which it is one of many different properties. In the early dialogues, then, *there is just one predication relation*. Everything that is said about properties and their instances is compatible with the claim that the properties do not exist over and above their instances. Socratic properties are, possibly, immanent universals.

Insofar as the property makes what has it such as it itself is, and because the properties are “in” the material particulars, Socrates can treat particulars as potential objects of knowledge, provided that one has (prior) knowledge of the property itself.³⁰ But it is not the case that justice, by being present to Socrates, makes Socrates *simpliciter* an object of knowledge. Rather, its presence allows the agent who knows the definition of justice to know that Socrates is just. Because particulars have properties, i.e., are instances to which (the *ousia* of) Piety is present, they can serve as examples and counterexamples against which Socrates will test definitions. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how any elenctic conversation or investigation (perhaps any conversation at all) could proceed unless there is agreement, at least provisionally, that there are particular instances of the sought-after properties.³¹

Socrates never considers a particular act, object, or person a paradigm such that by ostending it, one can learn what a moral property is. Unlike the property itself, the particulars are complex. They are independently identifiable apart from their possession of the property whose nature is sought. Because they have many properties, Socrates thinks it difficult to focus exclusively on the respect in which the particular is, say, courageous. When we consider the multitude of particulars and their circumstances, we typically isolate different properties or aspects as the factor responsible for courage in different circumstances, e.g., in warfare, or diving, or wherever courage is (thought to be) present. The proffered explanations typically turn out to be too narrow or too broad.³² Particular cases are often deemed to be somehow too limiting. What appears to make for courage in hoplite battle will not answer the question what is courage for a peltast. What makes for piety in

sacrifice will not work for prosecution of wrongdoings. By the same token, we should say that what is paradigmatic in any pious action, qua pious, would not be the amount of libation poured say, but would be the knowledge of the libation pourer that caused her to pour so much, then, to such a deity, for such a purpose, and so on. This knowledge is the general account of Piety, which only people who know what piety is can apply in any particular situation of the appropriate sort.

There has been some disagreement³³ over whether Socrates complains about the answers provided by his interlocutors because they are (or are not) merely instances of the sought after property, or because they are universals which are neither extensionally nor intensionally equivalent to the property. The emerging consensus, which I share, is that the failed definitions are generally universals, but simply too narrow or too broad (*Euthyphro* 5d–6a, *Laches* 190d–192d9), or failures for other reasons (fly in the face of general beliefs or do not capture the formal causal relation).³⁴ So if Piety is said to be being loved by the gods, it follows that a particular instance, whether it serves as a counterexample or a confirming case, will have different properties, to which the different definite descriptions refer: Euthyphro's prosecution will be at once an act of prosecution, an act of piety, and an act loved by the gods. Any given pious particular will manifest her piety in a particular action and the action itself will fall under different types or universals. And since we are liable to view the act as being of a type which will turn out to be inadequate as an analysis of the definiendum, the complexity of all particulars renders them problematic as paradigms. This confusion of the types under which particular actions fall is a function of our own credulous nature, the complexity of the particular, and the assumption, seemingly shared by Socrates and his interlocutors, that properties are themselves definable.

Metaphysical Conjectures

Socrates' search for a *logos* is not an inquiry into *what it is to be a property*, or an idea, or a form. He refers to it as a thing (πράγμα or ἡμίμα or τι, *Pr.* 330c1, *La.* 191e10–11, *H. Ma.* 287c–d, esp. c4), as well as an *idea* or *eidōs*. He does not blanch to say that this same thing is found in many places, at many times, and in different sorts of items, e.g., men, their souls, and their actions. Nor does Socrates examine whether there are differences in kinds of properties—say, between ethical properties and natural kinds.³⁵ Indeed, no one in these early dialogues questions whether properties are definable; or how a property can self-predicate and be related to other properties; or how the identity conditions of properties and particulars differ; or the nature of material particulars and their capacity to change and possess multiple prop-

erties; or in what sense particulars share characteristics with the properties they have.

We, not Socrates, ask these questions, because the focal points of the metaphysics of the early dialogues are the properties he seeks to define. Properties are responsible for what things are, first, it seems, in virtue of being what they are, i.e., their nature or essence, and, second, in so far as they import this nature to what has them. What can we say about these features, especially the self-predication requirement?

Many have thought that a Socratic property self-predicates in that each is identical with its essence (*ousia*). The definiendum names or specifies X and the definition or definiens specifies the essence of X; for example, the statement that Justice is just then says that justice is identical with the essence of justice. In addition, it seems that the only thing a Socratic property is is its essence. Socratic properties are simple.³⁶

A second line of interpretation derives from consideration of the *logos* as a *linguistic* definition answering the “What is X?” question. It seems to some that the predication sentence whose subject is the property and whose predicate is the definition is “complete semantically.” This is contrasted with sentences involving a linguistic definition that are somehow not semantically complete.³⁷

The notions of semantic completeness and incompleteness are clearly the contribution of modern readers.³⁸ The contrast is between subject-predicate sentences that are qualified through the addition of restrictive clauses versus those that are not. The restrictions take the form of a comparison or a prepositional clause limiting or specifying the way in which the predicate applies to the subject. A sentence is semantically complete when there are no such clauses and the sentence preserves its truth value no matter what the context. Put differently, if one must appeal to the context or a restrictive clause to assess the truth value of the sentence, said sentence is not semantically complete.

The notion of “semantic completeness” derives from reflection on the rejected definitions found in the dialogues. Since the pseudodefinitions are too wide or too narrow, there is always a qualifying clause that specifies the problematic cases (*Meno* 73c9, *Laches* 192c1ff.). Punishing religious wrongdoing is pious, but it is not the definition of Piety because there are other pious acts that are not punishments of wrongdoing. In the *Hippias Major*, Plato runs through a series of definitions of the Fine (τὸ καλόν) ranging from a pretty girl, gold, burying your parents, to other “Socratic” definitions, the appropriate, the able and useful, the beneficial, and the pleasant. For various reasons, each of these definitions of the Fine is rejected. Now, we can construct sentences containing clauses that specify cases where the alleged definition applies and where it doesn’t—“Being a pretty maiden is beauty *for*

a human, but not for a god.” But it is unclear how semantic completeness and incompleteness account for the failure of these alleged definitions. One problem is to say what counts as a “context” and thus what makes the truth value of a claim context sensitive. While burying one’s parents cannot be what the Fine is because it is too narrow, Socrates thinks that it can be a fine action. Consider, then, the statement “Burying my parents is a fine act.” This seems to me to be a strict predication and there seems to be no context in which it is not a fine action. (Compare Antigone’s argument for burying her brother.) It thus seems to be semantically complete. On the other hand, this statement is particular, as opposed to general: it concerns the specific act of burying my parents. If we substitute “one’s” for “my,” we get a semantically complete statement which is general, but we still fail to arrive at the wholly general definition sought by Socrates. The problem with the pseudodefinitions is that they fail to capture all the explananda, not that they fail to be semantically complete sentences.³⁹

I think there is something to the notion of semantic completeness. But it addresses the *special relation* between a property and its essence, not a way of thinking about semantic notions or sentences. Intuitively, it captures the notions that the property, the Fine, is just fine, that is, *fine and nothing else, and that this simple property is responsible for all instances of fineness*. Whether or not the Fine is identical with its essence, it is nothing else besides.

The problem is that restricting a property to being just its essence seems unintuitive and, more importantly, inconsistent with fundamental aspects of Socrates’ program in the early dialogues. It is epistemologically unintuitive because we expect to learn something new when we come to understand the account that says what the essence of the property is, something that we previously did not know. But everyone knows that Virtue (the Virtuous) is Virtue (or virtuous). In arriving at a definition, we learn that Virtue is, in some sense, complex. It is a kind of knowledge, the knowledge of good and evil.

Consideration of Socrates’ use of the elenchus supports the notion that properties cannot be strictly simple. Aristotle, in the course of attributing to Socrates inductive accounts and the universal, reports that Socrates, in seeking to syllogize, sought the *ti esti*, the *what is it* (*Meta*. 1078b17–32). Since, for Aristotle, the definition serves as a starting point of his syllogism, he takes Socrates to be using the definitions as that from which “theorems” will be proved. Looking at the dialogues, we can ask what sorts of claims Aristotle might think Socrates proves, or seeks to prove, from the definitions of these universals. The answer is claims, generated in elenctic conversations, relating various properties to one another, such as piety and being god-loved, or being virtue and being teachable. Socratic properties thus seem to have some kind of relation to other properties. The relation of properties is manifested in the early mention of a *pathos* in the *Euthyphro* (11a6–b5). Conced-

ing that whatever is pious might be god-loved, that is, conceding the *ceteris paribus* extensional equivalence of the two, it is not the case that being god-loved is what the pious is. Something is god-loved because it is pious, and thus being god-loved is a necessary condition of the pious. In the *Hippias Major*, the last three definitions, the appropriate, the useful, and the pleasant, all seem to be necessary attributes of the Fine, even while failing as definitions of it. Here too we find the one and the odd related, as well as the two and the even. Further evidence for thinking that properties are related to one another is provided in every dialogue of search. It is assumed that what is fine, or virtuous, or pious is also beneficial, truly appropriate, and good.⁴⁰ The structure of the elenchus itself thus depends upon the relations between properties. Typically beginning from the “What is X?” question, or from questions such as “Is Virtue teachable?” (Is X Y?), Socrates demands from his interlocutors answers to a series of questions designed to test the proposed answer to the initial question. Socrates then tries to show that the answers to which the interlocutor assented are jointly inconsistent. Since these beliefs are not independent of one another, the method relies on the complex relations obtaining between properties.

The question of the simplicity of Socratic properties is especially hard to answer because of uncertainty about the relation of the virtues to one another and to virtue itself. In their case, the metaphysical and epistemological are inextricably entwined. Socrates hunts for a definition in order to gain knowledge of what, say, Piety is; if successful, he will acquire this knowledge; and this knowledge will in fact be what Piety is. Assume that all virtue is knowledge of goods and evils. If *each* of the virtues turns out to be just this knowledge of good and evil, then of course we cannot claim that there are two properties, Justice and Virtue, related as species to genus.⁴¹ It is not clear whether (how) the same arguments support the thesis that the Good, the Beneficial, the Fine, and the Profitable are also nothing but knowledge of all goods and evils. If they too are nothing other than knowledge of good and evil, then in the case of the properties discussed in the dialogues of search, there is just one property, Virtue, which seems simply and solely to be its essence, knowledge of all goods and evils.

Socrates’ focus on the virtues and ethical knowledge also complicates any account of the ways in which Socratic properties are imparted to various items. Unlike what might be called an “Anaxagorean account,” where properties seem to be materially present to, i.e., be material constituents or ingredients of, a complex particular, Socratic properties are immaterial. They are not constituents of bodies and they do not impart their nature in the manner in which a hot stone warms a bed. Stones are hot and pass that heat on to the bed, but Justice does not seem to have justice in that way or to pass it on in a similar fashion.⁴²

With knowledge in mind, we can see more clearly the contrast between

the way in which Anaxagorean constituents are what they are and the way in which a Socratic property self-predicates. A Socratic property is, in this instance, a form of knowledge that in some sense gets passed on to actions and states and other aspects of us. It makes the actions of the person and the person himself just. That Justice is knowledge is then causative both formally and in an important way efficiently, though *immaterially*, insofar as it is a cause of the just behavior of particulars. (I assume that the soul is immaterial for Socrates.) But neither the person per se nor the just behavior is itself an instance of *knowledge* of goods and evils. Anaxagorean constituents, on the other hand, are hot, i.e., bits of heat in a particular, and they cause the particular itself to be hot in the same way. The difference in part can be traced to the complexity of the particular of which these properties are properties, and in part to the material nature of Anaxagorean constituents, or conversely to the immaterial nature of Socratic properties. The Anaxagorean constituents are both a bit of matter and hot—perhaps a bit of matter that is hot through and through—and hence no constituent can be in two places at once, let alone in bodies, actions, and souls. Socratic properties, on the other hand, are immaterial, and they can be manifested in many places and things. When we recall that the crucial properties are knowledge, or different knowledges, there is less reason to wonder why this claim did not strike Socrates' interlocutors as odd. The craft analogy supports the notion that many different people can, at the same time and at different places, equally be architects, ship captains, or generals. And once the Socratic properties are identified with knowledge, we see that insofar as they make other things, e.g., actions or states, just without causing them to be knowledge, there is the potential for them to be characterized in a different manner from the particulars or the actions that they cause to be just.⁴³

What then are we to say about a Socratic property, its relation to its essence that is embodied in the self-predication assumption, and its relation to other properties? First, there is a tension in the texts. On the one hand, there appear to be a number of properties, e.g., goodness, appropriateness, justice, and virtue, which are related to one another. And since Socrates does not work with more than one predication relation, it seems that each Socratic property is many things in the same way. Anything fine is good and the fine is fine, so the fine is good. Anything pious is god-loved, and since the pious is pious, the pious is god-loved. Since it seems likely that there are always *pathe* that are entailed by each property's nature, Socratic properties appear to be complex. Here we find that there is a difference between a property, its essence and other properties that attend the definiendum. They are not the same as it, for the *pathe* are not part of the universal definition of the property. They are, as Aristotle might have said, necessary accidents derived syllogistically through the elenchus from the definition. On the other hand, the special role developed for Socratic properties as logical causes in-

clines Socrates to talk as though Justice is just and simply just. A Socratic property, insofar as it is just (identical with?) its essence, seems not to be complex. So it seems that a Socratic property, insofar as it is identical with its essence, makes its bearers such as it is—Piety makes Socrates pious—but it also causes the bearers to be characterized in other ways, ways entailed by the essence of the property: because Piety is also god-loved, it also makes all pious particulars god-loved.⁴⁴ Socrates' disregard for metaphysical niceties thus leaves us with an unresolved tension in his account of properties. It is left to Plato to investigate the issues of simplicity and complexity of properties and particulars and the possibility of different ontological relations. His is the metaphysician's task.

The *Meno*

The *Meno* appears to be a transitional dialogue between the Socratic and the middle Platonic works. Its introduction of an immortal soul, the Theory of Recollection, and its tantalizing discussion of knowledge and belief vouchsafe its connection to the latter. Just how it is connected to the earlier works is less clear. The question "What is virtue?" fits well with the early ethical dialogues. The method used in the first part is the familiar elenchus. Finally, and most critically for our purposes, the sorts of answers elicited by the "What is X?" questions about the virtues are similar to those found in the Socratic dialogues. On the other hand, we find in the opening of the *Meno* a series of properties and definitions unlike anything in the early dialogues. They emerge in the course of a discussion about teachability and they are meant to teach Meno what a proper definition of virtue would be like. This attempt to specify what makes for a definition of the right sort is a methodological turn, thus signaling a break with the earlier dialogues. Moreover, the properties themselves and the relations between them are very different from those previously exhibited between the parts of virtue. Indeed, not until the very late dialogues do we have anything akin to the kind of properties and their interrelations broached in the *Meno*. Socrates appeals to natural kind properties, e.g., bee, and the determinable properties of shape and color (and their determinates). But this new interest in the relations between properties still leaves open whether the properties are anything over and above their instances.

A second difference between the *Meno* and the early dialogues is its consideration of how a definition can be used to teach another, what is referred to as the "dialectical requirement" on definitions:⁴⁵ When you are defining something for someone you must use terms he agrees he understands.⁴⁶ In the course of satisfying this requirement, Socrates seems to offer and accept two definitions of shape, a possibility envisaged, if ever, only in the late

works where the Method of Collection and Division is in play. Two separate issues arise from this requirement: First, what are the metaphysical implications for what is defined, i.e., the property? Second, what are the epistemological implications, i.e., how are the different definitions connected in a person's head, for instance, when they are being used to teach one who does not know (but who thinks he does)?

The dialectical requirement is not, I will argue, a condition on *real* definitions. The definition of a property is not dictated by what someone thinks he understands. It is, rather, a condition on how definitions, and pseudodefinitions, can be used to instruct. Insofar as Plato is now concerned with how names and thoughts are connected, especially so as to permit teaching, we can say that Plato's epistemological interest is developing. The presuppositions of the elenchus are up for consideration.

The abrupt opening of the *Meno* introduces Gorgias and the possibility of Gorgianic definitions (70–71d). Meno wishes to know whether virtue can be taught. Unlike Gorgias, Socrates famously retorts that far from knowing whether virtue can be taught, he does not know at all what it is. Confessing to being unable to *recall* what Gorgias said, he cajoles Meno to tell him Gorgias's view.⁴⁷ Meno first presents the virtue of a man, i.e., to conduct civic affairs and to help friends, harm enemies, and to guard against his own suffering. He then says what the virtue of a woman is, that of a child, that of an old man, “. . . and a great many other virtues, so that there is no loss to say what virtue is. For each kind of activity and each stage of life, with respect to each function (*ergon*), there is a virtue for each of us, and in the same manner, a vice” (72a1–5). In the face of this panoply, Socrates protests that he wanted the one character because of which they are all virtue (72c6–8), just as there is some one essence (*ousia*) of bees, even though individual bees differ from one another in size or beauty. Meno *claims* to understand this point. Socrates asks Meno to say what is the same one Form for all the virtues.

There is nothing formally wrong with the idea of Gorgianic definitions.⁴⁸ Plato's most sustained critique of them begins from Socrates' request of Meno to think of the different practices or activities he picked out as all alike *just instances* of virtue, different from no other practice qua virtue than one bee differs qua bee from any other bee. The appeal to being a bee is unusual in that (1) it involves a natural kind, and in that (2) there is no connection between the common nature of the different bees and their distinguishing properties. It is noteworthy that in fact there are species of bees and differences between drones and queens, though neither is mentioned here.

It is doubtful, I think, that Meno could say what bee is. When he cannot answer Socrates' request for an account of the one kind that the virtues have in common, Socrates asks whether the variegated nature of virtue is also true of health and size and strength, where men and women also clearly differ.

Meno thinks that virtue is different from these properties (73a4–5). These properties are different again from being a bee and from what we have seen of virtue. By appealing to them, Socrates attacks the notion that different groups of individuals (humans) have different functions, and hence implies that the excellence of each group is not distinct. Health does not vary across the species nor does strength,⁴⁹ as Socrates points out. Unlike the property of being a bee, however, these properties are not (of) natural kinds. Another difference is that these properties have opposites and, *prima facie*, come in degrees. One can be more or less healthy or strong. In these respects, they are more similar to virtue than to being a bee.

Socrates' next attempt to elicit a definition homes in on an inadequacy of Meno's Gorgianic accounts of virtue. Each requires an adverbial modification. Man's virtue is not simply ruling the city, it is ruling it *well* or *justly*, and so too for the woman's management of the house. Each of these virtues, when fully defined, must then include an adverb which itself seems to introduce justice, or some virtue, into the discussion. Meno then commits a second blunder in identifying virtue with justice. Socrates asks whether he means that it is virtue or *a* virtue (73e1). When Meno hesitates again, Socrates introduces the property of roundness into the discussion: "I would say about roundness that it is *a* shape, not simply that it *is* shape . . .," because there are other shapes (73e4–6). Meno agrees that there are virtues other than justice, but is unable to satisfy Socrates' request to find one virtue which "is through them all" (ἡ διὰ πάντων τούτων ἐστίν, 74a9).

Determinables and their determinate species afford a way to think about parts and wholes quite differently from the early dialogues' account of the virtues and their relations to one another. Socrates argued that they were all the same one thing, knowledge of goods and evils. What hope there was to distinguish them was lodged in the possibility that different specifications might be available which allowed one to define each virtue in respect of different aspects of knowing goods and evils or different situations to which that knowledge could be directed. The different shapes, on the other hand, while they have in common that they are all shapes, cannot be one another or the same as shape. The different shapes are *incompatible* species that share a genus and they *cannot* ever be found together (in the same instance). The virtues, on the other hand, are either identical with one another, or never found apart from one another, or at least *compatible* with one another. A related but different point is that the individual shapes all have distinct *ousiai* or definitions. Shape and color thus also differ from the first example. Being a bee does not have species and the kind is exhausted, if you will, by all the individual bees, who are just bees differing in ways unrelated to what they are. Shape, the determinable, has species, and is exhausted by them, while the determinate species, in turn, are exhausted by their instances which are at once both round and shape(d).

The discussion moves forward. Socrates reiterates his request that Meno say what shape is, this same thing which is over them all (74e11–75a9). Socrates, of course, has to meet his own demand, offering up first the proposition that “shape is that alone of beings which happens always to follow color.” Socrates asks whether this is acceptable, adding that he would be happy were Meno to define virtue even in the same fashion (75b8–c1).

This exchange immediately precedes the statement of the dialectical requirement. Meno’s inability to answer, to learn from the previous examples, seems to frustrate him. He snaps his refusal (75b1). The definition itself is introduced with the subjunctive “Let it be” (ἔστω), and his request for a similar answer from Meno about virtue is couched with the qualification that such an answer would be “adequate” (ἱκανῶς . . . οὕτως, 75b11–c1). As for the proffered definition itself, it uses one determinable, shape, to specify the other determinable, color. Whether it is a definition we shall take up shortly. Its emergence here suggests that perhaps there is some determinable, comparable to color, to which virtue is related in the same way. Knowledge of course lurks in the shadows.

Meno promptly labels the proposed definition “simple-minded” (εὐηθεῖς). The problem, he says, is that someone might deny that he knows what color is, that he might be at a loss about color in the same way as he is about shape. Socrates treats this as a *sophistical* challenge (75c8–e5). First, he says that he would have answered truthfully, and then that he would have challenged the eristic questioner to refute him. Being friends, however, necessitates a somehow gentler and more dialectical answer, by which he means “to answer not only truly but also through those terms which the questioner would agree⁵⁰ to know” (75d5–7). In this case, the more dialectical answer utilizes the notion of limit, which Meno claims (weakly, οἶμαι, “I think”) to understand, as well as the geometrical notions of surface and solid. “Okay then,” says Socrates, “you should be able to understand what I say shape is from these. For every shape, I say this is what shape is, that into which the solid terminates, or in sum, shape is the limit of a solid” (76a4–7). Once more Meno ignores the proposed definition, asking instead that Socrates say what color is, in effect returning to the first definition. Socrates then offers to define color in the manner of Gorgias, which, he avers, Meno might especially follow. This definition appeals to the Empedoclean theory of effluences, pores, the fitting (or not) of effluences to different passages, and sight, all of which Meno and Gorgias accept. Based on these, Socrates defines color: “Color is the effluence from shapes symmetrical with vision and perceptible (by it)” (76d4–5). Meno likes this definition, which Socrates ascribes first to its familiarity (συνήθεια) and then to its being “tragic.” Meno concurs. Socrates, however, insists that the former is the better definition and that Meno would feel that way too had he not departed the previous day before the mysteries (76e6–9).

In the ensuing discussion of Meno's definition of virtue, Socrates condemns him for defining virtue and virtuous acts by appeal to the parts of virtue, as though it were possible to know a part of virtue without knowing the whole (79c8–9): "For also, if you remember, when I answered you just now about shape, we threw out the sort of answer that tried to answer through items still being inquired into and not yet agreed to" (79d1–4). Socrates bids him not to think that when virtue as a whole is being sought that he can explain it to anyone by answering through its parts (79d6–8). So ends the first part of the *Meno*.

The assimilation of the part/whole relation to the dialectical requirement is striking. They do not seem to be the same. Meno's problem seemed to be that one could not define one concept, shape, in terms of a distinct concept, color. The difference between these concepts is one of kind or phylum. Whatever we make of the dialectical requirement, it seems plausible that in fact we do teach one another by using a determinable we both are familiar with, color, to get at a determinable quite different from it, shape. At 79c–d, however, it seems that the dialectical requirement is applicable *within* a *single* determinable. Moreover, there remains the difference between wholes and parts such as the virtues seem to be, and determinates and determinables. Perhaps one cannot know what *a* virtue is without knowing what virtue is, but it is not clear that one cannot know what a triangle is without knowing what shape, in general, is. In part this is a reflection of the fact that the species, i.e., the determinate shapes and colors, are incompatible with one another, whereas the virtues are not. It does seem possible that one know one shape and not another, e.g., what a square is and not what a circle is. And it seems possible to know some shapes without knowing them all. But Socrates insists that we cannot know what one virtue is apart from another.

The whole course of this opening inquiry into virtue and its teachability suggests that we take the "dialectical requirement" with many grains of salt. When the requirement is revisited at 79d, it is not merely an unknown which cannot be appealed to, but rather something unknown because *it* is being inquired after. The root intuition behind the requirement is that one not define the unknown through the more unknown. This is a controversial thesis. It is not clear how we define many, especially basic, notions. Moreover, by itself it seems to suggest too coarse a treatment of definition. What is known not only varies from individual to individual, it varies over different times in one's life. The Aristotelian adage that we start from what is better known to us and arrive at what is better known by nature is testimony to one difficulty with the thesis. (The Theory of Recollection waiting in the wings is another.) But Socrates does not even voice the requirement in the form, Do not define the unknown through the more unknown. Plato does not write "which he knows." His claim is that one should, when discussing with friends, define the sought after item in terms of whatever notions the

questioner *agrees that he knows* (δι' ἐκείνων ὧν ἂν προσομολογήῃ εἰδέναι ὁ ἐρωτώμενος, 75d6–7). So the questioner may *think* that he knows what certain words mean. He may even believe falsely that he knows what the respondent is saying. The generalizing relative reminds us of the description of Gorgias at the outset. Everyone he talks to he does so in terms that they *say* they understand, notions in some sense familiar to the questioner, at least terms/notions that he has heard before. The broad hint is that most of their listeners do not, in fact, understand what they are hearing. The rapidity with which Meno flits from definition to definition suggests that he has only a passing familiarity with any of the notions Socrates uses. He professes to understand, but is really simply flirting with definitions (76a9–c2).

It is, therefore, difficult to decide what Plato wants the reader to make of this “dialectical requirement.” One problem is that we have no reason to think that what people believe about what words they understand is liable, on a person by person basis, to yield any definitions at all. Perhaps Plato is toying with the notion that ultimately he could find definitions whose terms are familiar to all, as though science or philosophical precision would ultimately become part of ordinary understanding. A second problem is that there can be no absolute premium placed on an interlocutor’s familiarity with terms, if Plato does think that the earlier definition about shape is better.⁵¹ His remark about the mysteries indicates, I think, that regardless of what Meno or anyone currently thinks, there is available a best definition, one that is most intelligible to those who have run the entire course of initiations. Plato might here be foreshadowing the role of recollection; for once anyone has recollected the Forms, then the terms of the definition will be familiar to him.

Perhaps the best way to save the dialectical requirement is to see it as an idealization of what a proper dialectical exchange would be like, i.e., one that resulted in the questioner acquiring knowledge. If we look to the earlier (or later) dialogues for guidance, there is little support for the claim that Plato is interested in constructing definitions with which the majority or the inexpert claim familiarity or are satisfied.⁵²

Whatever Meno’s failing at defining virtue and its causes,⁵³ the task is to make sense of the sequence of definitions, shape is what always accompanies color; shape is the limit of the solid; and color is the effluences from shapes commensurate with sight and perceptible (by it). We have two definitions of shape, and Plato invites us to infer that there is an alternative to the Empedoclean definition of color (76d8–77a5). Is this a signal that, with the middle period works at hand, each Form has more than one definition? And if they are not distinct definitions, are they to be judged to be extensionally or intensionally equivalent?

From the ontological point of view, the *ousia* of a property is set by nature. Essence does not depend on someone’s coming to have a linguistic

specification of it. There is little to support the suggestion that the two definitions are the same because they are extensionally equivalent. With the *Euthyphro's* discussion of Piety and God-lovedness in the background, extensional equivalence is not a Platonic reason for identifying two notions. In the context of the *Meno*, it is also hard to regard these two definitions as intensionally identical. The second is introduced because allegedly Meno did not understand the first. But in order for him to understand the second and not understand the first, the two must differ in content and, eo ipso, differ intensionally.

I suggest that we concentrate on the dialectical interchange and the context of trying to teach someone something he does not understand. In certain cases we try to get him to formulate new thoughts in terms that we are teaching him. In other cases we try to get him to see that words and notions he thought he understood he really did not, or did not fully, comprehend. Thus Meno might be aware of what shape is and not be aware, at the same time or in the same respect, of what it is to be the limit of a solid. And this can be true even though shape is definitionally identical with the limit of a solid. What the two definitions of shape show are that different specifications are available to bring one to a better understanding of shape. For Socrates, if these are both definitions, it would follow either that there are two distinct *eide*, properties, or that there are two essences, *ousiai*, of the same *eidos* or property. The latter runs too close to the rejected Gorgianic accounts of virtue. The former requires that Plato is prepared to leave undrawn a rather significant conclusion to the effect that there are two distinct properties of shape, just after he has argued that the different shapes, i.e., triangles, circles, squares, all share in the same one property.

Perhaps these two definitions are actually identical, not because they *mean* the same, but because, after reflection, one realizes that shape is (identical with) the limit of a solid and is (identical with) what always accompanies color, and that, by the transitivity of identicals, these two definitions must be the same. This, too, is difficult to accept. First, the definitions are rather unlike. The second definition has the form of a definition by genus and differentia; the first has the form of a necessary correlation, or an invariant correlation.⁵⁴ There is, I think, no way to capture the notion of color in terms of limits or solids, nor those of limit and solid in terms of color. The only identity here would be extensionally driven.⁵⁵

I think that there is another way to view the relation between the two so-called definitions. Following the lead of the *Euthyphro*, we can regard one as a *pathos* and the other as the essence of which that *pathos* is a *pathos*. In this case, the temptation is to view the second definition as the definition. First, it is a definition by genus and differentia, the form of definition predominant in the corpus and early dialogues. Second, the definition in terms of the necessary correlation begs the question "Why so correlated?" The explana-

tory aspect of the definition or *eidos* seems lacking in this case. Moreover, one can begin to see a way of explaining why color and shape are invariably correlated if shape is the limit of a solid. In fact, the way is intimated by the Empedoclean account of symmetrical effluences of shaped bodies. The intuition seems to be that the color is on the surface and flows from there in a prescribed manner. Treating these accounts then as specifying different, but related, properties has two great advantages. It preserves the notion that each property has one essence, while at the same time shedding new light on the relations between properties. Properties are related to one another as parts to wholes and determinates to determinables, and different kinds of properties are related to one another, as color is to shape. Secondly, the fact that it is possible to give different specifications of what is, in some sense, the same thing, allows definite descriptions and accounts which specify properties that are convertible with the definiendum to play a role in instruction. These two advantages combine when we recall one of the difficulties with the Unity of Virtue. If different specifications are possible of the same one thing, maybe we can find a way to identify each of the virtues with knowledge and then somehow specify different parts of knowledge as the meaning of the different virtue terms. The paradigm now is the determinate/determinable relationship. The task is to see whether knowledge can be set over kinds of objects—the subsets of goods and evils—in a fashion analogous to the way in which color is set over the colors. The stage is set then for two inquiries. The first will investigate the nature of properties and their relation to other properties and the particulars which have them. The second will take up the relation between things we believe we understand and what we do (or do not) understand, and how it is that knowledge and belief are set over their objects. The first inquiry is undertaken in the *Phaedo*, the second in the *Republic*.

3 THE EMERGENCE OF FORMS

SECTION ONE

The early dialogues, with their metaphysics of self-predicating properties, a single predication relation, and a fuzzy divide between apparently simple properties and complex particulars, leave wide room to construct etiologies for the robust metaphysical doctrines that emerge in the *Phaedo* and *Republic*.

The first section of this chapter will track the argument of the *Phaedo*. In approaching the *Phaedo* we should keep in mind that the whole of the argument is designed to secure the conclusion that the soul is indestructible and immortal. The elements of the metaphysical theory subserve that goal. Most have thought that Plato's argument fails to secure this conclusion. My brief is not with the final argument. Rather, I think that Plato's concern to "prove" the immortality of the individual soul is responsible, in part, for the hypothetical character of his Theory of Forms and thus his account of the clever *aitia* and the relations between Forms, particulars, and form-copies. Whether because he has yet to work out the details of the theory, or because dialogical necessities require that he not dwell on those details, the *Phaedo* provides us with only a sketch of the theory. Much is vague—for instance, the status of Snow, Fire, and form-copies—and perhaps even inconsistent: Can a simple Form possess more than one property?

In the second section of the chapter I turn briefly to the *Republic*. There we find Forms put to somewhat different uses. Their principle functions are

(1) to serve as objects of knowledge (and desire), and (2) to be the originals or models of which the particulars of the physical world are deficient copies. I will try to stay fairly close to the texts of the *Phaedo* and *Republic*.

In the third section I will lay out in a more analytic fashion a reconstruction of the middle-period metaphysics of Forms and participating particulars. The canonical elements of the Platonic middle period metaphysics are Forms, items that are (εἶναι), particulars, items that participate in Forms (μετέχειν), and immortal, immaterial souls.¹ Others have admitted “forms-in-us,” my “form-copies.”² I think that form-copies are part of the ontology, and a critical part at that. My reconstruction will leave many difficulties unresolved, including the complexity of Forms and the material nature of particulars. But given the hypothetical character of its presentation in the *Phaedo*, leaving much unresolved seems to me a virtue, for the Theory of Forms is, I believe, very much still a work in progress.

The *Phaedo*

The untreated worries of the Socratic dialogues find some relief early in the *Phaedo*. Epistemology and metaphysics bloom in the fertile discussion of the immortality of the soul. Socrates has surprised the audience with his proclamation that philosophers seek death. He depicts the soul as seeking freedom from the body so that it might have its best shot at (knowing) truth. This freedom from the body is described in terms soon to dominate the metaphysical debate: the soul comes to be separate (χωρίς) from the body, itself by itself (αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτήν, 64c5–8). Here it can best grasp truth, because the body hinders and distracts it. The senses furnish no truth; those senses about the body are neither accurate nor clear. The soul reckons (λογίζεται) best when it is itself by itself, i.e., not in contact with body (65a–65d3). At this juncture, Socrates changes course:

What about these things? Do we say that justice itself is something? Of course. And the fair and the good? Surely. Then have you ever seen any of these sorts of things with your eyes? In no way. But then have you grasped them with any other sense through the body. I am talking about all (of them), for instance about size, health, strength, in a word about the essence (*ousia*) of all of them, what each happens to be. Is it through the body then that what is most true of these things is contemplated? Or does it hold thus? Whoever of us should prepare himself to consider most accurately each thing itself about which he inquires, that one would come closest to knowing each thing. . . . he would do this most cleanly . . . who using his intellect itself by itself, unmixed (εἰλικρινές), would undertake to hunt down each of the beings, itself by itself (αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό), unmixed, (εἰλικρινές). (65d4–66a3)

This is the first passage widely agreed to introduce Forms into the dialogues. However, this group of interlocutors, the close associates of Socrates, is not at all unfamiliar with the metaphysical and epistemological language.³ The listing of Size, Health, Strength, as well as Justice, Beauty, and the Fair reminds of us the Socratic dialogues. But the language of isolation signals a change from the earlier dialogues. Both here and earlier we aim to grasp the *ousia* or essence of each thing that is. A Socratic property, however, was present to ordinary particulars and so too was its essence. Indeed, there was no clear indication that Socratic properties were ever found apart from particulars. Now these properties can be considered apart from particulars. Moreover, it appears that their respective essences are not even present to the particulars (65d11–e2). Plato is now explicit that we cannot achieve knowledge, or at least the most accurate knowledge, of any of these properties through the senses. They must be studied each itself by itself. The only clue to how we are to understand this recommendation is provided by the earlier thesis that the soul can exist apart from the body, itself by itself. Plato now adds that each of its faculties can be considered in isolation, especially thought, apart from the eyes, ears, and the senses. The idea that each of the beings, that is, the objects of the isolated reason, can also be unmixed and itself by itself is, in the first instance, a comment on their isolation from material, sensible particulars. Like the soul itself, the *onta* are most truly what they are when apart from bodies.

In this first encounter, then, Forms are conceived by Plato as clearly best known only through reasoning, when both reason itself and the Form itself is isolated from everything else. Though physical particulars do not provide us with objects of (the most accurate) knowledge, they are otherwise not disparaged. We shall see shortly that Forms are not merely not *best* known when they commingle with particulars, but that they are *never* known “through the senses.”

We next meet with Forms in Plato’s famous discussion of learning as recollection at 72eff. The Recollection Argument⁴ is supposed to show that our souls existed before birth and had at that time learned about the Forms. We now learn by being reminded of those Forms. We must have learned about them in a previous disembodied existence because our senses, and our reason relying on our senses, cannot grasp them in their communion with physical objects. This passage thus expands the indictment against the senses and provides more evidence that there is something problematic, at least epistemologically problematic, about the way in which particulars possess their properties.

I omit discussion of the mechanics of recollection (73c–74a).⁵ For my purposes the salient features are: (1) we can be prompted to recollect something “new,” Simmias himself, either by confronting something dissimilar, e.g., his lyre, or something similar, a picture of Simmias; (2) the knowledge of what comes to mind and the knowledge of what prompts it are not the

same⁶; and (3) when one recollects something from similars, it is necessary also to suffer this, to take in mind whether the initial object is deficient in any way with respect to likeness vis-à-vis that of which one has been reminded.

This notion of deficiency with respect to likeness triggers a discussion of the Equal itself, equal sticks and stones, and the debate over the fashion in which these material objects are deficient with respect to Equality itself.

The Equal itself is something besides the sticks and stones (*παρὰ τὰυτὰ πάντα*, 74a9–12). We know it,⁷ and we can inquire as to whence we acquire knowledge of it. We acquire it from the aforementioned sticks and stones in so far as they prompt our recollection. We take the Equal in mind, having looked at the sticks and stones, it being different from them. It is different in this respect: being the same two stones or sticks, they sometimes seem to be equal to one, not to another.⁸ The Equal itself, on the other hand, does not ever seem unequal, nor does Equality ever seem to be Inequality (74c1–74c5).⁹ The Equal itself is thus different from the sticks and stones that appear to be (and, in relation to other sticks and stones, are) unequal,¹⁰ though we call it to mind from seeing them. Plato does not say whether this is a case of recollection by likeness or unlikeness. It could be either.

The next phase of the argument signals that we are to consider it a case of likeness. We realize that all the sensible equals strive to be like the Equal itself but are lacking, or deficient with respect to being such as it is.¹¹ And because we recognize that these sensibles are striving to be what it is, we also realize that we must have come to know the Equal itself before any contact with these sensibles. The recollective process thus reveals that the sensible equals prompt us to recall the Equal itself; allows us to recognize that all sensibles are deficient with respect to the Equal, thus guaranteeing that there is a different knowledge of the two of them; and shows that we therefore must have acquired knowledge of the Equal itself at some previous time (74c7–75b8). The argument is then generalized: Plato declares that we have the same experience with the greater and the less, and then all such (*τοιαῦτα*). “For the argument is equally about the Equal as about the Fair itself, the Good itself, and the Just and the Pious, and, as I am asserting, about all those things on which we set the seal the ὄν ἑστίν,”¹² both in our questions when we ask questions, and in our answers when we give answers” (75c10–d5).

This second passage is not especially helpful. The language of deficiency, of striving and failing, of lack, is metaphorical. There is no clear foundation for the superiority of all those items certified to be what each is. Moreover, the exact range of items which merit this seal is also uncertain: about what do we *not* ask and answer questions of this sort? Of course the aim of the argument is not to detail the number and nature of Forms, but rather to show that the soul (is immortal because it) preexists and knows something before it enters our body.

A most striking aspect of the Recollection Argument is its rejection of abstraction or empiricism as a means to achieve knowledge. Accepted as fact is that we see certain things and call to mind others, and that in cases involving likeness we can see that the sensed objects are deficient with respect to the recalled “mental” object. But the two kinds of cases, the portrait of Simmias and the equal sticks, lead to different conclusions about the deficiency of the particulars. In the first case, the “sensible” is an image, representationally as like as one might wish, but lacking flesh and bones as it were. We see that it is an image, not the real thing. This example suggests that the range of Forms is broad, to include Human itself, the Dog itself, or any kind of which there are many images, that is, any sensible particular.

In the case of the sticks, on the other hand, Plato does not shrink from labeling them beings (*ὄντα*). Their problems are different: any stick is equal to one thing and unequal to another; and equal material objects can always seem or appear to be unequal to differently placed observers, or to the same observer at different times. What distinguishes the Equal itself is that it never appears unequal to anything or from any perspective. It is never thought to be anything but equal. This seems to be the message behind the controversial 74c1–2. This is of limited help, however, since we are never told why we do not, or cannot, confuse Equality itself for Inequality, or think it not equal. This example suggests that perhaps the range of Forms is limited to those properties for which there are opposites, or incomplete properties, properties that require some form of complementation (see chapter 2).

The Recollection Argument works only if the assumed knowledge is of something, a Form, which neither can be met with through a perceptual faculty, nor abstracted from our perceptual encounters. Plato does not, I think, attempt to fashion here a conclusive defense for any of the critical premises in the Recollection Argument. However, we do learn from the Recollection Argument that Forms and particulars are different. Mere logic suffices to show this, provided that we establish that the Form is one single thing and each of the particulars many. Few readers, however, think that showing the mere nonidentity of particulars and Forms is Plato’s aim.

Once the argument is underway, it becomes increasingly clear that Plato’s point is that the recollected Form is somehow *metaphysically* different from the particulars. All we can say here with any textual basis is that in the case of the sensible equals, they can *seem* to be both equal to some people or things or in certain contexts and unequal in others. The Equal itself cannot *appear* so. The question is why? One way to ground this difference is to cite the fact that a sensible equal will always *be* equal to one thing and unequal to something else, and then argue that the reason why the Form cannot appear unequal is that it *is* never unequal to anything else.¹³ But what explains this difference? One part of the answer is that physical, sensible equals are always complex: besides being equal, or equal to something, they are sticks and they have a certain length. Others have focused on the perceptual encounter itself.

There is always some perspective from which the sensible equals can be considered unequal, and so on for the other properties.¹⁴

With regard to the Form, it would seem that there is no perspective from which the Equal itself can be considered unequal. But, again, no reason is stated. One option is to appeal to the simplicity of the Form, grounding the inability to appear unequal in the fact that Equality has exactly one property. Thus to have it in mind at all is to consider it to be equal. A second option is to cite the special way in which it is equal. Being immaterial, it cannot be unequal to anything. Of course, by the same token, it cannot be equal. A third option also appeals to the special way in which the Equal is equal. It allows the Form to have many properties, but grounds our ability to identify it at all in our recognition of its nature or essence.

The Recollection Argument seems to me to underdetermine which of these options Plato has in mind. Plato does not allow us at this point to consider whether we can somehow focus exclusively on the sticks' equality. Beginning from the isolation of the soul itself from the body, we have moved to the isolation of the discarnate soul's object from everything else, especially from the enmattered particulars that are considered the object of the incorporated soul. Rather than discussing the various properties of the sticks, the idea of exclusive focus is reserved precisely for how we take in mind (ἐννοεῖν) the Form to be recollected. When the argument is summarized and generalized, the epithet αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστι is assigned to the Forms. We still are provided no handle on this notion, save for two remarks: we seek the *logos* of a Form in our questions and it itself serves to answer those questions (75c–d); we refer our perceptions to each of these *ousiai*, and we treat our perceptions as likenesses of them (ἐπὶ ταύτην . . . ἀναφέρομεν and ταῦτα ἐκεῖνη ἀπεικάζομεν, 76d7–e2). Once we realize this, we know that it is just one thing that is common to the many cases of equality and is responsible for equal things being equal. But all that is *said* here is that it never appears to be inequality. Finally, whatever we make of the sensible equals and their deficiency, it is by no means certain that we should generalize the grounds of their deficiency to account for the deficiency of the Beautiful, or Fair, or Good, not to mention Strength, Health, and all others. Plato has not yet supplied enough information to permit such a claim.

Having proved the soul's pre-existence, Plato next attempts to show that the soul's existence postdates its separation from the body (77c ff.). The worry is that the soul might dissipate and scatter (διασκεδάννυσθαι) upon exiting the body. Socrates asks what sorts of things are suited to (προσῆκειν) scatter, and whether the soul belongs to this class. The answer is "what has been put together and is a composite (συντίθεναι) by nature," for it is fitting that this be broken up in the way/place in which it was put together. "And if there happens to be anything incomposite (ἄσύνθετον), it is fitting for it alone, if for anything, not to suffer this." The class of the incomposite is

further defined as whatever holds always in the same respects and in the same way. The composite is then defined as the opposite, what holds differently at different times and never in the same respects (78c1–8).

The Affinity Argument (78b4–84b8) adds to our understanding of the metaphysical differences between Forms and particulars. Some of its terminology is new. Heretofore, *auto kath auto* was associated with being what a property is itself by itself (and thus in its own right), this notion being cashed in terms of isolation from the physical particulars, accessibility to pure reason, and freedom from seeming the contrary of what one is. While the terminology here associated with the Forms may be a different way of capturing the same notion expressed by *auto kath auto*, the definition of the composite is an advance on what we have seen before. Logically, the denial of “always the same” is “not always the same.” As of yet, we do not know whether to read the Greek as asserting “never the same,” suggesting change of some property at each moment, or perhaps even total change of properties at some or every moment; or the weaker “not always the same,” implying that something could remain the same for some time, or even always the same in some respect for as long as the thing endures. Since we do not know the force of the “fittingness to dissolution,” nor how to understand the notion of being a composite or an incomposite, caution is required here. From these opening remarks, we should infer only that if something is divided, it is composite.

Plato next (78c10ff.) turns to the Forms, “the very set of existents of whose essence we give an account in our dialectical exchanges.”¹⁵ These satisfy the criterion of being always in the same state, and Plato applies to them the formulae from the earlier passages, *auto to X*, “the X itself,” *auto kath auto*, “itself by itself,” and ὃ ἑστί, “what itself is.” New to the field, however, is the expression *μονοειδές*¹⁶ (78d5), and the assertion that these items never admit any alteration (*ἀλλοίωσις*) or change (*μεταβολή*) in any way at any time.¹⁷

In the context of this argument, the temptation is to treat *μονοειδές* as encapsulating the idea that the Form is a single property, or a single thing with exactly one property, alternatively expressed as its *ousia*, or its form (*εἶδος*), or what itself is. It admits no change or alteration in any physical sense. In contrast to the unchanging Forms stand the many fair or equal men, horses, and cloaks, and generally all the many things whose names are the same as the Forms (*δμώνυμα*, 78e2). Their condition is just the reverse of the Forms, “never as it were holding in the same respect either with respect to themselves or with respect to one another.”¹⁸ One grasps with the senses these changing or inconstant objects. The unchanging Forms are unseen, invisible, and grasped with the power of rational thought (*τῷ τῆς διανοίας λογισμῷ*).¹⁹

These early passages in the *Phaedo* isolate a special class of beings, Forms,

and surround them with a battery of locutions unlike anything in the early dialogues. At least one impetus for this segregation is his notion that there is an epistemological gap between the objects of the physical world, accessed through the senses, and the objects of knowledge, now thought to be a special faculty of the soul. This knowledge, or wisdom, or reasoning—Plato uses many terms and phrases to refer to this notion—may use the reports of the senses, but it cannot find in them its proper objects. The *Phaedo*'s denigration of the senses and elevation of reason is partially a consequence of Plato's attempt to prove the immortality of the soul. This project invites Plato to develop the terminology of separation and isolation: the soul must exist apart from the body and so must be able to be what it is itself by itself. First the soul, then its capacity to think, and *only then* its objects are assigned the status of being pure, separate/separable from other things, and being *auto kath' auto*. There is, I suspect, no one English expression that captures the significance of the Greek αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό in the *Phaedo*. When the isolation of the soul from the body is the focus, it is best translated "itself by itself." But when the focus is the *status* of the isolated, separated items, i.e., *being* what they are in their own respective rights when isolated from the sensible particulars, it is better translated as "in its own right," "self-sufficient," or "itself in virtue of itself."

Forms are found to be incomposite, indivisible, unchanging, uniform, and not capable of seeming the opposite of what each, respectively, is, only when they are understood to be isolated from particulars and when they *alone* are assigned essences. The sequence of properties indicates that the uniform, incomposite status of the self-sufficient Forms helps to explain why they cannot seem to be the opposite of what they are. Since they are solely and purely one thing, each can only appear to be the one thing each is. Once so considered, it becomes easier to think that there is no need to depend on the senses and their reports about what is available for study in the physical world. If there is nothing but the Form, itself by itself, that will serve as the object of knowledge, then these Forms in some sense cannot be found in the physical world *commingled* with other things. The Forms are assigned to a special realm, as though to effect a spatial separation, visited by the soul before its incarceration.

The emphasis of each of these three passages is the soul and its claim to immortality. But at each juncture Plato develops a bit more of the metaphysics. First *ousia* is stripped from particulars and assigned to isolated Forms. Then particulars are tagged as deficient. By the end of the Affinity Argument, the problem with particulars is their composite nature or their complexity. Complexity is responsible for their propensity to change. By contrast, Forms are incomposite and simple, each being unchangeably what it is in its own right. Deficiency can now be considered as either within a kind, if the image of Simmias can be said to be of the same kind as Simmias

himself, or between kinds of beings, i.e., particulars versus Forms. But in a surprising and pregnant turn of phrase, the relation of particular to Form is said to be homonymy, which invites Plato now to distinguish when the same expression refers to different kinds of objects. But the repeated emphasis on the capacity of reason to concentrate on the single, selfsame, unchanging, and perspectiveless object intimates that the nature of the Forms will have to be integrated with the needs of the knowing soul. The stage is set in these three passages for the profound metaphysical turn that awaits us.

The Final Argument

The reply to Cebes, comprised of the final argument (102a10–107b10) for the immortality of the soul and its preliminaries (95a4–102a9), is the locus classicus for the middle period Theory of Forms. Cebes has objected that though the soul may outlast many bodies, just as a cloak may outlast its weaver and many wearers only eventually to unravel, the soul too might eventually wear out and perish. The opening move in the reply is Socrates' declaration that the task now before them is the cause or reason for generation and destruction as a whole (ὅλως γὰρ δεῖ περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς τὴν αἰτίαν διαπραγματεύσασθαι, 95e9–96a1). He then recounts his own experiences in natural philosophy (περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίαν), including his confession that what he thought he once understood, he now, on the basis of his studies, no longer understands.²⁰

The cases over which Socrates says he puzzled are not those of the coming into being and demise of physical organisms, but the gain and loss of properties by those objects, or their growth and increase. The problem with the natural philosophers' accounts is that, broadly speaking, they are materialist; more narrowly, they fail to provide satisfactory *aitia*. The latter complaint takes center stage. The appeal to processes such as combination, addition, and division—along with the supposed objects or properties that figure in the combinations, e.g., adding a unit, or a head, is condemned for two reasons: (1) the same cause is responsible for opposite effects—the head is responsible for things being both smaller and larger; and (2) two opposite causes have the same effect—combination and division are responsible for something's becoming two.

The moral seems to be that a proper *aitia* must be both a necessary and sufficient cause of its effect. Socrates declares that he thought these materialist accounts confused. At best they provided one with necessary conditions but not reasons, as when they claim that his sinews and bones are the cause of his being in prison, not his decision to stay. Dismayed with his studies, Socrates recounts his excitement upon learning that Anaxagoras had declared *Nous* the cause of all things. His expectations were dashed. Anaxagoras fell

far short of explanation in terms of what is best. He concedes that, alas, he too is not capable of presenting such an account here. But he can provide a second alternative, the idea that Forms are causes.

In the preface to this theory, Socrates returns to the theme of abandoning the senses and the study of material objects *directly*. He allows that he will not look at the physical objects but instead he'll study the truth about *onta* in words (ἐν λόγοις). He adds immediately that his analogy is inexact, since he does not think that by doing this he retreats more to images than were he to study the *onta* in things (ἔργους, 99d4–100a3).²¹

What is the sense of *logos* here? The generic sense is linguistic, but we can choose between statement, definition, or, more broadly, a whole connected set of statements which we might call a “theory.” I think that the plural *logoi* directs us to a connection between statements or accounts. This conjecture is supported at the next stage of the argument, the Method of Hypothesis. It is a *logos* that is hypothesized. We endeavor to understand the relation of the hypothesized *logos* to what follows, in some sense, from it, and what other *logoi* might be “above” it.²²

The hypothesized *logos* Socrates proposes to consider is the oft mentioned, familiar, almost hackneyed²³ thesis that there are Forms, i.e., the *eidos* of Cause, and old friends such as the Fair, the Good, the Large, and all the rest. From these he hopes to reveal the cause and to show that the soul is immortal (100b1–9).²⁴ The familiar doctrine is that these entities are severally *auto kath' auto* entities. Once Cebes accepts the hypothesis, the novel implication is announced:

Okay: Consider what then follows (τὰ ἔξιης ἐκείνοις), if you also accept my hypothesis. For it seems to me that if anything else is beautiful besides Beauty itself, it is beautiful on account of nothing else than because it partakes of Beauty itself. And I speak in the same way about everything else. Do you accept this sort of *aitia*? (100c3–7)²⁵

The implication of this passage is that Beauty itself is beautiful. Left open is whether anything else is. If anything else is, it is in virtue of partaking in Beauty. We have met with this sort of *aitia* in the early dialogues. New here is that heretofore the argument in the *Phaedo* has stressed that Forms are isolated from particulars. Though particulars were said to strive to be such as Forms are and to fall short, only now does Plato assign to Forms responsibility for the properties of particulars. To highlight this new step he first tags it as a *consequence* of the hypothesis that there are Forms, and then he assigns a new locution, “partaking,” to mark the relation between Forms and particulars. This is offered as an account of a quite general cause, for the *aitia* in question is the cause of coming to be and destruction in general (ὄλως).²⁶ Plato, then, does not limit the range of properties to be explained in this way.

The notion of Form as cause is elaborated in the next lines. Socrates dismisses other “wise” causes of something being beautiful such as its having a bright color, or shape, or any such. Something is beautiful because it participates in Beauty. Plato deliberately eschews specifying the nature of this relation, leaving the reader to adopt whatever expression he chooses to represent the connection between a particular and the Form of which it has a share (100d4–7). He concludes his explanation of this first consequence of the hypothesis of Forms insisting not on the word “partake,” but on the fact that all beautiful things come to be beautiful on account of the Beautiful itself—τῷ καλῷ πάντα τὰ καλὰ γίγνεται καλὰ, the dative an echo from the early dialogues. This is the safest *aitia*, indeed so safe as to be simple-minded. This pattern of safe explanation is extended to cover being large and/or larger than, and being one and two. By returning to the previous problematic cases from his autobiography, we can now appeal in the safe explanations to *aitiai* that are both necessary and sufficient.

Not much more can be said on their behalf. To be sure, there can be no counterexamples, as apparently there could (would) be were we to explain something’s beauty by appeal to bright color or shape. But these *aitiai* are so safe and simple-minded that they seem virtually nonexplanatory.²⁷ The problems ascribed to the head as an *aitia* do suggest that the *aitia* of a property F cannot itself be characterized by the opposite of F. Combined with the implication that Beauty itself is beautiful, we can infer that the Form of F is F and is not not-F, whatever sense we make of the notion of opposite here. Perhaps, then, we are meant to take away only the idea that where we have many objects alike in some particular way, we are to begin from the assumption that there is some Form responsible for their similarity. This first consequence would then introduce what is known as the One-Over-Many argument. In order to see how this hypothesis can be unpacked so as to afford a more profound explanation, it is necessary to move on to the next consequence.²⁸

The final stage of the proof of the immortality of the soul introduces a host of problems. We have to consider new, more clever *aitiai*, at least some of which seem *not* to satisfy the conditions adumbrated in the previous discussion of causes. There are pressing problems about the status of some of the items in the account, in particular whether there are Forms of Snow, Fire, Cold, Hot, Three, Odd, and Soul. Also, there is controversy over how we are to regard the talk of the large-in-us and its kin. The last stage begins with another declaration of the general utility of Forms as causes, with the additional fillip that what partakes of a Form is named after it (τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ἴσχειν, 102b1), thereby explaining the remark in the Affinity Argument that particulars and Forms are homonyms (78e2–3). We then turn back to Largeness to be told that the surface form of the statement “Simmias overtops Socrates” is misleading as to the reality of the situation. It is not in

virtue of being Simmias that this overtopping occurs, but in virtue of the tallness or size that he happens to have (102b7–c4). Simmias is also shorter than Phaedo and for the same sort of reason, the smallness he has. Thus Simmias has the eponym “small” and the eponym “large.” Socrates amplifies his point: Tallness itself never admits (προσδέχεσθαι) at the same time to be large and small, and the large-in-us does not either. When its opposite approaches, either the large-in-us yields and flees or it perishes. The particular, e.g., Socrates, can admit either opposite and remain who he is, but the property-in-us, “still being the very thing it is (ἔτι ὄν ὅπερ ἦν),” cannot (102c10–103a2).

The interruption at 103a4 from a confused, anonymous listener indicates that Socrates is forging new metaphysical machinery in this section. These forms-in-us are to be regarded as distinct from the particulars that have them. Like the Forms of which they are instances, they never admit of opposites. Less clear is whether they ultimately should be viewed as different from the Forms in which the particulars partake.²⁹ The Greek is difficult. 103b5 explicitly distinguishes the opposite in nature from the opposite in us; 103b6–c1 is less clear:

τότε μὲν γάρ, ὦ φίλε, περὶ τῶν ἐχόντων τὰ ἐναντία ἐλέγομεν, ἐπὶ-
ονομάζοντες αὐτὰ τῇ ἐκειῶν ἐπωνυμίᾳ, νῦν δὲ περὶ ἐκειῶν αὐτῶν
ὧν ἐνότων ἔχει τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν τὰ ὀνομαζόμενα . . .

Then, my friend, we were talking about the things which have opposites, calling them by their name, but now we (say) that these opposites themselves, by which being present the things named have that eponym . . .

The referent of ἐναντία (“opposites”) in b6 is not certain, and hence neither is that of ἐκειῶν (“their”) in 7. There are two issues. First, there is a temptation to treat these forms-in-us as yet another way of speaking about the participation relation. Having noted at the outset that he is not overly concerned with precisely how to *talk* about the relation of participation, but rather with the two relata, Forms and participants, it can be argued that this “in-us” talk is just a stand in for how Forms can be thought to be responsible for the properties of particulars, i.e., their genesis and destruction. Second, the canonical treatment of how both particulars and Forms can be “called the same” also admits of only two items: Forms have the *onoma*, and particulars that participate in Forms have the *eponym*. If we admit only these two items, then we would be inclined to treat the items “after whom the particulars which have the opposites are called” to be the Forms of the opposites, not the forms-in-us.

The second issue can be met with the response that the forms-in-us can also be regarded as being called by the same name as the Form, though we

will have to decide whether they are so called in virtue of having the *onoma* or the *eponym*. This decision, in turn, awaits the clarification of their ontological status. The first problem, however, is less tractable. It requires a decision about the metaphysics of the final argument as a whole, and thus a decision about general issues in Plato's Theory of Forms.

The opposites-in-us are put to use immediately. Socrates asks for and receives agreement that there is something hot and something cold, and that these are not the same as fire and snow. Snow will never admit the hot, "just as we said before, and still be the very thing it is"; rather, as heat approaches "it will yield to it or perish" (103d5–12). The reference is back to 102e8, where the topic was the small-in-us. Some would like to carry it as far back as 102c1–2, where Simmias is said to be Simmias. We can push it back to Simmias only if we decide the nature of the participating particulars.³⁰ Some take the referent of "snow" and "fire" to be material particulars and treat them as essentially what each is, i.e., snow or fire, appealing to the passage at 102c as evidence that material particulars are endowed with essential properties. They regard Simmias's being Simmias (τῷ Σιμμίῳ εἶναι) as a case of essential predication, in contrast to the accidental predication involving his largeness and smallness. Justification for this reading derives in part from the belief that it is part of the ordinary conception of the physical world that at least some particulars have natures.³¹ I shall return to this conception below. Suffice it to say that we have no clear indication as to the status of snow and fire beyond the fact that they are being included, along with form-copies and Forms, in the class of items that do not admit certain opposite properties.

The uncertainty continues in the next passage. Socrates concludes that in the case of "some of these sorts of things," not only does the Form itself have the name for all time, but anything which, though not the Form, always has its character whenever it exists (ἄνπερ ᾗ), also receives the name (103e). We have seen that form-copies qualify as items which have the character of the Form and its name. On the other hand, that we are talking about some kind of particular is supported by the temporal qualifier "whenever it exists."³² Plato moves to augment our understanding. He tells us that the odd, necessarily, always has the name which we are now speaking, i.e., "odd." But there is also something else, not identical with the odd, which it is necessary to call always by its own name *and* to call "odd," because it is so natured that it is never found apart from the odd (διὰ τὸ οὕτω πεφυκέναι ὥστε τοῦ περιτοῦ μηδέποτε ἀπολείπεσθαι). An example is the three, or threesome, and the five, and half the number series. Conversely, the two and four and so on, deserve the name "even" in a parallel manner (103e5–104b4).

The examples do not make it any easier to draw conclusions about the metaphysical status of the items under discussion. While it seems that the argument requires that Hot, Cold, Odd, and Even be Forms, because they are the "opposites" partaken of, there is no consensus about the status of the

three and two. Two and three are not opposite to each other but they respectively always have evenness and oddness, which are opposite to one another. The conclusion is again that something other than Forms will refuse to admit a quality opposite to the quality it always has, even though it is not identical to that quality. The three will perish and suffer anything else before it endures to become even *while still being three* (104b6–c9). Whether we are dealing with Form, form-copy, or set of three things remains unresolved. It is hard to fathom how anything but the last could withdraw or perish, and it is hard to see what it would be for a trio to withdraw.³³

Summary statements of the desired conclusion follow in short order, including the only phrase that clearly suggests that the Three should be considered a Form, ἡ τῶν τριῶν ἰδέα (104d1–7, esp. d5, d9–10, e7–105b3). There is a kind of item, e.g. three or snow, which never admits the opposite, even or hot, of the property which it always has, odd or cold, even though snow is not the same as cold, nor three the same as odd. There are textual difficulties with the critical first summary at 104d1–3.³⁴ The number of items needed for the argument appears to be three: something that accepts a property; the property accepted; and a second property which follows in the train of the first, as Oddness follows Threeness wherever it goes. In dispute is whether the definienda are the physical stuffs that accept the initial property or the initial property itself. (The related question would then be whether there is a third unmentioned property, the nature of the thing that accepts the Threeness, i.e. Is there a Form of Snow?) At a different level, there are problems of status: first, with respect to the properties, namely, Are they Forms or form-copies?; and second, with respect to the item, e.g., snow, Is it a Form, form-copy, or material particular?³⁵

As the argument progresses, the focus becomes the Forms and form-copies, not the physical stuffs (or numbers?). “The opposite form” at 104d9 is specified as “the Form of the Even” (104e1). A final effort at defining the class is similarly indeterminate. The Three and the Two, Oddness and Evenness are now mentioned in the same breath with the Double and The Half, The One-and-a-Half, the Third, and the Whole. Whatever the status of the objects under examination, the punch line is delivered at 105b5–c7. The new response to the question “What, whenever present in a body (σώματι), will make it hot?” is not the old, safe, and ignorant “Heat,” but the different, clever answer “Fire”; what makes it ill is not Illness, but Fever; and what, when present to a number, makes it odd is not Oddness, but Oneness.³⁶

The kinds of properties are expanded in the last two paragraphs (104e7–105c7). It may be that Plato is expanding the range of Forms to include Illness itself and the Half itself. Whatever we make of this possibility, the new explanations are reminiscent of the earlier scientific ones where the target explanandum is explained by something other than itself. But it does not follow that we have here a new “theory of explanation” designed to replace

the original safe account. First, the *aitiai* now cited are not necessary conditions for their explananda: not all Illness is explained by Fever, or all Cold by Snow. Indeed, the new clever explanations leave themselves open to the charge that they violate the old prohibition that no opposite can be the cause of something if its opposite could also be the cause; colds as well as fevers can make one ill. The appeal to these sufficient factors also undercuts the logical or constitutive answer to the “What makes X F?” questions. These factors are *aitiai* of the efficient variety. They even have the flavor of material causes, assuming for the moment that Fever and Fire are best construed as material causes.

But the failure to specify the nature of these factors is reason to be wary. What is critical is the general distinction between an occupying item, its attendant opposite, and the excluded opposite. The lack of precision about the status of the occupying item is, I think, best understood to be a function of the ultimate goal of the argument, the nature of the soul. Plato tips his hand by specifying the body as that to which things like Heat, Fever, and Illness are present. The soul is present to the body. It is neither material nor a Form. Nonetheless, like Threeness or Illness, soul is treated as a “property” that occupies a body.

It seems obvious from the last stage of the argument concerning the soul that we must here be dealing with individual souls. It will do Socrates no good to learn that the Soul itself is immortal. He wants to argue that his soul, and each ensouled creature’s soul, is immortal.³⁷ Whatever we make of this final argument for immortality, the question is whether we can view the relation between soul and body as strictly parallel to that between Forms and bodies so as to draw reliable conclusions about the status of Forms, form-copies, and perhaps even Three, Snow, Fire, and such.

The soul is present to a body. This is a version of the occupation, possession, or seizing metaphor encountered throughout this section. Hence, a soul is like a form-copy or Form. It enlivens what it occupies, so that we can say that it brings life. Life is here treated as a property that has an opposite, Death. This makes the soul parallel to three, and leaves Life and Death equivalent to Odd and Even. Rephrased, this amounts to the claim that Soul is not what Life itself is but it always has life. (Or, adding individual souls, perhaps the claim is that an individual soul has life, so long as it exists.) When we bring in the body, it is less easy to see how the soul occupies the body in a manner analogous to how snow, *assuming it is a Form or form-copy*, occupies its body. There is no explanation of what snow is, or what fire is. Snow might be construed as water or air of some sort, just as (perhaps) fire could be earth or wood of some sort; things are after all “on fire” and fire can leave them. Maybe things can be “ensnowed” in a parallel manner. This might allow these bodies to have their own character, regardless of whether it is an essential character, and to become snowy or fiery. Only in this way can I see

a parallel with the way in which soul occupies body.³⁸ The body, if you will, in each case can lose its soul, fire, and snow. In each case we will have to decide whether we will admit into the ontology new items, soul, or fire, and snow. What does not seem an option is to try to reduce snow and fire, or soul, to body occupied in a certain manner by hot (and dry), or cold, or life. For this would destroy the possibility that souls are immortal.

The parallel between snow and soul is also sustained by the similar ambiguity, almost a studied ambiguity, throughout the entire discussion over whether Plato is discussing a Form or an instance of the Form, or something that is *sui generis*. There is no mention of a Form of Soul. And even were we to posit such a Form, we would have to reintroduce *individual* souls into the discussion. What is problematic is that we are tempted to posit a nature for soul, as well as for snow and fire. First, there is the fact that snow and soul are not assigned opposites and are assigned other properties for which there do seem to be Forms, namely Life and Death, Cold and Hot. There is the talk to the effect that something could not remain snow and be hot. Hence, we would be following at least scholarly tradition and the force of the argument of the earlier dialogues were we to assign an essence to things like snow and soul. Then the dispute would be whether or not to infer that where there is essence, there is a Form, namely Snow itself and Soul itself. Those who think that particulars have essences in Plato are tempted to accept that snow and soul are endowed with essential properties, just as Simmias seemed so endowed. Unfortunately, the parallel between soul, Simmias, and snow breaks down at this juncture. We have to assume that in all three cases, the respective essences are the species, soul, snow, and human. But the critical passage at 102c does not say Simmias remains a human, or any phrase concerning human. Rather it simply refers to his being Simmias. This is hard to do for snow, all of which seems generically alike. Soul introduces a further complication, since we have no handle on the notion of what it is to be soul, let alone a way to consider the question of whether there is the possibility (for Plato) of deciding whether there is an essence or nature of each *individual* soul.

The second source of temptation is, I think, our inability to determine the status of Threeness and the other numbers. Here there is the mention of a Form. If there is the Form of Three, then there should be a Form of Snow, of Fire, and of Soul. Whatever these Forms occupy, if they are occupiers, is an individual soul, a threesome, and fiery, as long as it lasts. (We leave open the possibility that what occupies is a form-copy). Insofar as there are occupied bodies, then these bodies may lose the properties specified, and their attendant opposites, provided that the body does not acquire the opposite in another respect from another source. The relationship then is fundamentally between occupier—soul, snow, threeness—and other properties—oddness, cold, and living. The final argument then will turn on the introduction to the equation of another property, imperishability. This commences with the

counterfactual reasoning at 105e10ff., and concludes with the claim that soul, because it is imperishable, must “go away.” Since we want a conclusion about individual souls, the subject of the counterfactuals is sometimes viewed as individual instances of the Forms of Snow, Fire, and Threeness. These would go away and not perish, were they imperishable.

If the subjects are form-copies, then we would need to make sense of the possibility that they go away or perish. Those who see only Forms and particulars here think that perishing is the destruction of the material particular and, a fortiori, its failure to partake any longer in any Form. Going away would be the perdurance of the particular after it has lost a property and acquired another. Conversely, it is Forms that have the properties forever. This is to say that now Forms for Plato stand in a complex relationship with other properties. Threeness is both three and odd, and it can never lose its oddness. Trios, on the other hand, can lose their threeness and hence their oddness, though not of course as long as they are trios. One of our cows could stop to graze leaving only a duo; the snow could melt. These explanations, it should be recognized, really only account for one-half of our metaphor. It is much harder to conceive of any of the trios or snows yielding or withdrawing. Equally difficult is an explanation for what it would be for the form-copy to withdraw. Perishing perhaps can be countenanced as the destruction of the heat-in-fire when the particular log is doused and the fire is quenched. The loss of a property would then be the perishing of a form-copy. The withdrawal of a form-copy, however, is rather mysterious, unless one conceives of these form-copies as going elsewhere. The Forms themselves can neither withdraw nor perish. So once more we are left with a hard-to-explain phenomenon, except in the case of soul. Here we can say what it would be for a soul to perish and what it would be for it to withdraw without perishing. It withdraws if it remains the very thing that it is, a soul, when it separates from the body. It perishes, were it capable of perishing, by going out of existence. The metaphor, I suggest, is proleptic and affords us little insight into the nature of these other items. These final arguments of the *Phaedo* thus offer us much to think about, but little in the way of conclusive evidence about the nature of particulars and form-copies. The nature of souls and the global aim of the dialogue complicate any reconstruction of the middle period metaphysics of Forms and particulars. Before attempting that task, let us consider what can be learned from the *Republic*.

SECTION TWO

The Republic

The *Phaedo* offers the first clear evidence of a doctrine of Forms. Forms are grasped by reasoning alone, not the senses. They are *auto kath' auto* or self-sufficient entities; each is what it is in its own right. They are the sole bearers

of *ousia* and they are immaterial and divine. They cannot seem other than they are and they are not subject to change. They are in some sense related to sensible particulars, which are said to participate in Forms, but particulars are deficient, imperfect, and striving to be like Forms. Moreover, Forms may be somehow related to other Forms or properties, e.g., Threeness to Oddness. Left unspecified is the range of Forms. We find language and arguments that imply a wide range of Forms, for instance a Form for every shared property, or a Form wherever there is need to explain the coming into being and loss of properties. On the other hand, when we examine the actual Forms used in arguments, or in whose “existence” an argument concludes, they are largely limited in kind at least to what scholars refer to as incomplete properties, properties such as Largeness, Justice, and Equality. Before trying to evaluate those arguments, and before offering my own reconstruction of the theory of Forms, let us consider some critical passages in the *Republic*. They are of unparalleled persuasive force in Plato’s campaign to show that there are Forms.³⁹

The central books of the *Republic* are designed to illustrate the education which will produce a philosopher-ruler in order that she might best rule an ideal polis. She will rule on the basis of her knowledge of Forms. An interpreter of the *Republic* must therefore decide how he thinks Plato views the relation between Forms and the sensible world, at least to explain why knowledge of the former helps one to understand the latter. One possibility is that while Forms are the foundational or basic objects of knowledge, knowledge of Forms permits one to know other things, e.g., states of affairs in the polis.⁴⁰ Another option is to deny that there are objects of knowledge beyond Forms, arguing instead that knowledge of Forms merely ensures that the philosopher-ruler will have better beliefs about the states of affairs, where “better” means that she will have more true beliefs, or keener insights into people’s behavior and motivations. The question then is how Forms, physical particulars, and epistemic states are related to one another?

I limit my examination to two key arguments, the argument of Book V to show that the objects of knowledge and belief are distinct (473c11–480a), and the argument in Book VII concerning studies that “summon the mind” (523ff.), though this will include some remarks on the analogies of the Line and Cave.

If Socrates is to show that the just life is the best life, he must exhibit the nature of the ideal polis and the nature of its philosopher-ruler. By the end of Book V (471ff.), the challenge is to show how the ideal polis can come into being. Socrates declares that the ideal polis can arise only when philosophers come to power, a thesis which, he is certain, will provoke a third, and greatest, wave of criticism.⁴¹ The defense begins with a definition of the philosopher. The philosopher will be one who loves wisdom *tout court* (475b4–9). Glaucon claims that this definition will allow many strange types to be

philosophers. They include lovers of spectacles and lovers of sounds who delight in learning something, though they willingly never spend time in serious discussions and arguments. Rather, they run around from locale to locale viewing and listening to performances and learning little crafts and such. Socrates demurs. To explain what he takes to be the difference between this group and real philosophers, he returns to the doctrine of Forms, with which he assumes Glaucon is familiar.⁴² There are Forms of Beauty and Ugliness, Justice and Injustice, each itself one, though each appears many owing to their interaction with actions, bodies, and one another. The lover of sights and sounds differs from the philosopher in that he delights in fair voices, colors, shapes, and products made from them, and in that their thought cannot see and delight in the nature of the Beautiful itself. These folk are likened to dreamers, who think a likeness not a likeness but the thing which it resembles (476c6–7). The philosopher, on the other hand, thinks that there is Beauty itself and he is able to see both it and the things that partake of it, and he does not confuse the partakers for Beauty itself. The former's mental state we would correctly label "opinion," the latter's "knowledge." The ensuing argument addresses the philodoxer who grows angry at the claim that he merely has beliefs, not knowledge. The argument is supposed to "appease him" and gently persuade him, all the while hiding from him that he is sick (476d8–e2). The language is that of rhetorical persuasion, not logical deduction. Nowhere are there indications that certain premises are precluded because they beg questions or because they would not meet with acceptance on the part of the philodoxers. They are sick, after all, and their deliverances may not be regarded as right headed to begin with.⁴³

Plato then sets out to show that the philodoxer lacks what the philosopher has, knowledge. Both concede that there is knowledge. Socrates immediately infers that there is something known. "What is not" is excluded from being the object of knowledge and then is said to be completely unknowable. Conversely, what completely is (τὸ παντελῶς ὄν) is said to be completely knowable. No attention is drawn to the adverb. Next Plato posits an intermediary: if there is anything such that it both is and is not, it would be intermediate between what purely is and what in no way is. It is then argued that over each of these three kinds of objects is their own respective mental state: over what in no way is, is ignorance; over what completely or purely is, is knowledge; and over what is and is not, is belief.

The objects of knowledge are Forms.⁴⁴ The pure being of 477a7 recalls the *Phaedo* (and *Symposium*), and the difficult "is and is not" seems to describe the participants in the Forms, the sensible particulars whose status is somehow deficient. The deficiency is now characterized as being between being and not-being, or equivalently, both being and not-being. At this stage in the argument there is no reason for the philodoxers to disagree. They will think that what completely is, are the very items that they view and hear and

discuss, the ordinary sensible particulars. They can thus ignore the strange characterizations of the other two kinds of objects.

The next stage has Glaucon agree that knowledge and belief are distinct faculties or powers, *dunamis*. Distinction of faculties is based on two criteria: distinct faculties have different objects, and each works differently on its objects.⁴⁵ The faculty of knowledge is set over being and knows it as it is (478a6, cf. 477b10–11). Belief, since it is agreed to differ from knowledge, must then have a distinct object. Hence, since knowledge is set over what is, belief cannot be. Note that the adverbs “completely” and “purely” have been dropped in the transition from the beginning to this stage, perhaps to be replaced by knowing being how it is or that it is [ὡς ἔχει or ὡς ἔστι τὸ ὄν]. Since belief is thought to be between ignorance and knowledge in respect of clarity, and since it has as its object neither what is nor what is not, the posited intermediate object, what is and is not, is assigned to belief.

What then is the force of these specifications of the objects of knowledge and belief? The philodoxer is reintroduced at this point. He denies that there is Beauty itself, i.e., an idea of Beauty itself that always holds in the same way and in the same respect. He believes in the many beautiful things (479a1–5). He is challenged to say whether any of these many beautiful things will fail to appear ugly, and so on, for the other properties, just, pious, double, large and small, heavy and light. “Is then each of these many things more than it is not that which anyone might call it?” (479b9–10). These many beautifuls are said to be ambiguous (ἐπαμφοτερίζειν): we cannot firmly conceive any of them to be or not be, to be both or neither (καὶ οὐτ’ εἶναι οὔτε μὴ εἶναι οὐδὲν αὐτῶν δυνατόν παγίως νοῆσαι οὔτε ἀμφοτέρα οὔτε οὐδέτερον).⁴⁶ Finally we are told that “the many opinions (τὰ πολλὰ νόμματα) about the beautiful and the rest roll about between pure being and not-being” (479b11–d1). These are the objects of belief. Those who see them and fail to see Beauty itself, and are incapable of being led to see it, are the philodoxers, who, *ex argumentis*, can have only belief, not knowledge (479d3–e5).

The description of the objects of the philodoxers, the many beautifuls, is the familiar Phaedan formula of what will (inevitably) appear as ugly. The verb φαίνομαι (479a7, b2, b4, d1) is ambiguous between appear and be, versus merely appear. The other idioms suggest that we are to view these objects as actually *being both beautiful and ugly*, as opposed to merely seeming to observers to be so without any commitment to the truth of the observation. However, at the end of the argument when Socrates recapitulates its progress (479d3–5), it is the many beliefs (πολλὰ νόμματα)⁴⁷ about the objects that seem to be problematic. It is unclear why we find this language here. The sentiment of the argument appears to be that the many beautiful objects will engender in observers, i.e., the philodoxers, different beliefs about their qualities, and differing assessments by different observers of the beauty of a given object. So, for instance, one person can think that a given painting is beautiful, a second person that it is ugly, or the same person can find it

beautiful when compared to the other paintings in the gallery, but ugly when compared to the other works of the same artist. Troubling on this account is that we should conclude from our distinct opinions that there is something peculiar about the way these objects are, i.e., that they should be said to be and not be. If we seek a completion for the phrase “be and not be,” it seems that the most accurate would be “able to cause conflicting beliefs in observers.” But then the contrast would have to be with objects that are not capable of causing conflicting beliefs in observers. This has not been claimed for the objects of knowledge. Perhaps, though, what it is to be perfectly or completely knowable just is for something not to be subject to, or to cause, conflicting beliefs in observers. But the philodoxers seem to gainsay this contention, for they think that Beauty itself is not.

There is no way to fix the meaning of the phrase “the many beliefs of the many about the beautiful.” The sight lovers believe that there are many beautiful things (479a3). There is no indication, however, that they offer *accounts* of what makes things beautiful. Certainly they do not think that *there is one thing* that, in virtue of its beautifying capacity, is beauty or makes things beautiful. The argument up to 479 is perfectly acceptable to them, since they think that they know what each thing is, namely each beautiful poem, tragedy, or artwork. The sudden announcement that each of their fair things is also ugly, or capable of appearing ugly, is unsupported by argument. While Glaucon and other Platonists can readily agree, it certainly would not find a welcome reception among the philodoxers. I infer, then, that Plato is *not* trying here to present an argument that would compel their assent from its logical force. Rather, we have here the beginning of an argument, to the effect that there is a distinction that Plato wants to secure in order to show what the philosophical ruler will have to understand.

We can say more about the nature of the objects that are to serve, generically speaking, as objects of belief and knowledge. We see that Plato is prepared to move from the ontological security of the Form as an *auto kath auto on* that always holds in the same way, to the claim that one knows it as it holds. In calling it a thing “which completely is,” and linking this with “complete knowledge,” and perhaps unmistakability, one can know such an item when one knows what it is, i.e., its essence. Whether this is the only thing one can know about a Form is not said. Hence it is not said whether knowing something completely is to know *all* there is to know about the thing. The argument leaves the objects of belief equally obscure. The sense of the “is and is not” is usually taken to be existential or predicative. If it is the former, then each thing would somehow exist and not exist. This has proven to be a difficult notion to wrap one’s mind about: what would it mean to both be and not be, or, conversely in the case of Forms, to just be superlatively? Degrees of existence, or a distinction between existence and subsistence, are unpalatable notions.

The preferred reading⁴⁸ takes the “is” to be predicative, at least of a sort.

The predicative interpretation of the objects of knowledge treats Forms as being what they are, where this means either that Beauty, for instance, is a beautiful object—perhaps superlatively beautiful—or as an identity claim, to the effect that Beauty is identical with Beauty. In either case, since here we do not have other properties ascribed to Beauty, we can consider the object to be just beautiful or just identical with beauty. On the latter reading, the Form need not *have* any property at all, that is, it need not be a beautiful item. The difficulties for the predicative reading arise in its treatment of the objects of belief. What would it be for something to be beautiful and not-beautiful, or large and not-large? One option is to claim that items fail to be beautiful in some respect and succeed at it in another. But this possibility seems itself to rely on an implausible thesis to the effect that for any property, each physical thing will seem in some respect to fail to have that property while at the same time possessing it in some respect.

Talk of respects and times is something we add to the text. Though we have at least seven descriptions of the in-between state of being and not-being, only in one (478d5) do we find the temporal qualification “at the same time”: εἴ τι φανεῖν οἶον ἅμα ὄν τε καὶ μὴ ὄν. Typically either there is no qualification, or Plato is very hesitant to say how something can be and not be, just as he was guarded in speaking precisely about participation in the *Phaedo*. The fact that it is between being and not-being then could mean that something is at different times beautiful and at other times not-beautiful, or generally that at times it is some way and at other times not that way, for any property we might ascribe to that thing. So, we might rule out such an object as knowable on the grounds that it changes properties and wait to see whether there is some property such that a physical object of a certain type cannot lose it. This reading does not preclude that in the case of certain properties an object will seem simultaneously beautiful and not-beautiful because viewed in different respects, comparisons or by different people. It merely leaves open how we are to regard the mysterious status of being and not-being. It respects the adumbrative character of these initial pages about the philosopher. We know only that the objects of belief and knowledge differ and how we should generically describe that difference. The details await.

Book VII

A second discussion of properties that seems to address the notion of being and not-being is found in Book VII (521cff.). Socrates has just finished the analogy of the Cave and has declared that the philosophical ruler must give up contemplating the Good and other Forms and return to “the cave” to rule. The search begins for a study capable of drawing the soul from “be-

coming” to “being.” Gymnastic and music proper are rejected. But since there is nothing really outside these domains, Socrates settles on a science that bears on them and all the other *technai*, *dianoiai*, and *epistemai*, the science of number and calculation. This is branded as a study which by nature leads to *noesis*, that is, draws one towards *ousia* in every way. On the other hand, there are studies which do not effect this turning (ἀγωγή, 523a1–8). To illustrate this distinction Socrates claims that some of the items occurring in perceptions do not summon *noesis* to reflection (ἐπίσχεψις), on the grounds that they are sufficiently judged by *aisthesis*, whereas others in every way summon *noesis* to reflect, on the grounds that *aisthesis* does nothing sound (523a10–b4).

This initial description thus concerns one example of circumstances wherein one can describe the difference between things that naturally summon intellect and things that do not. It marks off neither the only circumstances where this occurs nor even the first occasion. Moreover, Plato does not claim that perception is the best epistemic state about those things that are “sufficiently decided by perception.” One can also know them.

A subject is a nonsummoner in that it does not result in “opposite *aisthesis* at the same time.” Conversely, those that do are summoners, “whenever the sense perception does not point to one thing rather than its opposite, whether its object be near or far” (Grube, 523b9–c4).⁴⁹ An instance is provided by consideration of what we say are three fingers, the smallest, second, and middle. We are to assume that they are viewed at close range (523c8–9).⁵⁰ Here each finger will appear similarly and not differ qua finger, whether seen in the middle or extreme, seen as black or white, thick or thin, or any such. “In all this the soul of the many is not compelled to ask the intelligence what a finger is—a *ti esti* question. For the sense of sight does not indicate to it that the finger is the opposite of a finger” (523d3–6). (Since I cannot figure out what the opposite of a finger could be, I take the sense of τοῦναντίον [523d6] to be that it is not a finger.) This sense perception would not summon or awaken reason. But sight does not see sufficiently the largeness and smallness, and here it does make a difference where it is seen (middle or end). The same is true of the sense of touch: set over by necessity both the hard and the soft, the sense announces to the soul that it is perceiving the same (thing) to be hard and soft. In such a case the soul is at a loss as to what the sense signals that hardness is, if it says that the same (thing) is soft. The same is true of the heavy and light. These indications are strange and beg for reflective consideration.

It is likely then, I said, that in these cases first the soul attempts, calling upon reckoning and intelligence, to consider reflectively whether each of these things being reported is one or two. Then if they appear to be two, each of them appears to be one and different. If then each appears

to be one, and both two, then the mind will think them as separated, for were they not separate, it would not be thinking them to be two but one. Sight, we say however, thought great and small not as separated but as confused together. *Noesis* is needed to clarify this, to see them as separate, not confused, the opposite of sight, and from this circumstance it first comes to us to ask what is the large and the small. (524b3–524 c11)

Now the question is whether into this group of summoners should go one and every number. The answer is yes, since in the case of one and every number we see the same thing, at the same time, as one and infinite in number (525a3–5). This return to mathematics is abrupt. It is also somewhat odd. The previous cases had all concerned items closely connected to the senses such as hardness and softness, light and heavy, and large and small. They do not seem to be the proper objects of any science or study. Perhaps the connection is to be forged through the notion of measurement, since we can use scales and measuring rods to answer questions about them. Moreover, we are not given any defense of the claim that we see the same thing as one and many, let alone infinite. The circumstances surrounding these perceptual reports must be manipulated in order to make plausible the claim that we see the same thing as large and small, namely we have to blinker the perceiver from thinking comparatively. Plato's aim is to get us to mathematics as quickly as possible, not to offer a detailed account of perception.

Even if we can construct the scenario so that the result is the postulation of that small number of Forms that always or often simultaneously yield a opposite sensory report, we cannot stop there. The argument of Book VII continues after the introduction of number to embrace mathematics as one of those studies that summon the intellect. Socrates also embraces geometry, solid geometry, astronomy, and, finally, dialectic. These disciplines also study the intelligible as opposed to the visual or perceptible. But in their cases the contrast between visual and intelligible seems to concern objects, as opposed to properties such as hardness and heaviness. The language of image and reality comes to dominate, and for good reason: the last pages of the central books return to the theme that the whole of the physical cosmos is pallid and ghostly compared to the intelligible realm. There remains nary a hint that the sensible world is all right, provided that one not concentrate on the nefarious properties like size and weight. What starts out as a confusion of properties in a thing slowly becomes a condemnation of the things themselves, their properties, and their relations with one another. The idea that somehow problematical are only those properties mentioned in the first illustrative, or perhaps etiological, example of a study that stimulates the mind ignores what follows.⁵¹ In all cases the whole of the physical world and our

sensible contact with it are diminished while the intelligible realm and knowledge are elevated. The contrast between the secure perceptual judgments and the insecure summoners is then only temporary. It is drawn from within the perceptual order, by one either dwelling in the visible realm, or by an occupant of the upper portion of the line looking down. The philosophical inhabitant of the topmost part of the line, however, thinks that all perceptual judgments are unable to say about anything what it is, including what is a finger or a size. *Noesis* alone can do this.

The end of Book VII thus recalls the analogies of the Line and Cave. I want to emphasize two features of the analogies. First and foremost, the reader is offered a picture in which there is a succession of relations, all of which are *images of* something else. The sense of “is and is not,” left unspecified from earlier in Book V, is now developed in a manner rather different from what we encountered in the *Phaedo* (or in some interpretations of Books V and VII).⁵² Once we enter the analogies of the Line and Cave, the whole of the physical cosmos is called into question, both the particulars themselves and their properties.

The second feature is that the Form of the Good occupies pride of place among the Forms and is described in terms that force the reader to conclude that all Forms or intelligibles somehow have a share of it. I shall consider in subsequent chapters in what ways it is possible for Forms to enjoy a relationship with another Form.⁵³

If the end of Book V is a prolegomenon, then it is prologue to these analogies. The analogies have more persuasive or emotional force than argumentative power. Once again we have reason to recall the language of 476e1–2: Plato will try to *assuage or bewitch* his opponent. Their foundation is that the entire sensible realm is but a copy or image of the intelligible realm. There is no real effort to dissect the fashion in which anything could be called a realm, nor is there any more than a cursory effort to find regularities in the physical world. A fortiori, there is little in the way of an attempt to explain relations between Forms, even in the fashion of the *Phaedo*. The only indication that there is an ordered realm of Forms, besides the role of the Good, is the fact that we can know these Forms and that we are still countenancing sciences as a way of knowing. Even this is controversial since it can be claimed that sciences such as geometry do not have Forms for their objects. If this is right, there would be Forms of geometrical objects appropriately analogous to the objects or images studied by geometers.⁵⁴ If there are sciences whose objects are Forms, then it is reasonable to suppose that there are truths—theorems—relating kinds of Forms to each other. When properly worked out, there would be a series of laws relating properties to other properties, connected to one another in a way similar to the axiomatic structure of geometry. In addition, there is the notion that the ethical and political Forms, if there are any, should somehow be related to one another.

For the philosophical ruler will have to know how they are related to be in a position to rule the state better than anyone else.

The Forms themselves are the anchor for the philosophic spirit. Book VI opens with a description of the true philosopher, the reputed philosopher, and the difficulties faced by the philosophic spirit in contemporary locales. The implicit contrast remains that between the lovers of sights and sounds and the (true) lover of wisdom, and the differences in objects are now seen to reflect a difference in desire, virtue, and moral character. The foundation of the philosopher's knowledge and character is the Form of the Good. It is the greatest object of study and in virtue of their relation to it just actions and everything else become useful and beneficial. The contrast between the Good and the other Forms is sufficient to justify the claim that the Good is *primus inter pares*. The inability to say what the Good is prompts Socrates to turn to the three great analogies of Sun, then Line, and finally Cave. In each analogy there is, again, a wholesale discrimination between the visible and believable world of sense and matter and the intelligible world of Forms. The Good is to the intelligible as the Sun is to the opinable and sensible. On the basis of the previous argument about the different objects of different faculties, we can conclude that there is no knowledge of the physical world and there are no beliefs about Forms. With the two worlds separated in Sun, Line provides sharper images of the distinct realms and some clues as to their interrelations.

In Line, the physical world is split into two parts, the object(s) of *pistis*, conviction, and the object(s) of *eikasia*, "imagistic." The former is comprised of the ordinary furniture of the material world, e.g., beds, trees, rocks, and people, while the latter consists of shadows, and images on water or in mirrors. The contrast is between original and image. Central to the contrast is the difference in matter, or the absence of matter entirely in the case of the images. Shadows and images in water are insubstantial; and while a painting of a man or a statue of a horse is substantial, their matter is of a different sort from that of humans or horses.

The relation between the bottom part of the line to that of the top is also that of *image of*. This time, however, Plato reverses the difference in matter between image and model. The models in the topmost segment are *immaterial*. But whereas the immaterial shadows and images had to have a medium in which to be, e.g., water or air, the Forms, which are the models of the material particulars in the realm of *pistis*, i.e., the physical objects of everyday intercourse, do not require a medium. They are "outside" of matter and space. Existing in "logical space," Forms are grasped by dialectic which comes to its conclusion, the unhypothetical first principle, using nothing in any way sensible—*αἰσθητῶ παντάπασιν οὐδενὶ προσχρώμενος*—but using Forms themselves, (going) through Forms themselves and to them, arrives at

Forms as conclusions of its reasoning—ἀλλ' εἶδεσιν αὐτοῖς δι' αὐτῶν εἰς αὐτά, καὶ τελευτᾷ εἰς εἶδη (511c1–2).

The bottom section of the intelligible portion of Line has long been the locus of controversy.⁵⁵ We are told that the soul at this stage uses as images what before were models. This means that its objects in some sense are nothing but the geometrical or physical objects of *pistis*, e.g., wooden squares and such. The geometers try to make their claims not about the drawn or crafted geometrical objects, but about the Square itself and the Diameter itself. These items seem to be nothing but the mathematical Forms which live in the uppermost segment of the line (510d–e). If this is right, then the fundamental difference between the objects in the lower section and the Forms in the upper section of the intelligible portion seems to be one of method or pedigree. On the one hand, the geometer is using the material object but not thinking about it as a material object. Rather, he treats it as “demattered,” as merely a geometrical figure. Furthermore, geometers make hypotheses about the relation of these figures to one another. Insofar, then, as they do not secure the hypotheses, and since they are not in a position to consider the geometrical images, i.e., the dematerialized figures, in their own right apart from the material triangles from which they started, they are not yet thinking about the Forms themselves. They are trying or striving to reach the Forms themselves considered by themselves, but they are still falling short.

It seems to me to be impossible to determine what Plato ultimately thinks is the metaphysical status of these objects of *dianoia*. They remain relational beings, both in origin and in their dependence on “hypotheses.” It is easy to see them as just the physical objects considered in a special way, but that conflicts with the criterion of faculty differentiation. They are, therefore, better regarded as dematerialized images of those objects. Exactly what more we can say is beyond the scope of this metaphor. Perhaps Cave will shed more light.

The Cave presents peculiar problems. A chief one is that the average citizen of the state, the present-day polis if not the ideal state being crafted, is assigned a seat in the lowest of the four stages. In Cave this is exemplified by the chained inhabitants staring at a series of images on a cave wall. These are projected from behind them by a fire and result from the carrying of carved images of horses, men, and such by others—those in control?—in the cave. The projected images have a certain order and regularity and they are taken by each of the prisoners to be what there is. The prisoners can talk and hear one another so disputes arise over what has, is, and will happen, i.e., what appears on the wall before them. Following this first stage, a prisoner is freed from his bonds and can see the fire, parapet, carriers, and statues. He is then compelled to ascend to the surface, where again he is blinded by the light,

unable to see a “single one of the things which are now said to be true” (516a2–3). He would have to look first at shadows and reflections of men and other things. Then he could look at the things responsible for the shadows and images, and finally he could turn his gaze skyward to look at the light of the celestial bodies and ultimately the sun itself.

This familiar story reinforces the divisions in Line and illustrates anew the multiple *image* of relationships at work in Plato’s metaphysics. Here the physical objects visible to the sojourner once above ground, with the sun supreme among them, are equivalent to the Forms. Everything else is an *image* of these material particulars. There are the reflections of Rocky Raccoon in the water and shadows of him. These are equivalent to the dematerialized objects of *dianoia*. In the cave there are the figures carried by the controllers, carved statues of Rocky and his friends. These enmattered images are equivalent to the objects of *pistis*, the ordinary material objects as portrayed in Line. And finally there are the shadows of these sculpted figures on the wall, equivalent to the objects of *eikasia*. The reflections in the water and on the wall are both dematerialized. They also differ in that the latter is itself an *image of an image* of the Form. Both the carved figures and the reflections in the water are merely images of the physical object, in this metaphor equivalent to the Form. Here then we can locate a difference between the objects of *dianoia* and those of *pistis* as a function of the latter’s matter and the former’s lack of it. Converting back to the language of the Line, it seems that the immaterial image that is the object of *dianoia* is certainly more tractable intellectually, and we can infer that this increased tractability is a function of its demattered state.

We began this section on the *Republic* by rehearsing the exchange between Socrates and the lovers of sights and sounds. Throughout the ensuing books we meet these people, or their ilk, and never are they treated in a flattering manner. The lovers deny that there are Forms and instead think that what is beautiful are just the objects that they meet up with in their constant travel about town. They are always prepared to regard something new as beautiful, or not, and quick to offer any excuse for why it is so regarded. In fact, they are not in the habit of offering such accounts, but rather do so only when pressed. Like the majority of the cave dwellers, they are not prone to reflection about their beliefs. The key to the successive stages of the Line and Cave is not just that there is a series of objects and corresponding mental faculties, but that each is connected to the one below it by further reflection upon objects and their attendant faculties. Even, or especially, when we consider the lowest state and its perspectival fixity, we can see that the move from images to the models of which the images are images, is a move from two-dimensional to three-dimensional “contents.”

The moves beyond the second to the third, and finally from the third to the fourth and highest stage, are also prompted by further reflection and

looking at the objects in a different light/way. The recognition that the material objects are responsible for the shadows and reflections is an insight into the causal chain. But this is not so much an interest in the causal mechanisms. While the sun is mentioned, as is the water in some cases, Plato offers us nothing about surfaces, reflective optics, or the nature of light. (There is no reason to doubt that at this stage in his career he was familiar enough with these studies to explain what causes reflections in water. The Cave alone is sufficient evidence.) There also seems to be little emphasis on the similarity of qualities. Reflections in water often preserve colors and shapes in a remarkably realistic way, but here at least Plato ignores the similarities. Instead, the “causal” concern remains broadly logical: shadows and reflections are not simply images, but are images of (this) man, (this) horse etc., in *virtue of the relation they bear to their models*. Their nature qua image is then a function of the nature of their model.

When we examine the transition from the second to the third stage, a transition marked as the move from the visible to the intelligible, we have a clear case of the selectivity of perception. What guides the selection of properties is the geometer’s interest in just those aspects of the object that are broadly speaking geometrical. This seems to be a top-down interest. The focus on the Square itself, or the Diameter itself, or even the notion that we treat the former models as images, is due to the decision of the observer/geometer to think about what he is seeing qua geometrical object. If we take seriously the claim that these former models are now images, then they can only be images of Forms, and hence we might think that the Forms are themselves guiding the selective process, dimly present to the geometer’s consciousness. If Forms do guide the process, then there is little reason to expect that efficient causal mechanisms are in play. There is nothing about the manufacturing process, or how we draw, that prompts the intellectual turn. Of interest could only be what we draw, the “What is it?” question which motivated the initial search for definitions and knowledge. If this is a reflective activity, then we are in a position to understand what Plato means by his talk of hypotheses. The assumptions of the geometer are not merely the unproven and unprovable axioms of geometry, i.e., that angles are such or points and circles are so-and-so. Also assumed is that we are to consider something just as a geometrical object. This serves to distinguish this first intellectual stage from the stage of *pistis*, because *pistis* is not even a reflective stage. We just take for granted what we see, at least insofar as we fail to ask what it is to be a thing of a certain kind, or fail to isolate certain features from others in order to better investigate each. When we then turn from the third to the highest stage of the line, from *dianoia* to *nous*, we are considering the objects of the special science as no longer confined to their special science but generally. We seek to know something about the status accepted by each of the *dianoetic* sciences, namely what it is for something to be. This

is captured by the *auto kath auto* formula of the *Phaedo* and rephrased as *what is completely* in Book V. All ties to the material model from which the geometer started are severed and we focus exclusively on the geometrical image, now considered in this reflective act as an image of something, namely the Form.

