



Exhortations to Philosophy

*The Protreptics of Plato,
Isocrates, and Aristotle*

JAMES HENDERSON
COLLINS II

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For Mindy and Aurora

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Preface

PHILOSOPHERS AND *SOPHOI* in the late archaic and classical periods witnessed and performed the process of attracting and converting students. They did this not as a purely competitive enterprise, but as a collaboration of sorts both with conventional ways of speaking and acting and with other intellectual innovators. Philosophic advertising—which the Greeks call *protreptic*—attempted to turn prospective clients away from the claims of competitors and toward a given discipline by bringing those competitors on stage, letting them speak in their own ways, and allowing them to advertise their wares. In its ultimate goal—which was to turn people away from competing teachers—this advertising incorporated alternative ways of speaking and advertising which themselves also often contained multiple kinds of discourse. But all philosophical protreptic effectively shared the same objective of creating the very broad idea of higher learning. Philosophical competitors wanted to see this new market grow, but each of them wanted to lay claim to a greater part of that market.

The emergence of this collaborative philosophical campaign was generative because it encouraged a way of thinking about philosophy and advanced private education in dialogic terms. Much of this book explores the implications of this mode of thinking inside the professional disciplines themselves. But we can also see the implications outside of the disciplines. These implications continue to be explored today, not only in the narrowly circumscribed arenas of intra- and interdepartmental university politics, but also on the much more expansive political and ethical terrain that springs up around global questions about the aims, methods, and uses of education.

Moreover, this dialogic philosophical campaign encouraged ways of thinking about choices that lead to a given lifestyle. Prospective clients suddenly became agents capable of a total commitment to a way of life. Given a particular moral and cognitive psychology, they could be led to a

moment of conversion. Late archaic and classical thinkers had different ways of conceiving of this process. They had different kinds of discourse designed to work on the “parts” and “forces” which they believed constitute human beings. They focused on people’s abilities to turn their lives in different directions. In this way, the emergence of this philosophical campaign of conversion and competition generated discourse about ideal students as well as ideal educators.

The recruitment of students and the defense of disciplinary methods and boundaries has always been a difficult business. New kinds of education that promote unconventional pursuits have to compete for students and resources not only with traditional discourses and practices but also with other new disciplines and their respective pursuits. In antiquity, these competing forms of education took pains to *represent* themselves and their competitors as engaged in this struggle. This representation was an integral and explicit part of the construction of wisdom and liberal studies, no matter how theoretical or esoteric a discipline may seem. This combined rhetoric of conversion (Gk. *protrepein*, literally “to turn one toward”) and competition or dissuasion (*apotrepein*, “to turn one away from”) is as old as the institution of higher learning.

This study defines protreptic discourse as a dialogic and agonistic “rhetoric of conversion.” Philosophers such as Plato, Isocrates, and Aristotle promoted specific philosophical theories and practices designed to lead people to “convert” to the best and happiest lifestyle. This study focuses in particular on the development of philosophical schools and the rhetoric that philosophers used to “advertise” their discourses and lifestyles. The approach is largely literary since it analyzes how each of these philosophers incorporates and transforms the discourse of his competitors into his own protreptic. But I also examine protreptic discourses in the cultural context of Athens in the fourth century BCE. In particular, I show how these literary texts portray their respective disciplines to potential students in the intellectual “marketplace.” A study of this portrayal requires not only a literary approach, but sensitivity to issues that typically belong to the fields of philosophy, moral and cognitive psychology, and anthropology. By way of a new typology of protreptic discourse, this project concentrates on protreptics which explicitly discuss the marketing of philosophical practices. These protreptics advertise one brand of philosophy by comparing different philosophical protreptics to one another. As I argue, it is primarily through these protreptic texts that fourth-century philosophers construct the cultural and discursive practices of their disciplines in opposition to

one another. The legacies of this literary project include not only disciplinary practices but also the conception of human beings as creatures able to turn their lives around and undergo profound political and ethical transformation, that is, as capable of “conversion.”