At this point, then, in the sixth and seventh books, we are engaged in a rational reconstruction of what the finished ontological and epistemological doctrines are that will justify Plato's thesis that philosopher-rulers are necessary for the existence of the ideal state. The opening stage at the end of Book CS33,39V can thus be seen as laying the groundwork for the metaphorical presentation of what the ruler will know and why he will be superior to anyone else when it comes to ruling the state. The fact that all the elements below the Forms are logically and explanatorily dependent on them ensures that she will have greater awareness of their behavior and nature than the nonphilosopher. Until 523 then, Plato is engaged in describing the knowledge of the philosophical ruler. He is not giving an account of what prompts or causes the ruler to go reflective, to turn from the unreflective acceptance of ordinary experience to the reflective effort of trying to understand what he until moments ago was convinced of. The importance of the finger passage at the end of Book VII is that it shows what might occasion the right person to reflect, that is, to summon the mind to further inquiry into what he sees and hears. I indicated above that I do not consider the focus on the primary and secondary sensibles important in itself. Plato's goal is to get to number and mathematics, not to found an argument about what Forms there are. The study of number is especially suitable because numbers are immaterial and the relations between the numbers are necessary, as opposed to relations between the properties of physical objects. The sciences isolated in the procession to dialectic are marked as the best or most conducive to philosophical development. They are not said to be the only sciences, nor are they said to be what alone a prospective philosopher should study. But the dialectical study of the Forms is the pinnacle of all studies. In the next section, I want to offer my view of what that might reveal about Forms and particulars.

SECTION THREE

Being and Participation

In the middle period dialogues Plato nowhere attempts to detail a Theory of Forms or an account of particulars. The successive arguments of the *Phaedo* are our best guide. But in the end, readers are left with a confusing array of items and relations based on a "Hypothesis," all of whose implications Plato has yet to work out, at least for public consumption. We must try, then, to

reconstruct his middle period metaphysics from a rather limited base. Unsurprisingly, the result is disagreement about the range of Forms, their nature, and the differences between Forms and particulars.

While details in the *Phaedo* and *Republic* may be slim, metaphors abound. With respect to the relation of particulars to Forms, of special importance are the metaphors of image and original, copy and model, example and paradigm. These are subtly different notions, but in each case the latter is of the former: an example is an example of something; a copy is a copy of a model; an image an image of an original. Metaphysically speaking, all copies are dependent on the original. Epistemologically speaking, though one can know, at least in a colloquial sense, much about a statue of Benjamin Franklin, say, one cannot know that it is a statue of Franklin without referring to the original of which it is an image. Insofar as Platonic Forms are not dependent on particulars, i.e., they are not immanent universals, the dependence is one way only. A second important metaphor from the *Phaedo* also suggests that particulars are dependent on Forms whereas Forms are not dependent on them. Particulars *strive to be such* as the Forms are and thus in comparison are imperfect or deficient. Forms, then, are independent, whereas particulars are dependent on Forms and thus deficient with respect to them.

Both the metaphor of the image and the language of deficiency are found only when Plato is describing particulars. Consider two other contrasts Plato deploys in his metaphysics. The first is Partaking versus Being in the *Phaedo*. The second is the *Republic's* notion of Being completely versus Being and Not-Being. Although these two criteria are related, we should be hesitant to claim that to partake just is what it is to be and not-be, or that partaking causes the participant to be and not-be. For the end of the *Phaedo* leaves open the possibility that Forms partake of each other, but the *Republic* never suggests that Forms are and are-not. Similarly, if Forms can partake, and if the copy metaphor is never applied to Forms, that is reason to be chary of identifying the copy or image metaphor with partaking.

Critical passages from the *Phaedo* also point up a host of features, usually found in pairs, which differentiate particulars from Forms. Forms are immaterial, nonspatial, and atemporal. Particulars⁵⁶ are material and extended in space and in time. Forms do not change and may not even be subject to Cambridge-change, i.e., relational changes involving, for instance, a soul cognizing them at various moments. Particulars change, may even be subject to change in *any* respect, and may even be subject to change in *every respect at any given moment*, i.e., total Heraclitean flux. Particulars are complex or multiform (*polyeidetic*) composites (σύνθετον), whereas Forms are pure, simple, or uniform (*monoeidetic*, ἕν). Particulars are the objects of the senses and of belief. Forms are the objects of knowledge, grasped by the intellect through definitions, dialectic, or otherwise. Particulars appear, and perhaps are, both F and not-F for some property F: particulars suffer from the com-

presence of opposites. The Form of F cannot be conceived to be not-F (and perhaps is never not-F). Hence the Form, The F itself, does not suffer com-
presence (at least with respect to being F).

It is not clear how these features⁵⁷ are related to the ontological and epis-
temological status of the various elements in the ontology. Nor is it obvious
which, if any, is most responsible for Plato's postulation of Forms. Naturally,
the texts leave us with many questions, to which different accounts of Plato's
metaphysics provide distinct answers. With respect to particulars, we can ask:
(1) Does Plato think that they can change in all respects and can they change
in all respects at a given moment? Or are particulars able to possess proper-
ties essentially; that is, do some particulars have essences? (2) What is it for a
particular to partake of a Form, and what kind of property acquisition is
postulated by Plato? Is the property acquired the same as that had or consti-
tuted by the Form partaken of, or is the property acquired itself somehow an
approximation or a deficient property? (3) Particulars are characterized not
only as ontologically different from and deficient in comparison to Forms,
but also as epistemologically deficient. They are either not objects of knowl-
edge, or not as suitable as Forms. This is linked to their being composite and
complex, especially in that they suffer from the compresence of opposite
properties. In what sense does their complexity affect their knowability? And
if some or even one among their many properties is essential, how does that
affect their knowability?

The questions about Forms are roughly the converse: (1) What is it for a
Form to be or to possess an *ousia*? (2) Can a Form be, or possess, only its
ousia, or can it have other properties? And if a Form can have other proper-
ties, does it have them in the same way as particulars have their properties,
i.e., by partaking in Forms? (3) Is it possible for a Form both to be its
essence, that is to *Be* what it is, and to partake of itself, that is to be *charac-*
terized in the same way as the particulars (or other Forms) that partake of it?
(4) What is it about Forms that makes them suitable objects of knowledge? If
the Form F turns out to possess properties besides being F, say, being G, how
would this fact affect their special claim to being the object of knowledge, for
instance by calling into question whether they too suffer from compresence,
or by calling into question whether they can ever seem something that they
are not?

Aristotle's account of Plato's reasons for introducing Forms indicates that
change and essence are critical to Plato's thinking. He tells us that, in seeking
knowledge of ethical matters, "Socrates sought the universal in them and
turned to definitions. Plato, accepting this, thought that this (defining)
comes to be about different things, and not about sensibles. For it is impos-
sible that the common definition be about any of the sensibles, for these are
always changing. These sorts of beings he called "Ideas" (*Meta*. 987b1-7). At
the very beginning, then, the search for knowledge leads to definitions. The

question is where one can find definitions or definables. Aristotle asserts that Plato thought that definition could not be found in the sensibles because they were always changing, and that Socrates thought differently on this score. Our examination of the early dialogues found nothing to gainsay Aristotle's account. There was no mention of constant change among the sensibles and nothing to indicate that, for Socrates, properties occupied a special plane apart from the particulars.

Following Aristotle's lead, a most economical way to account for the cognitive superiority of Forms and the inferiority of sensibles would be to allot essence only to the Forms. Since we know from the early and the middle dialogues that knowledge is of essence, it is tempting to think that the absence of essence is responsible for the cognitive deficiency of the particulars. Particulars are deficient because they can or do change. They change because their properties are contingent. Their properties are contingent because they lack any essences (or any essential properties). But this is too quick. First, we do not know whether Plato's particulars can change with respect to all of their properties. Perhaps some have essential properties along with a host of contingent properties. Then Aristotle might be taken to imply that only with respect to a certain number of contingent properties did Plato posit definable Forms. Moreover, Aristotle seems to allude only to an epistemological difficulty arising from changing particulars. It is possible that this difficulty arises independently of whether some particulars have essential properties. For instance, particulars might be epistemologically problematic because they have many properties, only some of which are changing.

In this vein, consider the influential account of Gregory Vlastos. In his view, the notion driving the postulation of Forms is that Forms are cognitively superior, or cognitively more reliable than particulars:

In the interpretation I have offered of Plato's theory, the grounds on which sensible particulars are judged to be less real than their respective Forms coincide very largely . . . with those categorical features which disqualify them for serving as objects of a certain kind of knowledge: knowledge which, Plato says, has "infallibility," or, in less inflated, more exact, terms for what he means, logical certainty. Nothing can qualify as a cognoscendum for this purpose if it is concrete, temporal, spatial, and caught in chains of physical causation—if it is cluttered up with contingent characters. All of its properties must stick to it with logical glue, so that they can never get unstuck with changes in time, spatial location, or causal environment. ("Degrees," 73)

Why is it that merely being subject to change in some respect disqualifies a particular from being a cognoscendum? If the particular turns out to possess an essence, then particulars should be suitable objects of knowledge at least with respect to what they essentially are. For what seems to guarantee that

properties stick to the Form with logical glue is their being in the essence of the Form, or at least that they follow from the essence in a fashion akin to the way that having angles sum to 180 degrees follows from the essence of triangle.⁵⁸ Vlastos, I think, wants to deny that particulars have essences. But his examples illustrating the fault(s) of the sensible order leave the issue unsettled in important respects.

His first example derives from the metaphor of a copy. Consider the difference between real and fake flowers, real and fake diamonds, or gold and fool's gold. If we ask for the essence of a flower, or of gold, we no doubt would get a highly complex *logos*. For ease of argument I will stick with gold and abbreviate its essence as its atomic number, 79. For Vlastos, in addition to this "real" essence we associate a host of stereotypical properties with gold, to include its color, shape, feel, etc. By including (some of?) these stereotypical properties as part of the essence (along with the atomic number), we see one fashion in which, for Vlastos, the sensibles are deficient: just as fool's gold has *some* of the properties of gold *but not all* of the properties, so the sensibles in Plato have some of the properties of the Form in which they participate but not all. Speaking less carefully, we can say that the sensible shares *some* of the essential properties of the Form. The fake flowers have some of the essential properties of flowers because they have the stereotypical properties of flowers. In this respect, we can say that sensibles are imperfect because they fail to possess *the whole* of the essence.⁵⁹

At other times his account of the nature of the deficiency takes on a different hue. Consider a second example, the contrast of a pure sample with an adulterated, impure sample, or an alloy. The crucial feature in this metaphor is the purity of the one and the impurity of the other. Let the Form be a pure item and understand by its purity that it is simply and solely its essence, just as pure gold is simply and purely gold, 24-carat gold. It is just gold. The alloy, on the other hand, or the impure sample, is gold and other things besides. Here the deficiency is not due to the alloy's failure to have the whole of the essence of gold, but to its having *something else* in addition to that essence. It is both gold and lead, say.⁶⁰

The intuition is that pure gold is a better guide to what gold is. If we want to know what gold is, as opposed to what gold is best for jewelry, obviously it is better to turn to the pure sample. If we look at the alloy, we are liable also to find the essence of lead. In this case, the cognitive deficiency cannot be due to the fact that the particulars lack the essence. Rather, it must be due to the presence of another "essence," the essence of lead. Here, then, the problem is a combination of two factors, one metaphysical and one epistemological. The metaphysical contributor is the complexity of the alloy; it has two component metals. The epistemological contribution is, apparently, that we cannot in this kind of case study just the gold in isolation from the attendant properties, or perhaps just the other metal.

Vlastos relies on these metaphors in part to give substance to the Platonic thesis that material particulars suffer compresence of opposites, or more generally are F and are not-F. If the gold (G) is one element in my ring and the lead another, then since lead is different from gold, we can say that my ring is and is not gold, i.e., is and is not, or is G and is not-G. The same result seems to follow from the first kind of metaphor, the fake flower. Let the rose in my backyard be our real flower. My rose is a flower (F). Let the faux-rose in our living room be the fake flower. On Vlastos's account, the rose is F whereas the faux rose is F and not-F. The crucial move to establish this conclusion, however, is suspect. The negative predicate represents the failure of the faux rose to be a rose, that is, its failure to have the essence of flower. But Vlastos rolls into essence his host of stereotypical properties such as the color, size, and perhaps even the thorns or odor. The faux rose possesses these stereotypical properties. Only if we include the stereotypical properties as part of the essence can we then say that the faux rose *is* a flower.

This is to stretch the notion of essence beyond the breaking point. Nowhere does Plato meld stereotypical properties into the *ousia* of anything, and he never describes anything as having part of the *ousia*, not even in the passages where we learn that participation causes the subject to have a share of the Form. To be sure, we can claim that the subject acquires a *part* of the essence through partaking in the Form. But this is not asserted.⁶¹

Vlastos's metaphors suggest that particulars are cognitively deficient because they are complex. Suppose that a particular is F. Complexity entails that a particular has at least two properties, F and G. Since the G is not F, every complex particular can be said to be F and not-F. Our inability to grasp the property (F) in the particular is then grounded not in the compresence of an *opposite* property, but in the compresence of *another property*. The inquiring mind is unable to grasp the property as it is manifested in particulars in which it is alloyed with other properties. It does not know where to look or how to isolate the desired property from any other. This suggests that a fundamental contrast between the particulars and the Form F is that the latter is simple, or monoeidetic, in that it possesses just itself: It is just F.⁶²

On the other hand, in the passage quoted above, Vlastos grounds the cognitive reliability of the Forms in the analyticity, or logical certainty, or necessity, that holds between the essence of a Form and various properties "discernible in its nature." He even goes so far as to suggest that sometimes these logical relations are fused with physical necessity in the case of snow and cold, or fire and heat. Looked at in this light, the factor responsible for the deficiency of sensibles is that their properties are contingently related to them, in contrast to the Forms whose properties are necessarily stuck to them with logical glue.

If we emphasize the contingency of *all* of its properties, a particular can-

not have any essential properties. On the other hand, if we emphasize the complexity of the particular, then we are free to ascribe essences to (some) particulars. In this case, however, we should expect that the essences do stick to the particulars in a noncontingent fashion. Hence, there could be knowledge of these particulars, i.e., knowledge that Socrates is a man. If we allow that in the *Phaedo* or *Republic* there is knowledge of particulars, then the mere complexity of the particular would not render particulars unknowable.

Conversely, if complexity is the cause of cognitive deficiency, then with respect to Forms, the fact that all their properties are necessary properties would not suffice to render Forms knowable. For *if* a Form has many properties, then in the broad sense the Form F itself, since it is F and G, will be F and not-F. Thus Forms, too, might not be knowable. This is particularly problematic, it seems to me, when we reconsider the claim in the Recollection Argument that a Form cannot seem to be not-F. For if the Form F itself has many properties, then to one focusing on any property other than F, it can seem to be not-F. Something more is needed to account for the unmistakability of the Form.

In order to secure cognitively deficient particulars, those who would allow particulars to have essences typically distinguish complete from incomplete properties. Citing the majority of properties used as examples in the arguments in the *Phaedo* and elsewhere, sponsors of the complete/incomplete dichotomy contend that incomplete properties are those which lend themselves to being compresent to a particular along with their opposites in a *strict or narrow* sense, whereas complete properties are those with respect to which particulars do not suffer narrow compresence. On these interpretations, the fact that the particular has multiple properties is deemed insufficient to generate the claim that for *any* property F, a particular is F and not-F. Here the not-F must be the actual opposite, the not-beautiful or the not-just, as opposed to any property G, say, being a man, which is not identical with Beauty (F).⁶³ Simmias is, and is said to be, large and not-large—because he is larger than Socrates and smaller than Cebes—but he is not, and is not said to be, (a) man and not (a) man. According to this tradition, the middle-period Plato limits the range of Forms to the incomplete properties. Thus, there would be no Form of Man itself, or Fire itself, or Shuttle itself.

It is difficult to come up with criteria to distinguish complete from incomplete properties. Intuitively, complete properties are the essential properties of complex particulars, roughly those sortal notions that, by dint of their persistence, allow us to identify the changing particulars.⁶⁴ Incomplete properties, in turn, are a subset of the contingent properties, relational properties such as Largeness and Equality, or properties whose linguistic predication always calls for some phrase that specifies the context in which the predication holds, e.g., beautiful *for a temple* (see chapter 2). Forms are needed for incomplete properties in order to have some entity that possesses a given

incomplete property without also possessing its opposite: the Large itself is large and is not not-large; the Just is just and is not not-just.

I postpone to the Appendix a more detailed discussion of incomplete properties, compresence, and the arguments for a limited range of Forms. For present purposes, note that the manner in which a Form (of an incomplete property) is or possesses this incomplete property is controversial. It may be that Largeness itself is large in the same way as Socrates is a man (a complete property). Largeness itself may be identical with largeness. Or it may be superlatively large, such that it is larger than everything else and thus not small in comparison to anything. Or it may just be what it is to be large. What is crucial is that it not be, and cannot be, not-large.

To guarantee that a Form *F* not be not-*F*, or anything besides the (incomplete) property that it is, we could insist upon the simplicity of each Form. Each Form can be exactly one thing, the very property that it is. From the outset of the *Phaedo*, we are told that Forms are *auto kath' auto*, that they are *eilikrines*, pure, simple, and unmixed, of one form, *monoeides*, and incomposite, ἄσύνθετον. A Form is exactly and solely what it is. The reason, according to this account, why Forms are so open to the properly situated intellect is that they are just one thing, a single universal or property. To be aware of Beauty itself at all, then, is to realize that it is beautiful, for it is nothing else. Lacking any complexity, to see or to be aware of a Form is to know it. In this sense Forms are properly deemed “objects of acquaintance.”⁶⁵

Particulars, in contrast, are complex. The problem of the particular, on this account, is not that its properties are contingent, but that it has too many properties. Its deficiency is epistemological. It matters not whether particulars have essences. Indeed, we could even allow that in being beautiful, Helen possesses the essence of beauty, whatever that might mean. We could in principle know what Beauty is by studying Helen, for Beauty is to be found there. But because we are unable to isolate her beauty from at least her being not-beautiful, and perhaps because we cannot isolate it from the other properties present in Helen, we must turn elsewhere to find a Beauty which is simply and solely beautiful.⁶⁶

Vlastos emphasized the cognitive deficiency of Platonic particulars. His examples suggested that the real source of the deficiency was the multiplicity of properties in a particular. Others also emphasize the complexity of particulars, especially those who limit Forms to incomplete properties that are always compresent in particulars along with their opposites. They also locate the deficiency in the epistemological sphere; and for good reason, since many think that some particulars, e.g., Simmias, have complete or essential properties. Hence, they cannot be said to be deficient owing to the lack of essence. Nor, I think, would it be reasonable to claim that a particular is metaphysically deficient simply because it has properties besides its essence.⁶⁷ Finally, even if Forms are limited to incomplete properties, absent an account

of the way(s) in which particulars and Forms possess these properties, there is no *metaphysical* basis for finding particulars deficient.⁶⁸

I do not think that the compresence of opposites or the mere complexity of particulars is responsible for their deficiency. Nor do I think that the deficiency is primarily epistemological. Aristotle leaves little doubt that change is critical, especially insofar as it precludes definability and thus knowledge. Given that knowledge requires essence, and essence excludes change (in the case of the essential properties), we should deny that essence is predicable of particulars for the Plato of the middle period. Particulars will be epistemologically deficient in that there can be no knowledge of them, unless we abandon the thesis that knowledge is of essence. And particulars will be metaphysically deficient, at least to the extent that possessing an essence is a better state than lacking one. But more needs to be said about the peculiar contingent manner in which particulars have their properties and why it is that one cannot look to the particular beauties to obtain knowledge of Beauty. Complexity does contribute to the explanation of why particulars are both metaphysically and epistemologically deficient. But it is not the complexity of compresent properties. It is the complexity and the contingency resulting from the fact that Plato's are material particulars.

From the outset of the *Phaedo*, as well as in the *Symposium* and *Republic*, particulars are branded as material and, as a result, spoken of in the pejorative. Initially (64c–70c), Plato condemns the human body as a hindrance to the soul, both as the source of desire and of cognitive confusion. But by the Affinity Argument, and then again in the autobiography (95a4ff.), it is the bodily or material aspect of particulars that is targeted as problematic. Indeed, matter seems to be at the root of the other features that characterize particulars. What is extended in space (and through, or in, time) is body. The composite (σύνθετον) is also linked with the material. Because a material particular is composite, it is also multiform (πολυειδής) or complex (80b4). Complex material particulars are subject to change insofar as their composite nature invites dissolution or construction, or more generally coming-to-be or perishing.⁶⁹ When taken broadly, as it is at *Phaedo* 100ff. (or in the analogies of the middle books of the *Republic*), generation and destruction includes the exchange of properties. And since compresence requires complexity, the material nature of particulars is one of the roots of each material, sensible particular being *both F and not-F*.

The spatio-temporal, material character of particulars also contributes directly to the explanation of their suffering, and seeming to suffer, the compresence of opposites. In the middle period, Plato seems to accept an account of perception (*aisthesis*) which has as a necessary component the interaction of material elements. There *may* be subsequent or simultaneous psychic activity,⁷⁰ the judgment part of “perceptual judgment,” but there is at least some material intercourse between the body of the perceived object and

the sense faculty whose sensory object it is. The qualifications needed to account for a particular's being F and not-F are temporal, or a function of being comparable to other extended material objects, or standing in different relations to perceivers.⁷¹ Since material extension is a necessary condition for their perceptibility, no particular could *appear* to have compresent properties unless it were material.

In virtue of their material nature, particulars are extended, mutable, and subject to generation and destruction. Even in these middle period dialogues, I think Plato believes that because particulars are material, there is no property that a particular cannot lose. Mutability extends throughout the material particular in every respect: all of its properties are contingent or accidental. Material particulars, then, have no essential properties.

Some support for the thesis that they lack essence is found in Plato's remarks in the *Phaedo* on naming. In the Recollection Argument, Plato never hesitates to say that the sensible equals are equal. Indeed, because they are equal they can spark recollection ("by likes"). In the Affinity Argument, we then learn that the sensibles and the Forms are said to be homonyms (78e2). From the Final Argument, we can then infer that the participation of the equals in the Equal itself is the cause of the particular equals being equal. Thus, they would seem to merit the name "equal" because they are equal. This naming of participating particulars is, however, a *derivative* naming. Plato labels this kind of name an *eponym*. The sensible equals possess the name (= *eponym*) "equal" in virtue of their partaking of the Form, which deserves the name (= *onoma*) in its own right. The Form deserves the name in its own right because it is its essence.⁷² The reason, then, why particulars are assigned the *eponym* and not the *onoma*, despite the fact that Plato says that they are, e.g., equal, is because they lack the *ousia* possessed by the Form in which they participate. We can ask whether the equal sticks deserve any name in their own right? Those who think that they have an essence, say, being a stick, might then say "stick" is deserved. If they lack essences, as I contend, then all the names assigned to them might be eponyms.⁷³

The contrast between material particulars and immaterial Forms is one reason for Plato to introduce two different ways of being to accommodate the different ways in which Forms and particulars are related to their properties. But there is another ramification of the material nature of Plato's particulars. It concerns the way in which a particular manifests its properties. Since Forms are what particulars strive to be like, i.e., since we are directed to view the way a particular manifests its properties against the backdrop of the Form, let us start with the way in which Forms are what they are. Here there are two basic approaches to consider: The first treats a Form as actually characterized by the property that it constitutes. A Form can be a perfect instance, or a paradigm case, or an unqualified possessor of a property.⁷⁴ These three variants all agree that the Form, for example, Beauty, is itself a

beautiful object. Just as we say that Secretariat is a beautiful horse, or Yellowstone a beautiful park, when we assert “Beauty itself is beautiful,” we mean that Beauty is a beautiful object.

According to the Approximationist, the best-known variant of this approach, the Form is considered to be the *perfect* instance of the property it stands for. A particular that participates in the Form is an imperfect or deficient instance in that it has a property that *approximates* the perfect nature of the Form. For instance, the Circle itself is perfectly circular. A drawn circle, or a round ball, is deficient in that it is not perfectly circular, not exactly 360 degrees in circumference. It follows that the very properties particulars possess will *differ* from the property “of the same name” possessed by the Form itself. If what Beauty itself has is perfect beauty, then Helen has imperfect beauty and she does not have perfect beauty. Moreover, nothing seems to rule out that there are numerous kinds of imperfect beauty, perhaps as many as there are beautiful participants. The net result thus seems to be either that there is no one kind of beauty that particulars have in common, or that there are one or more (commonly shared) imperfect kinds of beauty. In the former case, there will be no need to posit a “one” over the many beauties. In the latter case, there is every reason to posit a Form(s) of Imperfect Beauty in which the commonly qualified imperfect particulars participate. Neither alternative is a happy one. While the appeal to the perfection of the mathematical properties is great, even in these cases it is doubtful that Plato adopts an approximationist strategy. For there is no more reason to claim that, for instance, the crooked line is an imperfect instance of perfect straightness than a perfect instance of the slight crookedness that it has.⁷⁵

According to the second approach, we should understand “Beauty itself is beautiful” to assert an identity of some sort. It denies that (the Form) Beauty is characterized by beauty. This approach excludes Beauty from the enumerated beautiful objects.⁷⁶ My reconstruction of Plato’s middle-period metaphysics is a variant of this second approach. I begin from the two relations introduced in the last argument of the *Phaedo*, namely Partaking and Being. An intuitive first approximation of their respective functions is to treat Partaking as a relation between material particulars and Forms, the result of which is that the particular is characterized *by the Form of which it partakes*. This clumsy prepositional phrase can be replaced by the name of the property which the Form constitutes. So, Helen, by partaking of Beauty, is characterized by beauty; Helen becomes (is) beautiful. All particulars are characterized and *whatever* each is, it is by partaking in the appropriate Form. There are then, on my account, *Forms for each and every property had by particulars* (*Phaedo* 100–1, esp. 100c6).⁷⁷ In contrast to the characterizing relation of Partaking, I maintain that the relation of Being is always noncharacterizing. I think that each Form, F, Is its essence (*ousia*), which is to say that the relation of Being links the essence of beauty to the subject, Beauty

itself.⁷⁸ I also will maintain the more controversial thesis that wherever essence (*ousia*) is predicated, it is predicated via Being. Since I claim that every property of a particular is possessed via Partaking, it follows that essence is not predicated of particulars.⁷⁹

How then is the materiality of the particular related to the characterization for which participation is responsible? The particulars of the middle and early dialogues are all material and complex. (Some, of course, are complex composites of body and soul.) But none have essences and, thus, particulars lack something had by Forms. In light of the material aspect, and because they lack essences, particulars manifest their properties in a peculiar way. What materiality induces is that a property be manifested in a *specific* way. So, when we consider a particular stick to ask what is its length, we expect to be told a specific quantity: the stick is five inches long. The same is true of its weight: it is six ounces. If we are concerned to explain why the stick is that long, one answer is that the matter of the particular compels it to have determinate length.⁸⁰ Only when we shift to the question "What is length?" do we begin to reflect upon the relations between length and the fact that each of these material particulars has a specific length. In the *Meno*, we saw Plato developing the notion of determinable and determinate. Here I think we see its fruition. There the properties themselves were determinates falling under a determinable, e.g., crimson and scarlet under red, red under color. Now, the properties under consideration are all *generic or determinable*, but when present in the particular they take on a specific, determinate character. Consider, for instance, mathematical figures. The Triangle itself will be a three-sided figure whose lines lack breadth and whose angles have no determinate degree. But all particular triangles will have lines with some breadth and angles with certain degrees.⁸¹ There is, then, a gap between the non-specific and nondeterminate property and the way it is manifested in the particular. The immaterial Form of Triangle is abstract and can have no particular dimension. *The property in the particular*, on the other hand, must be specific and determinate—the property in the particular is always a specific, determinate length, or color (hue), or size, or so on—because the particular is concrete, and because the property in the particular is itself a particular instance of the nondeterminate property.⁸²

The determinacy of the material particular is set against the nondeterminacy of the Form. We arrive at this nondeterminate Form not so much by abstracting away from the determinate size of the particular or the special beauty of the scene, but by changing our view of what we are looking at.⁸³ Plato never really tells us how we come to think about a Form or property by itself. But he does say that the property as it is found in the particular is both different from and somehow deficient in comparison to the Form itself. This determinacy of property is only one aspect of the difference. A second is the contingent way in which the particular has this determinate property.

The material aspect is, in the case of particulars, partly responsible for the contingency of its property possession. Matter is a sufficient condition for contingency but not necessary, since souls are in many respects contingently what they are, e.g., desirous of money.⁸⁴ (Matter is also a sufficient condition for complexity, though again not necessary, if souls, or Forms, can be complex.)

For all particulars, the determinate manifestation of the property is due to the fact that *it is a material particular* which partakes of the Form. In the *Phaedo*, all clear cases of participation involve particulars and in each case we find a material particular characterized in a certain way. Participation is a characterizing relation.⁸⁵ But the characterizing relation of Partaking is not the same as the determinate manifestation of a given property or the contingency associated with a particular's possession of a property. Plato's conviction is that in each case many particular things can be beautiful in the same way, just as many sticks can be equal in the same way. What accounts for the possibility that many particulars have the same determinate property is their participation in the abstract general Form. Insofar as the Form is a One-Over-Many, the sameness of the property is a function of the Form.

In contrast to this characterizing relation, Being is a noncharacterizing relation. In predications involving Being, the property predicated does not result in a subject characterized by any determinate feature at all. The fundamental contrast between the two relations is matched by the wholesale assignment of Participation to particulars and Being to Forms. While there may prove to be exceptions to these assignments even in the *Phaedo*, and while the later metaphysics will reexamine the issue of whether Forms can partake, the vivid impression left by the *Phaedo* and *Republic* is that Forms Are and do not partake, whereas particulars partake and never Are. In positing Being as a primitive relation, I am thus trying to reconstruct the special way of being Plato assigns to Forms.

On my account, then, we start from the claim that each Form is what it is in its own right, each is an *auto kath' auto on*. For when we ask, "What is the Form F?" we seek what F *is* ($\delta\ \xi\sigma\tau\iota$), and we seek what it is in a particular and special way. We seek what F is independent from any of its material instances, and in some sense independent of anything else, Form, form-copy, or soul. What each Form is, the respective $\delta\ \xi\sigma\tau\iota$ each Form is in its own right, it is in virtue of its essence, *ousia*. This *ousia* is what is picked out or specified by the *logos* answering the "What is F?" question. The connection between the Form and the essence being predicated of it is exhibited in the so-called self-predication statements, as well as other locutions, such as the *Republic's* formula that a given *on* is completely or perfectly. *The predication relation connecting an essence with that Form of which it is the essence is Being, εἶναι.*⁸⁶ I capitalize the "is" used to represent the predication relation of Being, e.g., Justice Is just. The predicate in such self-predication statements

stands for the (real) definition of the Form, conveniently captured by Nehamas's "what it is to be F."⁸⁷ I maintain then that each Form Is its essence.

The special relationship between a Form and its essence is captured in two principles. They owe their legacy to Parmenides, since they detail the way in which something is, and since they will receive much greater attention in the initial hypotheses of the *Parmenides*. I will label them Parmenidean Principles I and II:

Parmenidean Principle (PP) I: Each essence is the essence of exactly one Form.

Parmenidean Principle (PP) II: Each Form has (or is) exactly one essence.⁸⁸

A critical rationale behind both Principles concerns the relationship between Identity and Being. We shall turn to this shortly (and return to the topic in subsequent chapters). However, PP II receives some support from the *Phaedo*. I take it to capture the ontological force of the expression that each Form is $\mu\omicron\nu\omicron\epsilon\iota\delta\acute{\epsilon}\varsigma$: *of one essence*. In light of these Principles, and in keeping with the account of the ontological relation of Being, we can now stipulate that each Form *self-predicates*, insofar as each Form Is its essence. Self-predication statements cannot involve particulars, because they involve Being and essence. But they are required of Forms, since every Form must Be its respective essence. *Self-predication, then, is a constitutional principle of the very Theory of Forms*. Since Being, on my account, does not cause the subject to be characterized by the predicate it relates to the subject, a self-predication statement involving Being does not imply that Justice, say, is a just object, or that Beauty is a beautiful object. When Plato says that each Form is itself by itself, *auto kath auto, monooides*, simple, *eilikrines*, pure, and one, I take him to be referring only to the relation of Form to essence. Being is found only where subject and essence are related, that is only where essence is predicated of some subject. A Form, then, is what it is in its own right in that it Is its essence, and since the only thing it Is is its essence, each Form is *monooides*, "of one essence."⁸⁹

It follows that if there are other properties predicable of a given Form besides its essence, they are not predicated via Being. Since the only other ontological relation we have to work with is Participation, Forms would have to participate in these other Forms; and because Participation is a characterizing relation, a Form will have the property in which it participates. I will sometimes mark this relation by using the English "has" or "is." So, for instance, if Largeness partakes of Beauty, then Largeness is a beautiful thing. Since characterization seems to require a determinacy of a peculiar sort, there would have to be a peculiar manner in which Forms are beautiful.⁹⁰ On my account, therefore, neither the fact that a Form is pure, simple, or *auto*

kath auto is incompatible with the notion of middle-period Forms being complex or characterized. Whether we wish to say that Plato is committed to Forms that partake of other Forms depends on how we read the end of the *Phaedo* and the middle books of the *Republic*. But regardless of how we ultimately come down on that question, the vivid contrast of sensible and Form endures. No sensible enjoys Being at all on my account. A material particular is whatever it is in virtue of partaking in some Form, never in virtue of Being something.

The middle books of the *Republic*, I argued, leave little room for material particulars endowed with essences. If all the properties of particulars are had via Partaking, then we can say that each particular is characterized insofar as it has whatever properties it has. Nonetheless, it is possible for particulars or Forms to have certain properties in a stronger manner than others. In the *Phaedo*, we found statements connecting a Form to its essence, e.g., “Three is three,” and others connecting the same Form to other properties in what we might today call necessary predication, “Three is odd.” If “Three” here names a Form, then the former says that the essence of Threeness is predicated *via Being* of Threeness. The latter says that another property, Oddness, is predicated of Threeness. Plato is clear that it is no more possible for Three to fail to be odd than it is for it to fail to be three. Threeness is always odd. Both then are necessary properties (in this modern sense), but *only the former is a case of Being, i.e., a case of essential predication* in the Platonic sense. On my account, since there are only these two predication relations, only these two ways of being as I prefer to say, then Threeness partakes of Oddness and is necessarily odd without Oddness being its essence. Plato can therefore distinguish necessary from essential predication, and both from contingent or accidental predication.

No amount of work on the final argument is liable to decide how we must treat Snow, Fire, the Hot, and the Cold in the *Phaedo*. If we think that there are Forms of these properties, then we can also claim that all relations between Forms are necessary—Snow itself is cold—but that only one is essential, the relation obtaining between an essence and that of which the essence is predicated—Snow Is whatever it is to be snow.⁹¹ In this circumstance, I think it best to take seriously the notion that Plato is still working out the implications of the Hypothesis of Forms, especially with respect to the question of how Forms are related to other Forms. The “higher *logoi*” mentioned at *Phaedo* 101c–e might then be alternative accounts of the relations between Forms and Forms, and/or Forms and the particulars which participate in them. One alternative would be to think that the Form of Snow actually partakes of the Form of Cold and thus is cold, like the snow on my lawn. A second would be to somehow incorporate Cold into the *ousia* of Snow, thus allowing it to be predicated *via Being* of Snow. Or we could allow that in fact there is no relation between the Forms, and treat the (ap-

parent) participation of Snow in the Cold itself as grounded in the co-presence of the two Forms in every particular that partakes of Snow (recall *Rep.* 476a). Finally, of course, we could deny that there are Forms of Snow and Fire, treating the passages in the *Phaedo* as referring to particulars. With the option of necessary partaking available, we can even allow that particulars can have necessary properties without possessing essences. The particular matter or body that is the snow on my lawn is contingently snow, and hence cold, in so far as it can cease to be snow and become, say, water. On the other hand, just so long as it is snow, it is necessarily cold.⁹² But insofar as material particulars can cease to be what they are, Plato distinguishes them from both Forms, souls and, I will argue, form-copies. (Of course the proof designed to secure this status for souls is suspect.) To secure all the differences between these items, and to specify the various ways each is what it is, would be, I think, to examine the “higher *logoi*” on which the Hypothesis of Forms depends. The *Parmenides* addresses part of this task.

The rigid separation of Forms and sensible particulars is embodied in the isolation of these two ways of being, Being and Partaking. The criteria and properties that differentiate Forms and particulars are related to their respective ways of being, but need not and should not be identified with Partaking and Being. Mutability, extendedness, etc., are not equivalent to Partaking and they do not explain it nor are they explained by it. Still, the deficiency of the sensible is aptly viewed in terms of its way of being, i.e., in virtue of the fact that every sensible acquires all of its properties through participation. *The deficiency of the sensible is its deficient way of being.* Lacking any essence, it can only fail to Be.

This notion of deficiency has a long pedigree. In one sense it is a new way of cashing out the idea that Forms and particulars are different kinds or types of entities.⁹³ It clearly is not an approximation view or a view according to which Forms are treated as paradigmatic particulars. The very same property, Beauty, is related, via Being, to the Form Beauty itself that is related to the sensible particular via Partaking. The beauty of Helen is not itself deficient, her way of having it is. And since beauty does not characterize Beauty, there is no case to be made that Beauty itself could be a paradigmatically beautiful object.

A traditional formulation for capturing this notion of Form is that Forms are what particulars have, or that Forms constitute the properties had by particulars.⁹⁴ This phrasing has been associated with what is called the Identity account of Being, where the ontological relation between a Form and its essence is identity. There are reasons to think of Being as nothing more than identity. First, if we consider a given Form and the self-predication statement about it, “Justice is just,” for instance, the flexibility of Platonic Greek allows us to treat the predicate adjective as referring to the same thing as the subject, whether that be the noun *δικαιοσύνη* or the nominal expression

formed from the definite article and adjective, τὸ δίκαιον. Since Plato is (conceived to be) asserting the identity of the Form and its essence, this analysis seems to preclude the worry that somehow Plato is characterizing his Forms respectively as just, good, or beautiful objects.⁹⁵ Moreover, if we identify a Form and its essence and add that this is the only property predicable of a Form, it is plausible to think that if we are aware of a Form it cannot seem to be other than what it is. This identification of Form and essence affords a convenient way of parsing the simplicity of the Form or its pure and incomposite nature. If it is just identical with its essence and nothing else,⁹⁶ then it is a simple or pure property. It is a Democritean atom without the matter.⁹⁷

I have urged that it is best to treat the predication relation involving Form and its essence as Being, as a special relation on a par with Partaking. Since Being and Partaking are the primitive ontological relations, Being is in some sense prior to Identity. If it turns out, as it will, that a Form and its essence are identical, then their identification will have to be understood and accounted for in terms of Being. Moreover, in order for this preferential treatment of Being to be justified, we should be able to find either textual reasons for thinking that Plato distinguishes Being and Identity in this fashion, or philosophical reasons, or both. I think we can find both.

On my account, the fact that each Form Is its essence entails that the definition is predicated of the Form. More precisely, since the *ousia* is the ontological correlate of the linguistic *logos*, the account of Being developed here entails that the definition is both linguistically and ontologically predicable of a Form, and that the definition is not predicable of the particulars.⁹⁸ This follows from the fact that essence is predicated of whatever it is predicated of via Being: there are no accidental predications of essence. It would appear, then, that only Forms are definable. But it is not so simple. Based on the Parmenidean Principles and the foregoing account of Being and Participating, we can conclude that:

- 1) Each Form, F, Is its essence, Y.

and that

- 2) For all particulars, P, and for all properties, Y, if Y is predicated (able) of P, then P Has Y.

Furthermore, since the *Phaedo* asserts that particulars are what they are in virtue of the Form's being what it Is, it follows that

- 3) If P has Y, then P has something which Is Y.

The motivation for this claim is our understanding of the thesis at 100c that Beauty itself alone Is beautiful and that other things acquire their beauty in virtue of partaking in what Is beautiful. The traditional and obvious way to

parse this claim is to allow that it is the Form itself which the particular has, for it seems that only the Form whose essence is Y, Is Y. But if this is true, then if, as the identity view maintains, the Form and its essence are identical, *it follows that the essence must also be predicable of the particular*. In which case it seems that the particulars do have essences, albeit via Partaking, for they have something which is identical with an essence.

Form-copies, the large-in-Socrates, the hot-in-fire, and such, provide a way out of this predicament. There is no consensus as to whether they are bona fide members of the ontology of the *Phaedo*. The adumbrative character of the Hypothesis of Forms, and Plato's reticence to address the participation relation or to examine the "logoi" above the Hypothesis, preclude a definitive answer to this question. Many have argued that the so-called form-copies are nothing more than the Forms conceived of as inherent in, or immanent in, particulars, the particularization of the Form, or Forms as they function in the participation relation.⁹⁹ But if Plato wishes to avoid the consequence of predicating Forms and, thus, essences directly of particulars, then I think that we have a compelling reason for him to admit form-copies into his ontology. A second reason to think that form-copies are items in the ontology, and not merely particularizations explicable in terms of Forms and particulars, is the alleged status of the soul. The immortal souls of concern to Plato are the individual souls that essentially are what they are, and which withdraw and never perish. The Hypothesis of Forms, form-copies, and the clever *aitia* are introduced and developed to support the doctrine of immortal individual souls. As we shall see, the difficulty in accounting for Socrates in terms of his form-copies and his form-copies in terms of Socrates is paralleled in the case of *his soul*. It seems to be *Socrates' soul* that infuses the relevant matter to give rise to Socrates. Form-copies, then, are the property-analogues of individual souls.

The task is to determine the role form-copies play in the reconstructed metaphysical theory of the *Phaedo* and to distinguish them from both the Forms of which they are copies and the particulars to which, in some sense, they belong.

Particulars are participants and Forms Are what they are. Particulars are what they are, F, because they have something which Is F. This something is now posited to be a form-copy, not a Form: the F-in-Socrates, not the F Itself. On this analysis of participation, we must say that form-copies too Are what they are. Thus it turns out that Being relates the form-copy to its property.¹⁰⁰ I believe that the property so related is, once again, the essence. If this is correct, then we cannot allow Being to be identity, lest we collapse the Forms with their form-copies, i.e., with their property-instances. Intuitively, we want to distinguish the large-in-Socrates from the large-in-Plato and both from the Large itself. The possibility remains, of course, that Plato thinks that form-copies are also participants in Forms. If he takes this route, how-

ever, then Plato merely is postponing the predication of the Form of something other than itself via Participation. Better not to introduce form-copies.

Evidence that a form-copy Is its essence comes from Plato's remarks on naming in the *Phaedo*. The terminology of the relevant passages indicates that form-copies have the same name as the Form in that they are *named* (have an *onoma*), as opposed to the same name as the particulars, which are *named after* the Form (have an *eponym*). The distinction of name from *eponym* tracks not simply the differentiation of Form from participating particular, it tracks the presence of *ousia* or Being. Where there is an essence, the bearer merits the name of the Form in the same way as the Form itself. Where there is partaking, and only where there is partaking, the subject receives the *eponym*.

The fact that these inherent properties are responsible for the "making" or characterization of the particular also suggests that they Are what they are. Throughout the early and middle period dialogues, *ousia* has been aligned with the notion of logical cause. If the form-copies are now responsible for the particular's being what it is, each should Be its respective essence. Their power, then, results not so much from their being Anaxagorean bits of hot stuff, some part of the mereological sum of Heat, but in virtue of their being *abstract and singular elements*. They differ from their parent in that they are singular or unit-properties, whereas the Form is general and abstract.¹⁰¹

The relation of the form-copy to the particular is a real problem. The crucial issue is whether form-copies are dependent on particulars, especially whether their claim to be individual or unit-properties is only as good as the company they keep. Part of the difficulty is deciding which of the two possibilities developed in the military metaphor Plato envisages for form-copies: do they "withdraw or perish"? It is a struggle to understand just what the military metaphors amount to, but if the form-copies perish at the approach of their opposite, this suggests that form-copies are dependent on the particulars to which they belong.¹⁰² Those who deny that form-copies are bona fide *onta* cite their perishing as a principal reason to take them as nothing more than a metaphor for the particular's (temporary) participation in the Form. Conversely, if they are able to withdraw, they are in some sense independent from the particulars. In this fashion they are akin to individual souls, since neither souls nor form-copies will be dependent for their existence on the particular to which they temporarily belong.

But even if they withdraw and thus exist apart from the particulars, their individuality seems to be determined by the company they keep, e.g., Socrates, or this bit of snow. "Belonging-to-Socrates" is a relational property and seems to require that there be something, namely Socrates, to which the form-copy can belong. However, if form-copies are thus dependent on particulars, there is a problem, at least for my account, with respect to the

nature of particulars lurking in the *Phaedo*. For I have argued that particulars have all of their properties in virtue of participating in the relevant Forms. Particulars, then, are ultimately to be identified in terms of the properties they have, namely their form-copies. But if these form-copies, in turn, are themselves individuated by the particulars whose form-copies they are, we are confronted with a circle.

I do not think that Plato is guilty of this circle of individuation. He avoids it, however, not by privileging particulars and then letting form-copies be individuated by the company they keep, but rather by not making form-copies depend on particulars for either their being or their individuation. (Even in the *Phaedo*, I think that Plato would have to concede that particulars are nothing but form-copies.) It must be said that in the *Phaedo* Plato has not developed a detailed enough account of the nature of material particulars. I think that Plato, at this stage, accepted as relatively unproblematic that there are material particulars. And were he pressed for their individuating conditions, he probably would have cited their body and their soul, along with their form-copies. What would prove troubling is how to account for their material aspect, given that he maintained that all the properties of particulars were accidental and the result of the inherence of form-copies.¹⁰³ The *Timaeus* addresses this task.

Form-copies are not individuated by the particulars to which they belong, because, on my account, their status as individuals is primitive. In other words, they are introduced precisely as *individual* property-instances. In this respect they are like the individual souls, which, since they pre-exist and postdate the particulars they inhabit, are not and cannot be individuated by them. A form-copy is, in the strict sense, a simple individual, incapable of possessing anything besides (the essence of) the Form of which it is a copy. In this respect they are unlike individual souls, since souls have the capacity to change and to become complex when they are associated with bodies. Finally, they are not dependent on particulars, even for their individuation, because they can, I believe, withdraw when necessary and thus continue to be what they are when the particular has perished. They *can be said* to perish, but only in the sense that the particular to which they temporarily attach can itself perish or change. (Were they dependent on the particular, form-copies would in fact perish.) The reason they survive is that a form-copy *Is* what it is. In so far as anything *Is* what it is, it cannot, I think, cease to be, i.e., cease to be what it *Is*. In this respect, too, they are like souls. Both souls and form-copies are then individuals in their own rights, apart from any particulars in which they inhere.

Form-copies belong to particulars and derive or emanate, to borrow a neo-Platonic term, from Forms. They are introduced in part, I think, to prepare the ground for Plato's claims about souls. But they have other merits and they occasion certain worries. On the plus side, form-copies allow Plato

to respond to a threat posed by the metaphysics of Forms: to wit, that particulars might be indiscernible. If particulars are nothing in their own right, and in the absence of form-copies, then particulars are merely bundles of Forms.¹⁰⁴ But if they are bundles, then two particulars composed of the same Forms would be indiscernible and identical. If we admit form-copies, particulars are not bundles of Forms. Particulars will be bundles of form-copies. And unlike a Form, which would seem to have to be numerically the same in each particular, the form-copies will differ from one another since they are distinct individual property-instances, not universals. However, while the particulars are no longer identical, this still allows that two bundles of form-copies *could* be indiscernible, since the form-copies of any one Form differ, it seems, *solo numero*. Helen's form-copy of Beauty cannot differ in quality from Andromache's, but their form-copies are distinct. If we allow that Helen and Andromache each are presumed to be distinct particulars in virtue of their matter, we can further distinguish the particulars and the form-copies, i.e. the beautiful-in-Helen versus the beautiful-in-Andromache. Here again, then, the assumption of the material particular is relevant. When Plato recognizes that he has yet to account for matter, and thus the individuation of particulars, he has to pen the *Timaeus*.

Particulars, then, have the properties they have because they have form-copies derived from the Forms that Are those properties. And when they inhere in the material particular, the particular has a definite, determinate property instance of Largeness or Beauty. The particular is assumed to be a combination of matter and form-copies (and in some cases, soul). All the form-copies can be lost, for the particular has no essential properties or essence, and so too the soul can be lost. In fact, since Plato seems to think that the body also dissipates, the particular can totally disappear. Not so the Form, which Is what it is, an *auto kath' auto* being, precisely in that its essence is predicated via Being of it, and it is the only Form of which that essence is predicated. If there are form-copies, I conjectured that they too must be subjects of predication. Text and purpose indicate that they too Are, that essence is predicated via Being of them.

In arguing that a particular, *x*, is what it is in virtue of Partaking, I claim that what makes *x* beautiful, for instance, is its having something which Is beautiful. This something can either be a Form or form-copy, for these alone Are beautiful. It might seem, however, that this analysis actually strips the particular of its ordinary or intuitive qualities. For I have also claimed that Being is a noncharacterizing relation. Hence it seems that the qualitative aspect of property possession is being explained in terms of items that are not qualified or characterized in the appropriate manner.¹⁰⁵ This would be the result were Partaking being analyzed in terms of, or reduced to, the relationship of Being. But in the middle period at least, Partaking is itself a primitive relation alongside Being. Moreover, at this juncture the participat-

ing subject is assumed to be a material particular, whose material nature goes without analysis. The primitive relation of Partaking, along with the effects of matter, are thus responsible for the characterization of the particulars: in virtue of *having* something which Is beautiful, Helen is a beautiful woman. The form-copy is not responsible for the concrete, determinate character of her beauty. Her being a material object, and her *having* of the form-copy cause her to be so characterized. That her determinate character is the character of *Beauty*, on the other hand, is due to the form-copy that she has, and this form-copy, in turn, causes her to be beautiful in virtue of being a form-copy of Beauty itself. In this respect, Plato sustains the Socratic notion that Forms are logical causes. The Form, Beauty itself, makes possible the fact that Helen is beautiful, insofar as a form-copy of Beauty is something she has. Since she has all of her properties in this fashion, and since we seem to be able to identify her, and any particular, only through descriptions that refer to her properties, form-copies and their respective Forms are responsible for our epistemic access to particulars.¹⁰⁶

Crucial to the metaphysics of the middle period, then, is the idea that a Form and all its form-copies are related via Being to the same essence. How then are we to distinguish a form-copy which Is its essence, from the Form which Is also that very same essence? The middle period dialogues do not answer this question. Even the later dialogues only begin to suggest an answer. But I think we can see the foundation for the distinction in the notion of Being and Participating found in the middle period. Forms differ from form-copies because Forms are general or predicable of many, whereas the form-copy is singular and instantiable at only one place at one time. If they can withdraw without perishing, then perhaps they can be reinstated elsewhere at a different time. A Form and its form-copies are alike in being abstract, in that their essence is the same and in that the same essence is predicated via the same relation. Both kinds Are what they are and neither partakes.

There are two ways, then, in which Plato differentiates them. First, we can consider the Form of which the essence is predicated and compare it to the particular of which the form-copy is predicated. For if there are form-copies, then the Form itself will not enter into relations with any particulars, except derivatively in that form-copies of which it might be said to be predicable are predicable of particulars. The form-copy, therefore, is not in *all respects* an *auto kath' auto* being, since it seems to have a relational aspect to it.¹⁰⁷ Not so the Form. The Form is what it is in its own right. We have argued that this entails that the essence is predicable of the Form. If we now consider the Form and its relation to essence, we can see a second way to differentiate Form and form-copy.

Let us ask whether the Form is predicable of the essence and also whether the form-copy is predicable of the essence. If we allow for the reciprocal

predication of Form and its essence, we can better appreciate how identity is working its way into the Platonic account. We treat identity not as a primitive notion but as a defined one.¹⁰⁸ With respect to essence, an essence and that of which it is predicated are identical if and only if the essence is predicated via Being of the subject and the subject is also predicated via Being of the essence: for instance, Justice Is Doing One's Own and Doing One's Own Is Justice. In this circumstance, Justice is identical with its essence. In the case of the form-copy, this identity does not hold, for we saw that the transitivity of identity militates against it. If the beauty-in-Helen is identical to Beauty itself, then, *pari passu*, so too is the beauty-in-Andromache. But then the two form-copies would be identical.

If one looks at the notions of essence, Form, Being, and the linguistic predication statements involving them, the difference between the statements whose predicates are "Justice" and "the justice-in-Socrates" is more apparent. "Doing One's Own Is Justice" strikes the ear as well formed and plausible, for there does seem to be this strong unity between a property and its real definition, as we might say. Not so with "Doing One's Own Is the justice-in-Socrates." The problem with the latter seems to me to be its particularity. The predicate position needs to be occupied by a general term.

The middle period works are not sufficiently detailed to explore two other facets of the dichotomy of form-copy versus Form. A further consideration that might help to separate Forms from their instances is the availability of other predicates that apply to Forms. If Forms have or Are other properties, Forms cannot be simply and solely their essences, for they either Are or have other properties besides their respective essences. The same will not be true of form-copies, unless we include relational properties such as withdrawing from this particular, etc. A form-copy is a simple individual in the strict sense.¹⁰⁹ It is a pure property-instance, incapable of bearing additional properties.¹¹⁰ The second facet concerns the pressures exerted by predicability of the essence of both the Form, with which it is identical, and the instance, with which it is not identical. One way to appreciate the need to distinguish Form from form-copy is to consider a problem afflicting the identity account of Being. According to this interpretation, a Form and its essence are identical. Furthermore, the relation of Partaking holds between the particular and the Form. But since the Form and its essence are identical, then in having the Form, the particular will also have the essence. But this entails that the essence of various properties are had by the particulars, which is to say that essence is related not via Being but Partaking, i.e., that essence is contingently related to that of which it is the essence. If one goes this route, then particulars should turn out to be knowable, since essence, *ousia*, will be present to them. While this is a possibility, it is not one espoused by any defender of the identity account.¹¹¹

The identity account of Being runs into problems precisely because it

entails that the Form and essence are predicated of the particular. It will also follow on my hybrid account that the Form and essence will be predicable of the form-copy. This will have to be investigated when we consider the issue of separation. What must be recognized, however, is that if Form and essence do come apart in considering the status of the form-copy, then the notion of Being, as an ontological relation involving the predication of essence, is prior to identity. It is true on my account that the Form and its essence are identical. But it does not follow that the essence is not ontologically predicated of the Form. For not all predication of essence, that is, not every case of Being, yields the identity of subject and predicate.¹¹²

There are then three different kinds of entities to be included in the Platonic middle period metaphysics: Forms; particulars; and form-copies. (One should also include souls.) They are distinguished from each other by the way they figure as subjects and predicates in ontological and linguistic predications involving the two distinct metaphysical relations of Being and Partaking. These two ways of being *can* be shared by a single subject, but it seems that Plato confines partaking to material particulars and Being to Forms, and the “derivatives” of Forms, form-copies. I have argued that this means that no particular is anything essentially. They lack essences. I have also argued that the two ways of being are themselves graded as inferior and superior. To conclude this chapter, let me turn back to the *Republic's* notion that particulars are F and not-F, to show the two ways of being at work.

We have seen that the trouble with the “is and is not” stems from Plato’s failure to specify the sense of the verb “to be.” We shrink from thinking that Plato wants to say that things exist and fail to exist at the same time. In Star Trek entities wink in and out of existence, but even there it is because they are flitting between different dimensions. If we treat the “is” as predicative, then we face an unpleasant choice. On the one hand, we can try to understand why Plato might think that an ordinary particular is, say, both hot and not hot in the same respect at the same time, i.e., somehow violates the law of noncontradiction. This seems to most no less ludicrous than attributing to him the belief that they wink in and out of existence. All the more so, because earlier in the dialogue (436ff.) Plato uses the law of noncontradiction in the critical argument to establish the tripartite soul. On the other hand, many have tried to show that we should regard the completely exfoliated predicate to include the very relative clauses Plato so prominently recognizes in the argument at 436ff. This at least gives a plausible account of what it would be for things to be and not be, e.g., I am large with respect to my son and am not large (small) with respect to my father. But then it is hard to see why “being and not being” in this fashion is problematic. Moreover, it seems odd that Plato would fail to note the relevant qualifiers so soon after having developed the strategy of relativising the properties. The more worrisome objection to this view is that it works only for a limited range of

properties, whereas the metaphors of the central books of the *Republic* suggest that everything in the sensible order is deficient, that it all and severally is and is not. To accommodate this global deficiency, some have tried to stratify Plato's ontology into types and to assign an essence to each.¹¹³ Borrowing a page from accounts of focal meaning in Aristotle, there are different essences assigned to the Form, the image of the form, and the image of the image of the Form, and (perhaps) so on. What it is for the sensible particular, which is the image of the Form, to be and not be, is for it to be the sort of thing it is, i.e., to be its essence, and not to be the sort of thing the Form is, i.e., not to be the Form's essence. Since the essence of the Form, F, is the focal point for the essence of the image of the Form, F, Plato can say that the particular is and is not F. If we treat each of those predication statements involving different types as identity statements, then the "is and is not" phrase turns out to be shorthand for "is identical with its essence and is not identical with another essence."

My view is akin to this. Since any particular has its properties in virtue of Partaking in the Form, when it partakes of F, it is qualified in a certain way, and hence it is F. On the other hand, since it is not what the Form Is (because it is not essentially F) it Is not F. On this reading, the two Ises in the phrase are distinct: the positive Is, is the Is of having or Participation; the negative is, is the Is of Being. If we add form-copies to the account, the scenario is more complicated. Since all particulars are whatever they are in virtue of their form-copies, i.e., their property-instances, we look to the form-copies for guidance. I have said that what distinguishes the form-copy from the Form is that the latter is identical with its essence whereas the former is not. Since identity is defined in terms of reciprocal predication, it turns out that the essence is predicable of the form-copy, but the form-copy is not predicable of the essence:

The justice-in-Socrates *Is* what-it-is-to-be-just; and The what-it-is-to-be-just *Is not* the justice-in-Socrates.

The italicized words yield the required results, but the subjects are different: in the one the form-copy is the subject, in the other the essence is the subject. But in the argument of the *Republic* it is the same subject that is and is not, namely the sensible particular. I think that this feature of the analysis is not insurmountable. The switch of subjects is designed to show that somehow there is a difference between the Form and the form-copy. It attempts to illustrate how something can be its essence while not being identical to it. Unlike the more familiar, surface-level account that appeals to the two relations, Partaking and Being, this analysis uses only one, Being. Once again, then, the formula seems to be grounded in the idea that the subject is something and is not identical with that thing: it Is F, but it is not identical with

other things which are F, including the F itself. The price to be paid is that we have to keep essence distinct in thought from the different things that it is liable to be predicated of, although it is identical with one of those items. How we are to achieve this distinction in thought awaits guidance from the *Parmenides*.

4

REFINING THE THEORY OF FORMS

SECTION ONE

Overview

The *Republic* and especially the *Phaedo* leave the student of Platonic metaphysics with a host of worries. Early on in the *Phaedo* Plato breaks dramatically from the metaphysics of the Socratic dialogues not only by distinguishing Forms from particulars, but also by *separating* Forms from particulars. Forms, insofar as they are *by themselves apart* from particulars, and because they are respectively what they are in their own right or in virtue of themselves, are *auta kath' auta onta*. The Recollection Argument and the Affinity Argument further expand the differences between Forms and particulars. The Forms are the objects of knowledge. They are monoeidetic ones, immaterial beings not subject to any kind of change. Particulars are deficient material complexes, subject to change and the compresence of opposite properties, accessible to the senses but not to reason, and striving to be such as the Forms are.

In the last argument of the *Phaedo*, Plato finally sketches the metaphysical account designed to secure the differences between Forms and particulars. The Hypothesis of Forms stipulates that Forms and particulars enjoy distinct ways of being: Forms Are what they are; particulars Partake. I claimed that the key to Plato's metaphysics are these two ways of being, Partaking and

Being. Partaking, on my account, differs from Being in that it is a characterizing relation. Being is not a characterizing relation. Justice, and anything else that *Is* just, is not characterized by justice. Being, rather, always relates essence, *ousia*, to what possesses essence and is the relation involved in all ontological predications of essence. Since particulars only partake, and since, I claimed, essence is predicable only via Being, essence is not predicated of particulars. In virtue of there being a single essence predicated of it, and of no other Form, each Form is what it is and is what it is in virtue of itself (*αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό*). It *Is* this single essence (= *μονοειδές*). Since it *Is* this and *Is* only this, it is, in this sense at least, an incomposite being.

Complications arise for this account when Plato has to consider relations between Forms or properties. If a Form is related to another property or Form, whether it be an element in its essence, as the Three itself is perhaps related to Oddness, or some other property, the simplicity that distinguishes Forms from particulars seems to be threatened. And if they are related to other Forms in virtue of Partaking, then it seems that a(nother) principal difference between Forms and particulars is compromised; for now both Forms and particulars participate.

A second set of complications arises from the postulated relation between Forms and particulars. The arguments prior to the Final Argument suggested a gulf between them. The Forms were unavailable for study in this world and could only be known (here) through Recollection. Participation, as it is introduced in the Final Argument, seems to bridge this gulf between particulars and Forms. But the course of the Final Argument fails to settle whether or not a Form itself is in a participating particular. I sided with those who think that a form-copy, and not the Form itself, is present to the particular. Regardless of whether Forms or form-copies are present to particulars, problems arise when we try to explain the differences between, and the relations among, particular, form-copy, Form, and Essence. Plato's deliberate vagueness about the participation relation and the higher *logoi* (that would have to be examined were one to challenge the Hypothesis of Forms and its corollary of participating particulars) signals his awareness of possible problems. The uncertain status of Snow, Fire, and the Three itself, questions about the relations between Forms and other properties, and the vagaries of Participation all contribute to the suspicion that the *auto kath' auto* status of Forms does indeed face a challenge. It comes in the *Parmenides*.

The *Parmenides*

The *Parmenides* is both one kind of challenge to the Hypothesis of Forms and a response to the challenge. Its aim, then, is to illustrate how Plato wants to address some of the metaphysical worries inherited from the middle pe-

riod. The kernel of the Hypothesis is the thesis that a Form is an *auto kath auto* being, a being that is what it is in its own right, apart from or separated from anything else. Two other aspects of the Hypothesis, in turn, provide the basis of the challenge, namely the thesis that particulars come to be what they are by *participating* in Forms, and the suggestion embodied in the notion of the clever *aitia* that Forms or properties are somehow related to each other. In the first part of the dialogue (126–135c), the focus of Parmenides' critique is the Participation relation between particulars and Forms. The opening arguments utilize the Forms, form-copies, and the dependent particulars familiar from the *Phaedo*. They resonate with the language of parts and wholes and likeness and image. The arguments emphasize the fundamental thesis that there is one Form over many particulars. Here the challenge is to explain how the Form can be one and yet both remain separate from particulars and be in particulars, as Participation seems to demand. Absent, however, is any explicit investigation into what it is for a Form to be what it is in its own right. Most conspicuously, there is no effort to elucidate the ontological relation of Being, nor to distinguish Being from Participation, nor any attempt to say in what respect a Form, on its own, is one. The young Socrates cannot explain to Parmenides' satisfaction how we are to understand the participation of particulars in Forms.

Rather than prompting a condemnation of the theory, Parmenides declares that Forms are needed to preserve the power of dialectic (135b–c). He urges the young Socrates to become more practiced, to hone his instincts for “logoi,” here perhaps “arguments,” before attempting to define Forms (135d–e). The exercise that follows is then an example of the sort of training Parmenides has in mind. In my view, the second part of the dialogue is designed to provide the account so conspicuous by its absence in the first part, namely the investigation of the relation of Being and the analysis of what it is for a Form to be one and to be an *auto kath auto* being. Its focus is the relation between Forms or properties of the most general nature, the Forms of Being, Unity, Likeness, Sameness, Difference, and so on. (This “and so on” is not casual: filling out the list will give us the Forms that can be said to constitute the very framework of the Theory.) In this respect, it looks back to the challenge issued to Zeno by the young Socrates to show that the Form of One can be many, that Plurality can be one, and Likeness unlike (128e5–130a2).

The second part of the *Parmenides* reminds me of what a friend said about the soil of the Central Valley of California: “It will grow anything if you can get enough water on it. It has a bit of a compaction problem.” Scholars have made virtually every interpretation of Plato's metaphysics grow from the dense argumentation in this work. I will not offer a detailed account of the arguments in the second part, especially given the numerous excellent recent works on the dialogue.¹ I enroll myself in the tradition dating

back to the Neoplatonists,² whose assessment is that the dialogue, and especially the first two Hypotheses, sketches the general framework in which Plato accounts for the nature of Forms. The *Parmenides* is, on this reading, the first work in general metaphysics. It examines notions, e.g., One, Being, Same, Different, etc., the investigation into whose nature constitutes part of the enterprise that must be undertaken to preserve the power of dialectic. In this respect, we can say that they are notions that Plato thinks will be found in *any* inquiry into what there is, regardless of the special or specific entities proposed by a given inquirer. That is, whether the specific entity/ies be a Parmenidean One, the (Zenonian or Platonic/Socratic) many, or Forms, the theoretical examination of these entities will make ineliminable reference to these notions. How to accommodate these notions within one's theory will be a challenge for any metaphysician, as evidenced by the paradoxes generated in the gymnastic exercise.

Accordingly, these properties, or Forms, turn out to be predicable of the special items, namely Forms, that Plato proposes in his own account of what there is. Moreover, two of these properties, Being and Unity, turn out to be the critical elements in Plato's attempt to say what it is for a Form to be an *auto kath' auto on*. The general metaphysics of the second part of the *Parmenides* thus rejects both Zeno's claim that there cannot be many (beings) and Socrates' claim that a Form cannot be a complex being that in some fashion bears contrary properties. At the same time, it constitutes at least part of an examination of the Hypothesis of Forms and positions Plato in subsequent dialogues to work out in greater detail the relations between Forms and the relations between Forms and particulars. On my reading, then, the second part addresses only indirectly the question of the relation between particulars and Forms. The question of separation from particulars is not discussed because it is mooted by the analysis of the way in which Forms are *auta kath' auta* beings. In the second part of this chapter I will defend this claim.

If the *Parmenides* is Plato's first extended effort to work out a general metaphysical program, it is not his last word on the subject. The *Sophist*, *Philebus*, and *Timaeus* flesh out the late metaphysics of Plato. The *Sophist* especially continues the general metaphysical investigation. All three contribute to our understanding of how Plato came to think of the relation between Forms, captured in the structures of Collection and Division. The *Philebus* and especially the *Timaeus* then revisit the principal challenge of the first part of the *Parmenides*, namely the participation relation between particulars and Forms. They are Plato's last and by far most detailed thoughts on the nature of particulars and their dependence on Forms.

These later dialogues all build on the foundation laid down in the second part of the *Parmenides*. My concern here will be with the first two Hypotheses of the second part. These contain seminal insights into the very nature of what it is to be a Form. Before turning to them, however, some brief

remarks are in order about the first part of the dialogue. The sequence of arguments in the first part has provoked some of the fiercest and best debates about a cardinal issue in Plato's metaphysics, the nature of "separation." This doctrine is typically viewed in terms of Forms and particulars, although the fact that Forms can participate in other Forms suggests that it cannot be understood wholly in those terms. Besides, reaction to these arguments in large part seems almost to define one's take on Plato's later metaphysics. The fulcrum of interpretations is the two so-called Third Man arguments at 132a1–b2 and 132c12–133a6. Scholars have hotly debated the nature of these One-Over-Many arguments and the peculiar premises about Forms that Plato may or may not have employed in their construction. If thought to be telling objections to the Theory of Forms, these arguments signal a massive change in Plato's metaphysics. If thought to be objections that Plato knew how to dissolve, then these arguments indicate how Plato hopes to articulate a more elaborate theory of Forms.³ My view, in brief, is that none of these arguments is effective, and Plato knew it.

The First Part⁴

The youngish Socrates portrayed in this work is confident that he has worked out the relation between Forms and particulars. (It is surely deliberate on Plato's part that the youngest Socrates we encounter in the dialogues is made to defend the Hypothesis presented by the oldest Socrates we encounter in the dialogues, namely Socrates in the *Phaedo* on his deathbed.) Participation allows particulars to have multiple properties, including contraries, and thus be many or complex. Parmenides attacks this part of Socrates' account. After hearing Zeno's treatise, Socrates says he would be surprised if someone, who begins by distinguishing each Form, itself by itself apart (*διαιρηται χωρις αυτα καθ' αυτα τα εϊδη*, 129d7–8), for instance Likeness, Unlikeness, Plurality, and Unity, Motion, Rest, and all the others, then shows that these are able to combine with and be separated from one another.⁵ Precisely why Socrates would be amazed is not easy to determine. His remark seems to deny that any given Form could also be its opposite, e.g., One cannot be Many, Likeness cannot be Unlikeness, and so on. But underlying this contention seems to be the thesis that each Form is itself one, insofar as each is distinguished apart itself by itself. Thus what would surprise Socrates is if it could be shown not only that a given Form is qualified by its opposite, but that *it combines with anything* and thereby is revealed not to be one itself by itself, apart from other Forms. The pointed, almost boastful manner in which Socrates lays down this marker about the status of Forms as not subject to the vagaries of compresence augurs that down the line they will have to consider whether Forms are related to one another.

Particulars can be many by participating in Forms, even “contrary” Forms, but each Form is one and what it is in its own right. Parmenides’ initial query draws the admissions both that Forms and their participants are separate ($\chi\omega\rho\iota\varsigma$), and that there is a Form of Likeness “separate from the likeness we have,” thereby seemingly distinguishing the Form from the form-copies had by the particulars (130b1–5). His initial remarks address the range of these Forms.⁶ Socrates concedes that there are Forms of the properties he and Zeno have discussed, as well as Forms of moral properties. But Socrates balks at positing Forms of Man, Fire, and Water, and recoils at the prospect of Forms of Mud and other trifling physical stuffs (130c1–d9). The Forms over which Socrates hesitates recall his autobiographical confession that he can’t figure out what to say about natural matters, as well as the Final Argument for immortality, where the status of Fire, Snow, and the relations between these items and Forms were left unresolved. Parmenides writes this hesitation off to youth (130e1–4), suggesting that the older Plato has rethought what he would now say about Forms of physical stuffs and their relations with other Forms.⁷

The subsequent arguments shatter Socrates’ confidence in his claim that Forms can remain one while particulars unproblematically can be many by partaking in the appropriate Forms. What must a Form be like such that it can be partaken of in the requisite fashion? The first challenge is to understand how a Form could be present to anything as a whole or part (130e4–131a7). If it is the whole Form in each of the many particulars, then since each of the particulars is apart from one another, Parmenides claims that the Form will be apart from itself. Socrates responds with the analogy of the day being wholly present in different places. Parmenides permutes this promising suggestion into the analogy of the sail covering many people, claiming that each person would then be covered by, or partake of, a part.

The next phase of the objection then divides Forms into physical parts and treats both the Form itself and its parts as having physical dimensions and thus as characterized by the property for which they, respectively, stand. So, in another echo of the *Phaedo*, the parts of the Large would then be smaller than the Large itself and, nonetheless, make what they are present to large. Similar paradoxical claims about the Equal and the Small show that a Form cannot be one and have parts that are present in the particulars. The scent of Anaxagoras is in the air. Parmenides seems to be treating Forms as material stuffs or mereological sums. Participation is cashed as some small part of the same stuff being present to a given material particular. It has hard to see how such a picture could apply to Likeness or the Triangle itself. Indeed, it is most plausible in the case of Fire, Water, and other mass terms, Forms to which Socrates has not committed. That no notice is made of the assumption that Forms are here treated as material entities suggests that there might also be responses to the remaining challenges.

Next comes perhaps the most famous argument in ancient philosophy, the so-called (first) Third Man. If most of the assumptions underlying the first objection are at odds with the immateriality of Phaedan Forms, this argument focuses on the cardinal Phaedan assumption that each Form is one, in the sense that there is just one common property over the many particulars. It also depends on the assumption, bruited in the concluding phase of the first objection, that the Form is appropriately characterized by the property it constitutes.

I think you believe each Form to be one from this sort of consideration. Whenever it seems to you that there are a number of things which are large, looking over them all there seems, I suppose, to be some one and the same Form over them all. From which you conclude that the Large is One?⁸ Yes. What about the Large itself and the other large things: if you look over them all in the same way with (in) your soul, will there not appear again some one large thing, in virtue of which all these appear large? It's likely. Then another Form of Largeness will appear, besides both the Large itself that has come to be and the (large) things participating in that. And over all these, again, a different (Large), in virtue of which all these will be large. And no longer then will each of your Forms be one, but the number (will be) countless (ἄπειρα). (132a1–b2)

The argument in the text needs to be supplemented. The broad parameters of this aid are widely agreed upon.⁹ Since the second step in the argument requires that the Large itself be large, we need to assume self-predication of some kind. We also need to get from the premise that there will be some one large by means of which the Large and the many larges (particulars) are large, to the conclusion that this is another Large, Largeness, different from the First Large and any one of the original many large particulars. Here we appeal to the notion that nothing, here large, is what it is in virtue of itself, i.e., we call upon a nonidentity assumption.

There are various reconstructions of the argument, relying on different versions of the One-Over-Many, Self-Predication, and Non-Identity assumptions. The argument, properly augmented, is valid. Few today, however, think Plato did not have a ready counter. Given the metaphysics of Being and Partaking developed in the last chapter, the argument breaks down over an equivocation in the sense of “is” employed in “The Large is large” and “The many larges are large.” The many larges partake of, or have, Largeness. In virtue of partaking each is characterized by Largeness: they are all large items. In order to explain their (the many) being characterized in the same way, the (one) Form of Largeness itself is introduced. But the Large itself does not partake of itself or any Largeness. It is not a large item and hence will not appear in the same way as the many larges. Rather, the Large itself Is

(what it is to be) large. This is a self-predication assumption, not a self-participation assumption. And it is true, when it is interpreted to predicate largeness of the Form the Large itself *via Being*. Every Forms self-predicates in this sense, namely that its essence is predicated of it. If we then ask in virtue of what is Largeness large, we can see how Plato reacts to the nonidentity assumption: he denies it. The Large Is large in virtue of itself, for it is identical with its essence.¹⁰

Plato, then, can escape the Third Man by insisting that the Form *Is* what it is, whereas particulars *participate* in Forms.¹¹ There are ways to make the Third Man argument more effective. Were we to allow that particular humans, e.g., Socrates and Plato, have an essence, i.e., Are what they are, then the Form Humanity and the many humans would all be human in the same way. Or if we were to allow Forms to be perfect exemplars, at least in some versions of this notion, then the many larges and the perfect, paradigmatic Large itself would be large in the same way, namely via Participation, since both would then be characterized by largeness. Since in both cases *the way of being* is shared, if one then deploys the appropriate One-Over-Many principle, one might be able to show that there is more than one Large or Man. The second Third Man argument (132c12–133a7) can be handled in the same fashion, especially if it is read as essentially a version of the first.¹² Being is not a characterizing relation. Hence, while the many imitations will be like one another, for they all have Beauty, say, Beauty does not have Beauty. Hence it is not like them in the same way as they are like each other, or in the way that each of them is like it.

Between the two Third Man arguments Parmenides destroys Socrates suggestion that Forms are thoughts (132b2–c11). Here Socrates seems to be avoiding the regress argument and returning to the issues of participation and parts and wholes. He allows that were Forms thoughts, then they would be in minds and not in particulars, i.e., they would not be divisible in the materialistic manner implied by the first objection. Parmenides responds that as the objects of thought, they would still be ones over many in the very way that invited the Third Man regress (132b3–c8). To Socrates' second suggestion that Forms are thinkings, Parmenides then insists that given that particulars partake of Forms, either everything thinks or there are unthinking thoughts.¹³

With no more suggestions forthcoming from Socrates about the nature of participation, Parmenides returns one last time to the crucial tenet of the Hypothesis of Forms, namely that a Form is an *auto kath auto* being (133c3–134e8). Since how particulars could participate in Forms has proved inexplicable, Parmenides argues that Forms will not be suitable objects of human knowledge. Whoever posits Forms as *auta kath auta* beings agrees that none of them is “in us.” Furthermore, the many such Forms that are what they are with respect to one another (πρὸς ἀλλήλας) have their being (οὐσία) with

respect to themselves and not with respect to likenesses in us, or to whatever we make of the things that we have. Hence, Knowledge itself will have as its object the Forms, while the knowledge that we have will have as its object things in our world. Once more the argument looks back to a principal feature of Forms in the middle period, indeed to the very feature that, according to Aristotle, prompted Socrates and Plato to posit Forms, the need for a stable object of knowledge. Moreover, by positing that certain Forms are inherently related to other Forms or notions, e.g., Master/Slave and Knowledge/Known, Parmenides prepares the ground for thinking about the relations Forms bear to one another and to thought and language in general. As he famously first hints (133b4–c1) and then declares (134e9–135c3), it will take an extraordinarily accomplished person to avoid the pitfalls confronting the theses that each Form is one and is what it is in its own right. But, he tells Socrates, one cannot give up on Forms, for they are the *sine qua non* of the very power of dialectic. The allusion back to the middle books of the *Republic* is unmistakable. Without Forms there is no dialectic and hence no philosophical knowledge. And without philosophical knowledge, there is no life for the good person. The stage is set to reclaim the Theory of Forms by setting out the metaphysical framework in which it is embedded.

The First Two Hypotheses

The arguments of the first part question what it is for a Form to be one in light of its relation to particular participants (and minds). At this juncture, Plato must decide whether he will continue to employ the disjunction of Being and Participating in his theorizing. According to the Hypothesis of Forms, the role of Forms in relation to particulars is to be the logical cause or explanation of why particulars are the way they are. Since particulars can be whatever they are only through participation, they are dependent on Forms insofar as form-copies of a given Form are present to them. What enables a Form to make (possible that) particulars be in some determinate way is its unique relation to its essence, *ousia*. A Form does not partake of the essence, it Is the essence. In virtue of Being its essence, a Form Is what it is in its own right. It Is an *auto kath auto on*. And since Being is not a characterizing relation, the Form is not qualified by the property or essence predicated of it. Hence, the Third Man regresses are ineffective, provided that Plato can sustain the difference between Forms which Are and the many particulars which partake.

In challenging the coherence of participation in an *auto kath auto* Form, the first part of the *Parmenides* is thus a challenge to the notion that a Form Is what it is in virtue of itself. But the very notions of essence and unity seem to me to be left unchallenged by the arguments of the First Part. These

queries and arguments examine how a Form can be one in light of the alleged fact that many things partake of it. They do not ask what it is for a Form to Be whatever it Is, nor what it is for a Form to be one in its own right. In order to answer *these* questions, Plato must directly confront the issue of what it is for a Form to Be its essence. But more is at stake than the relation between Forms and particulars. The brash tone of Socrates' response to Zeno, I suggested, gestured at a different threat to the *auto kath auto* status of each Form, namely its relation to other Forms. Indeed, the very Forms introduced by Zeno and the young Socrates, e.g., Unity, Plurality, Likeness, Unlikeness, prepare the ground for this new worry. The final objection, that (some) Forms have their "being" with respect to other Forms, pointed in this same direction. And certainly when we can look backwards from the *Sophist*, to save dialectic will also require that we show how Forms commune with one another. If, then, we are to preserve the *auto kath auto* being of Forms, we must consider whether one Form can "combine" with another, that is, whether a Form can be one and many without sacrificing its *auto kath auto* status. In this respect, the problems of participation are prelude to the demonstration of the relations between Forms.

Fortunately, Parmenides' objections furnish us with a far richer apparatus with which to approach Participation and Being. Part/whole, one/many, Likeness/Unlikeness, and thought and discourse are all necessary if one is to understand how Forms can remain separate, *auto kath auto* beings, and yet partake of other Forms. All elements of the apparatus have appeared in various guises in the earlier dialogues, but each now takes on new importance in Plato's theorizing. The declaration that Forms are prerequisites for dialectic, embedded in the dialectical clash between Parmenides and Socrates, signals a more fine-grained approach to mind, language, and metaphysical theorizing. If Forms are a necessary condition for discourse, understanding what we say, and why we say it, should reveal insights into the relation and nature of Forms.

I will offer an interpretation of the first Two Hypotheses of the *Parmenides*.¹⁴ I give special attention to the Second Hypothesis, actually the first part of it. On my account, *the critical issue* of how a Form is related to its essence, that is, how a Form can be, be one, and be an *auto kath auto on*, is grounded in the initial arguments of this Hypothesis. Moreover, since I think that all other relations between a Form and other Forms or non-Form properties, if there are any, as well as relations between Forms and minds and words, are dependent on the relation of a Form to its essence, this passage foreshadows the path along which Plato's metaphysics develops.¹⁵ Finally, since the relation of Form to essence is, in my view, directly related to the question of the separation of the Forms, I will be in a position to discuss that central metaphysical issue after developing my interpretation of this stretch of the text. The account of separation will also allow us to look back at the

first part of the *Parmenides* and hence to the middle-period doctrines concerning the relation of Forms to particulars. It will turn out that the participation of particulars in Forms is no threat to their *auto kath' auto* status. Forms are separate from particulars in virtue of what each is.

In the First Hypothesis of the *Parmenides* (137c4–142a8), Parmenides subjects his hypothesis, “if the one is (one?)”—εἰ ἓν ἔστιν—to the dialectical scrutiny he wants Socrates to practice and understand. It is unclear how we are to parse the Greek. It is clear that the word-order here is different from that of the Second Hypothesis—ἓν εἰ ἔστιν (142b3: “if the one is [what it is]”). The emphasis in this First Hypothesis is on the simplicity and singularity of Parmenides’ One.¹⁶ Thus Parmenides’ first point is that it could not be many. Therefore there is no part of it and it is not a whole, lest it be many. It will be shapeless, limitless, not in space, not in motion nor at rest. At 139b4 we are introduced to the notions of Sameness and Difference.¹⁷

The (Parmenidean) one is neither the same as another or itself, nor could it be different from itself or another. For being different from itself it would be other than one and would not be one. And were it the same as another, it would be that and not itself. So that it would not in this respect be what it is, one, but other than one. So it will not be the same as another nor different from itself. Then while it is one, it could not be other than another. To be other than something belongs properly not to the one, but only to “other than another,” and no other. Therefore *by the to be one* it will not be other. But if not by that, it will not *be by itself*, and if not by itself, not as itself. And it, if in no way being other, will be other than nothing. Nor will it be the same as itself. *For the very nature of the one, that is obviously not also the nature of the same.* For when something becomes the same as something, it does not become one. When it becomes the same as the many, it becomes many not one. (139b4–d5)

Since it is not the same or different, Parmenides’ One also cannot be like or unlike, itself or another. (This suggests that Plato realizes that Likeness and Unlikeness are second-order properties: two items are like in virtue of each having the same property, e.g., being red.) The natures of like and unlike differ from being one, and thus the One cannot be like or unlike. It is not equal or unequal, nor is it in time. Not being in time, the One cannot have being:

Therefore the one is in no ways. Nor therefore is it such as to be one. For it would then be and have a share of *ousia*. Therefore the one neither is one nor is, if it is necessary to trust this account. And with respect to what is not (μη ἔστι) there could be nothing to it, as not being, nor of it. Therefore there will be no name, *logos*, nor any knowl-

edge, nor perception nor belief. Therefore it is not named, said, believed, or known. No one of the things that are perceives it. Is it possible for the one to hold so in these respects? No. (141e9–142a8)

The terse, bare prose matches the abstractness and austerity of the concepts deployed in Parmenides' critique of his own hypothesis. It is unlike anything else in the corpus. We are undertaking a general examination into the relations between Forms and we must be alert to notions being defined in their application to the argument. The roles they perform in the inferences in these deductions will help to determine what we are to make of Sameness, Difference, Unity, Being, Partaking, Likeness, Unlikeness, and other critical notions. The phase of the argument about Same and Different is especially important. For the first time in the dialogue (or the corpus!), we have the *nature* of Forms compared and differentiated: Οὐχ ἥπερ τοῦ ἐνὸς φύσις, αὐτῆ δῆλου καὶ τοῦ ταῦτοῦ (139d2–3: "For the very nature of the one, that is obviously not also the nature of the same."). We simply see that the natures are different. It is obvious, δῆλον. This is an intuitive or intellectual act. It is a part of, if not the same as, the dieresis of each Form apart itself by itself Socrates spoke of at 129d6–e4. What would surprise Socrates, recall, is if it were to turn out that once one had separated each Form, itself by itself, the Forms then turn out to mix with one another. Here the recognition of the difference in nature is simultaneously also a case of Forms being *separated from each other*. Recognition of when natures are distinct supports the argument at every step. In trying to understand what there is, we just see that there are certain items which differ from one another and, in virtue of their individual natures, we see their unique roles in the language that we speak and especially in a philosophical account of what there is.

Also critical is the intuition that each Form *is itself*. The distinction of natures is part of the argument that the Parmenidean One cannot be *the same as* itself. This is apparent in the proof that the Parmenidean One cannot be like or unlike: "Were it different from itself it would be different from One and would not *be one*." Since each Form is itself, the Parmenidean One is One. This is taken to mean that the Parmenidean One is such that it admits of exactly one property, being one. The problem with the Parmenidean One is that whatever is the nature of the One, it is obviously different from the nature of any other Form. Hence if *being one* is not the same property as *being (the same as) oneself*, then The One cannot *be itself*; for all that is allowed is for it to be one. The addition of the reflexive—*self*—thereby is denied to the One, since being self-identical is different from being one.

The import of this conflict between being one's self and being one can be seen in light of the *auto kath' auto* status of Forms. We have relied on the fact that each Form is what it is in virtue of itself. If we are to understand the

referent of “self” in the reflexive pronoun (αὐτό), we need to be able to specify some way that the Form is. What this way is in the case of each Form is its respective essence (*ousia*). The essence thus furnishes (the content of) the Form, which is the anaphoric referent of “self,” thus allowing one to say what it is in virtue of itself. (This relation between Form and essence, recall, is Being.) Since it is only its essence, it is one, but this now describes a *fact about the relation of essence to the Form itself*. This is a logical property, a comment on the ontological relation of essence to Form. It is something that one can (and must) say about any Form. The Parmenidean One is a spectacular first choice for dialectical training precisely because it forces the young Socrates to consider what it is for something to Be in its own right, independent of its many instances, i.e., how a Form can Be its essence, and be one, and be itself. In order to secure the different Forms, each itself in virtue of itself, we will need to understand not just what each Form is, i.e., not just what the *logos* of each Form is, we will also have to come to understand the nature of logical properties such as Unity, Sameness, Difference, Likeness, and Unlikeness.

In the subsequent stages of the First Hypothesis, the Parmenidean One is neutered and then destroyed by these considerations. Every property other than being one is denied it. Finally at 141e, it is denied a share of being, *ousia*.¹⁸ It is impossible to say what the force of “being” is here. It does not matter, provided that we recognize that *being* anything, *being* anyway at all, is distinct from being *one*. It seems that, on the hypothesis of the Parmenidean One, we cannot even consider the respective essences as essences of Forms, for that is to make them beings, as opposed to simply the peculiar essence each is. We have claimed that the Theory of Forms presupposes that each essence is the essence of exactly one Form. This is now viewed as predicating a property of each Form. In the case of the Parmenidean One, however, no property other than [being] one can be predicated, because it is just one. But this means, apparently, that the One cannot be its essence, for *being* its essence, and being *one*, which is its essence, are different. Hence the One is not one, and is not in any way at all.

The Second Hypothesis (142b1–155e3) redefines the starting point. We are to consider the consequences that follow from the assumption that One is (what it is), ἓν εἰ ἔστιν.¹⁹ The first is that this One cannot be itself (that), without partaking of being (οὐσίας . . . μετέχειν). The One of this Hypothesis thus differs in its starting point from the Parmenidean One. This “Platonic” entity is a One that from the outset is not restricted to (attempting to be) simply and solely one; it does not start from one *arche*. This Platonic One is a One which starts from two *archai*, Being and Unity. The manner of expressing this notion, with its juxtaposition of essence and Partaking, provides a striking contrast to the language of the *Phaedo*. Here a Form starts out by partaking, a notion restricted even in the first part of the *Parmenides*

to particulars.²⁰ The first inference here negates the final (ontological) consequence that had annihilated the Parmenidean One.

Therefore there will also be the being of the one which is not the same as the one. For that would not be the being of it, nor would it, the one, have a share of that (being). On the contrary, saying that the one is (ἐν τε εἶναι) would be like saying the one one(s) (καὶ ἐν ἕν). (142b7–c2) But now that is not the hypothesis, if one ones, what must follow, but if one is. Therefore “is” signifies something different from “one.” Then that the one partakes of being, this would be what is said when anyone in brief says that the one is. (142c2–7)

The Platonic One differs from the Parmenidean One in that it partakes of Being. The critical premise in this argument is once again an intuition, namely that “one is” and “one ones” *mean* different things. Like the difference between Sameness and Unity, it is taken to be obvious that Being and Unity differ, or that to be²¹ and to be one differ. Since these two *archai* differ, the Platonic One can partake of Being without thereby partaking of Unity or itself, which was all the Parmenidean One could do, since it alone was available to be participated in or to be a participant. The fact that there are two items is used to secure the partaking of Being which frees the Platonic One from the fate of its predecessor. Unlike the Parmenidean One, the Platonic One is a “One-Being.” The next step is to explore the consequences for a One that come from partaking in Being. The first question is whether a One-Being has parts.

If “is” is said of the One-Being (τοῦ ἐνὸς ὄντος), and “one” of the Being-One (τοῦ ὄντος ἐνός), and since Being and One are not the same, but they are of that same thing which we hypothesized, the One-Being, then is it not necessary that the whole is the One-Being itself, and that One and Being are parts of it? (142d1–5)

Since it is a whole with parts, we can next consider each of these parts.

Consider each of the two parts of the One-Being, One and Being. Is the One ever absent from the Being part, or Being from the One part? It couldn't be. Therefore in its turn each of the parts has One and Being; and in turn the smallest part comes to be from two parts; and according to the same argument, it is always so: whatever part comes to be, it has these two parts, for the One always has Being and Being has One. So that necessarily it always is two and never one. Therefore the One-Being in this way would be limitless in number. (142d9–143a2)

Having established that the One Is, Plato now points out that the One component is itself a One-Being, as is the Being component. For nothing may

lack either component. *Every Platonic One is a One-Being.* What are these One-Beings? The answer is any Form, i.e., anything posited to possess an *ousia*.²² Anything posited to be a Form cannot itself lack either component, lest it suffer the indignities of the Parmenidean One. This is true of every “part” that turns up in the argument, i.e., Sameness, Difference, Likeness, and each of the Forms. Clearly we have a different sense of “part” in play in this Hypothesis from that confronted in the first part (sic) of the dialogue. The different One-Beings are notional parts of a world of Forms, and each of these notional parts itself is comprised of at least two logical parts, a One component and a Being component. These are not material parts and they cannot be separated from that of which they are parts except by an act of intellection. One and Being, therefore, have to have both an “ontological” value and a “logical” value, if I may use these terms. They have an ontological value in that the One itself is a Form with its peculiar essence and Being itself is a Form with its peculiar essence. They have a logical value in that each severally is a condition that anything that Is must satisfy.²³ That anything must satisfy them, that any Form must partake of them, is the very grounds for positing them as Forms. In this respect, they are required elements in a theory of Forms. Nonetheless, what it means to be a One-Being is still unspecified.

Go in this direction further: We say that the One has a share of Being, wherefore it is. And on account of these, the One-Being appeared to be many.²⁴ What about this: The One itself, which we say has a share of Being, if we take it in thought itself alone by itself, without that which we say it partakes of, will this very thing appear to be one or also many? One, I think. Let’s see. It is necessary that the Being, *ousia*, of the One be one thing, and the One be another, if the One is not Being, but as One partakes of Being. Then if the Being (*ἡ οὐσία*) is different and the One is different, then neither by the One will the One be different from the Being, nor by the Being will the Being be other than the One. They differ from one another by the Different and Other. So then the Different is not the same as the One nor the same as Being. (143a4–b7)

The argument continues through the generation of numbers and then a host of predicates familiar from Zeno’s treatise and the First Hypothesis.²⁵ I halt here, because this rich text marks the entry of Difference into the enterprise. From it I think we can see how Sameness and other properties (predicates) legitimately can be said to enter the Platonic metaphysics. After having secured that any One-Being has two components, and that they are never found apart in any One-Being, the first step in the argument is to isolate one of these components. We are asked to consider the One component by itself in thought. Why think that this is possible? The basis for this distinction is

that we have already conceded that to be One and to be the Being of which One partakes are different. Our grounds for thinking this are the intuitions involved in recognizing when sentences mean different things (142c4–5), and this in turn rests on the intuition that their natures differ (139d1–5).²⁶ We do distinguish them and hold them separate in thought. But when we consider the two of them, then we understand that something else explains their *being different* from each other, something itself distinct from what it is to be One and what it is to be Being. For being Different is neither what it is to be One nor what it is to be Being.

The course of the argument has led us from the hypothesis of two factors to this third, Difference. We start our general inquiry into the nature of what there is from the consideration of how many primitives and of what sort we require in order to give an account of what there is. The failure of the First Hypothesis shows that one *arche* will not do. So, the next stage is to try two. The choice of One and Being no doubt reflects the Parmenidean provenance of the discussion. But they also reflect the nature of the inquiry itself, namely an attempt to set out an account of what there is. In logical or metaphysical space, Plato seems to be suggesting, we start from the notion that each thing that is, is something: to be is to be something. This is captured in the expression $\alpha \epsilon \nu \delta \nu$, a “One-Being.” This foundational item is itself comprised of two components that are never apart from one another in the ontological order. This kind of being is then universalized for all beings, or what here is referred to as all parts of the “One-Being.” Once one grants that a candidate entity is an $\delta \nu$, it follows that it is a One-Being. Since I have claimed that each One-Being is a Form, each Form then can be analyzed into a One component and a Being component, what is here termed “essence.” This is to say that each Form is something, and the something it is, is its essence. Thus each Form is what it is in virtue of being (Being) its essence.

The One component is, I think, harder to understand. If the Being component contributes the essence to the Form, the One component contributes singularity to the essence and to the Form of which it is the essence. In concert, they yield a Form that is what it is in virtue of itself, and that is in virtue of itself exactly one. Contributing to this general framework are the two Parmenidean Principles that are never far from Plato’s thought and help constitute his Eleaticism. (Parmenidean Principle I: Each essence is the essence of exactly one Form; Parmenidean Principle II: Each Form has (or is) exactly one essence.) In the case of each Form then, in virtue of Being its essence, it is one. By parallel reasoning it is also a being, for whatever is an essence, is a being.

How then do we determine that the essence of each Form is different? We see it. We see it in the reasoning that compels us to recognize that One and Being perform two distinct roles in the understanding of anything that is. Once we have accepted a plurality of two items, each itself a One-Being, we

immediately arrive at the third, Difference, which we see is implicit in our notional recognition that there are two One-Beings, One and Being. For once we conclude that each One-Being is its essence, we can say that there is something it is and it is this in virtue of itself. We use this notion, in turn, to justify the claim that any One-Being's being different from something else is due to Difference.

Any One-Being, any Form, Is its essence. Having found something for it to be, we can now consider it to be the same as itself. This sameness is distinct from what it is in itself, but it follows that once it is something in virtue of itself, every Form is the same as itself. Furthermore, at the meta-level occupied by this argument, we can see that in fact there are common characteristics of all Forms, namely that they are One, Being, Same, and Different. This sameness of properties gives us the notion of likeness or similarity, and conversely, the notion of dissimilarity, at least by negation. The multiplicity of properties demonstrates that each One-Being is, inevitably, many. Since each is also one, this is the first of the paradoxes of compresence to follow from the thesis that in order to be anything a Form must be a One-Being. Others follow, including of course that each is same and different. The highly monistic sense of "one" to which Socrates subscribed in expressing himself at the outset (129) about compresence is jettisoned with the end of the First Hypothesis. Forms cannot be ones in that sense. Being one for a Form is something it is because it is also something else besides.

What are we to make of this notion that each Form is a One-Being? In the previous chapter I proposed that we consider each Form to bear a special relation to its essence: of each Form there is a single essence, and that essence is predicated of its Form via Being. We now find that the Platonic One also must share in Being, or essence, in order to be. New to the account is that each Form that has a share of Being is also one. I take this to be an effort to capture the notion that essence is individual in that it is unique and the essence of exactly one Form. What the essence of any Form is is something Plato seldom tells us.²⁷ What we learn instead is how to theorize about the relation between essenced items. Insofar, then, as each Form is a unique essence, we can preserve the notion that it is what it is in virtue of itself. For what *it* is, is a peculiar essence that no other form is. Hence, each Form cannot be what it is in virtue of anything besides itself.

If this account of One and Being supports the interpretation of Forms in the middle period, the fact that Forms now seem to partake is cause for concern. Indeed, it is not just that they seem to partake of other Forms, for we had a hint of that in the *Phaedo* and *Republic*. Forms now suffer compresence, heretofore a blight on particulars. The problem of Participation, and Participation by Forms in Being, will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter. That the Forms now partake of other Forms, or Beings, is certain. However, what Forms partake of are not substantial properties such

as Heat, Cold, Good, let alone Fire or Snow. Forms partake of Sameness, Difference, Plurality, Unity, and so on. These Forms fall into opposites and thus each Form is qualified by opposites, e.g., same and different. It is true that Parmenides/Plato is able and all too willing to detail the respects in which a Form is the same and is not the same, or like and unlike. Certainly the mere fact that the sticks, for instance, seemed (in this way) equal and (in another) not equal was cause for condemnation in the *Phaedo*, irrespective of whether the contexts could be appropriately relativized. The principal difference, I think, is not that compresence is less a worry, but that it is trumped by the fact that each Form Is what it Is, and suffers compresence in virtue of being a Form. It does not suffer compresence with respect to its essence. Rather, in virtue of being what it Is, it must be other things, same, different, and so on. Particulars, on the other hand, lacking any essence, are threatened with compresence with respect to *any property*.

One problem compresence posed for particulars was that it rendered them cognitively suspect. Being both F and not-F precluded them from being an object of knowledge. Indeed, it seemed to threaten their very identifiability. Plato, anticipating that any particular is identified through its properties, has reason to be hesitant to allow one to have a steady purchase on a particular. The appeal to intuition about the difference in properties witnessed in the first two Hypotheses shows that Forms do not have that blemish.

Finally, the fact that Forms partake threatens to resuscitate the Third Man arguments. In the next chapter I will take up some Third Man–style arguments that do arise in the later metaphysic. But nothing introduced in the *Parmenides* is yet liable to subject the Form of Large to the regress offered at 132. The Form remains something which is, or Is, its essence. It does not have it. It is still an open question whether in partaking of Difference and Sameness et. al., we should assert that it is qualified or characterized in the fashion of particulars. But Being its essence, each Form Is what it Is and Is what it Is in virtue of itself, without thereby being qualified by the property it Is.

SECTION TWO

Separation

The development of the Platonic One-Being as a proxy for any Form is a turning point in Plato's metaphysical development. The general metaphysical theory embodied in the Second Hypothesis grounds Plato's thesis that there is an essence predicated of each Form in virtue of which the Form Is what it is. This thesis, I claimed, speaks to the Being component, or the essence, of each Form. The argument of the Second Hypothesis thus supports the thesis

of the *Phaedo* that each Form enjoys a strong ontological relation with its essence, the relation of Being. The One component, in turn, represents the intuition that essence is a unity,²⁸ an intuition buttressed by the assumption that the essence is unique to the Form of which that essence is the essence. In combination they allow Plato to claim that a Form is what it is in its own right: each Form is an *αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ ὄν*. But the general metaphysical theory of the *Parmenides* differs from the apparent doctrine of the *Phaedo* in one crucial respect. In the *Phaedo*, it seems that Forms are isolated both from particulars and from one another. Certainly it seems that Forms do not partake of one another. In the *Parmenides*, on the other hand, each Form *must* partake of at least Being and Unity and certain other Forms that are part of the framework of the general theory. How Plato conceives of the participation in these Forms, and what he thinks of the possibility of Forms combining with other Forms, will be the subject of the ensuing chapters.

The second part of the *Parmenides*, however, seems to have little to say about the relation of Forms to particulars. This is surprising, given the arguments of the first part. In particular, the Third Man argument has been one of the battlegrounds on which the great war over Aristotelian versus Platonic accounts of universals has been waged.²⁹ The Third Man arguments variously work with one-over-many and plurality principles, self-predication and non-identity assumptions, and assumptions about separation. It is separation, I think, that is key to understanding the Platonic metaphysics and its differences with the metaphysics of his brilliant student.

The notion that Plato's Forms are separate comes from two principal sources. First, there is the language and argument of the dialogues themselves marking Forms as separate (*χωρίς*) and as *auto kath auto* beings. There is little doubt that these locutions, in the context of the arguments in the *Phaedo* and *Parmenides*, along with contributory discussions in the *Republic* and *Timaeus*, signify that Forms are separate from particulars. The second is the report of Aristotle, especially those passages in the *Metaphysics* describing the intellectual history of Plato and the Theory of Forms. The thrust of these passages also is that Forms are separate from particulars. The debate arises over what it means for Forms to be separate, which in turn divides into questions concerning what Aristotle means by the term, and what Plato signifies in claiming that Forms are *χωρίς* and *auto kath auto* beings.³⁰ The critical question is what, if anything, does the *auto kath auto* status of the Form tell us about the sense in which Forms are separate?

Since Plato never discusses separation, it has tempted not a few to look to Aristotle for guidance (see especially *Meta.* 1042a26–31). There we find three senses in which things, including Forms, can be separate. First is a local or spatial sense: things are separate if they share no boundary. Second, there is the notion that things can be separate in account or definition (*logos*): things are separate if the definition of the one is not predicable of the other.³¹

Finally, there is the “existential” sense, which allows that items can exist independently from other things.³² Clearly Plato thinks that Forms are spatially separate from particulars, since Forms are outside of space and time. Many think that the dispute is over the existential separation of Forms and particulars. I think that ultimately at issue for Plato is definitional separation. First, let us follow Aristotle’s lead and consider particulars and Forms.

Aristotle, in the first book of the *Metaphysics*, tells us: (A) In the beginning of his career, Plato became familiar with Heraclitean doctrines. Two of them he retained. These doctrines are that all of the sensibles are always flowing, and that there is no knowledge of them. Socrates, meanwhile, was worrying about ethical matters, and not at all about the whole of nature, seeking the universal in them and thinking for the first time about definitions. Plato accepted his teaching, but held that the problem applied not to any sensible thing but to entities of another kind—for this reason, that the common definition could not be a definition of any sensible thing, as they were always changing. Things of this other sort, then, he called Ideas (after Ross):

ἐκ νέου τε γὰρ συνήθης γενόμενος πρῶτον Κρατύλῳ καὶ ταῖς Ἡρακλειτείοις δόξαις, ὡς ἀπάντων τῶν αἰσθητῶν αἰεὶ ῥεόντων καὶ ἐπιστήμης περὶ αὐτῶν οὐκ οὔσης, ταῦτα μὲν καὶ ὕστερον οὕτως ὑπέλαβεν· Σωκράτους δὲ περὶ μὲν τὰ ἠθικὰ πραγματευομένου περὶ δὲ τῆς ὅλης φύσεως οὐθέν, ἐν μέντοι τούτοις τὸ καθόλου ζητούντος καὶ περὶ ὁρισμῶν ἐπιστήσαντος πρώτου τὴν διάνοιαν, ἐκείνιν ἀποδεξάμενος διὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον ὑπέλαβεν ὡς περὶ ἐτέρων τοῦτο γινόμενον καὶ οὐ τῶν αἰσθητῶν· ἀδύνατον γὰρ εἶναι τὸν κοινὸν ὄρον τῶν αἰσθητῶν τινός, αἰεὶ γε μεταβαλλόντων. οὔτος οὖν τὰ μὲν τοιαῦτα τῶν ὄντων ἰδέας προσηγόρευσε. (987a32–987b7)

The Greek is somewhat choppy. We know that Plato learned from the Heracliteans that all sensibles are in flux and³³ that there is no knowledge of them. It is not said that there was no knowledge of them *because* of the flux. These beliefs, we are told, he retained later. We learn next that Socrates was seeking the universal and thinking about definitions in ethical matters. Again, these are two distinct matters, though Aristotle clearly thinks them related. The next remark is critical, and alas the Greek is unclear. The participle, ἀποδεξάμενος, has Plato accepting something, or accepting what Socrates said, or was doing. Plato, “on account of such a consideration (διὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον),” thought that definition (and the universal) was about different things, things other than the sensibles. For [he thought] that it was impossible for the common definition to be about the sensibles since³⁴ they are always changing. The quoted remark seems to look forward to the explanatory remark, and the synthesis of Socratic and Heraclitean beliefs. Knowledge, precluded by Heraclitean flux from being about sensibles, is, as Socra-

tes understood, connected to the universal through definitions. By allowing definitions to be about nonsensibles, Plato provided objects of knowledge. These definables he called Forms.

There is no telling from this argument what a definition or universal does, either for what it is the definition of, or to make knowledge possible. The historical passage at 1078b12 contributes some more information (B):

συνέβη δ' ἡ περὶ τῶν εἰδῶν δόξα τοῖς εἰποῦσι διὰ τὸ πεισθῆναι περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας τοῖς Ἡρακλειτείοις λόγοις ὡς πάντων τῶν αἰσθητῶν αἰεὶ ῥεόντων, ὥστ' εἴπερ ἐπιστήμη τινὸς ἔσται καὶ φρόνησις, ἑτέρας δεῖν τινὰς φύσεις εἶναι παρὰ τὰς αἰσθητὰς μενούσας· οὐ γὰρ εἶναι τῶν ῥεόντων ἐπιστήμην. Σωκράτους δὲ περὶ τὰς ἠθικὰς ἀρετὰς πραγματευομένου καὶ περὶ τούτων ὀρίζεσθαι καθόλου ζητοῦντος πρώτου. . . . ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν Σωκράτης τὰ καθόλου οὐ χωριστὰ ἐποίει οὐδὲ τοὺς ὀρισμούς· οἱ δ' ἐχώρισαν, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ὄντων ἰδέας προσηγόρευσαν, ὥστε συνέβαινεν αὐτοῖς σχεδὸν τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ πάντων ἰδέας εἶναι τῶν καθόλου λεγομένων. (1078b12–34)

The supporters of the ideal theory were led to it because they were persuaded of the truth of the Heraclitean doctrine that all sensible things are ever passing away, so that if knowledge or thought is to have an object, there must be some other and permanent entities, apart from those which are sensible; for there can be no knowledge of things which are in a state of flux. Socrates occupied himself with the excellences of character, and in connection with them became the first to raise the problem of universal definitions. . . . But Socrates did not make the universals or the definitions exist apart; his successors, however, gave them separate existence, and this was the kind of thing they called Ideas. (trans. Ross)

The premise here is that if there is to be knowledge and wisdom of anything (τινός), then there must be some different, abiding natures (ἑτέρας δεῖν τινὰς φύσεις εἶναι παρὰ τὰς αἰσθητὰς μενούσας). These natures are what Socrates sought to define in the ethical sphere. The universal he sought for seems also to be associated with these different natures. These natures and definitions Socrates did not separate (from the particulars). Plato did.

We can begin to see an ontological turn in this passage. There are *natures* that are to serve as the definables and hence the objects of knowledge. These abide, instead of flow, and they are different, especially in that respect, from sensibles. Socrates did not make these definitions and universals separate. Given that we saw in (A) that it was Plato who thought to marry Heraclitean flux to Socrates' searches, we can infer that Socrates did not think that the sensibles were in flux. Hence when we are told that he sought the universal

and the definition in the ethical sphere, we have no reason to doubt that these are to be found, on Aristotle's reconstruction of the philosophical history, in the sensibles. When Plato marries the Heraclitean and Socratic messages, he separates these natures, definitions, and universals from the sensibles.

The final passage is most informative (C):

ἅμα γὰρ καθόλου τε [ὡς οὐσίας] ποιοῦσι τὰς ιδέας καὶ πάλιν ὡς χωριστὰς καὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον . . . αἴτιον δὲ τοῦ συνάψαι ταῦτα εἰς ταῦτόν τοις λέγουσι τὰς οὐσίας καθόλου, ὅτι τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς οὐ τὰς αὐτὰς [οὐσίας] ἐποιοῦν· τὰ μὲν οὖν ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα βρεῖν ἐνόμιζον καὶ μένειν οὐθὲν αὐτῶν, τὸ δὲ καθόλου παρὰ ταῦτα εἶναι τε καὶ ἕτερόν τι εἶναι. τοῦτο δ', ὡσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν ἐλέγομεν, ἐκίνησε μὲν Σωκράτης διὰ τοὺς ὀρισμούς, οὐ μὴν ἐχώρισέ γε τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον· καὶ τοῦτο ὀρθῶς ἐνόησεν οὐ χωρίσας. δηλοῖ δὲ ἐκ τῶν ἔργων· ἄνευ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ καθόλου οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμην λαβεῖν, τὸ δὲ χωρίζειν αἴτιον τῶν συμβαινόντων δυσχερῶν περὶ τὰς ιδέας ἐστίν. οἱ δ' ὡς ἀναγκαῖον, εἶπερ ἔσονταί τινες οὐσίαι παρὰ τὰς αἰσθητὰς καὶ ῥεούσας, χωριστὰς εἶναι, ἄλλας μὲν οὐκ εἶχον ταῦτας δὲ τὰς καθόλου λεγομένας ἐξέθεσαν, ὥστε συμβαίνειν σχεδὸν τὰς αὐτὰς φύσεις εἶναι τὰς καθόλου καὶ τὰς καθ' ἕκαστον.

The Platonists make the ideas both universal and again as separate and of (or from?) the class of particulars (ὡς χωριστὰς καὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον, 1086a33–4).³⁵ (It has been argued previously that this is impossible.) The reason those saying that the substances (*ousias*) are universal combine these notions (universality and being separate³⁶) in the same thing is that they did not make the substances the same for (as) sensibles. For they believed that the particulars among the sensibles (τὰ μὲν οὖν ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα) flowed, and that none abided, and they believed the universal to be in addition to these [particulars among the sensibles] and something different. We are told again that Socrates moved such a position on account of definitions, but did not separate [them] from the particulars.³⁷ The Platonists, thinking rightly that the universal was needed for knowledge, set out the just mentioned universals as separate. They did this because, thinking that there had to be substances besides the sensible, they had no others (1086a32–b11).

At last the notion of substance (*ousia*)³⁸ enters the account. Disregard Aristotle's contention that Platonists, by separating Forms, are guilty of making them particulars. The supporting premise for this claim is that Platonists make them *ousiai*. This is the ontological key to the assimilation of universals, definitions, and the debate about separation. The introduction of the

term “universal” is liable to mislead here, since it is not a Socratic or Platonic expression. It clearly has resonance, however, with Platonic phraseology and should here be treated as the object of definition. The universal sought by Socrates just is the ontological referent of the definition answering a “What is it?” question. The answering *logos* or ὁρισμὸς refers to, or stands for, the *ousia* of the (say) ethical property. It is universal, as we saw, in that it applies to many. It is not separate in that Socrates allows that the particulars are themselves, or through their properties, in possession of the essence or *ousia*. The definition is thus in some fashion linguistically predicable of the particular, since the essence is found among the sensibles.

With the notion of *ousia* in place, we can now understand how Plato might think that there is no knowledge of sensibles. They lack *ousia*. Since knowledge requires definitions and definitions require *ousia*, if there is knowledge there must be things that have or are *ousia*. Hence, these must be other than the sensibles. Notice that we cannot determine whether they lack *ousia* because they change, or whether they change because they lack *ousia*. Nor does it matter, since we are assuming that there is knowledge.

What are we to make of this as an argument for separate Forms? Plato clearly thought it an argument, says Aristotle, with the repercussion, Aristotle assures us, that he makes universals into particulars by making them substances. We can disregard the charge laid at the feet of “being separate.” Aristotle is prepared to argue in this context that any substance is a particular. Hence, if a universal is a substance, then it is a particular. And since nothing is, for him, a universal and a particular, Plato’s separation of Forms renders them absurd, by his reckoning. This argument turns on peculiarities of Aristotle’s account of substance and can therefore be left to one side. Nonetheless, we cannot disregard the fact that it is in virtue of being a substance, an *ousia*, that Plato’s Forms are separate. What does this claim mean?

Separation, or being separate, is typically taken to mean ontological or existential independence. The handbook description of Plato’s Forms makes them out to be transcendent entities, as opposed to Aristotle’s immanent Forms. To be transcendent is then parsed as being capable of existing independently of sensible particulars. The weakest reading of this claim explicates ontological separation as amounting to nothing more than difference from particulars. A stronger reading would be that a Form, F, can exist independently of *any given* particular that is F. Since neither of these two readings would be repugnant to the proponent of immanent universals, the favored interpretation of the separation of Forms is that the Form F can exist independently of *all particulars* which are (have been or will be) F: Forms can exist *uninstantiated*.³⁹ This interpretation is not free from difficulties. When we assert that Plato thinks that a Form can exist uninstantiated by particulars, we need to consider what notion of particular is in play.⁴⁰

It is sometimes thought that Aristotle shows that Plato's argument is a failure. Plato's argument, or rather Aristotle's reconstruction of it, allows him to claim only that there are universals *different from* sensibles. Assuming, as Aristotle does, that there is knowledge and that knowledge is of universals, then the arguments show that the universals are not "in change" and that they are not sensibles.⁴¹ The argument *does not* show that universals *are not present in or present to* sensibles. Suppose that the sensibles are sensible particulars (τὰ μὲν οὖν ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα). Then even if the particulars change, it could be argued that some of their properties do not. Moreover, it has not been shown that the "sensibles" here refer to particulars such as Socrates. Some have argued that the "sensibles" here are sensible property types.⁴² I will call them Sensibilists. In claiming that universals are different from sensibles, Plato may have meant only that they are not definable in terms of sensible property types. Indeed, the claim may be even weaker, namely that they are not definable exclusively or entirely in terms of sensible properties.

One motivation for the Sensibilist interpretation of the argument on behalf of separated Forms is the number of arguments in the middle period dialogues that appear to use a notion of "flux" explicable in terms of sensible property types (see Appendix). I think that it is doubtful that Plato's concern in the middle period is to infer that Forms are separable from the claim that Forms are not definable in terms of sensible properties. In fact, it is not at all clear whether the proponents of sensible properties think Plato is prepared to argue for Forms, or separated Forms, on the basis of flux or not. (See especially Fine's work⁴³ on the difference between Plato and Aristotle over substance. She is alert to the possibility that they may simply disagree about the relation between being a substance, being separate, and being a particular.) However, since the Sensibilists' target arguments do concern the postulation of Forms, and since Plato's middle period Forms are almost universally thought to be, by his lights and ours, separated Forms, I will assume that their reconstruction is designed to get him from flux to Forms. It will not do so, as these scholars concede. However, I think that it *cannot* do so on their understanding of the argument. Charity recommends that we reject their account of separation, if an alternative is available. I will argue that it is.

First, it is not clear that not being definable in terms of *sensible properties* entails anything about the existential *independence of* Forms *from sensible particulars*. If particulars are more than a bundle of sensible properties, e.g., perhaps they have essential properties, or nonsensible properties, or matter, then independence from sensible properties will not completely determine the relation of Forms to sensible particulars. The Forms may in fact depend on nonsensible properties had by particulars, or essential properties, and so on. On the other hand, if particulars are a bundle of sensible properties, it *might* follow that indefinability in terms of sensible properties renders Forms

existentially independent of particulars. In this circumstance, however, there is no reason, besides mistaken belief, to link Forms to particulars at all; for if all of the properties of particulars are sensible properties, and if Forms are not definable in terms of sensible properties, then particulars do not acquire their properties by participating in Forms. This can be remedied, I think, by allowing that Forms are not definable *exclusively* in terms of sensible properties. This would mean that the linguistic definition of the Form *could* include (mention of, we would say) sensible properties, but *must* include at least one nonsensible property.

The relation of sensible properties both to the definitions of Forms and to the nature of particulars is at the heart of the argument proposed by Sensibilists. According to their account of compresence, flux is interpreted fundamentally⁴⁴ as an aspectual change, and not as the change of properties familiar from the generation and perishing of a material particular, or its gain and loss of a property, e.g., a certain pallor or a certain tan. (See appendix: “A [= aspect] change: x changes from being F in one respect to being not-F in another [e.g., x is big compared with y, small compared with z]” [Irwin, *Moral*, 148].)⁴⁵ A key example for this interpretation is the sticks from the Recollection Argument (*Phaedo* 74ff.), where the same sticks appear equal to one person, unequal to the next, or equal to this stick, unequal to another. The sticks themselves do not change. How they are viewed or regarded does. *But particulars are not the primary subject of flux, on this account.* Rather the primary locus of the compresence of opposites is *sensible property types* such as Bright Color.

What, then, is compresence in the case of property types?⁴⁶ It is not easy to say what Sensibilists have in mind. One difficulty is that they do not specify with any precision the notion of a sensible or observable property.⁴⁷ Hence, one cannot determine when a property is or is not defined in terms of sensible properties. A second difficulty for their account, and one especially germane to the separation debate, is the absence of discussion about the relations between sensible properties, incomplete properties, and complete properties. Typically Sensibilists maintain that there are no Forms (in the middle dialogues) for complete properties and that there are Forms for incomplete properties. There are Forms for the incomplete properties because sensibles, i.e., sensible properties, suffer compresence with respect to the incomplete properties. Since a property, F, suffers compresence if it is F and not-F, the afflicted property cannot be explanatory of all and only F things. Hence a Form is introduced in order to fill the explanatory need. This Form does not suffer compresence, which means that it is perfect, self-predicative, and paradigmatic: all these notions appear to amount to the same, namely being F and not not-F.⁴⁸

Lacking any detailed account of the relations between the different types of properties, it is unclear what we are to say about either the real definitions

of sensible properties themselves, or about the real definitions of the incomplete properties. The incomplete property, Beauty, suffers compresence insofar as it is defined in terms of a sensible property, e.g., Bright Color. Sensibilists seem to want to claim that anything defined in terms of sensible properties suffers compresence.⁴⁹ But this leaves it open whether Beauty, in its own right, suffers compresence. That is to say, it leaves it open whether beautiful particulars might be both beautiful and not-beautiful. Moreover, absent an account of what it is to be a sensible property, it is unclear whether being defined in terms of them is problematic only for incomplete properties. If one reads the discussion at *Rep.* 523–24 as indicating that fingers are “defined” in terms of sensible properties, then sensible properties cannot be the source of compresence; for (being) a finger does not suffer compresence. It is a complete property. But let us suppose that complete properties are not defined in terms of sensible properties. What is the relation between being a sensible property and suffering compresence? The Sensibilist, as we have seen, claims that if a property is an incomplete property, then it suffers compresence. Does any property that suffers compresence qualify as incomplete? If so, then if every sensible property suffers compresence, then the sensible and the incomplete properties seem to be equivalent if not identical. But this seems wrong: there is no reason to think that the property Bright Color suffers compresence. A temple that is brightly colored need not also be not brightly colored. Merely because something is a sensible property or defined in terms of them—a notion that we should be wary of pending an account of how sensible properties are themselves defined!—is not then adequate to account for compresence or separation.

The problematic of compresence and separation is not then *initially* to be understood in terms of the property, Bright Color, say, both being Bright Color and not being Bright Color. Rather, the compresent property is some second property. According to the Sensibilist, it is one of the limited number of “incomplete properties” (Irwin’s or B- and C-properties; see Appendix). The sensible properties are viewed as prospective definitions of these incomplete properties. To refute these definitions, we show that, for instance, Bright Color accounts for beauty in some particulars and does not account for beauty in others; or it causes some things to be beautiful and others to be not-beautiful. Failures of these sorts are then explications of what it is for a sensible property type, Bright Color, to suffer compresence: Bright Color is both beautiful and not-beautiful—Bright Color is F and not-F—because some brightly colored things are beautiful and others are not.

The prospective definition of Beauty is the result of a mistaken belief. According to the Sensibilist, we see a brightly colored temple, say the temple at Bassae, which we also are prepared to say is beautiful. We⁵⁰ then assert that it is beautiful because it is brightly colored. On the other hand, we then see another brightly colored temple, this time at Olympia. Of this we say it is

not beautiful, and that its being not-beautiful is due to its being brightly colored. In both cases our assertion is false. Being brightly colored is responsible neither for the temple at Bassae's beauty nor for the temple at Olympia's lack of beauty. (What is responsible, according to Plato, is its partaking in Beauty itself.)⁵¹ Notice, however, the assumption that Bassae, the material particular, is both beautiful and brightly colored, i.e., has these two distinct properties, and that Olympia is both brightly colored and not-beautiful. This account of compresence thus requires that in order for incomplete properties to suffer compresence, there must be some particulars that are *complex*: some of them have not only the sensible property Bright Color, they also have the targeted nonsensible, incomplete property Beauty; and *others* have the sensible property Bright Color and have the opposite of the targeted nonsensible, incomplete(?) property, (being) Not-Beautiful. Thus in order to demonstrate that incomplete and sensible properties are in flux, there must be particulars that are instances of both the Forms and the sensible properties. There must, then, be particulars that are both beautiful and brightly colored and particulars that are not-beautiful and brightly colored. This account of flux as compresence of sensible properties in the definition of incomplete properties *requires* particulars that instantiate properties. Beauty must be instantiated along with both Bright Color and its absence in order to show the need for a Form that does not suffer compresence.

It seems to me that if separation is understood to be existential independence, then this account, with its commitment to instantiated properties, cannot be a basis on which to conclude, or from which to argue, that Forms are separate *from particulars*. This is perhaps too strong: it cannot be a good basis. A more sophisticated defense is also possible, however. For the Sensibilist's Plato might argue that the fact that we find Beauty instantiated with Bright Color and with its absence, does not entail that Beauty *must* be instantiated. That there actually are beautiful particulars shows that Beauty *can* be instantiated, but actuality does not imply necessity. That there are instances proves that it cannot be what some think it is, but it does not address the issue of existential independence.

This rationale behind separation can be preserved by such speculations, but they seem to me be special pleading. First, the crucial step in Plato's argument, according to the Sensibilist, derives from a mistaken effort on the part of *others* to define incomplete properties, for which alone there are Forms, in terms of sensible properties. Why should Plato conclude anything about the relation of Forms to particulars on the basis of false definitions? Second, this interpretation suggests that Plato improperly infers from the nonreducibility of Forms to other properties the existential independence of Forms from particulars. This is a non sequitur.⁵² Finally, to get the argument off the ground, there must be particulars which instantiate the property to be separated. Only by inspecting the relevant counterexamples can one deter-

mine that the sensible properties fail to define the incomplete property. This account, therefore, presumes that Forms are instantiated in order to show that they need not be. If this were Plato's account of flux, it is hard to see why he might think that flux *supported* the separation of Forms from particulars. At best, property flux shows nothing about the separability of Forms from particulars. The separation is derived from a subsequent reflection that particulars need not instantiate (or have instantiated) Beauty. But if this intuition is what ultimately grounds the separation of Forms, it is preferable to see if there is a way to use it as the foundation for Plato's argument. I think that there is a way, and hence I think that the machinery of compresence and sensible properties, whatever they may be, is not the right account of flux.

All three Aristotelian passages advert to knowledge as critical in the move from flux to separated Forms. The passages also reveal that knowledge is linked to definition, and that both knowledge and definition are linked with the universal. The argument commences by assuming that (1) sensible particulars are always changing, that is, they are in flux. This is a metaphysical premise. Next there is the critical assumption that (2) there is no definition or knowledge of what is always changing, the sensible particulars. Finally, there is the assumption that (3) there is knowledge. This last assumption is another metaphysical assumption about what there is, namely knowledge. So far the argument reflects Plato's commitments, since he does assume that there is knowledge. But Aristotle shares that assumption, so it cannot be the source of his complaint against Plato's argument.

The second premise bridges the gap between knowledge and flux, but reveals little about Plato's reasons for precluding knowledge from what changes. Those are to be furnished from Aristotle's commentary on Plato's intellectual heritage. The flux or change in sensibles entails, somehow, that there is no definition of sensibles *and* that there are no universals among the sensibles. This is virtually an exegetical "*and*"; the object of definition is the universal; hence where there is no definition, there are no universals. Also, since where there is no definition, there is no knowledge, there is no knowledge of what is in flux. But there is knowledge.⁵³ With the relationship between knowledge, definition, and the universal in the open, we can turn to the premise that there is knowledge.

If there is knowledge, there are both definitions and universals. The second passage (B) gives us the first hint that the notions of definition and universal have ontological value. There we learn that Plato inferred from the previous assumptions that there were abiding natures, different from sensibles. The third passage (C) calls them *ousiai*. These are clearly metaphysical items. The fact that there is knowledge entails, for (Aristotle's) Plato, that there are *ousiai*. For *ousiai* are the referents of linguistic definitions and they are the objects of knowledge. These *ousiai* are also universals, to use Aristotle's term, though Plato calls them Forms.

At this juncture, a decision about the translation and identification of *ousiai* becomes critical. We can translate *ousia* as “substance,” and hew to a more Aristotelian line of interpretation. These substances are nonsensible, they are universal(s), and they are Forms. Aristotle asserts that, for Plato, these Forms are separate. But because they are separate, says Aristotle, they are particular. Hence, because they are separate they are both universal and particular. Since nothing can be universal and particular, we need to jettison the idea that the *ousia* required for knowledge and definition is separate. Different and common, Aristotle will insist, but not separate.

The Aristotelian notion of separation is too complex to investigate here, but it suffices for our purposes to note that he does *not* accept the assumption that the sensible particulars are in flux, and hence he need not seek elsewhere for his definable objects of knowledge. Hence he can assert that the objects of knowledge for him are also *ousiai*, substances. In his hands this is harmless, since his *ousiai* are in, or are found with, the sensible particulars.⁵⁴ They are different from these particulars, but they are not separate.⁵⁵ All this flows from his commitment to immanent Forms. Given that this notion of immanent Forms is one of the most important metaphysical differences between Plato and Aristotle, we are right to think that the Platonic separation under scrutiny implies that *ousia* are not found among the sensible particulars.

If we side with Aristotle then, we can ask why the nonsensible universals, the objects of definition, the *ousiai*, need be separate, i.e., exist independently from particulars. This is a legitimate subject for debate, arising from a disagreement about two cardinal issues: 1) Is the sensible world in flux and thus lacking in *ousia*? 2) Is anything that is separate particular? Plato, I am sure, does not think that separation entails particularity, as Aristotle conceives of that notion. (What is particular for Aristotle at the very least can not be predicated of many.) But both would agree that anything separate is (at least) separate from particulars. Aristotle might say “other particulars.” Plato would not. What does not seem to be a matter of debate is whether anything that is a substance, an *ousia*, is separate. Aristotle thinks that his primary substances, whether they be material particulars or not, are separate. And Plato, on Aristotle’s reading, seems to affirm this too. It therefore seems to me to be an error to question whether “separation issues from substancehood.”⁵⁶ This error is compounded if, on the basis of Aristotle’s report, we begin to query whether separation is, for Plato, a defining feature of substances (οὐσίαι). As Fine argues, “Whenever he characterizes the realm of *ousia*, he mentions—not separation but—changelessness, everlastingness, inaccessibility to sense perception, being basic to knowledge and definition, and the like. As we have seen, none of these features requires separation.”⁵⁷

In order to understand how, for Plato, separation issues from substancehood, we first need to consider the notion of “existential independence.” We have no clear discussion of “existence” in Plato.⁵⁸ The attempt to understand

what particulars are, what it is and is not to be an object of knowledge and definition, and finally, what it is to be or to have an *ousia*, will provide us with whatever evidence we have for Plato's position on existence. If we think that, for Plato, Forms exist, then it might seem that the (only?) question is whether their existence requires the sometime presence of a particular that instantiates them. There are two different ways that a Form might require particulars to instantiate it. It might be that Forms are the basic and primary existing things and that they somehow cause particulars to come into being, say by emanation or necessary interaction with other primitive items, e.g., souls. The existence of particulars is then a necessary consequence of the existence of Forms. In this respect, then, Forms could not exist without particulars and they would thus fail to be existentially independent.

The second way in which Forms might require particulars reverses the order of being, if you will. The Forms might be dependent on particulars for their (coming into) being. On this view, the properties of particulars might be similar or common to the properties of other particulars, but they are each a property of some one particular. The common nature, the definition, is then posited to be independent of any one particular, but not independent from all particulars. Why? Two reasons are available. The first is that we derive our knowledge and understanding of these properties from our experience with particulars which have them. This includes our explanations of why particulars are the way they are. In order for our explanations to work, the particulars must have the requisite properties. Since particulars do submit to explanation,⁵⁹ they have the properties; and since we assume that they exist, we do not need to assume that properties exist apart from them. The first alternative takes the existence of particulars for granted and then proposes a story about how we can explain the nature and behavior of the particular by understanding the properties that it shares with other particulars. The above is a well-known empiricist tale and may or may not reflect the truth. It does not, however, reflect Plato's telling of the Theory of Forms. While perhaps in the background of Aristotle's account, it cannot be what Plato might have thought it was to separate Forms. It is doubtful that there is knowledge of the sensible world, and there is clear evidence that he thought that knowledge of Forms does not depend on our experience of the physical world.⁶⁰

The second reason is that we cannot account for how we could come to know of the existence of uninstantiated universals. This is a more deep-seated objection. It not only speaks to worries about how we could be related to objects which are not manifested in particulars. It also bespeaks the belief that transcendent universals are liable to be merely conceptual items and thus are not demonstrated to exist. At best, then, transcendent universals would be objects of thought.

The line of reasoning leading to this conclusion is the product of reflec-

tion on the metaphysical disputes occasioned by the disagreement between Plato and Aristotle over *ousia*, essence. The treatment of existence as a property or as an aspect that can be considered independently of the notion of essence is, I believe, a late addition to the debate. I do not think that, for Plato, existence is a primitive and inexplicable aspect of Forms, detachable from essence, or its role in knowledge and definition. We cannot sensibly ask, therefore, whether the fact that Forms exist “issues from” the fact that Forms are substances (*ousiai*). Worries about “existential independence,” therefore, would seem to have to concern the notion of independence, not existence. Whence do Forms derive their essence?

Both the dialogues and Aristotle are clear about the answer to this question. We do begin from knowledge and definition, and the assumptions concerning flux and knowledge, and flux and the sensible world. Since there are knowledge and definition, there is *ousia*, essence. (That this flows directly from the assumption about knowledge and definition will trouble those of us who think that we cannot get from considerations about knowledge to claims about existence.) There is no indication, then, that Forms derive their essence from particulars. In fact, we learn that sensible particulars are not knowable or definable because there is no essence among them. Forms are “substances” because they have essences, and they are “nonsensible” because nothing sensible is or has an essence. At the very least then, it follows that particulars lack essences. If, furthermore, lacking an *ousia* means that they are not substances, then they are not substances. There are, then, only nonsensible substances.

If Forms have or are essences, do they exist? This can only be our question, not Plato’s or even Aristotle’s. Not only does the Greek language compel the conclusion that something is an *ōn*, a being, from the premise that it is an *ousia*, this relation gives flesh to the otherwise bare notion of existence under scrutiny in the separation debate. The Greek philosophical intuition is that to be is to be something. To be an *ousia* or an essence is the superlative something to be. The question is not whether being an essence qualifies one as an existent, but whether one can be an existent otherwise.

Forms exist, then, if they are or have essences. In this respect existence issues from substancehood. If independence can be shown to issue from substancehood, then Forms will be existentially independent. Does a Form’s possession of its essence depend upon the existence of sensible particulars? (I assume, for the sake of argument, that sensible particulars exist.) The answer falls out immediately from the argument from flux. Once it is granted that sensibles in flux are indefinable, Plato concludes that there is no essence to be found there. Otherwise they would be definable and knowable. Therefore the Form cannot derive its essence from particulars, for they have no essence to give. Being participated in, therefore, cannot contribute to the Form’s possession of an essence. So, even if it were to turn out that Forms neces-

sarily “emanate” and thus that particulars are “necessary consequences” of (essenced) Forms—i.e., Forms could not exist apart from particulars—Forms would still not depend for their essence on particulars. And since essence is sufficient for existence, “emanation” would be no threat to the independent existence of Forms.⁶¹

Separation does issue from substancehood. This is true for Plato, I believe, whatever interpretation we give to “separate.” If we think that “existential independence” is not a consequence of *ousia*, then it is less surprising that we would think that separation is not a condition of substancehood for Plato. The absence from the Platonic texts of *χωριστόν* might support this misapprehension. But the list of conditions mentioned above omits a condition: Nowhere do we see being an *auto kath auto on*. This condition is, I submit, a Platonic equivalent of “being separate.”⁶² A Form is what it is in its own right because it is its essence, which is its “being component,” i.e., what it is in virtue of participating in Being. These principles, derived from the Second Hypothesis of the *Parmenides*, have ancestors in the *Phaedo*. The steady migration of the expression “*auto kath auto*” from the soul, to the activities of the soul, to the objects of those activities, reveals that Forms are *auto kath auto* beings. There, too, they are in the service of knowledge. They are known by a reasoning soul, functioning on its own, separate from its body. The Forms, *qua* objects of knowledge, are as free from the bodily as the knowing soul is. They too are separate, i.e., *auto kath auto*, beings.

Separation of Forms from particulars is only one aspect of the assignment of essence to Forms. No explanation has been offered as to why change in the sensible particulars precludes them from having essences. Consideration of the notion of Partaking does not alleviate all worries. On my account, Forms are partaken of. These Forms are identical with their essence. If then we are prepared to say that Platonic particulars partake of Forms, how can we not say that they have essences? While this would not threaten the ontological separation vouchsafed by the fact that Forms are essences and thus *auto kath auto* beings, it would jeopardize the epistemological grounds undergirding the argument. After all, Socratic properties were present to particulars and in virtue of being present bequeathed their essence to the sensible particulars. So it is not foreign to Plato to allow essence to be found among the particulars. Why doesn’t participation require the same result?

Part of the answer to this question involves the nature of the participating particular. It was noted above that we take the existence of particulars for granted in Plato’s early and middle dialogues, and similarly we took for granted the existence of particulars in the discussion of separation. This assumption will be challenged in the last chapter. Here I want to focus on the other element in participation, the Form. In order to block the predication of the essence,⁶³ I utilized form-copies. These, I said, are what is had by a particular. Their being had by the particular does not entail that the essence

is predicated of the particular because they are not identical with their respective essences. Rather, the essence is predicated of them in the same way that it is predicated of the Form, namely via Being. While this may be an effective maneuver in blocking the transmission of essence to particulars, it leads to a different worry about the separation of the Forms. For now it seems that essence is predicated of something else, namely the form-copies. At the very least then they are definable and knowable. It thus follows that Forms are not definitionally separate full stop, but only definitionally separate from particulars.⁶⁴ What exactly the relation is between Forms, their instances and other Forms, awaits an answer.

5

FORMS AND LANGUAGE

Overview

The cardinal tenet of the Theory of Forms is that a Form is the peculiar bearer of its *ousia*, its essence. Because its *ousia* is predicable of a given Form, each Form is an *auto kath' auto* being: it is what it is in its own right. In virtue of possessing an essence, each Form *is* in a special way; each Form *Is* its *ousia*. It is paired in the Second Hypothesis of the *Parmenides* with another tenet concerning the unity of each Form; each Form must be both a thing that is and *one* thing. An essence is itself a unity, and a Form, in virtue of Being such an essence, is itself one. Each Form is also unique in that it and it alone among Forms *Is* its essence. These assumptions about Essence, Being, and Unity, embodied in Parmenidean Principles I and II, reveal that the most basic items in the Platonic metaphysics are One-Beings. This notion of a One-Being is a metaphysical condition governing all Forms, including Unity and Being. It is the development of the notion that each Form is *monooides*.

The fact that each Form *Is* its essence is sufficient, I argued, to sustain the claim that each Form is separate from particulars, and *a fortiori* any and all particulars which happen to be instances of it. The moral common to the *Phaedo* and Aristotle's "history" of Plato's development is that sensible particulars are indefinable and (hence) not subject to knowledge because they lack essences. To this extent, then, Plato can appeal to the argument of the

Parmenides to justify his earlier contention that Forms are the subject of a special intellectual inquiry and are not somehow abstracted from one's sensory experience. Sensory experience is not capable of yielding contact with essence, and thus is incapable of furnishing one with knowledge. Knowledge of Forms requires dialectical inquiry, an inquiry using the mind's own resources. The terse general metaphysics of the *Parmenides* is one aspect of such an inquiry. The late dialogues provide us with other aspects.

The isolation of the notion of a One-Being as a separate, unique *auto kath' auto* being allows Plato to move beyond the questions of the early and middle dialogues concerning particulars and their relation to Forms. Parmenides' recommendation (134e9–136c) to define what each Form is in the manner of his own exercise now compels Plato to concentrate on the relations between Forms. Whatever we make of the clever *aitia* of the *Phaedo* and the tantalizing remarks about the Good in the *Republic*, in the *Parmenides* we find clear evidence that no Form can be investigated independently of other Forms. In the course of establishing that each Form is a One-Being, Plato for the first time in the corpus appeals to the fact that properties have obviously distinct natures, Unity and Sameness in the First Hypothesis, Unity, Being, and Difference in the Second. In the latter, moreover, he explicitly distinguishes between things that are different or found apart from one another, versus those that are distinguishable in thought, or recognized to be different by reflection on the meaning of statements. The metaphysical inquiry requisite to preserve dialectic reveals that each Form not only must partake of Being and Oneness, each must also partake of Difference, Sameness, and other Forms. Each Form must be complex. The demands of thought, language, and metaphysical theory force Plato to posit relations between Forms. The *Parmenides*' demonstration that a Form must be complex signals a new set of problems for Plato, a set of problems that can legitimately be viewed as a new worry about separation.

Put very broadly, the new worry concerns the communion of Forms, or the relations Forms have to one another. These relations are varied. Given that Plato is investigating relations between properties, all of which in some sense are necessary if not analytic, the new worries should not be parsed in terms of the existential independence of Forms from one another. Consider Being, Oneness, and Difference. That each Form must be a One-Being, coupled with the power of thought to distinguish both Unity and Being, leads to the conclusion that there must also be a third Form, Difference, of which each Form must partake. The argument of this Hypothesis, and other passages in the *Parmenides* and later dialogues, shows that when one understands what a Form is, Unity, Sameness, Difference, and Being must be posited as Forms of which every Form partakes. But if each Form *must* partake of One, Being, and Different, in what sense could we ask whether one of these three would exist were the others not to exist? Of course one can claim

that these notions are not Forms, a topic that we will consider later in the chapter. But if we provisionally accept them as Forms, and entailed by the “existence” of any Form, then it makes little sense to think that the separation of Forms from one another could be a form of existential independence.

The new worries about separation arise, I believe, from the very character of the new way in which Plato studies them. In the *Phaedo* and *Republic*, Forms are hypothesized in order to account for a set of problems peculiar to the task at hand, the demonstration that the soul is immortal, and the proof that the just life is the happy life. Remarks on methodology, while present, are brief and always in the service of the stated goals. On the other hand, from the outset at *Phaedo* 65, and especially in the central books of the *Republic*, Plato emphasizes that Forms are the special objects of knowledge. As we saw in the discussion of separation, Plato assumes that there is knowledge, and that its objects are stable. In the *Republic*, moreover, the kind of knowledge is given some flesh. Dialectic is introduced as a discipline whose domain seems to be all of what there is, i.e., all Forms, and whose end result is an ability to give an account or definition of each of the Forms, each of the things that *Are*. But the nature of Dialectic is only adumbrated, and how one acquires it is only hinted at. It requires a long study of the nature and character of scientific and mathematical disciplines, and it likely includes reflections on their common principles, as well as the give and take of argument and elenctic inquiry. Clearly it is concerned with the development of definitions, and must concern itself with the nature and experiences of the rational soul that enables one to acquire these definitions. But no commentary is offered on the nature of definitions, and little attention is given to the question of how language and thought are able to limn the world. Beginning with the *Parmenides*, Plato’s focus changes dramatically.

Certainly Plato had no better predecessor to guide him in the inquiry into the relation between what there is and how one can think about it. Parmenides had famously and cryptically identified the two. To pry them apart, *to distinguish what there is from the general study of what there is*, is thus a different kind of separation. Plato undertakes, for the first time, to distinguish the conceptual order from the ontological order. In speaking of the conceptual, I mean to include language, thought, and theory. As the transitional passage at 134–35 indicates, part of metaphysical inquiry includes determining what makes language and thought possible. Since Plato takes for granted that they are possible, the very conditions that are requisite for thought and theorizing will have metaphysical consequences. As we have witnessed, Being and Unity must together be accepted as ontological foundations in part so that we can think and talk about what there is.

Since metaphysical inquiry is itself part of thought and language—it is by Plato’s reckoning its apogee—such inquiry must be self-accommodating. Ideally the very principles, categories, and commitments of the inquiry must

be assimilated into the theory itself. This is an exceedingly difficult task. In general, there are problems incorporating the relation(s) of exemplification or instantiation, resemblance or compresence into metaphysical realism, nominalism, or trope theory. Plato is not immune to these difficulties. Many of the most penetrating difficulties of the *Sophist* are of this sort. In this dialogue, Plato for the first time offers a study of various theories of Being, with at least the underlying aim of setting out the general principles governing any specific or special ontology. The host of notions familiar from Aristotle's *Metaphysics* are deployed in the search for the sophist. (It is no accident, of course, that this results first in the discovery of the philosopher. The sophist is an [bad] image of the philosopher and as such cannot be known without first knowing what he is an image of.) The twists and turns of the argument introduce the notions of subject and predicate, universal and particular, part and whole, one and many, same and different, rest and motion, participation, separation, thought, language, and theory.

In my account of separation (chapter 4, section 2), I remarked that the assumption that there is knowledge might, in the eyes of many, taint the ontological conclusion. This is not the only instance of the mixture of the epistemological and metaphysical. In the *Sophist*, and elsewhere, Plato refutes various metaphysical doctrines, e.g., Monism, on the grounds that they make theorizing or knowledge impossible. But Plato is not always ready to posit ontological items in order to save the conceptual or "semantic" phenomena. The most famous instance of resistance is his denial that there is an ontological kind corresponding to every general term or predicate in the language: not all distinctions in thought or speech have an ontological correlate. Between cases like "barbarian" and the rejection of (strict) Parmenidean Monism, are difficult decisions about the interplay of language and what there is, decisions concerning the notions of Unity, Sameness, Difference, and Being. My approach to these matters will be metaphysical not linguistic. I begin (again) from the premise that each Form Is its essence.¹ The self-predication assumption remains the fundamental condition governing Plato's later metaphysics of Forms. Only by understanding how and why it is that each Form Is its essence will we be able to see what it is for Forms to partake of one another, and thus navigate our way through the maze of the argument of the *Sophist*.

The complexity of the Form is a consequence of the kind of thing a Form is, a One-Being. Thus from the outset of the post-Parmenidean theory, his is a pluralist metaphysic, one of whose elements is Being. Further, very general reflections lead to additional Forms such as Sameness and Difference. Thus one task of the later metaphysical works, beginning with the *Parmenides* and continuing in the *Sophist*, is the study of the relations that hold between these rather abstract Forms.²

There is uncertainty about how to characterize the relation(s) between a

Form and these new, ubiquitous properties, or a Form and any other Form. Participation was developed to cover the relation of particulars to Forms. It is a characterizing relation. If Forms participate in these other Forms, then each Form will be definitionally separate from the ubiquitous Forms discussed in the *Sophist* and *Parmenides*. But this suggests that Forms *actually have* the properties answering to the names “Unity,” “Sameness,” “Difference,” “Being,” and certain others. They will be characterized by these properties just as a particular is characterized by any Form in which it participates. Plato’s general metaphysical theory requires that there be complex Forms that stand in ontological relations with one another. Ideally, we can represent these relations in language and give an account of them in our theory. Plato, always sensitive to language and its limitations, understands that language, in the end, can only be an imperfect guide to what there is. But treatment for the new worries about the relations between Forms, about the notions of Being and Participating, and about the nature of essence, must begin with the study of language. It is the best guide he, and we, have.

The separation and communion of Forms with one another involve the seminal issues of Plato’s later metaphysics and is found in numerous discussions in the later dialogues. To many, the communion of Forms has signaled a rejection of large elements of his earlier account of Forms, particulars, Being, and Partaking. The critical changes assume many forms, depending on one’s take on the earlier Theory of Forms: Forms are subject to participation; Forms are complex; Forms and particulars are no longer the only *onta* in the ontology; there are non-Form properties, corresponding to the predicates of the language that do not refer to Forms or particulars³; some even think that Plato gives up Forms altogether. The metaphysical differences fit hand to glove with alleged changes in his epistemology and developments in his philosophy of language, if the phrase can be put in service without eliciting the charge of anachronism. Plato’s notion of knowledge is no longer wedded to the name or perceptual metaphors. The new analog is the statement or proposition, where subject and predicate reflect a more complex state of affairs, a world of related entities, not the isolated, simple Forms deemed appropriate to serve as the referent of a name.⁴

In this chapter I investigate some of the key features of Plato’s later metaphysics as they pertain to Forms, the relations between Forms, and the relations between language and Forms. Obviously I cannot cover this entire topic. Discussion of false statement I postpone until the next chapter. My vehicle is a detailed study of the *Sophist* and the issue of the interweaving of Forms, aka *sumploke eidon*. Before turning to the texts themselves, however, I think it is useful to consider how the secondary literature has come to formulate the questions in the way that it has. Fortunately, this can be accomplished by looking back to one remarkable article that is the font from which much of the most trenchant and decisive scholarship of the last half-century

has flowed, Gilbert Ryle's article on the *Parmenides*, published in *Mind* in 1939.⁵

In his study Ryle contends that by the time of the *Parmenides* Plato was breaking free from a theory of substantial Forms, wherein "abstract nouns are proper names and Forms are terms in relational propositions" (10–11). In asserting that Being, Unity, Sameness, Difference, Similarity, and Dissimilarity are vowel forms, Plato was recognizing a distinction among concepts: "Plato uses this analogy to explain how certain concepts like existence and non-existence have a different sort of logical behavior from most ordinary concepts, just (as I construe him) because they are not terms in the propositions which we think but the forms of the combinations of those elements into propositions. . . . For what it is tempting to construe as the essential properties of universals will in fact turn out (since universals cannot have properties) to be formal features of propositions, in which of course universals will be factors" (18–19).

It is fair to say that Ryle's article occasioned a "linguistic turn" in the examination of Plato's later philosophy.⁶ To read Ryle, it seems that front and center in Plato's mind are worries about the logical behavior of concepts, especially those concepts and "behaviors" that characterize how we think and talk about Forms. Whereas it strikes Ryle as plausible to ask after the nature of a substantial Form, i.e., what is it to be an animal, or perhaps even after the nature of a Form such as Justice, he finds odd the idea that there is an analysis or definition of Sameness or Unity or Being. Ryle's interest in promoting the linguistic turn deterred him from investigating the definitions of substantive Forms and their parts.⁷ He did, however, think that Plato came to view knowledge as fundamentally propositional, as "knowing that," i.e., as best expressed in a statement, and thus not (any longer) intuitive, or "acquaintance-like," as best expressed by a "name." The statement or judgment is complex and thus exhibits relations between Forms or subjects and properties in general. With the syncategorematic "Forms" now treated as types of judgments, i.e., identity statements, predications, self-predications, and so on, there is no question of whether substantial Forms are separate from the Forms of Unity, Sameness, etc. There are no such Forms. A substantive account of Being would be a mistake. And as for the substantial Forms themselves, Ryle's program directs us to consider Forms in terms of the statements in which they figure as subject or predicate. If separation and communion is an issue at all, it will thus be addressed through consideration of the relations Forms have to one another as they are expressed in statements.

The Rylean viewpoint has us look to different ways of using expressions, formulating judgments, and thinking about what is common to and presupposed by our judgments. Substantial Forms not only do not enjoy any special status (over particulars) as subjects in these judgments, they cannot even be subjects or related to one another, because universals cannot have properties.

I think most would admit that Ryle's view is extreme. Plato is not done with substantial Forms, especially if the *Timaeus* is late. The *megista gene* and such "vowel-forms" as there might be are not merely forms of judgment. But his view forces us to reconsider the notions of Being and Participating, along with our conception of what it is to be a Form. Our understanding of whether and how Forms are separate from one another will clearly hinge on our understanding of the import of different ways of *speaking about* Forms.

A second feature of Ryle's account was his attack on the notion of Participation.⁸ By reconstruing Being, Unity, Sameness, and Difference as forms of combinations of elements, Ryle liberated Being from the ranks of Forms. Participation, on the other hand, was never assigned that status. In Ryle's view, Plato abandons the old notion of Participation for good cause. The objection is called "Ryle's regress." In brief, the idea is that according to Plato, Participation is a relation between one thing, the particular, and a second thing, the Form. Since this relation is found in all cases of particulars possessing properties, we have, by Plato's lights, a many—all the instances of participation—over which we should posit a one, the Form of Participation itself. "We have two different instances of the relation of being-an-instance-of. What is the relation between them and that of which they are instances? It will have to be exemplification Number 2. The exemplification of P by S will be an instance of exemplification, and its being in that relation to exemplification will be an instance of a second-order exemplification, and that of a third, and so on ad infinitum."⁹

Ryle's regress eliminates Participation as a viable relation between Forms, or Forms and participants.¹⁰ Various responses to the regress have been offered. One can plausibly insist that Participation is a *sui generis* relationship, a primitive relation which helps to comprise the theory. We might insist that it is then incumbent on the theorist to explain how the categories of the theory are to be assimilated to the theory and demand that she offer a general defense of her primitives. There is no explicit discussion of this sort in the dialogues. If it is any consolation, Plato can console himself with the knowledge that he is not alone among metaphysicians in this regard.¹¹ Nonetheless, the late dialogues, and especially the *Sophist*, do address themselves to the role certain primitives play within his metaphysics. The sought-after defense then may be nothing more than the display of how the Theory of Forms saves various phenomena, e.g., false statement, the possibility of dialectic, thought and speech, the various "truths" that we take to be obvious. We can, I think, defend Plato against Ryle's regress, at least to the extent that we can show that he is no worse off than other metaphysicians, whether those who posit a primitive relation, e.g., brute similarity,¹² or those who also postulate some other sort of connection between universals and particulars.

One line of defense appeals to the nature of the supposed relation. Ryle's regress treats Participation as a dyadic relation, one that obtains between two relata or objects.¹³ In the case of Participation between a particular and a

Form, Plato clearly seems to concede that the Form, an αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό being, is an object. Must he concede that the particular is an object? No. Participation between a particular and a Form does not “tie” or “add” a property to an *independently existing object*, an object that would or could exist prior to any Participation it might engage in. Rather, Participation is what gives the particular any and all of its properties; it somehow brings about the particular. Participation, therefore, would not be a relation holding between one *object*, the particular, and a second, a Form.

This line of defense suffices, if at all, only when we consider the relation between particulars and Forms. It is available only because particulars are nothing in their own right. Since Forms are *auto kath' auto* beings, the same line of defense will not work if Forms participate in one another. We have seen that in the *Parmenides* Forms do partake of each other, and the *Sophist* confirms this apparently new development in the account of Forms. I will examine how we are to understand the *Sophist's* notion that Forms not only partake or commune with other Forms, but I will specifically take up the problem of how Forms can be said to partake of Being, a locution first encountered in the Second Hypothesis of the *Parmenides*. I will argue that this “act” of Participation is the crucial moment in Plato's later metaphysics; indeed, that prior to it no Form is a being or a logical subject. But for the purposes of understanding his (possible) reaction to Ryle's regress, let us assume that the fact that Forms participate is sufficient to call into question the reply just offered in the case of particulars.

Instead of trying to meet the objection head on, let us consider why Ryle levels his objection against participation. The problem is that participation is supposed to link or tie a subject to its properties. In Plato's hands, this is to link Forms to subjects, whether those subjects are other Forms or particulars. On pain of succumbing to the regress, we must then give up, it seems, either the Forms as properties, or the particulars as subjects, or the idea that they are tied together somehow. At this juncture, however, anyone who believes that universality *and* particularity are ineliminable and irreducible aspects of the metaphysical order will balk. Every theory has its primitives. There are, to be sure, alternatives to Plato's Transcendent Realism, but each relies on its own primitives. We can appeal to other types of realisms, e.g., Aristotle's immanent realism or a Scotus-style formal distinction, but the culprit remains the need to distinguish some item's general aspect, its properties, from its particularity.¹⁴ Perhaps nominalists do not need to worry about participation. But Plato is not a nominalist.¹⁵ His metaphysical relations, of which Participation is a key, are primitive aspects precisely because he thinks it is incumbent to recognize a distinction between a subject and its properties. The only alternative appeared to be Parmenidean Monism. That turned out to be no alternative at all. Thus Plato's ultimate line of defense, I conjecture, is not the outright defeat of the objection, but *tu quoque*: the

regress afflicts all who admit the two factors into their ontology. Moreover, to do without universals and particulars is worse than to suffer the regress. So, his account is best judged in terms of what phenomena can be saved by admitting into the ontology a notion of Participation. To determine those phenomena, we need to turn to the *Sophist*.

Background to the Argument of the *Sophist*

Of all the dialogues the *Sophist* offers the most deliberate and detailed discussion of the relation of Forms to each other. While there is notably little description of the communion or participation of so-called substantial Forms with one another, the properties under consideration complement the key notions developed and exhibited in the Hypotheses of the *Parmenides*. Chief among them are Being, Sameness, and Difference. These three are the key players in Ryle's linguistic turn, because they are also most easily construed as forms of judgments. But it is principally the notion of Being that conditions all aspects of interpretation. Ryle (re)opened the door to the rejection of Being as a substantial Form by showing that it could be treated as a way of speaking or, somewhat more precisely, as a way of using the copula in various judgments. By the mid-1960s his student began his landmark essay on the *Sophist* thus: "Platonists who doubt that they are Spectators of being must settle for the knowledge that they are investigators of the verb 'to be'" (Owen, "Not-Being," 223). The pivotal issue in the debate became how many different senses, or uses, or meanings of this verb Plato had isolated, either by specifically drawing attention to them or at least having deployed the Greek *estin*, or an equivalent expression, in such a fashion that one could reasonably assert that Plato "discovered," or at least recognized, the "is" of identity, or the "is" of predication, or the "is" of existence.¹⁶ Owen himself argued powerfully that the argument of the *Sophist* "neither contains nor compels any isolation of an existential verb" (225). Owen also contributed to the language of the debate. He distinguished two syntactically distinct uses of the verb, a complete or substantive use in which it determines a one-place predicate, "X is," and an incomplete use in which it determines a two-place predicate "X is Y." Corresponding to the former is the semantic distinction between existence, or senses reducible to the notion of the existence, of some object or state of affairs, versus a second use in which "it is demoted to a subject-predicate copula or to an identity sign" (224).

Owen's language, while it has not met with universal endorsement, has come to dominate the debate.¹⁷ It was given a powerful boost by the virtually simultaneous publication of Frede's monograph, *Praedikation und Existenzaussage*, in which he developed a similar account of the copula. In so far as the debate is over whether there are passages in the *Sophist* where an "is,"

that is a form of εἶναι, is best understood as signifying existence, it seems to me that Plato does use an “is” of existence. But that is insufficient to show that an existential sense of the verb is *isolated* in the *Sophist*. More to the point, I think, is that the division into different linguistic uses, and especially the existential use, obscures the metaphysical aspect of the Form of Being. In particular, it invites the reader to distinguish questions of existence from questions of essence or participation in Being. This proved quite problematic in considering separation and will prove no less so when we inquire into what follows from the fact that a Form partakes of Being, i.e., possesses its *ousia*. Since existence is not independent of essence, we should not expect the isolation of a one-place “is,” as Owen and others understand that notion.¹⁸ Plato does not saddle his metaphysics with the property of Existence. However, to the extent that essence confers existence on whatever possesses it, by partaking in Being, a Form becomes a logical subject. Partaking in Being is what it is for a Form to be (a Form).¹⁹

What is at stake, then, between the linguistic and metaphysical accounts of the copula is not whether there is an interest on Plato’s part in depicting the linguistic behavior of the verb in its complete or incomplete uses. Plato puts forth great effort to detail linguistic behavior. But the linguistic investigation is subservient to the metaphysical inquiry. He studies language in order to draw conclusions about the nature of the Forms that ground his linguistic practices, particularly the nature of Sameness, Difference, and Being. This is not to say that the metaphysical nature of Sameness and Being and their relation to one another is easy to discern or to depict in language. Since the identity of Form and essence on my account is defined in terms of Being, it turns out to be very difficult for Plato to depict unambiguously their relation in a study of the copula.

As with Owen, Frede’s concentration on the linguistic copula and the terms which flank it cause him, I believe, to lose sight of some metaphysical implications of key passages. Even where Frede seems to focus on the metaphysical aspects of partaking and the nature of the *Forms* of Being and Sameness, his commitment to presenting his insights in terms of the incomplete “is” and the *reference* of expressions leads to untenable analyses of Plato’s account of Sameness and Being. A first manifestation of a difficulty emerges when we try to align his idea that there are different “uses” or “senses” of the incomplete “is” with the apparent insistence that there is exactly one Form; why does Plato not assign two Forms to correspond to the distinct uses? The Rylean will perhaps take this difficulty as evidence that we are not to think of these Forms as old-style Forms at all.

There are, I think, at least two unfortunate casualties of the linguistic turn. The first is the demotion of Motion and Rest from the ranks of *megista gene*. Ryle omits them from his discussion, since they are substantive “concepts,” and cannot be plausibly viewed as forms of judgments, or forms of

combinations of elements in judgments, They do of course figure in the Battle of the Gods and Giants (245e6–249d4), but discussions of this passage seldom link them with the notion of the greatest kinds. In other recent scholarship, emphasis is placed on their role in the argument at 250a8–c8, whose conclusion is that Being, according to its own nature, neither rests nor moves. It is generally agreed that the purpose of this argument is to distinguish identity from predication statements. However, scholars disagree about whether, once we have drawn this distinction, Being can be said to (predicatively) rest on the grounds that all Forms rest. (If Being partakes of Rest, then it, *pace* Ryle, would have a characteristic of a substantive Form.) The problem is that if all Forms rest, then Motion too should rest. But Plato writes repeatedly in this section of the dialogue that Rest and Motion do not, and cannot, combine. For this reason, at least, we have a cause to demote them from the ranks of greatest kinds, for they do not, unlike Being, Sameness, and Difference, go through all Forms. Yet, the program statement at 254b7–d2 more than hints that they are to be considered greatest kinds. Moreover, many readers are uncertain how to interpret the claims that they do not combine, emphasizing instead the conclusion of the argument with the Friends of the Forms. There (249b8–10), Plato seems to assert that all Forms *qua* Forms do rest. I think that all Forms do partake of Rest. One of my aims, therefore, will be to try to find a place among the greatest kinds for Rest and Motion. The Battle of Gods and Giants is key here. Motion and Rest are to be included among the greatest kinds because they represent those aspects of Forms that allow them to be at once the objects of knowledge and to be unchanged by that knowledge.

The second casualty of the linguistic turn is the role of Participation in the dialogue. Since Ryle's essay, attention has focused almost exclusively on Being, Sameness, and Difference. It is noteworthy that whereas Being is assigned a place among the greatest kinds, Plato nowhere mentions that Participation is a Form, let alone one of the greatest Forms. This is not to say, however, that Participation fails to play a role in the argument. Both the term *μετέχειν* and a host of related expressions are found throughout and at crucial times. The very fact that so many alternative expressions, and potentially alternative relations, are found in the dialogue has led many to suspect that in the late Plato Participation has become a family of relations. I think that this is accurate. But I do not think that the multiplication of relations justifies us in dismissing the absence of Participation as a Form. And once it is recalled that Being remains a Form, though it has various uses or senses, the mystery of the missing Form of Participation only deepens.

The fact that Being is a Form and the fact that Participation is not assigned this status reinforces the suspicion that Plato did not feel threatened by Ryle's regress. It is necessary to take the two facts together in order to derive this support. For the mere absence of Participation is telling only if we

think that the *Sophist's megista gene* exhaust the greatest kinds or most important Forms. But there is reason not to believe this. In the *Republic*, the Good is cited as the most important and somehow the foundation of all Forms. In the *Parmenides*, we have Unity, a Form that seems to be partaken of by all Forms, itself included. In the *Symposium* we find reason to think that Beauty is a Form that all Forms partake of, because all Forms are, for Plato, beautiful. So it might be argued that Participation, like these others, was just left off the list. However, the force of this counter is diminished by the fact that Being is on the list. Since the *Phaedo* at least, Being has been found in opposition to Participating: the former is the way of being enjoyed by Forms; the latter is the way enjoyed by particulars. Even if we concede that in the (early) middle period, Forms do not participate, that Being excludes Participating, and that in the later period Being no longer excludes Participating, the fact remains that Being is a, or the, distinctive mode of *being* for Forms. But if both Being and Participating are ways of being, what reason might Plato have for insisting in the *Sophist* that there is a Form of Being, which would, at the same time, prompt him to refrain from positing a Form of Participating? A comprehensive account of Participation and Being is possible only if we can understand how Plato conceives of the status of the all the greatest kinds. But if we are to come to this understanding, and especially if we are to appreciate the roles played by Motion, Rest, and names and statements, we cannot start with *sumploke eidon*. By the time Plato turns to discuss the greatest kinds, he has spent almost forty pages laying the groundwork for the discussion. While I will not retrace his effort in its entirety, I will devote more than the usual space to the early parts of the dialogue. Here, if I am right, we can witness his linguistic turn in the making. In particular, we will see how he comes by both the plurality of kinds that are required for *kinds* to interweave, and how he comes by both the linguistic tools, i.e., names and sentences, and the agents, rational souls, that allow us to trace in language the ontological advances in his later metaphysics.

The *Sophist*

Especially for those having taken the linguistic turn, the study of the argument of the *Sophist* often begins with the introduction of Parmenides at 236eff. The Eleatic Stranger brings him into the discussion once the sophist has taken refuge in the notion that he is a fashioner of images, of which there are two kinds, likeness-making (εἰκαστική) and appearance-making (φανταστική, 235b5–236). Not only does the Stranger not know into which kind to set the sophist, he is confused by the whole obscure notion of what seems or appears, but is not. So worry about the notion of an image is the catalyst for the ensuing discussion. But Plato has penned almost twenty pages prior to this point. Image-making itself was introduced to explain the

sophist's amazing capacity to produce the (false) belief in the young that he is the wisest of all about every topic. Like the expert who draws images which have the names of the real beings (*μιμήματα καὶ ὁμώνυμα τῶν ὄντων*, 234b6–7), the words of the sophist are spoken images (*εἶδωλα λεγόμενα*, 234c6). This capacity, in turn, appeared only after the Stranger, having produced six “accounts” (*logoi*) of the sophist through careful collections and divisions, announced that they had still failed to capture the true definition. A sophist's capacity to talk about everything and to inspire the ignorant to believe whatever he said on any topic was itself laid at the feet of one aspect of the definitions, “antilogic” (*ἀντιλογική*, 232b6).

The fact that the Stranger has produced six accounts of the sophist prior to this point of the dialogue is connected to the sophist's ability to produce conviction in the ignorant. This is to say that none of the six is actually *the* definition. While it is fitting that these be false accounts of the master of falsehood, there is no indication that they are false. Each may then pick out a feature of the sophist. The multiple definitions, as well as the notions of images and appearances, look back to the very opening of the dialogue. There (216c4–5), Socrates, contrasting the true philosophers with the fake, declares that *the true* ones appear to be of all sorts owing to the ignorance of other people (*φανταζόμενοι διὰ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἄγνοιαν*), sometimes appearing as sophists, sometimes as statesman, and sometimes even as madmen (216c8–d2).²⁰ This prompts him to ask the Stranger how he thinks about and uses the names, “sophist,” “statesman,” and “philosopher” (217a4). The question is whether there are three kinds corresponding to the three names, or whether there is simply one kind with three names. The stranger replies that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the names and kinds, but insists that the hard part is to discover the *logos* saying what each is. The problem is that each of us may have only the name in common, whereas our reason(s) for calling someone a sophist may differ, even to the point of being private (218b5–c5).

The six so-called definitions of the sophist are a case in point of this phenomenon. The relations between language, speaker, and world are such that we can have many beliefs or descriptions of the same phenomenon. Left unsaid is that we can equally have many names for the same thing. The imprecision and flexibility of language, especially in the hands of the gifted or clever speaker, leaves room for confusion and even falsehood. For instance, anyone who thought that the three names are names of one thing *might* have a false belief. The opening steps in the argument prepare the reader for the lesson in how language can fail to represent accurately the way the world is, and how users of the language can lead people into believing falsehoods. The three principle figures in the drama of the dialogue, language, world, and speaker, are thus exhibited *in actu*, even before the possibility of there being such a trio is confirmed.

The Stranger fears that their pursuit of the sophist into the division of

image-making has led them into a dead end. The problem is that they have assumed that false statement and belief are somehow possible. Parmenides, however, had denied the very possibility of false belief and false speaking, or more generally, that not being could be (τὸ μὴ ὄν εἶναι). Hence, until his arguments can be dissolved, their hunt is over. The Stranger constructs three arguments in support of Parmenides' contention. The relation of the three arguments to one another is hard to fathom.²¹ The first concerns the application of an *expression*, the name "what is not (τὸ μὴ ὄν)": To what should one (the putative listener/respondent) apply the name τὸ μὴ ὄν? (When first posed (237b7–8), however, the expression is "*what in no way is* (τὸ μηδαμῶς ὄν)," directing our attention at the outset to the notion of what is not as a complete lack of being.) The pivotal equation in the first argument (237b7–e6) is that what is not is the same as nothing (μηδέν). "What is not" cannot be applied to what is, and a fortiori not to any thing (τι), and hence not to any one thing (ἓν τι). Hence he applies it to nothing, which means, says the Stranger, that he says nothing at all and thus does not even speak. Since he does not speak, he cannot speak falsely.

The second argument (238a1–c10) attempts to treat as its subject what is not, this time an ontological item, not an expression. Difficulties arise in trying to assign any being, i.e. property, to what is not, and a fortiori no number can be applied to it.²² From this ontological premise the Stranger concludes that we cannot speak about it or grasp it in thought, because the available expressions must either be singular or plural. Hence what is not is inconceivable and unutterable. Indeed, the third argument points out that they are violating the very conditions articulated in the second argument in saying that it—expressed by a singular term—is inconceivable.

Whatever is to be made of these three puzzles,²³ the Stranger regards them as the sophist's first line of defense. It seems to follow that since one cannot coherently talk about what is not, he argues on behalf of the sophist, then one cannot coherently talk about images at all. In two final preliminary arguments he contends that there can be no such thing as an image, and then that there can be no such thing as a false image. In good dramatic fashion the Stranger returns us to the point from which our digression to Parmenides began. But these last two arguments are not, I think, a mere application of the lessons learned in the first three.²⁴ When Theaetetus tries to say what an image is by listing various kinds of images, the Stranger emphatically retorts that only verbal images are of concern to the sophist (239e5–240a6). Theaetetus then defines an image as something fashioned after a true thing and is another like it (ἕτερον τοιοῦτον). It cannot of course be the real thing which it is like and fashioned after, and hence it cannot truly be. Rather, it *is somehow* (Ἄλλ' ἔστι γε μὴν πως, 240b9). The Stranger concludes that, in so depicting what an image is, they have effected some sort of weaving together of not-being with being (τὸ μὴ ὄν with τῷ

ὄντι). The allusion is back to the first argument (237c7–8), though the Stranger says merely that they have been compelled to agree that not-being somehow is. Having shown that images are impossible, the next stage in the argument proves that the sophist cannot, as they have alleged, inculcate a false belief in anyone, for that would mean that we are fastening together that which is to that which is not (240d1–241b3). This conclusion is based on the familiar definition of false belief as thinking that which is is not, or that which is not is.²⁵ This time the allusion is to the second argument (238a5). The cumulative force is to show how the conclusion of the third argument can be avoided, for they have just done so.²⁶

These two arguments simultaneously look backwards to the preceding three and foreshadow the stages of the argument to come. The first three work with the name “what is not” without questioning whether they have a right to linguistic expressions at all. Rather, the paradoxes are generated from the unstated assumptions that a name must have a referent and that a referent must be or be in some way. (I suspect these come to the same, but the “or” accommodates advocates of both the incomplete and the complete “is”.) These last two arguments address what the first three take for granted, names. The Stranger’s insistence that it is only verbal images (cf. 234c6) that the sophist cares about drives home the point: an image, defined as something other than, or different from, a thing that is (an ὄν), goes proxy for names or verbal expressions in general. Being different from what it is an image of, it is different from being (τὸ ὄν). And being different from being, *any word is a not-being*. The echo from the first argument at 237 is liable to suggest that only “what is not” is a problematic notion. But the insistence that words, and images in general, must somehow be (Ἐλλ’ ἔστι γε μὴν πῶς), foreshadows both the nature of the patricide (241d5–7)—to compel not-being to be in some way and being, in turn, somehow not to be (βι-άζεσθαι τό τε μὴ ὄν ὡς ἔστι κατὰ τι καὶ τὸ ὄν αὖ πάλιν ὡς οὐκ ἔστι πη)—and the conclusion of the argument against the monist at 244b6ff.: on Parmenidean grounds, according to Plato/the Stranger, all words are suspect. The word-world relation is at stake, as the absence of any personal pronouns in the conclusion of the argument at 240c1–2 also indicates. An interweaving of some sort has taken place; no mention is made of agents. This is quite different in the fifth argument. If we accept that there are verbal images, it does not follow that there are false verbal images, i.e., false statements or beliefs. There are such, of course. But the responsibility rests not simply with the apparently unintelligible mixture of what is and what is not that is the word (image of)-world relation, but with something we agents do. In the conclusion to this final argument, agents, i.e., souls, are imported again into the argument: “We are forced often to attach (προσάπτειν) being to not-being” (241b1–2).

The Stranger’s response to the Parmenidean defense of the sophist is to

attack. The target is to show that not-being in some manner is and that being in some manner is not.

The Stranger begins anew with the declaration that we must reexamine what previously we took to be clear, namely the notion of being deployed by Parmenides and the rest who have attempted to define how many and of what sort the beings are (242b10–c6). The fact is, he claims, there is liable to be as much confusion about being as there is about not-being. We no more understand the positive ontological doctrines, principles or forces of the early philosophers than we understand what is not (242c8–243b10).

To illustrate the Stranger turns to the dualists. Their problem is that they posit two items and two names, e.g., “hot” and “cold,” but use a third term, “being,” saying that both are and each is. “Being” either refers to a third item, being, or it refers to one or both of whatever pair a dualist posits. In each of these three cases (e.g., hot, cold, or hot and cold) the dualist turns out to be a monist, since only one thing will be (243d6–244b3). The conclusions of this argument are designed to call into question how naming works, and as a consequence under what circumstances an item can have more than one name. It seems that the Stranger relies on the premise that a name has one referent to raise the possibility that dualists are trinitarians. In the rest of the argument, however, it is assumed that items (and pairs) can have more than one name, e.g., “hot” and “being.” The problem is that the nominata putatively named by the distinct terms are identified with each other. The dualist, in saying that the hot is, does not predicate a property of the hot. Rather, the Stranger contends, the dualist must concede that he is identifying (the) being and the hot. This seems to follow because the dualist helped himself to the notion of being without explaining what it is. So long as being is not introduced as a distinct member of a pluralist ontology, and until predicating and identifying are distinguished, all pluralists will turn out to be monists.

So, the Stranger turns to those who say that the all is one in order to find out to what end they say that being is. Clearly Parmenides is the target. The argument commences along the lines of the previous argument. The monist says that only one thing is and yet calls something “being.” The Stranger next asks whether they use two names for the same thing (as apparently was open to the dualist). But instead of identifying one and being, as the monist would wish, the Stranger notes that it is quite difficult for a monist to answer this or any other *question* (244c4–6). It is ridiculous to posit two names, i.e., *two* of anything, while professing that there is only one thing. The difficulty is that one cannot even accept that a name is something.²⁷ If he supposes that the name is different from the thing (πρᾶγμα), he says there are two items (244d3–4).²⁸ Moreover, either the name is the same as the (one) thing, or he will be compelled to say that it is the name of nothing; and if he says it is of something, there will turn out to be only the name of name, there being

nothing else for it to be the name of (244d6–9). That is, since the monist can admit only one item in his ontology, if he insists that there is a name, then that name is the only thing that there is. Hence if it is *of* something, it would have to be of name, i.e., itself. The last step is then to substitute back the expression τὸ ἓν as the name. Since it is a name and since it is, *ex hypothesi*, the name of one, and since there is only one thing, the expression τὸ ἓν turns out to be the name of one *and* name (244d11–12).²⁹ The key to this final claim is to recognize that the Stranger is treating the expression first as the *kind* of thing it is, i.e., a *name*, and then treating it as the particular name it is, namely “the one.”

This argument shows that on Parmenidean grounds, “being” is no less impossible to apply to what is than “not-being.” (Recall the arguments at 236ff.) It is the first of what will be at least three operational self-refutation arguments found in the dialogue.³⁰ Parmenides cannot, consistent with the assumptions of his theory, *present* his monism. The argument, however, cuts deeper. First, it shows that any account of naming must assume at the outset that names are different from what is named. This was the conclusion forecast by the (fourth) argument concerning images. Before one can properly approach the issue of predication versus identity, there is need to secure the very item, a name, in this case, “being,” whose use is to be disambiguated in seeking to understand predication. Second, it secures a *kind* of being, names, i.e., linguistic images, differing in kind from another being; for names differ from the things that they name. And since the assumption goes unchallenged that what is named is being (τὸ ὄν), it also follows that with the positing of names, the Stranger has secured *one kind of not-being*. The first stage in the review is complete with the development of this conclusion. But we still lack any insight into what being is.

Those who number beings are dismissed after consideration of the monists. Reflection on the course of the argument reveals the distinction of two different kinds of entities, names and *onta*. The number of either is left to another time. The next stage in the argument brings to the fore those who would speak differently about being, i.e., who would tell us of what sort (ποῖα) it is. This seems only fitting, given that names and their referents are different *kinds* of things. The next stage of the argument will develop another kind of being. Plato moves from words and things to the user and maker of words, the soul. Once again the argument will only indirectly draw attention to this third player in the drama, but its course leaves little doubt that Plato now wants to introduce soul into the argument as another kind of being.

The Battle between the Gods and Giants (245e6–249d4) begins with the Stranger describing the Giants as wholly dedicated to the notion that what there is is matter. He deliberately avoids a direct challenge to their position. In a remarkable act of rehabilitation, the Giants are so reformed that they ultimately accommodate immaterial entities into their ontology in the guise

of particular souls and forms of knowledge (246d4–247d6). These reformed materialists, at the behest of the Stranger, accept a new mark of being designed to embrace both their original material entities, souls, and knowledge, namely the power to act or be acted upon; in short, *δύναμις* (247d8–e4).

With the new mark (*ὄρος*) on the table, the materialists are dismissed in favor of the idealists. The Gods were originally (246b6–c2) introduced as maintaining that true being is confined to some intelligible and bodiless kinds (*νοητά ἅπτα καὶ ἀσώματα εἶδη*), dismissing all the rest as *genesis*.³¹ This division is reiterated at 248a7–8. The Stranger, just as he had surprised the materialists with his reformation, now augments the idealists doctrine by grafting the soul on to it:

And you claim that by our body through perception we have communion with *genesis*, and that with our soul through reasoning we have communion with real being, which you say always holds in the same way with respect to the same things, whereas *genesis* holds differently at different times.

Καὶ σώματι μὲν ἡμᾶς γενέσει δι' αἰσθήσεως κοινωνεῖν, διὰ λογισμοῦ δὲ ψυχῇ πρὸς τὴν ὄντως οὐσίαν, ἣν αἰεὶ κατὰ ταυτὰ ὡσαύτως ἔχειν φατέ, γένεσιν δὲ ἄλλοτε ἄλλως. (248a10–13)

Besides introducing soul and its capacities, the Stranger's remark contains the first use of the critical term *κοινωνεῖν* in the dialogue.³² A host of terms signifying participation or communion quickly follow: *μέτεστι* (248c8), *ἁρμόττειν* (248c9), *μεταλαμβάνειν* (248d6–7). The Stranger, on behalf of the Gods, points out that they will not accept the new mark, for only *genesis*, not *ousia*, appropriately shares in *dunamis*. The problem, he goes on to illustrate, is to decide what to say about knowledge and what is known. If *ousia* is known, and if knowing is a doing (*ποιεῖν*), then it seems that *ousia* is acted upon (*πάσχειν*): “and insofar as it is known, to that extent it is moved on account of its being affected (*κινεῖσθαι διὰ τὸ πάσχειν*), which we say could not come to be concerning that which is at rest (*περὶ τὸ ἡρεμοῦν*)” (248d10–e4).

Both the Gods and the Giants, then, are victimized by the Stranger's insertion of knowledge and soul into the account. In addition to the talk of communion, the stranger now adds the language of motion and rest in the company of soul and its objects.³³ However implicit motion and rest have been in the talk of action and affection, or in the materialist doctrine of the Giants, they become explicit only in the company of soul, or rather knowledge and its objects. It is not an option to deny that there is knowledge. The Stranger and Theaetetus agree that there must be knowledge, life, and soul—it must belong to what completely is (*τῷ παντελῶς ὄντι . . . παρεῖναι*, 248e7–249a1)—and thus one must agree that motion and what moves are

(beings).³⁴ But equally, the Stranger declares, there must be motionless beings (*ἀκίνητα ὄντα*) if there is to be knowledge, for its objects must be stable and unchanging. The conclusion is that what is *is both what is at rest and what moves* (*ὄσα ἀκίνητα καὶ κεινημένα*, 249d3).³⁵ This phrase embraces, strictly speaking, only the objects of knowledge and souls.

The statement of the conclusion of the battle is prefaced by the explicit declaration that the philosopher must fight with every argument (weapon) against anyone who would maintain anything about anything, while simultaneously destroying knowledge and mind. Since they destroy knowledge who insist that what is is solely what moves, and who insist that what is is solely what is at rest, their accounts must be rejected. Once again an operational self-refutation argument leads to the rejection of ontological rivals. Both the Gods and the Giants are represented as “maintaining something about what is.” This is treated as though they are claiming to know that what is is what is at rest, for instance. Since, if their respective accounts were true, they could not know anything, and hence not this, their accounts cannot be true. Dualism, monism, materialism, and idealism all suffer the same fate: Plato has not proved that his rivals are mistaken in their ontologies; he has shown that none of them can, on their own terms, even offer their respective accounts.³⁶

I have belabored the arguments from 236 to 249 to indicate the actual concerns and arguments preceding the much more famous section on the interweaving of Forms. Both the interweaving of Forms and the solution to the problem of not-being fundamentally presuppose that there are a plurality of Forms, or kinds. The question is where has Plato justified his claim to this plurality of beings? This is a problem in any case, and especially so in light of the fact that this stage of the argument started with Parmenides. The impossibility of “what is not” having any application is a consequence of his monism. A denial of plurality is equally a consequence. So to fully execute his father, i.e., to defend his own account of what is, it is incumbent that Plato shows that he is entitled to a plurality of *onta*. The purpose of the argument to this point is to show how Plato is entitled to a plurality of beings, as well as words and souls, which will also prove to be weapons needed in the pursuit of that fashioner of images, the sophist. Names are secured at the end of the first half of the review from those who would enumerate what is. Rational, intelligent souls are secured at the end of the second half from those who would say of what sort being is. The plurality of beings comes next.

With soul, word, and being (*τὸ ὄν*), it seems that the Stranger already has a plurality of objects as well as communion between them: souls commune (*κοινωνεῖν*) with *onta* in knowing, i.e., knowledge is *of onta*, and names in a different sense are *of onta*. But I think words and souls are regarded by the Stranger as different kinds of beings, in some sense “other than *onta*.” His

next step is to introduce *two beings of the same kind*, two that can be known and named. The two *onta* are derived from the conclusion at 249d3–4, that that which is embraced (περιελιγμέναι, d6–7) as many as move and rest. What moves and what rests is then (250a8) hypostasized as two *onta*, Motion and Rest (κίνησις and στάσις). The generalization has led some to view the ensuing argument as though it were about classes of particulars, or at least particulars of the ordinary variety.³⁷ But it is the *nature* of these properties that is important. The arguments against the Gods and Giants show that in order for there to be knowledge, in order for one even to be able to think and talk about what there is, there must be knowing souls and unmoving *onta*. Rest and Motion are then necessary properties or characteristics, respectively, of the knowing soul *qua* intelligence and *onta qua intelligibles*. Their hypostasis results from the deduction of these entities with these properties: since there must be moving and resting things, there must be (the properties) Motion and Rest.

The emergence of these two properties prompts the Stranger to remark that they have fallen once more into the quandary of the dualists. But this allusion to the dualists is somewhat disingenuous, for the Stranger has new weapons with which to defend himself. The claim is that both and each of the two properties are. This does not mean that both are moving or both are at rest. Rather, positing in the soul, i.e., distinguishing in thought—ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τιθεῖς (250b7), recall the *Parmenides* (chapter 4)—that Being is some third thing such that Rest and Motion are embraced by it, collecting them together and looking at their communion with *ousia* (αὐτῶν πρὸς τὴν τῆς οὐσίας κοινωσίαν), the Stranger asks whether they both are (250b7–10). Theaetetus avers Being, Rest, and Motion are *three* different things. Being, therefore, in virtue of its own nature (Κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν), neither is at rest nor in motion (250c6–7).

This conclusion marks the first appearance of the notion of a nature (φύσις) in this part of the dialogue. It is also the first time that properties are said to share in Being: Motion and Rest *commune* with *ousia*.³⁸ Why does the Stranger now think he is free to introduce Being as a distinct item? Part of the answer is that he, unlike the dualists, introduces Being along with the language of natures and (talk of) properties *communing* with *ousia*. The dualists failed precisely because they had not admitted Being into their inventory, and hence could not predicate it of either, or both, the hot or the cold. The result was that they could not distinguish their candidate beings from one another. No ontological account is viable unless Being is admitted as a separate item.³⁹

But the bulk of the answer must be derived from the Battle of the Gods and Giants. Its conclusion requires the predication of properties of its *onta*, souls, and Forms: Motion must be predicated of souls; Rest must be predicated of Forms. They must differ from each other if there is knowledge, i.e.,

communion with *ousia*. This is to say, as many have recognized, that Being is now predicated of Motion and Rest, as the phrase communion with *ousia*, now applied to the properties, suggests. Both must be and both must be different from each other and Being.

If Motion, Rest, and Being are now endowed with natures and can be said to be, are we entitled to read the verb in any special way? The answer to this question has divided scholars. The crucial text is the conclusion to this entire section of the *Sophist* (250c6–7): “With respect to its own nature, therefore, Being neither rests nor changes (Κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν ἄρα τὸ ὄν οὔτε ἔστηκεν οὔτε κινεῖται).” On the one hand, it seems obvious that Being is here said to differ in nature, i.e., is not the same as, either Motion or Rest. By the same token, however, Being is predicated of them. While this can be read as an existence claim, it is best understood to signify that each of them has its own distinctive nature.⁴⁰ On the other hand, it seems that Rest must be predicated of Being; for Being is an object of knowledge, and we have just seen that all objects of knowledge are at rest. That all Forms are changeless has always been a dogma of Plato. The difficulty is that for exactly the same reasons Rest should be predicated of Motion, since it too is a Form. This seems, however, to be precluded both (twice) later in the dialogue and in the course of this very argument at 250a8–9. There the Stranger asks Theaetetus whether Motion and Rest are not most contrary (ἐναντιώτατα) to each other? He answers, “Of course.” The superlative contrariety *seems* to rule out not only that they are the same, but also that one can be predicated of the other. In addition, there is the sense that whatever is true of one contrary should be true of the other. Thus if Rest is predicated of Motion, Motion should be predicated of Rest, and Being too for that matter. Faced with these difficulties, some have concluded that the Stranger is here not talking about Forms at all.

To the question of whether we can read the verb “is” in a special way, the answer is “not yet.” There is more stage setting to come before we are in a position to discuss the varieties of predication. Therefore a definitive solution to the crux passage will also have to be postponed, if it is available at all. However, some progress towards an answer is available. First, I think the superlative “most contrary” is designed to undercut, not reinforce, the opposition between Rest and Motion.⁴¹ The very argument on the basis of which they are hypostasized requires that Motion and Rest commune: Motion enters as the knowing soul and Rest as the object of knowledge. And the language of communion is introduced to capture the relation between knowledge and its objects. Motion and Rest are most opposed to one another, only if we consider Motion and Rest as properties *divorced* from the soul and its intelligible objects. More speculatively, the weight of Plato’s own work, as well as the weight of the tradition,⁴² tilts decidedly towards ascribing Rest to the Forms *qua* objects of knowledge. This implies that while Being, with

respect to its own nature, is not what it is to be Rest, it does predicatively rest. This is to say that the nature of the activity that is knowing is not such as to change or alter the Forms. If we wish to consider Cambridge-style changes as alterations, we can bracket the essential nature of each Form, and those properties that belong to it in light of both its nature, its relations to other Forms, and its nature as a Form. Forms, in being known, will not then be altered in any of these bracketed respects, even if there are new truths of a relational sort about them, e.g., “Rest came to be known by Plato on . . .”

Perhaps we can press ahead a little further. While the status of Rest is agreed upon by those who accept this traditional picture, Motion has received little attention. One reason is that Motion, unlike Rest, is divorced from Forms and assigned to the material particulars. This resonates well with the dogma that the material particulars are in some kind of flux, i.e., constantly changing or at least subject to change. For this reason, among others, many have treated the Motion that comes to the fore in the argument at 249e2–250c7 as though it emanated from the genesis of the Gods, or the material natures of the Giants, or simply the many particulars, even though they have not been explicitly mentioned. But this is not so. The origins and *raison d'être* of this Motion are activities of soul. This aspect of motion also has a Platonic heritage, the doctrine that soul as self-moving enjoys a distinctive kind of *kinesis*.⁴³ But this notion does not capture the full dimension of Motion. It leaves us with a Form that is predicable of only souls, not other Forms. This much Plato could have achieved without turning to the Gods. What the final part of the *Battle* introduces is knowledge, or, more generally, the rational aspect of the soul (λογισμός, 248a11). Seen in this light, the peculiar quality of psychic self-motion is its ability to think about, speak about, and come to know Forms. And this provides us with a way to understand how it is that Motion, in concert with Rest, can be predicated of τὸ ὄν. Rest immunizes what is from being changed when grasped by a psychic activity. Motion, conversely, can be predicated of what is insofar as what is can be thought about, spoken of, and known. With respect to its own nature, Being neither rests nor moves. But that very nature qualifies Being as the object of knowledge and speech. Together, then, Motion and Rest secure Being as an unchanging object of knowledge and speech. And along with Being, they provide Plato with the tools necessary to breach the sophist's fortress of Not-Being, namely knowledge, language, and a plurality of *onta*.

The puzzle over how Being could fail either to move or to be at rest leads to the declaration that we are now in an aporetic state about Being equal to what we were in with respect to Not-Being. This is not true, I think, and the sudden introduction of a new topic indicates that the Stranger is now ready to move on. He immediately proposes to explain how one can name (call) the same thing by many names on each occasion (ἐκάστοτε) of naming (251a5–6).⁴⁴ Theaetetus does not follow, perhaps confused by the adverb.

Having struggled for so long to show that one could call something by more than one name, the Stranger's remark implies that they cannot ever call it by one name. Whenever they have discussed what there is, they have called the candidates by many names: recently they have secured the authority to call Motion and Rest by their own names and that of Being. (The one possible exception is Being itself. Of course, Being too will turn out to have many names.) Asked for an example, the Stranger abruptly turns the discussion away from properties, souls, and intelligibles to ordinary particulars. His example is that we call a man by many names (ἐπνομαζόντες), ascribing to him colors, shapes, sizes, virtues, and vices. This is our old friend the complex particular, the source of misunderstanding in the hands of the young and the late-learners about how something can be one and many. This latter group, on the grounds that the many cannot be one or the one many, do not allow one to say "The man is good," but only "The good is good" or "The man is man."

Plato's account of participation enables him to explain away these "paradoxes" of the one and many. The opening moves in the *Parmenides* (128e5ff.), and later in the *Philebus* (14c11–15a7), suggest that he is no longer disturbed by at least certain aspects of the problem. The sudden, explicit introduction of the particular indicates that the notion of participation is about to be introduced into play to explain how it is that we always use many names in speaking of the same thing. This is reinforced by the term ἐπνομαζόντες (251a8), which was the technical term in the *Phaedo* for the naming relation concerning particulars. The difference now is that participation and its linguistic counterpart will be deployed to show how Forms, and anything else (περὶ οὐσίας καὶ ὄτιοῦν), must also be many and be called by many names (251c8–d3).

The Stranger returns immediately to Rest, Motion, and Being to ask whether such things mix or have a share of each other. Do (these) properties partake of each other: or rather do all partake of all; none partake of any; or do some partake of some others and some not (251d5–e1)? They cannot all fail to partake if there is to be any metaphysical theorizing. For in each case, whether it be dualists, monists, or natural philosophers, "they say that their favorites 'are,'" that is, there is at least a communion with Being (252a–b). Once again we see that it is a requirement on metaphysical theorizing that one's proposed ontology be consistent with the statement of that ontology.⁴⁵ Nor can it be the case that all have the power of communion. Theaetetus declares that he can show this to be unsatisfactory; for were all to commune with one another, then motion would in every way be at rest and rest in turn would move.⁴⁶ The answer is that some do and some do not partake.

The final prologue before the frontal assault on the interweaving of Forms is the letter analogy (253a1–c3). The analogy is generated by the fact that some letters combine and some do not. Keeping in mind that the Stranger

has warned us that likeness (ὁμοιότης) is the slipperiest of beasts (231a6–8), caution is called for in contemplating this analogy. The relations between letters, and between letters, syllables, words, and sentences, may not model exactly the relations between kinds. Letters divide into vowels and consonants. Vowels especially, “like a bond,” go through all, so that without a vowel it is impossible for any one of the others to fit with another. This implies that a vowel goes through, i.e., links with, both consonants and other vowels. However, it does not imply that any particular vowel must go through in every case, i.e., be present in every syllable. Vowels as a group will go through all. Expertise is needed to determine which letters can go with which, just as with music. The punch line is:

Well then, since we have agreed that they have mixture with one another in the same way (as with notes), won't the one who will show us which kinds agree with one another and which won't accept one another have to have some kind of knowledge to go through the arguments; especially if there are kinds which go through them all so that they are able to combine, and again in divisions, if there are others through the wholes that are the cause of divisions? (253b8–c3)

There is no question that the philosopher is the expert in the case of kinds (γένη). Nor is there much doubt that the vowels are to be likened to what will shortly be dubbed “the greatest kinds.” This leaves Ryle’s “substantive Forms” to play the role of the consonants. Problems begin to arise when we press the analogy harder. The first thing to note is that the penultimate remark intimates that some kinds enable the others, and perhaps themselves, to combine with one another. In the preceding remarks on combination, there had been no hint of “vowel-like” Forms. There is no vowel, of course, which must be present in all syllables, so here the analogy must be tweaked slightly. More tweaking follows. In the case of the letters, there can be no combining of consonants without the presence of some vowel. Two consonants can be juxtaposed, but they do not themselves form a syllable. In the case of Forms, however, it is not clear whether the so-called vowel Forms are actually part of the combining of a substantial Form with another substantial Form. Let us call an account that requires a vowel Form to mediate in *any* case of communion a “doglegged” account.⁴⁷ Let us call “direct” an account that, while it will permit communion through a “vowel” Form, also allows (substantive) Forms to partake of one another without also partaking in a vowel Form. (If one maintains that there is an ontological relation between the parts of the definition and the definiendum, e.g., Animal of Man itself, it is likely that one adopts a direct account.) This is meant to leave open the possibility that in order to directly partake a Form must, in some logical sense of prior, engage in a prior partaking of a vowel Form. That is, perhaps

partaking in Being or Sameness is logically required before any Form can be thought to partake of another Form. In this respect, partaking of Being (or Sameness and Difference) might serve to bestow on any Form its determinate nature, i.e., constitute it as a Form. Perhaps this would be analogous to a given vowel combining with itself, * $\alpha\alpha$. Fundamentally, however, the vowel analogy captures the aspect of participation that “links” the character of one Form to a distinct Form. The analogy thus assumes the availability of vowels. One aspect of the communion of Forms is to ground the availability of each and every kind. In neither account, notice, is anything said about vowel forms communing with other vowel Forms. Just as *alpha* and *upsilon* can combine to form $\alpha\upsilon$, so Being and Rest, supposing that both are vowel Forms, can combine such that the statement “Being rests” is both meaningful and true.

Another problem arising from the analogy concerns the order of the relation of communion or participation. The order of the vowels and consonants determines both whether a potential combination is a syllable or not and which syllable it is. The combination $\alpha\upsilon$ is a word, but * $\upsilon\alpha$ is not. The order of the kinds, that is, whether Rest partakes of Being or Being partakes of Rest, will also matter. Assuming that both partakings are possible or necessary, they would be two distinct facts, we might say, namely, that Rest is and that Being rests. It seems certain that Plato intends the participation or communion relation to be nonsymmetrical.

Finally and, I think, most importantly, the letter analogy does not tell us what kinds or Forms should be counted as vowel Forms and which as consonantal. The talk of combination and division at the end of the analogy, and the subsequent description of the dialectician’s knowledge (253d5–e2), are easier read as marking as vowel Forms Being, Sameness, and Difference, and perhaps even Unity.⁴⁸ Moreover, the language of wholes, of going through all kinds and enabling them to combine, suggests that there might be Forms that go through all Forms, themselves included. In his summary of this analogy, the Stranger emphatically declares that nothing prevents some from going through all and having communion with all Forms. This follows right after the stipulation that other kinds will commune to a greater or lesser extent. The next leg of the discussion will then select from among the Forms those greatest ones and say first of what sort each is and then what power of communion they have with one another (254b7–d2). Though the conversational force of the argument would lead one to think that the greatest kinds just are those with the broadest power of communion, i.e., the power to go through all, most have found this a difficult inference to draw. For the first kinds marked as greatest are Motion and Rest, substantive Forms, i.e., consonants. But they surely do not go through all others, since they do not even go through each other, let alone themselves. Or do they?⁴⁹

The Interweaving of Forms

The culmination of the argument of the dialogue is the section from 254d4–264b3. My concern for the remainder of this chapter is with the first part of the argument, 254d4–255e6, the section known as *sumploke eidon*, or the Interweaving of Forms. The long review of ontology and ontologists has provided the Stranger with at least the three kinds, Being, Rest, and Motion. About Being he has explicitly said that it has a nature (250c6), and in virtue of their communion with Being (250b9) the same is true of Motion and Rest. So there is a plurality of kinds, each with its own nature. Furthermore, it seems certain that insofar as these kinds can be called by many names and be said to be, each, in addition to having its own nature, also participates in other properties. Two prominent questions developed from the course of the survey remain. First, what is participation between Forms, and, in particular, how are we to conceive of participation in Being, i.e., the role of Being as a vowel Form? For instance, does communion with Being confer existence on the participant? And does Being partake of itself in order to be? The second question concerns the number and range of communing Forms. The argument has thrown up numerous candidate kinds, e.g., Hot, Cold, One, Soul, Body, the Colors, Shapes, Knowledge, Virtue, Natural Kinds, Words, Letters, along with Motion, Rest, and Being. Certainly the four pages preceding *sumploke eidon* suggest that the Forms, in general, partake of one another to differing degrees; that is, the extent or number of Forms participated in varies from those that go through, i.e., are participated in by, all, to those who go through who knows how few. Do some Forms go through or commune with all Forms? Do they commune with themselves? And in what sense does a given substantive Form have a wider or narrower range of communion?⁵⁰

Sumploke eidon opens with the Stranger's declaration that, on the basis of their discussion, Motion, Rest, and Being are the three greatest kinds (254d4–5). It is not said here what makes a kind "great" (μέγιστον). There is a sense that the more you go through, i.e., combine with, the greater you are. On the other hand, the epithet may be due to the role they have enjoyed in the discussion to this point. The next remark summarizes their agreement (φαμὲν) that Rest and Motion do not mix with one another (254d7). (This is the only premise about which their agreement is cited.) Perhaps this is meant to weaken the premise, flagging it as something that later may call for reconsideration. That they do not mix with one another augurs that they are not as widely distributed as Being. Both are then said to mix with Being. In virtue of this partaking, they are. The next conclusion is that there are three things. It seems to be taken for granted that Being also is, even though it is

nowhere said *to partake of itself*. Since they are three, the Stranger concludes, each is other than the other two and the same as itself (254d14–15). This marks the introduction of Sameness and Difference into the discussion. As in the *Parmenides*' Second Hypothesis, they are introduced subsequent to the "proof" that something *is* in virtue of mixing with Being.

The next phase of the argument is supposed to show that Motion and Rest are not identical with either Sameness or Difference (255b5–6). Its success would thus prove that there are four Forms. They too are to be considered greatest kinds, it seems, for the premise is that they mix with the initial three "always of necessity" (ἐξ ἀνάγκης αἰεί, 254e4).

- 1) Whatever we predicate in common of both Motion and Rest can be neither of them. (2) For then Rest will move and in turn Motion will rest. (3) For concerning both [Sameness and Difference], if change or rest becomes either, it will compel the other to change into the opposite of its own nature, since it then is participating in its own opposite.⁵¹ (255a7–b1)

The argument turns on what sort of predication is involved when Motion or Rest participates in its own opposite.⁵² The initial assumption is that Sameness and Difference are predicable of both Motion and Rest (254e2–255a5). The implicit participation in these properties does not affect the nature of the participant and nothing is deemed problematic about Motion and Rest acquiring new properties. In virtue of partaking of Sameness, Motion is the same as itself and Rest the same as itself. Motion does not, in other words, come to have the same nature as Sameness. In 1–3, however, Sameness, for instance, is identified with Rest, i.e., they do have the same nature, and when Motion participates in this new Form, it acquires the appropriate property: Motion's partaking of Sameness is *eo ipso* its partaking of Rest. In this case Motion rests. It is unclear whether its nature becomes that of Rest, or whether it acquires the property of resting. Since both alternatives have been ruled out in earlier arguments (250a8–c7, 254d7–8), Sameness and Difference are distinct from Motion and Rest.⁵³

One is liable to locate the problems in this argument in different places, depending on one's interpretation of the thesis that Motion and Rest do not combine. Those who would claim that their incompatibility is a function of the impossibility of a moving thing also being at rest think that the expressions shift from their naming use to their generalizing use in 3. I have contended not only that "Motion" and "Rest" are used to name kinds, and not to generalize over particulars, but also that there is a sense in which they do combine. *Every* Form, in virtue of being a Form, is at rest and in motion. Motion and Rest then do participate in each other. Hence I think that this argument should be viewed either as an *ad hominem* argument directed at

Theaetetus, or as involving an equivocation over the nature of the participation relation. As an *ad hominem*, it succeeds, because Theaetetus agrees that Motion and Rest, qua Forms, do not mix.