I begin with an examination of the protreptic dialogues of Plato’s *Euthydemus*, *Protagoras*, and *Clitophon*. Through a close reading and narratological study of these dialogues, I show how Plato uses Socrates to characterize and engage with competition and critics in an effort to convert different audiences to adopt certain kinds of discourse and practice. I then examine Isocrates’s use of traditional aristocratic rhetoric in his protreptics, which he showcases in a variety of genres—the philosophical pamphlet (*Against the Sophists*), letters to young kings (*Ad Demonicum*, *Ad Nicoclem*, *Nicocles*), an autobiographical apology (*Antidosis*), and an encomium and account of pedagogical practices (*Panathenaicus*). In these texts, he turns students away from his competition while attempting to attract and habituate them to specific practical and political models.

In an epilogue to this project, I describe the crystallization of this genre in the making with an examination of competing “voices” in dialogue with one another in Aristotle’s multivoiced *Protrepticus*. Aristotle flattens Platonic and Isocratean protreptic strategies and objectives by writing relatively monologic dialogues and analytical treatises that polemically incorporate and control the voices of competing philosophies to introduce the new discipline of “theoretical philosophy.”

I have used Greek for block quotations and shorter quotations in parentheses. I have used Latinized forms of Greek proper names for the ease of nonspecialists. Abbreviations for ancient sources follow the *Oxford Classical Dictionary* (4th ed., 2012).

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Introduction

1 Protreptic and the “Rhetoric of Conversion”

Philosophers of the fourth century BCE developed the emerging genre of the “protreptic” (which means, literally, “turning or converting someone to a specific end”). Simply put, protreptic discourses use a “rhetoric of conversion” that urges a young person to adopt a specific philosophy in order to live a good life. The rhetoric of protreptic discourses needs to be analyzed in the sociopolitical context of fourth-century Greece (especially Athens). I argue that the fourth-century philosophers used protreptic discourse to market philosophical practices and to define and legitimize a new cultural institution: the school of higher learning (the first in Western history).¹ Specifically, I investigate how competing educators in the fourth century produced protreptic discourses by borrowing and transforming traditional and contemporary “voices” in the cultural marketplace. They aimed to introduce and promote their new schools and define the new professionalized discipline of “philosophy.” This study combines literary approaches and new historicism to focus on the discursive interaction between Plato, Isocrates, and Aristotle: each incorporates the discourse of

1. For a later account of the origins of the Academy as a place of philosophical learning, see D.L. iii.7, 41; see also Theophrastus’s reckoning of what remained of this space and its resources (v.51–2). For discussions of what makes the philosophical ‘school’ an institution, particularly at this time, see Jaeger (1948, pp. 11–23), Chroust (1967), Baltes (1993), Long (1999b, pp. 13–14), and Watts (2007). In his groundbreaking work on the institutional aspects of Athenian schools, Lynch (1972) argues (contra Wilamowitz, 1881, pp. 263–291) that the schools were not legally religious brotherhoods (θ(α)σοι) but private individuals and colleagues giving instruction in public buildings. For a survey of philosophical classroom practices in the ancient world, see Snyder (2000). More work remains to be done on the pragmatics of philosophical community and instruction in the fourth century.

his competitors into his protreptics. Appropriating and transforming the discourses of their competition, these intellectuals created literary texts that introduced their respective disciplines to potential students. Using different genres and discourses, the fourth-century philosophers variously constructed the cultural practices of the first academic institutions of the Western world, and originated even much of our own contemporary debate about the practical applications of a liberal education.

In classical Greece, philosophers and intellectuals explicitly addressed the divide between practice and theory, usefulness and “disinterested” contemplation.² The “protreptic” discourses were essentially agonistic “advertisements” that urged people to turn their lives toward the cultivation of virtue, wisdom, and the self. These ancient protreptics claimed to offer something of great consequence—not only theories and ideas but a veritable “art of living,” which enabled one to be a virtuous and happy individual. Long before Socrates, itinerant sages traveled through the Greek world, making similar claims. Sages who, in the fifth century, began to advertise and sell the products of their respective wisdoms came to be called “sophists.” In fourth-century Athens, however, a different kind of sage emerges—the first professional intellectuals and with this shift, the oral contests of practical wisdom became a literary marketing campaign for disciplinary and institutional legitimization. In their protreptic discourses, Plato and Isocrates advertised their disciplines as uniquely useful endeavors. Aristotle argued that theoretical knowledge is useful for guidance in practical matters, but claimed that it should also be chosen not for the sake of anything else, but for its own sake.³ In addition, they deliberately differentiated themselves from traditional discourses and practices (as well as from other philosophers competing in the intellectual marketplace).