On the other hand, it is tempting to see this argument, and the next, as turning on a failure to distinguish identity from predication. While the initial assumption concerns predicating Sameness and Difference of Motion without identifying the subject and predicate, 1–3 seem to involve identifying the nature of the subject and predicate. The transition is effected at 255a7–8 and a11–b1, where one of the two subject kinds is *identified with* either of the two predicate kinds (Sameness or Difference). At 255a12–b1, the (counterfactual) participation in the opposite (*μετασχόν του ἐναντίου*) causes the subject, Motion say, to have the property, Rest = Sameness, but also to have the same nature as Rest (*μεταβάλλειν αὐ ὅτιον ἐπι τοῦναντίον τῆς αὐτοῦ φύσεως*). Whatever the nature of the arguments and its fallacies, it seems reasonable to infer that Plato is more interested in reaching his conclusion than in whether he argues fallaciously to achieve it.

Having shown that Rest and Motion are distinct from Sameness and Difference, the next phase demonstrates that Being and Sameness are distinct.

But if Being and Sameness signify nothing different, once more in saying that Rest and Motion both are, we will say that both are in this fashion the same, insofar as they are.⁵⁴

The argument seems hopelessly fallacious, when after substituting “being the same” for “being” we say “both are,” i.e., “both are the same.” It confuses being the same as itself with being the same as each other. Depending upon how we complete the elliptical “is the same . . .” and “are . . .,” we can generate new claims, some of which Plato would affirm, others of which he would deny: “Rest and Motion are the same as *each other*”; “Rest and Motion are *each other*”; “Rest and Motion are *participants in Being*.”⁵⁵ It is, I think, less important to repair the argument than to notice two things about it. First, as we saw with the previous argument, Plato is not particularly interested in precise argumentation or careful wording. The fact that Theaetetus accepts the conclusions of the last two arguments so readily seems to call into question just how committed Plato is to his claim in the first argument that Rest and Motion do not mix. Second, the aim of the argument is to show that Sameness and Being are distinct notions. Asserting that something is the same as itself, that is asserting an identity claim, is not then to be regarded as a kind of “Being” claim, or even a sense or use of “Being.” This strongly suggests that we should be wary of construing the “incomplete” use of “is” as having as one species the “is” of identity.⁵⁶

The fifth and final phase of this part of the argument distinguishes Being and Difference. It is probably the most crucial text in the dialogue. It contains two lines that seem to speak directly about Being and how the Form is

spoken of. Since the publication of Frede's *Praedikation und Existenzaussage* over thirty years ago, the distinction alluded to in 255e12–13 has become critical to almost every discussion of the notions of Being and Not-Being that emerges here from the contrast of Being with Difference. Though I will have something to say about Not-Being in the course of my analysis of Being, here my main concern is with the notion of Being itself and its contrast with Partaking.

The text of the crucial lines is, for the most part,⁵⁷ uncontroversial (255c12–13):

Ἄλλ' οἱμαί σε συγχωρεῖν τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν αὐτὰ καθ' αὐτά, τὰ δὲ πρὸς ἄλλα ἀεὶ λέγεσθαι.

But I think you agree that of Beings, some are said (to be) in their own right and others are always⁵⁸ said to be with respect to other things.

This pronouncement about Being is contrasted with Difference (255d1–7):

Τὸ δὲ γ' ἕτερον ἀεὶ πρὸς ἕτερον ἢ γάρ; Οὕτως.

But The Different, of course, is always said (to be) with respect to something different.

Οὐκ ἄν, εἴ γε τὸ ὄν καὶ τὸ θάτερον μὴ πάμπολυ διεφερέτην· ἀλλ' εἴπερ θάτερον ἀμφοῖν μετείχε τοῖν εἰδοῖν ὡσπερ τὸ ὄν, ἣν ἄν ποτέ τι καὶ τῶν ἐτέρων ἕτερον οὐ πρὸς ἕτερον· νῦν δὲ ἀτεχνῶς ἡμῖν ὅτι περ ἄν ἕτερον ἦ, συμβέβηκεν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐτέρου τοῦτο ὅπερ ἐστὶν εἶναι.

This would not be true, were Being and Difference not completely distinct. But rather, if Difference partook of both kinds as Being does, then sometimes there would be some one (of the different things = ἐτέρων) that is different (= ἕτερον) from other things but not with respect to a different. Now, on the other hand, it has transpired for us that whatever is different is of necessity the very thing it is, [i.e., different] from another.

The first problem of interpretation is to decide in general what is being predicated and whether we are told also about things that are subjects of the predicates, i.e., the bearers of properties as well as the properties borne.⁵⁹ Our starting point is the τὰ μὲν . . . τὰ δὲ distinction. We will need to decide what items go into each group and also whether an item may, for whatever reasons, be included in both groups. (I assume that the division is exhaustive, as there is *no* indication that the Stranger is discussing only *some* of what is.) Of particular importance to any understanding of this passage will be a decision whether Being itself is a property assignable to either group. There can be no doubt that Being is a fifth kind, alongside Sameness, Differ-

ence, Rest, and Motion. Yet, the mention of “the two kinds in which Being participates” (ἀμφοῖν μετείχε τοῖν εἶδοῖν), forces us to ask whether one should posit two Forms of Being. Explaining the relation between Being and these “two kinds” thus is a constraint on any interpretation.

A traditional reading of this text finds here a distinction between two kinds of predicates or properties, namely absolute versus relative properties.⁶⁰ Absolute or complete predicates are, for instance, “man” or “horse,” and relative or incomplete ones are, for instance, “equal” or “good.” Read this way, there is no need to view these lines as implying anything about uses of “is”; it divides beings, *onta*, not uses of “is.” To the extent we wish to segregate Being from uses of “is,” we must note, however, that Being is said to partake of both kinds. If we identify the two kinds as absolute versus relative predicates, it is incumbent to say how Being can partake of both.

One possible answer begins by distinguishing two different notions or senses of the absolute/relative dichotomy. On one plane, there is the logical difference between those properties that are relational or in need of a complement versus those that are not in need. (The complete properties are sometimes referred to as “monadic,” the relative as “polyadic”). Here we find the distinction adumbrated above between properties such as Large or Equal, versus Man or Horse. On the other plane, there is the ontological difference between entities that stand in need of something else, i.e., dependent beings, versus entities that are not in need of something else in order to be what they are. The latter are *auto kath auto*, the former are *pros allo*, or better *pros ti*. Typically in Plato, particulars and all images are assigned to the category of dependent beings, while *every Form* is treated as an independent entity, an *auto kath auto on*. In this classification, it does not matter whether a given Form is a relative or incomplete notion in the *logical* sense, e.g., the Equal itself: all Forms are independent or *auto kath auto* beings.⁶¹ Conversely, we should hesitate to assert that any Form is relative in the logical sense.⁶² Sticking with the ontological notion, we can ask whether Plato tries to account for the Forms’ status as *auto kath auto*, self-sufficient, or independent entities. If he does, then it is reasonable to think that it is in virtue of a Form’s participation in Being that each is an *auto kath auto* being. We should then have to decide whether we want to view particulars as equally participants in Being. The difficulty in this circumstance is that whereas a Form’s participation in Being “causes” it to be an *auto kath auto on*, what appears to be the same kind of participation in the same Form causes a particular to be a dependent (*pros ti*) entity. One option is to treat them as participating in a second form of Being, which, while alluded to in 255d3ff., is not introduced. Or we can try to explain that in virtue of their own character, which they would have to have independent from and prior to their participation in Being, they somehow do not get to be *auto kath auto onta*.⁶³ I think that the text tells against both efforts. Whatever we make of the two ways of being

said, there is a heavy presumption in favor of finding exactly one Form of Being. To the extent, therefore, that particulars generate worries, it is best to deny that the discussion has anything to do with particulars. We are constantly at the level of Forms, or even isolated in the domain of greatest kinds. Hence the $\delta\upsilon\tau\omega\nu$ of 255c12 refers exclusively to Forms.

If we are to distinguish properties according to their logical status, we need a means. The litmus test for the division is the intelligibility of predication statements involving them. Complete properties are those that can be the predicate in a statement of the form “A is B” and yield a sense such that the statement can be understood as is, by itself, or without a complement. Incomplete are those properties which, when serving as predicates, yield statements that cannot be so understood, because they *must*⁶⁴ be added on to, i.e., completed, in some sense. In a related fashion, the incomplete/complete distinction is also applied to the “is,” the verb or copula. It involves the use and meaning of the English “is,” (and assumptions about the relation of Greek to English): if “A is” can be understood, then “is” is used in a complete fashion; if it cannot, then “is” is used in an incomplete fashion. An incomplete use of *esti* is “a use in which a subject expression and the appropriate form of the verb requires a complement in order to constitute a complete sentence, though in an elliptical sentence the complement may be omitted.”⁶⁵ Typically those who consider the Form of Being in light of the complete or incomplete “is” struggle to assign any status to the Form. Its role is distributed across and exhausted by the different kinds of predication statements.⁶⁶ “Platonists who doubt that they are Spectators of Being must settle for the knowledge that they are investigators of the verb “to be” (Owen 223). The linguistic turn, initiated by Ryle, is completed with the elimination of Being as a Form, replaced by the forms of judgments available in the language.

It is necessary to be alert to the difference between the senses of “complete” and “incomplete” as they apply to properties and as they apply to “is.” On the one hand, the question is whether a given property, and especially the property Being, is a complete or an incomplete property. On the other hand, the question is whether there are syntactic or semantic differences involving the (use of) Greek *esti*.⁶⁷ Doubtless the answer to the latter question is evidence for an answer to the former. But even if there are different uses of the Greek best captured by the distinction between a complete and an incomplete “is,” it does not follow that we have to dispense with the Form of Being. Indeed, some scholars have argued that the logic of the argument compels us to admit two Forms of Being here, corresponding (roughly) to the two kinds of “is,” as suggested by 255d4.⁶⁸

In drawing these distinctions, there are presumptions concerning the relevance of appeals to Aristotle and later discussions of relative predicates (*pros ti* or *pros allo*), and presumptions concerning the availability of an “is” of

existence.⁶⁹ Whatever the merits of Aristotle's discussion of relatives,⁷⁰ it is developed in the *Categories* in light of his conception of predication and his assignment to particulars of the privilege of being primary substances. This has exerted a powerful influence on interpretations of this passage, since the substitutions for "A" in the test statement "A is B" usually are particulars. So, when we consider the first test for properties, examples such as "Socrates is (a) man" qualify man as a *complete* property, whereas "Socrates is tall" reveals tall to be *incomplete*, apparently because we need to add "for a human" to (fully) understand it.⁷¹ However, when we take up Forms, Plato's primary substances, the results are not so clear. If we can substitute *any Form* for A, then it would seem that incomplete properties such as the Good itself and Difference itself will appear as both subject and predicate in statements involving an incomplete "is," as well as appearing as a subject in a statement involving a complete "is." In virtue of being Forms, each has a definition, expressible as the self-predication statement. Hence, in the sentence "The Good is (whatever it is to be) good," we find an incomplete property specified via an incomplete predication that does not require any further complement. This is a consequence of the fact that *all Forms*, for Plato, are ontologically complete, i.e., are *auto kath' auto onta*. Furthermore, if "The Different is" is well formed, then an incomplete property will serve as a subject in a predication involving a complete "is." (Opponents of the "is" of existence or the one-place "is" will deny this is well formed.)

It seems that the incompleteness of incomplete predicates is best understood when they serve as predicates in predication statements whose subject terms *designate particulars*. This is not to say that only in such statements do we understand a property to be incomplete: "Justice itself is different" begs for completion no less than "Socrates is different." However, when predication statements involve Forms *as subjects*, then not only will incomplete properties sometimes serve as the subjects of definitions, they will also be eligible to serve as the predicated property, and sometimes as both, i.e., "The Different is different [from all other Forms]." "The Good is good," when read as self-predication, predicates the essence of Goodness of the Good. (It can be read also as a self-participation statement, in which case it characterizes the Good as a good thing. I think that the self-participation statement is also well formed and complete. The complement "for a Form" is not needed.)

There is no reason to doubt that by the time of the *Sophist* the distinction between relative versus absolute, or complete versus incomplete properties, was available to Plato (and Aristotle). But there are reasons for doubting that this is the distinction given voice to at 255c12–13. First, the *onton* does seem superfluous if Plato wishes merely to mark a difference between the predicables. Second, and more importantly, there is no indication that we are investigating the logical characteristics of these different kinds of properties. No-

where else has the appropriate notion of incompleteness or relativity arisen, despite the fact that at least some of the properties discussed in the course of the argument are relative. For instance, Sameness has just been discussed. In light of the fact that we are contrasting relative and absolute properties, it is reasonable that both Difference and Sameness would be assimilated to one another, in contrast to perhaps Motion and Rest.⁷²

The last and much the most important objection to this interpretation is the simple fact that Being is not discussed by its sponsors. Cornford (*Knowledge*, 282) tries to isolate Being in maintaining that “. . . Existence blends with (‘partakes of’) both the characters belonging to things which ‘are what they are just in themselves’ (*kath auta*) and things which ‘are what they are with reference to other things’ (*pros alla*).” Not knowing what these “characters” are, it is difficult to make much of this claim. Clearly Cornford, while accepting that Existence (= Being) is a Form, does not assign it to either classification. Moreover, he does not offer an explanation of why it falls outside of the classificatory scheme. Recent proponents of this interpretation also ignore the problem of the Form of Being itself. It suffices that Difference partakes of only one kind to distinguish it from Being. But I suspect that we accept this so readily because we recognize that Difference is irremediably relative in the logical sense. If another interpretation can locate Being in its grid, it stands a better chance of reflecting Plato’s intentions in this brief, but crucial argument.

There is another traditional interpretation of the distinction drawn at 255c12–13. It is indifferent to the distinction between complete versus relative properties. It is not, however, indifferent to the complete versus incomplete uses of “is.” According to this interpretation, the distinction marked at 255c12 is that between an “is” of existence and a predicative “is.” The *auto kath auto* way of being said (to be) represents existence statements, i.e., the “is” is complete or one-place; the *pros allo* stands for predications where the “is” is incomplete or two-place. This provides a reason *not* to posit Participation as a Form, whereas we do have a reason for positing Being as a Form, namely the fact that Existence is a property that all Forms partake of. Being is Existence. Participation, on the other hand, is a relation obtaining between Forms, including the Form of Being. Motion, for example, partakes of Being and thus exists (256a1). When Plato wants to assert that a Form exists, he says that it *participates in Being*. This is what it is for a Form to be *auto kath auto*. In English, we would then use the one place “is” to represent this fact. When a Form participates in any other Form, it is then a *pros allo* relation or a *pros allo* predication, and we use a two-place “is” to represent this state of affairs. This leaves open the possibility that Being itself can be said to be *auto kath auto*. On the other hand, it seems clear that all Forms (and perhaps everything else) participates in Being, where Being is existence, for all of them are. It follows that as an *on*, Being will not serve as a predicate in a *pros*

allo predication. Given its nature as a Form, Being, when partaken of, will always be said *kath auto*. Mine will be a variant of this traditional account. What must be added to it is the notion of essence. But before developing my account, it is necessary to confront the linguistic turn head on.

The traditional interpretation of the τὰ μὲν, τὰ δέ clause concentrates on two different kinds of predicates. The most influential recent account rejects this concern. Instead, it opts to explain the crucial lines in terms of two uses of “is.” In his seminal monograph (and in his subsequent contribution on false statement—though with some modifications⁷³) Michael Frede argues that πρὸς ἄλλο and αὐτὸ καθ’ αὐτό are not properties of objects but “rather describe the manner or way in which a predicate is predicated of some object, more precisely, the way in which a property or feature belongs to an object” (24). These ways and manners are reflected in the different uses of the verb “to be,” and these two uses are themselves labeled forms or kinds, on the basis of 255d4 (ἀμφοῖν μετεῖχε τοῖν εἰδοῖν). Frede emphasizes that we are here concerned with one form, Being, which participates in the two “forms” corresponding to the two kinds of uses of predicates (15). He never specifies how we are to understand these notions of “forms and uses,” but he insists that Plato is not describing two predicates, “is₁” . . . and “is₂,” with different meanings: for “it is clear that, in the *Sophist*, if two predicates have different meanings, the Forms associated with them must differ as well. Thus if “is” has two meanings, we would need to associate two Forms with these two meanings” (15).⁷⁴ It is no easy task to determine the relationship between uses, meanings, and Forms in Frede’s account. In part this is due to his embrace of synonymy and paraphrase as a means of distinguishing uses, for especially synonymy depends on notions of meaning. In part, however, Frede’s difficulty is due to the elusiveness of the “two kinds (of being said to be)” in which Being is said to partake. Frede rightly, I think, eschews the option of postulating a second Form of Being. This is why he insists that there are not two meanings involved. What is needed is a strategy that allows the “two kinds” to be connected to exactly one Form. Though this is never explicitly stated, I believe it is Frede’s goal. He has, however, chosen the wrong means.

I am sympathetic to Frede’s account of the nature of the claim at 255c12–13. The two ways of being, or being said to be, are a reflection at this date of the initial discussion from the *Phaedo* of two ways of being, what I have called Being and Participating. I part company from Frede in two crucial respects. The fundamental difference is that we understand the *auto kath auto/pros allo* distinction differently. This will come out most clearly in that I believe that Being has a substantive nature, that is, Forms do partake in Being. For Frede, Being is exhausted by its linguistic uses. I also differ from Frede in that I believe the sole determinant of when a statement expresses a *pros allo* or an *auto kath auto* claim is the way of being: to be *pros allo* is to

be *characterized* in some way, namely to *have the property* picked out by the predicate, by *allo*. To be *auto kath' auto* is to be one's essence and this is, I maintain, a noncharacterizing relationship. In my view, it is not necessary that the referent of *allo* be *numerically different* from the referent of the subject that is so characterized. Not so for Frede: his dedication to stating his account in terms of the numerical distinctness of subject and predicate leads to unacceptable results.⁷⁵

Frede distinguishes his two ways of being by focusing on the entities referred to by the terms that appear to the left and right of the copula. According to his analysis, “[i]n a sentence of the form ‘X is Y,’ ‘is’ is being used in the first way, if what is signified by ‘X,’ i.e., that of which something is being predicated, is not different from *Y-ness* [my italics], i.e., that which is being predicated of X” (30). It is used in the second way if they do differ. These two ways of being (said to be) are meant to capture the premises needed in the local argument whose aim is to show that Difference and Being are distinct Forms. But they are also intended to capture the variety of statements Plato wishes to make, or which Frede (and others) thinks Plato wishes to make, about Forms. In particular, these two ways of being are meant to cover: (1) the self-predication claims that have proved so fertile a field of controversy; and (2) the predications which sometimes result in what are called the two-level paradoxes.⁷⁶ These are predications that involve properties which are true of all Forms in virtue of the fact *that* they are Forms, as opposed to the properties true of a particular Form in virtue of *what* the Form is. For example, (being) different, (being at) rest, (being) eternal hold of every Form qua Form. (Since Frede believes that Rest is predicable of all Forms qua Forms, he thinks that it is predicated of Motion, i.e., that Motion and Rest combine. He does not, however, say that Motion is predicable of all Forms. He does not deny it either.) And (3) the predication claims involving particulars that partake of Forms.

Frede's is_1 represents the “is” of definition. Thus in its fundamental use, its ontological correlate is the predication of essence of the Form whose essence it is. But that is not its only use. The limit case of an is_1 statement is the self-predication, e.g., “Man is man,” where, it seems, there can be no doubt that the subject term and the predicate refer to the same entity, Man itself. More problematic are sentences in which the predicate is the (full) definition of the subject-Form. Frede says that this account “excludes all sentences in which ‘x’ does not stand for the Form or concept of X, since ‘y’ [my italics] always involves reference to a Form” (31). Comparing these two remarks, it is apparent that Frede at times says that the predicate is “is y,” and at other times that it is “Y-ness.” He nowhere indicates what he means by “Y-ness,” nor does he indicate that they are different. If his subsequent remarks are a guide, it seems that the reason why “y” always involves reference to a Form is that it refers to Y-ness; “Y-ness,” in turn, always involves

reference to a Form because “Y-ness” is, or “Y-ness” refers to, an essence, namely the essence of X.

From 255b11–c1, we can see that X and Y-ness (in this case Being and Sameness) are different, if “x” cannot be replaced by “y.” The background assumption here, of course, is that the Form is precisely what is predicated by the predicate-expression. So the same Form would be associated with “x” and “y” if the two expressions are synonymous. Thus it follows that definitions will be standard cases of the first use of “. . . is . . .”. (31)

I think that there are reasons to question whether the name, e.g., “Man” and the definition, “biped animal,” are synonymous, but that is not my concern here.⁷⁷ If “Y-ness” limits the reference of “X” to Forms, it can only be because essences are predicable of Forms alone; and if “X” and “Y-ness” are to refer to what is not numerically different, it can only be because *a Form and its essence are identical*.

Though Frede does not remark upon the shift from y to Y-ness, his argument does suggest one rationale. In his monograph, Frede is uncertain “whether classifications are also cases of ‘. . . is . . .’ used in the first way. . . . [It] will depend on whether or not Plato regards the genus as different from the species. . . . [If not,] it would also be used in the first way in ‘Man is an animal’” (31).⁷⁸ There is no hesitancy, however, in the later piece. Now the parts of the definition are predicable of the definiendum and in these predication statements “is” is used in the first way (“False,” 401).

That a part of a definition is essentially predicable along with the definition of which it is a part seems to many—in my experience, almost everybody—intuitively right, if not obvious. If biped animal is predicable of Man in the manner marked by Frede’s “is₁”, then so too is (must be) animal. But against this clear intuition, we need to place another: the Form Man itself and the Form Animal itself *are obviously different Forms*. If we are to honor Frede’s own criterion for is₁ predications, then it cannot be the case that a genus or any part of the essence is predicable in the same fashion as the essence itself, namely in a statement using is₁. At the very least, Frede would have to provide an argument that ascribes to Plato an account of partial identity.

The claim that a Form is no different from a part of its essence is ad hoc. It reflects, I suspect, an Aristotelian heritage. More importantly, perhaps, it reflects an Aristotelian heritage wherein particulars in natural kind categories are considered to be either the bearers of essence or, inclusive “or,” primary substances. Here we are on more solid ground in predicating in the same way of Socrates the properties being a man *and* being an animal. But I suggest that a closer connection to our text is not the predications concerning material particulars, but those concerning primary substances in *Meta-*

physics Zeta 1032a4–6 and *Theta* 10. There we learn that, strictly speaking, a primary substance and its essence are identical. Each is also a simple, ἀσύνθετον, and known in something akin to perception or touch, let us say a perceptual grasp. While insisting on the identity of primary substance and essence, Aristotle also admits that essence is predicable—though perhaps not in the same way—of material composites such as Socrates. Here, however, the material particular is not identical with its essence. For Plato, Forms clearly rank as the primary substances. (I have urged that they are the only substances.) Thus I think it is best to resist the temptation of thinking in terms of hylomorphic composites and their relation to the parts of a definition. For Plato, there is no *ontological predication* of a part of an essence of the subject whose essence it is.

Frede's position is, I suspect, also motivated by his understanding of the *ontological commitments* entailed by Plato's use of collection and division. In the next chapter I will argue that these hierarchies are not ontological maps. While it may be true that the *linguistic predication relation* between a subject and a predicate in the linguistic definition, e.g., "Man is (an) animal," should be viewed as the same as that which holds between a subject-Form and the *full* linguistic definition, such an *ontological state* of affairs threatens the unity of the Form; for the Form Animal is distinct from the Form Man. If, therefore, one thinks that Plato always insists on the ontological unity or simplicity of each Form, the "parts" of the essence cannot belong to the Form in the same way as the essence of which they are a part. Of course this is not to claim that the linguistic predication relation is the same or different. Here we might find a star example of where linguistic and ontological predication part company in Plato. (In contemporary metaphysics there is an analogous point in the debate about tropes or simple particulars. A simple particular is, by definition, a particular that can exemplify only one simple nonrelational property. The objection is that this account involves the dualism of universals and particulars. In the case of a simple particular, the "such factor" is the universal and the "this factor" is a bare particular. The counter is to distinguish particulars from facts. Let *a* exemplify ϕ . That is the simple particular. Then *a* is an instance of ϕ , but ϕ is not a component or a part of *a*. But ϕ is a component of the fact that *a* is ϕ . The analogy is in many ways inexact. But there are two points of comparison. First, like the simple particular, the Platonic Form can bear exactly one essence, and that essence is not a component of the Form. Second, the modern problem points to a gap between the incomposite ontological item, the simple particular, and the complex [quasi-]linguistic fact. There is no need to confuse the fact that the Platonic linguistic definition is complex with the unity or simplicity of the essence. This is not to claim that there are no problems with the notion of the unity of the definition. Rather, it is to emphasize that it is a difficulty that Plato [and Aristotle] seeks to overcome.)⁷⁹

In Frede's first way of using "is" and in my account of Being, one relies on the special relationship between a thing and its essence (and for Frede the parts of its essence). Frede's second way of being said to be, on the other hand, seems to *characterize* the subject. When predicates apply to Forms in virtue of the fact that they are Forms, for instance, "rest" is predicable of any Form simply because it is a Form, these are cases of the second use of "is." Statements concerned with particulars are more readily identified as instances of this second use. Particulars acquire all their properties by participating in Forms and each particular is clearly different from any Form in which it participates.⁸⁰ The problem, however, is with Frede's *account* of the *pros allo* used in the case of Forms. For if we must distinguish the referent of the subject from that of the predicate in "is₂" statements, and if the only alternative is a definitional "is₁" where the subject and predicate are identical, we cannot accommodate instances where Plato thinks that (some) Forms are *characterized by themselves*. Frede's account leaves no room for self-participation: e.g., "Rest is resting," when meant to capture the fact that Rest is at rest. (Rest is at rest, because all Forms, in virtue of being Forms, must be at rest.) The problem here is with his analysis of the different "is"es in terms of the distinct relata or the same relata flanking the "is." For example: "Difference is (what it is to be) different." This is the first use, an "is₁" predication. But insofar as it is different from all other Forms, it also is characterized by itself—it is different. This is, *prima facie*, a different sense of "is" from the first. Yet it is not the *pros allo* or second use specified above, for "Y"—here, "is different"—does not pick out something distinct from Difference, which is "X" here. On this analysis, then, all self-characterizing statements would be classified as *auto kath auto* statements, even though they differ in sense from the "is" of definition.⁸¹

If we follow Frede, we will also say that there is a definitory use of "is" and a characterizing use, and add that somehow these two uses do not embody or represent distinct meanings or distinct Forms. But if so, we need an account of how we are to understand the common bond that unites these two uses such that Plato can claim that there is only one Form of Being.

One of the aims of Frede's monograph, and the avowed goal of Owen's "Plato on Not-Being," was to show that Plato neither isolates nor needs to isolate an "is" of existence. The debate over whether Plato uses the "is" of existence has been long and inconclusive. In my discussion of separation I argued that if we want to consider questions of existence, it should be conducted under an investigation of Plato's conception of essence. Nothing in the *sumplokē eidon* section suggests anything different. For Plato, the world of Forms remains a world of definable entities. In virtue of being endowed with essences, they are, or can be said to be (by us), existing things.⁸² Whether a claim to be is best viewed as elliptical, or as employing an incomplete "is," or an one-place "is," cannot, I think, be authoritatively answered.

Nor need it be, with one proviso: there is no evidence for the notion that something can merely exist without being something or other. Indeed, the principal thrust of Plato's anti-Parmenidean metaphysics is that every *on* is complex or possessed of more than one property. Each is a One-Being. I want now to argue, on the basis of *sumploke eidon*, that in both the logical order and the ontological order the possession of essence is the foundation of Plato's metaphysics.

In the critique of Frede's two ways of being we saw that left out was any way to *describe* what I have been calling self-participation statements. If we insist that *pros allo* predication always introduces a second Form, then we find that self-participation is impossible. This defect can I think be remedied. If *pros allo* predication is viewed as *all kinds of predication other than auto kath auto predication*, then we can treat self-participation as one kind of *pros allo* predication.⁸³ This contrastive reading of *pros allo* predication offers the best hope of understanding the difference between the two ways of being said to be and the postulation of the Form of Being. The contrastive reading of *pros allo* uses of "is" segregates being said to be *auto kath auto* from all other forms of predication. These other forms will embrace both complete and incomplete predicates and, more importantly I think, predication statements whose subject and predicate expression refer to the same property or thing, but are not *auto kath auto* statements. All *pros allo* predications are united in that the subject is characterized by the property specified in the predicate, whether or not that property is "numerically distinct" from the subject, i.e., from the Form referred to by the subject-term.

There is a question of whether we can cash the sense of *allo* in an appropriate fashion. One reason for Frede's emphasis on numerical distinctness was his thesis that the ἄλλο at c13 had to be read "strictly," just as the ἕτερον at d1 and in the succeeding analysis of how the Different is predicated.⁸⁴ One difficulty with this thesis, as Heinaman pointed out,⁸⁵ is that Sameness is canonically treated as a relational property and included among *pros allo* or *pros ti* predicates. I think that there is another problem, however, having to do with the issue of Sameness. In working out the notion of an incomplete "is," Owen, Frede, and others juxtaposed the syntactic one-place "is" and its semantic counterpart, the complete use of the verb signifying existence, with the two-place "is" whose semantic counterparts were the copula or predicative use and the identity sign. Once the complete use is jettisoned, as it is by Owen and Frede, the incomplete uses are then assigned to the two different ways of being at 255c12–13: the copula to the *pros allo* uses to import a second Form different from the subject; the identity sign to the *auto kath auto* use signaling that the expressions flanking the ἐστίν designate the same thing. Unsurprisingly, then, we found that Frede's is_1 turned out to consist only of identity claims (or partial identities, assuming that the parts of the definition are is_1 predicable of the definiendum). Moreover, the two

criteria Frede employs to isolate is_1 uses, numerical sameness of reference and synonymy, both point to understanding his first use as the identity sign. Nonetheless, Frede denies that his first use is equivalent to the identity sign. One reason is that the “is” of identity also, if not typically in discussions, holds between a particular, or the name of a particular, and some definite description that signifies that same particular, e.g., “Theaetetus is the main respondent in the *Sophist*.” Frede’s is_1 , however, is restricted to Forms and their relation to their respective essences. Even though Form and essence are identical, and all of Frede’s is_1 statements are identity statements, this is an accidental feature of his account, made inevitable in part by his focus on numerical sameness of reference.

This is a desirable outcome, regardless of whether Frede’s language *per se* can sustain it. First, in this part of the argument there is no mention of particulars and definite descriptions. Second, and much more importantly, Plato not only has just distinguished Being and Sameness, but almost immediately afterwards parses identity claims in terms of the subject Form’s participation in Sameness (256a3–b4). For present purposes, it is enough to point out that identity claims for Plato, except for the self-participation claim involving Sameness, involve a Form different from the subject Form, namely Sameness itself: “The F is the same (as itself)” is analyzed as “The F partakes of Sameness with respect to the F.” Thus if the *pros allo* use at 255c12 imports a second Form numerically distinct from the Form designated by the subject, or more precisely, distinct from the subject and Being, then identity claims must be *pros allo* predications, not *auto kath auto* predications. If there is an “is” of identity in Plato, it is not in the *auto kath auto* predications of 255c12.⁸⁶

According to the contrastive reading, the fundamental distinction Plato wishes to mark at 255c12–13 is that between Being, understood as what the participating Form is (Is) in its own right, and any other property the participating Form happens to possess or be. To partake of Being is then to be *auto kath auto*. To be in any other way is to be *pros allo*, which is to say that *allo* stands for any respect other than (participation in) Being. It is not necessary, then, to read the contrast strictly in Frede’s sense, for that marks a contrast between different Forms whose claim to be has already been established or taken for granted. Though it is perhaps fair to complain that he has not expressed himself as clearly as we might desire, I think that Plato’s intention here is to isolate Being itself, *auto kath auto*, if you will. It is not to isolate whether the referents of subject and predicate terms are numerically identical or different. The contrastive reading in which Being itself is the focus of *auto kath auto* predications serves this purpose best. It allows us not only to distinguish self-predications from self-participations, but also to locate Being as a substantive notion, indeed the greatest of the greatest kinds.

Cases of self-participation differ from self-predication in that we are con-

sidering the subject in different respects. Intuitively, the difference is that between what a subject has versus what a subject is. “Rest is rest,” when it is a self-participation claim, says that Rest is at rest. “Rest is rest,” when it is a self-predication claim, says that Rest is what it is to be rest. The self-participation claim depends ontologically on what Rest is, on what it comes to be in (timelessly) participating in Being. Thus the *pros allo* self-participations will have as their focus the *auto kath auto* self-predications. The primary task, then, is to give some content to the notion of partaking of Being, or *auto kath auto* predication.

An *auto kath auto* predication statement will use what might most safely be called “the definitional is.” Typically in the dialogues such statements have the form “F(-ness) is F.” These are definitional in the sense that the predicate awaits the proper unpacking, which will culminate in the fully articulated definition upon the discovery of the essence of the Form being defined. *Pace* Frede and others, it is the essence alone, i.e., the whole of the definition, that is *ontologically* predicable *auto kath auto* of the definiendum. Parts of a definition, though they are not ontologically predicable, may in fact be *linguistically* predicable in the *auto kath auto* manner. If this is so, then we will have grounds to assert that here too ontology and epistemology, in this case, ontological and linguistic predication, come apart. We can add that if to possess an essence, in the case of a Form, is for it to be or to exist, then the world of Forms is the world of definable entities and exists simply in virtue of the fact that Forms are definable.⁸⁷

These definitional statements are to be distinguished from ordinary identity statements, which, for Plato, will involve the subject’s relation to the Form Sameness. In virtue of *partaking* of Sameness each Form is self-identical. Consider Motion. In the claim “Motion is the same as itself,” “itself” is a reflexive pronoun, taking its reference anaphorically from the subject “Motion.” (In Greek, αὐτός is here also reflexive.) The anaphora seems to require that there be something, a property with some content or nature. For this reason Plato begins the argument of *sumploke eidon* by showing that each Form partakes of Being. There is a Form, F, that can partake of Sameness and thus be self-identical, just because F, in a “conceptually prior” partaking,⁸⁸ partakes of Being *auto kath auto*, thereby acquiring its essence. Sameness, Difference and Being present special difficulties here. Consider Difference. Difference is a Form and hence Difference has an essence. When we wish to state this fact we would have to use “be” in an *auto kath auto* fashion, i.e., “Different is (Is) different.” If this is correct, we find ourselves up against Plato’s declaration at 255d1 that Difference is always said [to be?] *pros heteron*, with respect to something else or with respect to something different. We cannot escape the bind merely by distinguishing “Difference” used as subject and “is different” used as predicate. For in our *auto kath auto* statement we can legitimately have “is different” as predicate. By “Different is

different” we learn that the Different has a nature, that it Is that nature. In the injunction at d1–7 we are told that when “difference” is predicated, then the subject is being said to be different from something or everything else. When “is different” is used in the *auto kath auto* statement, let us say that it is not *being different* that is predicated, but *what it is to be different*, for in effect we are saying that its essence is being predicated of the Form Difference. Thus, as with all other Forms, Difference is (Is) what it is, difference, in virtue of its own nature. In the case of everything else, however, there is little confusion when we point out that say, Justice, is not different from all other Forms *simply in virtue of its own nature*. Rather, Justice is different from all other Forms because of its participation in the Different. We must be careful not to think that what Justice is in virtue of its own nature contributes *nothing* to the *grounding* of its difference from all other Forms. In the case of every Form, each is different from every other in part because of its own nature, because in virtue of its partaking in Being each is a natured entity, and because for Plato there are the metaprinciples that each Form has one nature and each nature is the nature of exactly one Form.⁸⁹ Recognition of this contribution allows us to say that simply because something is a Form, it partakes of Difference. Hence, simply because it is a Form, Difference not only is (Is) what it is to be different, but it is different, where here we are using “is different” in the *pros heteron* or *pros allo* sense. When we say that the Different is different from everything else, we assert that the Different *partakes* of itself.

Nehamas (“Participation”) has written trenchantly on this difficult passage. He says that the statement, “The Different is different from everything else,” is not grounded in the nature of Difference, but “rather, it is grounded in the fact that the Different, like everything else, partakes of the different and is distinguished from other things in virtue of possessing characteristics which it does not share with them” (205). With the first conjunct I have no quarrel. With the second I do. While possessing the characteristic of going through all the Forms will distinguish Difference from most Forms, what characteristic distinguishes Difference from the other *megista gene*, or at least Sameness and Being? *Pace* Nehamas’s claim that the difference of Difference is not grounded in its own nature, I can think of nothing that distinguishes Difference from everything else except its possession of its own nature.⁹⁰

Nehamas goes on to argue that we can understand statements of the form “The Beautiful itself is other than beautiful” or “The Beautiful itself is not beautiful” as asserting not that “the nature of Beauty is not what it is, but only that Beauty possesses some other characteristic as well” (210). This is established through a consideration of the role Sameness and Difference can play as second-order properties.⁹¹ We can say of a ball and a shirt that they are the same in virtue of their sharing a property, say both of them are red. Sameness can range over all properties and be predicated on the basis of two

things sharing some property. Similarly, Difference ranges over all properties and can be predicated on the basis of two things failing to share a property. In the case of Beauty, because being beautiful (or even partaking of beauty?) is a different property from, say, being the same as itself, we can say that Beauty is not beautiful and mean that it is something else, namely the same (as itself). Nehamas generalizes this treatment and concludes that we can say that Difference is different from Difference and grounds this in the fact that it is something other than different, namely, say, it is the same as itself. With this I can agree. However, when he connects this treatment of the peculiar “is not” statements, e.g., “Beautiful is not beautiful,” with the grounding of the statement that the Different is different *from everything else*, he seems to be suggesting that the Different partakes of Difference because of *some other character* that it possesses. It seems that Nehamas believes that the Different could not partake of Difference were it not to possess some other characteristic. This is wrong. The Different, like every Form, partakes of Difference simply because it is a Form. Difference will possess other characteristics; the *megista gene* guarantee that each Form is what it is and, in addition, is whatever the *megista gene* stand for. And this same fact renders it inconceivable that the Different or any Form could fail to have these properties. But it is not the possession of these properties that licenses or grounds the Different’s partaking of itself. These kinds of “facts” are all dependent upon the nature of the Different. The Different has these characteristics because it has a nature, i.e., because it is a Form; moreover, it is owing to the very nature of the Different that these are *distinct* characteristics. By the same token, there will be no characteristic that the Different possesses apart from possessing its nature that distinguishes it from the *megista gene* which lack that characteristic. So, the Different can be said to be different *from the Different* because it is other things besides what it is to be different. But it is these other things because it is what it is, i.e., *because of its nature*. And when we wish to explain why the Different self-participates—in Nehamas’s terms, to ground the statement that it is different *from everything else*—we cannot appeal to features that it has or lacks that distinguish it from everything, nor need we cite the other features, e.g., Sameness, that it has because it is a Form. It self-participates because it is a Form, that is, because every Form partakes of the Different.

The same pattern of argumentation, *mutatis mutandis*, would show why the Same is *auto kath auto* the same and why it partakes (is *pros allo*) of the Same, and why the One is *auto kath auto* one and partakes (is *pros allo*) of the One. All of Ryle’s syncategorematic Forms then are regarded by Plato as Forms, not forms of combinations of elements in judgments. I forego these demonstrations in order to return to Being. I asked early on in this chapter why there is a Form of Being but no Form of Participation itself. Now we have found that it is necessary to appeal repeatedly to the Form’s nature or

essence in order to understand Plato's various remarks in this section of the *Sophist*. We appealed to essence when we explained what it is for a being (to be said) to be in the *auto kath' auto* fashion, and the possession of an essence was critical in the account of a Form's possession of other properties, especially Sameness and Difference. The notion of being an essence is thus *prior* to both Difference and Sameness. It is prior in that in order to be the same as itself, each Form must be what it is, and this is just what it is for a Form to partake of Being, to be *auto kath' auto*. Plato, I submit, conceives of Being as this generic property, i.e., *essencing*. Each Form, when it partakes of Being, is essenced and, *once essenced*, can be said to be—full stop if you like—can be said to be different from everything else—which in the case of Forms means every other essenced thing—and can be said to be the same as itself.

The temporal notions employed throughout these remarks must not be thought of as marking real distinctions in time. Rather, they are confined to moments in the conceptual or logical dimension. There is no time when Difference is what it is to be different yet not different from all other Forms, as though it were waiting for them to partake of Being. Yet it is talk of Being partaking in Being or Difference partaking of Being that is so difficult to wrap one's mind around. One source of the difficulty is that there is no subject, i.e., no Form, prior to the Form's partaking of Being. A second, perhaps related, difficulty is that we are wont in some way to regard Being as a Form on a par with Red when we consider how it is partaken of. (Ryle's account rightly tried to deter us from giving in to this tendency!) Everything that is red partakes of Redness, and in partaking of Redness comes to be the same thing, namely red. We can say that everything that is partakes of Being—we tend to see this as asserting existence—and turn around and say that in partaking of Being everything comes to be the same thing, namely existing. But this I think is not quite right. Change the end of the second conjunct to read "the same thing, *a being*." For this better signals that what each becomes in partaking of Being is its *own unique essence* or nature. What is common among all the Forms is that each is a thing of this kind, *an essenced thing*, not that each possesses *the same property, existence, or the same essence*.

Plato, therefore, has reason to postulate a Form of Being. It also goes some way towards explaining why there is no Form of Participation itself. Partaking is common to all interactions between Forms and participants, whether the participants be particulars or other Forms. Difference partakes of Being and partakes of Sameness. When it does so, it is tied to its object in different ways, not because of the relation but because of the special nature of the relatum, Being. When it partakes of Being, it becomes essenced. The special function of this Form is *to create, or legitimize, or ground subjects for the partaking relation*. That partaking in Being creates logical subjects, subjects that then must go on to become complex bearers of other properties,

licenses Plato's postulation of a special way of being, what Plato describes as being said to be *auto kath' auto*, partaking of Being, or (what I earlier called) Being. We *could* say that the Form becomes *characterized* by Being, where it is (1) understood that it was not a legitimate object before this partaking, and (2) provided that we understand that being characterized by Being does not entail that there is some single first-order property everything becomes in being so characterized. We can then say that in partaking of Sameness and Difference, each of these Forms does become characterized by these properties. Indeed all Forms are so characterized because they are Forms.⁹²

There is a sense, however, in which Being is special in respect of self-participation. The other self-participating Forms each acquire their respective natures in virtue of their participation in Being, and then go on to acquire the characteristic property that they constitute because of their nature. Being, too, then must acquire its nature by partaking in Being. But it is hard to envisage what further participation in Being could be appropriately described as self-participating. Here perhaps we can say that there is no difference with respect to Being between self-partaking and self-predicating. Or, we can appeal to the fact that in partaking of other Forms, each of which is itself a being in virtue of its partaking of Being, Being self-participates.⁹³

I have argued that participation, at least among Forms, is a primitive notion wherein the subject is characterized by the property named by the predicate. The special exception is participation in Being, which, because of its foundational role, has a special cachet and merits a special way of being said. If we are satisfied that Being is a Form while Partaking is not, then we can maintain our theory that there are two basic predication relations in Plato only with some adjustments. One obvious adjustment is to assert that while there are two predication relations in the middle period, there is only one in the later, namely Partaking. On behalf of this assertion we might point to the elevation of Being to the status of a Form and Plato's recognition, apparently around the time of the *Parmenides*, that Forms also participate. However, if we consider that when Being is partaken of, that partaking creates or endows entities with essences, we can preserve everything we want from the *Phaedo's* Being (provided that Forms alone partake of Being). To participate in Being is to "become" an entity of a special sort. To participate in Being is to be a Form.

6

NOT-BEINGS

Overview

The late dialogues do not abandon the Forms of the *Phaedo* and *Republic*. Forms remain what they have always been, the primary bearers of *ousia*. In virtue of partaking in Being, each Form Is what it is, an *auto kath' auto on*. But there are changes, or advances, in the Theory of Forms. Forms are assigned new tasks, tasks occasioned by a new set of questions addressed in the late dialogues. Many of the questions result from Plato's increased sensitivity to the nature and structure of metaphysical inquiry and to the nature and structure of language. In the *Parmenides*, the question is what must Forms be like if dialectic is to be possible. The answer is that each Form must partake of Unity and Being; each Form must be a One-Being. In his pursuit of the sophist, the Stranger declares that in order to catch that master of falsehood, they will have to determine the nature of the verbal image that is his stock and trade. Since the sophist deals in false statements and beliefs, the question is how is false belief or statement possible? To answer this question, the Stranger must first determine what is and what is not, and then show how language can represent what is and what is not. In the last chapter, I concentrated on the crucial stage in the hunt, the "proof" that there must be a plurality of beings, each of which must itself be many things in virtue of partaking of Being and certain other Forms. Common, then, to both dialogues are two features of the Doctrine of Forms, which, at best, receive little

notice in the *Phaedo* and *Republic*. First, Forms are shown to be complexes; they are both Beings and participants. Second, Plato now concentrates on a special kind of Form, e.g., Being, Unity, Sameness, Difference, demanded by reflections on language, thought, and metaphysical theorizing itself.

As a result of these reflections on theory and language, I, like Ryle, think that Plato grows increasingly aware of the differences between the ontological and the conceptual/linguistic orders. In the *Parmenides* (143a–b), Plato distinguishes what can be separated in thought from what cannot be found apart in nature. This distinction, I believe, provides part of the solution to the problem of whether the parts of a definition are *ontologically* predicable of the definiendum (see Introduction). But the *Sophist* provides some of the best evidence that Plato recognizes a gap between what we say or think and what there is. For the aim of the dialogue is to show that falsehood is possible, that thought and language can fail to limn what there is.

My goal, then, in this chapter is to explore the status of certain items that emerge from reflections on method, language, and thought. If we can call the constituents of thoughts “concepts,” then the broad concern of this chapter is Plato’s treatment of some of the various kinds of concepts corresponding to which there may well *not* be Forms.¹ The first part of the chapter focuses on the best known of these items, the not-beings (μη ὄντα) of the *Sophist*, and in particular the parts of the Different. Their status has been a perennial problem. There is little doubt that in his account of Not-Being and falsehood Plato *talks* about not-beings. But scholars are divided over whether they are (1) Forms, (2) parts of the Form Difference and thus perhaps Forms or a kind of Form, (3) identical with the Different itself, (4) non-Form concepts or properties, or (5) some kind of second-order entity. I will argue that the parts of the Different are not Forms. They are conceptual items, the products of souls who in thinking and speaking move terms or concepts into various relations with one another. They have determinate content, but they are not such that anything could partake of them. If they can be said of a subject, but nothing can partake of them, we would have in Plato’s account of the parts of the Different a prime example of the separation of the conceptual and ontological orders.

In the second part of the chapter I consider the Method of Collection and Division. The process of collecting and dividing results in various statements about some targeted definiendum. *Sometimes* these statements seem to be composed of terms or concepts (“cuts”) correlated to which there does not appear to be a Form. These conceptual cuts, I claim, are also our creations. Other statements, however, refer to real kinds and suggest, at least to many readers, that a given Form is *ontologically* related not only to the “parts” of its definition, but also to all of the Forms in its division. In the previous chapter we saw that Frede allowed that the parts of the definition were predicated of the definiendum in the same manner as the essence itself, i.e., his

first way of being, is_1 . Frede claims that such statements are “partial identities.” Another possibility is that the definiendum participates in the genus, that Plato thinks that the Cat itself is an animal in the same way as my cat Chris. Since this option is repugnant to most readers, others have claimed that there is an ontological relation distinct from either the *auto kath auto* or the *pros allo* being of *Sophist* 255c12–13, a different kind of partaking.² A third distinct relation might then be assigned to account for the relation between “parts” that do not correspond to real kinds, the aforementioned mere cuts.

On the other hand, there may be no ontological relations between either the Forms or the mere cuts that figure in the collections and divisions. Rather, the relations between them might be conceptual or intensional.³ I will contend that there are no ontological relations of any sort between the Forms marked by the concepts deployed in the various collections and divisions. The diereses mark out conceptual connections, not ontological or existential relations between Forms. Statements such as “Man is animal” may be said to use a strong linguistic copula, but what makes them true is not that the strong ontological relation of Being relates the Forms Man and Animal, but rather the compresence of Animality and Humanity in all particular human beings. (These claims are promissory to the extent that the ontological cash backing them is to be found in the next chapter where I present a detailed account of particulars in the late Plato.) Here too, then, we find a nascent distinction of the conceptual and ontological orders in the late Plato. Just as a part of the Different, even though it has a determinate conceptual content and is derived from Forms, is nothing one can partake of (or Be), so too a part of a definition, even though it has a determinate conceptual content and is derived from Forms, is nothing a Form can partake of or Be.⁴

Not-Being in the *Sophist*: The Background to 255e

If we are to evaluate the status of the parts of the Different, we must see what role they play in Plato’s response to the sophist’s challenge at 236ff. to show that not-being, images, and falsehood are possible.

There is no consensus as to whether Plato meets the difficulty posed by the sophist about the very possibility of false statement. Some have argued that while Plato offers a solution to one (kind of) problem, he does not penetrate to the heart of the matter. At its heart, the problem of false statement concerns the nonexistence of the *state of affairs* that the false statement purports to be about, e.g., the flight of Theaetetus.⁵ Whether or not Plato offers a satisfactory analysis of the problems of falsehood and negation as *we moderns* view that nest of issues is beyond the scope of this chapter. The stretch of the *Sophist* from 255e8–263d is, I think, unusually obscure and

controversial. I will be content to shed *some* light on how Plato viewed the problem of negation and falsehood.

Plato's nest of issues arises from the sophist's challenge to the very possibility of falsehood in the introductory remarks on image-making at 232d–236 and in the five arguments from 237–40. The sophist creates images insofar as he creates false beliefs in the minds of the ignorant, particularly the false belief that he knows everything. This creative aspect is reinforced in the last two arguments at 239e7–241b3. The former purports to show that a statement, because it is a verbal *image* made by a speaker, is impossible, for an image is something that is not. The latter then contends that a false statement—were we to concede that there are statements—is impossible, for one cannot say what is not. Statements have to say something and what is not is not there to be said. (The first three arguments are designed to queer the notion of not-being and the use of the name “not-being.”)

In the course of the *Sophist* Plato tries to show how it is possible to say what is not, first by offering an account of how we are to understand what is, what is not, “being,” and “not,” and then by explaining what a statement is. In the immediately subsequent survey of ontologies, the Stranger shows that names, i.e., verbal images, and souls, i.e., speakers, are beings of some kind. Having secured names and souls, Plato then turns to the interweaving of Forms to show that everything that is also is not. The interweaving of Forms also makes *logos* possible (259e5–6). Hence Plato can assume that *logos* partakes of Being (260a5). There are parts of language that are naturally able to fit together (συναρμόρτην, 261d5) to allow a sentence to be made (261–62). Sentences are syntheses of a name and a verb (predicate). Speakers combine Forms, or rather their linguistic counterparts, to make statements.⁶ Thus in his role as maker of false beliefs, the sophist is the one who puts together (συντίθεσθαί, 262e12) the particular names and verbs into a statement, which is either false or true. Plato's solution to the problem of false statement, depicted at 263 in his analysis of “Theaetetus flies,” is to show that the “constituents” of this state of affairs—and, generalizing, any state of affairs—all are, in some sense, though not in the way represented by the false statement.⁷

The movements of the argument from 255e8–263d address themselves successively, if not always neatly, to rebutting the earlier Parmenidean arguments against not-being and the application of the name “not-being.” Relying on the fact that there are speakers (souls), language and a *plurality* of complex *onta*, they show how it is that rational agents create falsehood. I believe that the active role of the speaker is glimpsed even earlier in the argument, in the antithesis that is a part of the Different. Exactly how the doctrine of the parts relates both to the immediately preceding discussion of difference between Forms and to the final account of falsehood are vexed questions. I think that the role of the parts of the Different is distinct from

that of Difference itself. The speaker is responsible for the partitioning of Difference, i.e., the focusing of Difference on a particular Form on each occasion. I think that in like manner the speaker is responsible for the juxtaposition of the subject and predicate in a given false statement, setting a property in opposition to what are in fact the properties that belong to a given subject. At the end of the day then, I hope to show how we speakers and thinkers are largely responsible for falsehood.

The role of the rational agent as creator of images is muted throughout the course of the discussion. Conversely, the foreground is occupied by the proof that everything that is also is not. This is a consequence of the fact that if there is to be anything at all, there must be a plurality of beings, including Being itself, each of which is many or complex because everything that is combines both with Being and with other Forms. Insofar as Being is different from every other *on*, each is (a) not-being. Plato, then, uses the pluralist ontology and the notion of interweaving of Forms to show how one can meet the Parmenidean arguments at 237–240. Since each thing that is also is not, we can intelligibly apply the name “not-being,” and we can apply it to something (actually, everything) that is. Furthermore, to (each) not-being other beings, including number, can, indeed must, be attached (προσγίνεσθαι, 238a8); for each *on* is a not-being to which, as a necessary subject of interweaving, other beings must belong.

The availability of *onta* that both are and are not enables Plato to demonstrate how it is possible to intelligibly say something false, e.g., “Theaetetus flies.” One of the chief interpretive difficulties concerns the analysis we are to give of a statement of this kind. This is a predicative statement, in which a property is attributed to a subject, namely Flying to Theaetetus. Plato’s solution turns in part on showing that both the subject and the property are beings. Theaetetus is a material particular and thus an item that has many properties. Flying, in turn, is a property shared (in) by many particulars, e.g., all of the birds in my yard. What makes this a false statement is that, according to Plato, Flying is not one of Theaetetus’s properties. It is different from all the *onta* that are his properties and hence it is not one of his beings; it is a *not-being* of his. “Theaetetus flies” is then a false predication statement.

We shall spend a fair bit of time trying to detail the elements of this account. But it is worth mentioning at the outset that nowhere in the argument up to 263 has Plato *clearly* indicated that we are discussing predication statements at all, especially negative predications. This has prompted some to argue that nowhere in the stretch of text from 257 to 263 is predication under consideration.⁸ All the negative claims, including those for which the doctrine of the parts of the Different is developed, are, on this account, nonidentity claims. I think that this cannot be right with respect to “Theaetetus flies,” and I will argue that it is not the right way to view the parts of the Different. Admittedly, philosophical charity prompts us to find an ac-

count of false predication statements in Plato lest his account of false statement be seriously flawed. The majority of scholars do not accuse him of this failing. Rather, the disagreement is about where and what kind of account of them he offers. I think that the parts of the *Different* are designed to effect the transition from nonidentity claims concerning Forms to negative predications concerning particulars (and Forms.) One of the aims of this chapter will therefore be to see how Plato makes the transition from negative identity statements to negative predications, and then to show how the negative predications supply machinery requisite for his account of false statement.

Sophist 255e8–257a7

The Stranger's last question (251d–252) posed to all who have said anything about being is what relations do the *onta* have with one another: do all combine with one another; do none combine; or do some combine with others in various respects and not combine in others? The letter analogy (253–254d) expands upon this notion of interweaving. Vowels and consonants are such that some combine and some do not, implying that some Forms⁹ combine and others do not. The vowel-like Forms permit and produce linkages between themselves and the “consonantal” Forms. The subsequent argument shows that in order for the five great Forms, Motion, Rest, Being, Same, and Different, and a fortiori any Form, to qualify as a Form at all, each must partake of Being. This partaking, I argued, creates logical subjects that can and must then go on to partake of Sameness and Difference. Difference goes through them all; on account of Difference, each is other than the others (ἕτερον εἶναι τῶν ἄλλων, 255e3–6). Being, Sameness, and Difference thus clearly seem to qualify as “vowel” Forms that combine with every Form. We are given little guidance as to what we are to make of claims such as “Form A does not combine with Form B.”

Having demonstrated to his satisfaction that there are these five kinds, the Stranger takes them up again, starting with Motion. I paraphrase: Since Motion is other than Rest, it is not Rest. But it is, on account of its partaking of Being. Furthermore, Motion is other than the Same and thus is not the Same. On the other hand, it is the same, for it partakes of the Same with respect to itself. It is not the Same, in that it partakes of the Different with respect to the Same. Thus we speak differently in saying that it is and is not the same. Different Forms, at the least, are involved: Motion and Sameness, in the positive assertion, Motion, Difference, and the Same in the negative (255e8–256b3).

The Stranger follows this up with his notorious counterfactual that were Motion to partake of Rest, it would not be absurd to call it resting (255b6–7). Theaetetus concurs, citing the assumption that Forms do and do not

combine with one another. The Stranger then demonstrates that Rest is and is not different, both in virtue of the same thing, namely that it partakes of Difference with respect to Difference. Finally, he completes the survey, pointing out that Motion is other than Being (*ἕτερον τοῦ ὄντος*, 256d5–6). At 256d8, the expression “not-being” (*οὐκ ὄν*) appears for the first time in this part of the discussion, a direct substitution for the *ἕτερον τοῦ ὄντος*, “other,” which had just been used. “Motion therefore clearly is truly not-being and being, since it partakes of Being.” The Stranger summarizes the result: not-being is necessarily over Motion and about all the Forms, for the nature of the Different, making each different from Being, makes them not-being. We can say equally correctly of all Forms in the same fashion that they are not-beings, and that they are beings. Each is a being because it partakes of Being; each is a not-being because Difference makes it other than Being. “Therefore, concerning each of the Forms, Being is much, not-being countless (*ἄπειρον*) in number” (256e5). This is followed up with the thought that Being itself, in turn, is not exactly as many as are the other Forms: “For not being those, it itself is one, and in turn is not the others countless in number” (256b6–257a7).

The first movement of the argument utilizes Difference and Being to destroy the first pair of arguments offered in the name of Parmenides on behalf of the sophist (236b7–238c10). Since each kind partakes of Being, each is a being. And since each kind partakes of Being and other beings, i.e., other Forms, each is complex. The beings that are “much” (*πολύ*) concerning each and every Form are then the beings it is predicatively, i.e., in virtue of partaking in them (along with Being itself). On the other hand, since Difference makes any Form different from Being, it makes each Form not (be) Being, and thus “not-being” applies to each Form in virtue of (this) Difference. Hence each Form can be the referent of “not-being.” And since each Form is not Being, and is also many things, e.g., Same, One, beings can be added to not-being. (Being itself is a not-being in that it is not each of the other beings.)

The disparity in number, much versus countless many (256e5–6), requires comment. Each Form is much because it has many properties. Motion has predicatively at least two of them, Sameness and Difference. Thus an “is” of predication is at work in the account. But only, it seems, on the positive side: for the not-beings assigned to each Form are to be cashed in terms of difference of nature from, i.e., nonidentity with, each and every other Form.¹⁰ The question, then, is why there are countless or infinite not-beings? Since nowhere have we been told that there is an infinite number of Forms, and since particulars are absent from the discussion, it is best to take the *ἄπειρον* to signal that the number of Forms which a Form is not is indefinitely large, in contrast to the many, but very limited number of Forms of which any Form partakes.

The role of the Different is critical in the initial response to Parmenides. What each Form is in itself, i.e., in virtue of partaking of Being, Is simply and solely its essence. But in the respect that concerns us here, Plato thinks that it is not in virtue of being Square that the Square differs from Redness. It differs in virtue of Difference. The Different Is (has) its own nature. It is a single Form and it explains a set of similar facts, namely that each Form is different from any other.¹¹ Difference thus makes each Form other than, or not, something else. The series of negations involving Motion show that at this stage we need only have a *subject* under examination to say that it is not every other Form. There is no interest in the nature of the Form whose name fills the . . . in the statement “Motion is different from . . .” Difference is applied formulaically to any two Forms. There is no mention of the partitioning of Difference. And there is no hint of negative predication, though positive predicative relations have been exhibited between Motion and Being, Sameness and Difference. This is unsurprising, given the nature of these greatest kinds. Since Being, Difference, and Sameness must go through every kind, there is no opening for the consideration that a Form lacks one of them. Perhaps this goes some way towards explaining the hasty introduction and departure of Rest at 256b6–c3. Given that it has been agreed that Rest does not mix with all Forms, i.e., Motion, it would force the issue of negative predication into the open. The first stage of the argument thus exhibits only Forms that do combine, since even in being a not-being, each Form partakes of Difference.

Sophist 257a8–259b5

The next and longest phase of the argument commences with the reminder that their anti-Parmenidean conclusion is premised on the interweaving of Forms. The Stranger then takes up the term of the first of Parmenides’ arguments (237c), “not-being,” to drive home the significance of the foregoing.

‘Ὅποταν τὸ μὴ ὄν λέγωμεν, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐκ ἐναντίον τι λέγωμεν τοῦ ὄντος ἀλλ’ ἕτερον μόνον. (257b3–4)

(1) When we say “not-being,” we do not, it seems, say any opposite (contrary) of being, but only something different.

Theaetetus requires more help.

Οἷον ὅταν εἴπωμέν τι μὴ μέγα, τότε μᾶλλον τί σοι φαινόμεθα τὸ μικρὸν ἢ τὸ ἴσον δηλοῦν τῷ ῥήματι;

(2) For instance, when we say something is not large, do we seem to you in any way to point with the expression to the small any more than to the equal? (257b6–7)

The Stranger then draws the conclusion:

Οὐκ ἄρ', ἐναντίον ὅταν ἀπόφασις λέγῃται σημαίνειν, συγχωρησόμεθα, τοσοῦτον δὲ μόνον, ὅτι τῶν ἄλλων τι μὴνύει τὸ “μὴ” καὶ τὸ “οὐ” προτιθέμενα τῶν ἐπιόντων ὀνομάτων, μᾶλλον δὲ τῶν πραγμάτων περὶ ἅτ' ἂν κέηται τὰ ἐπιφθεγγόμενα ὕστερον τῆς ἀποφάσεως ὀνόματα.

(3) We will not agree, then, when someone says that denial signifies an opposite (contrary). We'll agree to so much: when “not” and “non” are prefixed to names which follow them, they signal something other than the names, or rather other than the things to which the names following the negative are about. (257b9–c3)

This is a controversial stretch of the text.¹² I take 257b1, Ἴδωμεν δὴ καὶ τόδε (“Then let us look also at this”), to introduce a new point. But it is unclear how we are to understand the general point found in the third remark. One issue is whether predication slips into the discussion here, or whether Plato is still operating only in the realm of nonidentity.

Clearly, the idea expressed in (1) about the opposite of being is critical to what follows. The notion of opposite or contrary was not explicitly introduced in the preceding argument, though Difference and Sameness are opposites and at 255b12–c1 Motion and Rest were identified as opposites. As translated, the *τι* is an indefinite pronoun modified by *ἐναντίον* (“any opposite”). In this case no subject is mentioned, but rather the Stranger is remarking upon what the expression means or signifies.¹³ In this regard, we can see that one difference between 255e8–257a7 and the current passage is the concentration on the property negated and the simultaneous avoidance of specifying the subject. This reverses the order of 255e8ff., where once a subject was isolated (Motion), one knew the sole Form, i.e., Motion, to exclude from the position after the “other than” or “not.” In order to assert such nonidentities, we do not need to know anything about the nature of the Form with which Motion is not identical. The Stranger's introduction in (1) of the notion of a contrary (*ἐναντίον*) thus marks a departure from the foregoing where Difference was indiscriminate; isolating a contrary within the range of Forms not identical with the specific subject was not part of the story. In order to develop the notion of what is contrary to some Form, we must know something *specific about the nature* of the Form following the “not.”

Moreover, we are dependent on the preceding argument for the expression “not-being” and the referent of the *τοῦ ὄντος* (being). In the preceding argument, any Form qualified as a not-being insofar as it was not identical with Being itself or *with any other Form*. On the other hand, the immediately preceding remark concerned Being itself. But if *τοῦ ὄντος* (257b3) in (1) refers to Being itself, then the Stranger's remark seems out of place. He is

trying to ensure that we not admit the notion of being contrary to Being in place of otherness than Being. Given the sophist's Parmenidean defensive strategy where what is not must in no way be, "contrary to Being" could only mean *does not partake of Being in any way*. Since Theaetetus knows that Forms must partake of Being and must also not be (in respect of not being any of the other Forms), it is likely that τοῦ ὄντος refers to any being, i.e., any Form. And given that the notion of contrary implies understanding the natures of given Forms, (1) suggests that we are shifting to substantive Forms, Forms which, unlike the greatest kinds, can fail to be partaken of. Since the previous stage does not mention such Forms, Theaetetus is rightly puzzled about the point of (1): what besides nonidentity between Forms does "other than being" mean?

The next passages help somewhat. In (2) we have a subject, something (τι), in the temporal clause, and a candidate not-being, the not-large. The large is an opportune example since it is a substantive Form that does have an opposite (polar contrary), the small. The Stranger's point seems to be clear enough: When we say something is not-large, we do not signal that it is small, the contrary of large, or middling, or any particular property at all in favor of another. The third remark then tells us what we do signify. What a negative particle signifies is something other than what is signified by the expression that follows it. What the "not-large" signifies is something other than large.

Let us postpone for a moment what this something is to concentrate on what is and what is not said in these three texts. What is not said is what kind of subject we are dealing with. In the first remark it is unlikely that any subject is introduced. The third restricts itself to commenting on the predicate. Only the second offers a subject, the indefinite pronoun "something." If "something" refers to ordinary particulars—and prima facie, the indefinite τι seems more suited to particulars than Forms—then we have moved beyond the previous argument. There only Forms were considered, and wherever "not-being" occurred it marked nonidentity between a *targeted* subject Form and *any other* Form. If the Stranger is now expanding the discussion to include particulars, it is reasonable to understand his comments to concern not merely the "not" of nonidentity, but also the "not" of negative predication. It is reasonable because particulars are whatever they are in virtue of partaking in Forms, that is, in virtue of *being predicatively* what they are. And the substantive Forms are just the Forms that particulars partake of and fail to partake of. (It would have hugely complicated matters to consider now whether particulars partake of Being, Sameness, and Difference.)

The assumption that we are speaking about particulars has led many to conclude that the third remark yields significant information about negative predication claims, to wit: when we say that a particular is not large, we signify something about *all* of its properties.¹⁴ We signify that each of its

properties is other than, is not identical with, the property named by the expression following the negative particle; that is, each of its properties is other than large. The attraction of this reading is that it foreshadows what turns out to be the analysis of the false predication statement at 263. Unfortunately, while the Greek underdetermines much here, there is no way to make it say this much. There is no mention of *all* of the subject's properties. Supporters of this reading must latch onto the "something other than [the names] ($\tau\hat{\omega}\nu \acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\omega\nu \tau\acute{\iota}$)" at 257b10 and then import a generalization. The generalization is critical, because the fact that a given subject has some property not identical with Largeness has no bearing on whether it is large. Socrates is just and just is not identical with large but his being just has no bearing on whether he is large.

It is not even certain that mention is made of *any* of the subject's properties. Those who would see properties of particulars in play here do have recourse to the notion of an incompatible property, i.e., a determinate property the possession of which excludes possession of any other determinate property falling under the same determinable. This tack is invited by the sample property large in (2). For while "not-large" does not imply which of the many determinate sizes (size is the determinable here) the subject is, it is one of the other ($\tau\hat{\omega}\nu \acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\omega\nu \tau\acute{\iota}$), each of which rules out being large. This reading garners little (other) support from the text, however, or from philosophical reflection. Incompatibility is found nowhere else in the argument. And for good reason: incompatibility does not accommodate the full generality of (3), since not all properties fall out under determinables, e.g., Beauty. Moreover, it is unclear whether something could fail to be qualified by any of the determinate properties of a given determinable. Most damaging, however, is the fact that incompatibility, rather than providing a general account of negation or not-being, requires an *antecedent* understanding of "not." For what it is to explain a subject's failure to be large in virtue of its possession of an incompatible property is this: something can *not* be large and small at the same time and in the same respect.

The clear message of this section is that "not," when combined with a predicate F, does not signify the opposite or contrary of F. What it does signify is some(thing) other than F, whatever that may be. Given that the range of subjects to which this compound predicate applies includes particulars, the function of this compound predicate, the "not-F," is somewhat different from the nonidentities previously met with. It will have to be incorporated into an account of particulars whose nature and whose properties remain unspecified. Ruling out anything about a subject, or supplying a potential range of properties that the subject might be other than, indicates that we must consider what (the natures of) the subject and the Form are. The $\tau\acute{\iota}$ in (2) makes it reasonable to think that the subjects are ordinary particulars. But while it is true that particulars must be some way or other, Plato is not

yet ready to push the properties of the particular into the spotlight. If we eliminate incompatibility and the generalizing account of the subject's properties, it is left to account for the "some(thing) other (τῶν ἄλλων τι)" as the predicate. What is indicated by the negative particle placed before a name, here "large," is simply and precisely other than Largeness. More work remains on what the particular is not.

The next phase of the argument specifies what the something other is that is signified by "not-being" used in this fashion (257c5ff.). The Stranger suggests that the nature (φύσις) of the Different is parceled out just like knowledge. Theaetetus again needs clarification.

That (knowledge) is also somehow one, but each part of that, marked off from it and (in) coming to be over something (a subject matter), has its own name; wherefore there are said to be many skills and knowledges (sciences). (257c10–d2)

Knowledge, while somehow one (Μία μὲν ἐστὶ πού, 257c10), has parts, the various sciences and skills. These sciences are individuated by what they are set over, their subject matter, for each is a part of the same one thing, namely Knowledge. We are not told how we are to think of the unity or oneness of Knowledge, or what its subject matter might be. It seems likely, however, that if the subject matters of the individual sciences can be thought of as specific *onta*, the musical Forms(?), the geometrical Forms(?), the subject matter of Knowledge itself—perhaps thought of as Dialectic?—would be all the *onta*.

Knowledge, then, somehow remains one Form or genus with its appropriate subject matter—knowledge is always knowledge of something—while its parts are distinguished by their specific focus. The Different suffers this same fate: although one being, it too has parts. There is a part of the Different set against (ἀντιτιθέμενον) the Beautiful (257d7), and it has its own eponym: "What on each occasion we call the 'not-beautiful,' this is other than nothing else than the nature of the Beautiful" (257d10–11). The subject of this sentence has been a matter of debate. Some have supplied a (potentially different) subject for each occasion on which we say that *something* is not beautiful, e.g., "x is not beautiful," "y is not beautiful," etc. But, once again, there is no indication that we are generalizing over different subjects. (This time there is not even the indefinite pronoun "something" [τι].) The generalization has been borrowed from 257b10, in keeping with the accounts of negative predication the generalization subserves. The glance back to 257b10 is appropriate, however, for the Stranger's claim does provide an answer to what is signified when we say, here, "not-beautiful." The something other is nothing other than the part of the Different, the Not-Beautiful. This is the subject of 257d10–11, what "not-beautiful" refers to on each occasion of its use.¹⁵ The Stranger's next two remarks expand upon the nature of these

parts.¹⁶ He repeats the two-part formula introduced in marking off the parts of Knowledge to guide our understanding of the parts of Different. These two aspects, marking off and setting over, are not so much two temporally distinct actions or processes, but rather are two aspects of one logical process. What a part of the Different is, is somehow constituted by the setting of the Different against some particular Form; and, conversely, when we consider the signification of “not-F,” we are to look to a part of the Different. The Not-Beautiful is some kind of antithesis of a Being (the Different) towards a Being (the Beautiful) (257e2–7). Its whole nature consists in being a part of Difference set in contrast to Beauty. That is its essence and that is all it is.

The “subject matter” of a part of the Different is an independent being, Beauty, Largeness, or seemingly any Form. The Different, it then appears, comes divided into parts, the exact number of which is equal to the number of Forms, each of which will be the focus of a specific part. The Stranger goes on to assert that the parts of the Different are no less deservingly said to be than their positive counterparts, the Forms to which they are set in opposition (257e9–258a5). Since each Form is a being with its own nature, and the Different itself is a being, the Stranger concludes that the parts of the Different are equally to be posited as beings (258a7–9). Hence the Stranger can assert, or at least get Theaetetus to agree, that the Not-Large, the Not-Beautiful and so on, are no less beings than the Large itself and the Beautiful itself. But appearances can deceive.

Problems with the status of not-beings are reflected in Aristotle’s *Peri Ideon*, where the Forms of Negations figure as a part of the One-Over-Many Arguments.¹⁷ If the parts really are ontologically on a par with their positive foci, then particulars and Forms alike should be able to participate in these parts. If Socrates is not-beautiful, and if the Not-Beautiful itself is a Form, then Socrates should be not-beautiful for no other reason than because he partakes of this Form. But Plato nowhere writes of this kind of partaking, and indeed nowhere asserts that any not-being or part of the Different is partaken of. The problem with a negative Form such as the Not-Beautiful or Not-Human is that there is no ontological feature common to the things which are not men or not beautiful. There is no ontological feature that marks a real resemblance.¹⁸

The Different itself furnishes a possible solution to this worry. *Perhaps* the Different is itself inherently divided into parts, such that there is no partaking of Difference *simpliciter*. Rather, whenever something partakes of the Different it partakes of some particular part, e.g., the Different-from-Beauty. So, Plato might be thinking that what is partaken of by everything that is, for instance, not-beautiful, is the specific part of the Different, the Other-than-Beautiful.¹⁹ Were this Plato’s contention, however, it is all the more remarkable that he does not say that anything partakes of these parts. But I think

that he is rightly chary of understanding Difference in this fashion. For on this line of reasoning, what would explain why Motion, say, is different from all other Forms would not be its partaking of Difference. Rather, it would be because it partakes of Difference-from-Rest and partakes of Difference-from-Being, and so on. Plato, however, seems to reason that Motion is different from everything else, i.e., everything whose nature is not what it is to be Motion, in virtue of partaking in Difference itself.²⁰

Even if we bracket questions about partaking for the moment, the claim that the parts of Difference are *onta* of equal standing with their positive counterparts rings somewhat hollow. When we consider any given part, it is obvious that it is in some sense a construct of Difference and some positive Form. The Not-Beautiful is the focusing of Difference on Beauty, where the two logical stages of separation from Difference and focusing on Beauty somehow constitute the Not-Beautiful. The Beautiful, on the other hand, is not a construct of this sort. It has a nature in its own right. Whatever we make of the parts of the definition, there is no two-step process involving Difference or the like.²¹ What seems to be driving the remark at 257e9–10 is that there is a definite or determinate *content to the notion* of the Not-Beautiful: the whole being of a part of the Different is simply that it is other than whatever Form it is focused on. If being able to assign a determinate content to a predicate expression is sufficient for it to be, then the Stranger has shown that every part of the Different is.

We are skirting dangerously close here to an unacceptable semantic One-Over-Many argument. Plato is not arguing that wherever we have a predicate in the language, there is a Form corresponding to it. It does not matter even if a significant number of speakers, or all speakers, associate the same content or information with that expression. He rejects as Forms notions such as barbarian, for which there is a name, “barbarian” (βάρβαρος), to which people assign a definite content, not-Greek. These names make cuts, but they do not signify kinds, i.e., Forms (*Pol.* 262a8–263a4). “Barbarian” collects an indefinite group of particulars (ἀπείροτος) which, in reality, have nothing in common (262d3). If merely having a definite content were able to qualify the Not-Beautiful as a Form, then the idea that the parts of the Different are Forms conflicts with the *Politicus*. For βάρβαρος would then be a name for the part of Difference, the Not-Greek.²² For Plato, whether there is a Form is determined by whether there is a property (potentially) participated in by subjects. This ontological One-Over-Many condition will not allow there to be Forms for the Not-Beautiful or Not-Large, since there is no partaking of these Forms.

If we think that the Different comes *objectively divided* into parts, and that the argument is designed simply to lead to this conclusion, then we have to view each part as indicating nonidentity with the Form on which it is focused. This is the only sense in which Difference can be said to have parts

objectively, i.e., independent of the acts of speakers and thinkers. For every Form, then, there will be a part of the Different focused on it, and *any* Form will be able to figure as what any subject is not. But if there is a part of the Different focused on every Form, then there is a part of the Different focused on Being itself. It would seem, then, that this part would be what not-being most truly is. Is there such a part?

From 258a11–259b6 the Stranger expands upon and summarizes the results of this section four times. The repetition is needed perhaps because of the obscurity of the argument to this point. Precisely what not-being really is, however, has eluded readers. In the first summary passage, 258a11–b3, we are the victims of an ambiguous text.

Οὐκοῦν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡ τῆς θατέρου μορίου φύσεως καὶ τῆς τοῦ ὄντος πρὸς ἄλληλα ἀντικειμένων ἀντίθεσις οὐδὲν ἦτρον, εἰ θέμις εἰπεῖν, αὐτοῦ τοῦ ὄντος οὐσία ἐστίν, οὐκ ἐναντίον ἐκείνῳ σημαίνουσα ἀλλὰ τοσοῦτον μόνον, ἕτερον ἐκείνου [*italics mine*].

So then, it seems, the reciprocal antithesis of the nature of a part of the Different and the nature of what is,²³ is no less being (*ousia*)—if it is permissible to say such a thing—than that which is itself, signifying not the opposite to that, but this much only, other than that.

The text does not admit of a definitive interpretation. The first element of the opposition is relatively uncontroversial: it is a part of the Different. Whether one translates “nature of the part . . .” or “part of the nature . . .” largely reflects one’s view of the second element. One question is whether it is appropriate to speak of the “parts of Being,” given that we have not explicitly confronted the locution elsewhere. A part of Being would be any Form. A second question is whether “the nature of Being” or the alternatives “part of the nature of Being,” “nature of a part of Being,” refers to Being itself. The italicized words, especially *αὐτοῦ τοῦ ὄντος οὐσία*, seem to say as much. After the first declaration that they have found the long sought after not-being, the second summary again seems to mention that part of the Different is set against Being:

Πότερον οὖν, ὡς περ εἶπες, ἔστιν οὐδενὸς τῶν ἄλλων οὐσίας ἐλλειπόμενον, καὶ δεῖ θαρροῦντα ἤδη λέγειν ὅτι τὸ μὴ ὄν βεβαίως ἐστὶ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν ἔχον, ὡς περ τὸ μέγα ἦν μέγα καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἦν καλὸν καὶ τὸ μὴ μέγα <μὴ μέγα> καὶ τὸ μὴ καλὸν <μὴ καλόν>, οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν κατὰ ταῦτόν ἦν τε καὶ ἔστι μὴ ὄν, ἐνάριθμον τῶν πολλῶν ὄντων εἶδος ἔν;

Is it necessary, working up our courage, to say that not-being securely has its own nature; that just as the Large is large and the Beautiful beautiful, the Not-Large is not-large and the Not-Beautiful is not-beau-

tiful, so also Not-Being according to the same (principles?) was and is Not-Being, one Form among the many beings? (258b8–c3)

On a second reading, it is not clear whether there is a part of the Different set against Being. Clearly were there one, this would compete strongly for the title, “what not-being truly is.” For while all the other parts are matched to their positive counterparts, e.g., Large to the Not-Large, Being and Not-Being are *not* conjoined together. Indeed, the phrase in which Not-Being is mentioned leaves it open that Not-Being is and was not being on the grounds that all the other positive Forms have their counterpart parts of the Different (οὗτω δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν κατὰ ταῦτόν). *What Not-Being is is these parts of the Different taken collectively.*

The third passage supports this reading to a degree:

Ἡμεῖς δὲ γε οὐ μόνον τὰ μὴ ὄντα ὡς ἔστιν ἀπεδείξαμεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ εἶδος ὃ τυγχάνει ὄν τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἀπεφηνάμεθα· τὴν γὰρ θατέρου φύσιν ἀποδείξαντες οὐσάν τε καὶ κατακεκερματισμένην ἐπὶ πάντα τὰ ὄντα πρὸς ἀλλήλα, τὸ πρὸς τὸ ὄν ἕκαστον μόνιον αὐτῆς ἀντιτιθέμενον ἐτολήσαμεν εἰπεῖν ὡς αὐτὸ τοῦτό ἐστιν ὄντως τὸ μὴ ὄν.

We have shown not only that the not-beings are, but we have also brought to light what the Form of Not-Being happens to be. Having demonstrated both that the nature of the Different is and that it is chopped up over all beings with respect to one another, we have dared to say that not-being really is this very thing: each part of that (the Different) set in opposition to each (kind of) being.²⁴ (258d5–e3)

This at first seems to identify Not-Being with the Form, Difference, and then to identify Not-Being with any part of the Different or the parts taken collectively.

The fourth and final passage provides an assessment of the whole argument reaching all the way back to 254d.

Nobody can say that this not being, which we’ve made to appear and now dare to say is, is the contrary of Being. We’ve said good-bye long ago to any contrary of Being, and to whether it is not, and also to whether or not an account can be given of it. With regard to not-being, which we’ve said is, let someone refute us and persuade us that we’ve made a mistake—or else, so long as he can’t do that, he should speak just as we speak. He has to say that the kinds blend with each other, and Being and Difference pervade them all and each other, that Difference partakes of Being and so, because of that partaking, is. But he won’t say that it is that which it shares in, but that it is different from it, and necessarily, because it is different from Being, it clearly can be not-being. On the other hand, Being partakes of Difference, so, being different from all of the others, it is not each of them and is not

all the others except itself. So Being indisputably is not millions of things and all of the others together, and also each of them, are in many ways and also are not in many ways. (258e6–259b6; White, p. 54, modified)

None of the four texts unqualifiedly cites a part of Different set against Being itself. Not-Being is, depending on the context, either identified with Difference itself or more likely, with the parts taken collectively, but where there is no part focused on Being. If there is no such part, then it follows that the Different *is not objectively divided* into its parts.

What then is a part of Different, if it is not a Form? And if it is not there to be participated in, how are we to understand the metaphysics involved in grounding claims about something's not being beautiful? Plato insists throughout the analogy that Difference is one Form with its own nature. The initial stage of *sumploke eidon* is designed to show how there can be many logical subjects, each of which Is, in virtue of partaking in Being, and each of which is many, in virtue of partaking in the other greatest kinds, including Difference. Thus in the first stage of the argument (255e8–257a7), the Different accounts for the fact that each Form, each logical subject, is different from everything else, especially Being itself. It is undifferentiated because, given a subject that partakes in it, any and *all other* Forms are suitable complements in the claim that "The F is other than . . ." The focus of the argument is on the subject and its partaking in Difference. At this stage, therefore, nonidentity exhausts the way in which Difference performs its duties.

In the next stage of the argument (257a8–259b5), the subject disappears and the differentiation of Difference moves to the fore. First (257b1–c4), we learn that in saying that a subject is different from F or not-F, we do not say that it is the opposite of F. It is simply other than F. It seems that Plato is here talking about particulars and their properties, but there is no mention of what the participating particular (or Form) is, i.e., what it does partake of. We are told simply what it is not. Then (257c5ff.) we learn what it is not. What it is not is a part of the Different. When "not-beautiful," for instance, is said of a subject, we say that it is other than Beautiful. Again, however, in saying that something is not-beautiful, one does not say that the subject *partakes of* anything at all. The statement signals simply that the subject is other than beautiful.

Still, we will have to try to determine whether the parts of the Different should be understood in terms of nonidentity or nonpartaking ("negative predication"). I do not think that in saying that a subject is other-than-F we mean that it is not identical to F. Were the function of the parts to mark nonidentities with each Form, then we would expect there to be a part of the Different opposed to Being. Moreover, were the parts nonidentities, the second stage would seem to offer no advance from the first stage. Finally and

relatedly, understanding the parts in terms of non-identity won't get us the right analysis of negative predications, whether those predications involve Forms or particulars.

While it is incontestable that there is no text, save perhaps 257b6–7, that clearly uses a predication statement concerning particulars to make its point, the doctrine itself makes the most sense if it is developed as an account of such negative predications. The analysis of those predications is still not obvious. There are two options, depending on how one regards the moral expressed at 257b9ff. (1) In saying that some (particular) *x* is not-beautiful, we say nothing about what *x* is; that is, we say nothing about *x*'s partakings. Rather, we say only what *x* does not partake of. (2) In saying that some (particular) *x* is not-beautiful, we say that *x*'s partakings lie outside of Beauty. (2) allows us to bring in *x*'s properties. It allows us to ground the truth of *x*'s partaking being "outside of Beauty" in the fact that none of *x*'s properties is identical with Beauty. (2) thus links the account of negative predications involving particulars with the nonidentities of the first stage and prepares us for what is to come in the account of the false statement at 263. According to (1), on the other hand, the doctrine of the parts allows us to account for negative predications in terms of the subject's *failure to participate* in the appropriate Form. So, what "x is not-beautiful" says on this account is that *x* does not participate in Beauty. Supporters of (1) can look to the earlier discussion of the interweaving of Forms, where it was said that some Forms do not combine with one another. The failure to combine is, on this interpretation, the absence of participation between the specified Forms. Similarly when the subject is a particular: "x is not-beautiful" tells us that *x* does not combine with or partake of Beauty.

On neither of these interpretations does this sentence assert that each of *x*'s properties is not identical with Beauty. And on both the sentence asserts that Beauty is not a property of *x*. But on interpretation (1), there is no presupposition that *x* partakes of anything at all, that anything is a property of *x*. This interpretation thus threatens to run counter to the basic principle guiding Plato's account of not-being, that anything which is not must in some way be. On the other hand, we have seen that throughout stage two Plato studiously avoids telling us anything about the particular subjects of the sentences. Indeed, the status of the subject will come to the fore in the next stage. There we will see not only that the subject term of a statement must be about something, but also that Forms (plural) are involved in every subject-predicate sentence, regardless of whether the subject is a Form or a particular.

Rather than choosing between interpretations (1) and (2), I think that one should embrace both. The parts of the Different are designed to help us understand the predicate in a negative predication claim. They reveal that what gets said—and what is meant—in such a claim is that the subject does

not partake of the Form that is the focus of a given part. Once we recognize that every subject must, however, be many things, it will follow that none of its properties can be identical with that Form. For this is just to say that none of the properties it does partake of is identical with a property it does not partake of. Given that the subject must partake of many Forms, Plato, I think, reckons that with respect to what makes the negative predication claim true or false interpretations (1) and (2) come to the same.

But the discussion of the subject's properties lies ahead. A part of the Different is not one of its properties, for parts of the Different are not objective parts/properties that something can partake of. (Thus they are not second-order properties such as "the property of having no property identical with beauty.") What are they? And in what sense are they truly what not-being is? The obvious counterpart to an objective part is a subjective part. The parts of Difference are subjective in that they are the creations of speakers and thinkers. The key to the partitioning of Difference is the antithesis, the Janus-headed process of marking off the part from Difference and setting it in opposition to some Form. This antithesis is subjective in that it is something speakers and thinkers do each time we set a "not" before a predicate. We thus construct each part anew when we hold in the same thought a subject and a given property that we think it lacks, and say of the subject that it does not partake in that given Form. In order to do this, we thus have to have some understanding of what it is that the subject does not partake of. We select the property and consider the subject in light of it. For this reason there is no part of the Different set against Being itself. We cannot consider the subject and think that its partakings are outside of Being. Given that we have any grasp of what Being is, this would be to try to think about something apart from all of its properties. Were there a part of the Different set against Being, it would be the contrary of Being, a notion, the Stranger insists repeatedly, that was banished long ago. In the predication claims where we construct a part of the Different, we cannot intelligibly say that any subject's partaking lie outside of Being.²⁵ In nonidentity claims, on the other hand, we do not appeal to a part of the Different, we appeal only to Difference itself. We do not need to know anything about the respective natures of the properties for which the subject and predicate expressions stand, save that they are different. Here we can allow Being to be either the subject or the complement. But only here.

A part of Difference, then, is a construct, an antithesis produced on a case-by-case basis by a speaker when he makes a predication statement. A part is built from two *onta* and in virtue of its very origins is *determinate in nature*: it is precisely other than the Form it is set against. This is a very different kind of being than that enjoyed by Forms or even particulars. But it is not a total surprise, since we witnessed earlier that language and images in general have to have their own peculiar nature. What seems to be required of

linguistic items, or images in general, is that they have a *determinate content*, a content derived from the *onta* that they are about.

The parts of the Different are then doubly not-beings. They are not Forms. Nothing can partake of them and they do not directly partake in Being. They acquire their nature from the special relations of their parts. They can be said to partake of Being, but only *because they are a part of language*, and hence acquire their status as beings of a special sort. The parts serve a predicative function as opposed to functioning in nonidentity claims. The predication claims will typically have particulars as subjects, but nothing precludes the parts from appearing in predication claims involving Forms. If Rest does not partake of Motion, then in the statement “Rest is not motion” a part of Difference, the “not-motion,” is part of the predicate. What is special about claims involving Forms such as this one is that we cannot determine from the statement itself whether it is a nonidentity involving Difference, or a negative predication involving the part of Difference. The Stranger is alert to this problem. After his final conclusion he castigates those who play fast and loose with claims of Sameness and Difference (259b8–d7). He implies that one can follow the twists and turns of Sameness and Difference, distinguishing claims of negative predication from claims of Difference, and claims of Sameness from claims of being. Success at this task will lead to the end of the hunt.

Sophist 263a–263d4

Plato’s account of false statement begins with the declaration that the very possibility of language (*logos*) depends upon the interweaving of Forms (259e3–5).²⁶ There is more than one reason why a plurality of Forms is necessary by Plato’s reckoning. The immediate context (260a5–b2) provides an obvious reason: he justifies his remark by appealing to the fact that Language is one of the beings. Were there no blending of *Logos* and Being, then there would be no *Logos*. But this is not the only sense in which the interweaving of Forms is a necessary precondition for statements. Two others derive from earlier claims in the dialogue, especially the refutation of the late-learners. There the very possibility of presenting an account of what there is required that Forms combine. Were there no interweaving of Forms, then the metaphysician could not say what there is, since in doing so she must “attach Being” to something (252a5–10). This reason is dominant in the subsequent course of the argument. It represents the main thread of *sumploke eidon* according to which each *on* must in fact be many, and insofar as it is many each Form also is not, i.e., each Form partakes of Difference from Being and the other Forms. When a statement involves Forms, whether it be a statement involving either of the two ways of being said to be, or

statements marking sameness or difference of Forms, the dependence of *logos* on an interweaving of Forms is transparently ontological. The subject and predicate are both Forms.

Lurking in the background, however, is a second reason involving statements about particulars. Here it is not obvious how Forms are involved in each case, since the referent of the subject-term is a particular. Indeed, as we've seen in the discussion of 257b1ff., the properties of the particular subject never make it to the surface. At best, one could argue that since two Forms are involved in the nature of a part of the Different, Forms are involved in those cases. But in fact a particular subject is many in the same sense in which each Form turned out to be many, namely in having many properties. The one instance (251a5ff.) where the Stranger speaks about particulars confirms that many Forms are involved in each *logos*, i.e., each subject-predicate statement: "Let us say how we call the same thing by many names on each occasion of speaking." That each *on* must be many also then applies to particulars, since each of them will have many properties. The interweaving of Forms is then a prerequisite for all statements not because many Forms are *transparently* involved in statements about particulars, but rather because in order for there to be particulars that can serve as the referent of the subject-term, they must have many properties. This reason will shortly move to the fore when the Stranger turns to the account of false statement.

The Stranger's next task is to show that *logos* mixes with not-being as well as Being.²⁷ If it blends only with Being, he says, there will only be true statements. If there is to be false statement, then it must blend with not-being, since falsity in thought and speech just is saying not-beings (τὰ μὴ ὄντα, 260c3). There is little prospect of parsing this claim simply in terms of negative predication or nonidentity statements. There is nothing inherent in any of the claims involving not-beings that implies that they are true or false. Besides, since these not-beings are themselves said to be, mixing with them is just to mix with another one among the many beings. The parts of the Different do, however, allow the Stranger to assign a definite content to all assertions involving negative particles and a predicate. They say what the subject does not participate in; they say what the subject is other than.

Saying what is not provides the one link between falsehood and the parts of Different. One sense in which *logos* mixes with Being is that language, and its parts, are *onta* of a certain sort. Language is an image, capable of representing things. It is a natural feature of the world, a practice of rational agents. The statements have specific content, even those involving expressions like "not-beautiful." In asking whether language partakes of not-being, as well as Being, the Stranger takes for granted that there is this representational medium. What he now seeks is how, or whether, a statement can come to represent what is not the case, as well as what is the case. His avenue is to

explore how statements are constructed. Here again he relies on his previous remarks about the parts of the Different. Those not-beings are antitheses crafted on each occasion by speakers, constructs from things that are, i.e., the Different and a second Form. To clarify this point he invites Theaetetus to consider the nature of a statement. He locates two components of a *logos*, a name (ὄνομα) and a verb or predicate (ῥῆμα). Neither names alone nor verbs alone will suffice to make a statement. Statements must be *composed* (συντίθεσθαι) from a name and a verb. Names refer to the agents or subjects. Verbs refer to actions. When woven together in a statement, the result is not a mere listing of names and verbs, or subjects and properties, but something more. A statement says something about something: the name component identifies the subject we are speaking about; the verb component specifies what we mean to say about the subject. The weaving together of name and verb, the statement, then says of the subject what the verb specifies (261d–262).

The Stranger does not treat these two components equally. He insists that in order for a *logos* to be a statement, the name component must refer to something or specify the subject. In this respect, a statement cannot be about nothing.²⁸ The subject is specified independently from the predicate, i.e., from what gets said about the subject. This is crucial, for it implies that the subject is something besides what gets predicated of it in any given (simple) subject-predicate statement under examination. Here we see how the interweaving of Forms makes statements possible: the material particulars referred to by subject terms are complex; they partake of many Forms. We are able to specify the subject independently of what gets said about it by latching onto one of its other properties (262e5–6). Having specified that a statement must be about something and must say something about its subject, Plato then adds that such a statement can have the quality of truth or falsehood. Truth and falsehood thus are a function of what is said of, i.e., what is predicated of, the subject.

The Stranger turns first to a true statement, “Theaetetus sits.” He offers the following analysis of this true statement, and by implication true statements in general: It says things that are (*onta*) that they are about you (Λέγει δὲ αὐτῶν ὁ μὲν ἀληθῆς τὰ ὄντα ὡς ἔστιν περὶ σοῦ, 263b4–5). A true statement says of something that is, e.g., Theaetetus, the things that are about him, that they are (about him). There are many things that are about Theaetetus. A true statement isolates one of the things that are of/about Theaetetus, e.g., sitting, and says that it is about him. (Plato characterizes true statements in terms of things that are, and not a thing that is, in order to prepare the way for his account of false statement, where the plural is needed.)

The things that are about Theaetetus are beings or not-beings. The *rhema* chosen by a speaker as the predicate of the sentence he composes refers to a

being independently of its inclusion in this particular sentence. “Sitting” refers to the property Sitting, and Sitting is something that is, a Form. That this is true also of negative *rhēmata* such as the “not-beautiful” was the burden of the argument for the parts of the Different. “Not-sitting,” like “Sitting,” has a determinate content, even though there is no Form to which it refers. In a sense it refers to the Form Sitting, though in combination with the negative particle in a predication statement, the statement asserts that Sitting is not one of Theaetetus’s properties. The truth of the statement thus turns on whether the property referred to by the predicate is among Theaetetus’s beings. In the positive predication statement, something that is, is predicated of something that is, and the statement says that the property belongs to the subject; e.g., “Theaetetus sits” says that Sitting is one of Theaetetus’s properties. The statement is true if Sitting is, in fact, a property of Theaetetus.

The same general framework applies to the false statement “Theaetetus is flying.” Here again Flying is something that is. The statement predicates something that is, Flying, of something that is, Theaetetus. It says that Flying is one of Theaetetus’s properties. The Stranger’s account of false statement is more drawn out than his account of the true statement.

The false says things other than the things which are (‘Ο δὲ δὴ ψευδοῦς ἕτερα τῶν ὄντων, 263b7).

This is then characterized further:

The false statements says things that are not that they are (Τὰ μὴ ὄντ’ ἄρα ὡς ὄντα λέγει, 263b9).

And finally,

The false statement says things that are that are different things from the things that are about you. For we said that there are many beings concerning each thing, and many not-beings (‘Οντων δὲ γε ὄντα ἕτερα περι σοῦ. πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ ἔφαμεν ὄντα περι ἕκαστον εἶναι που, πολλὰ δὲ οὐκ ὄντα, 263b11–12).²⁹

The false statement says that something that is, Flying, is among the properties that belong to Theaetetus. Again there is a collection of properties, all of those that belong to Theaetetus, and Flying is not one of them. Thus the statement that says that it is one of them is false. The *onta* are other than what is, not because Flying is something that is not, but because the things which are, are limited to those that belong to Theaetetus. Since Flying is other than these beings, namely Theaetetus’s beings, it is a not-being. So in general a false statement does speak of not-beings, namely beings that are different from any of the beings belonging to the subject.

If the analysis is satisfactory, the connection to the foregoing is murky.

The backwards reference to 256e5–6 is troubling. There, it seemed, we had only an account of nonidentity, whereas here we have a predication claim.³⁰ Why is the reference not back to 257ff. and the parts of the Different, where at least negative predication statements appeared to be under examination? The need for nonidentity emerges in the analysis of how we *determine* that the false statement says (things that are but) things that are different from those that are about the subject. The “about you” (περὶ σοῦ) at 263b11 is necessary to complete the analysis begun at 263b7, as the complementary analysis of the true statement makes clear. The parenthesis (above) reminds us that what gets said in any statement is something that is, here Flying, about something that is. Ultimately only beings, whether they are particulars or Forms, can be represented by language, for an image must always be an image of something that is. Hence only beings, or rather the subject and predicate expressions that refer to them, can be combined in statements. What it is for something that is a being to be a not-being in a false predication statement is for it not to be one of the properties of the subject. This is to say that it is other than any of the subject’s properties. For example, Flying is a not-being in the sample sentence because it is other than any of Theaetetus’s properties. But this is to say that it is not identical with any property Theaetetus has. The basic framework thus requires that we utilize the notion of nonidentity developed at 255–6. What was not developed there, save marginally on the positive side, was any sense of predication, especially negative predication.

But if nonidentity is a necessary element in the account of false statement, so too is predication. To understand what is claimed by these statements and to determine their truth or falsity, one needs to isolate the subject and the properties of the subject so that we can ask whether Flying or Sitting is among his properties. The Stranger has established that it is not a question of whether there are these properties, nor a question of whether Theaetetus is something with many properties. The truth or falsity of the statement “Theaetetus flies” is a question of whether Flying is among *Theaetetus’s* properties. The account of the truth and falsehood of the two predication statements thus requires us to consider the participation relations enjoyed by Theaetetus. (The analysis of the truth of “Theaetetus sits” could easily have been given in terms of the identity of sitting with one of Theaetetus’s properties.) And this fact, it seems to me, gives us a hook back to the parts of the Different. There we saw that when it is said that something is “not-beautiful,” the statement specifies what the subject does not participate in, i.e., what is not to be included in the set of its beings. Just as the attribution of the part of the Different indicates that the subject is other than this, Beautiful, so the false statement presents another thing that the subject is other than, namely Flying, for Theaetetus does not participate in Flying.

It is regrettable that Plato refrained from analyzing negative predication

statements, especially false ones. If the parts of the Different really were designed to fill that need, an account of the truth and falsity of negative predication statements would have shed light on Plato's thinking. While there is much that is terribly unclear about the account of false statement and the course of the argument itself, one thing is incontestable: the elements from which both true and false statements are constructed are all *onta*. They come by their claim not to be through a juxtaposition with other *onta*, namely other Forms in the case of nonidentities, or the properties of a given subject in the case of predication statements. In the former case, the sense in which a Form is a not-being is harmless, since it is the counterpart to the principle that we must start with a plurality of beings. Not-being in this sense is a reflection of difference in *ousia*, or nature, and is accommodated within the ontological theory. But even here the particular sentence asserting the difference between two Forms is the product of a speaker who takes in thought the selected Forms. A denial of difference between two Forms is a falsehood, because Difference goes through all the Forms, including itself. In this respect, then, a false identity claim is a construct of the speaker.

The not-beings of the predicational variety are more worrisome, whether they are the parts of the Different, or falsehoods saying of what is about a subject that it is not about the subject, or of what is not about a subject that it is about the subject. Plato's account relies on the notions, established by the end of the Battle of Gods and Giants and elaborated in *sumploke eidon*, that anything that is is many (*πολλά*), and that only things that are many can be represented in speech or thought. The common bond uniting the falsehoods discussed at 263 and the parts of the Different is the role of the speaker/thinker, the agent who constructs the problematic not-being. In setting Difference, a being, against a different being, e.g., Beauty, the speaker fashions a not-being, a part of Difference, whose sole function is to indicate what the subject is not, what something does not partake of. This part is not itself something a subject of any sort can partake of. Rather, a speaker selects a particular property and focuses Difference on it. In this respect, negation, here the negation of the participation relation, is an operation, something rational agents create. Whereas Difference is a feature of the world, and thus must be assigned a Form, the parts of Difference are not natural features. Their claim to be derives from their determinate content. Their content in turn is derived from the nature of Difference and the Form to which a speaker sets it in opposition.

The creative powers of the rational agent are also at work in the construction of all predication statements. The interweaving of Forms allows a particular to have many properties. That it has many properties in turn makes it possible for the speaker to isolate a subject and then to go on to ascribe some property to it. The property ascribed is selected by the speaker and in the statement he makes that property is asserted to belong or not to belong

to the subject. Plato thus presupposes that there are many properties belonging to the particular, even though the given statement does not say this. What makes the sentence true or false is whether the property selected is among the properties which do in fact belong to the subject. The account of predication statements thus involves the notion of nonidentity developed at 255–57, as well as predication, since we need to isolate the subject and consider whether or not what is ascribed to it is among its properties, i.e., among the properties it partakes of. Whereas a true statement reflects an actual state of affairs, that is, the relation between a subject and a Form, the false statement represents what is a possible, but not an actual state of affairs. What claim it has to be, is dependent totally on the two beings which the speaker utilizes in its construction. Since in a false statement the relation posited between the selected predicate and the subject is different from the actual situation, i.e., what there is, a false statement is simply the fabrication of the speaker. It is a composition which, while its building blocks are also two beings, is the product of a rational agent. In putting together subject and predicate, we rational agents are liable to create falsehood.

Collection and Division

The Method of Collection and Division is a successor to the process of Recollection.³¹ When introduced in the *Phaedrus* and *Sophist*, the method is designed to yield the definition (*logos*) of what is being studied so that its successful practitioner can acquire knowledge of a Form, or whatever is under investigation, e.g., sophistry. The question of whether there are non-Form properties, or concepts in general, emerges from the fact that one can generate a number of divisions embracing any given subject, as evidenced by the *Sophist's* seven collections and divisions developed for the sophist.³² Each of these divisions, in turn, yields a distinct definition. In the *Sophist*, the collections and divisions evolve from the question with which the dialogue opens, whether the names “sophist,” “statesman,” and “philosopher” name three things or just one (217aff.)? The Stranger’s introduction of the method is preceded by his remark that while people may have the three names in common, each of us may have our own private notion of what it is that we mean by each name (218c1–5). The multiple definitions may reflect the different notions people associate with sophistry.

But prior to the articulation of the collections and divisions themselves, there is no indication that the method is liable to yield multiple definitions of each item. On the contrary, while something may enjoy many names, there is just one definition, which is why it is a better epistemological guide than the name. The definition makes clear what the thing is (*Sophist* 216b5–c5). When we consider the various collections and divisions themselves, on

the other hand, we are confronted with many definitions, each developed by focusing on different aspects of the definiendum. Assuming that there remains at least one definition that says what each Form is, we must decide whether the multiple definitions are all true or whether some (or all) are false. If some are false, then there are, it seems, collections and divisions that produce informative statements and yet fail to produce the appropriate definition. These statements could be flawed in at least three ways: (1) Like those Cratylean names (*Crat.* 432e) that maintain the outline but do not give the full picture, a definition might say something true about a “part” of the essence of the definiendum but fail to pick out the *whole of the essence*. (2) A definition could pick out a property of the definiendum, but fail to refer to the essence itself, marking off instead a property which the definiendum happens to have, or even a property unique to the definiendum, i.e., the *logos* generated in the collection and division could be a definite description. (3) The account generated by the collection and division could simply fail to refer either to the essence or to any property of the definiendum. There might be no such property at all, or it could name a property but not one had by the sought after object. In all three cases what people say about a subject might be different from what each subject is. Communication among people who speak the language nonetheless remains possible, and obviously people say falsehoods all the time in conversations, both ordinary and philosophical. One of Plato’s tasks in the later dialogues is to account for the fact that people think differently, and sometimes falsely, about objects. As part of this account, Plato seems ready to consider how what people *think* about objects might require him to make finer *ontological* discriminations than merely the bifurcation of Form and particular. This point is made vividly in the *Statesman* 262: Socrates is warned not to wed himself too closely with names (μὴ σπουδάζειν ἐπὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν, 261e5–6), lest he assume that every “cut” (μέρος) corresponds to a kind (εἶδος). Mere cuts for which there are names in a language, e.g., “barbarian,” do not mark off Forms, though they do seem to be contentful. The question is, Are there *non-Form properties* to which these mere cuts refer?

Reflection on the nature of the Method of Collection and Division suggests that multiple analyses are almost certain to result no matter what the subject matter under investigation.³³ First, in the late dialogues where it is deployed, every potential object of study, whether Form or particular, turns out to have many properties. Second, Forms or practices are related to other Forms or practices; understanding a given practice requires that we determine how it is different from or similar to a second practice. Finally, every kind of item is liable to have different roles in different situations, thus making prominent certain features in one situation and different features in another. For instance, in the *Sophist* sophistry is considered both as a productive and as an acquisitive art. Equally, it seems, there would be certain

features emphasized and isolated in a biological collection and division of the Horse itself, other features in a division of means of combat, and different features emphasized and isolated in a division of farming.

On the other side of the ledger, the individuals engaged in the process of collecting and dividing will also differ with respect to the interests, background, and collateral information each brings to the task. (That we differ in actual fact is noted as early as the *Meno's* mention of the “dialectical requirement”; see chapter 2.) As our perspectives and needs change, we look to different aspects of the definiendum. The multiplicity of properties, and the variety of approaches that emphasize different aspects of the object, force us to consider whether Plato remains the realist of the middle dialogues. This amounts to the question whether he maintains that each definable item has exactly one essence, i.e., one definition.

The Method of Collection and Division itself exerts epistemological pressure to deny that each Form has an essence in the traditional sense. Application of the Method typically issues in a treelike structure of some kind, with the target property/practice occupying a node that is connected to other nodes above, below, and parallel with it. The problem is that nothing in a schema of collection and division privileges the relation between the definiendum and any one node over that between the definiendum and any other node. Moreover, given that an item can be located in multiple schemata, there is no reason to privilege a “definition” derived from any one schema about a potential object of knowledge over any other “definition” derived from another schema. The potential plethora of collections and divisions seems to ensure that every property of an item can figure in some kind of collection and division. The primary object of knowledge therefore need no longer be restricted to the definition of (what previously had been thought to be) a Form's essence.³⁴

Regardless of whether we think that the multiplicity of divisions undercuts essentialism, Plato does not endorse that inference. The fact that each of the “definitions” of the sophist seems to be no better than the next indicates to him instead that they have yet to hit upon the single, or singularly illuminating, definition (*Sophist* 231–32). This is not to say that the other descriptions—as opposed to the unique definition—are false. Some may even be truths derivable from the essence, picking out properties akin perhaps to the necessary accidents highlighted by Aristotle. These properties are equally real or objective kinds, i.e., they themselves will be definable. Essence remains one and essence “explains” how the various descriptions generated in the different collections and divisions are capable of leading to the object of knowledge.³⁵ If the different collections and divisions themselves ultimately have their focus on the single essence of the definiendum, then there is less reason to think that any statement relating the definiendum to some property in some schema is equally suited to pick out an “object” of knowledge.

On the other hand, some collections and divisions will generate statements making use of cuts that do not stand for real kinds, e.g., a division of Human that makes use of the notion of barbarian. It is unclear how Plato wishes to accommodate these notions. Some, like “the not-ten-thousand,” can be assigned a determinate content, insofar as ten thousand is a number. Appeal to the “not-ten-thousand” is problematic, then, because it will not advance the inquirer to his goal, understanding what number is. The problem with cuts like “barbarian” seems somewhat different. It is unclear whether Greek is a real kind for Plato, and hence if “barbarian” means “not-Greek,” the whole content of the notion seems to be our manufacture. In both cases, however, Plato seems to deny that there is any one property by partaking in which a particular comes to be “other than ten thousand” or a “barbarian.” These cuts then are creations of confused inquirers and, while they have determinate content in virtue of their dependence on real kinds, they have no ontological standing in Plato (*Politicus* 262d-e). They may have “conceptual content.”

According to a new orthodoxy (see note 34), a second consequence of the Method of Collection and Division is that Forms can no longer be known in isolation, especially by means of an act of intuition or some act of acquaintance. We arrive at this conclusion by starting from the fact that the various *logoi* generated by the Method are semantically and syntactically complex. Thus in order to know that Man is a rational bipedal animal, it is claimed that one must know the definitions of Rationality, Bipedality, and Animality. The same will be true of the definitions of these kinds. It follows, according to the new orthodoxy, that in order to know any one truth about a Form in a given division, one must know how it is related to all the other properties in any schemata in which it figures. The analogy of grammatical letters and musical notes, prominent in the *Theaetetus*, *Sophist*, and *Philebus*, provides the paradigm for this picture. *Episteme* is treated as understanding, as opposed to knowledge; for “understanding” conveys to some English speakers the broad and expansive grasp of a whole (domain of) science.³⁶

I cannot consider in a detailed manner this “field” theory of knowledge in the late Plato, lest I lengthen an already lengthy work. A limited discussion is necessary, however, since the ontological underpinnings of this epistemology affect the issue of whether the “parts” of the definition are predicable of the Form. In brief, then, I want to contend that Plato does not espouse the “field” theory. First, what evidence we have from his contemporaries suggests that he never subscribed to such a holistic epistemology. Second, at crucial moments the field theory itself must rely on an act of insight. If so, then there is, I believe, no good reason to think that Plato denies himself acts of insights into knowledge of individual Forms. Finally, I think that holistic accounts misconstrue the role of collection and the nature of the particular in Plato’s late epistemology and metaphysics. Were we to accept the logic of

this holism, then we should conclude that if we are to know anything, or any truth, we must know everything, i.e., all the sciences. One ontological consequence of this global holism would be that we couldn't limit what is predicable of a given Form to the parts of its definition, or any other favored set of properties. Each Form will turn out to be, in Frede's terminology, partially identical to every Form.

When we arrive at the late dialogues and the Method of Collection and Division, the stability of particulars is no longer the concern it once was. Plato is dismissive of the one/many problem as it applies to them. The *Philebus* (14d–e) and *Parmenides* (129) ridicule those who think the problem of the one and many as it afflicts particulars is severe.³⁷ Indeed, the ontologies of the *Philebus* and *Timaeus* are designed, in part, to show that particulars are reasonably persistent and capable of possessing many properties over a long span of time (see chapter 7). The stable particulars turn out to be the very items from which we begin the process of collection. We collect particulars under those kinds or properties deemed salient to the particular inquiry. In collecting, then, we can go from particulars to a species, or to a genus, or to any universal, even to a cut that is not a kind. There is *at the outset* little to guide the process beyond the interests of the collector. However, when we consider the finished schema of collection and division, what the collection and division would be like if rationally reconstructed, it would consist of the enumeration of all the infimae species that are immediately above the particulars, then higher species, and finally the genera and the higher/highest genera. The exfoliated division beginning from the highest genera would then have the same kinds in a treelike structure as the finished collection beginning from the particulars.

One difference between collecting and dividing would be the role played by the particulars. In collecting, the dialectician begins from particulars exhibiting a suitable group of properties. They are part of the process. In a finished division, on the other hand, they would occur only as a postulate. If we were disembodied souls living in the world of the separate or transcendent Forms, we could see the fully exfoliated division without ever worrying whether there were instances of the Forms.

There is a second, and epistemically fundamental, difference between collection and division. Even though they result in logically identical schemata, nothing about the process of collection, relying as it does on our surveying a group of particulars, allows us to conclude that we have a complete or exhaustive enumeration of the infimae and higher species and genera. With a division on the other hand, Plato's remarks suggest that one knows that a schema is complete. Nowhere in the dialogues are we told how this knowledge is gained. Nothing, however, in the process of division permits one to conclude that one has come to an end point. It seems, then, that the dialectician comes by this knowledge through an act of intuition: she sees that the

schema is complete and fully exfoliated. The particulars then serve as prompts for the process of division, but that process itself is our only means to the intuition into the completeness of the process.³⁸

To collect various particulars in search of species and genera might itself seem to be a hopelessly relativistic enterprise. Which particulars one gathers and what one sees, or which properties one even decides to select for, all appear to be subject to the interests and discriminatory powers of the selector. The schemata will include properties for which there are kinds, and properties which, while they have names and are perhaps conceptually significant, are merely cuts. The construction of these schemata will be subject to convention or Protagorean influences. Plato recognizes that all sorts of misguided divisions are liable to be generated as a result. Nonetheless, he avers that Collection and Division is the method by which all scientific truth has been discovered (*Philebus* 16c). Why such confidence?

In collection, particulars are regarded as bearers of properties in an uncomplicated manner. The collector can survey a number of particulars and note the *collocation* of properties. Moreover, it seems that Plato assumes that, to a large extent, the same properties will turn up in any search whose parameters are the same or similar. Different cats will exhibit some of the same properties. The assumption underlying the notion of “natural joints” (*Phaedrus* 265e) is that this association or collocation of properties will also endure through time as the marker of a species or kind. (In the next chapter, I will argue that the account of mixtures in the *Philebus*, and especially the construction of the species out of the geometrized bodies in the *Timaeus*, reveals why particular members of the species will, at least for the most part, exhibit the same properties.) Davidson³⁹ labeled this phenomenon “trueness to type”: members of a species will remain true to type because a certain collection of properties is most beneficial to the maintenance of the species, i.e., to its reproduction and flourishing. When we combine the *Philebus*’s mixtures with the teleological reflections of the *Timaeus*, it is plausible to assume that Plato holds that there is exactly one collection of properties that marks off a “type,” and that it is the having of those properties that offers the best guarantee (available) for Secretariat and Mr. Ed to be healthy horses. Conversely, because it is likely that we will confront horses relevantly similar to Mr. Ed and Secretariat when we start a collection of quadrupeds, it is probable that we will come up with or posit the appropriate infimae species. The natural joints will force themselves into the open, provided that we take the time to inspect the inhabitants of the natural order. In what might seem a reversal of form from the middle-period works, it thus appears that only if we ignore the sensible world are we liable to fall prey to Protagorean or relativistic problems when it comes to constructing the divisions. If we start from the *logoi* offered by individuals whose interests are relative and peculiar, we are liable to find that no one collection and division is a better guide than

another to the nature of things. Only if we confront the natural order will the natural joints become apparent.

If the vast majority of a kind of particular remain true to type, then the investigator will find a collection of associated properties in each of the instances of that type. These particulars will, however, have other properties which will vary from one case to the next, for instance one cow may be brown, another black. Suppose it turns out that all of the cows one meets are brown. If he were to rely on collection alone, Plato would have to include brown as one of the differentia in the division of which Cow itself is a species. But collection is not his only source of information. The Method of Division offers its own insights. It seems to me that Plato's likely response would be to appeal once again to an *intuition* that color should not be part of the definition of a natural kind, perhaps citing that it is no part of any other similar natural kind, or perhaps arguing that surfaces are the sorts of things that admit of variances in coloration. Whatever *we* may think of an appeal to intuition, it opens the door to a similar account of the relation between elements of the definition and the definition itself. Each instance of a natural kind will have all the properties specified in the definition of that kind and all the necessary accidents which flow from that essence. (This is not to say that they bear the essence.) On the basis of these properties the dialectician constructs the appropriate collection and division of the subject matter of the science that studies the kind under examination. He will mark out the relations between the properties in the division. Reflecting on the results from other sciences and properties that recur in different domains, he will refine the schema, eliminating features such as the brown color that all the surveyed cows happened to be. He can even go so far as to relate the nodes to one another in generalizations and claim that there are conditional necessities such that, for instance, anything that is extended is colored, or anything that is a man, is risible. It may even turn out that in order *to come* to know a given Form it is necessary to know some or even all the necessary accidents that attend the essence, or the elements of the definition themselves. But the sense in which this may be necessary is not one in which knowledge of the elements of the definition, let alone knowledge of the necessary accidents, is *constitutive* of the knowledge of the species. On the contrary, I think that it is precisely this threat, posed by Speusippus, against which Aristotle reacts strongly.⁴⁰

Speusippus seems to have argued that to know anything, one had to know the difference between that thing and *any* item with which it is not identical. This reasoning did not prompt him to become a skeptic, since his *Omoia* is an attempt to satisfy this condition on knowledge.⁴¹ The account of understanding espoused by the field theorists forces Plato into the same bed as Speusippus. On their account, to know what F is, it is necessary to know the definition of F. But what it is to know this definition, is to know all the parts

of F's definition, and this, in turn, requires one to know the definitions of the parts, and the definitions of the parts of the parts, and so on. At the very least, their Plato will be committed to claiming that in order to know any one Form in a scientific domain (represented by a collection-and-division schema), one must know every Form in the domain. Clearly Aristotle did not think that the Method of Division committed one to holism, and equally clearly he does not level this charge against Plato's account.

Defenders of the field theory, relying on the letter and music analogies for textual support, seldom contend that Plato's is a global holism. Rather, in their view one need understand only *the entire science* in order to know any one truth or Form found in that science. But it is not clear that scientific domains can be segregated, so long as one requires that knowledge of a given Form entails knowledge of the parts of the definition and the necessary accidents. Finally, the very fact that each Form is liable to occupy nodes in multiple collection and division schemata implies that it will not be enough to know the truths of one domain in order to know a given Form. As Speusippus recognized, if the collections and divisions are treated as marking out essential relations among the Forms, then only a completely exhaustive classification of all the differences and similarities between anything and everything will suffice for knowledge.

Whatever *we* might make of the possibility of a limited holism, the ancient evidence is that both Plato and Aristotle denied that Speusippean holism is a consequence of their respective accounts. Both assert that Forms are in some sense unities and that knowledge of Forms, or *primary ousiai*, is punctate and nondiscursive.⁴² If Forms are ontological unities known in an act of intuition, then the Method of Collection and Division should not be seen as indicating that there are ontological relations obtaining between the various nodes. In particular, it is unlikely to commit Plato to the view that the parts of a definition are ontologically predicable of the definiendum. How then are we to view the relation between the elements of the schemata and what states of affair, if any, do they depict?

I view the properties as heuristic guides to the essence, as stepping stones or signposts to the desired goal, i.e., the essence of the definiendum. The fact that particulars are stable enough to bear properties, combined with the teleological assurance that there is exactly one combination of properties that ensures the continuation of the species, or put differently, that constitutes the trueness of type that perdures, allows one to move from the properties exhibited at the level of particulars to the *infimae species* and beyond. The *different paths* thought by the field theorist to constitute knowledge are still available on this picture. In fact, since the different paths or different hierarchies are capable of leading to the understanding of what a given species is, the heuristic model is better able to accommodate the multiplicity and relativity of the schemata. The various divisions are thus to be treated as useful

ways to guide or limit a search, not as indicators of actual ontological relations between elements of the definition.⁴³ The tendency to view the relations as ontological derives from the Aristotelian and or Speusippean rejection of Platonic ideas, not from remarks within the dialogues themselves.

Evidence that the collections and divisions do not constitute a map of ontological relationships is that nowhere does Plato assign ontological priority to any “higher” or “lower” node in a hierarchy. In constructing his collections and divisions, Plato never uses the language of participation to indicate that a Form is predicated of another Form. Moreover, in both the *Philebus* and *Timaeus*, the particulars are “constructed” according to a program that requires a particular human, Socrates for instance, to partake of the single Form Man. He does not come to be human by partaking in the Forms Bipedality, Rationality, and whatever other properties might be thought to be included in the definition of Man itself. The Forms remain ones, by participating in which the complex particulars themselves come to be ones of a certain sort. Leaving aside the *megista gene* and those special Forms such as the Good, the Beautiful, and Unity, no one Form is said to be prior to another.

The collections and divisions of the later dialogues do not, then, depict ontological relationships between the elements of the fields or between species, differentiae and genera. Rather, they are ways in which those in pursuit of knowledge of Forms can execute a search. If the Forms are still separate, and especially if the doctrine of Recollection has any force left, the Forms will guarantee that the divisions are able to issue in success.

If one treats the schemata of collection and division as heuristic or analytic guides to the unitary essence of a Form, then parts of the definition will not be *ontologically* predicable of the definiendum in any fashion. Besides its essence, the only properties ontologically predicated of a Form are the formal properties predicated of all Forms. These properties, e.g., Sameness, Difference, Beauty, Goodness, are predicated in virtue of the fact *that* a Form is a form, not in virtue of *what* the Form is. The evaluative properties are predicated of Forms because Plato, I submit, thinks that all Forms are in fact beautiful and good. Others are necessary from a methodological or logical point of view, e.g., Sameness. Forms will be ontologically complex because they too are now bearers of these select properties.

If one adopts this heuristic approach to the schemata, then the parts of the linguistic definition, as well as some of the differentiae, will be *linguistically* predicable of the Forms. While this language is slightly different from that of other interpreters of Plato, the approach is not novel. At its root, the heuristic approach contends that the relations between the Forms are conceptual and the truths of division are conceptual truths. The ontological underpinnings for truths such as “Whales are mammals” will be explicated in terms of the collocation of properties in (material) particular

whales, each of which will partake both in the Whale itself and the Mammal itself. These facts about particulars will not capture the necessity inherent in the statements, and thus Forms will remain epistemologically necessary. But it is Plato's conviction that since these truths are, upon philosophical reflection, necessary truths, they constitute reasons to posit unitary Forms. In the next chapter we shall see how the mathematical and quasi-scientific construction of particulars in the *Philebus* and *Timaeus* is his attempt to countenance complex material particulars that lack essential properties within a thoroughly Platonistic account of scientific laws.

The fact that the linguistic definition is semantically and syntactically complex, while the ontological definiendum and definiens is simple, points to the irreducible and ineliminable gap between the discursive and intuitive accounts of knowledge in Plato. It is the culmination, perhaps, of Plato's increasing sensitivity to the gap between the ontological and the conceptual. Whether it is the determinate content of the parts of the Different, or "cuts" that fail to pick out kinds, or finally the "analytic" truths concerning the definiendum and its parts, the way we learn about and represent what there is in thought and language need not mirror the states of affairs. With respect to knowledge, the choice is then how to weight the passages emphasizing the intuitive versus the discursive, as well as other parts of the corpus that play into the hands of those who would defend one side or the other. In emphasizing the intuitive I have argued that the collections and divisions furnish a heuristic or analytical map. They are ways in which we can proceed to learn what some kind is. The problem for my view arises most dramatically when we recall that someone who knows a Form, and thus knows the essence, is able to give an account, i.e., say what that Form is. Since there is no guarantee that the knower will have pursued the Form along the path that yields the essence, and since it is not essential even that he learn the nature of the Form via one of these heuristic paths, what accounts for his ability to say what the known Form is? To this question I think Plato has no answer. The ability to say what the essence is, to give the definition, seems to come to the philosopher simultaneously with the insight in those cases where we have little reason to think that she has pursued any course of inquiry that would lead her to the definition. The ineffability discussed in the *Seventh Letter* is of a piece with this phenomenon, but it is not, I think, the same. There the problem seems to concern the statement of the synoptic whole, the Forms' relation to the Good, each other, and human souls. This insight into the global, teleological framework is perhaps inexpressible because of its complexity and size, or maybe because of the awe it inspires in the beholder. Here the problem is more akin to the dilemma announced at the end of the *Theaetetus*, where the syllable seems inexpressibly something over and above its constituent elements. Emerging from the dialectical give and take of the elenchus, and embracing the systematic developments of the Method of Collection and

Division, it is unsurprising that Plato is wedded at the end to the belief that the knower can express her knowledge in an account, i.e., *logos*. Yet the very same history impels Plato to deny that fluency in the give and take of methodology *constitutes* knowledge. Intuitive insight provides the avenue of escape from the coherence generated in elenctic consistency, and similarly the relativity of the Method of Collection and Division is harmless only because it is a heuristic device. The gap between inquiry and insight, between the ability to give an account and the knowledge from which it results, is unbridgeable through discursive devices. Recollection or something equally mysterious, to those who find mystery in insight, is the inevitable residue of Platonism.

7

THE NATURE OF MATERIAL PARTICULARS

SECTION ONE

Overview

In contrast to the middle period works, the later dialogues highlight the power and need for Forms to have properties; they somehow commune with one another. In the earlier works Forms are often said to be simple or unitary in nature, particulars complex or multiform. The simplicity of Forms was not, I suggested, to be taken in the strictest sense. Even in the Socratic dialogues, the *Phaedo*, and the *Republic*, Forms sometimes appeared to stand in relations to other Forms, e.g., the Good. On the other hand, Forms always were regarded as universals, as “ones” over the many particulars, as the entities responsible for the characteristics had by the participating particulars. The fundamental contrast between the Forms and the particulars concerned the Forms’ possession of essence versus its absence in the case of particulars. A Platonic Form Is just one thing, its respective essence.

Whatever we make of the simplicity of the Forms in these earlier dialogues, surely by the time of the *Parmenides* Plato sees that no Form can be so simple as to be utterly unrelated to any other Form. In the later dialogues, Forms take on an increasing complexity. *Sumploke eidon* shows that every Form has certain properties. The relations between Forms are, apparently, also depicted in the schemata of collection and division. Various terms are

utilized to address the relationships, including “partaking,” “mixing,” and “communing.” Works from the Academy and various other schools in the later years of Plato’s life and immediately after focus on the relations between Forms or properties. Modern scholarship has been similarly intrigued.¹

The community of scholars has had less time for Platonic particulars. Perhaps this is due to the very notion of Platonism, which to the modern ear is a doctrine about properties or universals. Or perhaps it is because in the *Sophist* and *Parmenides* Plato’s aim is to expand his account of Forms. In the latter (*Parm.* 129ff.) he even seems to dismiss the problem of the one and many as it affects particulars, a remark echoed in the *Philebus* (14d–e). Whatever the reason, there is comparatively little scholarly attention paid to the status of the particular in Plato’s later works. This is unfortunate, for the *Philebus* and especially the *Timaeus* contain by far and away the most sustained account of the nature of particulars to be found in Plato. It is also unfortunate for those concerned with the later account of Forms; for particulars are certainly implicated in Plato’s Method of Collection and Division in a way that seems fundamentally at odds with their role in the middle period. In the *Phaedo* and *Republic* Plato directs us to give up studying sensible particulars if we are truly seeking knowledge. Particulars are ruled out as a reliable source of information about what there is because they are mere γυγνόμενα. Not so in the later works, where some particulars at least are said to come into being, *genesis eis ousian*. In the later works Plato rehabilitates the material particular. With the advent of collection and division, particulars have a role to play in the acquisition of knowledge. They are viewed as at least a reliable starting point, if not something more, on the course to understanding what there is.

Three aspects of the rehabilitation are of special note. (1) Plato tries to account for a vastly larger number of the properties of ordinary particulars. Various biological, physical, and “technical” properties are specified and investigated in collections and divisions, in addition to the moral properties familiar from the earlier works. Plato is interested in detailing the systematic relations between various properties and the different kinds of particulars that have them. Particulars in the *Timaeus* and *Philebus* seem more richly endowed. (2) For the first time there is an effort to account for the material aspect of sensible particulars. In the *Philebus* and *Timaeus*, body is analyzed and constructed in altogether new ways, by appeal to the notions of Limit, Unlimited, Mixture, Cause, and to mathematical notions such as numbers, ratios, elementary triangles, the regular solids, and so on. The mathematization of the particular is somewhat astonishing. Mathematics is one of the foundations of Platonism. Critical passages in the *Republic*, *Meno*, and elsewhere speak to Plato’s devotion to mathematics. His conception of knowledge is arguably modeled on mathematical intuition and the deductive structures of geometry and arithmetic. If the matter or body of a particular, or

even an aspect of it, is mathematized, there is reason to think that particulars have thereby become epistemologically more respectable. (3) The particular is more accessible to our cognitive states, or at least the access seems friendlier. In the late dialogues we see far more attention devoted to distinguishing different states such as memory, belief, perception, and phantasia.² The particular is directly or indirectly the object of all these states and the linguistic phenomena associated with them. Particulars seem both to persist and no longer to be victimized by the compresence of properties. Their behavior is more regular and predictable. In part this is due to the transformations of their matter according to the properties bequeathed to them by the mathematized structure of their material component. And in part this is due to the fact that over the very same complex particular there is a network of Forms or properties related to one another in the manner depicted in the schemata of collection and division.

In this chapter my focus will be the nature of material particulars in the *Philebus* and *Timaeus*. I think that the particular is, in fact, vastly better off than ever seemed possible from the vantage point of the *Phaedo*. My principal aim is to show that Plato has an elaborate theory of the material particular and its properties. The most novel aspect of this late metaphysical account of particulars is that in both dialogues two apparently distinct theories are developed in order to analyze their nature. In the *Philebus*, which I take to be a first stab at the new account, there is the Promethean Method of Collection and Division presented at 14b–20a, and the fourfold ontology of Limit, Unlimited, Mixture, and Cause developed from 23b–27c. In the *Timaeus*, there is the initial account of the creation (27dff.) utilizing the Demiurge, the World Animal itself, and the available matter of the cosmos, and there is the “restart” (47eff.), which employs the Receptacle, both geometrical and “traditional” Forms and the elementary triangles. The fundamental question concerns the internal relations between the two accounts presented in each dialogue and what they tell us about the nature of the particular. A second concerns the external relations of the pair of accounts in the two dialogues to one another. A third concerns the relation of these accounts to Plato’s earlier doctrines. As to this last question, I do not think that this new account replaces Participation or renders obsolete the Theory of Forms. The *Timaeus* and *Philebus* retain the traditional Forms and continue to maintain that particulars are not suitable objects of knowledge. This failure is still best laid at the feet of their failure to be anything essentially, i.e., to Be or to partake of Being. Nonetheless, the key elements of the new account benefit both the particulars and the Forms themselves. Their newfound stability makes particulars suitable for collection and division. And the complexity and stability provided by the interaction of the two theories affords Plato the means to depict in what sense Forms can be said to combine, while at the same time providing a way to retain the essential ontological unity of each Form.

The *Philebus*

The *Philebus* is one of Plato's last dialogues. It is about the good, the good life for humans, and how one studies the question "What is the good life for humans?" The argument is difficult to comprehend both because of its structure and because of the large number of ill-connected themes.³ I will not discuss the ethics proper, save insofar as it impinges on the metaphysical aspects. But one part of the ethics must guide our understanding of the metaphysics, namely Plato's conclusion that a mixed life is the best life for humans. This conclusion requires that we make sense of the nature of mixtures in general, and this human mixture in particular, which ultimately turns out to be "some bodiless order ruling over an ensouled body" (64b6–8). The mixed life turns out to combine different kinds of pleasure and knowledge. I believe that a mixture which is the mixed life for a given individual will vary from person to person; each mixture is a particular (life), though the elements of each mixture are generically the same, namely pleasure and knowledge. (Every mixture, on my account, turns out to be a particular.) Understanding the nature of the good life thus involves the analysis of pleasure and knowledge, and this, in turn, requires an investigation into the nature of their objects. It follows that insofar as knowledge has primacy in the mixed life, the study of the good is a study of knowledge. This guarantees that the *Philebus* will be a methodological study; the philosophical method will itself have to be included in the effort to establish what is the good for humans.

This is a huge enterprise. Plato clearly does not attempt to undertake the whole of it in this dialogue. Although the *Timaeus*, with its examination of the cosmic order, and the *Laws*, with its examination of the political order, flesh out different aspects of the whole, it is likely that Plato thinks it impossible to set down in writing the nature of the philosophical enterprise in its entirety. I equate dialectic with the *global* methodological inquiry that is philosophy. At 59c Plato introduces dialectic as the master science, just prior to discussing the mixture of pleasure and knowledge that is the mixed life. It is set over all the other sciences, both the quotidian and philosophical, and includes not only the Method of Collection and Division and the fourfold ontology, but also the sketchy epistemology and the moral psychology adumbrated in the central section of the dialogue. In short, dialectic should enable one to *combine* the various doctrines of the *Philebus* into a synthetic whole, in the same fashion that it enables one to *combine* the various pleasures and knowledges into the good life.

Indeed, the most novel aspect of dialectic in the *Philebus* (and *Timaeus*) is the elevation of the truths of combination, what we can legitimately label *synthetic truths*. While the truths of division, *analytic truths* relating the genera, species, and differentiae of collections and divisions, are critical prereq-

uisites for successful inquiry into nature, full understanding of the natural world and the world of Forms requires that one be able to combine the species articulated in a single division with one another, with species located in other divisions, and with factors apparently indigenous to the physical world. While a synthetic truth, such as that the good life is a mixture of pleasure and knowledge, will differ in character from the analytic truths of division, Plato seems to regard them as no less certain or indubitable. Their justification is teleological, and for that reason a proper examination of their character would require the investigation of Plato's teleological account of the Good. At the end of this study of the *Philebus* I shall address briefly some of the issues that arise in the discussion of the unmixed pleasures (50e–55c) and the critique of knowledge that contains the remarks on dialectic (55c–59d). But, as indicated above, I will ignore the ethical doctrines in the *Philebus*. My goal is to explore the relations between the ontological accounts in the first part of the dialogue. The first of these, the Method of Collection and Division, the gift of some Prometheus, enters quickly, stays altogether too short a time, and then seems to disappear without introducing the next act. Its rapid disappearance is responsible for one of the critical metaphysical puzzles of the *Philebus*, namely the relation between collection and division and the fourfold account of what there is. Clearly both are required parts of the account of the mixed life of knowledge and pleasure. But it is a perennial puzzle precisely where we are to locate the Forms exfoliated in collection and division within the fourfold ontology of Limit, Unlimited, Mixture, and Cause. In this regard, the *Philebus* leaves much dangling. I will offer my conjectures about how to integrate these ontologies. A more thorough and satisfactory account awaits us in the *Timaeus*.

The *Philebus* begins *in medias res* with Socrates summarizing a dispute between himself and Philebus over the good for all living things.⁴ Philebus champions pleasure as the good. Socrates defends the side of knowledge, understanding, memory, and their kin. Handing the defense of pleasure over to Protarchus, Socrates undertakes the consideration of the nature of pleasure, its different kinds, and their relation to one another and to the good (11–14). Pleasure, here, is a kind, not a particular. Protarchus is wary of allowing Pleasure to be divided into good and bad pleasures. The worry about dividing pleasures then becomes the vehicle to introduce the Method of Collection and Division. It is capable of treating the issues of dividing kinds and the relations between kinds. In a prelude to the introduction of the Method, Socrates hurriedly introduces color and colors, shape and shapes, and different kinds of knowledge and pleasure. These kinds are all determinables, and the members of each kind/determinable are all said to be opposite (ἐναντίον) to one another, although the notion of opposite is not explained here (12e3–13a5). The one/many problem concerning kinds is contrasted with the more humdrum mysteries about the one and many,

namely those that apply to material particulars (τῶν γιγνομένων τε καὶ ἀπολυμένων, 15a1–2), e.g., distinguishing between the single person and his many parts or limbs. “But when someone tries to establish that Cow is one and Man is one and the Fair is one and the Good is one, concerning these unities (ἐνάδων) and the such, the much to do with division becomes a controversy” (15a4–7). Color, shape, and pleasure we have seen before in the earlier dialogues. The Forms of Man and Cow are less familiar. They are not determinables like color or knowledge, and hence their partitioning should have a different structure.

Socrates next states the controversy he has in mind. No amount of work on the text of 15b1–c3 seems likely to tell us how it must be read. Are there two or three questions? The gist of two questions is relatively clear. The first asks whether it is necessary to understand these monads truly to be such, i.e., monads (15b1–2). Another queries how the Form can be one given that it comes to be in the many particulars that come to be and perish. It seems that it can neither be cut up and dispersed in the many nor can it be one apart from the many in isolation.⁵

Those seeking another question locate it at 15b2–4 (εἶτα): “Then again how can each of these be, each always being one and the same and admitting neither generation nor destruction, nevertheless most certainly this one?” Given the previous remarks and the subsequent course of inquiry, it is tempting to see in this strangely composed series of questions allusions to problems concerning the relation of Forms to one another. Those who read a third question thus try to capture a different aspect of the unity of the Form than that called into question by its relation to particulars. But the Greek offers no indication that the difficulties concern anything other than the relation between Forms and particulars.⁶ Are there these unitary Forms and how can they be both unities and somehow in, or responsible for, the many particulars? Problems about one and many *with respect to Forms*, not particulars, are the source of difficulties (ἀπορία) if they are not resolved, and progress (εὐπορία) if they are (15b8–c3).

Socrates proposes to begin to attack the problems from a consideration of language. For this becoming one and many occurs everywhere in what is said and it is an inherent and recurring feature of language (15dff.). The young especially delight in the one/many confusions language can create. With the *Parmenides* and *Sophist* in hindsight, we know that this feature of language can confuse anyone, including philosophers. These dialogues teach us that our discourse inevitably involves one and many insofar as every subject, whether a particular or a Form, must be a many. Moreover, a basic and recurrent way of speaking is the subject-predicate statement where we do predicate a property of a subject, and typically predicate something different from the subject. Socrates, encouraged by Protarchus to find a way to lead them peacefully through this linguistic morass, introduces the Method of

Collection and Division. This method is easy to display but very difficult to use. “For everything that has been discovered in the realm of art (τέχνη) has been made clear through this means” (16c1–3). Collection and Division is then a method of inquiry, a way to discover truths about the subject matter of the various arts and sciences. The method thus will help them both avoid the pitfalls of language and solve the problems of the one and many.

The method is a gift from the Gods handed down by some Prometheus. The tale of the elders, to paraphrase, is that (1, μὲν) that which is always said to be (beings, *onton*) is from one and many, (beings, *onton*), and, (2, δὲ) has (having) cognate, σύμφυτον, in it limit and unlimitedness (ὡς ἔξ ἑνὸς μὲν καὶ πολλῶν ὄντων τῶν ἀεὶ λεγομένων εἶναι, πέρασ δὲ καὶ ἀπειρίαν ἐν αὐτοῖς σύμφυτον ἐχόντων). (3) Things being so arranged (τούτων οὕτω διακεκοσμημένων) it is then necessary for us always to posit and seek on each occasion the one Form for each (kind of⁸) thing, for we will find it since it is there. (4) After we grasp it, then we search for two, if there are so many, or (5) if not, three, or some other number; and (6) it is necessary to consider each one of these unities again in just the same way, (7) until one not only sees the foundational unit as one and many and unlimited, but also how many it is. (8) It is necessary not to bring the form of the unlimited to the plurality until one sees the whole number of the plurality between the unlimited and the one. At that point it is okay to let each of the ones go into the unlimited (16c9–e2).

The Method of Collection and Division, or equivalently, the Method of Dieresis, maps out the relations between genera, species, and the particulars. While it appears that Socrates is talking about any being, not just Forms or kinds, the previous dismissal of the one/many problem with respect to particulars directs our attention to Forms and their divisions. The problem is that some clever people move too fast through these divisions, releasing them to the “unlimited” before they have systematically and completely worked out the divisions of the kinds into all the appropriate subspecies and subgenera.⁹ The unlimited to which the kinds are released are the particulars. In a rationally reconstructed and complete division one would place the infimae species directly above them. If we limn nature, we can successfully display the relations between all the kinds. There is no hesitancy in ascribing to nature the actual number of kinds or joints. We *find* these kinds in nature, we do not put them there.¹⁰ Plato does not say why it is that nature is this way. (The explanation is one of the jobs performed by the *Timaeus*.) Similarly, he does not say why it is that language has the structure it has. (The reason [*sic*] for this is also hinted at in the *Timaeus*’s construction of the soul, 35aff.) But because inherent in both nature and language is this same one/many structure, the Method of Collection and Division, when properly employed, can lead the dialectician to the discovery of the various Forms. The study of language, even though it contains extraneous and potentially misleading elements, can thus guide us in our inquiry into nature.

The introduction of the Method reveals little about collection. Nor is it clear how the Method addresses the one/many problem with respect to Forms. On the face of it, each Form is stipulated to be a one. A Form seems to be many in virtue of the number of kinds that may be ranged below it, above it, or at its level. Forms, then, are complex, but not in the same way as particulars. Particulars are complex in that they have many properties, e.g., a bowling ball is green, round, hard, heavy, etc. Being ranged in a hierarchical division of other Forms does not suggest, however, that a Form *has the properties* found in their nearby divisions or mentioned in their definitions: Man itself and Cow itself do not partake of the Animal itself and they are not animals in the way Socrates and Elsie are. But even if we postulate that a Form is many in virtue of its relation to other Forms in the division, there results some uncertainty about the unity of the Form: how can it be a single thing, a monad, if it is in anyway complex? Given the course of the argument prior to the Gift, there is a strong temptation to find a concern about the unity of the Form or monad that reflects this placement in a Porphyrean tree, or whatever the nature of the divisional schema, a problem different from the familiar difficulties engendered by the fact that many particulars participate in a given Form.

The introduction to the Method also assigns an explanatory role to limit and unlimitedness. It *suggests* that the fact ($\delta\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\ \omicron\upsilon\acute{\nu}$) that *onta* are constituted from them is somehow responsible for there being a unity in each case (16c10–d2). A closer look at the crucial opening stages reveals some of the problems inherent in this suggestion. First, it is uncertain whether “those always said to be (beings)” refers to particulars, Forms, or both.¹¹ The subject is introduced in the *men* clause, which stipulates that these beings are from one and many. Given the preceding remarks, this is neutral between Forms and particulars. The *de* clause, with its participial construction, is a problem.¹² We do not know how to regard the circumstantial force of the $\acute{\epsilon}\chi\acute{o}\nu\tau\omicron\omega\upsilon$, “having.” Some translate the *de* clause as *virtually explanatory of why* beings are “from one and many.”¹³ Others regard it as a new claim, unconnected to the previous statement.¹⁴

Whether one finds only Forms included in these first two stages of the gift depends largely on one’s view of the relation between the one and (the) many and limit and unlimitedness. We have just learned that both particulars and Forms are somehow one and many. The remark that all of art has been discovered by practicing this method does not dictate that Forms are under consideration at the outset, or even that Forms are primarily under consideration, since how these discoveries are made will be revealed by setting out *the whole* of the method. On the other hand, since Forms are clearly in view at later stages (3–8), it can be argued that they must be included as at least part of what is always said to be. Similarly, it would seem that if particulars are appealed to at any point in the method, then they too should be included among the beings of 16c9.

If Forms are the subject, or even a part of what are always to be from one and many, and if we think that the *de* clause is explanatory, then we need a story about how Forms can have limit and (the) unlimited “in” them. One possibility is to link the sense in which a Form is one, i.e., a unity, to its being comprised of limit, and to use the unlimited to account for its being (a) many.

The description of the divine method suggests that genera and species are unchangeable entities; the genus animal, for instance, is the nature common to all animals, and this common nature is *invariable* and *one*. . . . If the Forms are conceived in this “scientific way” neither their unity nor their plurality is problematic any longer; the situation as envisaged at 15a–b does not obtain. There is not the Form itself in splendid isolation in the realm of the eternal, and a hopeless multitude of the Forms split up and dispersed in the realm of generation and destruction. If this interpretation is correct, the earlier diagnosis of the way in which Forms are one and many was mistaken and is now revised. The Form *qua* Form remains a unity despite the fact that it always already contains integral parts: It admits a *limited plurality* insofar as it is specifiable in terms of its species and subspecies; and it admits the possibility of *unlimited plurality*, since there can be an unlimited number of animals. Each Form, then, represents a unity and plurality on several levels. There is generic unity, and there is specific unity, and there is the unity of the sensible object that is a member of the species and genus. There is a limited specific plurality, and there is unlimited plurality among the sensible objects. (D. Frede, *Philebus*, xxix–xxx)

It is not clear from Frede’s analysis exactly what the unity of the Form consists in or whether/how limit functions to account for the unity of the Form. Her comment about “the earlier diagnosis” implies that the sense in which the Form is one has changed. But even if we have the complete division, construing this as all the specific parts, does the fact that the Form is a limited plurality make it one? It seems that each Form is one in that we are to conceive of each Form as uniquely specifiable in terms of a given limited plurality (arranged in the right order).

Other claims tell against this interpretation. That “The Form *qua* Form remains a unity despite the fact that it always already contains integral parts” suggests that the unity is not to be accounted for in terms of the notion of limit. Rather, insofar as the parts are integral, *the unity is assumed*. Regardless of Frede’s intentions, I think that we should not try to account for the *unity of the Form* by appeal to the *de* clause, and *a fortiori* not by appeal to the notion of limit. If Forms are under consideration, and if limit and unlimited explain something in the *men* clause, I think that limit and unlimited apply

only to the many factor. What limit and unlimited explain are different ways in which a Form can be a “many.” A Form is a many because it is a limited plurality (on the many levels Frede mentions), for there is an *exact number* of species, differentiae and genera in the hierarchy. But it remains true that the only sense in which Forms have the unlimited “in” them remains their relation to an indefinite number of particular instances.¹⁵

The old problem of the one and many with respect to Forms is reconfigured in the Gift. That problem was that a Form is merely a *one* over a many and a *many* because it was *somehow in the many particulars*. Now the complexity of relations between Forms, both those explored in *sumploke eidon* and those emerging from reflections on the Method of Dieresis, reveals a Form to be a many in a different way. *Sumploke eidon* showed that a Form must have many properties, e.g., Sameness, Difference. The Gift indicates that we must account for the fact that in language and in the Method of Dieresis a Form is *said to be* related to its (many) species, its genus, and its differentiae. These ways of being many queer the unity of the Form derived from its being just *one* thing over the many particulars that partake of it. They illustrate the phenomenon that in giving an account of what a Form is, a Form is conceived to be a “many” insofar as the division displays its relations to other Forms, some of which are found together with it in the particulars from which collection begins.

The only clear sense in which each Form contains within itself an unlimited is when it is considered to be over its many instances. These many particulars were always for Plato (potentially) unlimited in number. When we collect the many larges or men, then we are liable to find Man or Large common to them. New in the description of the Method of Dieresis is the number of Forms, i.e., differentiae, infimae species, intermediate species, and genera, over each of these numerically unlimited particulars. A particular is a many not merely because it has many properties each of which is located in a distinct division, e.g., pallor, largeness, and being a human. Rather, each is also a many in that each has a host of related properties, properties hierarchically arranged in a single division, e.g., being rational, two-footed, animal, and human. Since the same particulars will be at the bottom of various hierarchies, extensional accounts of Forms will not work.

If we think that Forms are among the beings mentioned in the opening lines, we can accept the idea that they have limit in them insofar as they are in some sense related to a finite number of real kinds in all those schemata that reflect nature. But its relation even to the many other Forms with which it cohabits a scheme does not explain the unity of each Form. Rather, the unity of the Form still lies in its postulation *as a one over the many*, as some one species or genus collected from the particulars (on Forms). That it is a unity is then not explained but assumed. What justifies this assumption is not addressed here. The complexity of the particular, where we now study

the various properties as they are exhibited, thus gives rise to the many related properties that constitute the division. But no combination of properties is thought, or said, to cause a unity to arise in the Form. For there is no such combination of discrete properties in the Form as there is in the particular.¹⁶

An alternative approach to the two opening clauses of the divine method is to treat the beings as particulars. Particulars are always said to be from one and many, and to have limit and unlimitedness in them. We can posit on this basis that there is one Form over them. This then is a third step (16c10ff.), marking the first time in the Gift that there is explicit mention of Forms. Since the particular *onta* are from one and many, it seems to follow that each has some one property ranged over it in a special way and a multiplicity of properties ranged over it in a different fashion. Each of these properties will be a Form. The subsequent stages in the Method dictate that these Forms will then be subject to partitioning into other properties. The manner in which we determine the special way in which a particular is one will be determined in part by the nature of the *techne* one is engaged in, in part by the interests the inquirer brings to the task, and in part by the particular itself. On this reading, the initial depiction of the Method of Collection and Division is deliberately vague and proleptic. The sense in which a particular is one, that is, how we are to determine which one kind is directly over it, remains to be discovered. Similarly, how it is that particulars have limit and unlimited in them is not discussed. The notion of the unlimited seems to apply only to their numerical multiplicity. Limit is not specified at all. Two alternatives come to mind: insofar as each particular is one kind of thing, it is limited; the one kind would, however, be relative to the collection and division embarked upon in a given case; second, the number of properties a particular might have could be finite and hence limited. Exactly how the Gift is to be used to effect a cure for the difficulties of the one and the many remains to be told.¹⁷

The Mixed Life

The Gift of Prometheus suggests that in order to settle what is the good life for man they must enumerate the different kinds of knowledge and pleasure. In the transitional passage between the Gift and the fourfold ontology (18e–23b), Socrates indicates that even a complete division of both pleasure and knowledge will be inadequate.¹⁸ They need a new method because neither pleasure on its own nor knowledge on its own can account for the good life. Without knowledge and its kin, we could not appreciate pleasure. A life without pleasure of any sort also seems unchoiceworthy. Socrates is charged

with continuing the discussion as it deserves, whether by division of pleasures or some other means. The other means is a new method that reveals the inadequacy of merely making divisions.

The need for this new method was revealed in a dream, or perhaps when awake, to the effect that there was some third candidate, superior both to pleasure alone and knowledge alone, namely the combination of pleasure and knowledge (22a1–2). This will be the human good, or the good life for humans.¹⁹ Socrates adds that it is an open question whether one of the two is more responsible for the good life, perhaps even being its cause.

The problem with the Gift, then, is that it does not tell us how to combine elements from different divisions. Such truths of combination differ from the “analytic” truths made available by the complete division of a subject matter. The study of mixture requires a new method with different weapons, though perhaps some were present in collection and division (23b5–9). The new method is a fourfold division of everything. The nature of the fourfold division, and in what sense it employs some weapons (βέλη) that are different (ἕτερα) and others that are, perhaps, the same (ἕνια καὶ ταῦτά) as those of the Method, are major metaphysical cruxes in the *Philebus*.

Limit and unlimited can be traced back to the Gift. But their use there was unclear, especially in the case of the limit. The best if not the only parsing of the unlimited construes it to be the unlimited particulars. Forms, or kinds, have the unlimited “in” them in that they have a potentially unlimited number of instances. Limit, on the other hand, seems to apply best, or only, to a kind, or to the particulars insofar as they fall under a kind. The enumeration of these kinds or monads into infimae species, superior species, and genera also makes the kinds a locus of limit, in that there is a limited number of kinds ranged under or over a given Form. Since any particular has many properties, the schemata of divisions over a particular would thus also display the limited number of properties had by the particular.

Lacking in the Gift, however, was an explanation of how either a particular (or a Form) could be understood to be a one or a unity in virtue of the kinds over it. The construction of particulars is not part of collection and division proper. So to be able to use the particulars in collecting, Socrates needs to account for how they come to have the properties they do in a way that facilitates collection and division. This is part of the new machinery the fourfold ontology brings to the table. The sorts of truths or principles arrived at in the fourfold ontology concern disparate elements that interact with one another in ways that are not apparent to one who is considering the properties in a given division or the definitions of one of those properties. The truths of combination heralded in the transitional passage offer the prospect that combination will shed light on how particulars can be at the same time both a unity and a plurality. The ultimate aim of the fourfold

ontology, then, is to show how we are to think about the general theory of mixtures in order to understand the good life, itself a mixture, of a human, itself a different mixture.

The Fourfold Ontology (23c–27c)

Since the Method of Collection and Division appeals to both particulars and Forms, and since the good life can equally be construed as a type of life or the particular life lived by a particular human, the subject matter of the fourfold ontology is also a matter of controversy. Socrates takes his starting point to be the division of everything that *now* is in the universe into three (Πάντα τὰ νῦν ὄντα ἐν τῷ παντί διχῆ διαιλάβωμεν, μᾶλλον δ', εἰ βούλει, τριχῆ, 23c4–5). The subject matter of the fourfold ontology—the need for a fourth element is introduced at 23d5—certainly includes particulars. “Now” (νῦν), if read strictly as a temporal adverb, suggests that only particulars are the subject matter. Allowing it to have the sense of “all-inclusive,”²⁰ we can also admit Forms into the ontology.

To the limit and the unlimited the new method first adds the mixture, that kind which is some one thing mixed together from both (ἐξ ἀμφοῖν τοῦτοις ἓν τι συμμισγόμενον, 23c12–d2). Since there must be a cause of any mixture, the new method posits the cause as a fourth kind. The procedure will be to segregate the three from cause, “and then make a test of two of them, having observed that each is split and scattered into many, by collecting each back again into one, to see whether we can somehow understand how each is one and many” (23e3–6). The unlimited is canvassed first to show that it is some kind of plurality (πολλά). The initial characterization of the unlimited appeals to the criterion of “the more and less.” What admits of this qualification has no end (τέλος), and being without ends it is unlimited. This lack of ends is expanded to include no definite quantity (πρόσον). Were an unlimited to take on a definite quantity, “this would be its end, for it would no longer be, for instance, hotter or colder” (24d2–3). While there is more to be said, the mark of “the more and less” is proposed for the unlimited. It is the nature of the genus of the unlimited which we posit on the basis of collecting samples of the more and less (24e7–25a4).

Two views of this first element of the division are prominent. Some think that the continua themselves, understood as general or universal notions, are the unlimited(s). Others think that the unlimited(s) are, in a sense to be explained, particular items that have the unlimited or are unlimited, things that have, in some sense, no single definite degree. While different passages can be cited on behalf of either view, I believe that the subsequent discussion favors treating the unlimited(s) as particulars. However, this does not pre-

clude there being universals under which some of these particular unlimiteds fall.

The limit is next. The limit is that which takes on the opposite qualifications, the equal, equality, then the double, and in general whatever is related as number to number or measure to measure (πᾶν ὅτιπερ ἄν πρὸς ἀριθμὸν ἀριθμὸς ἢ μέτρον ἢ πρὸς μέτρον, 25a8–b1).²¹ The limit is a relation between the elements or ingredients of things, in particular any relation that can be represented in terms of ratios and proportions, e.g., so much heat to so much cold. The precise unifying characteristic of the limit is left unspecified, as are the sorts of entities related by the relation. Some reasons for this lack of specificity are revealed in the subsequent remarks about the sorts of things in which we find limit, namely the mixtures that constitute the third class of the ontology.

The third kind of item is initially characterized as the mixture of limit with the more and the less (25d2–3). Realizing that a clearer account of a mixture requires a more precise specification of the second class, Socrates now allows that the unifying characteristic of limit will appear in their account of the mixture. The limit is *whatever* causes opposites to cease holding differently from one another, making them commensurate and harmonious by imposing a number (25d11–e2). Harmony and measure are the mark of the limit. His first examples, health, music, and fair weather, are items plausibly viewed as resulting from the “mixture of opposites,” e.g., music as the mixture of the right amount of the high, the low, the fast, and the slow. The nature of limit and the sorts of “opposites” related are then expanded. When limit is imposed on the unlimited with the result that there is something fine (καλόν), there is (a) mixture. Mixtures are countless in number, but include beauty, strength, and the good and fine things in our souls, especially those resulting from the imposition of limit on pleasure. What the “opposites” are in these cases is harder to determine. Protarchus remains bewildered about the nature of the third class, in part because there is so great a number of mixtures, and in part because they have not yet determined how it is one by nature. Socrates then takes another stab at defining mixture: “a mixture is the offspring of the limit and unlimited which is one (ἓν), a coming into being (γένεσιν εἰς οὐσίαν) from those measures produced by limit” (26d7–9).

This specification of the class of mixture still leaves its membership uncertain. First, there is the question whether it is individuals or types, i.e., Forms that are defined. The fact that Socrates characterizes mixtures as things, *ones* which (be)come-into-being, indicates that particulars, albeit of a certain sort, populate the class of mixtures.²² Second, there is debate about how broad the membership is. The last two characterizations, reinforced in other passages, are, I think, dominant. A mixture is a harmonious, measured thing, to include instances of natural kinds and some of their properties. The class of

the limit is responsible for the right measure between the unlimited components that partly comprise the mixture. Insofar as mixtures have a limit, they have the right measure or proportion between their unlimited elements. In a particular mixture, or at least one kind of mixture, we might find a ratio of opposites such as the hot and the cold. But the elements upon which limits are imposed are not always opposites, and the limits are not always representable in numerical terms.

The fourth genus of the fourfold ontology is the cause. Since all that comes to be (πάντα τὰ γιγνόμενα), i.e., the mixtures just described as *genesis eis ousian*, comes to be on account of some cause, Socrates declares that there is no difference between the nature of what makes (ποιοῦν) and the cause (αἴτιον), and similarly no difference between what is made and what comes to be. The product is secondary to the maker, its slave even, and the ingredients of the mixtures along with the mixture itself are assigned a cause, a certain Demiurge (26e–27b2). This Timaeian echo is reinforced a few moments later. Returning to the genera of pleasure and knowledge, it is decided that pleasure is in the unlimited class whereas knowledge is to be assigned the role of *nous basileus*, ruler of the cosmos. The argument is again by analogy, one of macrocosm and microcosm: the universe is governed by, or is the product of, intelligence, some amazing wisdom. The divine mind orders the heavens and the various animals and other objects in the universe. Our body is an example. It is composed of the four elements, earth, air, fire, and water, just as is the body of the universe. The difference is that the universe's constituents are purer and more potent. Socrates thinks that the macrocosmic elements in some sense nourish the weaker, impure microcosmic kin. The divine mind is the cause of the items of the universe that qualify as mixtures. Human souls are also derived from their macrocosmic counterpart, the divine mind. A human soul is the cause, therefore, of certain other mixtures, including the good life for man. On this score, a mind²³ is the cause of everything that is (well) mixed. There is, then, a tight circle to the notions of mixture, cause, and right or good proportions and limits.

When a limit is imposed on an unlimited, it yields a mixture, something harmonious, measured, fair, some one thing that comes into being. The emphasis on *gignomena* reinforces the claim that the mixtures are particulars. The appeal to the craftsman suggests that the imposition of limit on an unlimited will include cases where shape is imposed on some matter, e.g., the form of the *pthos* jar on clay. Mixtures will then be particulars (of a certain type) that have a certain relation between their parts. The related parts can be opposites, or ingredients diverse enough to include pleasure, the human body, or clay and water. Let us call the relation imposed on such parts that defines a mixture “the right relation.”²⁴ The “species” of the class or kind of limit will be these right relations. Limits are then universals of some sort, numbers or magnitudes, or more generally relations or shapes. (Soul is a

special case here. See below.) Since a mixture is a particular, it therefore seems that the unlimited element must be some kind of particular. For it is difficult to see how the mixture of two (abstract) universals could result in the coming-into-being of a particular.

If we keep the notion of a right relation between its parts as the defining characteristic of a mixture, then among the unlimited will be *anything* with the wrong relation between its parts. Since these entities nonetheless have *some* relation between their parts, we confront the question whether the relations that hold between the ingredients of these unlimited particulars are also limits. If here, too, there is an imposition of limit on an unlimited, then we would be forced to regard these particulars of the unlimited sort as *bad mixtures*. Though the *Philebus* is less than specific about these matters, it seems that only rightly related particulars qualify as mixtures. There are, then, no bad mixtures. And since only mixtures are caused by mind or reason, reason is not responsible for the particulars of the unlimited sort. However, provided that one is careful not to confuse particulars of the unlimited sort with the caused, rightly related mixtures, there may be no harm in thinking of the unlimited sort of particulars as bad mixtures (of an unlimited and limit). They will differ from the (good) mixtures in that they turn out to be improperly balanced, since the relation between their elements is fleeting.

An unlimited particular, then, is something that has the wrong relations between its ingredients. Even if we concede that these relations are nonetheless definite in that, say, my fever has a definite degree at a certain time, no one degree will be a stable property of my fever, i.e., it will not be definitive of the fever. Rather a fever can change degrees within a certain range and remain a fever.²⁵ The unlimiteds are then stable to a certain extent in that they persist through changes in degrees, but unstable with respect to holding any particular degree. Conversely, the mixture does not endure a change in the relevant relation, for such a change would be from the right relation to a wrong relation, and the particular would then cease to be a mixture. On the other hand, Plato thinks that these mixtures persist because, other things being equal, the unlimited ingredients of a mixture are prone to maintain the right relations between them.

The analysis of (good) mixtures requires that one distinguish between the property(ies) of the mixture that endure, *qua the kind of thing each mixture is*, from both the entity as a whole and the unlimited aspect upon which the limit is imposed. Socrates is a mixture (see 32a9–b2). What he is, is a man, and it is the property of being human that endures. Socrates *as a whole* is distinct from Socrates *qua human*, and distinct from his body, i.e., the earth, air, fire, and water, for instance, or the opposites upon which limit is imposed. It might seem that mixtures must be so perfect or exact that the slightest change among their unlimited elements would destroy them. But

this is hard to attribute to the large-scale mixtures such as Socrates or my dog Ajax. Their stability resides, rather, in the continuation of their human or canine state or life. We can then view the mixture as comprised of a limiting relation on a body that can change to a certain extent, provided that the limit itself is not lost. The limit would then be the relation that makes Socrates a good member of the human kind. When we add the resources of the qua operator, we can say that qua human, Socrates is a stable mixture, namely a human being, in virtue of the limit holding between the relevant parts, whatever they may be. On this interpretation, the body or matter of the mixture is the unlimited. Plato says very little about the right relation that is imposed on a human body, i.e., how we might conceive of the soul as a right relation relating the unlimited material aspect of the human, or about any limit that is imposed on the unlimited aspect of the individual members of the natural kinds. But it is clear that no mixture is truly permanent. Everything that comes to be inevitably perishes. The mixtures are particulars which, while indeterminate in number, are determinate in respect of their remaining a member of the species. The kinds under which mixtures fall, on the other hand, e.g., Dog, Human, the Virtues, are permanent.

Throughout this section, the language of “form,” “kind,” and “nature” is used in speaking of the four principles. By granting that each is a kind, a universal, or an abstract notion, we can incorporate the Method of Collection and Division into the fourfold ontology. Each of the four is a genus. But we face difficulties when we ask what sorts of genera, species, and subspecies fall under these four greatest kinds. Perhaps the easiest place to start is with the cause. Plato indicates that there are two kinds of mind, the divine and the human. The human mind is dependent on the divine mind in the same fashion that the elements of our body are dependent on the divine elements (28d–30e). Plato, however, does not say enough to determine what relation there is between the human minds and the divine mind. That a human mind is the cause of the good life for a human suggests that the class of cause will contain many members. To the extent that *individual* human minds are the causes of good lives, the good life might be relative to each individual. Since this is antithetical to Plato, one needs to show how the divine mind can determine a single goal, the Good Life, which all right reasoning human minds can have as the goal of their actions and decisions. Even here there will be room for latitude since the (sorts of) pleasures, upon which an individual mind will impose order, will vary from person to person. This lends credence to the claim that the ingredients of mixtures upon which limit is imposed will vary, even while both the limit imposed and the mind imposing that limit are invariable. An adequate account of the relation of the human and divine mind would require an investigation of Plato’s teleological ethics. Since this is beyond the scope of this chapter and book, let us conclude that in the class of cause there are many members and, perhaps, two

species.²⁶ Falling outside of this class is anything irrational, random, and accidental (28d5–9).²⁷

With respect to the unlimited, it seems that the mark of the more and less provides ample room for species and genera. Maybe too much room.²⁸ On the one hand, Plato puts into this class both the hot and the cold, and the hotter and colder, and similarly (countless?) other kinds of things that admit of variation along a continuum.²⁹ On the other hand, the particulars in the class of the *apeiron* are susceptible to constant change and perish when a limit is imposed upon them. The various descriptions leave room, then, for a variety of kinds and many particulars. There is the continuum of temperature, and the continuum of moisture, along with the Hot, the Cold, the Dry, the Wet, and so on. These will be kinds, perhaps arranged so that the Hot and the Cold fall under the continuum of temperature. The problem here is that the degrees seem to be likely candidates to be the instances of the Hot and the Cold. We can avoid this problem if we require an instance of any kind in this genus to admit of variation in degree. Any hot thing qua hot can be hotter or colder, for instance. In this respect the particular unlimiteds (in the class of the *apeiron*) will be (the kinds of) entities that retain their nature through changes in degrees; that is, their nature requires them not to keep a single definite degree. This interpretation is most easily grasped when it is applied to things that are from opposites, such as hot and cold.

But this notion of variance works less well for other items that seem to belong in the unlimited. For if all mixtures are analyzed at least into a limit and an unlimited, if not exhaustively into just these two, then somehow we need room for body, or matter, and in general whatever figures as ingredients which can have a limit imposed upon them. Here instances of the unlimited will be the higher order constructs of body that have a place in a metaphysical analysis of any mixture. We will then conclude that there are species of body, e.g., earth, air, fire, and water, which, along with the pleasures, say, are found in the class of the unlimited.

I do not think the *Philebus* supplies enough information to allow us to say definitively whether the *kinds* of matter or bodies belong in the class of the unlimited. (The *Timaeus* will offer some help.) Clearly the kinds of pleasure have a new home. Kinds in the class of the *apeiron* are, then, those that serve to demarcate continua, the Forms of the Hot, the Cold, the Dry, the Moist, and whatever other Forms are found in their divisions. Not much more can be said with confidence on the basis of the *Philebus*.

When we turn to the limit, the complications are rather different. There are particulars of some sort in the genus of the unlimited. But there are no particulars of the equivalent sort in the genus of limit, for the rightly related particulars are mixtures. A limit is an abstract universal, a relation between elements of some sort. If there are “members” of this kind, each would have to be some ratio or shape.³⁰ Limits are imposed on an unlimited and always

order or create order in something, or between the opposites or ingredients of some thing, whether these are material or immaterial components, e.g., pleasures. We start from the “species” of numerical ratios and proportions, e.g., “two to one.” Various kinds of unlimiteds, that is, various kinds of opposites or ingredients, will be able to take on the same limit or ratio, and thus come to be mixtures of different kinds. Some limits, therefore, are multiply realizable in different sorts of particulars in the class of the unlimited. But other members of the class of limit appear to be more specific or circumscribed with respect to the kind of thing on which they are imposed. In general, the limits imposed on the unlimited aspects of more complex mixtures, including the good life for man, are liable to be local to that kind of item alone. In this respect, it seems that the limit is responsible for a mixture’s being the very kind of item it is. Indeed, were there not the need to introduce the mind as cause of the good life (or the universe as a whole), it might be argued that there is no need for a separate category of cause. This inference is supported by the impression that the cause is introduced almost as an afterthought. But Plato insists that since the mixtures come-into-being, i.e., are *gignomena*, there must be some cause; for every good thing which comes to be is caused. The machinery and logic of the Demiurge is close to the surface here. But there is no mention in the *Philebus* of the models used by the divine mind to “construct” the kinds of mixtures whose instances populate the cosmos.

The next question then must be “What are we to make of the species or kinds that turn up in the category of mixture?” According to the *Philebus*, whatever is a mixture is a limited entity. However, because certain limits can be imposed on different types of unlimited ingredients, we cannot *identify* the species of mixtures with the limits that partially comprise them. And because certain particulars belong in the class of the unlimited, not all particulars will be classifiable as the numerically indefinite (the *apeira* of the Gift) falling under a kind of mixture. The species of the class mixture will then be only the *kinds* of good or fair entities in the cosmos, including not only the most perfect parts of Music, the right notes and rhythms (26a4), Fair Weather, Health, and the Virtues, but all the natural kinds, e.g., Horse, Ox, Man, Justice, and so on—everything which is not classifiable as an unlimited entity (cf. 15a). The species and genera in the class of mixture will then include *most of the traditional Forms*, whose collection and division are the subject matter of the Gift of Prometheus and the earlier dialogues.

We have seen that only those entities that have limits are mixtures. Because they have the limits they do, each is the kind of mixture it is. Moreover, since to have a limit is, *eo ipso*, to be well proportioned and ordered, each mixture is a good member of the kind to which it belongs. For Plato, then, being limited in a particular way, being a mixture, and being a man, say, turn out to be interdependent notions.³¹ In one respect, then, the mix-

tures turn out to be classifiable according to their respective limits. But the species Human or the species Ox is *not identical* with the (kind of) limit imposed on the unlimited aspect of the particular human being or the particular ox. For the limits, considered abstractly as ratios and proportions, are independent of the unlimited on which they are imposed. The species of the natural kinds or the Virtues will then be distinct from the mathematical limits, the former occupying niches in the class of mixture, the latter belonging to the class of limit.

Mixtures are unlimited in number insofar as there are indefinite numbers of men, dogs, plants, and so on for all the creations of the divine mind. They are also unlimited in that each mixture contains an unlimited factor, whose power and influence on the particular mixture is unclear. It seems likely that particular mixtures are subject to destruction in virtue of their unlimited factor. The unlimited factor also accounts for the variations between the different humans.³² The unlimited factor of the mixture, treated as some kind of matter, is, by its very nature, unstable. Like the particulars in the class of the unlimited, e.g., the hot or cold entities of the temperature continuum, it cannot retain any limit permanently. I think that Plato wants us to see that especially in the case of complex organisms, the matter is such that the relation between parts is always breaking down even in the case of those aspects of the unlimited on which order is imposed. These properties, then, will not only change, they will help distinguish individuals of the same kind from one another. For example, my fever will, in all probability, vary in degree differently from my wife's fever. Ultimately if he is to avoid issues of indiscernibility, however, Plato will have to add to his account of the unlimited aspect of mixtures a "theory" of space and time. This is one of the accomplishments of the *Timaeus*, and thus is another reason to think that the *Philebus's* metaphysics is a precursor to the account in the *Timaeus*. Since these properties are laid at the foot of the unlimited, it is that factor which once again accounts for change and variation. The mixtures will have some properties of this type.

Natural kinds are such that their members remain members of the kind since the appropriate limit rightly relates the relevant opposites or matter, even though in other respects the individuals suffer change. It may be necessary to loosen this notion in order to accommodate humans who, e.g., lack limbs, reason to some degree, or other features associated with what it is to be a human. But whether such a particular qualifies as a human, i.e., as a mixture, is something Plato thinks is to be assessed only after we understand the ideal or good mixture against which the deficiency is judged. A limit is the right relation in that it guarantees stability, but only to the extent possible for a created entity. The right relation will endure.³³

It remains for Plato to show that there is only a single right relation, i.e., that there is only one limit per species. For even if there remains just one

essence, or definition, or Form for each species, it does not follow that there is only one relation which, when imposed on the appropriate unlimited material, allows one to be a good mixture, i.e., a particular instance of the natural kind. Plato does not *argue* that there is exactly one right relation per species. However, it is clear that the defense of the assumption of just one limit per species would appeal to teleological considerations. What can be said on this score awaits the interpretation of the Demiurgic activity of the *Timaeus*.³⁴

The Method of Collection and Division was introduced to solve the problem of the one and many with respect to Forms. Unlike the old problem, where there is one Form over many particulars, the new problem is how one genus, pleasure, can have many species, i.e., how can there be different kinds of pleasure. For these reasons, all the steps in the Gift of Prometheus, save for the nod to the unlimited particulars to which division is finally “let go,” can *seem* to be about only Forms. We saw that there was reason to think that while Forms were the concern of stages 3–8, the opening sentences might be about particulars. The kind that is directly over each particular is the “one” over many from the old problem. Since each particular is many things, potentially there are many “ones” over each particular. Since it is necessary that we be able to collect the particulars to begin the process of collection and division, an account is needed that will show how the particulars can have their many properties in such a fashion that allows the scientist, starting from a collection of particulars, to discover the complete, rightly arranged division of properties over the particulars. But the nature and status of the particular is left dangling by the Gift. When it is determined that the good life for such a particular, a human, is a mixture of elements from different divisions, Plato then has two reasons to account for particulars and the nature of such mixtures.

The fourfold ontology addresses this problem. We can now see that what has limit and unlimitedness in its nature is a particular, not a Form. Most particulars, and especially the human being and its good life, are mixtures. A mixture has two factors, an unlimited factor and a limit imposed upon it that rightly relates some parts of the unlimited factor. Since these particulars have many properties, there are many kinds under which they fall. A given science will construct its own divisional scheme and even in that scheme there will be many kinds under which each particular falls. Which kind or kinds is “directly over” a given particular will then be determined by the proper exfoliation of the schema of collection and division. The Method posits a single (infima) Form over particulars, and then “discovers” some number of unities within the kind just posited. Ideally an inquirer is to find the exact number of kinds within each unity, i.e., Form. But the “kinds within each unity” will be determined in large measure by the study of the various particulars in which the kinds within each kind are co-instantiated.

The fully exfoliated division will yield truths about the relations between the kinds, but these will be “conceptual truths,” marking relations of compatibility and incompatibility or implication. The only ontological relations between the kinds will concern their combination or co-instantiation in the particulars over which are found the complete number of infimae species of the science. When this number has been determined, and ideally not before it has been determined, then one can allow the Forms discovered, and the Method itself, to “go to” the unlimited particulars, for no more scientifically useful information can be gathered.

Consider the properties related to Human in a collection and division. From the mixture of a certain limit and an unlimited body these properties, all of them, are somehow the result. The exact number will be the number of kinds in the division. But Rationality, Animality, being Human, and so on, will not exhaust the properties of the particular human. Even more will turn up in other collections and divisions, including those properties which fall under the species and genera in the class of the unlimited. There are different types of unlimiteds, e.g., different species of “mores and lesses,” instances of which will also be properties of a particular human, his body, his fever, his pleasures, and so on. The particular will then have astonishing complexity. And although no one science will schematize all of its properties, each property of the particular may appear in some schema, whether that appropriate to the mixture, the limit, the unlimited, or the cause.

The fourfold ontology enables Plato for the first time to make the particular a legitimate object of scientific study. It thus complements the Method of Collection and Division by showing how some particulars, at least, can have sufficient stability, unity, and complexity to permit the assignment of its many properties to different divisions of what there is. The discussion of the quotidian and philosophical sciences at the end of the *Philebus* is evidence of this new status. The mathematical precision alluded to in the closing pages of the dialogue is connected to the limit-factor responsible for the stability and trueness to type of mixtures. But the unlimited elements of mixtures, and the unlimited particulars themselves, remain somewhat mysterious. If only mixtures have causes, then unlimited particulars seem to have no causes. Moreover, it is unclear how we are to think of the unlimited components of mixtures, especially the material bodies of particulars such as Socrates or an ox. I have noted that in light of the variability of the unlimited elements, it is unlikely that two mixtures will have the same properties. But lacking an account of space (and time), the ontologies of the *Philebus* are not adequate to individuate particulars. While the *Philebus* marks a decisive advance from the metaphysics of the earlier dialogues, the fourfold ontology and the Method of Collection and Division are, I believe, a precursor to the richer, more detailed account of the *Timaeus*.

The End of the *Philebus*

The Method of Collection and Division and the fourfold ontology subserve the attempt to define the good life for a human. The first task after defining the logic of mixtures is to locate the ingredients in their proper genus. Pleasure, admitting as it does the more and the less, is placed in the genus of the unlimited. Hence, no pleasure can be a mixture.³⁵ The long central part of the *Philebus* takes up the task of deciding the exact number of all the “ones” associated in the collection and division of its genus and species. After a long disquisition on the types of false pleasures, Socrates turns to the true pleasures, for only these will find a place in the mixed life (50eff.). He then subjects knowledge to examination and division (55cff.). Finally (59bff.), he moves to synthesize these two ingredients in order to present a ranking of various lives. Almost all of this final two-thirds of the *Philebus* falls outside the concern of this chapter. But the remarks on the true pleasures, and his brief discussion of the different kinds of sciences, dialectic, and their objects contain additional information about particulars and Forms. The critical issue concerns what is implied by the Phileban formula *genesis eis ousian*, that (some) particulars come-into-being: is Plato now prepared to allow that particulars have essences and rank as objects of knowledge? No little controversy has been provoked by his tantalizingly brief remarks in the last part of the *Philebus*.³⁶

The culmination of the investigation of pleasures concerns those which are true, unmixed (ἄμεικτον, 50e6), and pure (καλός, καθαρός, 51b3ff.).³⁷ The pure kinds of pleasures, color patches and their kin, have this in common: whereas the impure colors and pleasures are measured perhaps by magnitude and amount, the pure patches do not become whiter with the addition of more pure white. They are, especially in comparison to no matter how much impure white, just whiter, just better, a more pure representative of whiteness. The same is true of the unmixed pleasures. No matter how small, no matter in comparison to how much impure pleasure, the pure are more pleasant, truer, and better (53a–c). So the sense of measure and its lack that is relevant here concerns the variation of scale in the case of the two kinds of pleasures. They are so well balanced that once they come into being, there is no sense in talking about increasing them or augmenting them in the ways appropriate to the impure pleasures. Recall that the “more and less” defined the unlimited kind. They merit these epithets associated with mixtures insofar as they do not admit the more and the less.³⁸

The next phase of the discussion is, it seems, almost designed to neutralize the impression, engendered by the descriptions of pleasures as pure and having moderation (ἔμμετρία), that these special pleasures might qualify as mixtures and, insofar as all mixtures are good, thus be good in their own

right (52c4). The question now is whether all pleasure is a process, a *genesis*, as opposed to a being, an *ousia*. Since any mixture is a *genesis eis ousian*, there is no reason to balk at allowing particulars to have *ousia* in some sense. But Socrates denies that any pleasure can qualify as a being *simpliciter* (an *ousia*), because pleasures are becomings. Beings are self-sufficient while becomings are in need of something. Since generation is for the sake of being, so too all things that play a role in generation are for the sake of being, albeit indirectly: “I say then that drugs, all tools and all materials (ὑλη) are set down for the sake of generation, and that each particular *genesis* is for the sake of some particular being, and that *genesis* as a whole comes to be for the sake of being as a whole” (54c1–4). Given that this is the way the world is, and given that the good is self-sufficient and that for the sake of which things come to be, then pleasure cannot be (a) good or a being. (Perhaps this is why the unlimited particulars never make it into the rank of things that become into being.) This is reemphasized; Plato seems to be reminding us that even the pure pleasures, being as measured and unmixed as they are, are still in the category of *genesis*.³⁹ No pleasure then can be a good, since it is for the sake of something else.

The discussion turns to the examination of the kinds of knowledge to see how they are to be mixed into the mixed life. The division of knowledge requires many cuts. The sciences are divided into the productive (δημοουργικόν) versus the liberal arts. By applying the measure of purity to the productive sciences, they are divided according to their affinity with numbering, measuring, and weighing. In short, the more mathematical and, hence, the more precise or accurate the science, the purer it is. When precision is removed we are left with knack, experience, and guesswork (55e). Finally, these more precise sciences are again divided, this time according to their users: there is the arithmetic of the many, and the arithmetic of the philosophers (56d4–6). This division has as its focus the kinds of objects studied by the everyday versus those studied by the philosophical sciences. A first attempt at clarification of this distinction appeals to the counting of monads that differ not at all from other monads, versus the everyday counting, which counts cows and armies as, say, two. The other more accurate sciences follow suit. Of these two kinds the purer is the philosophical. The philosophical variants of the more accurate sciences are, it seems, the most precise of sciences, and their objects would seem to be those suited to such a precise study, namely the Forms or kinds investigated in the Method of Collection and Division.

The problem is that one science has been excepted, dialectic. “Clearly everyone knows what I’m talking about. I think absolutely everyone who has even a little intelligence thinks that the most true knowledge by far is that whose domain is being, and what naturally in every way always is the same” (περὶ τὸ ὄν καὶ τὸ ὄντως καὶ τὸ κατὰ ταῦτόν ἀεὶ πεφυκὸς πάντως . . . ,

58a1–5). Socrates contrasts this science with Gorgias’s rhetoric: dialectic is to rhetoric like the pure white is to the impure. But the comparison is not apt really. Dialectic is a lover of truth and a doer of everything for the sake of truth. There is no purer science and it is best considered to possess “purity of mind and reason” (τὸ καθαρὸν νοῦ τε καὶ φρονήσεως, 58d6–7). It seems that dialectic occupies a pedestal all alone. There is no quotidian variant of dialectic. Dialectic alone occupies the vantage point from which one distinguishes and combines, to whatever degree and in whatever fashion Plato thinks possible, the quotidian and the philosophical sciences in the pursuit of the good life.

The introduction of dialectic and its subject matter makes it difficult to determine the subject matter of the quotidian and philosophical sciences. Language familiar from the middle-period dialogues is deployed to characterize the objects of dialectic: what always is versus what becomes (τὰ ὄντα ἀεὶ and τὰ γιγνώμενα). Because the latter never is, nor has, nor will be the same, about them there could not be the most accurate truth, or any certainty (59a11–b5). But if dialectic studies the Forms, what are the objects of the more accurate philosophical sciences? If the philosophical sciences study the changing particulars, then what do the quotidian sciences investigate?

The answers to these questions, such as they are, can best be gleaned from the ensuing discussion of the mixture that is the good life (59d10–64b9). Into this mixture will go all the sciences and the true pleasures. Socrates and especially Protarchus insist that the quotidian, less accurate, “false” sciences must be included, “if they are to find the road home” (62a–b). The inclusion of the quotidian sciences signals that the good life under discussion is that of the everyday human, not some ideal life wholly separate from the changing world.

The discussion of the good life reveals that an object of the philosophical or divine sciences neither comes to be nor perishes, but rather is what is always in itself and in the same way (κατὰ ταῦτά δὲ καὶ ὡσαύτως ὄντα ἀεὶ, 61e2–3). These are the Forms, entities that admit of definitions and that are known by practitioners of the appropriate philosophical sciences. The objects of the quotidian sciences, as we were led to expect, are the changing and inexact entities of the physical world (62a–b).

But the fact that the sciences concerned with the particular are now hived off from the accurate sciences gives pause, for it seems at odds with collection and division and with the fourfold ontology. The Method of Collection and Division was highlighted as the path to discovery of all that concerns science (16c2–3). While the monads to be divided are surely Forms, the process of collection concerned particulars. Similarly, in the fourfold ontology, the analysis of mixtures into a limit imposed by a rational mind on an unlimited item seemed tailored to show that material particulars had sufficient stability to admit of study. Lastly, the pure patches of color and the

other fine objects of the pure pleasures also signaled that some particulars at least have the pureness and perfection to qualify as objects of the best sciences. In short, the thrust of the ontological discussions in the *Philebus* seems to elevate (some) particulars from the rank of mere *gignomena* to that of beings which come to be, *genesis eis ousian*.⁴⁰ The declaration denying certainty (βεβαιότης), greatest truth, and accuracy to the particular seems at odds with the very enterprise of the *Philebus*.

One response to this predicament is to view the difference between the quotidian and philosophical sciences to be one of aspect, not object.⁴¹ The difference in subject matter is to be drawn according to whether the particulars are considered in light of the kinds of beings they are, or in light of the changes they undergo, including their generation and perishing. Even if they lose their limits at some point, they nonetheless can be viewed as having these limits. Their possession of limit qualifies the particular as the object of a pure science. When we consider the members of the same species, we view them as equally men because they are limited in the same way: they have the same right relation between parts. “He believed that if knowledge is to be stable and reliable, routine and experience are insufficient. Real knowledge must be of stable structures behind the appearances. And such knowledge can be had only if we understand the mathematically determined relations that constitute such structures.”⁴²

An appeal to aspect is, in many ways, promising and supported by the argument of the dialogue. On the other hand, to study particulars under an aspect is a fuzzy notion. In asking after what some particular is one presumes that there is a kind over it. But the kinds in the *Gift* were the traditional Forms of Ox, Man, and Cow. However, when we consider the division of sciences at 55ff., the aspects under which the mathematically precise sciences study particulars line up with the limits that particulars embody.

The “structures” and the “mathematically determined relations” are the limits introduced by the fourfold ontology. But there is no indication that the philosophical sciences are limited to the mathematical sciences. There is no reason to think that there are not accurate philosophical sciences of biology and psychology that will study the traditional Forms of Man, Ox, Pleasure, and Knowledge. But even if we grant that some accurate philosophical sciences study limits, to decide whether particulars are the object of the philosophical sciences one needs to determine whether, and in what sense, particulars provide these limits for study. The *Philebus* provides no definitive answer to this question. Indeed, perhaps it is impossible to find an answer anywhere in Plato. But the critical issue is whether the limit can be isolated and abstracted from the particular. The language of this late discussion does not hold out much prospect that Plato, at the end of his career, changed his views about abstraction. The problem with the particulars remains their unlimited factor and the change and inconstancy it induces. Mixtures are not

“always” what that they are. Particulars remain deficient in three respects: (1) they gain and lose a variety of properties; (2) at a certain point in time they lose the right relation or limit and perish; (3) it is not clear that they ever perfectly instantiate a limit owing to their unlimited aspect. Plato still insists at the end of the day that what is definable are the unchanging Forms or limits, not the particulars. These are the familiar complaints of the *Phaedo* and *Republic*. Whatever we are to make of the claim that particulars come-into-being, they do not qualify as the objects of definition, and hence they do not qualify as the objects of any precise science. Insofar as they are the objects of a science at all, they are the special concern of the everyday, imprecise sciences.

Even if the particulars fail to achieve the status of truly knowable, there can be little doubt that the *Philebus* offers a more precise account of their nature than any proffered by earlier dialogues. The great advance is not that they can prompt the scientist to develop his account of the nature of the Forms—they served that role in the *Phaedo* insofar as they promote recollection. Rather, what is novel is that they are now revealed to be at once members of kinds, e.g., an ox, dog, or human, *and* they are shown to embody in their “matter” some mathematical structure. Their mathematical structure provides them more stability than they have ever had and better equips them to remain members of some kind, as long as their matter and circumstances permit. The final elaboration of this mathematization of the particular is to be found in the *Timaeus*. But before turning to that work, our question about the relation of dialectic to the sciences remains to be answered.

In the discussion of the category of limit, I noted that the same mathematical limits could be imposed on a variety of media. For this reason, I argued, it would be a mistake to identify limits with natural kinds. Various kinds of particulars, owing to their different unlimited factors, can embody the same limit. If we consider the given philosophical sciences that are to study these limits, we can see that no one science is capable of embracing all the different ways in which a given (mathematical) limit is utilized in Plato’s metaphysics. Assume that the same limit figures in music and meteorology. It is no part of music to study weather or of meteorology to study music. The complete knowledge of the limit is not provided by either science, not even by mathematics. Mathematics will study the numerical ratio independent of the notes and chords, or the fair weather, which are made possible by the imposition of the limit. In order to fully appreciate the resourcefulness of limits, a discipline is required that ranges over many sciences. This is one of the tasks of dialectic. In this respect, dialectic and each philosophical science share objects, though the objects of a given science will only be part of the domain of dialectic.

The power to combine the products of the various sciences is nowhere better exhibited than in the consideration of what makes for the mixed life

of a human being. Here the dialectician must combine the analysis of pleasure and the analysis of knowledge, along with the information furnished by the study of the various biological sciences, mathematics, and the less precise quotidian sciences. All of these, as Protarchus insists, are part and parcel of what it is for the life of a particular human to be a mixed and, therefore, happy life. This final example of a mixture also serves to check the reader from assigning too much weight to the mathematical sciences. Whatever we are to say about how the mind studies how mind is imposed on pleasure to produce the appropriate mixture of pleasure and knowledge, Plato offers no prospect that there are numerical values to be assigned to these items, nor that a mathematical ratio will dictate in the case of any person, let alone all people, how to combine one's various (pure) pleasures and knowledge. The nature of the limit imposed on pleasure is quite different from the mathematical limits imposed on music. The flexibility of the notion of limit, apparent from 23–28, where sometimes it was imposed on opposites, sometimes on matter, and sometimes on ingredients, is emphasized in the final account of the measure which, when imposed, results in the happy life: “To me it seems that our discussion has arrived at the design of what might be called an incorporeal order that rules harmoniously over a body possessed by a soul” (D. Frede’s translation of ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ καθαπερὲὶ κόσμος τις ἄσώματος ἄρξων καλῶς ἐμψύχου σώματος ὁ νῦν λόγος ἀπειργάσθαι φαίνεται, 64b6–8).

Dialectic, then, remains the master science, and it has as its objects both the particulars and the Forms. Indeed, dialectic ranges over all kinds of *onta* and ultimately over all “pseudo-*onta*,” such as those “created” by mistaken beliefs and misguided cuts. Its special concern is the combination and synthesis of the various sciences, crafts, and forms of inquiry, even those that fail to merit the title of a less precise demiurgic science. The fact that dialectic is at bottom a science of combination and integration also helps us understand in what sense Plato considers the Method of Collection and Division to be at once a part of each science and yet distinct from any given science. What a fully exfoliated collection and division reveals are the infimae species and the higher species, genera, and differentiae of a given field of study. It displays the various elements of the science that can be combined. But the finished division does not reveal how the infimae species, for instance, the notes, chords, and scales of music, are to be combined to produce a beautiful piece of music. This is the gift and the task of the musician, who must know the elements of the collection and division, but who must also know something more. The mark of any given scientist will then be her ability to combine and synthesize the information provided by a collection and division appropriate to her field of study. By the same token, the mark of the dialectician will be her ability to combine and synthesize, among other things, the collections and divisions developed by the various sciences. Her

domain is nothing less than the greatest of all mixtures, the cosmos itself, and the mind(s) which both provide it with measure and are its cause.

SECTION TWO

The *Timaeus*

Prior to the *Philebus* and *Timaeus* metaphors dominate Plato's discussions of particulars: particulars are deficient; they are images; they have a share of Forms; they are one and many; they change; for any property F, they are in some way F and not-F. There is no effort to say what makes each particular, e.g., Socrates, one or the particular that he is. There is almost nothing in the way of an *analysis* of particulars.⁴³ The material nature of particulars is partly responsible for the characteristics that distinguish Forms from particulars. But there is no discussion of how bodies are composed, nor is there any account of what it is for particulars to persist through changes. Plato ignores the instability of material elements or the gain or loss of material properties, except on the grand scale of death.⁴⁴ Traditionally Plato is said to be a Heraclitean on this score. Material particulars either (1) change all of their properties at each moment; or (2) change some of their properties at each moment; or (3) change all of their properties over time; or (4) change some of their properties over time. Although the total flux envisaged in (1) is sometimes thought to be Plato's considered position, I believe it is the position he attributes to certain Heracliteans. His position, rather, is a combination of (2) and (3): there is no property of a particular that it always has, and at any time there is some property that it is always exchanging.⁴⁵

The way they bear these properties, I have argued, is the source of their deficiency. Particulars lack essences and thus are never essentially anything. Rather, particulars are "havers" or participants. Particulars change—they are in "flux"—in that they acquire and lose properties. This exchange of properties is analyzed in terms of their partaking in Forms, items that never change. Plato is sometimes thought to adopt a bundle theory of particulars: a (material) particular consists of a collection of properties. I suggested that Plato adopts a modified version of a bundle theory: Platonic particulars consist of form-copies, not Forms or universals. The *Timaeus* explicitly and powerfully develops this "trope" account.

With the advent of the critical dialogues Plato develops a more powerful and complex account of the Forms. Forms are now required both to Be and to partake, breaking the apparent pattern of the middle period dialogues where particulars only partake and Forms only Are. With the mingling of ways of being in one world, it would be reasonable to think that the ways also mingle in the "second world," the world of material particulars. Particulars, on this reading, would have essential properties. Besides the argument

from symmetry, many interpreters think that the arguments of the late dialogues offer reasons to posit natured particulars of an Aristotelian variety. One is a broadly epistemological argument developed from the Method of Collection and Division. A second derives from the considerations of language found in the *Sophist*, the *Statesman*, the *Philebus*, and, as we shall shortly see, the *Timaeus*. These dialogues suggest that Plato now posits particulars that either themselves have essences or have constituents (bodies) that are essentially endowed. Their new status allows us to (re)identify and refer to particulars and allows them to be the objects of scientific study.

In the *Philebus*, we saw that the process of collection begins from particulars. By studying them and their properties, the scientist can construct divisions whose nodes and relations display the properties collected from the particulars. But within the account of collection and division, there is no analysis of the particulars from which collection typically begins.⁴⁶ The construction of the particular is found in the fourfold ontology. The notions of limit, unlimited, cause, and mixture are deployed to explain how everything from musical chords to weather, from fevers to storms, and from particular oxen to the good life, comes to be. Some particulars are mixtures composed of something from the category of limit and some unlimited factor. This unlimited factor sometimes is said to be opposites, but at other times appears as the shapeless ingredients from which, e.g., statues and pots are made, and then again as the bodies of the creatures that populate the world. Many mixtures of limit and an unlimited are the individuals of the natural kinds. Socrates is a human, and a mixture of a limit (soul) imposed (by a mind) on an unlimited factor (his body). Particulars that are not mixtures are unlimited particulars, whose nature and construction Plato considers only in passing. The properties of both the mixtures and of the unlimited particulars are, in turn, either mixtures, e.g., the virtue of Socrates, or unlimiteds, my fever. Mixtures are far more stable than unlimited particulars.

The fourfold ontology thus reveals how the particulars become into being. But the *Philebus* offers little detailed guidance as to the nature of the unlimited factor in a mixture or how the imposition of limit on such a factor is to be understood. Similarly unexplicated is how one is to conceive of the relation between the limits and the natural kinds whose instances arise from the imposition of a given limit relation on a given kind of matter. The numerous allusions to the notions of ratio and proportion in the discussion of the limit do indicate that Plato now takes to heart the mathematical advances of the fifth and fourth century. The imposition of limit lends stability and permanence to the particular of which it is a factor. Still absent, however, is any way to individuate particulars. The possibility remains that two particulars could be indiscernible, because nothing in the Phileban account speaks to the spatio-temporal or relational properties of particulars. But many ontological issues are mooted in the *Philebus* so that Socrates can pursue his

search for an account of the good life. They demand a return engagement. The ontology that is the subject of a short subject in the *Philebus* becomes the feature-length presentation of the *Timaeus*.

The *Timaeus* is Plato's most elaborate account of nature, as that phenomenon was understood within the scientific tradition of Greek thinkers. It is his cosmology and cosmogony. The dialogue itself is so ingeniously constructed that even now there is little agreement about its place in the order of the dialogues, about the connection of its opening remarks on Atlantis to its subsequent remarks, or about whether the generation of the world is a fact or a fiction, i.e., whether Plato believed that the physical cosmos indeed was generated. In the course of this chapter some of these questions will be considered, but they are not my main concern. My focus will be on the nature of the particular and Plato's account of how particulars come to be. Since the cosmos itself is a particular for Plato, the biggest one, the genesis and nature of a particular must be the expressed concern of the dialogue. I will argue that this dialogue provides an account of particulars which, while going far beyond anything developed in any other work, is consistent both with the metaphysics of particulars defended in chapter 3, and with my account of the particular in the *Philebus*.

It has long been thought that the ontology of the *Philebus* and the *Timaeus* are similar. The mathematical emphasis initiated in the *Philebus* is carried to remarkable lengths in the *Timaeus*. Indeed, there is a tradition, still flourishing today, that numbers the late Plato as a member of the Pythagorean schools of Sicily. We are told that the one and the unlimited dyad are the basis of everything, that, like Pythagoras, Plato became enamored of the notion that everything is number.⁴⁷ Others find in his failure to mention the Atomists confirmation of his indebtedness to the physics of Democritus and Leucippus, namely, that he too posits some kind of primitive material atoms in his precosmic chaos. Common to Pythagoreans, Atomists, and Plato is a concern with what we can call "mathematical physics." Plato's is not the first, but his is the most sophisticated physics of his time.⁴⁸ While the *Timaeus*'s account (47ff.) of the receptacle and the Demiurge's geometrization of body merit Plato's inclusion in the ranks of physicists, it is critical to note that this part of the dialogue is a second sailing on the subject of the generation of the cosmos. Prior to its development, Timaeus offers a more "traditional" Platonic account utilizing the notions of model and image, i.e., Forms and material particulars (27ff.). In this first account, the Demiurge makes both the physical cosmos and the rational soul, leaving it to the lesser gods to create the material particulars and irrational soul. That there are two constructions of particulars says at once too much and too little about the particulars: too much because we have two theories of their nature and construction; too little because we are not told how to reconcile the two theories.

The fact that we have two such accounts, however, does provide an opportunity to link the *Philebus* and the *Timaeus*. Both dialogues present *two ontological accounts* and do so without guiding the reader as to their connection. If they can be shown to parallel each other, or if a stronger connection can be forged between the two paired accounts in the *Philebus* and *Timaeus*, between the Method of Collection and Division and the fourfold ontology, on the one hand, and the *Timaeus's* appeal to Forms and images and then geometrized matter on the other, this would give us solid ground from which to argue that the *Timaeus* is as late as the admittedly late *Philebus*.

One obvious link is the limits of the *Philebus* and the geometrical Forms of the *Timaeus*. Both are mathematical in nature and both are imposed on some unlimited element. Another link is the Demiurge, who in both dialogues is responsible for the cosmos. However, in the *Philebus*, there are no models to which the divine mind looks in fashioning his mixtures. In the *Philebus*, moreover, the Demiurge, or mind in general, is responsible only for some particulars, the mixtures. In the *Timaeus*, on the other hand, with the guidance of the Demiurge, it *appears* that *everything* in the generated cosmos comes to be from the interaction of the geometrical Forms with the receptacle or precosmic matter. The problematic link is the status of the unlimited, both in regards to the unlimited particulars which are not mixtures, and the unlimited factor in the mixtures on which limit is imposed. The *Philebus* is silent about the genesis of the unlimited.

If we are to assimilate the accounts of the two dialogues, we must try to determine to which feature of the *Timaeus* the *unlimited* is equivalent or, failing that, analogous. There seem to be two candidates: (1) the primitive or precosmic chaotic material bodies; or (2) the ordered bodies of triangles in their various complexities.⁴⁹ The choice here has far-reaching implications for one's understanding of Plato's late metaphysics. To opt for (1) entails admitting matter as a primitive notion. From this foundation some have argued that particulars have essential properties. Typically the embrace of (1) also leads to the elimination of the traditional Forms, or their "reduction" to mathematical Forms. To opt for (2), at least on my account of (2), is to deny that matter is primitive, that any particulars are essentially endowed, or that the traditional Forms are done away with. Since I will argue on behalf of (2), let us start with an account that favors (1), the precosmic matter. The identification of the unlimited with the precosmic material bodies seems to have much going for it.