Scholars who have studied protreptic have claimed that there was a fixed genre identified by specific motifs and discourses that had its roots

2. For a detailed study of disinterest and the rhetoric of “uselessness” in Classical philosophy, see Nightingale (2004), especially chap. 5, pp. 187–252. This work describes the appropriation and transformation of traditional *theoria* into philosophic *theoria*—“activity that is impersonal, disinterested, objective . . . an entirely new form of spectating that the philosophers attributed to the gods themselves” (pp. 69–70). Plato defends philosophers who engage in this activity from the allegation that they are useless (ἀχρηστοί, *Resp.* 489b), but Aristotle embraces the charge of uselessness, and develops a philosophic activity that is nonproductive and an end in itself. Cf. Cooper (1987/1999).

3. Cf. *Protr.* (ed. Pistelli) 53.15–54.5, 56.2–12.

in sophistic and Socratic forerunners. These scholars have identified the “genre” of protreptic in Plato’s *Alcibiades I*, parts of other Platonic dialogues, and Aristotle’s *Protrepticus*. But these texts taken together describe only part of a much larger and dynamic discourse of protreptic in the fourth century BCE. My theory of protreptic treats “philosophy” as a discursive and social practice that was emerging in Greek literature at this time. The discourse of philosophy was developed through hybridization of traditional genres and discourses (including oral speeches and dialogues). I argue that protreptic discourse was not a fully-fledged genre in form or content; it was an emergent genre in antiquity. Fourth-century protreptic discourses took the form of complex and mixed texts that later began to crystallize into a genre.⁴ As I argue, protreptic discourse in the fourth century was incorporated into many different genres. Using different generic forms and “voices,” the philosophers developed protreptic rhetoric that offered new, competing ways of seeing the world. In this period, then, protreptic was a genre in the making. Using the work of M. M. Bakhtin and other genre theorists, I argue that new ways of seeing the world disrupt generic order and generate the development of new hybrid forms of discourse.

I offer a new typology of this genre in the making. In particular, I examine protreptics that explicitly discuss the marketing of philosophical practices. These protreptics advertise one brand of philosophy by comparing different philosophical protreptics. They mark these different strategies for conversion with second-order language of advertisement (e.g., the writing or delivery of *προτρεπτικός λόγος, παραινέσις, παράκλησις, ύπόθηκαι*). These

4. In a certain sense, the genre “emerged” with Aristotle’s wildly popular *Protrepticus*, especially as far as concerns later authors, who engage with the text as a relic worthy of imitation or outright reproduction. Philosophy as a discipline in the late fourth century appears to become less directed at potential students and more directed at itself, that is, from one discipline to another, in an increasingly standardized polemic (cf. Owen, 1983). I speak of the genre not emerging until just before these changes because, as will become clear, theories which locate the genre in sophistic forerunners do not take into account the active discursive and cultural forces of hybridization and innovation which Plato, Isocrates, and Aristotle unleash in the marketplace of ideas. As far as Bakhtin is concerned, some genres in another sense never “emerge” as static objects, though they seem to be as still as mountains: “After all, for the ordinary observer, mountains are the epitome of stasis, the embodiment of immobility and immutability. But in fact mountains are not at all inanimate” (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 29). Forces have “congealed” in a mountain, which cause it to change: it “pulsates, and oscillates . . . [Mountains] change internally, become active, and create weather” (pp. 29–30). See Branham (2002) for numerous efforts to find the “pulse” of unfinalizable ancient genres, which Bakhtin otherwise describes as “readymade” and pits against his eternally wandering novel.

self-reflective protreptics—a subclass of protreptic discourse—appropriate traditional discourses and transform them into new genres of literature. Plato fashions protreptics by way of dialogues and dramatic narratives that characterize his competition as eristic acrobats and rhetoricians who are useless both philosophically and politically. Isocrates opposes this position, explicitly defining the “correct” mode of discourse and action. In advertising his own intellectual wares, he criticizes Plato and other philosophic pretenders for useless abstractions and mental juggling. Aristotle combines (and flattens) Platonic and Isocratean protreptic strategies by writing analytical treatises that incorporate the voices of multiple competing genres to introduce the new discipline of “theoretical philosophy.”