In introducing the need for the Demiurge both dialogues rely on the principle that what comes to be requires a cause. Since the *Philebus* restricts Demiurgic activity to the mixtures, it can be inferred that the unlimited particulars, as well as the unlimited factor in mixtures, do not come to be. This suggests that the unlimited "stuffs" of the cosmos are primitive. The Phileban unlimited is characterized as either constantly changing or inher-

ently unstable. But it is often characterized as a particular or something determinate, something capable of changing, say temperature, within a certain range. (For this reason it seemed best not to view the unlimited as a continuum.) These two facets of the unlimited augur that the closest parallel in the *Timaeus* would be the precosmic, chaotic bodies. Both dialogues thus seem to suggest that the late Plato opts to include some kind of matter as a *primitive* in his ontology.

This conclusion is reinforced by the observation that in the second Timaeian account of the generation of the cosmos the Demiurge is not the cause of everything. Whatever we are to say about the Demiurge's role in cosmic generation at 27dff., he shares responsibility in the second account with necessity or the wandering and random "cause." The realm governed by necessity is (thought to be) the precosmic matter and its "residue" in the geometrized cosmos. Seen in this light, the *Timaeus* addresses two unresolved difficulties afflicting the unlimited in the *Philebus*. It identifies the unlimited with primitive matter and it accounts for its behavior by augmenting the category of cause, restricted in the *Philebus* to mind, with necessity.

Obviously it is impossible to assign to the precosmic bodies all the jobs performed by the unlimited in the *Philebus*. First, the unlimited also serves as a category along with limit and mixture. Second, while the precosmic chaos and the unlimited particulars share the feature of being subject to constant change, the precosmic matter is chaotic; it is not stable enough even to allow for its classification as a fever, foul weather, or maybe even as hot. But these dissimilarities are not surprising. The *Timaeus* advances a more articulate mathematical ontology and adds new items, e.g., the receptacle, to the account. It thus can address residual problems from the *Philebus* with new weapons. So, for instance, the *Timaeus's* richer mathematics allows the ur-matter of the cosmos to be geometrized in such a fashion that the resulting bodies can admit the "more and the less." Geometrized matter now serves as the unlimited factor in the particular mixtures, e.g., Socrates and Fido, and allows Plato to give a relational account of sensible qualities such as the hot and cold, or wet and dry. But like the unlimited of the *Philebus*, precosmic matter is ungenerated and is, as we shall see, always changing.

The emphasis of this interpretation of the ontologies of the *Philebus* and *Timaeus* is the addition of some primitive material element along with a new role assigned to the broadly mathematical notions of limit and the geometrical Forms. The receptacle is treated as the space occupied by the matter. The Demiurge and Necessity become the agents who construct or cause the ordinary particulars to come to be.

Once we have matter as a primitive notion, we have a contrast with the middle-period ontology of traditional Forms and particulars that are mere bundles of properties. The postulation of primitive matter (the unlimited factor) precludes that all components of the particular are subject to genesis.

And once the *Timaeus* provides a way to bring mathematical notions to bear on the analysis of everything, that is, once even the Phileban unlimited particulars can be assigned a geometrical structure, Platonic particulars can be thought to have arrived at a point where both their stability and variability can be rigorously explained in terms of their geometrical structures. Geometrized or limited matter thus affords an account of particulars which assigns to (some of) them essence or *ousia*. According to this interpretation of this section of the dialogue, at the very least *matter itself must be essentially endowed* so that the Demiurge can utilize its properties in order to construct the higher-order particulars. That matter is essentially endowed is also shown by the so-called much-misread passage at 49a1–50a4. For in order that our language be able to refer, there must be something, matter or material particulars, not subject to flux. At the least then, matter is essentially or permanently what it is. And if matter has an essence, then there is reason to think that the organized material particulars themselves might now possess some of their properties essentially. What it is to be a human is just for the right limit to be imposed on the correctly organized matter. Since the very contrast between a mixture and an unlimited particular is the former's insusceptibility to change, it is not a long leap to the view that the particular dogs and humans are essentially canine or human.⁵⁰ On this reading, permanence and insusceptibility to change become a mark of essence. Since some particulars are limited in the appropriate way, Plato has no reason to preclude them from possessing essences. This shift in thought is witnessed by the *Philebus's* depiction of them as what comes into being (*genesis eis ousian*). This new status is then reinforced by the later remarks on the pure patches of color as well the admission that particulars are the objects of both the everyday and the philosophical sciences.

The prospects for this interpretation of the ontologies of the two dialogues, and the prospect for essentially endowed particulars, turn, I think, on one's understanding of the relations between the two ontological accounts proffered within each dialogue. To account for particulars in terms of primitive matter and the geometrical Forms is to conclude that Plato rejects the first account of the generation of the cosmos. The familiar middle-period ontology of Forms, embodied in the notion of the cosmos as an imperfect image modeled on the World Animal, is no longer needed. (The World Animal itself contains all the kinds or species and is equivalent to the complete exfoliation of all the divisions of the Gift of Prometheus.) The new account at 47eff. signals that the traditional Theory of Forms cannot accomplish all the tasks that Plato requires of his account of particulars. Indeed, it seems that not even with the addition of the receptacle can the *traditional Theory* of Forms do the job. Hence on this interpretation, the traditional Theory of Forms is a third wheel, eliminated by appeal to Ockham's razor, and replaced by the account of geometrized Forms, material bodies (triangles), and the

receptacle. A corresponding interpretation of the *Philebus* would assign the Theory of traditional Forms to the collections and divisions and then try to locate it in, or reduce the Method of Collection and Division to aspects of, the fourfold ontology. What survives from collection and division is only the methodology. One might still allow that there are Forms of the four “kinds,” Cause, Limit, Unlimited, Mixture. But instead of the traditional Forms of Man and Justice which occupy the nodes of their respective divisions, one identifies these Forms with limits. Ideally, with a more refined account of limit or other mathematical notions, one could do the same for the species of the unlimited. The *Timaeus* could then be seen to provide the more refined account. Matter and mathematics thus replace the traditional Theory of Forms. And with the abandonment of that theory, the gulf separating the realm of Forms endowed with essences and the realm of particulars locked in the purgatory of constant genesis is effectively bridged.⁵¹ There may remain distinctions between the nature of the geometrical or mathematical Forms and their material counterparts. But with respect to the ordinary material particulars that populate the cosmos, they can now be said to have come into being. With respect to the *Timaeus*,⁵² once we include matter in the account, the receptacle and the geometrized Forms alone are necessary and alone are capable of interacting to provide an appropriately causal account of the behavior of the material particulars.

Plato thus rehabilitates the material particular at the expense of the traditional Theory of Forms. This reading of the relationship of the two dialogues captures the sentiments of many, perhaps beginning with Aristotle. Matter and mathematical notions of limit, ratio, and the geometrical Forms, provide essentially endowed particulars from which one can construct the divisions of the late dialogues and secure particulars as the object of thought and language. Plato does not abandon Forms entirely, but rather changes his view about the types of Forms that are needed. The Form of Man is transformed into a certain limit or a complex geometrical Form. Socrates is a human because he is a geometrically and mathematically determinate mass of matter. According to his earlier metaphysics, the only mixing involved the participation of a particular in a traditional Form.⁵³ Now there is mixture between matter and the geometrical and mathematical Forms. Socrates is a human not because he partakes of Man itself, but because of the sort of limit that relates his material components.

Whatever the attractions of this general account of Plato's late metaphysics, I think it misconstrues the accounts within the *Philebus* and *Timaeus* and their relation to one another. I do not believe that Plato replaces the traditional Theory of Forms with a new mathematics. Nor does he espouse a doctrine of essentially endowed particulars or argue that there is some kind of primitive matter that is essentially anything at all. The problem with the “likely account” developed above is that it fails to include the kind of mixing

that is the hallmark of the *Philebus* and *Timaeus*: namely, *the way in which the two theories within each dialogue combine with one another*. We should not be misled by the fact that the late Plato contends that Forms both Are and participate, or that he accepts that each Form is one and many. For when we turn to the material particulars, we find little evidence that they too are said both to be (Be) and to partake. (This is precisely why proponents of essentially endowed particulars emphasize the Phileban *genesis eis ousian*.) We do, however, find a new primitive, the unlimited of the *Philebus* and the receptacle of the *Timaeus*. Instead, then, of an argument that particulars both are and participate, what we find is that Plato develops two theories to account for the properties and “nature” of particulars, where before we had one, participation in a traditional Form. The best way to understand Plato’s late metaphysics of particulars is to consider the methodological implications of the two theories within each of the dialogues. Why does Plato think that two theories are needed?

In trying to assess the relations between the ontologies of the *Philebus*, we saw that one way to combine the two theories was to locate the traditional Forms within the fourfold ontology while simultaneously allowing that the four principles were themselves genera. Mathematical Forms are placed in the genus of limit. I conjectured, rather weakly, that into the unlimited go the Forms for the Hot, the Cold, the Wet, the Quick, and such. The crucial Forms mentioned at the outset of the Gift, Man, Ox, and the other natural-kind Forms, along with the Virtues, belong in the category of the mixture. While this allows Plato to meld the two ontologies, the bond between them is much stronger. The real novelty is the way limits and the unlimited are combined to produce particular mixtures. Correlated with each natural kind there are a limit and an appropriate matter. Each instance of a natural kind, e.g., Socrates, is a mixture of limit and unlimited, and in virtue of the limit imposed remains, for as long as its unlimited factor permits, a good instance of the kind that it is. In the case of the particular instances of the natural kinds, the unlimited is a body itself containing organized groupings of matter. These component bits will either be mixtures in their own right or unlimited particulars. The *Philebus* only hints at this program, intimating that at the bottom one will find the four elements or some opposites, e.g., hot and cold stuffs.

The fact that there is some one limit assigned to each kind does not entail that the kind Human is reducible to a given limit relation. The same mathematical limit is, in principle, able to be imposed on different kinds of unlimited factors and would retain its nature regardless of whether the Demiurgic mind ever imposed it on, for instance, a human body. On the other hand, since many different kinds of particulars admit of the same limit, the study of these limits in their various manifestations can now lead the inquirer to Forms which themselves might bear relations to one another. The mathema-

tization of the (matter of the) particular thus helps to explain similarities in nature. The introduction of limit and unlimited as components of mixtures also suggests that Plato no longer is sanguine about analyzing particulars merely in terms of participation in the Forms of Man, Pale, Rationality, and so on. This is the status of particulars at the conclusion of the Gift of Prometheus. The particulars remain mere bundles of Forms, entirely lacking in persistence and lacking any sort of alternative characterization or substrate which can be cited as what has the Forms, or even where the bundled Forms are located. Conceived of as mere bundles of properties, particulars cannot display the hierarchical arrangement of Forms displayed in a completely exfoliated division. The introduction of limits and matter organized in the appropriate manner now allows Plato to model in the particulars this hierarchical arrangement of Forms. Finally, the two disparate components, together with the nature of the natural kind, enable Plato to accommodate truths about the relations between Forms found in distinct divisions. These synthetic truths, or truths of combination, e.g., that the good life for a human must consist of pleasure and knowledge, can now be explained in terms of the sort of thing a human being is, namely, this kind of body on which is imposed this sort of limit by a intelligent mind, whose purpose is to bring about a creation of a specific sort, a human being. Absent, however, is any account of space and time that would permit one to locate and individuate any of the particulars of either variety.

The blending of the two ontologies in the *Philebus* is a promissory note Plato cashes in the *Timaeus*. I believe that here too he articulates two theories to combine them, not to eliminate one. The second account is developed in far greater detail. Not only does it contain new primitives and Forms, it fleshes out the sketchy Phileban metaphysics of mixtures and provides a means to locate particulars in space (and time). Its chief concern is to detail the fashion in which mathematical limits, here geometrical Forms, are imposed on an unlimited factor. In particular, it reveals how we are to conceive of the organization of lower and lowest level bits of matter into hierarchically organized bodies, with new “limits” imposed at each level. The geometrical account, therefore, does explain those aspects of the Phileban unlimited pertaining to particulars, both the unlimited particulars and the unlimited factor of mixtures.

At the same time, however, Plato tries to show that the nature of the particular cannot be fully explained by just the theory of geometrical Forms, matter, and the receptacle. Both the constant adversion to the purposeful actions of the Demiurge and the introduction and subsequent allusions to the traditional Theory of Forms indicate that the traditional Forms still have a role to play in the complete explanation of what it is to be a particular of a certain, determinate sort. If both the traditional Forms and the geometrical

Forms *cum* receptacle are needed, then no interpretation of the *Timaeus* can succeed unless it accounts for the relation of the two theories to one another.

Perhaps the best place to begin to see how the traditional Forms and the geometric Forms complement each other is to note that there are tasks which Plato wants his two complementary theories to perform that the traditional doctrine of Forms fails to perform, or perform best. This fact is signaled by the introduction of the receptacle, alongside that of geometrical Forms. They complement each other in that together they provide: (a) an analysis of the nature of matter; (b) a means to individuate particulars by making possible their location in space; and, finally, (c) a way to lend sufficient stability, regularity, and permanence to particulars so that their behavior can be studied and predicted, though not with certainty, so that they can serve as the starting points for scientific inquiry. My analysis does not, however, entail the rejection of Plato's thesis that particulars never Are but always come to be. In this regard, then, Platonic particulars are still in flux. Indeed, the addition of the receptacle and the geometrized matter secures this claim in a novel and more powerful fashion.

My account does not embrace essentially endowed particulars in part because I do not believe that matter is a primitive, unanalyzable factor in Plato's Timaeian metaphysics. As we just saw, an account that eliminates the traditional Forms in favor of the geometrical Forms does so in no small measure because it finds Plato committed to the notion that matter is a primitive, unanalyzable factor in his ontology. The ur-matter of the *Timaeus* serves as the domain over which Necessity rules on its own, namely the matter in the precosmic chaos. This same matter sometimes also serves to license reliable descriptions of the phenomenal particulars, providing them with the required stability.⁵⁴

I believe that in the *Timaeus* matter, or corporeal body of every sort, is a construct. Because all body is constructed, it is not ultimate and it is "analyzable" into the elements that figure in its construction. On the other hand, matter, or body, is not reducible to any of its component elements. Because it is irreducible, it is for Plato basic and ineliminable from his ontology. In other words, given the elements or primitive factors in his ontology, matter turns out to be, for Plato, an inevitable product. These primitive factors include the receptacle and both the geometrical and traditional Forms. Plato needs both kinds of Forms to explain the nature of matter and the changes in qualities that characterize particulars. The traditional Forms, or let me say, "the Formal account," is designed to handle the problem of qualitative change. But to do so it requires that there be *place(s)* where form-copies or images of the Forms are manifested. Place is provided by the Geometrical account. The Geometrical account, in turn, is designed to handle the problem of (the nature of) matter. But to do so it requires a specification of the

properties that the geometrized material phenomena are to have. That specification is provided (only) by the Formal account. If the two accounts complement each other in this way, one consequence is that Plato nowhere offers an account of the *particularity of the phenomenal particulars*, since both the geometrical Forms responsible for place and the traditional Forms responsible for the properties of the particulars are themselves general or universal factors. (Compare the question of the unity of the Form in the Gift of Prometheus: there the unity of the Form was also a posit.) Since one cannot *derive* the particularity of anything from universal components, Plato *posits* that there are particular features. These posited particulars are not, however, ordinary things such as you and I. They are, rather, the form-copies or particular property instances of the geometrical and traditional Forms. It turns out that there are no phenomenal particulars, as they are ordinarily conceived.

I think that one can best appreciate how the two theories complement each other by understanding the logic of Plato's remarks about what can and cannot be said of the phenomena in flux. I will begin, therefore, *in medias res* with the much-misread passage at 49c7–50a4. Once we see the difficulties confronting the problems of reference to particulars we will see more clearly why Plato thinks the receptacle and a theory of geometrized Forms are necessary. In the second section I will address the view of those who would find matter an unanalyzable primitive in the *Timaeus*. In the third and final section, I will turn to the problem of the two accounts. In all three sections, I will keep in play the alternative line of interpretation that favors matter and the geometrical Forms. As I said earlier, the *Timaeus* is ingeniously constructed, with little guidance as to its moral. The text supports different reconstructions of Plato's late metaphysics of particulars and Forms. Ultimately, I believe, both text and philosophy leave us with a Plato who remains a Platonist.

One last preliminary before turning to the argument of the *Timaeus*: there is a global requirement for a truly adequate interpretation of the *Timaeus* which, for lack of time and space, I cannot address here. The issue is the general teleology of the *Timaeus* and its purpose within the Platonic dialogues. This issue is closely connected to the question of the status of the *muthos*. Those who think the creation of the cosmos literal are likely to regard the work as primarily a cosmological treatise. Those who treat it as a myth, on the other hand, have to consider what kind of instruction (διδασκαλίας χάριν) is it for the sake of. It is not, I think, instruction on cosmology, cosmogony, and metaphysics alone, for the import of the Demiurge is not fully captured by looking so narrowly at that subject matter. The Demiurge is an intelligence. Whether or not Plato is committed to the existence of a Demiurge over and above the world soul, or whether he is committed at all to souls over and above our own, I leave aside. What he is

committed to is the presence of soul within the primitives of his ontology. I posit, without argument, that our souls and the Demiurgic soul are alike insofar as our reason is akin to his. The Demiurge, in my view, is nothing more than our rational soul idealized. (In this regard, there is much to support the mythical status of the construction; for the construction of soul violates the external criterion that soul is immortal and imperishable, and the internal criterion that *nous*, intelligence, is found only in soul. Since the Demiurge is himself an intelligence, there must be a soul constructing a soul. When we combine these considerations with the mysterious elements from which the soul is constructed—two different kinds of Being, Sameness and Difference, mixed together so that there is a third kind of each, which is then mixed to form the world soul—there is reason to doubt that the generation of the cosmos is to be taken literally.)

The construction of the physical cosmos I then take to be a lesson in how we are to think about the nature of the material world in which we live and of which we are a part, and how we are to react or act in light of our knowledge of the nature of the physical cosmos. Or, since I think that the Demiurge is just us and hence that the cosmos is not created, the moral is how we are to understand our place in the cosmos and how the material world comes to have the effects that it does on us. Ultimately we are building our life within this material world. Thus I see the *Philebus* and *Timaeus* as part of the same project. In both dialogues Plato is now squarely focused on the life individual humans lead in this world. The *Philebus*, while it adumbrates the ontology developed in detail in the *Timaeus*, explains how each of us is to conceive of the nature of pleasure and its role as a component in the good life. The *Timaeus* then reveals to us the nature of those other objects, our bodies included, with which we are to live in pursuit of that life. In coming to understand the forces governing their behavior and their interaction with our senses and soul, we learn both how to regulate the circles in our soul and how to impose limits on our desires. The *Timaeus* is then a guide to the rational construction of one's life in a world where perfect order is a necessary fiction.

Talk of Phenomena in Flux

At stake in the dispute over 49c7ff. is whether or not Plato is here claiming that phenomenal particulars are in flux. Beginning with Aristotle, it has seemed to most readers a veritable given that Plato maintains that the physical world is a world of flux. In the last fifty years, however, this dogma has been subjected to powerful criticism. Scholars who have harbored suspicions about the coherence of substantial flux are prepared to claim that Plato abandons his Heracliteanism in the late dialogues because he realized that it

is impossible to say or think anything about an object that is in flux. Since we can speak or think about phenomenal particulars, they must therefore have some stability. If we accept that Timaeus speaks for Plato, unlike, say, Socrates presenting the secret doctrine of the Heracliteans in the *Theaetetus*, then only in the *Timaeus* does Plato speak about flux and offer any account of what a particular is. Those who think that he abandoned his Heracliteanism argue that here at 49c7ff. he says that we can refer to phenomenal particulars as such.⁵⁵ I shall refer to this reading of the passage as “the tradition.” The alternative reading of the passage I shall refer to as “the reconstructionist.”⁵⁶ I am a reconstructionist. According to the reconstructionist, the phenomenal particulars of the tradition are, strictly speaking, not objects “as such.” Hence, we cannot speak and think about them in themselves. On our reading of the passage, Plato is here claiming that we ultimately must identify and describe phenomenal particulars by way of the properties or factors that figure in their construction.

One difficulty in adjudicating this dispute is that there are different notions of what constitutes a phenomenal particular, i.e., what a particular is for Plato,⁵⁷ and what it is for something to be in flux. A second difficulty is that the text of 49c7ff. does not force us, by dint of either grammar or philosophy, in one direction or another. To meet these difficulties we must first situate this passage in the context of its surroundings. Then by examining the differing conceptions of particulars and flux, I will develop my own reconstructionist reading.

The linguistic prescriptions of the much-misread passage come at a critical juncture of the dialogue. (They come almost at the exact midpoint.) Although the specific concern of Timaeus’s remarks is the four traditional elements, earth, air, fire, and water, his closing words indicate that the lesson applies to the whole of the physical cosmos (50a1–4).⁵⁸ They concern, therefore, the very phenomena about which Timaeus has promised a new account moments earlier. Whereas his earlier account of the cosmos, he tells us at 48e, made do with two factors, the intelligible Form as model and the image of this model involved in becoming and visible, he now needs a third factor. This third factor is the receptacle. The ensuing lines promise an exploration of the nature and power of the receptacle, to be preceded by an investigation of an *aporia* concerning the four elements, namely that

it is hard to say with respect to each of them, which we ought really to call “water” rather than “fire,” and which any one name rather than all and each severally, so as to use some reliable and stable account. (49a6–b5)

The choice of the four elements is due to the role they played in earlier cosmologies. This preliminary *aporia* looks back to Timaeus’s remark at 48b3–c2 that no one has ever revealed the genesis of the four elements, an

account of which must precede that of the generation of the world. Whereas previous cosmologists had treated them as primitive elements (στοιχεῖα), he insists that they do not qualify even as syllables (συλλαβαί). The particular difficulty is that fire, earth, air, and water seem to be constantly changing into one another in an endless cycle of becoming (49b6–c7). This cycle of change generates the difficulty in saying what each is. The passage at 49c7–50a5 is supposed to instruct us as to how we are to speak of these bodies, given that they seem to be involved in flux. What then is its lesson?

In a series of articles in the 1950s, Cherniss argued that the point of 49c7–50b5 was to show that the particular instances of the four elements appealed to by previous cosmologists could not be referred to—he used “denominated” instead of “referred to”—because “no part of the phenomenal flux is distinguishable from any other.”⁵⁹ He claimed that contrary to the traditional interpretation, the passage did not offer a new way of referring to the phenomena or to particulars, but rather a new sort of item to which our names actually refer: “fire,” for instance, denominates “the such and such, whatever the correct formula may be, that is always identical in each and all of its occurrences.” The tradition argued spiritedly against this view.⁶⁰ According to its interpretation of the passage, Plato is trying to defend our referential practices of referring to the phenomena, with one very crucial proviso: Plato is suggesting a new way of *construing* our references. The improper old way was to construe our references as *identifying references*: instead of predicating “water” of something I am referring to, I am identifying that thing as water. What Plato is instructing us to do at 49c7 is to stop trying to make identifying references to the phenomena and to start, instead, to make *attributive references*. This is why Plato tells us not to refer to the phenomena by using “this” (τοῦτο), but to use “such” (τὸ τοιοῦτον). The problem with “this,” is that it suggests a permanent substrate which retains its identity through change. “Such,” on the other hand, suggests that its referent is an attribute of something else, namely the receptacle.

Thus Plato’s justification for the reference of “fire,” etc., to phenomena is the new logical role that he assigns to those terms: they are to be viewed as picking out a recurrent attribute of something else. In other words, these terms are to be construed as logically (though not grammatically) adjectival. And this is precisely what the reliable and secure account is (πιστὸς καὶ βέβαιος λόγος, 49b5): the construction of our nominal references to phenomena as adjectival descriptions of some basic, permanent subject worthy of that status. This subject is the receptacle, for only it can be designated as τοῦτο (Zeyl, 147).

With respect to our linguistic practices concerning the word “fire,” the text directs us “not this but such on each occasion to call fire” (μὴ τοῦτο ἀλλὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐκάστοτε προσαγορεύειν πῦρ, 49d5–6). The tradition reads this as “do not call on each occasion fire (z) ‘this’ (x) but [what is]

such' (y).” The reconstructionist reads it as “do not call this (x) ‘fire’ (z) but call what is such (y) ‘fire’ (z).” “Do not call Z ‘x’ but call it ‘y’” versus “Do not call x ‘Z’ but call y ‘Z.’”⁶¹ The reconstructionist, it seems, offers a new referent of the term. The tradition offers a new way to refer to the old referent, the transient phenomenal fire. When the dispute is couched in these terms, it might appear that Plato’s principal concern here is the proper or best way to talk. This is not so. His concern is metaphysical.⁶² How we are to construe our referential practices is to be determined by the nature of the phenomena we are trying to talk about. What is at stake between the reconstructionist and the tradition is not so much these linguistic formulae but rather the account of the phenomena themselves.

To focus the metaphysical dispute, consider the new account of becoming promised at 48e2. Timaeus had declared that his new starting point for the generation of the cosmos was greater than his previous one. Before he needed only two primitives (ἀρχαί), Forms, and an image (μίμημα) of the paradigm, which has becoming and is visible. Now there is need of a third, the receptacle. At issue between the two readings of the passage at 49c7ff. is the role played by the receptacle in the new account. Because they view the introduction of the receptacle differently, the two readings offer radically different accounts of the nature of the transient phenomena. According to the traditional reading, the receptacle is merely *a third factor to be added* to the two previous ones, Forms and the phenomena themselves.⁶³ The phenomena remain what they have always been, their nature unaltered by the receptacle. What changes is our understanding of what the phenomena are and have always been. Similarly, Plato is not instructing us to change our linguistic practices: we can continue to use demonstrative sentences, such as “This is fire,” to talk about the phenomenal fire. He insists only that we change our construe of the semantics of such statements. The traditionalists’ attachment to the phenomena motivates their dislike of the reconstructionists’ commitment to new referents for names. When traditionalists read that the referent of “fire” is not the phenomenal fire, but instead the distinct and self-identical characteristic, they charge the reconstructionist with introducing a *fourth* primitive item when only three, the Forms, the phenomena, and the receptacle, are allowed in the new account.⁶⁴ Were the reconstructionist to introduce a fourth primitive, his account would merit condemnation. But the reconstructionist is not guilty of the sin of ontological inflation.

The receptacle is the key element in Timaeus’s argument that the previous cosmologists had misconceived the status of the four elements. Since the proper understanding of their status is the prelude to our understanding of the nature of the cosmos and its parts, we can safely assume that the receptacle’s role in explaining their status will be the same, *mutatis mutandis*, as it plays in the explanation of the physical cosmos. In claiming that they are not primitive or atomic elements or even syllables, i.e., molecules constructed

from just two factors, Timaeus suggests that the four traditional elements are themselves compounded from other constituents. Timaeus of course does not *here* tell us the true status of the traditional elements. What *is* clear is that the traditional elements are not to be regarded as primitive and unanalyzable. What seemed to previous cosmologists to be the foundations of the cosmos are actually constructions of some sort. Therefore we may infer that, if even the four traditional elements are analyzable, then all the phenomena, of which they serve as building blocks, are also analyzable.

The juxtaposition of the new beginning with its introduction of the receptacle and the denial of elemental or syllabic status to the traditional elements suggests, I believe, that the receptacle is not some third primitive (ἀρχή) merely added to Timaeus's previous account. When viewed as a mere addition to the account, the receptacle functions simply as space or, at best, as providing a place in which the four traditional elements are located. But the previous cosmologists are alleged to have erred not in failing to provide for space, but rather in thinking that the four elements were the basic or virtually basic constituents of the cosmos. Like earlier cosmologists, Timaeus's previous account at 27c^{ff.} had assumed that the four elements were primitive and unanalyzable. So too the traditional interpretation of 49c7^{ff.} assumes that the phenomena retain this status, even though how we are to conceive of the phenomena does change. The reconstructionist sees it differently. The introduction of the receptacle heralds a new account of the traditional elements, an account different from the one which Timaeus had proffered at 27c. The receptacle is, rather, a new primitive which, when combined with some second constituent, yields a new analysis of phenomena, an analysis which denies them the status of element (στοιχεῖον) or syllable (συλλαβή).⁶⁵ Whereas the tradition thinks that 48e2 should be read as stipulating three *independent* elements,

1. Forms;
2. Phenomena;
3. Receptacle;

the reconstructionist reads it as analyzing phenomena into two constituents according to the following schema:

- 1'. Forms
- 2'. Phenomenon = (2'a) Receptacle + (2'b) _____.

Since the reconstructionist takes this tack to avoid the charge that he introduces entities beyond necessity, it might seem to follow from the tradition's vantage point that the blank (in 2'b) should be filled by the reconstructionist's self-identical and recurrent characteristics. But this is not the whole story. Consider how this view of the reconstructionist's 2' might analyze an instance of phenomenal fire. It would be a "compound" of recepta-

cle and a recurrent characteristic. This would render it a syllable, a status not permitted it on the reconstructionist reading. The reconstructionist needs an account of 2' which, first, respects the limit of three primitives and, second, assigns to phenomenal fire neither the status of atom or that of molecule. This is problematic. For if Forms are disqualified as a constituent,⁶⁶ then it seems inevitable that the remaining two primitives comprise the phenomenon. And if the phenomenal fire is comprised of only two primitives, how can it not have the status of a syllable?

As a starting point to the answer to this question, let us return to the charge that the recurrent characteristics are a fourth primitive. I intimated that according to the tradition, the reconstructionist would fill the blank in 2'b with these characteristics. Curiously enough, this seems to be the tradition's view of the phenomena. The disputed terms "are to be viewed as picking out a recurrent attribute of something else. . . . This subject is the receptacle, for only it can be designated as τούτο" (Zeyl 127–28). Thus the statement "This is fire" would predicate a recurrent attribute of the receptacle, and it would seem that what phenomenal fire is is a "compound" of receptacle (2'a) and a recurrent attribute (2'b). But this seems little different from Cherniss's view:

Phenomenal fire is the region of the receptacle that has at any moment been affected by fire, phenomenal water the region that has been affected by water, and so according as the μμήματα [the recurrent and self-identical characteristics] enter into the receptacle. (51b4–6, cf. 52d4–e1).⁶⁷

Prima facie, it seems not only that the traditional and reconstructionist readings agree as to the nature of a phenomenal particular, but also that both are compelled to treat an instance of phenomenal fire as a syllable, i.e., compounded of two primitives. Their disagreement seems to be about the linguistic consequences of assigning such a nature to the phenomena.

Given this view, let us see why Cherniss thinks that the phenomena cannot be distinctively denominated. He continues: "The intensity and limits of the apparent affections of the receptacle are continually changing and so are indeterminable as fire, water, or anything else."⁶⁸ Cherniss, unlike the tradition, does not identify the phenomena with affections of the receptacle, but with the *apparent affections* of the receptacle. He takes at face value Plato's claim that the receptacle itself is never altered by the exits and entrances of the μμήματα (50b6–c2). Therefore we cannot construe "This is fire" as predicating some property of a subject, if we construe the notion of predicating, attribute and subject in the manner of the tradition. *There is no subject* of which the μμήματα are attributes. At best, the receptacle *appears* to be affected or changed by the entrances and exits of the μμήματα. But there is still more to be said. For a defender of the traditional view could

reply that “This is fire” is best read as a *feature-placing* claim, a claim which locates the recurrent attribute at or in a region of the receptacle without committing one to attributions of properties to subjects. Phenomenal fire would then turn out to be denominable by, say, “fiery (or fieriness) here now.”

This reply makes explicit one fundamental difference between the accounts offered by Cherniss and the tradition. Whereas the tradition treats a phenomenon as the affection of *the receptacle*, the first Cherniss quotation reveals that he treats a phenomenon as the affection of a *region* of the receptacle. No doubt the tradition thinks that it is only a region that is affected. However, like the feature-placing construe, it helps itself to this notion of a “region” or “part” of the receptacle. Both presume that the receptacle is demarcated or divided in such a way that one can locate a given recurrent property. But the receptacle does not come cut up and ready to serve.⁶⁹ The reconstructionist does not presume this. While he, as everyone must, treats the receptacle as a primitive, he regards the regionalization of the receptacle as itself a product. The reconstructionist stills maintains that the phenomena are to be analyzed into two components, but he offers a different component than the receptacle (2'a), namely “a region of the receptacle” (2'α). The replacement of the receptacle with a region of the receptacle is a critical feature in the reconstructionist's explanation of why an instance of phenomenal fire is not even a syllable. For if *one* of the two components of a phenomenon is itself a syllable, i.e., a compound of two elements, then the status of the phenomenon itself cannot be that of a syllable. The trick here will be to ensure that the reconstructionist does not introduce a fourth primitive in order to create the regions of the receptacle.

The replacement of 2'a with 2'α also helps in understanding why the phenomena are indeminable or, to put it differently, why the feature-placing account is unacceptable. It simply ignores Cherniss's notion that the “limits and intensity of the apparent affections are continually changing.” This talk of intensity and limits is admittedly vague. Since he later describes these affections as indeterminable, I propose to use his account of the indeterminateness of the affections to get a handle on his claim about intensity and limits.

The tradition and the feature-placing alternative both assume that the affections are determinate. Why think that they are so? If they could appeal to the region in which they occur, they could assign the affections determinate locations. Since there is no explanation of how these regions come to be present, this avenue is closed to them. The source of the determinateness must then lie in the recurrent property. What then accounts for the determinateness of these recurrent properties? The answer is the Forms of which these recurrent properties are *μιμήματα*. The recurrent properties are identified by reference not to the affections they cause, but to the Forms of which

they are copies.⁷⁰ If the affections (or apparent affections) inherit their determinateness from the recurrent properties, and the recurrent properties inherit their determinateness from the Forms, then the Forms, in their interaction with the receptacle, must account for the determinateness of the affection. But they cannot perform this task.

If the affections, apparent or otherwise, are to be determinate, then they must be limited in respect of space and probably in respect of time. The problem is that the receptacle itself is a homogeneous spatial mirror and the Forms are nonspatial. One can infer from these “facts”⁷¹ that the recurrent attributes are also nonspatial. What they derive from their models, the Forms, is logical determinateness: they are determinate property-instances of the very property constituted by the Form. But even though the receptacle can be said to provide space (*χώρα*) for these logically distinct attributes, there is no provision for place, which is necessary if they are to be *locally* distinct or determinate. Being *homogeneous*, the receptacle *on its own* admits of no distinctions, and the nonspatial recurrent properties cannot provide a limit or metric for space. According to the reconstructionist, Demiurgic action is required. The Demiurge delimits the spatial reflections and organizes them to bring them nearer to conformity with the ideas, which are at once their originals and the models of this Demiurgic activity. He delimits these reflections by giving them geometrical configurations, “thus representing spatially the logical distinctness of their non-spatial originals.”⁷²

The reflections or recurrent attributes are consequences of the mere existence of the receptacle and Forms. The geometrical configurations provide for dimensional cross sections of space and thereby provide places for the recurrent attributes to enter and exit the receptacle. An instance of phenomenal fire is the product of the entrance of a form-copy of Fire into a region of the receptacle delimited by the appropriate geometrical configuration. These entrances and exits of recurrent properties do not actually alter the receptacle, so the affections are only apparent. The apparent affections of regions of the receptacle are the phenomena. In claiming that the limits are constantly changing, the reconstructionist has in mind the fact that the basic triangles and corpuscular bodies, i.e., the geometrical configurations, are constantly being reconstituted. The dissolution of a corpuscular body is, at the same moment, the disruption of the “focus of events” that is the entrance of the recurrent properties in that region of the receptacle. Since these triangles provide the spatial dimensions for the recurrent attributes, the spatial dimensions or limits of the phenomena can also be said to be constantly changing.

There is much more to be said about these corpuscular bodies and the Demiurgic activity of delimiting space through geometrical configurations. I shall return to these matters in the final section. Nonetheless, even this limited account of how space is transformed into places suffices to justify the

assertion that the phenomenal particulars cannot be referred to. Particulars are apparent affections of the receptacle. They are apparent because the receptacle is in no way affected or altered by the entrance and exit of the recurrent attributes. *Pace* the tradition, there is no legitimacy to subject-predicate talk at all on this story, because there is no *subject* of a property here, neither the underlying and unchanging particular fire, nor the receptacle. Whenever we try to isolate the particular to describe it, we always confront the recurrent property. We never reach the particular itself. It was this consequence, I believe, which drove Cherniss to assert that the referent of the disputed names is always the recurrent attribute. It was also this consequence that motivated my reconstrual of the demonstrative sentence as a feature-placing account. The problem with this account is that it requires a means by which we can locate the feature in space and time. The tradition overlooks the problem. The reconstructionist, on the other hand, argues that the only means available to delimit space, coupled with the natures of space and the recurrent attributes, yields particulars in constant change.

The derivation of place via the geometrical delimitation of space also explains how we are to understand the reconstructionist's analysis of a phenomenon. The task facing the reconstructionist was to show how (2') a phenomenon could be analyzed into two primitive factors without thereby acquiring the status of a molecule or syllable. The answer is that the first element, $2'\alpha$, is itself a construct of the receptacle and a geometrical configuration. A particular instance of phenomenal fire will then be the occurrence of (2'b) a property-instance of Fire in ($2'\alpha$) a region of the receptacle. The reconstructionist of course will extend this analysis to all the phenomena that the Demiurge will go on to construct. But while it is open to him to argue that the traditional four elements do not deserve the status of syllable because they are compounds of geometrical configurations, the metaphysical thrust of his position is embodied in $2'\alpha$. All body is a construct of the sort specified in 2', according to the reconstructionist. What requires defense is the claim that the creation of place or regions in the receptacle is in fact the product of two primitives. In what sense are the geometrical elements used to delimit space primitives? Before addressing this question, let us examine an alternative account of Plato's metaphysics of particulars, an account which, if correct, would obviate the need to answer this question.

Necessity and Matter

This alternative approach to the metaphysics of phenomenal particulars also considers ordinary particulars to have a status well above that of a syllable. Moreover, it offers an explanation of the delimitation of space that relies on a primitive. Finally, it allows that phenomenal particulars have enough stabil-

ity to enable our words to refer to them. The critical primitive element in this alternative is matter. Unfortunately, a quick perusal of *LSJ* reveals that the Greek word for matter, ὕλη, first occurs in Aristotle.⁷³ Therefore the impetus for the postulation of matter cannot have its source in the occurrence of ὕλη in the text of the *Timaeus*. Rather, its proponents claim, matter is needed to save the doctrines expounded in the dialogue and to ground the philosophical implications of those doctrines. Since there is no mention of matter, and since if the reconstructionist program we sketched above is viable there is an alternative means of saving the doctrines, matter's proponents are staring at a heavy burden: either they must show that their view is so vastly superior that the hints at matter that they find in the text should be regarded as the real driving force behind Plato's doctrines; or they must find some doctrine that requires the postulation of primitive unanalyzable matter. Success in the latter case is more compelling. And scholars have had a favorite candidate that seems to require primitive matter, Plato's doctrine that the cosmos is the product of two causes, Intelligence and Necessity.

The two causes first appear at 46c7–e6. Having sketched an extromission account of vision in terms of the mingling of kindred kinds of fire, *Timaeus* declares that all the preceding is actually an accessory cause (συναίτιον) that the god employs in accomplishing, to the extent possible, the form of the best. Most natural philosophers mistakenly think these materials and material processes are the causes (αἴτια) of everything, not recognizing that νοῦς and λόγος are absent from them. For νοῦς belongs only to soul.

The lover of intelligence and knowledge must of necessity seek first the causes of an intelligent nature, and second as many are the causes of things moved by others and which of necessity move other things. We must act on these principles. We must speak of both kinds of causes, but separately of as many as are, with Intelligence, the makers of fine and good things, and as many as, deprived of Intelligence, bring about on each occasion a chance event without order. (46d7–e6)

The general problem with respect to Necessity and Intelligence is to determine their respective natures and the relation between them. Is each itself a cause of a certain kind of effect; that is, are Necessity and Intelligence independent of one another at any point? For the proponents of matter an affirmative answer to this question is most propitious. If Necessity has a domain that it alone governs, it is likely to consist of matter and its behavior. The *Timaeus* seems to afford two possible domains: (1) the precosmic chaos; and (2) the purely material matters in the organized cosmos such as the transformations and reconfigurations of triangles. The broader claim would be that Necessity alone is the cause of some events in the organized cosmos and (all) events in the precosmos, everything disordered and random.⁷⁴ In the next section I shall consider what happens in the organized cosmos. Until we

decide whether the geometrization of matter requires an appeal to the Demiurge or Forms, and whether Forms, as causes, should be enlisted in the ranks of Intelligence, we are in no position to evaluate Necessity's right to claim any facet of the organized cosmos as falling *entirely* within its domain. The narrower claim is that Necessity is the sole cause of events in the precosmos. This doctrine promises to be the one that most plausibly requires primitive matter. In this section my aim is to show, first, that a precosmic chaos inhabited by primitive matter is not a domain wherein Necessity is the sole cause. Thus the proponents of matter will be deprived of their best candidate. My second aim is to show that a most plausible account of primitive matter suffers from severe *internal* problems. Therefore, regardless of how we view the precosmic chaos or other doctrines propounded in the dialogue, such an account of primitive matter will not do in its own right.

The description of the precosmos at 52d2–53c3 introduces many topics which, if pursued to their logical end, would overextend an already long chapter. Chief among them, at least for the purpose of the debate over matter, is whether the creation is literal or mythical. If the creation is literal, then we can assume that there is a precosmic state and, in all likelihood, some kind of matter in that precosmic state which the Demiurge works up into the cosmos. Hence, if the matter in the precosmic state changes, or if the precosmos experiences state changes in some other fashion, there is some reason to think that Necessity has a domain of which it alone is the cause; for *ex hypothesi*, the Demiurge cannot be the cause of such changes. If the creation is mythical, there is far less reason to believe that there is a domain governed by Necessity alone. The so-called precosmos is one aspect of the present world. Its nature will be determined by a metaphysical analysis of the complex bodies that comprise the physical world.⁷⁵ Chaos would be the behavior of organized bodies that cannot be explained by Intelligence.⁷⁶ There will then be no domain that Necessity alone explains. For the explanation of even this behavior will have to appeal to the *organized* bodies from which it results, and thus the total explanation will include Intelligence. Therefore in order to demonstrate that Necessity has its own domain, it will not suffice to show that *Intelligence alone* cannot explain a given phenomenon in the cosmos. All that follows from this failure is that something else *in addition to* Intelligence is needed, not that something else *alone* must be its cause.

Although I think there is good reason to view the creation as a myth, let us grant the proponents of matter that there is a precosmic state. Granting this, is there good reason to think that Plato regards matter as a primitive element in his ontology? There are two approaches to the nature of this matter assumed to be present in the precosmos prior to Demiurgic intervention. Some have held that the matter exists as (slightly) deformed stereometric particles.⁷⁷ A second approach is to view precosmic matter as “ultimate simples.”⁷⁸ These simples have their own character; each is endowed

with a property, e.g., being fiery. On this second approach, the bodies of the traditional elements are constructions or arrangements of these ultimate simples. On the first, the Demiurge creates the traditional elements by “perfecting” the deviantly shaped stereometric particles.⁷⁹ With respect to the qualities or properties belonging to a traditional element, the two approaches agree that the properties are initially found in the constituent elements. The properties of a fire molecule therefore are not, or at least not directly, the result of a form-copy of Fire entering a region of the receptacle. Nor are the properties emergent: they do not result from the combination or arrangement of elements that lack those properties. This is clearest on the second approach. The many ultimate simples move about in the precosmic chaos and combine and separate by chance. Chaos is said to possess traces of the four traditional elements because *at random* these simples will achieve a geometrical arrangement that resembles the arrangement the Demiurge fashions for the bodies of the traditional elements. What is missing in the chaos is only the regularized shapes of the molecules, not the properties of fire, water, etc.⁸⁰

On this second approach, the ultimate simples are material⁸¹ and they are in motion. In addition, they have a property in virtue of the fact that each images a single Form. Finally, they are eternal.⁸² These eternal, material images of Forms move about through the receptacle independent of and prior to Demiurgic and psychic intervention. The simples, though susceptible to Demiurgic persuasion, combine and dissolve on their own as they move about in the receptacle. Both their random movements and those movements which by chance result, on the very odd occasion, in a likeness of the arrangement of, say, a fire molecule, have as their cause Necessity alone. Here then is the domain of Necessity, the realm where Necessity governs independently of Intelligence.

Matters, I suggest, are not so clear. In seeking a doctrine that requires matter, we turned to Necessity and the literalist conception of the precosmos because it seemed to be free of Intelligence at least in the guise of the Demiurge. But the Demiurge disappears from the discussion well before the introduction of the precosmos at 52d1. He departed with Timaeus’s announcement at 48e2 of his new account of the cosmos. In his stead, Forms play the role of cause. I noted earlier the problem of deciding into which of the two kinds of causes we should enroll them, if into any. If either of these two approaches towards matter in the precosmos is to secure a special realm for Necessity, it cannot allow Forms to enter the ranks of Intelligence. Were they to be enrolled there, we would find that in so far as *ultimate simples have Forms as their causes*, we would lack a realm wholly free of Intelligence of which Necessity is the cause. In like manner, the sponsors of deviantly shaped particles must deny that Forms are an aspect of Intelligence. For the identification of these deviant shapes as deviant requires an antecedent grasp

of the perfected Forms from which they deviate, or at least a grasp of the perfected geometrized bodies which result from the Demiurge's activity.

There is, I think, a more intractable difficulty facing those who would cite the precosmic chaos as a realm where Necessity is the sole cause. It is hard to see how in a chaotic environment there can be any causes and effects. Put somewhat differently, it is hard to reconcile the notions of cause and explanation with the notion of chaos and random disorder. Even if we grant that there are different states or different events in the precosmic chaos, it does not seem possible to identify any distinct events so that they may serve as causes and effects in an explanation. Initially, we are told, the receptacle "had every sort of diverse appearance to sight" (52e1) and was "without proportion and measure" (*ἀλόγως καὶ ἀμέτρως*, 53a8). The stuff which is distributed by disorderly motions is first described as powers (*δυνάμεις*), and then these powers are said somehow to constitute the four kinds (53a2). But in their chaotic state these stuffs are not fire, water, earth, and air, but vestiges of them. We cannot then describe two events, A and B, as distributions of earth, air, fire, and water. If we focus on the potentiality implicit in the notion of *δύναμις*, we are forced to think in terms of the actualities which either the Demiurge will create, i.e., the atomic triangles and molecular bodies, or in terms of the Forms, whose characters (*μορφάς*, 52d6) the receptacle receives. So to conceive them, however, requires that one already have, for specifying events in the chaos, notions that are available only after Demiurgic intervention.⁸³ If we try to do without the notions of order and regularity, and of Fire, Water, etc., made possible by Intelligence, then we cannot identify the random disordered events or states of affairs that Necessity is alleged to cause, or conceive of the two events that are to stand in any kind of temporal order.

Confronted with matter and motions of the precosmos too chaotic to permit individuation, defenders of primitive matter have two avenues open to them. One is to argue that while (1) Plato recognizes that he cannot demonstrate *what is basic*—as to the kind of basic stuff he can only give a likely account—he nonetheless concludes that (2) there must be *some* kind of primitive matter from which the bodies are made. (It is this primitive matter that moves about in the chaos, on this view.) In support of (1), the defenders of primitive matter can point out that Plato denies that the four traditional elements have the status of a syllable. They can also cite Timaeus's disavowal of the necessity to use triangles (53d4–54a6) in an account of the (constitution of the) bodies of the four elements. But even if we grant that all this is true, that Plato knows that he cannot say what is basic, nothing here implies or is evidence that he believed that *some kind of primitive matter* must be basic. The best that one could argue is that he can conceive of the possibility of primitive matter: the proponent of matter avers that even if he cannot conceive of the nature or description of the movements or the two

different distributions of material stuff in the precosmic chaos, he can conceive (of the possibility) that there are two distinct distributions of matter that stand in the relation of cause to effect. But arguments from conceivability to possibility are notoriously difficult to assess. And arguments which rely on the premise that we can conceive of the possibility that something exists even when we cannot conceive of what any such thing is, are even more perilous.⁸⁴

The second avenue open to the proponents of matter is to insist that the ultimate material principles do have some character. Even if we cannot specify its nature or essence, we can say enough about what it is to support the notion that Necessity alone governs its movements.⁸⁵ Philosophical and textual problems block this avenue. First, if the perceived philosophical need is for some natureless entity to function as a building block for the phenomena of the cosmos, we already have a candidate. Timaeus's account of the genesis of the four elements and cosmos utilizes an uncharacterized primitive, namely the receptacle. Were material principles of any sort ultimate or primitive, we would have expected that they be mentioned as the new foundation needed for the account of genesis introduced at 48e2ff. At the very least, we would expect an adumbration of their relation to the receptacle, the foundation actually cited. Needing some text besides the controversial description of chaos at 52d2ff., proponents of ultimate material principles find them in the passage at 49c7ff. They are allegedly what enable us to refer successfully to the phenomena of the physical world.⁸⁶

This attempt to save the phenomena as the referents of our words differs from the one previously canvassed. Whereas the traditional reading utilized recurrent properties and the receptacle in order to provide the needed stability, this reading regards the ultimate material simples as constituents of the phenomena and derives the needed stability of phenomena from the nature of the simples that, at least in part, comprise them. These ultimate simples, not the receptacle, are the subject of the recurrent properties.

In what way, then, are these postulated entities simple? *Ex hypothesi*, they have both a material component and a property. First, the fact that they unalterably and eternally possess their respective characters does not mitigate the conceptual difficulty. Merely to possess a property in this fashion does not confer "simplicity" on the bearer. In the case of the Forms, they too unalterably and eternally possess their respective properties. But this does not constitute their simplicity. The simplicity of a Form, to the extent that the notion is applicable, seems to be derived from the fact that any given Form, e.g., Beauty itself, is the *only* thing that is (Is) beautiful. Moreover, since Forms possess whatever properties they possess eternally and unalterably, that something possesses a character eternally does not entail that it possesses that character essentially. The simplicity of an ultimate material simple cannot, therefore, be derived from the *way* it possesses its character.

Second, when Plato discusses things other than Forms that have some property, G, unalterably and as long as they exist, it is in virtue of some other property, F, which these things have, i.e., in virtue of their essence, that they possess property G “of necessity.”⁸⁷ Being simple and lacking an essence, the ultimate material principles cannot have any other property that would permit this. The proponents of ultimate material simples are, in effect, prepared to countenance denatured matter, which at the same time as it lacks an essence has a character unalterably and eternally. Finally, it might be argued that the simplicity of these ultimate material simples is due to their possession of *exactly one* property, or exactly one property eternally and unalterably. But this defeats the avowed aim of the postulation of matter. Matter’s alleged role in this section of the *Timaeus* is to enable language to hook onto the phenomena. However, on this line of argument, it is not the material aspect of these simples that furnishes the stability, but rather the character it receives from the Form. The singular, unalterable and eternal properties once again allow us to refer to the world. Matter’s role then is not to provide stability for the phenomena, but to be the bearer of the properties which provide the stability. What then leads us to postulate such a bearer? We never confront these simples. What we name are the combinations of simples which configured in certain ways yield the air, earth, water, or fire molecules. These molecules, i.e., the traditional four elements, are particular arrangements of simples that endure for a time. The arrangement is viewed as the property of a “set” of simples. We are justified in applying a name, e.g., “fire,” to one of these arrangements, because even though the arrangement may have altered, “the name still refers to a set of simples of which that arrangement was once a property.”⁸⁸

The arrangements of ultimate material simples are more than just the *bodies* of the traditional elements. Were the arrangement merely some geometrical configuration, we could not properly predicate “fire” of it. We can call the arrangement “fire” because in addition to having the appropriate shape, the arrangement has the property of fieriness. But this property is not a property of the “set” of simples, nor does it emerge from the arrangement. It is actually possessed by the constituent material simples. The properties of at least the molecules of the traditional elements are therefore reducible to the constituent elements of the molecules. The justification for naming the phenomena as we do is grounded in the character of the simples, not in the arrangement. Moreover, by dint of the same reasoning that led to the displacement of triangles as ultimate in favor of material simples,⁸⁹ the actual geometrical structure suggested by *Timaeus* for a molecule of fire will not be necessary for that molecule to be, or to be called, fire.⁹⁰

Whatever we make of the exact role these ultimate material simples play in the justification of our linguistic practices, we discover once again a realm of entities that are alleged to be the domain of Necessity, the random ar-

rangements and movements of simples. And unlike the view considered previously, there seems to be a way of describing these distinct events; for regardless of the subsequent acts of the Demiurge, appeal can be made to the unalterably characterized simples. (Of course, if this is to be certified a realm governed by Necessity alone, we cannot include Forms as part of the realm of Intelligence.) Unfortunately, the very fact that these ultimate material simples move at random provides the best evidence that there can be no simples of the sort alleged.

If Necessity is to have the motions and events of the primordial chaos as its own domain, there must be movements in that chaos not induced by soul. That body is responsible for any motion on its own is not the typical position of Plato. Soul, as *the* self-mover, is the source of all motion (*Phaedrus* 245c5–246a2, *Laws* 894b8–896c4).⁹¹ How then does the motion of pre-cosmic matter arise?

Now concerning motion and rest, if we do not agree in what manner and in what conditions they arise, many difficulties will stand in the way of our subsequent reasoning. Something has already been said about them, but there is this to be added: motion will never exist in a state of homogeneity. For it is difficult, or rather impossible, that what is to be moved should exist without that which is to move it, or what is to cause motion without that which is to be moved by it. In the absence of either, motion cannot exist: and they cannot possibly be homogeneous. Accordingly, we must always presume rest in a state of homogeneity, and attribute motion to a condition that is heterogeneous. Further, inequality is a cause of heterogeneity; and the origin of inequality we have already described. (57d7–58a2, trans. Cornford)

If the material stuffs are to move, they must have heterogeneity, (ἀνωμαλότης). And what causes heterogeneity is inequality (ἀνισότης). This inequality, in turn, appears to have as its cause the fact that Demiurgically created triangles can combine to form triangles of different sizes. By Plato's own lights, then, we apparently must appeal to the Intelligent causes to explain the source of the irregularity that could cause the motions of the matter. It may be objected, however, that in the above passage we are dealing with the motions of geometrized bodies, not the stuff of the primordial chaos. If we wish to examine the motions in the precosmos, we need to look at the doctrine expressed in 52d2–53c3. There the traces of the four elements are said to be unevenly balanced and to lack proportion and measure. As a result, these things move the receptacle, and it in its turn moves them. Might these be motions of matter arising from purely mechanical reasons?⁹² Might the inequality of 58a1 be attributable to the features of the trace elements described at 52–53? I do not believe so. But my purpose in raising this issue is not to determine whether the motions could arise from mechanical

means. It is rather to show that if they are to do so, then these traces must be more than *ultimate material simples*. A simple of Fire must have more than the character, e.g., fieriness, which it comes by as an image of the Form Fire, because these characters as such cannot be the source of the imbalance or lack of measure. Not even if there were more simples of a given kind located in one region of the universe than in another, nor even if the simples were unevenly distributed, would we get any motion. A property instance of Fire is not something to which the property or character of balance or inequality applies. What must be present in the primordial chaos is matter with *density and weight*, stuff that has an absolute metric independent of Forms and the Demiurge. The so-called ultimate simples cannot therefore be simple; at a minimum they are material, hence weighted and sized and shaped, and fiery or watery or what have you.

Ultimate material simples will not suffice if the matter of the precosmic chaos is to be the domain of Necessity. Nor will uncharacterizable stuff prove adequate. The only avenue left is to take the matter of chaos to be Democritean atoms. I find no credible evidence in the *Timaeus* for such a reading.⁹³ Hence, I find no independent domain for Necessity, no way to explain how motions could arise in the primordial chaos, and no doctrine in the *Timaeus* that requires the postulation of primitive matter. Necessity and Reason are distinct kinds of cause. But they are not independent of one another. Necessity can explain only with the help of reason. It is always and truly a co-cause (*συναίτιον*). How we are to understand the relation between them is dependent upon Plato's account of matter. And that account is to be found in his notion that the theory of geometrized space is a complement to the Theory of Forms.

The Two Theories

The relation of the Formal account to the geometrical account is not addressed directly in the *Timaeus*. However, many scholars have indirectly characterized the relation between the two kinds of Forms in their examination of the relation between Necessity and Intelligence. In these discussions matter is once again aligned with Necessity against Intelligence. While it does not, perhaps, here enjoy the status of a primitive, the fact that it is a construct is seldom noted. This failure has, I believe, deleterious consequences for those accounts that would assign Necessity an independent domain. But my concern in this final section is to explore the topic of Necessity versus Intelligence in order to show how *Timaeus* uses the two kinds of Forms to account for the nature of phenomenal particulars.

If we reconsider many of the foregoing arguments against primitive matter, we find that they rely on the assumption that Forms are part of the

realm of Intelligence. This suggests that it might be possible to justify the postulation of matter and to explain the relation between Intelligence and Necessity by allowing Forms to influence matter—that is, by allowing matter to be informed.⁹⁴ In this case, the domain of Necessity will be some subset of phenomena *in the cosmos*, as opposed to the precosmos. There is, I believe, one proviso that any such account must observe: the organization or informing of matter must be free of the influence of the Demiurge. Should the Demiurge be required, we lose the right to claim independence for Necessity. The line demarcating Formal influence from Demiurgic intervention is drawn between the two kinds of Forms Timaeus uses in his account of the cosmos: the traditional Forms, e.g., Fire, Justice, Man, and the geometric Forms, e.g., Triangle, Plane Figure, Pyramid. How and where it is drawn distinguishes the various approaches to the problem of the two accounts.

One influential approach views the world of “earth, air, fire and water in perpetual motion and interchange” as the realm of Necessity. In this world determinate effects follow regularly from specific causes.⁹⁵ It is a world in which there are regular causal sequences, because it is a world in which *matter* has a definite, dependable structure. But this world is too regular and orderly to be governed by Plato’s “Necessity” or “wandering cause” (48a6–7). The element of disorder is introduced by the collisions or conjunctions of these regular causal sequences. These collisions and, a fortiori, their results, are “unplanned.” Necessity is represented by the regular causal sequences involving these well-defined material bodies, chance by the their conjunction.⁹⁶ When Intelligence steps in, certain apparently random collisions of sequences come to exhibit a regularity. The cause of these regular convergences is Intelligence and the production of these convergences and all subsequent constructions based on them constitutes the “ordering” of the cosmos effected by Νοῦς.

Necessity and chance are here *distinct* factors comprising the realm of Necessity prior to the intervention of Intelligence. The regular causal sequences, representing Necessity, seem due to the participation of matter—I assume of differing sorts—in the Forms of Fire, Water, Air and Earth.⁹⁷ The random collisions of these informed elements represent chance. Since Intelligence accounts for the construction of all the regular and beneficial collisions of sequences, and the construction of all the complex phenomena, Intelligence is responsible for a complex phenomenon’s participation in all the other Forms.

The distinction between Chance and Necessity, however, is not found in the *Timaeus*. Moreover, in the depictions of the precosmic chaos, the Wandering Cause and Necessity belie the possibility that these “regular causal sequences” of the elements comprise the domain of Necessity. The passage at 46e1–6 is particularly uncongenial: necessary causes produce a random and disordered effect on every occasion (τό τυχόν ἄτακτον ἐκάστοτε ἔξερο-

γάζονται). But even supposing that we can reconcile the distinction with the texts, the realm of Necessity envisaged by this account is not free from the influence of Intelligence. Consider these causal sequences. A causal sequence is described as “A followed always or usually by B.”⁹⁸ The four traditional elements exhibit this behavior. What is it that they do and how are they able to do whatever they do? The As and Bs are nothing other than the transformations of the traditional elements into one another, the recombinations and dissolutions that produce the liquids, metals, gases, etc., and the processes of heating, cooling, and others of this sort. These are the very processes, however, which *Timaeus* insists are accessory causes, not causes (46c7–d3). Even these, therefore, are to be explained through a collaboration of Intelligence and Necessity. The reason Intelligence is needed is that the explanations of these processes will depend upon the geometrical configurations of the matter involved. The geometrical configurations, in turn, are those produced by the Demiurge. A world of Aristotelian matter observing regular causal sequences is found in the *Timaeus*. It is, however, not the realm of Necessity acting on its own, but the first stage in the Demiurgic construction of the cosmos. It is a stage that this account omits.

A modification of this approach produces a different picture of Necessity’s fiefdom within the cosmos. Like the previous account, this one begins from matter. However, it does not root Necessity in the *regular causal sequences* of precosmic matter. Only when the Demiurge intervenes do we find matter exhibiting regular causal sequences.⁹⁹ The Demiurge, like before, combines materials to bring about purposeful products. What he produces are the phenomenal objects of the cosmos. By and large, these objects are well behaved and have some of their properties in virtue of the properties of their constituent matter. On the other hand, since these objects are constructed from basic materials, they are complex. In their *complexity* Necessity is housed.

Every phenomenal object instantiates a very large number of properties, all of which have causal implications. Hence, any ordering of phenomenal properties, in particular the best one imposed by the Demiurge, will bring with it many side-effects some of which will not be goods and others of which will be positively undesirable. . . . It is precisely these unavoidable collocations of good and bad properties that Plato would call chance.¹⁰⁰

The origin for this view is the *Phaedo*’s account of Forms such as Fire (99b–105b). The world of Forms has a certain structure; Fire brings with it Heat, Snow, Cold, Three, Odd. So too in the *Timaeus* the Forms have causal implications. These implications are first manifested in the nature of the matter or “raw material” that the Demiurge will employ. The different kinds of matter have reliable natures in virtue of the Forms that they image.¹⁰¹ But

Necessity enters only after the raw materials are combined to form complex phenomenal objects. The various properties of the phenomena exclude some properties and import others. Or rather, the properties of the constituents of the complex phenomenon do. Because his material constituents have properties related in such ways, the Creator's power to produce what he will is limited. Sometimes he will have no choice but to employ constituents some of whose properties will work at cross purposes with others of his goals for the object he is building. For instance, in fashioning the human body (74e–75c), he must use bone, flesh, and sinew. In order to protect the body the flesh ought to be thick. But thickness of flesh will result in inflexibility, dullness of sensation and other undesirable features. Given his options, the Creator must choose between these incompatible alternatives: “The constraint is Necessity, which can be referred to the mutual entailments and exclusions of Forms: as Plato says, the Necessity is displayed in the logos or account of the situation” (74e4–5).¹⁰²

Once again, we are asked to accept that matter unproblematically images or participates in the Forms of Fire, Water, etc., or their geometric equivalents. The difficulties begin when some material is made to image a Form such as Man, or Horse. It is unclear, though, where on this reading we are to locate the source of the constraints on Demiurgic activity. Forms, i.e., properties, do stand in relations of incompatibility and entailment; but its relations to other Forms does not threaten a given Form with imperfection. One might look to the joint embodiment of two Forms in a given phenomenon as the source of the difficulty. Yet this too seems impossible: if the two Forms are incompatible, then nothing could instantiate them. So, we must make each phenomenon complex; each “part” could then instantiate one of the incompatible Forms to yield a whole, some of whose properties are incompatible with one another. Adopting this interpretation, we would locate the incompatibility not so much in the Forms themselves, but in their *material* embodiment. If you want or need to use such and such a kind of matter, then you must figure on confronting its properties. Some of these will be suited to your purposes as a craftsman, others will not. You deal with the latter as best you can, never entirely able to overcome their inherent inability to yield to your suasion. Necessity, on this reading, is the result of two factors. On the one hand, there is the contribution of the properties of different kinds of matter that the Demiurge uses in his constructions. These properties are due to the Forms imaged by the different kinds of matter. On the other hand, there is the fact that the Demiurge combines the matter in certain ways, and then combines previously produced compounds into higher-order complexes. The consequences of combining matter are “unavoidable collocations of good and bad properties that Plato would call chance.”¹⁰³

In order to evaluate this interpretation of Necessity, we need to distinguish the combinations of matter that result in *unavoidable collocations of*

good and bad properties from the *unavoidable combinations of matter with necessary characteristics*. Let us start with the construction of the four traditional elements. The Demiurge apparently has a choice of geometric shapes from which to build these elements. He chooses the two sorts of triangles because they will best suit his purposes (53b–e). His immediate purpose, to be sure, is the construction and the transformations of three of the four elements. But he also has more distant plans for these elements. Since they will figure in everything else he will construct, he must assign them now a configuration that will permit them to play a particular (causal-explanatory) role in the subsequent productions. In each and every construction, however, the Demiurge knows which properties the finished product must exhibit: they are those properties present in or standing in an implication relation to the Form of which a given product is an image. Since the Demiurge is necessarily guided by the Forms, he cannot avoid combining the materials with their inherent properties in the manner he does. So, for instance, given the properties of Fire, Air, Water, and Earth, the Demiurge cannot avoid the choice of triangles, once he determines that they best suit his purposes.

After completing this first task, of course, the Demiurge has no choice but to work with the four traditional elements. All subsequent productions, therefore, will unavoidably have collocations of properties bequeathed them by their constituents. The account of Necessity under examination does not, however, think that all collocations are what Plato would call chance; rather, the chance ones are those which combine good and bad properties. But what sense does “good and bad” have here? In each and every case, the Demiurge builds according to his specifications. Since the imperfection or incompatibility does not reside in the Forms, it seems to follow that nothing bad or imperfect can reside in something that images a Form. A molecule of fire, for instance, has the collocation of properties dictated by the Form of Fire. There are, it seems to me, no “bad” properties in the bunch. Similarly, the human body has the collocation of properties dictated by the Form of Man. And similarly, there are no bad properties in this bunch. The only criterion we can apply to distinguish “good” from “bad” in a discussion of the properties of a Demiurgic construction is conduciveness towards realizing his goal. If the Demiurge were to use a component in a construction when there was another component available that was more conducive towards the realization of the goal, then the collocation would be bad. But it does no good here to confuse properties that limit the realization of a goal with properties that, were they present, would make for the realization of a different goal.¹⁰⁴ There is nothing chancy or random about the constituent elements and subsystems of the human being or any other physical object. Nor are there any bad properties. There are only properties that it would be nice to have, if we but could. But we can’t.

The notion guiding the preceding interpretation is that it is necessary that

matter have certain essential properties. The Demiurge is therefore constrained in his actions; he cannot overcome the inherent limitations imposed on him by matter. He may do what he wishes with his materials, but he must work with the materials presented to him. Hence his products can be only as good or as perfect as his materials permit. One flaw in this notion is that it suggests that there is something the Demiurge wishes to craft but cannot.¹⁰⁵ A second flaw is that it ignores the fact that the Demiurge begins his constructions with the geometrical figures. If we are to understand the relation of Necessity and Intelligence, the nature of matter and the intelligibility of the phenomenal particulars, we must consider how the Demiurge does build the world.¹⁰⁶ I have argued that matter, for Plato, is not an unanalyzable primitive. He does not say that the Demiurge geometrizes matter. But I do believe that Plato thinks that it is necessary that there be matter or corporeality. These claims are not incompatible, for something can be necessary or inevitable without being primitive. Adhering to the order of myth within the *Timaeus*, world construction begins from three kinds of unanalyzable primitives, the receptacle or space (χώρα), the Forms and Soul. Matter or corporeality is then viewed as an inevitable consequence of the interaction of these three primitives. That is to say, given the Forms, the Demiurge's desire to generate the cosmos as an image of the Forms, and the receptacle, he has to construct matter. (If one holds that the creation is mythical, as I do, our metaphysical assay reaches these same three primitives and their product, matter, by working our analysis back from the ordinary objects of everyday experience.)

One reason that matter has seemed to some to be primitive is that Timaeus declares that that which comes to be must be bodily (σωματοειδές) and hence visible and tangible.¹⁰⁷ In order to be visible, in turn, it must be composed of fire, and in order to be tangible it must be made of earth. Therefore, the Demiurge, when he began to construct the body of the cosmos, made it from earth and fire (31b4–8). Water and air are soon added, and the body of the cosmos is constructed from the four (32c5–6). Like the previous cosmologists, this account takes the four traditional elements as primitives. When Timaeus offers his revised account at 48e2, it is in part to correct the impression left by this earlier one. But even at 31–32 there are telltale signs that body is not a primitive notion. First, the chain of implications—if generated, then bodily; if bodily, then visible and tangible; if visible and tangible, then made of fire and earth—implies only that anything generated has body, not that body must be primitive. Second, and more significantly, a crucial premise in the reasoning that results in the postulation of water and air as means uniting earth and fire is that the world was to be solid (στερεοειδές). “For if it had been required that the body of the universe should be a plane surface with no depth, a single mean would have sufficed to unite itself and its companions” (32a7–b2).

The *sine qua non* for the construction of the cosmos then is not that we assume as our primitive notions the four elements, but rather that we must assume that depth (βάθος) is present. When Timaeus finally returns to the topic, he reiterates this assumption: the elements are obviously bodies, and all body has depth. And depth, moreover, must be bounded by surface (τὴν ἐπίπεδον περιειληφέναι φύσιν, 53c5–7). Timaeus, then, constructs the ultimate bodies by bounding space with surfaces to form triangles with depth. Corporeality or materiality is not, therefore, an unanalyzable notion. It is the result of the bounding of space. But this construction or analysis of corporeality does not *reduce it* to some other factor (or factors); it results from the bounding of χώρα, but is not a property of either χώρα or the bounding surfaces.¹⁰⁸ It is an emergent property, and because it emerges from the interaction of primitives it is a basic factor in the physical cosmos. Corporeality is basic in that it is irreducible and *ineliminable*. Given the mechanics of the myth, it is necessary that the generated cosmos be bodily. The necessity is then translated to all subsequent, or rather prior, conditionals. If there are to be bodies then they must have depth and, and if there is to be depth, it is necessary that χώρα be bounded by surface.

The central role enjoyed by depth is also displayed in the Demiurge's remarks on the need for the kinds of triangles he first constructs. The half-equilateral and the right-angled isosceles are the most perfectly suited to his purposes, but they are one among many possible starting points. What is required of them all is that they have depth. What distinguishes the two triangles is that they allow for the mathematically neatest explanation of the transformation of the elements and the subsequent constructions based on the elements. By combining and arranging these two kinds of triangles, the Demiurge creates differently sized triangles and then the bodies of the four traditional elements. Since these triangles combine and dissolve in patterns dictated by their sizes and nature, the triangular building blocks of the four elements, combined in the way they are, enable the elements to exhibit the properties and undergo the processes that are appropriate. The properties are not properties of the constituent triangles and hence are not reducible in the strict sense. But neither are they properties of the arrangement of triangles. They too emerge, this time from the systematic organization of the bodies. The emergent properties are those which are appropriate to fire, water, earth, and air, and the molecules and larger bodies composed of the four elements. What accounts for these emergent properties is, in one sense, nothing but the properties of the component triangles and their arrangement; for the triangles and arrangement allow the body to realize the properties appropriate to fire. But *that* the elemental triangles are able to combine in the appropriate way, and *that* they do combine in the appropriate way, results from the Demiurge's activity. Moreover, and more importantly, he constructs them and everything else in the way that he does because the properties of the four

elements and of all subsequent constructions from the elements are predetermined. What he is building is Fire, and what Fire is, the properties that Fire must have, is determined by the nature of the Form Fire itself.

The geometry of matter explains how the bodies of the four elements exhibit the requisite properties, but those properties and the laws, as we would say, which relate them to other properties, are not part of the geometrical account. Thus one cannot make do with just the geometrical Forms in an explanation of the phenomena. One also needs the Forms of the traditional sort. Timaeus himself, as if to head off those who would infer the sufficiency of the geometrical account from the successful construction of the elements, resolutely insists that there is a Form of Fire and all the others which we are always describing as beings in and of themselves (αὐτὰ καθ' αὐτὰ ὄντα, 51c1). How then do the two kinds of Form interact with one another? We begin with the receptacle and the two kinds of Form. The receptacle plays a dual role, first as the place where form-copies of the traditional Forms enter and exit, and second as the space bounded by the surfaces of the plane figures. These surfaces are envisaged as the form-copies or images of the geometrical Forms, parallel to the form-copies or property instances of the traditional Forms. The bounded surfaces yield bodies with depth from which molecules and compounds of molecules will be constructed. The construction of bounded surfaces, triangles, and bodies is simultaneously the delimitation of the previously uniform receptacle or space. Thus in one fell stroke the Demiurge creates body and place (τόπος). These bounded spaces permit the specification of a place in which form-copies are manifested or reflected. The presence of the form-copies in this “field” will confer upon the constructed body its qualitative properties. Thus a molecule of fire will consist of both a cluster of form-copies of Fire (and form-copies of other Forms, e.g., the Hot or the Yellow) and an arrangement of isosceles triangles. *The space occupied by the body of the fire molecule will be the very place in which the form-copies of Fire occur.*

Admittedly there is the air of the *ad hoc* to this coincidence of form-copy and appropriate body. Some of this air cannot be dispelled; it does just happen that the form-copies are matched up with the appropriate bodies. On the other hand, it is not mere coincidence that this set of triangles is combined in such a way that they are the constituents of a Fire molecule. For the blueprint for the physical construction is the very same Form, Fire itself, that generates the form-copies which occur in the place defined by the triangles. The two kinds of Forms, along with the receptacle, thus complement one another. The geometrical Forms allow Plato to create bodies with depth out of bounded space and thus transform space into place, which, in turn, provides a home for the form-copies. The traditional Forms, on the other hand, guide the construction of molecular bodies in that they present to the Demiurge the set of properties that anything that is to be a fire molecule must have. But the complementation goes further. The theory of geome-

trized matter affords Plato a new means to account for change and persistence of particulars, and a way to do so without undercutting his metaphysical tenet that particulars have no properties essentially.

A particular, for *Timaeus*, will be any appropriate material object occupying a region of the receptacle and having properties. The properties of the particular will be a dual function of the form-copies occurring in that region and the properties of the matter whose constituent triangles define the region of the receptacle. The properties of the matter will be those properties we assign to the matter in our division of material versus nonmaterial properties of the object. We are guided in our division by the knowledge of the essential natures of the geometrical (mathematical) Forms and traditional Forms. The material properties of the particular, those explicable by means of the geometric shapes, for instance its power to combine and resolve, its tensile strength and its solidity, afford Plato a means to handle the problem of the persistence of particulars, the problem that, I believe, has motivated many to introduce matter as a primitive into the Platonic ontology.

A particular in the pre-*Timaeus* dialogues seems to be nothing but a bundle of form-copies or properties. One problem for this view is the lack of any rationale or mechanism for grouping form-copies or properties so that they can constitute discrete particulars. A second problem concerns the conditions for persistence: if the particular is identified with the group of properties at a given time, then the persistence of that particular amounts to the continuation of just that bundle of properties. Were there to be a change in any one property of the bundle, say, it were to lose the property of being pale, the particular would go out of existence and a new particular would come into existence. Thus there could be no change in a particular over time, for nothing would persist to serve as the subject of the change in properties. To avoid both problems some have used matter and/or essential properties in their account of Platonic particulars. The matter serving as the subject or bearer of the properties permits the grouping of the properties. And either the matter or the essential properties remain throughout the change of accidental properties, thus affording a persisting feature by which we can identify the particular before and after a change of properties. But to many readers, of course, that particulars possess essential properties appears to be incompatible with Plato's thesis that particulars acquire all their properties through participation in Forms, which alone among entities bear or are essences. As for the appeal to matter, there is simply no indication that Plato, prior to the *Timaeus*, had developed the notion.

The introduction of the receptacle affords Plato a means to handle both problems. To be sure, the receptacle is not the subject or bearer of properties. Nor does it alone provide us with particulars. It is, at best, only one very large particular. If my account of material bodies is right, we avoid both problems. Since the bounded regions of the receptacle are places where form-copies are manifested, we can group form-copies or properties into

discrete bundles. Simultaneously, the bodies constructed from these bounded regions define these places and can thereby serve as the bearers, or at least the apparent bearers, of the properties.¹⁰⁹ Moreover, we obtain an account of particulars bearing properties without committing Plato to any essentially endowed particulars. A particular will be built from material bodies. These different bodies will be subject to change and ultimately dissolution. But so long as they are composed of relatively enduring geometrical configurations, certain properties will remain “fixed.” The enduring material bodies, occupying a constant region of the receptacle, or reasonably contiguous regions of the receptacle, will be the home of the properties associated with everyday particulars. Particulars will persist through changes of property both because some of the matter will occupy the same region(s) or continuous regions and because some properties will remain present through a great many changes. Nonetheless, no particular will be anything essentially: first, because it will possess *all* its properties in the same manner, namely, as form-copies entering the receptacle; second, because the geometrical configurations of triangles and complex figures are all subject to change and dissolution.

This solution to the problem of persistence and the nature of particulars will strike many as too good to be true. Why should just the right properties be instantiated for just the time that matches the persistence of the conjoined triangles and their dissolution? The answer will not please those who insist upon an Aristotelian picture of particulars—that is, particulars consisting of matter and endowed with essences. Plato, however, does not find this picture philosophically compelling. The realm of essence, of what truly is, at least in the *Timaeus*, is the world of Forms. Plato does not think that there is anything about the matter of, say, Aristotle, that justifies predicating the nature or essence of man of either the matter itself or the particular of which it is the matter. For in asking after the nature of man, i.e., in asking what accounts for this matter’s being a man by nature, we are eventually driven back to geometrical elements, which only temporarily take on certain shapes, and eventually to a denatured medium.¹¹⁰ There is nothing attractive about assigning essences to matter. In its place, Plato accepts space and definable properties, his paradigms of intelligibility. All matter, on this account, has properties, and thus can be admitted into a lawlike account of change. The price he pays for coherence and intelligibility is that he is saddled with the inexplicable coincidence of geometrical bodies occupying space and properties entering and exiting the place defined by those bodies. But one metaphysician’s inexplicable coincidence is another’s primitive relation.

Conclusion

We began this investigation by examining whether the phenomena depicted in 49c7ff., as such, were nameable. If Plato has ready to hand the account of

particulars we have reconstructed, does it supply an answer? Yes. The particulars of the tradition cannot be named.¹¹¹ There are no particulars, as such. There is only space and Forms. Even when we construct, or perhaps I should say deconstruct, a particular, we find that we are able to pick out or denominate a particular only through its properties. The sources or bases of the particularity of a phenomenon are the form-copies or *μιμήματα*, the particular property instances of the Forms, especially those instances of the geometrical Forms that provide for the bounding of space. It is the properties themselves, especially the instances of the traditional Forms, which we name, even in cases of demonstrative identification. When we take as our paradigmatic particulars individuals such as you and me, we easily slip into the demonstrative statement of the form “This is Silverman.” But even this is problematic for Plato, since we have no good account of what a person comes to. A Platonic soul, with which I, Silverman, am most plausibly identified, is not necessarily human or always human. “This is a man” is even more problematic, since the matter that is my body is subject to change in all respects. We identify it as my body through the properties it exhibits, for a while. In the case of the four elements, the constancy of the matter is even more ephemeral. The property of fire is what is present to appearance, i.e., is the “phenomenon,” not the triangles. The underlying matter that allegedly possesses that property is a posit at which we arrive at the end of much philosophizing. In the case of the four elements, with whose denominability the passage at 49c7ff. is concerned, the rapidity and frequency of change is great. At their level, it seems likely that the constituent triangles are undergoing a constant process of combination and dissolution. Here, if anywhere, there is the possibility of Heraclitean flux of the most intense variety. But as we transpose to each higher level of complexity, the rate of change diminishes and the possibility of robust flux seems far less likely. To ground the indenominability of all particulars in robust flux becomes an act of faith.

If our reconstruction of Plato’s theory of matter is correct, the grounds lie elsewhere. What renders particulars indenominable are the facts that (1) the geometrical configurations that constitute their matter are always subject to change, although perhaps not all of them change at every moment, and (2) a material body of whatever complexity is itself identified through a property. What makes it true to say of a given particular that it is fire, is not that its matter has (or had) a particular geometrical arrangement. Nor is it because the arrangement is changing even as we speak—at a given moment the arrangement is what it is. Nor is it because a given arrangement is unverifiable. What makes a given arrangement the arrangement of fire is *the presence of a form-copy of Fire*. Put somewhat differently, the arrangement was selected because it best met the specification of the Formal blueprint. For Plato, the answer to the question “What is it to be fire?” is never “To be Fire is to be such and such an arrangement.” It is that *to be fire is to be some unified set of properties*. The physical world is in flux because it is a world of becoming, a

world that clings to existence by being related to the Forms from which its properties derive and to the receptacle in which these form-copies, which are its properties, occur. It is in flux in part because it is generated and to be generated is to be dependent on a cause outside of itself, the Forms. The constancy of flux for Plato is, at bottom, the lack of independence that marks particulars off from Forms.¹¹²

CONCLUSION

In all the dialogues prior to the *Philebus* and *Timaeus*, a particular is *assumed* to be complex and material, and it is assumed that a particular is not what it is in its own right. Rather, whatever a particular is, it is in virtue of partaking of a Form. What is it, then, that participates? As we saw at the end of the third chapter, a particular seems to be nothing but a bundle of form-copies, each of which is the property-instance of a particular. There is no principle of unity to these bundles and each of the properties seems no more and no less entrenched than the next. The loss or gain of a property thus spells doom for a particular: particulars cannot persist through changes. Moreover, a particular does not seem capable of predating the various participation relations in which it stands. Plato's particulars are threatened by a vicious circularity. Each is individuated by and analyzed into its property-instances, but each instance in turn is individuated in terms of the particular whose instance it is. How then can the particular even be a participant? For good reason, it seems, Plato builds a wide gulf between particulars and Forms.

The *Philebus* and especially the *Timaeus* are designed, in part, to meet these difficulties. But developments in the Theory of Forms, especially developments concerning the relations between Forms, are critical precursors to the decisive advances made in these late dialogues. In the Socratic dialogues, the relations between properties are uncertain. The "parts" of virtue are somehow related to one another and to virtue itself; there is some connection between a Form and its *pathe*, e.g., Piety's relation to being god-loved;

and in the *Meno* some Forms are related as determinates falling under a determinable. In the *Phaedo* and *Republic*, along with their emphasis on the essential, monoeidetic nature of each Form, its singularity and separation from particulars, there are vague indications that Forms are related to one another, especially the *Phaedo's* discussion of the clever *aitia* (whose dependence on Forms is uncertain), and the *Republic's* famous claim that all Forms are somehow related to the Good. But absent from the discussion is mention of Forms for natural kinds or the ordinary objects of the physical world, stones, sticks, fire, earth, air, or water.

Beginning with the *Phaedrus* and *Parmenides*, the Theory of Forms becomes increasingly sophisticated. Different kinds of Forms are introduced, ranging from the syncategorematic Forms of the *Parmenides* and *Sophist*, to the panoply of properties, including natural kinds and mathematical notions, sketched in the *Philebus*, *Statesman*, *Sophist*, and *Timaeus*. On the sophisticated account, Forms are located in divisional structures of various sorts, from the genera, species, and differentiae of a Porphyrean tree, to the determinates and determinables of Color and Shape, to the greatest kinds, which straddle the conceptual and metaphysical orders. The relations between the Forms, as displayed in these divisional hierarchies, have consequences for the new account of particulars developed in the *Philebus* and *Timaeus*. So long as each Form is isolated from other Forms, and a particular is a mere bundle of properties, there is no reason to think its possession of any one property is connected to its possession of any other property. The rich structure of Forms occupying the nodes of a divisional schema prompts the development of an account of particulars that allows Plato to model in the particular the relations between Forms.

There are two decisive advances in the *Philebus* and *Timaeus*. First, there is the addition of a new group of mathematical Forms to complement the traditional Forms. Second, there is the *Timaeus's* introduction of the receptacle (and the unlimited factor of the *Philebus*). The combination of the two types of Forms and the receptacle allows Plato to give structure and stability to the particular, to the degree that a particular can be stable.

In the *Philebus*, we find two ontological accounts, The Gift of Prometheus with its traditional Forms and the newer fourfold ontology with its mathematical notions. They are bridged by the transitional passage where the good life for a human is revealed to be a mixture of knowledge and pleasure, a combination of elements from different divisions. The truths of combination heralded in the transitional passage come to the fore in the fourfold ontology. The Gift leaves indeterminate the nature of the particulars, especially those, like man, in the natural kind categories. The fourfold ontology reveals that many of these particulars are mixtures of a limit and unlimited factor. These particulars, in turn, can have other mixtures as properties, e.g., the good life for an individual human is a mixture of a mixture. And though it is only hinted at in the *Philebus*, it is easy to conceive that a particular

mixture could similarly be composed of elements that are themselves mixtures. This account of mixtures, I noted, is importantly distinct from the sense in which a Form located in a divisional scheme can be treated as a combination of elements. The truths of combination involving particulars typically involve elements from two different schemata or categories. At a minimum they are combinations of elements from the genera of the unlimited and the limit. With two different factors involved in its nature, the path is open to assign different properties to particulars in virtue of these distinctive factors: some properties will be had because of its unlimited, i.e., bodily, aspect; some in virtue of its limit; and some in virtue of their combination. And since some mixtures can be built up from other mixtures, Plato can mimic in the account of the properties of particulars the hierarchical arrangement of Forms displayed in a division. In virtue of the kind of mixture he is, directly over Socrates, for instance, will be the infima species Man, and Socrates will have the various properties found in the definition of Man, Rationality, Bipedality, Animality.

When we turn to the *Timaeus*, we again see the two very different kinds of Forms deployed in successive accounts of generation. As in the *Philebus*, the traditional Forms enter first and then are augmented by the mathematical Forms and the receptacle. In the *Timaeus*, the mathematization of aspects of the particular is carried to much greater lengths than in the *Philebus*. Two noteworthy advances achieved in the *Timaeus* are: (1) The unlimited factor from the *Philebus* is itself mathematized. The material ingredients, the opposite qualities, e.g., hot and cold, and all body are assigned geometrical limits. (2) Concomitantly, the receptacle is added as the ultimate recipient of instances of both the geometrical Forms and the traditional Forms. The geometrization of the receptacle permits Plato, for the first time, to develop an account of space such that particulars can finally be located in a spatial and, since the *Timaeus* also develops an account of time, temporal framework. Particulars can now be individuated by their location, thus allowing the differentiation of two Platonic particulars that could be indiscernible with respect to their properties. The two distinct kinds of Forms, or the two theories, are once again responsible for all the properties of the particular. Equally, they also complement each other in accounting for the complex structure of the particular by *combining* with one another to simultaneously provide for the material and qualitative properties of any particular. No longer need a particular be a mere bundle of unconnected properties. First, they are linked in that each appears in a specific region of the receptacle. The regionalization of the receptacle is a function of the exits and entrances of form-copies of certain geometrical Forms. These entrances define places in the receptacle and thus, once adequately developed, allow one to make sense of the fact that numerous properties are compresent in a given particular, i.e., at a given place or region of the receptacle.

But compresence is inadequate to explain why certain properties are regu-

larly instantiated with one another. In order to address this problem, Plato develops his account of the geometrical nature of the four elements and the material bodies of particulars to complement the traditional Forms. Tracking each successive level of (material) composition, there is a simultaneous presence of the appropriate qualitative feature, the form-copy emanating from a traditional Form. Plato does not explain the presence of a form-copy of Fire in the region of the receptacle occupied by the appropriate pyramidal structure. Or better, since any attempt to develop an explanation would require an investigation of his teleology, this co-occurrence is not explained wholly within the two theories. The mixture of theories and Forms serves, rather, to provide for the limited stability of the particular and to show how the hierarchical and complex relations between Forms can be mirrored in the particular. Because it is composed of certain kinds of triangular structures, a liquid has a certain material structure. This material structure, in turn, entails that a given particular has various physical properties. Moreover, because the particular has the material structure dictated by the geometrical Forms, Plato can now better account for two of the notable features of the *Phaedo's* doctrine of particulars, their persistence and their ability to manifest in a determinate fashion the nondeterminate Form. A particular can be said to persist through the exchange of properties in that certain of its properties remain in the appropriate region(s) of the receptacle whereas others depart more quickly, in virtue of the fact that the geometrical structures coordinated with the former are more resistant to dissolution than the structures coordinated with the latter. And because these triangular structures endow the particular with depth, breadth, and solidity, they are capable of "materializing" the Form of the Circle or the Form of Beauty in a determinate manner (see chapter 3).

That the two kinds of Forms are complementary entails that one cannot be reduced to the other. They play distinct roles in accounting for the behavior and properties of the particular, especially within the teleological framework of the *Timaeus*. It is plausible to view one function of the geometrical Forms, with respect to complex particulars, as approximating that of the efficient cause as well as the material cause. In turn, it is equally plausible to regard one function of the traditional Forms as approximating that of the Formal cause. The interplay between the two kinds of Forms is most apparent at the lower levels of the higher-order complex particulars. The triangles are chosen as the *archai* for the generation of the cosmos because they best "enable" the Demiurge to construct the four so-called elements so that these elements can behave in the manner requisite to, for instance, fire. The manner requisite to fire, in turn, is determined by the nature of the *traditional Form* of Fire itself. The Demiurge looks to this Form in fashioning a body appropriate to fire, which is to say that the nature of the Form of Fire determines the phenomena to be saved by the body he will construct. What Fire itself is is thus explanatorily prior to the pyramidal nature of the mate-

rial fire. *Mutatis mutandis*, the same will be true of every complex material construction.

The two different kinds of Forms thus play different but equally critical roles in the late Platonic account of particulars. The geometrical Forms provide a place for particulars to be and provide a way for Plato to construct the body of a particular so as to provide it with structure and stability. The traditional Forms, on the other hand, are manifested in the regions defined by the geometrical shapes and account for the qualitative properties of particulars. Though neither account is adequate on its own to account for all aspects of the particular, Plato thinks that together they suffice. Moreover, they account for all the phenomena without ascribing to the particular any essential properties. Indeed, the interaction of the two theories along with the receptacle provides Plato solid grounds for thinking that particulars lack essences.

In setting out my analysis of the fourfold ontology, I argued that the limit relation obtaining between some ingredients or opposites could not be identical with the Form of the mixture. Even when we posit, on Plato's behalf, that there is only one right relation in the case of each species such that mixtures related by that relation are good members of the kind, the (traditional Form of the) species, e.g., Man itself, can not be identified with a given limit. Limits, especially the ratios and numbers or mathematical limits, can be realized in different media. Conversely, unlimited particulars or ingredients are capable of being wrongly related. While unlimited particulars are unstable, they nonetheless embody some vaguely mathematical relation, just not the right one. For this reason I urged that with proper care we could think of such particulars as bad mixtures. It seems then that a given set of ingredients can admit of different limits or mathematical factors.

With the development of the receptacle, Plato has a perfectly plastic medium capable of receiving any kind of property, or any kind of limit. *Timaeus* is most emphatic about this aspect of the receptacle. Its nature is to be capable of receiving any Form. In order to be truly capable of receiving any Form, it cannot have any intrinsic property, lest that property preclude a Form from "entering" it, or lest it adulterate some property which does enter it. The nature of the receptacle is thus second order: the property of receiving all (first-order) properties. The receptacle serves as the ultimate ground for all particulars. A particular is identified with a region of the receptacle and in virtue of that identification comes to be the kind of subject it is. Insofar as the receptacle is essentially no first-order property, so too no particular is essentially anything. The receptacle in this regard is the theoretical counterpart to the Form of Being in the *Sophist*. The essence or function of Being itself is to provide each Form with its respective and unique essence. Its essence, then, like the receptacle's, is second order: each Form, in virtue of partaking of Being, itself becomes the logical subject it is.

There is a related reason why Plato's late particulars cannot be anything essentially. In his depiction of the geometrization of the receptacle, Timaeus notes that there is no necessity that the elementary bodies be triangular. The receptacle (or space) does not have an intrinsic metric or topology. Plato thus leaves it open that there are different ways to bound space and hence different ways to construct the bodies of the four elements and every higher-order compound. For this reason it is impossible to identify the property of Fire, say, with any given geometrical configuration. It follows that one cannot identify any property with any given material structure. On the other hand, both Platonic space and his late particulars do admit of conditional necessities. Once a metric or a shape has been imposed on a space, certain things follow of necessity. In a parallel fashion, given that a particular is fire, or a human being, he can argue that certain other properties follow of necessity.

Granting that the receptacle cannot be essentially anything at all, and granting that no particular material structure *must* be assigned to instantiate a given Form, is there nonetheless a way to assign essence to a material particular? One final possibility is to argue that particulars acquire an essence by standing in a relation to the appropriate Form. One impetus for such a view are contemporary arguments that particulars can be essentially related to other items. For instance, I am essentially related to my parents and the dime in my pocket is essentially related to the Philadelphia Mint (assuming that necessarily only that mint strikes dimes). Why not then allow a Platonic particular, Socrates, for instance, to have an essence by participating in the Form of Man?

There is much to be said about the various facets of the ancient and modern debates concerning essential properties, and certainly too much for a conclusion to an already long book. But the battleground seems to me to be about two intuitions. The first is the intuition that:

(E) If some particular, x, is essentially F, then it is F not in virtue of its relation to F.

Obviously a supporter of relational essence denies this. Instead she will contend that provided we have a roughly identifiable particular, we can let that particular stand in the participation relation to the relevant Form. Supporters of (E), on the other hand, defend their intuition by appeal to a second:

(R) For x to be able to bear any relation R to something else, y, x must be something in its own right, independently of its bearing R to y.¹

The crucial phrase in (R) is "x must be something in its own right." Supporters of (E) treat this as requiring that what x is in its own right is its essence. Consider a probable Aristotelian metaphysical principle: in order for a typi-

cal particular in a natural kind category to be anything it must be essentially what it is, namely the natural kind to which it belongs. Opponents of (E), on the other hand, argue that while x must be something identifiable, what x is might be any property, or any property that permits identification of x , other than the essential property F , to which it stands in the disputed relation.²

If we take our cues from the contemporary examples, we should be careful to register some disanalogies with the Platonic cases. First, both the mint and my parents, to which the dime and I, respectively, are allegedly essentially related, are themselves particulars. In the Platonic cases, the relation will be to some Form, a universal. Second, there is a difference between *being essentially related to something*, as I am to my parents, and having an essence by standing in a relation to something, as the Platonic particular, *ex hypothesi*, is to the Form. It is an open question whether I, or this dime in my pocket, have an essence. One can deny that I have an essence and affirm that I am essentially related to my parents. Part of the difficulty here is the need to distinguish *de re* essentialism from *de dicto* essentialism. Third, and relatedly, whereas at least in the case of the dime, it is clear that we have a roughly identifiable spatio-temporal continuant that can stand in the relation to the mint, namely, the chunk of metal that went through the press, it is not clear that we have anything parallel in the Platonic case.

Since what x is in its own right cannot be what it is essentially, it must therefore be some accidental property of x , P , to which we appeal for identification. It may follow from this identification that x is essentially some other property, Q . But if this is so, we seem to be within the realm of *de dicto* essentialism. Given that some particular is a human, for instance, it must be rational. But while Plato would not balk at this conditional necessity, or so I have argued, *de dicto* essence is not what defenders of natured particulars seemed to be after. Similarly, if what x is in its own right is merely an accidental property, then we should be able to strip that property from x and still have x . Since we can strip everyone of these properties through which identification is effected from a Platonic particular, we seem to be left with only the receptacle, which cannot stand in an essential relation to any one Form, nor have an essence by standing in a relation to some Form.

The same kind of worry afflicts our consideration of the property F , which allegedly becomes the essence of x via participation. Since x will stand in the participation relation to any number of properties, how is the one that bequeaths essence to x to be distinguished from those that don't? Since x is, *ex hypothesi*, identifiable independently of F , it seems that x can be what it is regardless of whether it partakes of F . But then it can't be F essentially. It looks as though the only alternative open to the defender of relational essence is the *de dicto* route. But this is, I think, no threat to the Plato depicted in the preceding chapters. The Platonic particular remains free from essence in a metaphysical or *de re* manner, for no particular is anything in its own

right. Whatever necessities can be attributed to a particular, are attributable in virtue of the fact that it *partakes* in a Form, i.e., in virtue of the fact that it is accidentally or contingently P, for any property P, and *given the nature of that Form*, certain other properties are also partaken of by x: given that Socrates is a man, then he must be rational, two-footed, and an animal. Essence remains in the world of Forms, for Forms alone remain definable entities.

The *Philebus* and especially the *Timaeus* propound a revolutionary account of particulars in comparison to that found in the early and middle period works. Their account of Forms, on the other hand, is more the outcome of an evolution that begins in earnest in the *Parmenides* and *Sophist*. The thrust of the middle period metaphysics is to isolate Forms from particulars and from each other. Each Form is (Is) what it is, whereas particulars participate and never are. One obvious difference in the *Parmenides* is that Forms can now partake of other Forms. In keeping with the *Phaedo's* initial presentation of the two ways of being, Being and Partaking, I argued that even when a Form partakes, it comes to be characterized by the property it partakes of: just as Helen becomes beautiful by partaking of Beauty itself, so too does any Form become beautiful by partaking of Beauty itself. Since Partaking is a characterizing relation, the number of Forms that a given Form partakes of turns out to be quite limited. A Form partakes of only those properties that any Form will have in virtue of the kind of entity it is, namely a Form. The *Sophist* and *Parmenides* propose a host of such properties, Being, Sameness, Difference, Unity, Plurality, Likeness, Unlikeness, and so on.

Identifying those properties true of any Form in virtue solely of the fact that it is a Form is one of the tasks of general metaphysics. In addition to the *megista gene*, I believe that Plato's commitment to the special metaphysical characteristics of Forms leads him to claim that all Forms partake of the Good itself and Beauty itself. This is to say that every Form is a good entity and every Form is beautiful. Since no Form is a material entity, the characterization of each Form entailed by its participation may well be different from that experienced by particulars. But Plato does think that Forms are beautiful, perhaps in much the same way that mathematicians and logicians attribute beauty to proofs. (Whether mathematicians would grant the same depends on to whom you are talking.) Moreover, given the erotic attraction rational souls have towards the Beautiful, the beauty of Forms also helps to explain our desire for knowledge of them. The manner in which all Forms partake of the Good is even more complicated, involving both the ethical and teleological dimensions.

Since the *megista gene* are inherently abstract or logical notions—the rationale behind Ryle's claim that they are not substantial Forms—in their case characterization is liable to be a function of representing their status as

Forms. In the case of Sameness and Difference, once Plato can establish the logical status of the particular, a given particular can be said to be the same as itself and different from anything else.

Since Forms can partake, and since there are properties that every Form partakes of in virtue of being a Form, it follows that certain Forms will partake of themselves. Thus one novel feature of the later metaphysics is that some Forms are self-participants whereas the others do not self-participate. Beauty, like all Forms, partakes of Beauty, but the Animal itself is not a participant in Animality. On the other hand, I argued that each Form self-predicates and indeed urged that self-predication is the hallmark of what it is to be a Form. By “self-predication,” I mean that each Form stands in a special relation to its unique essence. Self-predication thus captures the notion from the *Phaedo* that each Form, F, is what it is to be F. Since what it is to be F is the essence of F, self-predication represents the thesis that each Form is its essence, or in my terminology, Is its essence. This relation, Being, between a Form and its essence is the basic and fundamental relation in Plato’s metaphysics. What it is to be a Form is to be a Being, i.e., to be related in a particular way to an essence.