I look in particular at the rhetoric of the “usefulness” of philosophy. Each of the fourth-century philosophers argues that his particular philosophy is the most “useful” discipline for living a good and happy life. In the *Republic*, Plato responds to his detractors and competitors who have claimed that his philosophy is “useless.” As he argues, the “apparent” uselessness of the philosopher should be blamed on the ignorance of those “who do not know how to put him to use.” Isocrates claims that he alone is a “philosopher,” and says in his *Antidosis* that Plato’s teachings are a mere “preparation” for true philosophy, that is, a “useful” education in rhetoric and politics. Isocrates, then, offers a pragmatic philosophy based on “suitable opinions about useful things.” In yet another turn, Aristotle, in the *Protrepticus*, argues that philosophy is the disinterested contemplation of truth: one studies philosophy primarily for its own sake and secondarily to help one to live a good practical and political life. Aristotle’s protreptic promotes a “disinterested” act of contemplation; philosophy begins to free itself from “useful” action in the practical and political spheres. I examine the ways in which protreptic discourse, forged in the crucible of competition, offered radically different conceptions of philosophy and of effective philosophical marketing.

In addition to distinguishing “useful” or “useless” discourses and practices, Plato, Isocrates, and Aristotle use rhetorical *topoi* that exhibit shared features. Each has a specific notion of human psychology, and their discourses are oriented toward the psyches of prospective students. Protreptics direct the audience from “worthless” and “harmful” lifestyles and navigate them through the treacherous waters of a whole host of competing protreptics and the bad values that they propagate.⁵ For the

5. In the ancient world and perhaps until modernity, fourth-century Athens was uniquely

protreptic to succeed in this competition, it must strip its audience of its present values and offer the most attractive alternative. Protreptic discourse also seeks a pledge from its convert: he must not only accept the philosopher's intellectual arguments; he must adopt an entire lifestyle. Protreptic discourse must get the audience first to listen, then to agree, and then to make a pledge to stick with the study, training, and discursive practices of the discipline.

I begin this book by analyzing protreptic in the Platonic dialogues. Plato composes dramatic protreptic speeches in which someone converts or tries to convert a person to a new way of living. Narrative complexity in some dialogues allows for different attempts at conversion to be in play simultaneously. I begin my study with the *Euthydemus*, which opens with a frame narrative in which Socrates narrates to a friend an earlier event in which he performed protreptic discourse in an agonistic debate with several sophists. In this frame narrative, Socrates's friend is a father looking for an instructor for his sons. Socrates tells this friend, in vivid detail, how he and some visiting sophists entered into public debate over the question of how one should live a happy life. In the reported narrative, both Socrates and the sophists were competing for the attention of a large audience, which included men seeking lovers, intellectual entertainment, and professional instruction. In the midst of this diverse audience, Socrates had singled out one young man to participate in the debate. In both narratives, Socrates attempts to convert his listeners to a lifestyle that features the love of wisdom, devotion to virtue, and care for oneself. In the frame narrative, the friend/father is surveying the market, looking for instructors for his sons. In the reported narrative, the young man singled out by Socrates takes seriously the search for correct philosophic theories and practices. Interestingly, the young man makes more headway toward

rich in possibilities for personal self-fashioning. The protreptics of Plato, Isocrates, and Aristotle had to compete not only in the marketplace (which they were defining) of *philosophical* ways of life, but in the bustling marketplace of ways of life at large after the Peloponnesian War. Philosophical protreptic had to contend with every possible formulation of and approach to "the good life"—including new intellectual discourses like historiography and medicine, new means for the acquisition and display of wealth in a suddenly less austere and restrictive climate, and new opportunities for civic life rooted in an Athenian dependence on civic protreptic for keeping the citizenry participating in and turned toward the needs of the state. It is easy to imagine that these innumerable options and their respective smooth-talking and shrewd purveyors (let alone the very idea of a "lifestyle choice") must have been strange and exciting for potential converts. This study often refers to this larger context but focuses primarily on the marketplace of intellectual discourse among those thinkers who claimed the title of "philosopher".

being converted by Socrates's protreptic, while the father proves evasive and skeptical. We see here the success and the failure of protreptic discourse performed in a live public debate.

I follow my study of the *Euthydemus* with a close reading of another narratively complex dialogue that once again shows Socrates attempting to convert multiple audiences by characterizing, dramatizing, and ventriloquizing his competitors. In this dialogue, the *Protagoras*, Plato's Socrates takes great pains to present clearly the professional claims, methodologies, and personalities of *multiple* rivaling sophists in a more private venue among converts, that is those already protrepticized. Socrates, as narrator, reports to an anonymous friend not only the events of this contest and the various efforts to mediate between the conflicting and mismatched objectives and methods of the competitors, but also his own efforts to prepare a young and suggestible Hippocrates for the contest before it has begun. The proliferation of competing professional claims and methodologies, and more importantly the extent to which these claims and methodologies metamorphose and become entangled as the narrative of the contest unfolds, provides insights into the ways in which rivals effectively need one another—indeed, they appear at times to collaborate—in order to create a new enterprise at large and to stake a place within that enterprise. My analysis of Platonic protreptic concludes with a brief discussion of protreptic failures which Plato offers as a sort of negative exemplum.

I next examine Isocrates's use of protreptic discourse in a variety of discursive genres—a philosophical pamphlet (*Against the Sophists*), letters to young kings (*Ad Demonicum*, *Ad Nicoclem*, *Nicocles*), and an autobiographical apology (*Antidosis*). In these texts, Isocrates attempts to attract students to his unique philosophical program. Isocrates composes first-person written speeches that explain his principles to prospective pupils. In all of these texts, Isocrates discourses on the way to articulate and implement practical and political ideas. In his letters to young kings, for example, he offers a long list of concrete and traditional rules for improving conduct, suggesting that the addressee (and the reading public) should be habituated to these. Using traditional aristocratic rhetoric, Isocrates constructs “serious and noble” models for the good life; he also attacks his competitors who offer different ideologies. In his autobiographical “apology” (*Antidosis*), Isocrates provides a detailed defense of his life and educational practices, attacking those who have slandered his school and his conception of liberal education. Here, he defines “philosophy” and argues that his competitors are not true philosophers. Responding to his many critics,

he incorporates into his speech short passages from other texts that he has written: these serve as “samples” of his discourse and ideas. Using his own writings as “witnesses” of his life, he offers a “true image” of his life as an educator. It is also in this protreptic discourse that Isocrates most of all gives voice to his anxieties about protreptic failures and limitations.

Finally, in an epilogue, I examine protreptic discourse in Aristotle’s *Protrepticus*, which is rarely read because it is preserved in fragments (though the fragments are substantial). In this treatise, Aristotle merges the “voices” of his competition, putting them into dialogue with one another in a relatively monologic discourse. The fragmentary remains as we have them do not explicitly distinguish the voices of opposing programs, but one can easily see competing arguments and discourses within the treatise. Many scholars argue that Aristotle’s *Protrepticus* is disjointed and inconsistent. In my view, the treatise is not disjointed but dialogical: Aristotle incorporates opposing and competing claims and discourses to produce a multivoiced text. One “voice” argues that philosophy is a “useful” and practical endeavor designed to lead people to succeed in the political and practical spheres. Another “voice” argues that philosophy should be chosen only “for its own sake”: it is contemplative rather than practical in orientation. A third “voice”—which we might identify with that of the author—argues that we must pursue both kinds of philosophy while privileging theoretical over practical pursuits—a practice Aristotle develops later in *Metaphysics* 1 and *Nicomachean Ethics* 10. In the *Protrepticus*, the diversity of opposing claims is clear, but the diversity of discourses and genres which Aristotle includes in this contest is less so. I trace the most remarkable of these, but argue that the *Protrepticus* ultimately represents a reduction of discursive hybridity, and for this reason signals the crystallization of what was previously—notably between Plato and Isocrates—an emerging and complex genre.

2 *Earlier Protreptic Configurations*

Let us begin with a brief look at earlier discourse that is broadly exhortative (προτρεπτικόν). A careful survey of these less restricted uses of προτρέπω and προτροπή is beyond the scope of this study. Let it suffice to say that the verb has a range of meanings, from the middle uses in Homer of soldiers *turning* in headlong flight (προτρέποντο, *Il.* 5.500; note also the adverb προτροπάδην), the sun turning toward the earth from heaven (ὄτ’ ἄν ἄψ ἐπὶ