In the critical dialogues, Plato augments his account of what it is for a Form to Be, probably in light of his articulation of the way in which a Form can participate. In the *Parmenides*, we learn that a Form is a participant in Being and in virtue of that participation is what it is. This notion is reemphasized in the *Sophist*, where Being, Sameness, and Difference are clearly enrolled in a new and special rank of Forms, the greatest kinds. But despite the fact that Sameness and Difference join Being in this rank, along with, it seems, Rest and Motion, Being still enjoys pride of place. In logical space and time, or in the realm of reason, a Form’s participation in Being is prior to all its other participations. By partaking in Being a Form acquires its unique essence; that is, it comes to be a logical subject. Once it qualifies as a logical subject, it *then* follows that a Form is the same as itself and different from all other Forms (and everything else that can be said to be). In this respect, Being itself cannot be treated as a first-order property, such as Existence, for by partaking in Being the different Forms acquire their unique and different essences. Being thus becomes, in the *Sophist*, what I refer to as the Essencing relation. Precisely in this respect, Being and the receptacle are alike: each serves as a second-order property required by reflection on the metaphysical enterprise. The receptacle cannot have any (first-order) property or essence. Its nature, rather, is to be capable of manifesting or receiving any property. Being, in turn, cannot itself have any first-order property or essence. Its essence, rather, is to bequeath essence to any and every Form.

The peculiar status of Being and the receptacle, along with the introduction of the *megista gene*, indicate that Plato has coupled his attempts to save the phenomena of nature, which led to the postulation of the Theory of

Forms, with inquiries into the nature of metaphysical inquiry itself. The receptacle is the product of bastard reasoning, a postulate made in order to account for the possibility of participating particulars that can occupy a spatio-temporal framework. The peculiar nature of the receptacle is the result of Plato's adherence to his metaphysical program, not the inevitable or only way to admit particulars into a metaphysical account. Not only were alternatives such as Aristotle's known to him—I assert this without justification—but he could have postulated matter as a primitive and allowed for material continuants to engage in participation with Forms. Instead, adherence to his Theory of Forms and to the idea that particulars lack essence prompts him to embrace the receptacle, wherein particulars are loci of form-copies and thus essentially nothing at all.

In a similar fashion, reflection on his metaphysical inquiry, including his conception of what it is to engage in metaphysical inquiry, prompts Plato to articulate the sorts of Forms that are necessary in order for metaphysical inquiry to be possible. As Ryle noted, one role played by the *megista gene* is to make possible different kinds of judgments. While Ryle, I claimed, went too far in asserting that Sameness, Unity, Difference, and Being are merely forms of judgments, his insight into Plato's increasingly sophisticated awareness of the nature of language and thought is important and accurate. Forms, Parmenides tells the young Socrates just after a determined series of objections about participation have been put to him, are required if dialectic is to be saved. Plato never questions whether dialectic or, broadly speaking, thought and language are there to be saved, for what he is engaged in at the present moment is thinking and speaking. The *megista gene*, along with certain other Forms introduced in the *Parmenides*, are properties needed for the required salvation. And since language and thought are part of nature, the fact that they are required to save certain natural phenomena justifies their postulation as Forms. Their status as greatest kinds is not due then simply to the fact that they are widespread, i.e., that they are widely participated in by other Forms and particulars. They are greatest kinds also because they are required for metaphysical (and all other types of) inquiry and because they allow the postulated Forms and particulars to play the sorts of roles required of them by Plato's special metaphysical theory. They are formal conditions on Formhood and, therefore, derivatively apply to particulars, souls, and everything else in a fashion appropriate to each.

Forms are required if there is to be thought, language, inquiry, and knowledge. Plato never doubts whether there is knowledge. From the early dialogues attention to the craft analogy, to the *Phaedo's* introduction of Forms as the *auto kath' auto* objects of a soul which is itself by itself, and then to separation and the Method of Collection and Division, the knowing activity of the soul is assumed and Forms, or *ousiai*, are its objects. To account for the nature of the rational soul and its ability to know, Plato introduces the

Forms of Motion and Rest and assigns them to the ranks of the *megista gene*. Every Form, in virtue of being the sort of thing it is, partakes of Motion and Rest. Hence, Motion should partake of Rest as well as Motion and similarly Rest should partake of Motion as well as Rest.

I suspect that no amount of labor will explain away to everyone's satisfaction the apparent denials of this possibility in the *Sophist*. In partaking of Rest, Plato does not mean to indicate that a Form is not moving through space or in time, since Forms are not in space and time. Nor does it mean that Forms are free from alteration or generation or destruction in the manner of particulars, though they are free. When introduced in the Battle of Gods and Giants, the Rest at issue is freedom from affect when a Form serves as an object of knowledge (or thought or language). The same line of reasoning, I argued, compels Plato to postulate a form of Motion. It is much harder to see what it would be for a Form to partake of Motion. Certainly a Form is not subject to change of properties, translocation, or generation and destruction. But we need not and should not view it in terms appropriate to describe the motions of particulars. Motion, like Rest, is introduced to "save" psychic (self-)motion, and in particular the form of psychic Motion that is rational activity. The Form of Motion is neither identical with soul nor with knowledge. Rather, Motion seems to be responsible for explaining how Forms can be the objects of the rational soul in so far as the self-moving soul communes (*κοινωνεῖν*, *Sophist* 248a11) with Forms in thought and language. Motion allows Forms to serve as the object of knowledge. Since all Forms can be known, including Motion itself, all Forms partake of Motion. Since Rest, conversely, is responsible for the imperviousness of those same Forms to being altered by this communion, they are correlative notions and, moreover, notions introduced, like Being, Sameness, and Difference, in light of reflections on the phenomena of thought, language, and metaphysical inquiry.

If the Form of Motion explains how Forms can be known, that is not its only function. Obviously it must somehow be connected to the motions of material particulars. The likely bridge between these two functions is Plato's idea that a soul is a self-mover. It is beyond the scope of this book to detail how psychic self-motion initially sets Timaeian bodies into motion such that Necessity can be said to be an accessory cause of certain subsequent movements of bodies. It is equally beyond the scope of this book to explain the relation between the Form of Motion and the nature of a soul as a self-mover. Plato assumes that such souls are primitive beings in his metaphysics. Indeed, I think he believes that no metaphysical theory can do without them, for the same reason he thinks that Forms must be part of any metaphysical theory: self-moving souls are required if there is to be knowledge.

In my introduction I spoke of the tension felt by a realist in considering the status of properties such as knowledge, thought, and language. Their

claim to be seems dependent on the presence of, and practices of, rational souls. Plato never wavers from his assumption that there is knowledge, and he wields this assumption against his rival metaphysicians. If there is metaphysical inquiry, there are souls and Forms. This is the moral of the argument of the Battle of Gods and Giants. No metaphysical inquirer can, consistent with being a metaphysical inquirer, deny that there is knowledge or Forms. Arguments of this kind are notoriously difficult to make out.³ They are, however, part of the lifeblood of philosophy, whether they are called “self-refutations” or “transcendental arguments.” If successful, they show that metaphysical inquiry requires that there be knowledge and its objects. Of course, that there is such inquiry seems to be a contingent matter and hence the grounds for accepting that there is knowledge and its objects are equally contingent. In this respect Plato can conclude that Forms are conceptually necessary entities demanded by thought. If Plato believed that in virtue of being conceptually necessary they are also metaphysically necessary, then they are necessary beings, full stop.

If there is knowledge, then, Plato believes, souls must be self-movers. Given the nature of soul, he also thinks that souls are necessary beings, beings that must be or exist in virtue of the kind of thing they are. This argument, as the history of philosophy shows, is also difficult to make out, since it turns on inferring existence from essence. But in this respect it exhibits a pattern of reasoning that has great appeal to Plato, who assumes that essence implies existence, to the extent that he recognizes existence. These are not separate notions for Plato, and their separation is another version of the separation of the metaphysical from the conceptual. This intuition concerning essence and existence holds for all Forms. Plato’s Forms are essential unities, and in virtue of being what they are, are. The unity of the Form, its identity with its essence, is part of its very being qua Form. These are conclusions reached by very general inquiries into the nature of Being and essence (*ousia*). His reasoning concerning a Form’s unity and identity with essence leads Plato at times to a picture of knowledge as intuitive and ineffable, matching the unitary, nondiscursive essence of the Forms.

But other reflections show that a Form cannot be simply and solely its essence, for in virtue of being identical with its essence every Form must be, i.e., partake of, other Forms. Further reflections on how human souls pursue, acquire, and express their knowledge lead to the requirement that one who knows be able to give an account of what he knows. The Method of Hypothesis, the ascent of the divided line, the Method of Collection and Division, the fourfold ontology, and the complementary theories of geometrical and traditional Forms all suggest that in thought and learning Forms are related to other Forms. But the metaphysical unity of essence and Form demands that only the essence as a whole is predicated of the Form. Only in our thought, language, theories, and definitions are the “parts” of essences

(linguistically) predicated of Forms. Besides partaking of Being and the *megista gene*, Forms stand only in conceptual relations of compatibility, incompatibility, and implication with other Forms. The metaphysically simple Forms are also manifested as wholes in the many particulars that partake of them: Socrates is a man in virtue of partaking in Man itself. On the other hand, the ontological accounts of the *Sophist*, *Timaeus*, and *Philebus* show why it is that a given Form, e.g., Man, is found in the material particulars along with the other Forms that figure in its definition, as well as with Forms from other divisions. The essential unity of the ontological essence, the product of metaphysical inquiry, is at odds with the complexity of the linguistic definition, equally the product of the inquiries in which Plato is engaged. Here too there is need to separate the conceptual from the metaphysical, the linguistic predicability of the parts of the definition from the ontological impredicability of the parts of the Form itself.

For Plato, then, separation, a hallmark of his philosophy of Forms, comes in many forms. There is the separation of Form from particular, of Form from Form, and finally of Form qua being from Form qua object of inquiry and knowledge. The contingency or relativity ascribed to Plato's Forms because they are the result of rational reflections on the nature of metaphysical inquiry is paralleled today in conclusions drawn in the debate between Realists and their opponents. To us rational inquirers, the general nature of Forms or Universals, as well as their definitions or essences, appear irremediably relative in that we are rational inquirers whose inquiries are themselves relative to the peculiar interests and ideologies with which we pursue them. The flexibility of our inquiries, the many different approaches that seem at least equally worthwhile and successful, suggest that we cannot live with Plato's Forms or Real Essences. And yet *we* seem unable to live without rational inquiry. And everywhere we turn in our inquiries we find that we confront entities that must satisfy the same demands as Forms must satisfy for Plato: fixity of content and the essential unity of the definiendum and definiens. Perhaps the necessary existence of Forms or properties turns on the fact that we are rational creatures. Certainly Plato thinks that wherever we turn in our rational inquiries we find them. If reflection reveals that we cannot live with them, it also reveals that we cannot live without them.

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APPENDIX

Different accounts of the transformation of Socratic into Platonic metaphysics divide into the metaphysical and the epistemological. In this appendix I want to consider the epistemological account of Terry Irwin (and Gail Fine)—one of whose origins is Owen's studies of the *Peri Ideon*.¹ A feature of the account is its bold thesis that in the middle-period dialogues there are only a limited number of Forms, what are referred to as Forms for Incomplete Properties. Finally, their account offers an explanation of why Aristotle levels some of his charges against Plato's Forms, and in particular why he thinks that separation is so problematic (see chapter 4, section 2).

The account begins by considering the different properties that appear in the early dialogues. These properties fall into three rough groups. In group A we find properties like being a bee (*Meno* 72). In group B we find properties such as health, largeness, and strength. In group C we find virtue, justice, and other moral properties. The basis for dividing properties into these kinds is that we cannot, or cannot easily, *settle disputes* about the C-properties. We can settle disputes about B-properties. About A-properties there are apparently few disputes. The original motivation for the division is thus epistemological.² This division is described in at least two of the early dialogues. *Euthyphro* (7a) is a stage in the argument against Euthyphro's contention that the god-loved is what the pious is. The crucial point in this stage is the concession that the gods quarrel. The different kinds of properties are found in the contrast between what the gods quarrel about versus the sorts of things that we, and, by implication, they can readily determine and agree upon. We can calculate, measure, and balance different things to settle disagreements about weight, size, and quantity. Not so if we try to settle disagreements about justice, fair and foul, good and bad. Here there is no adequate judge or means to decide disputes (7d4). Hence it is inferred that the gods quarrel about these properties: some think some things good, others consider the same things bad. Euthyphro's definition cannot be right because it would result in the claim that the same things are pious and impious, since they are loved by some gods and hated by others.

The difference between properties is not a difference in the way something possesses the two kinds of properties. Agamemnon's golden mask weighs one pound, say, and is beautiful. It is characterized by these two properties. The difference is epistemologically driven. The dispute is, on the face of it, about *which things* are good or bad, or how much they weigh, or which is larger. But about the B-properties, there is no attempt to decide what largeness is or what size is. Rather, the devices used to settle disputes adjudicate which things weigh how much, or how tall, or how fast they are. The quarrel about good and bad, on the other hand, is only ostensibly about

which things are so, since the basis of the dispute is that different individuals have different views of what *makes* things good or bad. Herein lies the problem, according to Irwin. We cannot agree with one another about the definitions of moral and value notions, and we cannot find definitions all of whose elements are themselves not subject to dispute. We long for a measure that would tell us how to calculate moral notions, as a craftsman's level would settle disputes about the flatness of a surface. But we have none.

The second passage that contrasts virtue with other properties is from the *Meno*. First, we find the property of beehood, whose essence is what makes bees bees, contrasted with beauty, size, or other such properties by which bees differ from one another (72b). Then Meno is asked whether virtue alone differs from man to woman and so on, or whether health, size, and strength do too. Shape and color are also discussed. To which group they should be assigned Irwin does not say. The thrust of these distinctions is that we can figure out empirically, or mathematically in some cases, the size of various things, how much they weigh, which one is heavier or lighter, which is larger, and so on. We can also devise tests to determine speed, strength, and perhaps even health. Finally, there is even a nod to the ordinary opinions of people. We don't dispute about bees. Nor do we dispute about color and shape. But as the discussion of color and shape reveals, the absence of dispute does not rule out alternative definitions of properties about which we might either dispute or be ignorant. Similarly, we cannot say what beehood is though we recognize bees. It is too strong even to say that we share beliefs about what a bee is, though no doubt we could say many of the same things about bees. Indeed, however we test to settle disputes about speed or size, these tests do not explain what size is. Nor are they said to. For Irwin, these tests allow us to contrast B-properties with the virtues.

Along with the expanded number of properties, the *Meno* raises questions about definitions. We saw (chapter 2) that the dialectical requirement suggested that good definitions must take into account what is known or intelligible to an interlocutor. This requirement certainly lends itself to the epistemological account. It seems safe to say that properties about which we do not dispute seem to be (easily) defined in terms everyone understands. The point of the division of properties is to suggest that we can readily determine through observation what is and is not a bee. It also is true that unlike the C- or even the B-properties, these A-properties seem to form a special class. They are the essential properties of particulars.

But to choose bee as an example of a special class of properties, in contrast to both moral properties and B-properties such as size, shape, and even health, i.e., all the easily decided properties from the early dialogues, is to change tack. For the contrast between essential and nonessential is coupled with a further epistemological distinction now designed to show that B-properties are suspect. The condemnation of the senses at *Phaedo* 65ff.,

according to this view, calls into question accounts of properties based on or comprised of “sensibles” or “observation” predicates. The problematic properties mentioned in the *Phaedo* include B- and C-predicates. These are “inaccessible to the senses,” though why they are is not stated. But the reason is not far to seek: A-predicates are not mentioned, Irwin says, because “An A-predicate is associated with the same correct set of descriptions by everyone, but a C-predicate is associated with different sets of incorrect descriptions by different people, though each set still preserves the outline of the C-property” (147).³

The next step in Irwin’s argument explains why there is this same correct set of descriptions in the case of A-properties and simultaneously accounts for the problem with B-properties. Appealing primarily to the finger passage at *Republic* 523ff., Irwin argues that the senses mislead us about size, shape, color, heat, and the other B-properties. On the other hand, they do not mislead us about fingers, nor, by implication, about bees, humans, or other A-properties. (C-properties will return momentarily.) One might wonder what happened to the decision procedures available in the early dialogues. The problem is that the senses report the same thing as large and small. Sometimes this thing is a finger but at other times what is large and small is a definite length, e.g., three inches long. The senses thus confuse largeness and smallness and to distinguish them reason is summoned. Reason seeks definitions to answer the question “What is largeness?” We do not need to summon reason in the case of A-properties, then, because the senses give “adequate answers” to the question “What is a finger?” They do so because “. . . [W]e can decide when something is a finger by a fairly uniform set of observations, and settle doubts by further observation” (148).

The decisive shift in this passage concerns B-properties. Whereas in the early dialogues measurement could settle disputes about what is larger than what, it is incapable of answering the “What is largeness?” question. Indeed, if we look back on the early dialogues, this question did not arise; for no one would think that a ruler could settle what largeness is, or a scale what weight is. They merely measure it, without asking what it is. But the Socratic dialogues do show that these questions are legitimate, even if Socrates did not worry them to the degree he worried about the definitions of moral properties. If we follow Irwin, then, either we have to conclude that Socrates mistakenly thought that measurement could settle disputes about what a B-property is, or we have to accept the idea that Socrates thought that we could determine what the definition of a property is from observation. This is surely more plausible, especially if it means that Socrates thought that we could observe material particulars and learn what Justice is. Plato would then be denying what Socrates believed, namely that the essence of Justice was to be found in particulars (as well as in the Socratic property).⁴

But this is not Irwin’s point. He, rather, thinks that observation yields an

account of what something is in that certain properties are “accessible to the senses,” and the account of what bee or largeness is will consist of these sensible properties. It is as though observation reveals a constant and consistent set of properties such that we can say what a bee is, e.g., striped body, winged, has a stinger in the rear, buzzes, and so on. These are, it seems, all observable properties. The problem with B-properties is that no cluster of properties will be constant. There is no “uniform set of observations” to decide when something is large because we need to know in the case of each thing “the relevant standard of comparison.” The ruler can tell us that the flagpole is taller than the tomato stake, but lacking the relevant standard it cannot tell us that it is a small, large, or normal-sized stake. Observational properties do not reveal standards of comparison.⁵

Irwin’s remarkably systematic account requires that one read the critical passages of the *Meno* and *Republic* with a narrow focus. We have seen that the initial division of properties in the *Euthyphro* does not include the critical A-properties for which observation supplies an adequate account. In fact, *nowhere* does Plato say that observation offers an adequate account of Irwin’s A-properties. In the *Meno*, the bee example is introduced when Meno has offered a swarm of virtues in answer to Socrates’ query about what virtue is. Meno agrees to Socrates’ claim that bees differ from one another in beauty, size, etc., but not insofar as they are bees. Socrates then asks whether Meno could say what this same property is that all bees share. Although Meno claims to be able to, *he never goes on to answer*, and there is no hint that the answer would be in terms of an agreed upon set of descriptions or a uniform set of observations. Indeed, given that Meno falsely believes that he can provide a similar answer to Socrates’ query about virtue, it is more reasonable to infer that he cannot define bee either (73c1–5). When we turn to the *Republic*, we do not find that the senses settle disputes about fingers or furnish a uniform set of observations to “decide when something is a finger.” Rather, we discover that the *question* “*What is a finger?*” *is never raised* on the basis of sensory reports. This passage, then, does not entail that the senses provide us with an acceptable *account* of what a finger is.

Our survey of the early and middle dialogues reveals that Irwin’s three classes of properties do not function in the ways he describes. The decision procedures do not provide answers to “What is it?” questions involving B-properties, but rather tell us about particulars which have B-properties. The race tells us who is quicker, not what Quickness is. Perhaps Socrates thought that the definition of some B-properties, e.g., Quickness, or Shape, an easier task than the definition of moral properties. But there is no means to resolve disputes about the correct definition of these B-properties. He never says how we are to arrive at their definition. The same is true of Irwin’s A-properties. Nowhere in the early and middle dialogues does Plato or Socrates define a natural kind term. In their case, moreover, though there ap-

appears to be widespread agreement about who is a man, or what is a bee, or a finger, there is no hint that he thinks their definition an easy task or that a correct set of descriptions is widely agreed upon. The most that Irwin shows about them is that at an *initial* stage of a reflective life they do not cause one to ponder what the senses are reporting.

Irwin's division of properties is a prolegomenon to his account of flux and separation of Forms in the middle dialogues. According to him, we can see how Aristotle's report on the origins of separation follows naturally from problems afflicting B- and C-properties. The problems have to do with two kinds of change, each of which has a legitimate claim to be the referent of the doctrine of flux:

1. S(= self) change: at time t_2 x is more or less F than it was at t_1 (e.g., it becomes hotter than it was, or moves further from y than it was).
2. A(= aspect) change: x changes from being F in one respect to being not-F in another (e.g., x is big compared with y, small compared with z). (148)

Irwin thinks that “. . . [A] doctrine of A-change in sensibles follows naturally from the problems with B- and C-properties” (149). The key element in Irwin's explanation of flux and separation is the thesis that the difficulties of flux concern not the sensible particulars, or not directly the particulars, but rather infect what he calls “sensible properties.” He remarks that Plato wants to distinguish observation—and I assume observational or sensible properties—from “examination and interpretation of what is observed”—the non-sensible or “theoretical” properties. But he never provides any criterion by which Plato does distinguish them, nor does he ever say how he would do so. It seems that Irwin accepts as a sensible property anything anyone in a dialogue says he sees, hears or senses in some way, from beauty, to goodness, to being a finger. On the basis of what speakers say in the dialogues, virtually every property is treated as sensible, at least before reflection. But the ordinary conversations of the dialogues are no better a guide to what Plato thinks to be sensible than the language of conversation, or newspapers, or television is for present day accounts of sensible properties. In a philosophical account of what is and is not definable and in what terms, we are concerned with terms of art, not the terms of everyday conversation.

Be that as it may, Irwin's aim is to show that flux is a function of A-change in properties. The difficulty arises not from the particulars or the examples—all agree that Aristides is just and that the Parthenon is beautiful—but when one tries to define what Justice is or what Beauty is. As he views *Republic* 523ff., 476ff., and key passages in *Phaedo*, problems set in when we try to define these C-properties and B-properties in terms of sensible properties. The problem is that sensible properties suffer A-change: burying our parents and being buried by our children, a sensible property for

Irwin, suffers A-change in that it is sometimes admirable and sometimes disgraceful; being three feet long is in some things small and in others large. Thus the attempts to define largeness as being three feet long fail. As Irwin reads the finger passage (149), problems will arise if we rely on sensible properties to understand largeness: “for they always present largeness confused with smallness, and reasoning is required to find the right principles for distinguishing the two properties.”

This account again pushes the Greek to the limit. First, the properties under consideration at this point in the dialogue are limited to those closely allied with the senses themselves, e.g., thick, thin, large, small, hard, and soft. This seems to militate against including under the umbrella of “summoners” other B-properties such as health, or quickness. Second, there is little textual support for the claim that the senses *always* present largeness confused with softness, or any other pair of properties (but see 524e2). Plato does say that the same sense is necessarily set over each pair, but he constructs a special situation to exhibit a confusion wherein the sense reports that “the same is hard and soft.”⁶ Third, Irwin’s “always,” as well as his general interpretation of this passage, downplays the developmental aspect of the finger passage. Not only do we discover that other matters summon the mind, but there is the possibility that once the mind has been summoned, we are no longer always confused by even the circumstances which on first encounter led to the summoning of mind. This is critical, for Irwin notes that if the opposite aspects can be easily distinguished, then A-change is “useless for Plato’s purposes” (149). Finally, there is no evidence that what we have here are senses giving accounts of any of these properties. It is the mind, once summoned, that asks after the being of hardness and softness, and especially one and the numbers. (The goal of the discussion, it will be recalled, is to introduce number and arithmetic as a science which summons the mind. Even it is just a preliminary study in a whole sequence of studies.) It seems, then, that the problem is with the examples, not the accounts.

Let us accept for the moment that there are Irwin’s three kinds of properties and that there is a group of properties that we can usefully classify as “observational.” In what sense does A-change in them capture the notion of flux in Plato? Since the observational or sensible properties are meant to be accounts of, i.e., definitions of, B- and C-properties, Irwin has to insist that they are offered as definitions in the dialogues. He thinks that the arguments of the *Hippias Major*, and especially the sight-lovers in *Republic V*, show that some have tried to define Beauty in this manner. Since the sight-lovers explicitly deny that there is one Form, the Beautiful itself, they do not try to define Beauty. Hence Irwin must allow that they offer many definitions, each of which relies on some observational properties. It seems to me an odd reading of Plato to think that he accepts conclusions about the nature of definitions of critical properties on the basis of mistaken definitions of these

interlocutors. The fact that they fail would suggest nothing about Plato's views, unless their failure can be traced to Platonic motives. This Irwin attempts to do by introducing the passages in *Phaedo* and *Republic* concerning the failure of the senses to report what anything is. The success of this step, in turn, depends upon: (1) how we view the role of the senses in Plato's account of the recollection and definition of Forms; and (2) how plausible an account of the deficiency of the sensible world Irwin can provide. About (1) I have argued that Plato assigns no role to the senses in determining answers to "What is X?" questions. The mind alone asks and answers these questions, and there is nothing in the dialogues that dictates that certain kinds of properties, i.e., so-called sensible or observational properties, should be ruled out. Indeed, if we allow that fingers and heads are "sensible properties," then so too we should include wings, number, heat, and cold. But these are all observational properties, at least according to the criteria provided by Irwin.

The real crux is (2). For Irwin, the primary site of aspect change is the property type, not the particular. Irwin is careful to say that sometimes it is the particular that suffers aspect change, just as he is careful to distinguish those properties that are legitimately relative, such as largeness, from those such as bravery or justice which seem not to be incomplete in the same way. For him, the problem is not whether Leonidas was brave, or Socrates at Potidea—they clearly were—but with offering as an explanation of what makes them brave a property type, such as standing firm in battle, which is apparently an observation term. In these property types there is a problem akin to, if not the same as, the difficulties which afflict accounts of beauty that appeal to particulars, namely that *opposites are compresent*. In the case of the beautiful maiden, it is easiest to understand the objection to concern a single woman, à la Heraclitus's Helen: she is beautiful compared to other mortal women but not beautiful compared to Aphrodite. The same pattern applies to the equal sticks of *Phaedo* 74, at least if we concentrate on the sticks themselves in comparison to other sticks: stick A is equal to stick B and unequal to stick C. This is how the passage is typically read. But Irwin sees it slightly differently.

For him, the problem is better viewed in terms of the actual size of A. Let that be three feet. The problem is that, were we to ask what makes this stick equal, one is liable to cite its being three feet long. This would be equivalent to thinking, in the case of the fingers of *Rep.* 523ff., that the middle finger is largeness and the middle finger is smallness, or, rather, letting the finger be three inches long, that smallness and largeness is being three inches long. But no one in the dialogues makes claims like this. The sight-lovers and their ilk do not think that being brightly colored is what beauty is, for they deny that there a single form of Beauty. So it will do them no harm to point out that being bright colored fails to make everything beautiful or that it in fact

makes some things ugly. They never claimed that it was universally responsible for beauty. They maintain only that it makes this particular item, say, the Temple at Bassae, beautiful.⁷

Let us grant that someone might offer sensible properties as definitions of Beauty and other B- and C-properties and that Plato is warning us off this project. Still, it is unclear whether Irwin's account of flux is viable. The key notion is that sensible property types also suffer aspect change. But, unlike particulars, they are not relativized to time, or perspective, or other properties.⁸ In their case, aspect change is a function of the opposite effects they produce in different particulars, e.g., Bright Color suffers aspect change insofar as it "changes" from "being beautiful in x to being ugly in y" (152). In other words, the sensible property type, e.g., Bright Color, is F and not-F, beautiful and not-beautiful, because it makes some thing(s) beautiful and others not-beautiful. It is best to embed these definitions in terms of sensible property types within a "Some think that." For nowhere do we find evidence that *Plato* is prepared to assert that Bright Color makes things beautiful or accounts for the beauty of anything. Indeed, all these definitions in terms of sensible properties are mistaken. What does emerge is that there are cases where a physical particular is both beautiful and bright colored and other cases where a particular is ugly and bright colored. A putative definition in terms of bright color would then be rejected for the familiar reasons, e.g. the definition is too narrow or too broad, admitting too many candidates or excluding candidates it should admit.⁹

In order to assess the viability of his account, let us try to understand how, according to Irwin, sensible properties come to figure so prominently in the Plato's thought. Irwin seems to think that we expect all properties to be analyzable as "some observable property" ("Heracliteanism," 8). This is so, apparently, because observable properties allow us to define or understand bees, fingers, and other A-properties. It is unclear whether Irwin thinks that A-properties are defined in terms of observable properties and equally unclear whether these properties are possessed essentially by ordinary material particulars. Also, we agree that particulars are beautiful and large because, according to Irwin, the dispute is not about examples but definitions. This is an important concession, for it entails that particulars can be (and are) beautiful or just: "A particular just or brave action is (or may be) entirely just or brave, and not equally unjust or cowardly" ("Heracliteanism," 7). Irwin concedes this about some moral properties because he believes that they are not relative or incomplete in the same manner as Largeness, or Good, two obvious relative or incomplete properties. On his account then, there can be "perfect samples" of some of the properties for which Plato postulates Forms.¹⁰ Since at least some of the B- and C-properties are entirely present to sensible particulars, it cannot be a problem with the B- or C-property themselves. Indeed, it seems that we might (should?) be able to

claim that Beauty or Justice is sensible or observable, since we have no doubt that Aristides is just and we have been given no other means to acquire our beliefs besides observation. Nor can the problem be with the particular itself, or even the observable properties per se. The problem then, according to Irwin, is with the expectation that in the case of a B- and C-properties, they will be definable in terms of sensible properties. Since observable properties in themselves are unobjectionable, Plato must conclude that they are inadequate in the case of B- and C-properties on the basis of an empirical failure to turn up any adequate definitions.¹¹ But even this must be qualified, since the sensible property types Bright Color, or Color, and Shape, apparently B- or C-properties, are themselves definable, and presumably definable in terms of sensibles. The failure of Bright Color to be what beauty is, is simply a denial of (definitional) identity between properties, not a special kind of failure due to the presence of sensible properties in the definiendum.

If nothing prevents particulars from being entirely just or beautiful, these particulars will not be in flux either owing to self-change or aspect change.¹² In this crucial respect they will be unlike large particulars, which are large in comparison to this particular but small in comparison to a second. Recognizing this, Irwin argues that what is in flux even in the case of largeness are “the sensible properties” that some cite in an explanation of what makes something large, e.g., by a head, or being three feet long. The claim is that if we ask after an explanation of the non-relative moral properties, any sensible property will also suffer the same compresence as the explanations of properties like Largeness that utilize sensible properties. So it turns out that only the sensible property types can always be said to suffer compresence.

I have argued that the texts cannot support the readings that Irwin gives them. The division of properties into A-, B-, and C-properties, especially as something Plato argues on behalf of, is hard to justify. There is no reason to think that Plato ever accepts that observational properties are ever adequate to define A-properties. And the condemnation of the sensible world is not limited to his sensible property types. Moreover, the argument requires that Plato has ready to hand a distinction between observational and nonobservational properties. That Irwin fails to supply one himself makes it all the more unlikely that we can derive one from Plato’s writing. Lastly, the crucial move in Irwin’s account requires Plato to conclude on the basis of an inductive generalization that only in the case of certain properties is it impossible to find a definition in terms of sensibles. But let us suppose that we are willing to read the texts as Irwin does and let us suppose that we accept Irwin’s account of flux. What are we to conclude about Plato’s middle-period theory of Forms and what can we say about particulars?

Since we can define A-properties in terms of observational properties, Irwin wants to deny that there are Forms for them. Forms are posited only for properties that do not admit of definitions in terms of observational

properties. So there are only Forms for B- and C-properties. What, then, are we to conclude about these Forms and their definitions, or to put the matter differently perhaps, about their properties? Some who have argued that Plato admits Forms only for incomplete properties have concluded that Forms are perfect examples of these properties. Thus, although Forms would bear incomplete properties, one could never find a relevant context in which the F itself would appear or be not-F. Since Irwin thinks that particulars can be entirely just or beautiful, I think this cannot be his view. Other supporters of a limited range of Forms think that these Forms themselves cannot be incomplete bearers, or possess the incomplete property incompletely. For this would not distinguish them from the particulars. In which case, they contend, Plato would have to hold that there are only Forms of Incomplete Properties and that such Forms possess *completely* these incomplete properties. This is, I think, a logical monster. And while that fact does not preclude one from attributing it to Plato, it surely should give one pause.

It is not clear how Irwin conceives of the ontological status of his Forms. He clearly thinks that they are “irreducible” to sensible properties and hence separable from sensible properties in this sense. They are defined in terms of nonobservational properties. The questions remain whether the incomplete properties are identical with their definitions, and whether this allows, or entails, or precludes them from being beautiful, just, or large. The answers, in turn, are complicated by Irwin’s commitment to the definability of A-properties in observational terms. It seems that both Forms and properties are thus definable, A-properties in terms of sensibles, B- and especially C-properties in terms of nonsensibles. Thus it cannot be definability that distinguishes Forms from other properties. More worrisome is that Irwin fails to tell us whether Forms are distinct from particulars in respect to definability. It is tempting to infer from his account that Forms possess their definitions in a strong or complete manner, as do A-properties. It is also tempting to infer that material particulars also possess A-properties in the same complete manner: bees are completely or essentially bees, but incompletely or accidentally large. But I do not think that even this can be right, since Irwin wants to claim that particulars can be “entirely just.” He never says what this ontological relation amounts to, but there is no reason to think that it differs from the relation linking Socrates to the A-property Humankind. It is striking that Irwin never says how we are to consider the ontological relations of Partaking and Being.¹³

The absence of a discussion about these two ways of being that are introduced in the *Phaedo* is a warning signal that Irwin’s amazingly systematic account is idiosyncratic. If we return to the Aristotelian accounts from which Irwin begins his article, we see that Aristotle closely links definition and knowledge, and thinks that *they* are unavailable in the changing sensibles. Indeed, since knowledge is unavailable because it is of definitions, it must be

the absence of definitions that is characteristic of the sensibles. Irwin's effort to limit Forms to a subset of properties and sensibles to sensible properties ignores the role definitions play in Aristotle's account. For Irwin, particulars are definable, and hence there should be knowledge of particulars, just not ethical knowledge. To defend his version of Aristotle would then require another epicycle of interpretation, an epicycle where the statement that there is no (common) definition of sensibles would have to be parsed as the claim that there are common definitions of properties though not in sensible terms. But even on Irwin's account there are definitions of sensibles such as Bright Color. What Irwin offers is a denial of identity between properties, not the denial of definability of properties. All of Irwin's properties are definable, both sensible properties such as Shape and Bright Color, and nonsensible properties such as Beauty and Largeness, as well as A-properties. For Irwin, Plato separates Forms because individuals mistakenly think that they know about certain matters of ethics and health and size and other nonethical matters in the same way that they know about bees and humans. They do know about these latter, and they know them through observation and crude reports about color, size, shape, and sound, or other such qualities. This is one way to reconstruct Plato's motives for separation. But given an alternative, I do not think it's the best way.

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NOTES

Introduction

1. Plato never entertains the question whether knowledge is possible, despite the fact that he devotes much of his time to the study of what knowledge is. Plato and his critics, e.g., Aristotle and Speusippus, agree that there is knowledge. Their disagreements concerned whether knowledge requires (Platonic) Forms. Among moderns see, e.g., Cherniss, *Riddle*, passim, esp. 81ff., Lear, *Desire*, Davidson, *Philebus*, 62ff.

2. Frege, *Foundations*, vii.

3. Parmenides, B2. This is not to say either that general reflections on the nature and implications of philosophizing are not to be glimpsed in the *Republic* or *Phaedo*, or to say that Plato had not thought of them until some date certain well into his philosophical career.

4. Ryle, "Parmenides."

5. For the purpose of differentiating what there is from what is inside the head, I will contrast the metaphysical with the conceptual, the epistemological, and the linguistic. Hence the use of the "I." Obviously there are differences between the three. I do not think the differences affect the point I am trying to stress.

6. Indeed, by the time of the *Timaeus*, it is not clear whether there are any material particulars at all. In this circumstance, Plato's particulars may well be mere loci (in space or the receptacle) of apparent alterations of the receptacle. See chapter 7.

7. A second aid to our understanding of Parmenidean Being is our conception of how Parmenides is responding to his predecessors and how his successors answered him. See Curd, *Legacy*.

8. The second or "fused" existentialist reading differs from the pure in allowing that the force of the "is" is a mixture of identity and existence. For the pure reading, see Owen, "Eleatic." For the fused, see Furth, "Elements." On the Greek verb "to be," see Kahn, *Verb*. Barnes, *Pre-Socratics*, is one purist who is not a numerical monist.

9. Most recently, Curd, *Legacy*, and Nehamas, "Three Ways" and "Parmenidean Being." One of the originators of the reading is Mourelatos, *Route*. I borrow the phrase "predicational unity" from Curd.

10. Fragment B8, according to this interpretation, provides the criteria for being-in-this-manner and aims to demonstrate that each such being is whole, unchanging, and of a single nature.

11. An essence is, roughly, that which makes something be the very thing that it is. It is hard not to think of Aristotle when considering *ousia*. Moreover, it is hard not to think of the individuals in the natural kinds as the sorts of things that have essences. Provided that we do not invest too heavily in Aristotle's own efforts to explain the nature of essence in terms of form, matter, actuality and potentiality, it is helpful to consider Aristotle's inquiries into *ousia* when thinking about the relation between Forms and essences.

12. Others have taken different paths. McCabe, *Individuals*, follows individuation, Moravcsik, *Platonism*, sameness and difference. One might equally pursue the notion of parts and wholes, or soul, or the particular, or trace the history of the approaches in the scholarship.

13. But there are others: souls, form-copies, receptacle, matter, abstract entities that are not Forms.

14. See the argument at 1031b28–1032a4.

15. This is sure to meet with resistance from those who think that part and whole are metaphysical relations.

16. See chapter 1, section 3.

17. Frede, *Praedikation*.

18. Much of the discussion of the *Timaeus* was originally published in my “Timaeus.”

19. On the Tetralogies of Thrasyllus, see Cooper, *Collected Dialogues*, Introduction, viii–xviii. Obviously one would have to decide what to do about those dialogues in which Socrates does not appear.

20. Two kinds of criteria are available to us in establishing these groupings. First, there is historical evidence. This includes allusions within the dialogues to other works, e.g., the references at the beginning of the *Timaeus* back to the *Republic*, or from the *Sophist* back to the *Theaetetus*. We also have the testimony of contemporaries and later authors, the evaluation of which requires careful attention to the context of the testimony and the purposes to which the report is being put. And finally there is collateral evidence about the persons and events which are mentioned in the works, for example the death of Theaetetus after the battle at Corinth in 369. The second set of criteria are stylistic. Included here are studies of the vocabulary, syntax, grammar, and style of the dialogues. There is the hope that these areas might furnish objective evidence for dating, since they seem to concern matters that do not depend on point of view, either Plato’s or his readers’. Of particular importance are three features where there seems to be evidence of change between dialogues and periods, hiatus, prose-rhythm, and combinations of particles. Pioneering studies of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries have given way to recent work aided by computer programs. Unfortunately, neither the earlier nor the contemporary studies have settled the tough questions about dating, especially the microdating of specific dialogues such as the *Timaeus*. The fault, it seems, is not with the data but with the assumption that stylistic criteria furnish us with evidence that is free from doctrinal biases. The difficulty, in short, is that we cannot say how the subject matter of the dialogue or the authorial purpose(s), conscious or unconscious, influence these matters of style or syntax.

21. Finer discriminations are possible. There are, I suspect, transitional dialogues between these broad periods and probably between clusters of dialogues that might make up subgroups within each period. Besides the placement of the *Gorgias* and *Meno* towards the end of the Socratic period, I am not really sure where the *Cratylus* should go, and I suspect the *Phaedrus* is best viewed as coming at the end of the critical period. On the dating see Brandwood, “Stylometry.”

22. I also believe that we have all that Plato wrote and, perhaps more controversially, that we have all that his ancient readers had to work with in seeking to reconstruct his philosophy. Obviously there were those who heard Plato’s lectures, remarks, and conversations, from which reports and notes were probably constructed and passed along. But I do not believe that we are missing anything from Plato’s pen.

Chapter One: An Overview of Platonic Metaphysics

1. Indeed, it has been argued that separation is not a feature of his Theory of Forms. See chapter 4.

2. Cf. Vlastos, "Separation."

3. I am indebted here to the work of H. Paul Grice, unpublished, and especially Alan Code, "Essence." Neither, however, comments on what I am calling the "characterizing" and "logicizing" aspect of the two primitive relations. Moreover, Code is noncommittal about form-copies. Hence his analysis of partaking differs from mine. See also Nehamas, "Self-Predication."

4. Seems, because once form-copies are admitted into the ontology then they too will either be participants or Beings. Souls are surds here.

5. So Vlastos, "Third Man," 236 (in Allen, ed.) reads the "is" in his original contribution to the literature.

6. See Cherniss, "Relation," and Allen "Self-Predication."

7. There is logical space for an account that allows only one thing to be predicated of a Form, namely its essence. See McCabe, *Individuals*, ch. 3.

8. Recall Parmenides. See Nehamas, "Self-Predication," Vlastos, "Redefinition," Silverman, "Synonymy," and Code, "Essence."

9. I think one reason why Plato says so little about particulars is that he takes as his starting point the notion that a particular is always identified through some property it possesses. The identification is problematic because particulars change their properties. This disqualifies the particulars from serving as the metaphysical foundation of his ontology or the foundation for the epistemic access we have to properties. That particulars depend on Forms helps to explain why Plato spends the bulk of his metaphysical inquiry investigating Forms; for in seeking the definition of the property, we thereby seek what it is that allows us to identify, to the degree possible, a particular that happens to have that property.

10. Cf. Vlastos, "Degrees," Turnbull, "Natural," Fine, "Immanence," Devereaux, "Separation." Cf. Aristotle *Cat.* 1a22 ff. They are the "tropes" propounded in the 1920s by Stout, in the 1950s by D. C. Williams and Wilfrid Sellars, and today by various metaphysicians. See D. C. Williams, "Elements," Sellars, "Complex," Campbell, *Abstract*.

11. I think that Frede's view is the same in *Praedikation*. The difficulty of articulation also, I find, infects his language and explanatory remarks.

12. Cf. Code, "Essence," and Grice, unpublished. Intuitively one wants to insist that everything that is is self-identical, including particulars. But given their mutability, their dependence on Forms and the receptacle, it is less than clear in what sense a Platonic particular can be self-identical.

13. *Tim.* 52c2–5. See Patterson, *Image*, and M. Frede, "Becoming."

14. See, for instance, M. L. Gill, "*Timaeus*," Strange, "Double," Morrow, "Necessity."

15. I am less certain about the unlimited aspect in the *Philebus*, which serves as that upon which limit is imposed. Insofar as the unlimited can be regarded as matter, I think that Plato displaces it in the *Timaeus* in favor of the geometrized receptacle.

16. We know Forms in a fashion analogous to the way in which we come to know

mathematical objects and truths. This is so both as objects of intuition and as exhibiting the deductive structures whose necessity Plato wished to find in his Theory of Forms. See Vlastos, "Mathematics," Burnyeat, "Mathematics."

17. Two important instances where they agree are that (1) essence, *ousia*, is a primitive notion, and (2) there is a primitive metaphysical relation that applies to essence and that to which it belongs. This relation I call "Being." It may well be that other metaphysical relations also are called by the same name. They will be derived from this primary application of Being, namely that involving *ousia*. Primary applications can be distinguished from secondary applications either by appeal to a weakened version of the ontological predication relation of Being, or by appeal to different kinds of subjects to which essence belongs. Thus if all bearers of essence can be called substances, there might be different kinds of substances, primary, secondary, and so on. Finally, there might be a difference in the essence predicated of a subject. For instance, there could be parts of essences that are predicated in a derived manner, or essences might be predicable of the same subject: suppose, for example, that both the definition of man and the definition of soul were predicable of Socrates.

18. See Owen, "Not-Being," and especially Frede, *Praedikation*. I do not consider the Pauline readings of Vlastos to be part of this orthodoxy. See especially "Ambiguity."

19. McCabe, *Individuals*, and Moravcsik, *Platonism*, especially part 2.

20. Frede, *Praedikation*.

21. Form-copies can be said to partake in a derivative sense insofar as the essence of the Form of which they are the copy can be predicated of them.

Chapter Two: Socratic Metaphysics?

1. We can wonder when Plato had arrived at these theses. We can view the theses as well formed when the early dialogues were composed, but kept under wraps by Plato so as to allow a planned unfolding of his philosophy. We can think that these dialogues represent an early stage in the development of his, Plato's, views. Or, compatibly with whenever we think Plato arrived at his metaphysical theses, we can take them as offering a picture of Socrates himself at work on caring for his soul. Accepting any of these alternatives would not change the conclusions reached in this chapter.

2. Vlastos, *Ironist*, esp. "Contra," 45–80; Woodruff, *Hippias*, esp. 161–80; *pace* Allen, *Euthyphro*, 67–72, and Shorey, *Unity*. Kahn, *Dialogue*, challenges the traditional division of the dialogues. He groups *Laches*, *Charmides*, *Euthyphro*, and *Lysis* together just before the middle period works (between 385–78), on the basis of their common and new interest in the nature of the definition and definiendum. He even allows that the metaphysical developments of the middle period are in mind when they are composed.

3. *Ap.* 29d–30b, 31b, 32d, 36c, 39d, *La.* 186a.

4. The best possible state of the soul, ὡς ἀρίστη (*Ap.* 30b2), is to be read in tandem with the end of Book I of the *Republic* (352ff.), where the function argument is introduced to show that the virtuous life is the happy life.

5. The contrast is primarily with the *Phaedo* and its Hypothesis of Forms (100b5) endowed with special features foreign to the Socrates of the earlier dialogues, e.g.,

inaccessibility to the senses, immateriality. The systematic linkage of the epistemology (recollection and the denigration of the senses), the metaphysics (the perfection of Forms and the imperfection of the sensible world), and the ethics, especially the desire for Beauty and the Good in the *Symposium* and *Republic*, support those who would claim for Plato a Theory of Forms. Those skeptical about how well our notion of a “theory” translates into Platonic idiom would be chary of such an attribution.

6. *Meta.* 1078b17–32; cf. 987b1–18. Besides universal definitions or accounts, Aristotle credits Socrates with being the first to pursue “inductive” or “analogical” reasoning.

7. *Ironist*, e.g., 63, and *Studies*, passim, and “Elenchus.”

8. See especially “Contra,” 56–66. The influence of Aristotle, and Plato, is palpable when we seek to distinguish what Socrates is doing when reflecting on relations as they appear in his ethical theorizing, from reflection on the relations in their own right, i.e., qua relations.

9. While definition is clearly one sense of the term, there is reason to think that a *logos* can range from a single proposition to a whole dialogue, to perhaps even a corpus of work or its verbal equivalent.

10. The results of this examination persuade him that he is wisest in that he knows that he does not know about these most important matters, unlike the poets, statesmen, and craftsmen he interrogates. It seems that elenctic examination is then a sufficient condition for happiness in that one who successfully engages in it makes one’s life worthwhile. It may not be a necessary precondition, however, if one can gain happiness through some other means. But Socrates implies that if one achieves happiness through some other means, one must then examine elenctically this fortunate state.

11. See *Ap.* 20a–b, 24c–25c, *Cr.* 46c–47d, *Eu.* 13b–c, *G.* 514b–515a, 520a4, and c4–5, and *La.* 183–190. The crux of the matter concerns the force or purpose of the analogy. Socrates repeatedly insists that experts are better guides to action and judgments about, e.g., health, horse training, and so on, than the majority or nonexpert. The question is whether we are to infer from this that he thinks that there are moral experts and that their expertise is especially similar to the expert knowledge of the trainer and doctor. Since Socrates challenges many claims to knowledge, it may be that the craft analogy is designed not to show what Socratic moral knowledge is like, but rather to refute those who claim to have knowledge. See, for example, *Cr.* 46b–48a: Socrates contrasts the opinions of the many with those of the doctor and trainer. But he leaves it open whether there is an expert in matters moral, εἴ τις ἔστιν ἐπαίων, 47d1–2. (See also *La.* 184ff.) Cf. Vlastos, “Pessimism,” Penner, “Socrates,” 125–126, Woodruff, “Early,” and Irwin, *Moral*, on the craft analogy.

12. It is hotly disputed whether there is some form of knowledge other than “elenctic knowledge” acceptable to, or recognized by, Socrates. At issue, broadly speaking, are (1) the principles, or metaprinciples, governing elenctic inquiry, including whether one knows the examples and counter examples; (2) a set of truths concerning the relation between a host of evaluative notions, e.g., is courage always good, which Socrates seems to assume or regards as accepted by (almost) all, and claims about his own states of mind and God’s too. I believe that the outcome of this debate has little bearing on my project and hence will gladly steer clear of it. It impinges primarily in so far as we have to consider whether there are relations between distinct

properties, such as Goodness and Courage. See, to name a few, Geach, “*Euthyphro*,” Vlastos, “Method,” “Disavowal,” and “Elenchus,” with replies by Kraut, “Comments,” and Polansky, “Vlastos.”

13. See especially Irwin, *Moral*, who contends that the craft analogy, along with other factors, forces Socrates to regard virtue as an instrumental means to happiness.

14. Precisely what an expert in a craft must know about subcrafts and related disciplines is quite controversial. For instance, an expert rock climber might not know how to climb on ice, even though the principles are the same. Socrates appears to idealize craft knowledge to such an extent that a true craftsman should be able to relate how the various components of his skill fit with one another, whether these components be viewed as steps or subordinate crafts in the service of a superordinate craft. This too appears problematical, once it becomes an issue whether a craftsman needs to know when it is good for him to practice his craft, e.g., when the doctor must know both how to cure and *when* to cure a patient (who happens to be better off dead). See Brickhouse and Smith, *Philosophy*, 166–71.

15. Diogenes Laertius 2.18.

16. The ethical expert can be said to know many truths. Alternatively the truths can be treated not as individual isolatable propositions but rather components, in some manner, of one expertise. On the tricky matter of the “singleness” of the object of ethical knowledge, see Penner, “Socrates,” 139–47, and Kraut, *State*, 244–309.

17. This is a controversial claim, and one I will not defend, since even if the virtues are distinct parts of the whole, Virtue, they each turn out to be knowledge of some sort. For different perspectives on the question of the unity of virtue and its relation to knowledge, see Penner, “Unity,” Irwin, *Moral*, (“On the Unity of Virtue,” *passim*) and Vlastos, “Unity,” along with “Parts,” (and the relevant starred notes). Ferejohn, “Unity,” comes closest to the position I sketch here on the relation of the virtues to one another, the relation of their accounts to one another, and the “What is X?” question answered by the different *logoi*.

18. On the causal aspect of knowledge see Penner, “Unity,” Vlastos, “Parts” and Penner’s reply to Vlastos, “Early.” It is a sufficient condition, given the absence of psychic states that are countervailing to this knowledge, and to the extent that we discount deficiencies of the body and circumstances beyond the control of the individual. See Brickhouse and Smith on the Sufficiency Thesis, *Philosophy*, 132–146.

19. That it does make the person act appropriately is evidenced in Socrates’ denial of *akrasia*. However, the psychological mechanisms leading to behavior are not much analyzed in the early dialogues.

20. This “causative” force is expressed in many ways. Sometimes a prepositional phrase is used (*Pr.* 360c, 332a–e). Sometimes verbs are used (*Ch.* 160d). Sometimes it is expressed through an instrumental dative.

21. Cf. Vlastos, “Contra,” 56–7: “In the *Euthyphro* he lays down two conditions the right answer to that question will have to meet: [1] The definiens must be true of all cases falling under the definiendum. [2] The definiens must disclose the reason why anything is an instance of the definiendum.” See also Woodruff, *Hippias*, 150ff., who places three requirements on definitions: “1) the explanation requirement: Whatever the fine turns out to be, it must be something I shall call the *logical cause* of fineness: it is what makes all fine things fine. . . . 2) The self-predication requirement: What makes things fine must be strictly fine itself; that is, it must in no way or

circumstance be foul. 3) The unity requirement: What makes things fine must make every fine thing fine. . . . This means that the fine must be one and the same in every case of fineness” (his italics). I include here conditions about the knower and the pious as paradigm because of the particular passage. Cf. Kahn, *Dialogue*, ch. 6.

22. See Woodruff, *Hippias*, 153–57 and 168–174.

23. Sharvy’s discussion, “*Euthyphro*,” of the nature of definition and formal causality is most helpful in trying to get clear on the fine points of Plato’s discussion.

24. It is critical to note, however, that Socrates’ “What is X?” questions arise in the context of a search for definitions whose generality is assumed and whose “causative” power is more logical than efficient. Because it is general and more logical than efficient, it seems also to be *assumed* by Socrates that there is exactly one definition of each subject under discussion. This does not follow, since there could be many different kinds of virtue, each general in that it applies to many instances, and each “logical” in that it explains why particulars of the appropriate sort are virtuous; for instance, virtue for a man and a woman might differ, or for a soul and a city (see note 32 on Gorgianic definitions).

25. One could take the *logos* to specify the meaning of the word “X,” treating the *logos* as a linguistic definition. On this line of interpretation, we confront sticky issues of synonymy, depending on what inchoate account of meaning is assigned to Socrates (or the early Plato). If the meaning is the reference of the term, then two terms are synonymous if they signify the same one ontological item. I do not believe that this is a plausible account of meaning, nor do I think it an account forced upon us by the texts. I think that the texts allow us to treat the various terms for the virtues as nonsynonymous and, at the same time, as having as their referents the single universal, knowledge of goods and evils. It follows that the accounts of the various virtues all specify the same one ontological item, though it leaves open whether the specifications of that item are the same. See Penner, “Unity,” Vlastos, “Unity,” and especially Ferejohn, “Unity.”

26. Cf. Vlastos, “Contra,” 58ff.

27. See Code, “Essence,” 425ff.: “Throughout his searches, he [Socrates] assumed the following: SOCRATIC PRINCIPLE: If X Has Y, then the definition of Y is L-predicable of X.” For Code, “Has” represents partaking, roughly nonessential predication, which obtains between particulars and Forms, as opposed to Being, roughly the essential predication relation, which obtains between Forms and their essences in the *Phaedo*. “L-predicability” is linguistic predicability. See ch. 3 for a more detailed discussion.

28. The only extended discussion of what it is for something to be present to a subject occurs in the *Lysis*. At 217c–e, Socrates distinguishes hair’s taking on temporarily the white color from the dye from its really becoming white due to old age. Here we find the presence of whiteness, λευκοῦ παρουσίᾳ λευκαί, causing the appropriate particular to become white, whereas in the case of the dye the hair is not such as to be white, but rather whiteness is merely present to it. That is, the hair, at the time of dying, is not of the right sort to have (and to hold, as we might say) whiteness, whereas when the hair (and the man) have aged, the hair is of the right sort.

29. Cf. Ross, *Theory*, 228. Indeed, because there is no difference in principle, the particulars can be thought to (but do not!) serve as paradigm cases of properties.

30. See Burnyeat, “Examples,” esp. 381–85, on the problem of the paradigm and

examples in Socrates' epistemology. Examples will not do as substitutes for definitions or as definitions themselves, but there is no reason to think that they are not instances of those definitions.

31. The problem of the priority of definition does not affect the claim that the particulars are instances of the property whose definition is sought. The issue of priority concerns whether we can know that a particular is an instance of a property whose definition is *unknown*. The role of examples or paradigm cases in Socrates' epistemology and the *elenchus* is only part of a more general epistemological worry about examples and paradigm cases whose history is long and rich. The nest of issues arises from reflections on philosophical method and especially from worries about the nature of knowledge and the given. I am not sure whether or how those considerations dovetail with the complexity of the particular with which I am concerned. See Burnyeat, "Examples," 386–87.

32. The narrow definitions are, I think, a challenge to Plato's Socrates. Call these narrow definitions "Gorgianic," following Meno in his namesake dialogue. The Gorgianic intuition is that Justice, for example, differs from group to group, or city to city, or class to class. We would then seek not one and the same definition common to *all* instances of justice, but a number of definitions, each of which suits only a limited class of items. Socrates nowhere mounts a decisive argument that such accounts will not do. The craft analogy seems to be one source of Socrates' confidence that a definition must be fully general. If no craft has more than one kind of product and no product is the strict goal of more than one craft, then if there is a craft for making one just, it might be thought that each virtue is one in all its cases because there is just one craft that produces it. Socrates also cites generic considerations about language and communication. We do not seem to be saying different things when we describe a man as just from when we say the same of a woman. If we could show that we could not understand one another were Justice to vary from circumstance to circumstance, then Socrates would have a powerful argument in favor of a single definition. With the hindsight of Aristotle and Wittgenstein, we now have reason to think that maybe there is no way of eliminating the Gorgianic possibility.

33. See especially Nehamas, "Confusing."

34. Being god-loved fails to capture the formal causal relation because it is a *pathos*, not the essence of piety. A proposed definition of a virtue that fails to be good or noble would contravene accepted common opinion. See *Ch.* 159c1, *Ly.* 216d2, *La.* 192b5ff.

35. A list of all Socratic properties is not easy to generate for two reasons. First, properties mentioned in the transitional dialogues, including the *Gorgias*, may or may not be Socratic. Second, it is debatable whether properties offered up as examples should be accorded the status of properties to which Socrates is himself committed. For instance, at *Lysis* 215d–e, Socrates mentions wet, dry, hot, cold, rich, poor, and others. Should we posit properties for all these? Besides the virtues (and their opposites?), we can include Whiteness, Quickness, Size, Strength, Weakness, Shape, Color, Being a Bee, Health, Beauty, Goodness, and perhaps the sciences/pseudosciences of the *Gorgias*, e.g., Rhetoric, Medicine. See *H. Ma.* 294, *Pr.* 332b–c, *Ly.* 217d–e, and the *Meno*, *passim*.

36. See Vlastos, "Unity" and "Understand," Allen, *Euthyphro*, esp. 69–125, Woodruff, *Hippias*, 149–75 and Nehamas, "Imperfection."

37. Woodruff, *Hippias*, 153–59.

38. “The conception of strict predication is one I introduce as a hypothesis for interpreting Socrates and others. The hypothesis is that Socrates and his contemporaries try to understand predication, if they can, as strict predication.” Woodruff, *Hippias*, 159 n. 5.

39. This is to say that in the order of explanation other notions are prior to the notions of semantic completeness and incompleteness.

40. These assumptions help guide us away from the alleged definitions and towards knowledge as the answer to the ethical “What is X?” questions in the early dialogues. See H. Benson, “Priority,” and Woodruff, *Hippias*, 138–47. The bibliography on the question of the priority of the definition and the Socratic Fallacy is voluminous. Benson’s fine essay provides a good, recent review of the literature.

41. Ferejohn, “Unity,” argues that we can, however, distinguish the various specifications of the virtues from one another and thus preserve an intuition to the effect that the names differ in meaning even though they specify the same one state. Besides appealing to the notion of contingent identity, his gambit crucially depends on the possibility of there being discernible “special subclasses” of goods and evils to which one can assign the (specifications of the) virtues.

42. Cf. Brentlinger, “Incomplete,” 63–66.

43. A defender of an Anaxagorean account of Socratic properties can treat them as mereological sums. Thus while no individual constituent (or part) of Heat can be in two places at once, different individual constituents can be. The property of Heat can then be viewed as the mereological sum of these constituents. Mereological accounts have difficulties, however, especially with immaterial items such as the numbers and shapes, not to mention the virtues.

44. Cf. Sharvy, “*Euthyphro*,” 130–32, on transitivity and causal priority.

45. Irwin, *Moral*, 136–38.

46. This requirement is alluded to twice in the first part of the dialogue, at 75c8ff. and then at 79d1–4. It is clear that the second depiction differs from the first.

47. The historical facts about Meno, his relation to Gorgias (or “what Gorgias said”) within the dialogue, and even his name all contribute to the development of the paradox of inquiry. See especially Klein, *Meno*, 35–53.

48. Various scholars have proposed pragmatic conditions thought to govern answers to the “What is X?” question, ranging from Allen’s “Regulative Principle of Dialectic,” *Euthyphro*, 69ff., to Santas’s, *Socrates*, 72–86, and Benson’s “Misunderstanding,” 128ff., appeal to Belnap and Steel, *The Logic of Questions and Answers*. In all cases, however, it remains an assumption, on Socrates’ part, that there is a single answer to each “What is X?” question for which there is an answer.

49. It is not easy to see how we could argue effectively against a staunch defender of Gorgianic definitions that this is true. Cf. Sharples, *Meno*, 127.

50. There is a problem with the text at 75d6. The manuscripts agree that the prefix is $\pi\rho\sigma\text{-}$. Gedike amended to $\pi\rho\text{-}$. What is critical is that the questioner agrees that he understands. I prefer $\pi\rho\text{-}$, since it seems to me more likely that the definer would need to establish before he submits a definition that the questioner thinks he understands the terms he is about to use. Note also that in a dialectical exchange the definition is true. Perhaps in other situations this need not be so. See Bluck, *Meno*, and Sharples, *Meno*, ad loc.

51. The text does not decide whether the better definition is the first or the second definition of shape. Cf. Klein, *Meno*, 55–67, and Nakhnikian, “Definitions.”

52. See *Cr.* 47cff., *La.* 184e8–9, *G.* 474a5–b1. There is, however, an important caveat to this claim; for Socrates also thinks that he can talk to every man about matters moral. I do not know whether the elenchus itself, with its dependence on the evaluation of the beliefs of the interlocutor and the “say what you believe” requirement, supports the dialectical requirement. Every interlocutor might say he is familiar with the terms “knowledge,” “good,” and “evil,” but few serious interlocutors would profess to *know* what they mean. The elenchus reveals to the interlocutor beliefs and relations between them upon which heretofore he had not reflected and perhaps had not even considered. The dialectical requirement might then be viewed as a starting point for a friendly beginning to definition. Start from notions familiar to your colleague in order to advance his understanding. Of course, for one interested in teaching there is no other place to start! In light of this fact, the dialectical requirement amounts to a recommendation about how to begin the process of instruction. It is a methodological remark about the use of definitions and definition-like accounts in instruction.

53. It is safe to say, I think, that the Empedoclean definition requires far more specialized knowledge than the first two definitions. It is also safe to ask whether Meno understands the definition’s terms at all. Socrates seems to indicate that he doubts it by labeling the definition “tragic,” i.e., dramatic and seemingly profound, but perhaps signifying nothing.

54. Nakhnikian, “Definitions,” 129–31.

55. Sharvy, “*Euthyphro*,” has argued that it is wrong to assume that the relation between definiendum and definiens in Socrates is that of identity, and hence that property identity is not at issue in this discussion. On his account the definition is an analysis of the property and hence the relation between definiens and definiendum need not be symmetric. Even while this is true, it does not follow that the definiens and definiendum are not identical, for sometimes we want to insist that the definiens both gives the formal cause and is identical with the analysandum. Cf. Santas, *Socrates*, 110–14.

Chapter Three: The Emergence of Forms

1. Other items are encountered, however. Relying especially on the fourfold divided line of the *Republic* and other passages, there is the suggestion that images, reflections, and some artistic products enjoy a metaphysical status distinct from that of ordinary physical particulars.

2. See chapter 1.

3. Plato’s intent here is difficult to discern. It seems that Simmias and Cebes must be regarded as philosophical sophisticates. Hence we cannot say that the ensuing remarks about what “we” do speak to what everyman does. See notes 7 and 11.

4. The allusion to diagrams at the commencement of this argument (73b1–2) suggests that the reader is meant to have the *Meno* in mind.

5. For recent work on the doctrine of recollection, see Scott, *Recollection*, Bobonich, *Utopia*, and Fine, “Inquiry.”

6. This claim is problematic in that it has been and will be argued that knowledge, in a strict sense, is of the Form alone apart from the sensibles. See next note.

7. It is not clear here whether the sense of knowledge is special or ordinary. At the outset (74ff.), Simmias grants that we know what Equality is. It is impossible to say whether “we” here is ordinary people or philosophers, and hence it is difficult to know how to understand the force of the “know.” It is unlikely that it carries the full force of the philosophical sense articulated at 76b1–2, all the more so since it occurs at the beginning of the argument before we learn what recollection is. I think it a colloquial usage, suggesting that we have been reminded of equality through our conversations and contacts with the world, though we are unaware of that facet of our experience. This is only one of many instances in the corpus where it might prove necessary to distinguish philosophical from ordinary knowledge, or colloquial uses of “know” (i.e., Greek expressions for knowledge) from philosophical uses.

8. 74b8–9. I read the dative τῷ, understanding the referent to be one thing versus another thing, not one person versus another person. See Rowe, *Phaedo*, 169, Gallop, *Phaedo*, 121–25.

9. Τί δέ; αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα ἔστιν ὅτε ἄνισιά σοι ἐφάνη, ἢ ἡ ἰσότης ἀνισότης; . . .

10. Note that there is no hesitation in saying that the sensibles are equal, thus indicating communion between the sensibles and the recollected Form. I take the φαίνεται to be veridical. A given stick will be equal to a second stick and unequal to a third. See Rowe, *Phaedo*, 169–70.

11. I think that features (2) and (3) (p. 6) are related with regard to this recognition of the shortcomings of the sensible. While I think that in the end Plato will deny that one knows, in a strict sense, the sensibles, the difference in knowledge requires that the sensibles differ in kind from the Form. If knowledge is here too linked to essence, then sensibles differ with respect to essence from the Form whose recollection a given sensible promotes. If they are knowable, then their essences are different from that of the Forms. If they are not knowable, they differ in that they lack essences. The realization of their shortfall can then be cashed in terms of the recognition that the sensibles differ from the Form recollected, much in the same way that any image must lack some property which its original has, or have a property which the original lacks. But Plato is much more inclined to view the difference between original and copy in terms of lack. This point is brought out in the *Cratylus*, 432a–d. Cf. Gosling, “Similarity,” 157–9 and Nehamas, “Imperfection,” 150.

12. The new OCT drops the αὐτό (75d2), though it resonates well here.

13. Cf. Vlastos, “Degrees,” 66ff. See also Rowe, *Phaedo*, 169–73, and Gallop, *Phaedo*, 121–31.

14. It is not easy to generalize either argument to cover even all the incomplete properties, let alone all the properties for which there might be Forms. See N. P. White, “Perceptual,” 66.

15. Rowe translation, *Phaedo*, 183: αὐτὴ ἡ οὐσία ἧς λόγον δίδομεν τοῦ εἶναι καὶ ἐρωτῶντες καὶ ἀποκρινόμενοι (78d1–2).

16. εἰλικρινές was used to describe the Forms at 66a2–3, right after the adjective was applied to the reasoning capacity.

17. ἢ αἰεὶ αὐτῶν ἕκαστον ὃ ἔστι, μονοειδές ὃν αὐτὸ καθ’ αὐτό, ὡσαύτως κατὰ ταῦτα ἔχει καὶ οὐδέποτε οὐδαμῆ οὐδαμῶς ἀλλοίωσιν οὐδεμίαν ἐνδέχεται (78d5–7).

18. The polar contrast is that between an absolutely unchanging Form versus an absolutely unstable particular. We can discount the stark claim about particulars, because even here Plato pulls back by slipping in an “as it were” (ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, 78e4).

19. The aim of this division is to find the kind to which the soul (and body) is more similar. The placement is obvious (*sic*): the body is more similar to the visible, changing, composite realm; the soul, apparently because it is invisible, more similar to the other realm. This is a rather weak justification for the assignment of soul to the same rough kind as Forms, since invisibility not only slips in as an afterthought at 79a4, but also because something could be invisible and yet bodily and even indivisible, e.g., a Democritean atom. The soul cannot be altogether unchanging or strictly uniform and incomposite. At the very least it changes place, not to mention conditions and states, e.g., from not being virtuous to being virtuous, from having beliefs to having knowledge. And given that it has many capacities, there is a fashion in which it is complex.

20. Plato waits until the *Timaeus* to return to this topic. There he also comments on (some of) his predecessors, but more to show that he is a superior player, as opposed to offering an account of Forms. There he actually builds particulars, here he assumes their presence and only endeavors to account for their gain and loss of properties.

21. The language of image and the notion of *logos* teem with ambiguity. The manner of expression hints that Plato recognizes, however dimly, that linguistic accounts are different from what they are accounts of and yet closely related, even more closely related than the physical objects which bear the properties of which the accounts are accounts. (The development of this intuition will be of prime concern in subsequent work.) And to the extent that here we see material particulars depicted as “images,” we shall have to bear in mind that *logoι* are also images. The *apologia* reminds one of the Recollection Argument with its emphasis on image, language, and how we are to study what there is in order to secure knowledge of Forms.

22. This suggests a rather a priori method of considering what follows of necessity from definitions and other propositions that might figure in theories. See Vlastos, “Reasons,” Rowe, “Explanation,” and Gallop, *Phaedo*, 177ff., Burge, “Aitai,” Stough, “Explanation,” and Brentlinger, “Incomplete.” Vlastos emphasized that the relations between Forms, as well as things such as snow, fire, and the three if they are not Forms, combine physical and logical necessity. The peculiar combination may or may not be the right analysis. Nevertheless the relation between properties or Forms, what Vlastos called “logical glue,” is critical to the Method of Hypothesis. It is also the source of great difficulty for Plato’s metaphysics. See section 3.

23. ἄπερ αἰετὲ ἀλλοτε καὶ ἐν τῷ παρεληλυθότι λόγῳ οὐδὲν πέπαυμαι λέγων, 100b1–3.

24. It is unclear whether the “form of cause” (b4), should be construed as committing Plato to a special Form, the *Aitia* itself. I suspect that it should not; rather, the expression looks forward to *aitia* in b8, and back to 95e9–96a1, where the same locution is first encountered.

25. “Partakes” translates μετέχει. I will use “partake,” “have a share of,” “participate,” and a few other English locutions to translate this verb and others that connote the same relation. I will argue that there are different types of participation in Plato, but I think that here we are dealing with just one kind of metaphysical participation relation. I do believe, however, that there are different ways to participate: some items can be said to partake necessarily, although most cases of participation are contingent or accidental. See section 3.

26. Of course he does not specify here that the range of “in general” (c6), extends beyond the aforementioned Forms, but the thrust of the argument suggests that wherever we have a change of property there is a Form in which a particular participates.

27. Even when we accept that Plato is not concerned with efficient causation, but rather seeks some logical or conceptual explication of what it is for some physical particular to be beautiful, the appeal to Forms does not advance the ball very far. See Taylor, “Causes,” esp. 47ff.: “If this answer is to have any explanatory force at all, much less provide an universal pattern of explanation, some independent specification of f-ness must be given, which will enable one to discern the explanatory link between x’s sharing in f-ness and x’s being f.”

28. I think that the debate over Socrates’ remarks about defending one’s hypothesis by appeal to a higher hypothesis admits of no definitive resolution. I favor Rowe’s approach to the controversy, namely to link the higher *logoi* with the vagaries of participation that Socrates declines to pursue. There is a strong temptation to read ahead to the *Republic*, or back to Socrates’ fleeting remark about teleology at 98ff., which would incline one to think that the Good itself is the highest hypothesis. But we do not know what sort of relation Plato postulates between *logoi* or hypotheses. It strikes me as premature to conclude that we are directed here to consider only logical or deductive or a priori consequences. After all, Forms might be metaphysically inert in that they have no role to play in explaining why particulars come to be. We could break apart the “epistemological hypothesis” that Forms are required for knowledge from the “metaphysical hypothesis” (Bostock, *Phaedo*, 164). I do not see how we can derive in an a priori manner the one from the other. Moreover, there is the question of what Plato thinks is to be done in order to explain what each Form is, whether this be understood as an analysis of a linguistic definition, or some sort of scientific or perhaps even mathematical investigation. The discovery that what F-ness is is xyz, might itself be treated as another consequence of the hypothesis of Forms, as might hypotheses treating of the relation between Forms. Save for the clever *aitiai* explored next in the *Phaedo*, this is all conjecture.

29. See Rowe, *Phaedo*, 249, note to 102b5–6, 253, note to 103b4–5, b7; Loriaux, *Phedon*, 2.14; Stough, “Explanation,” 25.

30. See Gallop, *Phaedo*, 198ff.

31. Cf. McCabe, *Individuals*, 25–45.

32. This is not conclusive, since we do not know what the conditions for being a form-copy are. I think that we cannot be talking about form-copies here, however, since the restrictive opening phrase, “some of . . . ,” could not concern them: all Forms have form-copies.

33. One gain that does seem to come from the shift to numbers is that we are confronted with an immaterial item, as opposed to snow and fire, which observes the strictures laid down for opposite properties. Since our target is to show something about an immaterial soul, immaterial numbers make for an easier transition.

34. The grammar and the subsequent illustration at d5 seems to favor treating $\delta\tau\iota$ as object of $\kappa\alpha\tau\acute{\alpha}\sigma\chi\eta\iota$, $\acute{\alpha}$ as subject, and $\delta\tau\iota \grave{\alpha}\nu \kappa\alpha\tau\acute{\alpha}\sigma\chi\eta\iota$ as object of $\acute{\alpha}\nu\alpha\gamma\kappa\acute{\alpha}\zeta\epsilon\iota$. This allows for an easier parsing of $\acute{\alpha}\upsilon\tau\acute{\omicron}$, now referring to $\delta\tau\iota$: “Won’t they be those things, Cebes, which force whatever they seize not only to have to its own character but that of some opposite.” So the three forces whatever it seizes to be both three and

odd. One could raise a difficulty if she thought that we actually would need three properties on this account: Threeness; the opposite, odd; and some unnamed property which is what the item seized is in its own right. But there is no indication in the text that there is a third item, and no mention anywhere in this section yet of something like a group of cows that are essentially cows, and three, and hence odd, because threeness seizes them.

35. See Gallop, *Phaedo*, 202ff., especially his versions A and B at 203–5; Rowe, *Phaedo*, 256ff. See also Nehamas, “Opposites,” 476ff.

36. See Rowe, *Phaedo*, 258–60, and Gallop, *Phaedo*, 204–213.

37. Even after we agree that the subject is an individual soul, there are serious problems with the argument. Some of those concern the validity of the proof that the soul is living, and (hence) immortal and (hence) indestructible. The relation of these properties to one another and to the soul is not directly of concern to me. (It is indirectly a concern because it could be argued that we have another cluster of properties or Forms to include in the inventory. See especially the Form of the Alive or Life at 106d5–6). On Personal Identity and the problem of transmigration, see McCabe, *Individuals*, ch. 9.

38. It is too difficult to work out similar equations for numbers. The text does not furnish enough information to make even an educated guess as to whether what “threeness” occupies is a number, or a set of items such as oxen. It seems to me that threeness does make what it occupies three, so I am inclined to say that we are dealing with numbers, just as we might say that Soul itself makes what it occupies, individual souls, souls. Then these numbers might be thought to occupy groups of oxen, as souls some bodies and snow some water and fire some wood.

39. A brief glance at the *Symposium* is in order, since Diotima’s revelation of the final mystery of Beauty itself is the longest depiction of a single Form in the corpus. She describes a multistage process beginning from a single body, and beautiful bodies in general, passing on through souls, and culminating in the beholding of “something wonderfully beautiful in its nature (τι θαυμαστόν τὴν φύσιν καλόν)” (210e4–5). If we are fortunate, we realize that what is beautiful in different bodies is akin (ἀδελφός); indeed that “it is foolish not to think the beauty in all the bodies is one and the same” (210b2–3). The beauty in souls and laws, practices, or knowledges, and the beauty in bodies are somehow related, and the nonsomatic beauties are superior or more honorable. This progression leads to knowledge of the one such beauty, Beauty itself, which

first, always is and neither becomes nor perishes, waxes nor wanes, and second, is not beautiful in this respect, ugly in that, nor beautiful at this time and not at some other, nor beautiful in comparison (πρός) to this, ugly in comparison to that, nor beautiful here, ugly there, as being beautiful to some and ugly to others. Nor, in turn, will the Beautiful appear to him [the initiate] as some face, or hands, or anything of flesh, nor some account or knowledge, nor as being in something else, such as an animal, or the earth, or heavens, but itself by itself, always being of a single kind with itself; and all the other beautiful things are partaking of it in some such fashion, that, while these others are coming to be and passing away, that becomes neither more nor less, nor suffers anything. (211a2–b5)

The most noteworthy parts of this description are at the beginning and end. The fact that Plato chooses to specify respects in which Beauty itself fails to be both beautiful and ugly recalls the Recollection Argument of the *Phaedo*, where the critical difference between the Equal itself and the sensible equals is that the Equal itself cannot appear equal and unequal. It seems that the special feature of each Form is its being “unqualifiedly” what it is. Each sensible particular, in contrast, is beautiful in a qualified way, because in some respect a sensible is or will appear to be ugly. At the end of the passage, we see that a Form is *auto kath auto* and μονοειδής: αὐτό καθ’ αὐτό μεθ’ αὐτοῦ μονοειδής ἀεὶ ὄν, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα καλὰ ἐκείνου μετέχοντα τρόπον τινὰ τοιοῦτον (211b1–3). The expression μεθ’ αὐτοῦ is perhaps *apokoinou*, though I think it is best read with μονοειδής. The idioms again return us to the language of the *Phaedo* prior to the final argument. This is significant because the last part of the *Phaedo* seemed to posit Forms as having relations with one another, that is, positing Forms that are both what they are, Three, and something else, Odd. The wording here can be interpreted to reinforce the notion that Beauty is beautiful and in no respect not beautiful, taking the *mono* as though it meant only beautiful. It is never not beautiful, because it is nothing other than itself. On the other hand, μονοειδής might mean that Beauty, considered just in respect of its essential nature or considered just in respect of itself, is just beautiful. Nothing in the passage forces one to choose one of these views.

40. See especially Fine, “Knowledge.”

41. In the run-up to the discussion of what the philosopher-ruler will be like, Plato once again deploys the language of deficiency, model, and copy. Socrates tells Glaucon that it will be okay if, having found what Justice is, the just man differs from it provided that he is as similar as possible (472b7–c2). The goal of the discussion, we are reminded, is to render judgment about the happiness of the just and unjust life, not to show that they are possible. The same is true of the state they are describing. They will describe it as best they can but they need not show that it is possible. But all descriptions are qualified: “Is it possible to realize anything in practice as it can be formulated in words or is it natural for practice to have a lesser grip on truth than theory, even if some people do not think so” (473a1–3). Compare *Phaedo* 99e, where *logoi* and *erga* are also contrasted (chapter 3, section 1). Whatever it means to say that something has more or less a “grip on truth,” the account (*logos*) of the just state and just person is better suited to reveal or explain what justice is than the state that may or may not come into being. Having just been told that the account of justice will not guarantee that the state is possible, we can infer here that 1) the account may show that there is a Form, i.e., what Justice is, and 2) the physical or actual state is already (pre)judged to be deficient.

42. The passage at 476a4–7 mentions Justice, Injustice, Good, Evil, and all the Forms, once again citing only Forms of a certain, i.e., incomplete, kind. New here is mention of the negative forms, Evil, Injustice, and Ugliness. The text at 6–7 is also famously problematic. There is, I think, no manuscript evidence for emending the text. The *καὶ ἀλλήλων κοινωνία* has struck many as inconsistent with the middle-period Theory of Forms because it implies that they interact, in an unspecified manner, with one another, violating the monoeidetic status of each Form and its *auto kath auto* nature. We shall return to this issue shortly. Recall, however, that Forms or Form-like entities seem to interact with one another in the *Phaedo*. Moreover, the

interaction may be explained in terms of the appearances of the individual Forms *in the particulars* where they are instantiated, thus leading to the *impression* that they interact with one another. See Adam, *Republic*, vol. 1, app. 7, 362–64.

43. It has become commonplace to condemn parts of the subsequent argument on the grounds that they beg a question against the philodoxer. While we might fault the argument on such grounds, there is no indication in the text that Plato does. The language of madness suggests that logical niceties will have little effect on the opponent. Compare Gosling, “Republic,” 120–24, Fine “Knowledge,” 107, N. P. White, *Republic*, Reeve, *Philosopher-Kings*, 58–71, Annas, *Republic*, ch. 8–9.

44. It has been proposed that we consider the objects to be propositions, or sets of propositions, or truths. See Fine, “Knowledge.”

45. ἐφ’ ᾧ τε ἔστι καὶ ὁ ἀπεργάζεται, 477d1. The τε καὶ construction rules out that the second conjunct could be an exegesis or paraphrase of the former. Moreover, although it is often assumed that the second conjunct is illustrated by the claim that belief is fallible whereas knowledge is infallible, the speaker of these lines (477e6–7) is Glaucon. There is little actually said about this second conjunct. The internal accusative construction and the verb itself are quite unspecific. Each faculty works in some way on its internal object.

46. This expansion on how the objects of belief present themselves to thought is especially interesting. The *παγίως* recurs at *Theaetetus* 157a4 and *Timaeus* 49d2 in passages clearly introducing flux. The fact that the many sensibles cannot be thought to be both, ἀμφότερα, seems to belie that they are somehow what is and is not. This may be rhetorical excess. It is also interesting to contrast the absence of *noesis* here with the turn towards *noesis* at 523ff.: there its object is *ousia*. Perhaps the absence of *ousia* among the sensibles explains the inability of *noesis* to fix securely on anything here.

47. Νόμματα is often translated as “conventions.” There might be ways to use this translation to defuse the epistemological force of “belief,” but I have no novel account to give of Plato’s choice of terms here.

48. Even Fine, “Knowledge,” the champion of a third possibility, the veridical “is” or the “is true” account, concedes that there is a shift from the veridical to the predicative at the latter stages of the argument. A prime motivation for the veridical reading is that it allows one to claim that the objects of knowledge and the objects of belief have some overlap. Read “is” as “is true” and “is not” as “is not true” or “false.” Then the object of knowledge is what is true or the set of all truths, while the object of belief is the set of all truths and falsehoods. But there is no mention anywhere of a set of truths and falsehoods. Moreover, there is a presumption that we should allow Plato to think this overlap a desiderandum. Fine’s Plato wants the objects and states of affairs of the physical world to be knowable. Again, there is nothing like this mentioned in the text. Indeed, the suggestion that what is knowable are Forms tells against it.

49. This translation is perhaps accurate, but there is reason to hesitate about its last clause. The participle, προσπίπτουσα, is feminine singular and seems to refer back to *aisthesis*. Perhaps Grube thinks that the *aisthesis* can be near or far only in so far as its object is.

50. This is seldom remarked upon but is critical for what follows. If seen from too far away, one cannot make out the number of fingers and in all likelihood cannot

make out that there are fingers in the visual field at all. This provision is but the first to suggest we are reading an illustrative passage, not an argument on behalf of a well-defined thesis.

51. See 527b, where the contrast is between what exists forever and that which at some time comes to birth and is destroyed; or 531c9–534 where the whole of the visual faculty and all of its domain is contrasted with dialectic.

52. See Appendix.

53. On the role of the Good see Patterson, *Image*, ch. 6, and Shorey, “Good.”

54. There are at least two ways to treat the objects of the sciences and the sciences/scientists themselves. On one account, both working geometers and dialecticians would study Forms, i.e., intelligibles, on the top half of the line, but study them differently or with a different set of concerns. For instance, the dialectician might try to prove or render nonhypothetical what the geometer hypothesizes. On the second, they may do this but they would also study objects differing in kind much like the shadow of Rocky Raccoon differs from Rocky himself. See Ferguson, “Simile,” Fogelin, “Analogies,” and Burnyeat, “Mathematics.”

55. See, most recently, Burnyeat, “Mathematics.”

56. Here I refer not to particular tokens of language or thought, nor even actions. Such activities or events are, I think, dependent on particulars of the sort I am concerned with. I, again, exclude soul.

57. In the early and middle-period dialogues, Plato does not treat these features as properties for which there are Forms, with the possible exception of (being) One. In the *Parmenides* and the late dialogues, Plurality, Motion, and Rest are mentioned as Forms. Whether Eternality is a Form is unclear, although the *Topics* would indicate that these features/properties were utilized in various arguments against the Platonists. See ch. 7.

58. Such properties we can call, following Aristotle, “necessary accidents.” Vlastos, especially later in his career, thought of geometry as the paradigm for how the properties of Forms were related to one another. In the 1960s, he often wrote in the idiom of necessity and contingency, thereby sometimes failing to distinguish essential properties from necessary properties as the ancients deployed those notions. For Plato and Aristotle, all the properties (nonrelational at least) of universals are necessary properties.

59. A different example of the deficiency stemming from the copy metaphor is Vlastos’s allusion to the painting executed partly by Rubens and partly by his student in the workshop. It is and is not a Rubens. “Degrees,” 60.

60. See the essays “Degrees” and “Paradox,” especially the latter (44–45 for the example of flowers; the gold example is found on page 48 and *passim*). It should be noted that Vlastos develops his account in the course of an argument denying that we find in Plato a “degrees of existence” theory. I believe that Vlastos has made this case. Vlastos contends, as I understand his argument, that existence does not come in degrees. But that allows there to be different kinds of existing things, namely Forms and sensibles. These distinct kinds, moreover, may themselves be graded by degree, i.e., into superior and inferior. Although of course one *need* not distinguish kinds in this way, Vlastos’s Plato does. The metaphors of real versus fake flowers and pure versus impure gold are thus deployed in an effort to expound and lend credence to the assignment of grades to the differing kinds of existents. Cf. Code, “Vlastos.”

61. If we are to press this conclusion we would at the very least need to consider whether essences and Forms are thought to have parts in these middle dialogues. Secondly, we would have to ask whether the sorts of properties cited by Vlastos are the relevant parts of the essence. It is safe, I think, to answer the latter question with a firm no. And though there are traces of doctrines that would allow the essence and Forms of the middle dialogues to be complex, they will not serve Vlastos's purpose. When a particular partakes of the Form it is made to be what, or such as, the Form is.

62. This is one of the reasons McCabe, *Individuals*, thinks that austerity and complexity are the fundamental differentiae in Plato's metaphysics.

63. Cf. Fine, *Ideas*, 46–65 and passim, on narrow versus wide compresence.

64. See McCabe, *Individuals*, 9–11 and passim, on the "grammatical prejudice."

65. We can distinguish this account of the unmistakability of a Form from the thesis that the essence itself is self-presenting. Were essence such that where it is present one would be aware of it and therefore know it, then we could also not be mistaken about a Form once we have been brought to awareness of it (say, by recollecting it). But this, then, would be an additional reason to deny that essence is found in particulars. For if essence is self-presenting, then we should know them once we observe them in the material particulars. If they are found in material particulars, they must be deeply hidden, i.e., nonobservable. Perhaps it is possible to be presented with a Form and yet be unaware of it or fail to know it. But it seems impossible that one not know it if one is aware of it.

66. Recalling the Socratic properties of the early dialogues, what differentiates the Platonic particulars from the Socratic is that the latter did not (explicitly) suffer compresence. Once Plato concludes that particulars are the victim of compresence, he separates the Forms of the incomplete properties.

67. To do so would be to insist that simplicity or monoeidicity is the cardinal metaphysical virtue. But see McCabe, *Individuals*.

68. Vlastos also appealed to the contingent manner in which particulars possessed (some) of their properties. This obviously will not work for those properties which are essentially predicated of particulars. But it is unclear that it works for any properties. Given that Helen is beautiful at some time, why would her subsequent loss of, or the possibility of losing, beauty account for our inability to recognize it when she has it? The fact that we do truthfully predicate beauty of her makes this all the more mysterious. This lends additional support to those who would locate the deficiency in compresence, especially when that is conceived to be the simultaneous possession of the incomplete properties of F and not-F. See the appendix.

69. Perhaps something could be material (somatic) and not subject to change, and perhaps something could be material and simple. But in these dialogues Plato associates the bodily with the complex and everywhere he assumes that the bodily is not static. It is remarkable, I think, that Plato nowhere confronts the Atomists. I will argue in chapter 7 that even a material atom, the best candidate for an incomposite particular subject only to translocation, cannot have just one property.

70. *Phaedo* 65d11, *Meno* 75c7ff. For the later theory of *aisthesis* see Burnyeat, "Grammar," and Silverman, "Commons."

71. If, in fact, compresence is merely apparent, or if there are compresent properties that rely on subjective or relative judgments (nonperceptual judgments) of cogni-

tive agents, then perhaps one could argue that those qualifications would not be a function of the spatio-temporal character of particulars.

72. Allen, "Participation," 45–47, Nehamas, "Self-Predication," esp. 100ff.

73. It follows that things are homonyms if their names are the same, either because The Form is called by the *onoma* and the particular by the eponym (derived from the name), or because two particulars share the same eponym.

74. The paradigm case option is developed by Strang, "Third Man," 187ff., in light of Wittgenstein's remarks about the standard meter. I am uncertain about his reading of Wittgenstein, but I think that, by Plato's light, the "Standard Beauty" would be characterized by beauty. By "unqualified possessor," I mean that the Form is viewed as not suffering from compresence with respect to what it is, i.e., Equality is equal and not in any way unequal, or the Large is completely large without being larger than anything.

75. Nehamas, "Imperfection," 145, and Allen, "Participation," 52–56. What is needed is an account which ranks the many imperfect beauties in light of the perfect beauty that characterizes Beauty itself. For such an account see Malcolm, *Self-Predication*.

76. This will have to be qualified later when we consider self-predication statements versus self-characterization statements. Beauty, on my account, will turn out to be among the few Forms which are subject to self-characterization. For a sophisticated recent variant of this second approach, see Fine, *Ideas*, on the self-explanatory character of self-predications (chapter 4, n. 48).

77. This is unguarded, to be sure. Safeguards and qualifications are forthcoming. Believers in a more limited range of Forms are liable to protest that the arguments in the middle period concern only incomplete properties. Even were this true, and even were we to disregard other passages where Plato indicates, perhaps without argument, that the range of Forms is not limited to incomplete properties, it would be hasty to conclude that Forms are limited to incomplete properties. Why should we think that the arguments he deploys in these dialogues are the only ones he has?

78. It seems to me that Plato considers the characterizing relation as the parsing of the claims of an ordinary speaker. I think that he treats it as prior in the order of discovery, in the sense that *initially* it seems not to call for explanation. We *start* our metaphysical reflections from the fact that there are many beautiful, or large, or just things, or many humans. Conversely, I think that the noncharacterizing relation does require that he explain what sort of predication is envisaged in the claim that Beauty Is beautiful.

79. "Yet surely the force of the metaphor of imitation, and of the χωρισμός, is to indicate that the deficiency in question is that of one *type* of thing with respect to something of another type: 'deficiency' here is a category distinction, not a distinction within categories" (Allen, "Participation," 52). See also Kung, "Thises."

80. There are other answers. In all likelihood, the order of events in its natural history also answers the question. I think that by the time of the *Philebus* and *Ti-maeus*, Plato is ready to offer an account embracing more answers to such questions about particulars.

81. I think that a similar account can be given for the moral properties in terms of the idiosyncratic characteristics of the different just individuals.

82. This same kind of gap also emerges in the craft analogy. On the one hand, a

model can serve as an exact paradigm for every copy one creates on an assembly line. Artistic workshops devoted to the production of capitols appear to have worked in this fashion. A master directs others to produce more capitols just like his paradigm. Such an analogy suggests that the Form is characterized in the same fashion as the particulars for which it is the model. On the other hand, potters and architects, ship designers, bed makers, and shuttle producers all can work from what we might think of as a blueprint. Here the model need not be another ship or shuttle or house at all. Indeed, the model-blueprint need not even specify particular material components or dimensions, sizes, weights, or what have you, provided that the relevant ratios and proportions are maintained by the potter, say, who might throw *pithoi* jars of different sizes and dimensions. This kind of model would admit of countless, variant copies, united by the artist's understanding of what the blueprint dictates. But each of these copies would be material products, houses, ships, and shuttles, with specific, determinate features. The shuttle analogy in the *Cratylus*, esp. 389d–390a2, is our best evidence for this point. The material aspects of the shuttle are almost disregarded in Socrates' remarks. Provided that the function is embedded in the material, it matters not whether the material is wood, or iron, or some *appropriate* material. The same would be true, up to certain limits, of the length or thickness of the shuttles. There is, however, some limit to how far we can go here. Shuttles made of cloth would not be able to perform their tasks and would be shuttles, if at all, in name only.

83. Cf. N. 7. White, "Epistemology."

84. When considered itself by itself, Phaedan souls are necessarily what they are. They are also individuals, numerically distinct from each other. Their individuality is not explained by the particular to which they are present, nor by the Form of Soul, if there is one. Since, when considered itself by itself, each soul will have, and have necessarily, the same properties, nothing explains the individuality of the soul. Nothing, however, precludes an individual soul from acquiring contingent properties when incarcerated. In so far as its relation to a body is responsible for a soul coming to have contingent properties, matter is again a necessary condition for contingency.

85. Two features of this account will come under special scrutiny in the later works. Throughout the *Phaedo* and all the early and middle-period dialogues, Plato spends little time discussing the material aspect of particulars, the individuation of particulars, or their persistence. Once his focus shifts to worries about the nature and behavior of these particulars and their matter, he writes the *Timaeus*. The second feature concerns Forms and the thesis that Partaking is a characterizing relation. It will turn out that Forms participate and, I will argue, are characterized. Since Forms are immaterial, the determination and contingency due to matter cannot afflict the Form. In their own way, Forms will be determinately characterized.

86. See Code, "Essence," esp. 425–29.

87. "Justice is just" is short for "Justice is what it is to be just." Cf. Nehamas, "Imperfection," and especially "Self-Predication."

88. This is not to say that each essence is predicable of only the Form of which it is the essence. We shall see that there are form-copies that arguably have the essence predicated of them. Moreover, if the Form and its essence are identical, then if the Form is predicated of the particular, it will follow that the essence is too.

89. Nicholas Denyer objected in conversation that on this account of "mono-eides," "polueides" should mean *of many essences*. Hence, in the Affinity Argument,

particulars will have to be *of many essences*. Since this argument precedes the distinction between Being and Having, I want to claim that the later discussion clarifies the sense in which the particular is of many essences, namely that it has many Forms. Why it does not thereby have many essences is discussed above.

90. This, I think, would not be a surprise to the reader of the *Symposium*, *Phaedrus*, or *Republic*.

91. Herein is cause to doubt that Snow and Fire are Forms. But if they are, then one can see why Plato would want to write a *Timaeus* in order to explain how particulars could come to have, necessarily, properties when the Forms lack them. I think that Plato would balk at the notion that any Form is hot or cold. For a different account of particulars in the middle Plato, see Nehamas, "Opposites." In this early work, Nehamas allows that particulars have essences. In his later studies, "Imperfection" and "Self-Predication," he develops his analysis of imperfection in terms of different ways of being. If he wishes to retain both accounts, then he must limit Forms only to Opposites, which he does. However, in "Self-Predication" there is little discussion of the essential properties of particulars. It is not clear whether he still accepts that particulars in any way enjoy the same kind of being as Forms. In "Imperfection," the reason why particulars have essential properties seems to be that they are needed for reidentification. I doubt whether this is true, and I think Nehamas would agree. But I doubt that Plato thought it was true, and apparently Nehamas does not. In the middle-period works I think Plato does not worry about the persistence and reidentification of particulars. When he does worry about it, he pens the *Timaeus*. There too, I will argue, there is no commitment to particulars endowed with essences, i.e., particulars which get to Be what they are.

92. Some might appeal to the modern *de re/de dicto* distinction in order to speak of *de dicto* essences or *de dicto* necessities.

93. I owe my introduction to this way of viewing the imperfection of the sensible world to a series of articles by Nehamas in the 1970s. Alan Code's work on Aristotle was also seminal. On the type-distinction see especially Kung, "Thises," and Patterson, *Image*. See also note 13.

94. Cherniss, "Timaeus," and Allen, "Participation." And see Nehamas, "Self-Predication," Vlastos, "Proposed," and Silverman, "Synonymy."

95. Besides the intuitive appeal of such a position, it also seems to allow Plato to resist Third Man difficulties. See *ibid.* For an excellent recent account of the Third Man worries and Plato's treatment of them, see Meinwald, "Good-bye."

96. It does not follow from the identity thesis alone that Forms are nothing but self-identical. This additional facet of Forms is derived from remarks such as those in the Affinity Argument concerning the simplicity and uniformity of a Form, as well as interpretations of compresence, the Recollection Argument, and other texts.

97. Cf. Sellars, "Particulars" and "Complex." See also the Cherniss and Allen articles in which the identity thesis is defended. Nehamas offers what he takes to be a different account intimately related to the identity approach. Vlastos argued that Nehamas's view collapses into the identity thesis. See note 94.

98. In this key respect Plato's Forms differ from Socratic properties.

99. See Fine, "Immanence" and Devereaux, "Separation." Contemporary concerns with tropes or thick-versus-thin particulars are other examples of the same worry.

100. To the best of my knowledge, all those who admit form-copies into the ontology assert that the strong(est) predication relation holds between them and the Form. Cf. Allen, "Participation," 46, Nehamas, "Opposites," 476.

101. Cf. Nehamas, *ibid.*, 477, who categorizes the relation as that of part to whole while at the same time allowing that the form-copy is completely, or essentially, what it is.

102. Devereaux, "Separation," a proponent of form-copies, thinks that they must perish, for this is what distinguishes them from Forms.

103. I leave aside problems occasioned by his commitment to immortal souls.

104. Or universals cum matter and soul. What is needed is an account of matter. Plato never satisfactorily explains how the body and soul are united.

105. Cass Weller put this objection to me.

106. With the development in the *Timaeus* of an *account* of particulars, these matters will have to be reassessed.

107. It would be impossible to determine whether a form-copy that had withdrawn from one particular had returned to another bearer, or whether a new form-copy had arrived. For this reason, withdrawal can be said to be equivalent to perishing.

108. See Mates, "Identity," and Code, "Essence."

109. Compare modern accounts of tropes such as those developed by Sellars, "Particulars," or D. C. Williams, "Elements."

110. This cannot be defended in a conclusive fashion from the text of the *Phaedo*. It is possible to read the passages at 102ff. as saying that there is the property instance, the fire-in-the-log, and predicated of it, because always found with it, is heat. The alternative I prefer posits a second form-copy, the heat-in-the-log, and lets the form-copy of Heat necessarily accompany each form-copy of Fire. I assume that other things might be the cause of heat, in the same way that it seems that other things besides snow might be the cause of cold. See Rowe, *Phaedo*, 249ff., and Gallop, *Phaedo*, 187ff.

111. It also afflicts Code's account, "Essence," since he does not include form-copies in his logic of Izzing and Hazzing.

112. Compare Aristotle at work in *Metaphysics Zeta*, especially *Zeta* 6. There he argues that a primary substance is strictly speaking identical with its essence. But it does not follow that, for Aristotle, essence is always identical with that of which it is predicated, i.e., that the ontological relation Being is the same as identity.