γαῖαν ἀπ' οὐρανόθεν προτράπηται, *Od.* 11.18), and a person giving himself up to grief (ἄχεϊ προτραπέσθαι, *Il.* 6.336), to active uses of general exhortation, injunction, and rousing, such as the speech-acts of Hegesistratus urging the gods to deliver the Greeks from slavery (προέτρειπε, Herodot. 9.90), Solon rousing Croesus (προετρέψατο, Herodot. 1.31), and perhaps the injunction from a fallen king Oedipus (*OT* 1446).⁶ Speech in the archaic world could certainly be called broadly exhortative in the mode of dissuasion, that is, “apotreptic” or paraenetic. Some examples include the broadly exhortative and dissuasive discourse of the Embassy of *Iliad* 9, and the speech of Nestor and Phoenix in general—those “conduits for the genre of paraenetic poetry.”⁷ Protreptic and paraenetic speech at this time involved a didactic or advice-giving context in which a (chiefly older) sage speaks to kings or a king speaks to his people. I mention these broader uses of protreptic discourse in order to distinguish them from the level of rhetorical sophistication that we find in some archaic poetic discourses (which have more bearing on, and are even celebrated by some writers of, fourth-century philosophical prose).

Two archaic examples of instructional and exhortative poetry—Hesiod’s *Works and Days* and Parmenides’s account of the journey of philosophical enquiry—introduce some of the themes and formal elements which we will be examining.⁸ These two accounts do not explicitly use the diction involving words related to προτρέπω, nor do they have a direct bearing on

6. *O.T.*1446: *varia lectio*: προστρέψομαι L: προτρέψομαι A γες: προστρέπομαι et προτρέπομαι γες.

7. Martin (1984, p. 31). For an examination of broadly apotreptic or paraenetic speech in the *Iliad*, specifically in the context of battle (“Kampfparänesen”), see Latacz (1977, pp. 246–250); these examples have exhortative or protreptic features (e.g., in the “Aufruf zum Kampf” and “Widerstandsappe”), but others are more simply apotreptic (e.g., the “Drohrede” and “Schimpfredere”). Another archaic example of broadly apotreptic discourse is Pindar’s paraenetic sixth *Pythian*, on which, see Kurke (1990).

8. They are “instructional” or “didactic” in the sense that this poetic discourse is about instruction and aims to instruct; “exhortative” or “protreptic” broadly in the sense that they are fictions about attempts to turn someone internal to the poem toward a new way of living. These poems are also, to varying degrees, “protreptic” in a more specific sense that is relevant to our discussion of fourth-century philosophical protreptic. Let it suffice to say that these texts use strategies to contain the “voices” of their competition, to make explicit the fact that they are in competition with other poetic discourses, and to refer to particular performance contexts, and that they use persuasive means appropriate to particular objectives internal and external to the text or ostensible performance context. That said, these texts are clearly not “philosophical” in the sense that they aim to establish the discursive and cultural practices of a new institution and discipline.

fourth-century philosophical prose.⁹ They do, however, contain elements which signal a departure from more traditional didactic configurations and set the stage, in part, for a fourth-century audience's expectations both of what constitutes an effective didactic approach and of what lies beyond the approach, that is, what an audience might take away from the instruction. These expectations are, as we shall see, an important part of understanding the emerging genre of protreptic discourse. In particular, we find in these protreptic discourses a self-referential language which situates the speaker as a player in his own generation among competing factions and also as a figure at the center of his narrative. This self-referentiality makes explicit the combination of a historical reality and a discursive reality, and therefore makes explicit the poet's concerted effort to construct a new genre, since it is at the point of intersection of "historical reality and discursive reality" that we find the "horizons of expectation" in the audience.¹⁰ Thus Hesiod and Parmenides cover new didactic and literary ground by constructing unusual dramatic contexts for their respective intellectual contests ("personal" and "professional"); they "embed" conventional and contemporary discourses in ways that serve conspicuously different purposes.