113. It is possible to meld Plato's account of naming and predication with different explanations of the type-difference between Forms and particulars. We can explain the naming of both Helen and Beauty itself "beautiful" either by stipulating that the same name applies because the same property is predicated of different types of subjects—abstract Forms versus concrete particulars; or we can say that there are different properties assigned which are somehow sufficiently related to one another that one name will serve (an approximation account); or we can argue that the name "beautiful" is elliptical for a complex expression, or rather a cluster of expressions, each of which, though different from one another, contains the expression "beautiful" as a constituent. Finally, one can implicate the relation between property and subject, claiming that different relations are involved depending on whether the subject involved in the predication is a particular or a Form. Suppose that there is a different

essence for each kind of type, the essence of the Form Equality, the essence of the image of the Form, i.e., the particular sticks, and the essence of the image of the image, i.e., the shadows of the sticks (and perhaps so on if we iterate, say, the shadows as reflections in water). Here again we seem to have different properties, but the account is neutral about the different ontological relations. On the one hand, it allots essences to all types of items, while on the other it seems to say that what it is for a type other than a Form to have an essence is for it to *partake* of the Form. What it is for a Form to have an essence is for it to *be* that essence.

An advantage of this last analysis of the type distinction is best appreciated if we consider the *Republic's* formula that the objects of belief “are and are not.” By assigning different essences to each type we might be able to parse the formula as indicating that the sensible particular is a chair and is not a chair, where the elliptical “chair” is filled out in different fashions on either side of the ampersand: on the affirmative conjunct it is a chair of the image kind; on the negative side it is not a chair of the form kind. One can thus dispense with the “is” of existence. We have instead, it seems, a statement of identity and a statement of nonidentity. Insofar as we treat the “is” as the same, we have avoided a charge of equivocation. The price, however, seems to me to be equivalent, for now the predicate “F,” here “is a chair,” turns out to be ambiguous. This leaves open, however, whether there is more to say about proper names such as “Socrates.” It may be that although all properties of particulars are accidental, and hence in this respect particulars can only be called by eponyms, there is still room to create a proper name for particulars, e.g., “Socrates,” “Plato,” and so on. And this may be done irrespective of how we integrate souls into our account. See Patterson, *Image*.

Chapter Four: Refining the Theory of Forms

1. Interest in the *Parmenides* may be at an all-time high. See the recent works by Allen, *Parmenides*, M. L. Miller, *Parmenides*, Meinwald, *Parmenides*, Gill, *Parmenides*, Sayre, *Ontology*, and Turnbull, *Parmenides*, as well as recent articles by Curd, “Problems” and “Unity,” Schofield, “Likeness,” and the relevant sections in Moravcsik, *Platonism*, and McCabe, *Individuals*, to name a few. Ryle’s 1939 paper, “Parmenides,” is, in my view, the most significant in terms of its impact on the scholarship. Other classic pieces include Cherniss, “Parmenides,” Cornford’s translation and commentary, *Parmenides*, Owen’s “Notes” and “Timeless,” and Vlastos’s papers on self-predication. On Ryle, see ch. 5.

2. See Morrow and Dillon, *Proclus*, 7–11, 28–47.

3. There are various intermediate positions, the most famous of which perhaps is Vlastos’s view that they are a “record of honest perplexity,” i.e., that Plato knew that there was a problem but did not know how to solve it. See Vlastos, “Third Man,” esp. 254.

4. For a lucid account of the arguments of the first part, and the dialogue as a whole, see Gill, *Parmenides*, Introduction, and Meinwald, *Parmenides*. Given the concerns about participation that dominate the first part of the dialogue, that we first encounter Cephalus returning from Clazomene is significant. Clazomene is the home of Anaxagoras, whose *materialist* account of inherence and parts and wholes is a rival to Plato’s account of participation.

5. . . . εἶτα ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ταῦτα δυνάμενα συγκεράννυσθαι καὶ διακρίνεσθαι ἀποφάνη (129e2–3).

6. I ignore the remark in the *Republic* (596a), which can suggest that there is a Form for every name or common noun or adjective in Greek. I do not think that the Greek privileges our linguistic acts. The accustomed method is to hypothesize that each Form is some one thing concerning each of the many particulars, to which we assign the same name—εἶδος γὰρ πού τι ἐν ἑκάστων εἰώθαμεν τίθεσθαι περὶ ἕκαστα τὰ πολλά, οἷς ταῦτόν ὄνομα ἐπιφέρομεν. The names are set over particulars that have a property in common. There is little doubt that by the time of the *Statesman* (262dff.) Plato explicitly rejects Forms where there are “cuts” but no kinds. The doctrine of the *Cratylus* is hard to discern, especially given the definition of a name as *diakritikon* and *didaskalikon* (383b13–c1). See Silverman, “Naming.”

7. Compare, for instance, Fine, *Ideas*, 100, who concedes that by the time of the *Timaeus* and *Philebus* Plato came to think that compresence somehow infects particulars in the natural kinds and thus prompts Plato to posit Forms for a much broader range of properties, including Man and Fire.

8. Taking ἐπι πάντα with both the infinitive εἶναι and the participle ἰδόντι (132a3).

9. The interpretations are too numerous to list. Vlastos’s “Self-Predication” has the Forms characterized by the property they constitute, which is to say that Forms participate in themselves. Cherniss, “*Timaeus*,” contends that they are not characterized by the property they constitute; he treats self-predication statements as identity claims. Sellars, “Vlastos,” Geach, “Third,” and others find different faults in Vlastos’s account. Of the many papers on the structure of the argument, the most helpful have been Cohen “Logic,” Nehamas, “Self-Predication,” and Code, “Origins.” My interpretation is closest to that offered by Nehamas.

10. Note that were the Form to be characterized it would self-participate. Here again it would be what it is in virtue of itself. While self-participation does not affect this Third Man argument, it is a concern when Plato turns to Forms such as Unity or Sameness in the second part of this dialogue and in the *Sophist*. And it might also be in play in the second Third Man argument, if Schofield, “Likeness,” is right.

11. See especially Meinwald, “Good-bye.”

12. On this argument see especially Vlastos, “Self-Predication,” 291–94, Cherniss, “*Timaeus*,” 364–74, Turnbull, “Third,” and Schofield, “Likeness.” Turnbull and Schofield offer a different analysis of the Likeness regress. On their tempting reading, the argument crucially appeals to the Form of Likeness and generates a regress of Likenesses, i.e., many Forms of Likeness. Their second Third Man argument views Socrates’ Likeness as a final response to Parmenides’ original question about the nature of the participation relation. Participation is parsed along the lines of the original or paradigm/copy model suggested in the *Phaedo* and *Republic*. The problem to be solved, according to Schofield, in the second part of the *Parmenides* and the subsequent dialogues is what to make of these “second-order,” or “topic neutral,” or “framework” Forms such as Likeness. I share the view that in the late works it is hard to isolate what are framework Forms and to distinguish them from first order or “substantive” Forms. But even if we accept Schofield’s reconstruction of the second regress argument, the distinction of Being versus Partaking will also render it ineffective.

13. The fact that the second Third Man starts from the idea that Forms are paradigms in nature ($\epsilon\hat{\nu}$ τῆ φύσει) links the argument with the former, where Forms are in souls. Both thus try to respond to the participation worry by dematerializing Forms.

14. See note 3 above for recent commentaries.

15. That the *Parmenides* foreshadows the development of his later metaphysics is not a new idea. I, however, cannot find interpretations that highlight the opening of the Second Hypothesis in the way that I do.

16. Gill, *Parmenides* (141), in the most recent translation, opts for “If it is one.”

17. The notions have undoubtedly been part of the machinery of the Theory of Forms, since Forms are different from particulars and each is posited as a one over many in virtue of the common or same property being manifested in many things. They appear here for the first time in the guise they will occupy throughout the late dialogues, namely as so integral to the later metaphysics that they at least share pride of place with Being itself.

18. *Ousia*’s, i.e., being’s, entrance is rather odd. It emerges from consideration of the tenses of the verb “to be”: in order to partake of Being, the One would have to be in time (141d7–e12). Compare the *Timaeus* 37e3–38b5. The conclusion hardly follows from what preceded, since Forms are timeless and hence will also not be said to have any tensed “being” or tensed statements true of them. But that the conclusion does not follow is really of little importance. The ambiguity over being One and the difference between it and any other property, logical or not, suffices to generate a true conclusion, if not one validly derived from what are in fact true premises.

19. In comparison with the First Hypothesis, the Second affirms all of the properties of the Platonic One that the First had denied of the Parmenidean One.

20. Those who find particulars enjoying strong, complete, or essential predications in the middle-period works will demur on this point.

21. I do not mean to signal an existential “is” by using this locution.

22. Naturally those who think that particulars are beings will reject this answer.

23. Ryle, “*Parmenides*,” saw this phenomenon in light of the judgments or statements that could be made about any (substantial) Form. Concentrating on the logical value, he declared them, and Sameness and Difference, to be syncategorematic Forms, Forms which lacked substantial definitions. They are, instead, forms of judgments. See ch. 5.

24. The Greek is tricky at 143a5–6, with ὄν as participle after ἐφάνη or as part of the name for the Form, the One-Being.

25. Pythagorean readings of the late Plato devote considerable attention to the importance of the derivation of the numbers in the next phase of this Hypothesis. See especially Turnbull, *Parmenides*, and Sayre, *Ontology*.

26. Compare *Rep.* 524b–c, where the mind must separate in thought smallness and largeness, which are confused in the particular.

27. Whether Plato defines Justice in the *Republic*, or anything in the collection and divisions of the late dialogues, is subject to dispute. The outcome of this dispute does not affect my argument.

28. By “unity” I do not mean that the essence is unified or the result of a combination of factors, i.e., the elements of the definition. There is, however, good reason to focus on questions of unity. See McCabe, *Individuals*, and Harte, *Structure*. See ch. 6.

29. The literature on Aristotle's version(s) of the Third Man argument is voluminous. I owe the most to Fine, *Ideas*, and Code, "Origins."

30. See Fine, "Separation," Morrison, "Separation," and their respective replies to one another; Vlastos, "Separation," Irwin, "Heracliteanism" and *Moral*; On Aristotle on Plato's metaphysics, see Fine, *Ideas*, Cherniss, *Criticism*, and Code, "Essence."

31. It is likely that definitional separation also involves the relation between the elements of the definition and the definiendum. For instance, are Man and Animal separate in account if the one must be mentioned in the account of the other? Plato's Forms are no less separate from each other, though we shall see (chs. 5 and 6) that the Forms' (new-found) power to combine, along with concerns about the elements of definitions, raise problems about how Forms can be separate from one another. See next note.

32. I omit discussion of priority in definition or nature. While it certainly is central to Aristotle's arguments about Being qua Being, it is not critical to Plato's account. In no small measure this is due to the fact that his is not an immanent realism and to the fact that his particulars, on my reading, are clearly dependent on Forms. Hence, Forms are naturally prior and, since they alone, I claim, are definable, definitionally prior.

33. The καί is a true conjunction, not an epexegetic καί.

34. The force of the participle is underdetermined by the text, but it typically is read in a causal fashion.

35. Ross, *Metaphysics*, 462, ad loc., and Fine, *Ideas*, 46, translate the genitive expression as classificatory: Fine, "as particulars"; Ross, "and belonging to the class of particulars."

36. Fine, *ibid.*, 46, adds particularity in place of being separate.

37. 1086b3–4 suggests that the genitive τῶν at 34 also depends on the χωριστάς.

38. In keeping with the topic of the argument, I here depart from my practice and translate οὐσία as "substance."

39. See, for instance, Fine's thorough discussion of the varieties of separation, "Separation," 31–45. Compare Armstrong, *Universals*, 64–76.

40. Two issues are of special concern. First, there is the question of whether a Platonic particular, e.g., Socrates, is best viewed as a mere collection of properties, a so-called bundle theory of particulars, or whether a particular is something other than a mere bundle, either because, for instance, it has a material component or because it has an essential property. See ch. 7.

41. The argument in *Meta.* 13.9 supplies additional premises which validly allow us to conclude that Forms are separate on Aristotelian grounds. Fine, *Ideas*, 60, thinks that the other two arguments do not yield valid arguments for separated Forms. Strictly speaking, this is correct since even in my reconstruction there are suppressed premises. But I think validity is not the issue.

42. E.g., Fine, *Ideas*, 45–61, Irwin, *Moral*, 145–57.

43. "Separation" and *On Ideas*, ch. 2.

44. Other types of change are admitted by the Sensibilists. The type exhibited by aspect change is, however, crucial to their understanding of the emergence and separation of Forms.

45. Of course there is nothing to preclude change of properties, and hence things could be in flux in both ways, although it seems that *no property, as opposed to a*

particular, could suffer from what Irwin calls *s* (= self)-change, unless Cambridge-change qualifies as self-change for a property. I know of no one who holds this view.

46. Fine's most recent discussion of this topic, *On Ideas*, passim, but especially 46–65, and 101, is by far the most comprehensive and the best. She distinguishes narrow from broad compresence. Some thing suffers "narrow compresence (of opposites) with respect to being F if it is F and not F in virtue of some one and the same aspect of itself. For example, the action type of standing firm in battle, under the description 'standing firm in battle,' is both courageous (in so far as it has some courageous tokens) and not courageous (in so far as it has some tokens that are not courageous)" (47). Her broad compresence, it seems, is reserved for the late dialogues. There a sample of sensible fire is fire and not fire in that each sample has "features that are not essential to the nature of fire, since each has bits of earth and the other elements mixed in (*Tim.* 49c–51d); no sensible sample of fire is pure fire." (Recall Vlastos's two kinds of compresence, chapter 3, section 3. See ch. 7 for my account of the *Timaieus*.) "Something is F and not F in the broad sense just in case, in addition to being F, it is also not F in virtue of having features that are not essential to being F as such. . . . Every F thing other than the property of F is F and not F in the broad sense" (100). Even properties will suffer broad compresence, insofar as they have elements in their definition with which they are not identical. For this reason Fine is careful to limit broad compresence to features that are "not essential" to being F.

47. See Appendix.

48. See Fine's discussion, *Ideas*, 46–65. That these notions are defined in terms of one another is not, in and of itself, problematic. No doubt others would fault some of the implications or equations established by Fine. According to Fine, the Form F is F in its own *sui generis* way, namely in *that it explains why sensible particulars are F*. The sensible particular is F in a different way, though, Fine claims, they are both F in the same sense of "F." "To say that if *x* explains *y*'s being F, it is itself F, though perhaps in a different way from the way in which *y* is F, is not to say that *x* and *y* are F in different senses of 'F'" (270, n. 37). Fine (277, n. 80) is aware of the difficulty in sustaining a clear distinction between ways of being *f* and senses of "F." Her account, if I understand it, seems to me to fall victim to the difficulty. Fine explains her claim that the sense of "F" is the same by appealing to the meaning of the term. Cows and horses are animals in different ways, but "animal" means the same in "Horses are animals" and "Cows are animals." Yet in her discussion of broad self-predication, she distinguishes the ways in which the form of Equal and the sensible equals are equal by appealing to what we mean: "But when Plato suggests that the form of equal is equal, he does not *mean* that it has the same measures as something. He *means* that it is equal because it explains why sensible things are equal to one another" (62, my italics). If he means different things when he calls them "F," then the sense of "F" is different in the two cases.

49. However, see Fine, *Ideas*, 58, who (at times) writes as though only "some sensible properties of F suffer compresence."

50. Since we are representing the account of an interlocutor, or imaginary interlocutor, it is unclear whether the interlocutor offers the prospective definition on his own. The fact that Socrates urges the sight-lover to give an account, or attributes such accounts to unnamed people in the *Phaedo*, is reason to hesitate to think that others are running around engaged in the search for definitions of the Socratic variety.

51. The advocate of Bright Color as the explanation of Bassae's beauty should be perfectly happy to concede that other properties cause the beauty of other things.

52. Of course it is not a non sequitur if the separation is from other properties. Advocates of this approach slide between separation from sensible properties and separation from sensible particulars. While they commence with claims about the relation between Forms and particulars, their conclusions concern Forms and other Forms, if sensible properties are Forms, or Forms and other properties.

53. Note that Socrates and Aristotle can accept that there is knowledge of the universal while espousing an immanent realism. The particular will then be knowable insofar as universals are in them. If Plato does not accept an immanent realism, then there will be no knowledge of particulars. Efforts to derive knowledge of the sensible particulars from a "basic" knowledge of Forms (universals) require that Forms be present in particulars, or that non-Form universals be present in particulars. If particulars have complete properties for which there are no Forms, then it is reasonable to conclude that they have them essentially and hence can be known in that respect.

54. It is important to distinguish the claim that sensible particulars are knowable and definable in virtue of their possession of an *ousia* and the claim that the *ousia* of the sensible particular is knowable. *Ousiai* are strictly definable and knowable, and *ousiai* are, strictly speaking, primary substances for Aristotle. Sensible particulars are not; they are definable, in a way.

55. This is a consequence of the Z6 thesis, along with other considerations about hylomorphic analysis. The sensible particular is not identical with its essence, as I read Aristotle.

56. Fine, "Separation," 71: "Aristotle's account of separation in M.9, then, seems to rest on the incorrect assumption that Plato, like Aristotle, believes that substance is as such separate. Forms are Plato's substances; and they may well be separate. But there is no evidence that for Plato separation issues from substantiality. We have not yet, then, found a route to separation."

57. *Ibid.*, 70–71.

58. See the opening pages of Cherniss, *Criticism*, especially 2, where commenting on *Topics* 137b3–13, he writes, "The Platonic conception of the idea as the *identification* of essence and existence is silently denied" (*italics his*).

59. The explanatory power is here taken to include a causal aspect, whereby the particulars are subject to explanation because they have the universals. Were universals inert in this respect, then they would function only as elements in our explanations, i.e., only as concepts in our laws. On why this won't do for Plato see chapter 7.

60. I postpone to another book in what sense experience is required for the *start* of recollection. Even those who think that Plato may have allowed knowledge of the sensible world make knowledge of Forms basic.

61. This is an occasion where our language of necessity and being a necessary condition fails to capture the ancient notions or relations under examination. The sort of dependence Plato and Aristotle has in mind in the separation controversy is not suited to analysis in terms of existing if something else does not. Given that Difference and Sameness must "exist" if Being and Unity exist, then they are not separate from one another. If one is a holist, then perhaps none of the Forms are separate from one another. In order for one to exist all must exist.

62. With Vlastos, "Separation," but not with Fine, who associates the condition with being free from compresence: *Ideas*, ch. 4 and passim.

63. Sally Haslanger asked why not let the essence be had by the particular? Her question betrays that my queasiness about allowing essence to be "accidentally" predicated of particulars may not be felt by others. No doubt sentiments about *de re* and *de dicto* essentialism (necessity) are at work here. Whatever those sentiments may be, the attribution of essence via some relation weaker than Being is to import an Aristotelian perspective into Plato. Aristotle does allow some kind of predication of essence of both the hylomorphic composite and the matter, though not necessarily the same kind. It is arguable that the predication relation is the same as that which obtains between the essence and those items which are primary substances. If so, then we need to distinguish the primary from the other ways in which the essence is predicated of that with which it is identical, namely the primary *ousia*, and that with which it is not, strictly speaking, identical, namely the material composite or the matter. This account would also require us to explore the difference in the material aspect of Platonic and Aristotelian particulars.

64. Cf. Code, "Essence," 425–29, who thinks that Forms are definitionally separate full stop, since he does not utilize form-copies in his account.

Chapter Five: Forms and Language

1. Contrary to the thrust of some recent scholarship: See McCabe, *Individuals*, Moravcsik, *Platonism*.

2. The grouping of Forms into trees or families does make it easier to think about whether one family is existentially separate from another. It seems easy enough to consider whether Animal could exist even if there were no Flower, or Capybara itself. Just where to draw the line between entailments between families of properties is a vexing question, both in the Academy and in the scholarship. The temptation is to think that all properties are somehow related. In Plato's case, it seems to be a function of the Good to determine which properties there are. Some might allow that we can understand a Form to be existentially independent of any Form in another Family even if the Good somehow determines that such families must exist and be related, as say the Virtues and Humans or Animals.

3. See Moravcsik, *Platonism*, part 2, for an extended analysis of the reasons to posit properties or abstracta that are not Forms. The most notorious passage on this score is the *Sophist's* discussion of the parts of the Different and the non-beings, which some would take to be properties but not Forms. See ch. 6.

4. The best account of the differences between the epistemology of the middle-period works and the later dialogues is Burnyeat's introduction to the Levitt translation of the *Theaetetus*. Generally speaking, I see far fewer developments than does he. See Silverman, "Commons."

5. It would be useful and interesting to trace lines of influence emanating from this article in particular and Ryle in general. The obvious link is to G.E.L. Owen and through Owen to his many students. Cf. Cherniss, "Timaeus," 233–36. In addition to this paper, his work on the *Theaetetus*, "Atomism," seems to have been an underground manifesto, influencing the direction of scholarship on that dialogue in En-

gland and America. Common to both works is a fascination with the similarities between Russell's Logical Atomism and Theory of Types and the developments of Plato's metaphysics and logic. Since *quellenforschung* applies to the history of scholarship, a study of Ryle's influence would help us to understand how the questions that we now answer or dismiss have come to be part of the contemporary scholarship on Plato. In addition to Ryle, Austin and others scholars at Oxford devoted much attention to ancient philosophy, especially Aristotle.

6. Besides Owen's work, Ackrill's papers on "*Sumplike*" (1955) and "Copula" (1957) are seminal studies. See also the work of Strang, "Third Man," which picks up another strand of English philosophical thought in the 1950s, the work of Wittgenstein.

7. Ryle dismisses the method of division: "Whether Plato did or did not believe that the Method of Division was a powerful philosophic instrument, we can be quite clear that it is not so. No philosopher, including Plato, has ever tried to employ it for the resolution of any serious philosophical problem, and if they had done so they would not have succeeded. For first of all it can only be applied to concepts of the genus-species or determinable-determinate sort, and it is not concepts of this sort that in general, if ever, engender philosophical problems" (41).

8. See especially Armstrong, *Universals*, vol. 1, 70–71.

9. "Parmenides," 10. Ryle then adds that this is not Bradley's regress "found in the necessity of there always existing a further relation to relate any relation to its terms." See also Armstrong, *ibid.*, I, 70–71. See Fine, "Armstrong," for a lucid discussion of problems with Armstrong's account of relational realisms. I am not sure that this regress is necessary, even if we assume that there should be a Form of Participation. We will see that certain Forms self-participate, i.e., a Form is characterized by the very property it is. Perhaps Participation can self-participate, thus blocking the regress.

10. Armstrong once thought it a potent weapon against Transcendent (Platonic) Realism. He retrenched in his subsequent work, *Opinionated*.

11. Cf. Armstrong, *Opinionated*, 108: "I do not think that the problem of characterizing the tie should detain us. This was Plato's concern in the first part of his *Parmenides*. There he showed conclusively that the relation of particular to form cannot be either 'participation' or 'imitation.' But it is perfectly reasonable for an upholder of universals to claim that instantiation is a primitive that cannot be explicated by analysis, definition, or metaphor. . . . Why not instantiation as a directly apprehended primitive?"

12. D. Lewis, "Universals."

13. See, for instance, Armstrong, *Universals*, 70–71: "It appears, then, that the Relation regress holds against all relational analyses of what it is for *an object* to have a property or relation" (italicized phrase is my emphasis).

14. Strawson, who with many others accepts this distinction, sometimes speaks of a nonrelational tie. See *Individuals*, 167–69.

15. For an interpretation of Plato's metaphysics and epistemology based on his antinomialism, see Penner, *Ascent*.

16. See Ackrill's "Copula" and "*Sumplike*," responding largely to Cornford's commentary, *Knowledge*, and Moravcsik, "Meaning."

17. There have been direct responses to the Owen-Frede contention that Plato

fails to isolate the existential “is.” See especially Heinaman, “Being.” Lesley Brown, “Syntactical,” has argued that the distinction between complete and incomplete uses of “is” is misdrawn. There are, she claims, two characterizations of a complete use of *esti*: “C₁ a use which neither has nor allows a complement; C₂ a use where there is no complement (explicit or elided) but which allows a complement” (53). Likening the behavior of “is” to verbs like *grow* or *teach*, she observes that they allow transformations such as: 1) Jane is teaching French; to 2) Jane is teaching. In a similar fashion she argues that “is” is often best viewed as used in the C₂ fashion. This allows her to claim that insofar as a subject is in no way at all, i.e., has no complement, it can be seen as lacking existence.

18. Brown’s, *ibid.*, C₂ interpretation of the copula fails to link existence and essence, though I believe nothing restricts us from amending it to do so.

19. Roberts, “Being,” argues for a similar emphasis on the metaphysical aspect of Being in the *Sophist*.

20. It is surely significant that Socrates, not the Stranger, makes these remarks, and equally important that for him it is the true philosopher—as opposed to the Stranger’s sophist—who can generate these different appearances in the ignorant others. Note that these images need not be false. Rather the ignorant do not understand the true nature of the philosopher which enables him to appear as he does. The *Republic* and *Phaedrus* confirm that in his own way the philosopher is sometimes a statesman and sometimes mad. The sixth definition of the sophist, 227c7–231e6, suggests that the practitioner of the true cathartic method, Socrates?, can be plausibly described as both a philosopher and sophist.

21. See Owen, “Not-Being,” and Heinaman’s, “Being,” critique of Owen’s attempt to read these arguments in terms of an incomplete “is.” I concur with Heinaman that an existential notion is operative in this section of the dialogue. See Brown, “Syntactical,” however, for a way to effectively merge the existential import with the syntactic incompleteness.

22. The text at 238a5 is deliciously ambiguous: Τῶ μὲν ὄντι που προσγένουτ’ ἄν τι τῶν ὄντων ἕτερον. White, *Sophist*, translates the last four words as “some other of those which are.” It can also mean something other than the things which are. As we will see, this is an apt description of any image, including a verbal image, i.e., a name. The tenor of this step cuts against Owen’s contention that existence and nonexistence are not in play in the dialogue. Number, it seems, cannot be attached to what is not, because it is a being, something existent, whereas not-being is not an existent in any way.

23. Owen’s analysis of this passage, “Not-Being,” 241–48, is complicated. He claims that the first stage is divorced from the next two—stage two neither challenges one nor builds on it. Stages two and three, on the other hand, are “self contained” and “provide between them all the material for the *Sophist*’s new problem: the problem, namely, whether sense can be made of those expressions ‘what is not’ and ‘what are not’” (242–43). In the first stage, according to Owen, the puzzle is about nonexistent objects of discourse. He links it with the “old perplexity” (from the *Theaetetus*, *Cratylus* and *Euthydemus*), where the difficulty is to fit the words to the world “without ever asking whether these are capable of coherent use.” It is like trying to see or touch nothing, which is to say that it is not to see or touch at all. However, Owen claims, the first puzzle has the right, i.e., the new, question, “*what is the proper appli-*

cation of the name ‘what is not.’” Stage two converts this question into one about reference, though it too keeps the equation of what is not and nothing. Since it does not give us one thing to mention it is unmentionable. For Owen, then, the equation of what is not with nothing stands. What is to be attacked is the equation of nothing and what does not exist. At this juncture Owen introduces centaurs and nonexistent flights of Theaetetus to show that the nonexistent is not the same as nothing. He claims that it is open to objections from two different points of view, that of the *Theaetetus* and that of the *Sophist*. The former treats the centaur and the nonexistent flight equivalently and, using the simple proxy view of names, declares that there is nothing to speak of in this case and hence there is no speaking going on at all. Not so the *Sophist*. Here we are asking whether nothing is to be identified with what does not exist: “now we seem to need a distinction between the case in which there isn’t anything being talked about and that in which there is something that is talked about, viz. nothing” (246). The task is to show that whereas we can describe centaurs and Theaetetus’s flying, we cannot describe the nothing we have been talking about. This amounts to the claim, for Owen, that the equation of what is not and nothing is acceptable in the *Sophist* provided that we recognize that, *pace* the *Theaetetus*, what is not is not to be parsed as what does not exist—for the flight and the centaur are on equal footing with nothing in that regard—but with what is not describable. For if we emphasize the role description is to play here, it turns out that what is problematic is that we are equating what is not with “what is not anything, what not in any way is” (247). This, according to Owen, shows that the *Sophist* is trying to import an unintelligible term as the answer to the original question at 237c1–2, to what to apply the name “what is not”: for the right answer is not “nothing” but “anything whatever, considered as differentiable from other things.” The trick for Owen, then, is to show that the argument in the dialogue does not require a special, i.e., existential, sense of the verb, but rather the proper analysis of how to negate it.

24. I think that Owen is mistaken in thinking that these arguments contribute nothing new to the argument. Cornford saw that they did: “We are thus led to expect a demonstration (1) that things that are not wholly real (eidola) can have some sort of existence, and (2) that it is possible to think and say what is false. In the sequel, this second point is established. But it cannot be said that the possibility of a world of eidola, imaging the real world of Forms, is ever demonstrated in this dialogue” (*Knowledge*, 215).

25. Heinaman’s, “Being,” interpretation of this fifth argument is a convincing attack against Owen’s claim that the nonexistent is nowhere in play. The adverbs modifying what is not and what is, respectively, μηδαμῶς (240e2, e5) and πάντως (240e5), would come out on Owen’s account as that which is predicatively nothing and that which is predicatively everything. The latter cannot be right.

26. It is also worth noting that the argument about what an image is, is conducted in terms of the singular term, not-being, whereas the argument about false statement utilizes the plural, things that are not. This reflects not only the worries about number from arguments 1–3, the plurals also look forward to the complexity needed to account for false statement at the conclusion of the dialogue. Cf. White, *Sophist*, n. 35.

27. *Και τὸ παράπαν γε ἀποδέχασθαι του λέγοντος ὡς ἔστιν ὄνομά τι, λόγον οὐκ ἂν ἔχον* (244c11–d1). White’s translation—“And it’s completely absurd, and

unacceptable, for someone to say that there is a name if there is no account of it”—is I think unacceptable, unless he is translating an emended text. The difficulty arises in trying to parse the participle ἔχον. I prefer to keep the manuscript reading and understand the claim at c11–d1 to parallel the grammar of καταγέλαστον at c8–9: “it would of course be ridiculous . . .”; “It would completely lack reason to accept . . .” There is no hint that an account, λόγος, or definition of anything is in play here. (Perhaps, though, all White means by “account” here is there is no defense available to the monist.)

28. Note the dual δύο . . . τινε without any participle, neatly straddling the ontological sphere without referring to them as beings.

29. I think that the Burnet OCT Greek here is fine. Use and mention are another matter.

30. The best account of the varieties of self-refutation arguments is Mackie, “Self-Refutation.” Burnyeat, “Self-Refutation,” is the classic study of the best known of the ancient self-refutation arguments, the περιτροπή of Protagoras in the *Theaetetus*.

31. Note that the Friends, unlike the materialists, do not reduce everything to being, or, like the previous ontologists, to their favorite beings. They accept different kinds of entities, though only one receives the sobriquet “being.”

32. It is worth comparing these descriptions of sensation, in particular the datives and the *dia* plus genitive phrases, with those in the *Theaetetus*, *Timaeus*, and earlier dialogues. See Burnyeat, “Grammar,” and Silverman, “Commons.”

33. The initial description of the Friends “becoming” had included the participle φερομένην, but the language of motion had been suppressed until now.

34. τό κινούμενον δὴ καὶ κίνησιν (249b2): the participle is in the middle, as is appropriate for soul in the Platonic dialogues.

35. Compare Keyt, “Paradox.” Keyt (reacting to an argument of Cherniss) points out that Plato does not draw the distinction between physical and psychical change in the *Sophist*. This is correct, but the loser in this circumstance is physical motion. Body does not enter the discussion in the last stage of the argument against the account of the Gods. “The Eleatic’s general conclusion summarizes the passage that begins at 248e6 and affirms that being is ‘as many things as are unchanged and as many as are changed.’ The things that are unchanged are the objects of knowledge, the Forms; the things that are changed are things that are ensouled, living bodies” (6). Keyt is misled by the middle, not passive, τό κινούμενον (249b2), and the expression τὸ παράπαν ἔμψυχον ὄν (249a10). The completely alive being is not a living body, but *that which wholly is* from 248e7–8. Keyt is correct, however, to note that even if we grant that Plato is here concerned with psychical motion and the rest of what is known, we have only the beginning of an answer to the puzzle of the argument.

36. This conclusion should be read along with the remarks at 242c8–243c5 where the Stranger first indicated that ontologists contemned them by the way they had presented their doctrines.

37. Most recently it led Vlastos, “Ambiguity,” to his Pauline interpretation. See also Bostock, “Is Not.”

38. This is true only to the extent that we consider the knowing soul’s communion with *ousia* as a noncandidate for the communion relation the Stranger here alludes to.

39. Cf. Roberts, “Being,” 238.

40. Since having a nature or essence confers existence, this can be treated as an existence claim, provided that one recognize that essence is required in order for something to be. Conversely, it can be read as an incomplete “is,” where the complement is the essence.

41. Compare Theaetetus’s ἀδυνατώτατον at 250d4, where he declares Being cannot be found apart from what moves and what rests. This is precisely what they have just demonstrated had to be true. Compare 252d9–10.

42. See Aristotle, *Topics* 137b3–13. Cf. Cherniss, *Criticism*, 435–42, Vlastos, “Ambiguity,” Keyt, “Paradox,” Frede, *Praedikation*, Roberts, “Being,” Heinaman, “Being,” and Bostock, “Is Not.”

43. See *Phaedrus* 245c–246a2, *Laws* 896e8–897b5, *Timaeus* 46c–e, *Phaedo* 105c9–107a1. See Cherniss, *Criticism*, 402ff.

44. White’s translation obscures the force of ἐκάστοτε: “Let’s give an account of how we call the very same thing, *whatever it may be*, by several different names.” This phrasing implies that anything can be called by several names, but leaves room for the possibility that there are occasions when we do not do so. The Greek implies that *whenever* we name (προσαγορεύομεν) anything, we call it by many names.

45. In the course of this part of the argument the infamous late-learners are introduced. It is unclear from the text exactly what they assert, because Plato omits the copula: they say τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθόν, τὸν δὲ ἄνθρωπον ἄνθρωπον (251c1–2); hence, it is uncertain exactly what form the refutation of the opsimaths takes. They may allow that one can only name, and maintain that there is a strict one-to-one relation between each name and its nominatum. Each nominatum then can have only one name on pain of being many. Thus they would deny that anything can be called by a name other than its own. In which case, they say that man can be called “man” and nothing else. They deny what the Stranger has just affirmed, that we can and do on each occasion call a thing by many names. If we think that they too assert sentences, then they seem to claim that the only thing we can say is a tautology of the form “man is man,” or “good is good.” This, the Stranger seems to say, they cannot claim since such utterances involve the use of many expressions in the *sentence*. He mentions εἶναι, χωρὶς, τῶν ἄλλων, and καθ’ αὐτό (252c2–4). Interestingly, the only apparent violation occurs with the use of “to be,” i.e., man *is* man. The other expressions would then be parts either of other assertions the late learners were liable to offer up, or those Plato thinks they would have to assert in articulating their theory. It is not an accident that these four specific expressions are not only key to his own account, but they also encapsulate the notion that each *on* is what it is in its own right apart from any relation it stands in to others.

46. παντάπασιν (252d6) might indicate confusion on Theaetetus’s part, due in part perhaps to the claim that all partake. His refutation seems to say that were they to commune, motion would become the same as rest—be it in every way. The Stranger follows up this “refutation” with the query: But this, I gather, is impossible by the greatest necessities that motion rest and rest move? I think that this comment undermines Theaetetus’s claim. The “greatest necessities” seems gratuitous. This is the second superlative, “most opposite” having been used initially at 250a8. (I think that Plato is setting things up for a fall.) Whether Theaetetus has yet grasped that participation or communion does not affect something’s nature is unclear from his remarks.

47. See especially Moravcsik, *Platonism*, 181ff.

48. The Gordian knot at 253d5–e2 of what the dialectician knows has not yet been cut.

49. It is not clear that Plato keeps to the order he prescribes at 254b7–d2. It seems that he immediately takes up the question of what Forms a given Form communes with and never states what each is. I think this is a false impression. It results from the failure to realize that it is the partaking in Being that performs the function of saying what each is, or better that each is an essenced item. The subsequent communion with Same and Different will then be regarded as the powers of communion.

50. The answers to these questions are not easy to glean from the text. We have seen that communion or partaking is used in a variety of different senses throughout the preceding argument: souls commune with *ousia*; Motion communes with Being; particulars have many properties (and are called by many names); some Forms combine more than others; some Forms, like vowels, are required for any Form to combine. We will also discover that there are fallacies in the arguments of this section. The sorts of repairs required, and the rationale behind the fallacies, are deemed to be different by different readers. Some have contended that at times it is not the kinds themselves but their participants that are the subjects of communion, especially where Rest and Motion are concerned. See especially Bostock, “Is Not,” who emphasizes the distinction between naming and generalizing uses of the relevant expressions, e.g. “the Fine.” “As a generalizing phrase, it is used to generalize over the things which the adjective is true of. In its naming use, it is used as a singular referring expression to refer to the abstract property, . . . what Plato calls a Form or kind” (104). It is unclear whether Bostock includes the Form itself as a (possible) thing which is generalized over, i.e., whether a Form can be characterized by itself, i.e., be subject to self-participation.

51. *περὶ γὰρ ἀμφοτέρα θάτερον ὅποτερον οὖν γιγνόμενον αὐτοῖν ἀναγκάσει μεταβάλλειν αὐθάρτερον ἐπὶ τοῦναντίον τῆς αὐτοῦ φύσεως, ἅτε μετασχόν τοῦ ἐναντίου.*

52. See especially Bostock, “Is Not,” 108–10, who analyses this argument, and the fallacy contained therein, in terms of a shift from the naming to the generalizing use.

53. Cf. Heinaman, “Self-Predication,” 55–66.

54. Ἄλλ’ εἰ τὸ ὄν καὶ τὸ ταῦτόν μὴδὲν διάφορον σημαίνετον, κίνησιν αὖ πάλιν καὶ στάσιν ἀμφοτέρα εἶναι λέγοντες ἀμφοτέρα οὕτως αὐτὰ ταῦτόν ὡς ὄντα προσερούμεν.

55. We might try to interpret “being” and “same” in such a fashion so as to secure a nonfallacious argument: “Do we mean to say that Motion or Rest is the same as anything (whatever you like), when we say that they are?”

56. Cf. Bostock, “Is Not,” 91.

57. At c13 B reads *ἄλληλα* where T and W read *ἄλλα*. See below for the various interpretive accounts which might have one substitute the correlative pronoun.

58. There is some question over the adverb *ἀεί*: Should it be taken only with the *δέ* clause or should it range over both kinds of beings?

59. Frede, *Praedikation*, offers three possible readings, and additional subpossibilities. His discussion is quite terse. The basic distinction is: (1) Treat the *τῶν ὄντων* as what is predicated and the *τὰ μὲν . . . τὰ δέ* clause to mark off two classes of predicables; (2) treat the *τὰ μὲν . . . τὰ δέ* as predicables and the *τῶν ὄντων* as

what the predicables are predicated of; and 3) treat the τῶν ὄντων . . . τὰ μὲν . . . τὰ δέ as that of which things are predicated. See *Praedikation*, 19–20.

60. The best ancient evidence is Diogenes Laertius III 108–9. See Heineman, “Being,” G.E.L Owen, “Proof,” Cornford, *Knowledge*, 281–85, Cherniss, *Criticism*, 280–83, n. 191. Cf. Frede, *Praedikation*, 19, Bostock, “Is Not,” 92–94.

61. Looking forward, we will have to take up the question of the separation of Forms from one another in general, and at least consider the separation of correlatives from one another in specific. There is the clear intuition that correlatives should stand or fall together. It is important to remember that Plato nowhere thinks that logically relative notions are any less ontologically absolute. Cf. Cherniss, *Criticism*, 283, n. 191.

62. Recall the Recollection Argument, and others in the *Phaedo*: there is no second Equal itself to which the Equal itself is equal, nor is the Large itself larger than the Small itself. This is to confuse the way Forms possess their properties with the way particulars are characterized by Forms. Parmenides, in *Parmenides* 133–34, argues that an ideal Relative (in the logical sense), e.g., the Master itself, has as its correlative (the *ti* to which it is *pros*), an ideal the Slave itself. This is part of the “greatest difficulty” argument, according to which the object of phenomenal man’s phenomenal knowledge would have to be phenomena, and God’s “Ideal” Knowledge the “Ideal” Forms. Thus man could have no knowledge of Forms and God no knowledge of phenomenal affairs.

63. This, however, seems to require that we assume that particulars enjoy a primitive status such that that status determines the result of a particular’s participation in Being. S. Marc Cohen offered this suggestion.

64. Must, not can, as the exchange between Heinaman and Frede shows. The latter claimed that (*Parmenides* shows) in all cases “a is” can be completed by “a is b,” i.e., (1) a is—can be completed by (2)—a is one thing. Even if we accept this formulation, Heinaman rightly points out that the Greek no more means that (1) can be completed by (2) than that (1) entails (2), i.e., that these are two facts, each of which is intelligible on its own; Heinaman, “Being,” 16–17.

65. McDowell, *Theaetetus*, 118.

66. Cf. Frede, *Praedikation*, 14.

67. See Lesley Brown, “Syntactical.”

68. Moravcsik opted for two Forms of Being in his monograph (“Being”). Frede insists that though there are two uses of “is” or two senses, there is nonetheless one “meaning” and only one Form.

69. Diogenes Laertius III 108–9, Aristotle, *passim*, e.g., *Cat.* ch. 5–6, *Top.* VI, ch. 8.

70. In particular, his discussion of “same” as a relative or *pros ti* predicate is used by Heinaman and Frede to buttress their respective, differing interpretations of 255c12–13.

71. This is an epistemological argument based on our understanding of sentences. There are also metaphysical arguments to buttress the epistemological claims. But it is not easy to justify the distinction. See White, “Perceptual.”

72. Frede’s discussion of the referent and nature of the expression *pros allo*, and its relation to ἕτερον which follows, is extremely compressed. I cannot find any argument beyond his claim that *eteron* and *allo* must entail numerical difference. This

seems to speak more to his interpretation of the crucial lines than any philosophical conception of relatives, which can include Sameness as a relative, or the demands of Greek. *Praedikation*, 16.

73. "False," 399–402.

74. The problem of assigning Forms to apparently dissimilar "uses" is not confined to Being. Consider Motion, which is sometimes divided into locomotion and alteration. It is better divided, I think, into self-motion and other motion. Regardless of whether these two "kinds" should be considered sufficiently analogous to the two kinds of "uses," i.e., εἰδοῖν of d4, they may serve to guide our reflections. Self-motion is primary and other motion, whether local or alteration, is considered derivative. So too we should be able to fashion an account of Being according to which one of the uses is primary and the other derived.

75. I am not persuaded that Frede's basic insight must be expressed in terms of numerical distinctness. There are times in his later piece where he seems to be aware of the drawbacks to this language. But even there he never ultimately abandons the program set out in the monograph. Connie Meinwald, in private conversation, has indicated that he is sensitive to the fact that his manner of expression lays himself open to objections. As I read the argument of *Praedikation*, however, I sense that the root of the problem is not manner of expression. It is, rather, a combination of reading with Aristotle in mind and dedication to the (Rylean) linguistic analysis (reduction?) of the greatest kinds.

76. See Cherniss, *Criticism*, 1ff., and Vlastos, "Paradox."

77. See Silverman, "Synonymy."

78. Meinwald, *Parmenides*, 67ff., who applies Frede's analysis to the *Parmenides*, explicitly admits such predications as type-1 predications.

79. Cf. Sellars, "Particulars." See also his "Complex," and D. C. Williams, "Elements."

80. His discussion of predications involving particulars sheds light on what Frede means by uses and meanings. "Although two different uses of '... is ...' are involved in saying that the Form X is x and that the individual Xes are x, '... is ...' has the same meaning in both. Moreover, there is no reason for supposing that '... is x' does have different meanings depending on whether it is applied to the Form X or the particular Xes. For in both cases, 'x' is associated with the same Form X; only in the one case it is predicated of itself, in the other of something else. And so it also was correct for us to stress, right at the beginning, the numerical distinctness of a from b in the second use of '... is ...'." (*Praedikation*, 32–33). Note the emphasis on numerical distinctness. Also, it is unclear why the fact that "x" is associated with the same Form X implies that the meaning of "... is ..." in the two predications is the same.

81. In his "False," Frede appears to recognize that statements of the form "The Different is different from all other things" are type 2 or statements with an is_2 "is" (402). He does not tell us how to emend his account of the difference between the two types, since his specific aim in this paper is to respond to critics about the uses of "is not," not "is."

82. On the other hand, I think that particulars also can be said to be, i.e., exist, in their case because they have properties which are themselves "existents." It is perfectly appropriate to attribute existence to particulars, provided that we are mindful of the fact that their claim to be is dependent on their participation in Forms. Since they are

dependent on Forms, and their way of being is also dependent on the possession of essence at one step removed, particulars are nothing in their own right, and thus cannot be said to be in their own right.

83. A big question is whether we can cash the sense of *allo* in an appropriate fashion. First, we have the contrast with *auto*, which gives us an anchor in what the subject essentially is. The *allo* will then be in a different respect from essentially; it will not then be necessary to read the contrast strictly. Instead we might view the *allo/heteron* as another sign of Plato's looseness of argument, as we saw with Sameness and Being in the fourth stage (255b8–c1). The cases of self-participation differ from self-predication in that we are considering the subject in different respects, what it has versus what it is.

84. *Praedikation*, 19.

85. Cf. Heinaman, "Being," 13–17. See Frede's reply in "False," 397–402.

86. Cf. Lewis, "Identity," and Bostock, "Is Not," 93–98.

87. For Plato, if some property-like entity turns out not to be definable, then not only does it lack an essence—and, hence, cannot be said to be *auto kath' auto*—it fails to exist in any way that he would have us understand the Greek expressions equivalent to this use of "exist." The same cannot be said for particulars.

88. Here, again, the pattern of inferences in the Second Hypothesis of the *Parmenides* needs to be considered: starting from a One-Being, Parmenides/Plato "generates" Difference through consideration of our conceptual abilities to at once isolate and consider in tandem Unity and Being

89. Cf. Armstrong, *Universals*, on essential uniqueness, 70. This is not to claim that each nature is the nature of exactly one item, for the nature or essence may also be the essence of particulars.

90. Recall that in the *Parmenides*' first Two Hypotheses the difference between Forms is obvious.

91. Second-order Sameness will be equivalent to Likeness, or depending on how wide a network of similarity relations we assign to Likeness, a kind of Likeness. *Mutatis mutandis*, second-order Difference will be equivalent to Unlikeness.

92. Since *au fond* participation in Being results in the essencing of Form, one might be tempted to conclude that in no basic case are there two *relata* connected via participation.

93. This would be consonant with Nehamas's reading. It is suggested by the argument at 256d11–257a6.

Chapter Six: Not-Beings

1. Even before the *Parmenides*, however, there are signs that Plato might admit items into the ontology that are neither Forms nor participants. As early as the *Republic*, scholars have found a nascent notion of the proposition in Plato. This discovery is aided and abetted by the doctrine that ἔστίς sometimes has a veridical use in Greek. Thus, taken as the object of belief or knowledge, what is and what is not become the set of true propositions and the set of false propositions, respectively. The object of belief is then the set of all propositions, of knowledge, the set of all true propositions. By adding other passages concerned with images and *phantasmata* to the survey, we can easily extend the range and kinds of mental entities. See Kahn,

Verb, Fine, “Knowledge,” and Silverman, “Phantasia.” More evidence of concepts can be derived from Plato’s arguments in the *Theaetetus* (see Silverman “Commons”). Closely allied to these are the meanings and other “factors” at work in the inchoate account of language Plato develops in the *Phaedo* and *Cratylus*. The final account of Convention, *Cratylus* 434e–435d3, alludes to thoughts in the speaker’s head that the hearer understands. Depending on one’s view of Recollection, one can also find in this doctrine traces of concepts. If one treats recollection as a process restricted to philosophers and their knowledge of Forms, and especially if one limits Forms to a select class of properties, i.e., incomplete properties, then there is reason to insist that the concepts and properties that figure in the thoughts of the non-philosophers are unconnected to Forms. Recall the discussion of the Dialectical Requirement in ch. 1. The terms or notions familiar to the questioner can be thought of as concepts or ideas or meanings, some or none of which might have Forms or particulars as referents. The *Cratylus*’s account of names, and in particular the definition of name at 388b13–c1, also leaves space for meanings or some semantic notions. If the definition appeals both to a diacritical criterion and separately to a didascalical criterion, then it is plausible to treat the latter as a function of what is in the heads of speakers, independent of what is in the world. A distinct consideration derived from the *Cratylus* is the status of what are sometimes referred to as name-Forms, the linguistic/semantic/conceptual types of which the (uttered and written) expressions in languages are tokens (389d4–390a2). It is most economical to treat these types as non-language specific such that “horse” and “pferd” are both treated as tokens of the type horse. I think that there is a Form, the Name itself, but I have doubts about individual name-Forms corresponding to each of the names in a language. Note that these two considerations are related. If one allows that expressions qualify as names either if they separate nature *or* if they convey information, then there is the possibility that there will be a large number of name-Forms where there are neither Forms nor particulars named by those expressions. Plato says next to nothing about the names of particulars, what we would call “proper names,” especially if one excludes the etymological account of the *Cratylus*. On the *Cratylus*, see Silverman, “Naming,” Kretzmann, “Correctness,” Kahn, “Cratylus,” Fine, “Naming,” and MacKenzie, “Cratylus.”

In the previous chapter we saw that reflection on language, thought, and methodology leads Plato to admit language itself as a second kind of entity, an *on* of some sort but distinct from the *onta* which serve as its referents. However, language and thought may not qualify as non-Form properties, since Plato posits Forms of Language and Knowledge, and perhaps even a Form of the Name itself. A different set of considerations based on the need to honor One-Over-Many style arguments *wherever* they can be developed leads to other possible candidates. This line of argument generates Forms, or non-Form properties, for notions that serve as primitives within the metaphysical theory itself. One such notion is the idea of Formhood itself, a property had, it would seem, by all Forms. Another candidate might be Participation itself. Forms for both notions may be *generable* by One-Over-Many arguments, but Plato never treats them as Forms. The latter, I argued, is regarded as the primitive ontological relation. The former, I think, is equivalent to the Form Being, that Form in virtue of participating in which each Form comes to be a logical subject, i.e., the very Form that it Is.

In addition, there are items or notions discussed in the late dialogues that do receive special consideration as members of the ontological domain. In the *Timaeus* there are the World-Soul or Demiurge, if they are the same—if not, then the list of new *onta* increases by one—the World-Animal itself, and the receptacle. These are not Forms, as I have construed Forms, because they appear not to be multiply *instantiable*. (It is not clear that Plato can show that there cannot be more than one world, and it is unclear whether his argument turns on the impossibility of there being more than one instance of the World-Animal itself. Cf. Patterson, “Unique,” Keyt, “Mad.”) For that same reason it seems to me that it is improper to consider them to be non-Form properties. Rather than being the products of One-Over-Many arguments, they are the conclusions of vaguely transcendental arguments concerning the apparently necessary conditions without which we cannot conceive of the spatio-temporal order of the *Timaeus* (see ch. 7).

The *Philebus* also furnishes us with a host of new items. The fourfold division of what there is into the Limit, the Unlimited, the Mixture, and the Cause postulates that there are particulars that stand as manys to the “ones” represented by these notions. It is unclear from the texts whether Plato thinks of these four factors as themselves Forms. And if he thinks of them as Forms, it is unclear whether we should regard them as something participated in by the various mixtures, limits, and unlimited items. Discussion of their status will also be postponed until the final chapter. Certainly, however, the late dialogues, including the *Timaeus*, are careful to admit souls into the ontology. In their case, Plato never flinches from accepting that these entities are neither material particulars nor Forms. Insofar as we distinguish different types of souls, say plant souls versus animal souls, we might be tempted to postulate Forms for these *kinds* of souls. But by and large Plato resists One-Over-Many arguments whose “particulars” are souls.

2. Moravcsik, *Platonism*, chs. 5 and 6.

3. See Cherniss: “The relation of the ideas to one another is that of implication or compatibility and its opposite, not that of principle and derivative or of whole and part” (*Criticism*, 46). Cf. Ackrill, “*Sumploke*.” It is unclear whether Moravcsik allows that there might be only conceptual relations between the nodes in his collection and divisions.

4. Of course the Form, e.g., Animality, Is what it is in its own right, But then it is not being considered as a part of a definition.

5. “The puzzle turns on the thought that the falsity of ‘Theaetetus is in flight’ should consist in the fact that the state of affairs that the sentence offers to represent, or perhaps the flight in which the utterer of the sentence would accuse Theaetetus of being engaged, is nothing at all” (McDowell, “Falsehood,” 128).

6. 238b2, 238b10, 239a3, 241b1–3, 251a9, 251d5–6, 262e12. On why Forms are involved even in cases where the statement concerns a particular, see *infra*.

7. Of the many papers on the course of Plato’s argument about false statement I have benefited most from Owen, “Not-Being,” Wiggins, “Negation,” Lee, “Negation,” McDowell, “Falsehood,” Bostock, “Is Not,” M. Frede, “False,” Van Eck, “Falsity,” and White’s introduction, *Sophist*, vvii–xxxiii. Though I will sometimes cite individual pages in these articles, each author’s interpretation of a given text usually requires the background provided by the entire article.

8. Cf. Van Eck, “Falsity.”

9. The Greek is γένος. I think that these γένη are Forms.

10. But see M. Frede, "False," 403–12, and Van Eck's reply, "Falsity," 23–25.

11. By taking a second-order approach to "The Different is different from the different," we can say that it is different from itself.

12. See especially Lee, "Negation," esp. 268, 274, 286–88, Lewis, "Is Not," 93–96 and n. 19. See also Bostock, "Is Not," 110ff., M. Frede, "False," 405–9, and Van Eck, "Falsity," 25–9.

13. The τ at b4 could be the subject of an implied $\epsilon\sigma\tau\acute{\iota}\nu$; if so, the point is that when we call *something* "not-being," we do not say it is contrary to *Being* but only different from it.

14. There is the alternative of reforming the account to one that talks of things that are big, i.e., treating the Big as referring to whatever is big, i.e., another generalizing reading, this time over things that are big. Cf. Bostock, "Is Not," 110ff., and M. Frede, "False," 405–9. Against this reading, see Van Eck, "Falsity," 25–29.

15. So Lee, "Negation," 276ff., and Van Eck, "Falsity," 31ff. Bostock, "Is Not," Owen, "Not-Being," 239, n. 42, and Frede, "False," are generalizers of different sorts.

16. In the first, 257e2–4, the $\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\omicron$ τ may or may not be a question-operator. See Owen, "Not-Being," 239, n. 42, and Lee, "Negation," 278, n. 15. In the second, 257e6–7, it is not clear whether the $\delta\upsilon\tau\omicron\varsigma$ is an objective or subjective genitive.

17. Now see Fine, *Ideas*, 113–16.

18. *Peri Ideon* 80.17–81.8. (See *ibid.*, 14–15.)

19. Here again we can utilize the analogy with Knowledge: no one partakes of Knowledge *simpliciter*; rather, one partakes of Knowledge by having some kind of knowledge.

20. One reason to think that there aren't parts of the Different can be glimpsed from consideration of Sameness, the counterpart to Difference. Why aren't there parts of Sameness? Suppose Blondeness is a property, and suppose that Bob partakes of the Blonde itself and that Bill partakes of the Blonde itself. Suppose one then says that Bill and Bob are the same because both are blonde. But Bill's partaking of Blondeness in and of itself does not make him the same, anymore than being what it is to be pink makes Pink different from white. One might then think what makes Bill the same as Bob in respect of blondeness is not that they partake of Blondeness, but rather a second partaking each enjoys, namely partaking in the part of Sameness focused on Blondeness. Sameness also comes divided into as many parts as there are Forms, and by partaking in the relevant part of Sameness two things come to be the same in a given respect.

This gambit would not be appealing to Plato, or to us. The metaphysics of the situation is reasonably clear: Bill and Bob each partakes of the same one Form, namely Blondeness. Indeed, the very notion of a Universal, or a One-Over-Many argument, would be superfluous were (additional) partakings in Sameness required to account for the having of a *common* feature. That Bill and Bob are the same in a given respect then becomes a function of our assessment of the situation. But this is not reflected in an additional partaking in a part of Sameness. The notion of a part of Sameness then is conceptually driven, a function of our ability and need to range particulars, and sometimes universals, together and assess their similarities. The same (sic) difficulty afflicts the parts of Difference. My dog and my elm tree are alike in not being human, not because each partakes of the Different-from-Human, but because

each partakes of a variety of Forms, none of which is Human. Or, if the notion of noncombination can be extended to particulars, because each simply fails to partake, that is, combine with, the Human itself.

21. One might contend that each Form is a construct of Being and something else (or maybe even a construct of Sameness and Difference). Cf. McCabe, *Individuals*. The problem is that there is no happy answer to the question “what else?” This is not to say that the Forms cannot be thought of as “parts of Being.” Rather, it is to claim that there is nothing prior to a Form’s partaking of Being.

22. It is arguable that “Greek” does not mark a genuine property. Cf. Fine, *Ideas*, 110, and Silverman, “Naming,” 35. If being Greek is not a property, then “barbarian” would not have any Form as part of its content.

23. See Lee, “Negation,” 282–83 for a summary of the alternative interpretations.

24. Cf. M. Frede, “False,” n. 7. I think that the $\xi\kappa\alpha\sigma\tau\omicron\nu$ is best read with both $\pi\rho\acute{\omicron}\varsigma\ \tau\acute{\omicron}\ \delta\upsilon\nu$ and $\mu\acute{\omicron}\rho\iota\omicron\nu$.

25. It is possible that there is no part set against Sameness or Difference for this same reason.

26. See Ackrill, “*Sumploke*,” Heinaman, “Communion,” and Clarke, “Interweaving.”

27. Cf. Owen, “Not-Being,” 253, n. 51.

28. See M. Frede “False,” 414–17, for the historical background to this claim.

29. Recall the initial substitution of not-being for $\epsilon\tau\epsilon\rho\omicron\nu$ at 256ff.

30. See M. Frede, “False,” 422, who claims that even at 256 we had something other than nonidentities.

31. See especially D. Scott, *Recollection*, ch. 1. It is hotly disputed whether and how the two might be related. I pass on this controversy, since nothing I claim about the Method turns on the issue. The Stranger develops more collections and divisions in the *Statesman*, and the practice is adumbrated in the *Phaedrus* and more trenchantly examined in the *Philebus*.

32. Multiple accounts of the statesman are found in the *Statesman*, and the prospect of multiple accounts is foreshadowed in the argument of the *Phaedrus*.

33. While the possibility of multiple diereses is consistent with the account of collection and division in The *Phaedrus*, multiple divisions are not proposed (unless one counts the different speeches about Love as divisions of some sort). One can locate the potential for multiple accounts in the disputed versus easily decided notions of the early dialogues, as well as the *Phaedrus* 265ff.

34. On knowledge in Plato and the later dialogues in particular, see Fine, “Logos,” Burnyeat, *Theaetetus*, Moravcsik, “Understanding,” N. P. White, “Metaphysical,” Annas, “Knowledge,” McCabe, *Individuals*, chs. 7 and 8, and Nehamas, “*Episteme*.” An extensive discussion can also be found in Moline, *Understanding*. There are important differences between these authors, especially concerning whether the late epistemology leaves room for knowledge of essence at all, or perhaps as a primary or required notion if one is to know any other truth about some Form. Burnyeat, *Theaetetus*, is careful to avoid assigning a specific epistemology to the late Plato, though the tenor of his work suggests that his Plato is a holist. Fine, Annas, Moravcsik, and McCabe all deny that knowledge of essence, at least in the traditional sense, is privileged in the late dialogues. Nehamas thinks it is privileged, though he too embeds such knowledge in a holistic framework.

35. The descriptions generated by the different schemata are analogous to the

various accounts of Justice generated in Book I of the *Republic*, though the methods differ. It is arguable that all the accounts developed in Book I turn out to be true descriptions of Justice, when suitably reinterpreted in light of the definition articulated in Book IV.

36. “Knowledge,” in contrast, suggests that one can know a single item, or at least know a single truth about a Form, namely what it is. Such knowledge of essence is more punctate, more like Russellian acquaintance, than understanding the varied relations any given Form might have to the other Forms or properties to which it is related in a collection and division.

37. Given the fourfold ontology with its reliance on the Unlimited, and the (in)stability of the constituent triangles of the *Timaeus*, particulars are not as problematically stable as these passages suggest. See chapter 7.

38. See Cherniss, *Criticism*, ch. 1, Moravcsik, *Platonism*, chs. 5 and 6, and Davidson, *Philebus*, 33–139.

39. See his discussion, *ibid.* of the mixture, 195–246.

40. *A. Po.* 97a6–22.

41. See Taran, *Speusippus*, 63–70, and 388ff.

42. That Plato at the end of his career still advocated the intuitive conception of knowledge seems clear from the *Seventh Letter*, a document which is either by him, or by someone extraordinarily knowledgeable about his activities and views. See Edelstein, *Seventh*. The reliance on insight is also strongly suggested by Aristotle’s resort, also at the end of the day, to the perceptual metaphors of touch and vision in his account of how one knows the primary substances. Whatever we ultimately make of his account of form and matter, actuality and potentiality, and the threefold doctrine of substances, it seems that those items which qualify as substances in a strict sense are known in a nondiscursive, intuitive fashion. Lacking a counterpart to matter or potentiality, Forms are more analogous to the *asuntheta* of the last chapter of *Metaphysics Theta* than to the hylomorphic composites and their Forms. And just as knowledge of the *asuntheta* is nondiscursive, Plato’s Forms, which are also identical with their respective essences, will also be known through an act of insight.

43. Cf. Cherniss, *Criticism*, 45ff. See esp. *Posterior Analytics*, 96a.

Chapter Seven: The Nature of Material Particulars

1. At times Forms exhibit relations to one another that make them seem to be super particulars. Aristotle’s *Topics* contains a series of arguments, or dialectical ploys, which rely on the fact that Forms have properties to generate so-called level-paradoxes. These are situations where predicates applicable to particulars, e.g., mortality to animals, are predicated of the Forms set over the particulars, e.g., Animal itself. A “paradox” results when we add that all Forms, as such, are immortal, or nonmortal. In virtue of the *kind* of item that it is, a Form is alleged to have a property incompatible with *the nature of the Form that it is*. Another series of objections concern the relations between the genus, the differentiae, and the species under the genus. If the Animal itself is the same in both the species Cat and Dog, then either the species are the same or the Animal is separate from itself. Similarly, if the genus partakes of the differentiae, the same item will have contrary properties. *Meta.* 1039a24–b19, *Topics* passim, e.g., 137b3–13; Cf. Cherniss, *Criticism*, 1–81, and Vlastos, “Two-Level.”

2. *Sophist* 263d–264b7, *Philebus* 37–40d2, *Theaetetus* passim.

3. A (surprising?) lack of unity in the account might be a reflection of the fact that Plato is describing and justifying a mixed life. It is not clear that Plato thinks that the mixed life is entirely unified; he hints that there are lives of pure thought that might be better, though perhaps not human lives. It is also true that there are arguments which are not fully articulated, perhaps because the complete division recommended in the discourse on method awaits subsequent dialogues. Certainly the teleology buttressing the argument of the *Philebus* is incomplete.

4. Philebus insists that pleasure is the good, not a good. This contention perhaps explains why at the outset they appear to be discussing the good for all creatures, not simply human beings. Socrates' candidate, knowledge, cannot be the good for all creatures, and so the debate quickly focuses on the more limited question of what is the good life for a human. Throughout the argument of the *Philebus*, the doctrines of Eudoxus and Speusippus hover in the background. See Gosling, *Philebus* passim, and D. Frede, *Philebus*, lxxi–lxxv.

5. εἶτε διεσπασμένην καὶ πολλὰ γεγонуῖαν θετέον, εἴθ' ὅλην αὐτὴν αὐτῆς χωρῖς. See Davidson, *Philebus*, 53–56, D. Frede, *Philebus*, xxi–xxii, Gosling, *Philebus*, 143–153, Striker, *Peras*, 13–17. Cf. *Parmenides* 131. The sense of “indefinite” here is hard to determine. It seems to mean that the particulars which come to be and pass away are indefinite in number. I suspect that the lack of guidance as to whether it also includes indefiniteness with respect to their properties is deliberate.

6. See D. Frede, *Philebus*, xxi–xxii, Davidson, *Philebus*, 49–61.

7. φανερά γέγονε, “has been made clear,” may mean that the method allows the expert to display his knowledge of some art in the most perspicuous fashion.

8. Kind because it is a Form we are worrying about.

9. The issue of speed also comes up in the *Politicus* and includes their mistaking mere cuts for kinds. See Chapter 6.

10. Alternative reconstructions of the items collected and divided are possible. Some maintain that even the indefinite (ἄπειρα) are kinds, as opposed to particulars. It is possible to distinguish two different kinds of kinds, the natural and the non-natural. In the case of the nonnatural kinds, the division into the indefinite might be a remark about the number of *possible cuts* that could be created by users of language bent on various projects. In this circumstance there are as many cuts as there might be predicates in the language. Even if we eschew nonnatural kinds or abstracta, there could be an indefinite number of natural kinds. See *Sophist*, 256e5–6, 257a4–7.

11. See Gosling, *Philebus*, 153–181, for a survey of the alternative interpretations. See Striker, *Peras*, 18–22, for a defense of the view that only Forms are under consideration at 16c9–10. Davidson, 63ff., seems to think that only particulars are being considered at the outset of the method.

12. “There is a sudden and unexpected mention of the ‘limit’ and ‘unlimited’” (Davidson, *Philebus*, 63).

13. D. Frede, *Philebus*, seems neutral here “having in its nature limit and unlimitedness.”

14. Davidson, *Philebus*, 63, paraphrases: “that all things which are ever said to be are derived from the one and the many, and have in them the limit and unlimited as part of their nature.”

15. One can also try to capture the notion of the unlimited in the Form by appeal to Aristotelian or Pythagorean notions. See Gosling, *Philebus*, 83–86, 143–181.

16. It will be protested that the demand that one completely enumerate the precise number of kinds suggests otherwise. Without knowing that number and, it is inferred, their relations, one cannot know any Form. Insofar as we are reconstructing what the philosopher knows, this may be true. Here the enumeration must be complete. But what accounts for this completeness; that is, how does the inquirer know that her division is complete? D. Frede, *Philebus*, rightly sees that this is crucial. She says that the method “ensures that all specific parts have been found and properly labeled.” But this is not so. There is nothing in the process of division that signals that no more Forms are available. What assures her that she has a complete enumeration is, I think, *intuition*. The philosopher sees that she has collected and divided all the Forms appropriate to her enterprise. In light of the allusions later in the *Philebus* to the divine mind, appeal to the *Timaeus* is appropriate here. Through knowledge of the Forms, perhaps in the guise of the World Animal itself, the practitioner of dialectic sees that she has reached an end. See ch. 6.

17. Socrates offers two examples to help clarify matters. Both letters and music, skills which most of us learn, exhibit the structure of genera, species, and unlimited. Precisely how the musical case is to go is a matter of dispute. I refrain from discussing the music analogy, since I know little about music, and Greek music in particular.

The case of letters is somewhat clearer, and it has the added attraction of being developed twice in two pages. (It is also found often in the late dialogues as an example of some aspect of dialectical procedure. See *Soph.* 253a–c, *Thet.* 202d–206b, *Tim.* 48b–c. See also Ryle, “Letters,” and Gallop, “Alphabet.”) First we are told that “the sound coming from our mouth is somehow one and, in turn, unlimited in number, of each and all of us” (17b3–4). But what makes us wise is not knowing this, but of what sort and how many are the sounds. The determination of the number and nature of these sounds is analogous to the learning of music, with its high and low notes and sounds, its rhythms and meters (17c–e). When the point of this analogy is questioned, the nature of the knowledge of letters is elaborated in the tale of Theuth, the “founder” of grammar. Theuth starts from the unlimited stream of speech. It seems that he considers some particular utterances, though for the purposes of constructing the division it matters not whether this be considered a particular utterance or a type of utterance. Moreover, it is unimportant whether the unlimited stream is considered to be the particular letters, words, or sentences, or whether it is undifferentiated sound. In either circumstance, Theuth brings order to this unlimited subject matter. He first recognizes vowels. Subsequently he continues to divide the different kinds of vocal sounds into mutes and sonants. Then once he determines the number for each and all of them, he gives them all the name “letter.” “And recognizing that no one of us could understand any one itself by itself without all the rest, considering the one bond that makes them somehow all one, he gives the name ‘grammar’ to it” (18c7–d2).

The process depicted here (18b6–d2) does not render pellucid the nature of the unity of the Form or the sense in which the particulars are unlimited. Theuth appears to start from an indefinite stream of sound. But this is indefinite only in so far as the “parts” or elements have not yet been identified. What Theuth does is recognize a kind of sound, then others like it in some respects, then others unlike the first group, though sharing some respects among themselves, and so on. This is a process of collection, or division, or more likely both. The unlimited spoken sound yields three

generic kinds, then the different elements of the alphabet ranged under its appropriate generic kind, and finally the labeling of them all as “letters.” We can see this as an example of what the reconstructed science might look like, in which case the individual kinds of letters will be the *infimae species*. The example itself then allows us to posit that in or over an “unlimited” such as spoken sound, we may first posit a genus, such as vowel, or some “lower” species, such as *a*. There is no restriction in the process of discovery as to what is seen, or seen first. This, in turn, indicates that we can arrive at the various elements in these divisions through any number of routes. Moreover, the example says nothing about what it is to know these genera or even the individual letters. What is said is that none of us could know one *auto kath auto* without knowing them all. The force of this claim is mitigated both by the limited number of kinds under consideration and by its restriction to someone who is a grammarian, i.e., an expert in a given field. He would not qualify as a grammarian unless he had knowledge of all the letters.

18. In order to settle their dispute, they must ultimately be able to enumerate completely each “one” and “same” and “similar,” and the “opposite” (I assume to each of the three predicates, i.e., many, different, and dissimilar), if any of us is to be worth a damn (19b5–8). While this may be heartfelt conviction about the nature of dialectic, Protarchus is given his largest speech precisely in response: “It’s probably so, Socrates. But while to know absolutely everything (σύμπαντα) is fine for the wise man, the second best seems to be not to be self-deceived” (19c1–3). The conclusion of his remarks contains a challenge to Socrates to do what they cannot and the promise that they’ll not let him go until they reach the sufficient limit (πέρας ἱκανόν) of the discussion. There is a high level of humor and respect between the protagonists. The tone of the σύμπαντα suggests that this is too heavy a burden to place on anything, indicating that Socrates’ previous remarks were over the top. See D. Frede, *Philebus*, n. 2, p. 13. Note that the need to know the number of any given thing, e.g., pleasure, does not seem to require knowledge of the number of everything, as Socrates’ remark suggests and is taken to suggest by Protarchus.

19. Whether or not it is second best depends in large part on whether one takes the life of reason, which I take to be equivalent to knowing everything, τὸ σύμπαντα γιγνώσκειν, to be a possible human life. See 22c5–6.

20. See D. Frede, *Philebus*, 18, n. 3.

21. It is uncertain whether it is the equal and double itself that are the limits, or the numbers and magnitudes that can stand in the appropriate relation. See Striker, *Peras*, 58–61, Gosling, *Philebus*, 92, 185–206.

22. Advocates of types can point to the fact that is only a certain *kind* of particular that qualifies as a mixture. Still, to depict a kind as subject to genesis is odd.

23. Throughout the discussion of mixtures and causes, including especially the account of the good life, Plato often collapses the soul, the mind, and knowledge. I trust that there is no difficulty in determining where we should not collapse them, e.g., where it is soul and not knowledge that infuses a body so that a human being is the resultant “mixture.”

24. See note 33.

25. D. Frede, *Philebus*, xxxv: “anything that can retain its identity through change in quantity belongs to this category. With good mixtures this is not so.”

26. See especially Davidson, *Philebus*, 247–93, who argues that the class of cause

has only one member, the divine mind, since the admission of human minds as causes would result in ethical relativism.

27. If these are responsible for anything, perhaps they are the *explanans* for the unlimited. Whether or not we can assign them causal powers, it does seem that they fail to meet Plato's standards to qualify as explanatory causes. We shall confront the issue again in the *Timaeus*.

28. See Gosling, *Philebus*, 185–206, Striker, *Peras*, 42–50, and Davidson, *Philebus*, 179–87.

29. *Politicus* 283c^{ff}. distinguishes two kinds of relatives, those whose frames of reference are each other, and those whose frame is some norm or measure.

30. Individual souls are a problem here. Souls are the limits of individual humans, but it is unclear whether Plato, in the *Philebus*, is committed to individual souls. See note 26 on minds in the class of cause. The *Timaeus* also addresses this issue in more detail, albeit in a rather metaphorical fashion. There the individual human soul is “constructed” from a rational component fashioned by the Demiurge and an irrational component fashioned by the lesser gods. See Silverman, “Commons.”

31. A thorough treatment of the *Philebus* and the role of mind in construction would reveal that the source of the good is not the mixture or limit itself, but rather the design which is fulfilled by the creator's imposition of the limit on the unlimited, i.e., that the source of the Good in these late dialogues is teleological.

32. Without such variations, it would be impossible to account for the fact that there are an unlimited number of mixtures of the human kind, for there would be no difference between these mixtures. They would be indiscernible from the vantage point of biology. There would be no difference because the limit in each mixture is the same. At the very least, the material nature of the ingredients or body, as opposed to the immaterial nature of the limit, will permit Plato to use spatio-temporal coordinates to individuate the various mixtures of the same kind. But this awaits the *Timaeus*.

33. Davidson, *Philebus*, 216–27: “It will be true to say, on this theory, that a given entity is a mixture, or has a limit, if, and only if, it has some given relation between its parts at all times. Now this will not mean that there are many possible relations between the parts for entities in the same species in case the following generalization is true: an entity belonging to any given species will maintain any given relation between its parts if, and only if, that relation is the correct relation for members of that species. If this generalization is true, then there will be only one relation between the parts for all the members of a given species which will remain the same—the right one. . . . The right relation can be defined as that one relation, in any given species, which will remain fixed. A mixture can be defined as any entity which has this right relation; a limit is the one right relation which is common to the members of a species; and something can be said to be good if it has a limit.”

34. Within the mixtures there will be those parts of the unlimited aspect of the particular upon which a given limit is not imposed, because they are extraneous to the explanation of why a given mixture is of the sort that it is. Extraneous aspects will be found in all relatively complex items such as humans, though there is nothing that earmarks parts or elements as extraneous prior to the individual being collected by a given scientist. While certain parts will be extraneous, say, to the biologist, they might not be extraneous to the artist or trainer. The *Philebus* raises but does not answer the

issue of whether all parts of a mixture could somehow be rightly related in their own way. Were this so, then it might seem that such a particular would remain true to its biological type and retain all of its properties, for as long as these properties and the particular itself last. The thrust of Plato's remarks here suggests that this is not likely, since (I think Plato assumes that) there will be properties of particulars which are not involved in right relations, i.e., instances of properties in the class of the unlimited that are parts of mixtures.

35. A capsule summary, offered as a possible definition of the genus, is the starting point of the inquiry:

καὶ ἐνὶ λόγῳ σκοπεῖ εἰ σοὶ μέτριος ὁ λόγος ὃς ἂν φῆ τὸ ἐκ τῆς ἀπειροῦ καὶ πέρατος κατὰ φύσιν ἔμψυχον γεγονὸς εἶδος, ὅπερ ἔλεγον ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν, ὅταν μὲν τοῦτο φθειρήται, τὴν μὲν φθορὰν λύπην εἶναι, τὴν δ' εἰς τὴν αὐτῶν οὐσίαν ὁδόν, ταύτην δὲ αὖ πάλιν τὴν ἀναχώρησιν πάντων ἡδονήν.

In a word, consider whether this definition is to your liking: The ensouled kind that has come to be naturally from limit and the unlimited, what we just were talking about, when this perishes, that perishing is pain, but the road back to its own nature, this general restoration, is pleasure. (32a8–b4)

Pleasure is a process of restoration of a state or condition of an organism, the organism being a mixture, and the state being the right relation between “parts,” a limit imposed upon an unlimited. The focus here is on particulars, their states, and their pleasures and pains. At least many states of the organism are themselves mixtures of some sort, and some of these mixtures have little permanence. Our pleasures and pains are the restorations and dissolutions of these “limited” states.

36. See especially Owen, “*Timaeus*,” 71–74, Cherniss, “*Timaeus*,” 310ff., and D. Frede, *Philebus*, liii–lxvii.

37. To label an unlimited item such as pleasure “unmixed” and “pure” is doubly oxymoronic: first, all unlimited things are unmixed in that they are not mixtures of the sort delineated in the fourfold ontology; second, in the fourfold ontology only mixtures are fair or pure. The sense in which the true pleasures are unmixed is explained by the absence of pain—some pleasures have no admixture of pain: “The pleasures concerning pure colors and shapes and most smells and sounds, that is, as many as have unperceived and painless lacks and whose restorations are perceived and pleasant” (51b3–7). Certain pleasures are pure and unmixed in that we do not *perceive* the lack. Socrates amplifies this notion by appealing to pure patches of color, or shapes drawn with compass and rule simply to draw a square or a circle. Such things are in their own right fair, not fair in comparison to something else. What it is for them to be beautiful colors or shapes in their own right remains to be seen.

38. Cf. *Politicus* 283ff.

39. Also in this category seems to be all the matter that has limit imposed on it, itself at once a process on its way to becoming some being. This suggests that the unlimited matter is for the sake of the mixture whose matter it will be.

40. See note 36.

41. See D. Frede, *Philebus*, lxii and lxiii.

42. D. Frede, *Philebus*, lix. This leaves it open whether particulars, insofar as they

embody these stable structures, are objects of the philosophical sciences, or whether only the structures themselves are the objects.

43. Plato does maintain a distinction between body and soul. In certain particulars souls somehow infuse bodies, at least for a while. To the extent that we can ask what is responsible for the personal identity of a particular, we should focus on the soul of an ensouled creature. But the doctrine of transmigration brings up short any effort to account for personal identity in terms of a person's soul. Cf. McCabe, *Individuals*, ch. 9.

44. The one exception is the *Symposium* 207d3–208b6, where Diotima is discoursing on the desire for immortality, which humans satisfy through reproduction. Even here what is critical is that we seek to perpetuate our character, not our physical characteristics.

45. See Irwin, "Heracliteanism," Cooper, *Theaetetus*, Owen, "*Timaeus*." The critical discussion is found in the *Theaetetus*, where Plato constructs an account for the Theaetetan-cum-Protagorean-cum-Heraclitean position based on the movements and alterations of qualities. He shows that this form of Heracliteanism is indefensible as a theory, whatever may be said about its metaphysical possibility. See Silverman, "Flux."

46. Typically, because one can also collect Forms by studying Forms at virtually any level of a division.

47. See Turnbull, *Parmenides*, ch. 9, and Sayre, *Late*.

48. On the Pythagorean tradition see Burkert's *Science*. On the Atomists see Sachs. For a critique of those who would enroll him in either camp the basic work is Cherniss, *Riddle*. See also Cornford, *Cosmology*, Vlastos, *Universe* and Mohr, *Cosmogony*. On his link with "contemporary" physics see Shorey, "Science."

49. The receptacle is another possibility. However, since the unlimited has a nature, "admitting the more and the less," and the receptacle must be characterless *per se*, we can discount this possibility. On my account, the receptacle does perform some of the functions of the unlimited in that it takes on limit, i.e., the geometrical Forms.

50. See Fine, "Relational," and Conclusion.

51. It has seemed, however, that it is precisely on this score that the *Philebus* and *Timaeus* differ. As Owen ("*Timaeus*") pointed out, the *Timaeus* reiterates the doctrine of the middle dialogues that what is in no way comes to be, and what comes to be in no way is. If Phileban mixtures are endowed with *ousia*, whereas Timaeian particulars remain locked in the purgatory of *genesis*, then there is no promise of uniting the accounts of the two dialogues. But Owen famously contended that the *Timaeus* was earlier than the *Philebus*, so that whatever it says about *genesis* would not, by his lights, affect the Phileban account. He might have added that the *Philebus* borrowed and refined certain notions from the *Timaeus*. But that response is not apposite here, given that we are seeking connections between the two dialogues. Nor is it necessary. Owen's focus was on the initial remark in the first account of the generation of the cosmos (27dff.). Defenders of this reading focus not on that account, but the second sailing at 47ff.

52. See Gill, "Matter," as well as Strange, "Double."

53. Forms mixed only insofar as the same one particular could have many properties by partaking in many Forms.

54. The particulars on this view would be comprised in part of matter. Since it is

thought that reference to particulars requires some aspect of them to be stable, matter allows them to be referred to.

55. The qualification “as such” is from Zeyl, “Talk,” 126. Gill, “Matter,” uses “in itself” (40) to qualify the physical particulars. Both use these phrases in describing what they take to be Cherniss’s position (see next note). By “as such,” I mean particulars as independent entities, entities that are more than their properties.

56. The leading reconstructionist is H. Cherniss: see especially “Sources,” “Misread,” and “*Timaeus*.” The articles develop claims advanced in *Criticism*. Other reconstructionists include Lee, “Image,” Mills, “Aspects.” Some traditionalists are Gulley, “Interpretation,” Mohr, “Image,” Strange, “Double,” and the authors mentioned in note 45.

57. I enroll in the tradition of treating the *γινόμενα* as particulars and refer to them indifferently as “phenomena” or “particulars.” The cosmos is the biggest particular. Other particulars are the parts of the cosmos such as you and I. The parts of us are particulars, e.g. my hand, the flesh and bones of my hand, and the corpuscles, whether conceived of as triangles or earth, which constitute the flesh and bone. The properties of particulars, e.g., the pallor of my skin, are property-tokens. They are not to be treated as phenomenal particulars of the sort at issue. I do not consider Forms, souls, or the receptacle particulars, though I will sometimes speak of particular souls, e.g., the world-soul, particular Forms, e.g., the Form of Fire, and particular regions of the receptacle. Particulars are involved in becoming, *γένεσις*, perhaps to the point of always “becoming.” Cf. M. Frede, “Becoming.”

58. . . . τὸ δὲ ὁποιοῦν τι, θερμὸν ἢ λευκὸν ἢ καὶ ὄτιοῦν τῶν ἐναντίων, καὶ πᾶνθ’ ὅσα ἐκ τούτων . . .

59. “Misread,” 361.

60. See especially Zeyl, “Talk.”

61. See Lee “Image,” n. 4 and n. 9.

62. The notion that we can reconstrue our referential practices without altering our ontology seems to me a dubious one, especially when the reconstrual is of the sort envisaged by Zeyl. However, perhaps all Zeyl means is that while the suggested reconstrual occasions a change in our ontology, the new ontology leaves phenomenal particulars, as such, to be the referents of our names.

63. Cf. Gill, “Matter,” 41, n. 15.

64. See 48e, 49a, 52a. For the charge, see Gulley, “Interpretation,” 63–64, Zeyl, “Talk,” 134, Gill, “Matter,” 41. Cf. Lee, “Image,” 367–68.

65. The remarks at 48c2–48e1 do not preclude this interpretation. The refusal to speak now about a “first principle or principles or whatever” (48c2–4) looks forward both to the introduction of the triangles, cf. *Timaeus*’s remarks at 54, and to the introduction of Forms and form-copies. With respect to the ongoing account, it would be out of place for *Timaeus* to speculate on the nature and number of Forms and form-copies.

66. Forms do not enter into any relations with the receptacle. They “beget” form-copies or recurrent characteristics, which enter and exit the receptacle. For the moment, I shall treat these form-copies as primitives.

67. “Misread,” 362.

68. *Ibid.* The passage continues: “Plato, having said that what fire is cannot be said to be ‘this’ or ‘that’ phase of the phenomenal flux but only to be the perpetually

self-identical characteristic that is the determining factor of the indeterminable affection, neither says nor suggests, as he is often said to do, either that the unidentifiable phases of phenomenal flux can be called τοιοῦτον, ‘such as’ the perpetually self-identical characteristic, or that this characteristic can be called τοιοῦτον, ‘such as’ the unidentifiable phase of phenomenal flux.”

69. It seems that they have assumed that because there are (ur-)bodies in space, that space is demarcated into places. This is a relational account of the nature of space.

70. “*Timaeus*,” 320.

71. “Sources,” 254–55, esp. n. 18; *Criticism*, 453–54, 114–25, 152–53.

72. “Sources,” 255.

73. ὕλη does occur at *Tim.* 69a6, but there it has its nonphilosophical meaning, namely, “wood or material.”

74. Cf. Strange, “Double,” 29 (and passim): “But the Necessity of the *Timaeus* is given its own proper domain of explananda: on its own, unpersuaded, it is the cause of everything disordered and random” (46e5). This is reading too much into the remark at 46e5–6. As a matter of logic, the claim is that everything produced by this kind of cause is disordered and random, not that everything disordered and random is produced by this kind of cause. Nor do I think that this remark, given its context, implies that Necessity ever operates on its own in the ordered cosmos. Bracketed by statements that Necessity is an accessory cause, it would be odd for Plato to assert here that it is an independent cause of anything in the cosmos.

75. *Criticism*, 420, “Sources,” 254; Gill, “Matter,” 37.

76. The behavior classified as chaotic is likely to include the mechanistic aspects of a complex organism whose actions or gross behavior is fully governed by intelligence. The mechanistic aspects are those that derive from the “material” or geometrical properties of the bodies that comprise, in part, the complex organism.

77. R. Mohr, *Cosmogony*, 109; I. M. Crombie, *Examination*, 219–23. Cornford’s attack on this “Democritean” reading of the *Timaeus*, in *Cosmology*, esp. 198–206, is, I think, definitive.

78. Gill, “Matter,” 47, and especially 48–53.

79. Mohr, *Cosmogony*, 109. I am unable to determine whether Mohr places form-copies of the traditional Forms in the precosmos, along with the deviantly shaped particles. For that matter, if there are geometric Forms, then it seems that they too should have form-copies in the precosmic chaos side by side with the deviant particles.

80. Gill, “Matter,” 52.

81. *Ibid.*, 47: “What gives permanence to physical objects such that language can get a grip on them is, after all, their matter. But the matter of physical objects is not, as so many have thought, the receptacle. On the contrary, the matter of physical objects is a set of principles which the deity finds already present in the receptacle and uses in constructing the bodies of the four elements.”

82. *Ibid.*, 51, “They are eternal: a simple is altogether and always such as the Form which is its cause.”

83. This is, I think, the intuition that has guided nonliteralists to insist that chaos is an abstraction from the present, organized physical world. “It follows that chaos is, in some sense, an abstraction—a picture of some part of the cosmos, as it exists at all

times, with the works of reason left out . . .” (Cornford, *Cosmology*, 203); cf. Cherniss, *Criticism*, 420, 444.

84. Even so, it might be objected here that Plato does indulge in this kind of argument when arguing on behalf of Forms. He cannot say what a Form is, but he nonetheless concludes that there must be such a Form. The objection does not strike home. Plato does engage in something *like* this form of argument. But he insists that Forms have certain natures or essences (he also contends that all Forms, as such, have other properties or characteristics, e.g., atemporality, unchangingness, etc.). If *initially* we can specify a Form only as “whatever it is to be,” e.g., Justice, after dialectical and philosophical (and scientific) inquiry we can arrive at the definition, e.g., “doing one’s own.” (See, for example, Nehamas, “Self-Predication,” and Silverman, “Synonymy.”) In the case of the ultimate material principles, however, not only does there seem to be no such nature or essence, but it seems that Plato is committed to the premise that even if there is such a nature, he cannot know what it is. Timaeus’s disclaimers about the necessity of the triangles indicate not that further scientific inquiry will turn up the certifiably primitive shapes, but rather that it is possible to construct the bodies of the four elements, and hence everything in the physical cosmos, from a number of different shapes. The commitment to a singular, necessary, and specifiable essence prominent in Plato’s consideration of Forms is absent from his consideration of matter.

85. Those who would treat the stuff of the precosmos as deviant shapes awaiting geometric perfection assign to the particles the geometrical properties of the perfected geometrized bodies. It is primitive matter that has or acquires these deviant shapes.

86. “Whatever these [the ultimate material simples] turn out to be, they provide the physical world with sufficient permanence that language can get a grip on it. . . . For the simples—though they move about in the receptacle, combining and separating in accordance with necessity—will not, if ultimate, alter in respect of their *own* character. They are eternal: a simple is *altogether and always* such as the Form which is its cause” (Gill, “Matter,” 51).

87. Here the fire and snow of the *Phaedo*, 103c–105b, comes to mind. They are necessarily hot and cold, respectively, in virtue of what it is to be fire and what it is to be snow.

88. Gill, “Matter,” 51.

89. *Ibid.*, 47–48.

90. The properties of the simples notwithstanding, it appears that Gill thinks that the geometrical arrangement justifies our naming of the molecules. “Prior to the organization of the cosmos into relatively permanent bodies, there are many copies of the simples, and these move about in the receptacle and combine and separate by chance. In this precosmic situation the four elements do possess certain traces of themselves because random compounds of simples will sometimes produce a likeness of them, though doubtless a fair likeness of any of them will be exceedingly rare” (“Matter,” 52).

91. When the division of causes is introduced at 46d5–e6, the language seems to indicate that the typical Platonic view is at work. First, we are to seek the causes due to Intelligence and Knowledge, notions which belong only to soul. Second, we are to

pursue those causes which belong “to things which are moved by others and of necessity set yet others in motion” (Cornford, *Cosmology*, 157). The “others” that are in motion (ἄλλα δὲ ὑπ’ ἄλλων μὲν κινουμένων, 46e1) are either bodies or souls. According to the typical doctrine, if they are bodies, then eventually what sets these bodies, or the bodies which move these bodies, initially in motion must be soul. So the typical doctrine does not consider the causes of Necessity to be wholly free of Intelligence. If this passage is to support an independent realm for Necessity, these “others” must be bodies whose motion is not due to soul. And since any motions of *organized* bodies caused by other *organized* bodies would still import Intelligence as a cause, the only option for those who would allot an independent domain to Necessity are the motions of the matter in the primordial chaos.

92. See Vlastos, “Disorderly,” 396 (pagination from Allen). Cf. Taran, “Creation,” especially 385.

93. I thus am not persuaded by Mohr’s attempt (*Cosmogony*) to revive the interpretation of chaos as consisting of Democritean particles with objective weight.

94. Without committing Plato to any specifics, this is to suggest that his matter is similar to Aristotle’s, at least with respect to all Aristotelian matter besides prime matter.

95. See Morrow, “Necessity,” 426–28 (pagination from Allen).

96. *Ibid.*, 433.

97. Perhaps these Forms are to be identified with certain geometric Forms. This issue is not clear in Morrow’s account.

98. Morrow, “Necessity,” 433.

99. This is the view of S. Strange, “Double.” Although Strange recognizes that the Demiurge is responsible for the creation of the triangles, it is unclear whether the precosmic chaos is Necessity’s own Domain.

100. Strange, “Double,” 35; Cf. Morrow, “Necessity,” 433.

101. Strange, “Double,” 33: “These constraints on Reason are intimately connected with the corporeality of the physical world. This is strikingly illustrated by the passage on the pre-cosmic chaos (52d–53c). Here we are to consider the receptacle as containing only traces or ἴχνη of the most basic Forms (Fire, Air, Earth and Water) ‘before’ the Demiurge’s shaping and organizing activity begins. This indicates that Plato does not think of Reason as the cause of the participation in these Forms: the Demiurge merely takes over these pre-existing formal elements and brings them to participate in better, higher Forms.” Strange, 38, n. 32, cites Morrow with approval here. Clearly the Demiurge or Reason is not responsible for anything’s participation in a Form in the precosmos. However, it is not clear that anything in the precosmos participates in a Form at all. Were it to do so, it would not be a trace, but a full-fledged instance. Moreover, even if the Demiurge is responsible for something’s participation in a Form, it would be participation in a geometrical Form. Throughout the preceding pages, the Demiurge is not responsible for the exits and entrances of form-copies. It seems that Strange is identifying Fire with a certain geometrical configuration, or generally identifying traditional Forms with geometrical Forms, when he claims that the Demiurge is responsible for something’s participation in a Form.

102. *Ibid.*, 33.

103. *Ibid.*, 35.

104. Were human beings able to be different from what we are, say our sight could be vastly keener if air and not fire were emitted, then the presence of fire in our eyes could be classified as bad.

105. There is also a related flaw. These interpretations appear to confuse the Necessity with which Intelligence effects a compromise with the Necessity that the generated physical cosmos be deficient or imperfect vis-à-vis Forms. Being the kind of Creator he is, it is necessary that he choose as his model the Form of the Animal itself and that he instantiate in the generated cosmos images of the Forms (29d–31b). He effects no compromise with this Necessity. In a similar fashion, it is necessary that the physical world, as an image of the Forms, be deficient with respect to the Forms. Here I allude to the fact that the physical objects will necessarily exemplify certain properties because they are and must be material objects, i.e., images in matter. The Triangle itself does not consist of lines which have breadth, but all triangles in the physical world have lines and all lines have breadth. It is necessary that all the material objects constructed by the Demiurge have whatever properties necessarily belong to matter. Yet here too the Demiurge effects no compromise with Necessity.

106. On the constraints confronting the Demiurge, see Sellars, “Soul.”

107. Strange, “Double,” 37, n. 15.

108. Cf. Strange, “Double,” 37, n. 15; and Cherniss, *Criticism*, 114 and 152–53.

109. That is, what appears to us, appears to us to be at some place.

110. Cf. M. Frede, “Becoming,” 50.

111. Recall that the particulars in question are bits or instances of fire, water, air, and complex things comprised of the elements. The names in question are general terms, not proper names such as “Socrates.” See Silverman, “Naming.”

112. Cf. M. Frede “Becoming,” passim, and Cherniss, “Sources,” 253–55.

Conclusion

1. Matthews and Cohen, “One,” 633.

2. Fine, “Relational,” 227ff.

3. See Stroud, “Transcendental.”

Appendix

1. The main contributions between Owen’s “Proof” and Irwin’s *Moral* and “Heracliteanism” and Fine’s *Ideas*, “Immanence,” and “Separation” were the two papers of J. Gosling, “Republic,” and “Doxa.” Other adherents, in various forms, include Nehamas, “Opposites,” and McCabe, *Individuals*.

2. This is not entirely fair to Irwin (*Moral*). His complex account begins from Socratic ethics. The epistemological turn is effected by his thesis that Socrates must eliminate “disputed terms” from the definition of moral notions (His ED). This, in turn, is necessary if the technical conception of virtue is to be sustained (TV: “Happiness is a determinate end to which virtue prescribes instrumental means or components already chosen under another description” [84]). This in turn is a necessary condition for the thesis that knowledge is sufficient for virtue (KSV), which in turn is required if the craft-analogy is to be sustained. Since I do not think that virtue is an instrumental good, I am prepared to abandon this line of reasoning, including ED.

3. The notion of preserving an outline comes from the *Cratylus* 432e6–7. For discussion see Fine, “Naming,” 298.

4. Note that the sensible property, being three inches long, is exactly what we get from measurement and this exactitude is what allows us to settle disputes about which stick, say, is longer. The decisive shift is to think that this is what largeness is, namely some particular size.

5. It is hard to decide from Irwin’s account whether the relevant standard of comparison is necessary in order to decide whether a tomato stake is large, or whether relevant standards are necessary in order to know what Largeness is. The *Republic* never worries whether something is large *for a finger*. Rather, the worry is what Largeness is. I think that in fact a fairly uniform set of observations would settle whatever questions one had about some cases of Largeness, e.g., Shaquille O’Neil is large for a man. Irwin of course wants us to see the senses as furnishing an account of what Largeness is, i.e., as what makes Shaquille tall. No set of observations of this property, however, will uniformly find being seven feet tall large, for trees of this height are small and men or horses large. But the crucial passage at 523ff. never develops the question “Is this a large finger?” The confusion is over what Largeness is. It is hard to see why knowing the relevant standard of comparison would enable one to answer this question. See White, “Perceptual,” for a lucid critique of the notion of observational properties and the problems afflicting accounts such as Irwin’s.

6. 524a6–10. The passage is not explicit about whether the senses report that the same finger is hard and soft or that Hardness is Softness. I think the latter. Irwin, *Moral*, n. 26, p. 319, reads it in the same manner.

7. Irwin recognizes the problem: “Plato must show that even within their chosen areas the sight-lover’s accounts fail, that (e.g.) the bright color alleged to be beautiful in temples is beautiful in the Parthenon but will not save a crude Boeotian effort from being ugly” (*Moral*, 152). But the text does not support this. Indeed, in the run up to the argument at 476, the lover offers a new *prophasis* to explain why each different beloved is pursued by him: one is honey complexioned, the next is dark, a third snub, and so on.

8. There is also the possibility of ascribing flux to classes of things described by sensible properties. Then the claim would be that “bright colored things, in so far as they are bright colored, A-change from being beautiful to being ugly, because some of them are beautiful, others ugly.” *Moral*, 152.

9. Fine, *Ideas*, also develops an account of compresence relying on type notions. See ch. 4, sect. 2. for a detailed discussion of her views. It is unclear to me that Plato would ever countenance Bright Color as what makes or is the cause of anything’s being beautiful. Granted that only mistaken philodoxers and their ilk offer up these failed definitions, one could appeal to the clever *aitia* of the *Phaedo* to ground the claim that a variety of properties besides Beauty itself could be the “cause” of something’s being beautiful.

10. Irwin thus rejects the arguments of Strang and Owen that Plato is driven by the need to find a perfect exemplar of disputed properties. The entirely just or brave act would suffice it seems. It is not clear, however, whether his Forms are also entirely just or brave or large.

11. Irwin cites *Phaedo* 74 and 65 as evidence of Plato’s condemnation of sensible properties. In the second chapter we saw that in these passages the senses or the body,

and the sensible and the bodily, were as a whole subject to condemnation, not some particular aspect of the sensible. Irwin does not explain how we get to the (limited) general condemnation of all sensible properties from the failure in certain cases of B- and C-properties. Perhaps it is that we discover that different people have different views of what makes something beautiful, and that sometimes one discovers that about different things, and at different times, he has other notions of beauty. We want to know what beauty is and we come to learn that the senses confuse beauty and ugliness for us, because they report that the same is beautiful and ugly. We summon reason to ask what Beauty is. It is doubtful that the finger passage will support the generalization.

12. White, "Perceptual," denies this. While it seems to be a contingent matter whether people do find Aristides just, White wants to argue that the possibility is always present. This is not true in the case of the Form Justice itself, which, according to his account of the *Phaedo*, cannot seem to anyone to be unjust.

13. Nehamas, "Opposites," also argues for a limited range of Forms in the middle dialogues. He is more explicit about the relations of complete versus incomplete predication, Being versus Partaking. His Plato, however, not only accepts that particulars have essential properties, but they even have incomplete properties completely. This follows from his interpretation of the final argument of the *Phaedo*, in particular his thesis that snow and fire are not forms but material particulars. He is moved to this claim by his (correct) understanding of the need for an individual soul that is neither a Form nor a form-copy—a class of entity that Nehamas also accepts. Since snow and fire are to be analogous to soul, and since a soul must possess completely Life, he thinks that snow will be (completely) cold, and fire (completely) hot. I think that this is the right position to adopt, if one holds that there are Forms only for incomplete properties and that material particulars have essential properties. But I also think that this and the other perverse conclusions required by the doctrine of Incomplete Properties is adequate reason to reject it.

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