The frame narrative of *Works and Days* portrays the poet in an unusual didactic relationship, the form and content of which will be important to our study of fourth-century protreptic. The poem contains an admonition which, in specific terms, prescribes a life of honest labor and a rejection of idleness. It also sings of five ages of mankind, exhorts kings to live justly, and offers advice on agriculture and seafaring. But prefacing and punctuating this hodgepodge of counsel is the story of the poet in a financial dispute with his brother, Perses, whom he addresses and rebukes: "But you, Perses, lay up these things within your heart and listen now to right, ceasing altogether to think of violence" (*Op.* 274–275). West (1978) notes that the "personal setting" of *Works and Days* is typical of ancient didactic literature, adding that Hesiod is "deviating from the usual pattern that a father instructs a son, or a sage a king."¹¹ Rather than advice from an authority figure, the frame emphasizes that directive comes from the poet to his brother. West argues that Hesiod—in his eagerness to "broadcast

9. On direct connections between *Works and Days* and *Protagoras*, see below. See Martin (2004) and Miller (1978).

10. Todorov (1990, pp. 19–20).

11. West (1978, p. 34).

[the] accusations of irresponsible idleness, bribery, and importunity” of his real-life brother, Perses—“goes out of his way to be informative about himself and his family . . . a little clumsily, for its own sake.”¹² West adds to this assessment, however, that his brother becomes a “changeable figure that Hesiod stations in his poem as he chooses . . . a real person, but . . . [in some ways] invented for the purposes of the argument.”¹³ Scholars have also remarked on the poem’s disjointedness, wherein the brother is admonished for failings that do not follow logically or temporally one from the next. West suggests that, at least in some cases, the more general contexts for failure were composed first, and the personal setting was added only later.¹⁴ The overall picture is one of inelegance and backtracking: the personal setting, while innovative, largely sits uneasily with the general “exhortation and admonition which is the substance of the poem . . . [and] is really meant for the edification of the public.”¹⁵

An alternative interpretation of the frame narrative not only provides a richer understanding of the poem itself but sits well with the literary strategies that are essential to developments in fourth-century protreptic prose. R. P. Martin (2004) describes the shift from the more conventional “didactic configuration” of “asymmetrical, generational transmission” to a relationship of feuding brothers as *the* point of the whole poem.¹⁶ Rather than a clumsy addition to disjointed narratives, the frame narrative of poet advising brother ties together “beautifully complementary tellings of the same basic story,” that is, that the cosmos (like the composition) consists of doubles (e.g., good and bad Eris, the “sibship function” of Epimetheus and Prometheus, and the “coequal creators” of Zeus and Prometheus).¹⁷ The frame organizes and becomes part of the more general exhortation

12. West (1978, pp. 33, 35).

13. West (1978, p. 40).

14. West (1978, p. 36).

15. West (1978, p. 38).

16. Martin (2004, pp. 31, 35). Hesiod says to his brother, “When you have got plenty of [fruit from labor], you can raise disputes and strive to get another’s [i.e., Hesiod’s] goods. But you shall have no second chance to deal so again. But let us right here settle our disputes in accordance with true justice” (pp. 33–34). Martin explains that, in this instance, “The point is not that Perses likes dispute, but that he is not directly involved in the one dispute that can help him; Hesiod’s is a *protreptic argument* saying why Perses should *become* a direct addressee in the first place” (p. 38n.15, my emphasis).

17. Martin (2004, pp. 35, 38–40).

and admonition of the poem. This resonance between the opening talk of good and bad cosmic Eris and the narrative frame of strife between brothers serves an important function:

the talk of Eris . . . is a rhetorically artful “indirect directive” that works by matching the feuding brothers of the moment with their mythic and theogonic template (given a change of gender). The implicit message is also good therapeutic discourse: these disputes have *always* happened in families. This strategy is part of Hesiod’s effective *pre*-didactic rhetoric, aimed at solving a would-be adviser’s [*sic*] first problem: getting the hearer to listen.¹⁸

The first narrative of cosmic doubling explains the trouble between the brothers and appeals to Perses’s sense of propriety before Hesiod has begun to lay down the general injunctions. By constructing the mythic world in a way that answers to the present and relatively mundane circumstances between brothers, Hesiod artfully obscures his poetic authority, wins over Perses (his internal audience), and makes his exhortative and dissuasive wisdom accessible. Martin explains that because of this didactic symmetry,

the addressee can more realistically have the chance of becoming like his advisor, and does not have to wait for years to test his wisdom (the long-range assumption of the generational model). The poem’s lyric technique, its dialogic format, require change and assent in the here-and-now.¹⁹

The doubling rhetoric not only prepares Perses for a dialogic and agonistic interaction with the poet’s wisdom, but it also makes the wisdom itself graspable, an agreement or conversion *potentially* imminent. Its “implicit directive” works both to grab Perses’s attention and to make the path to the poet’s wisdom short (or shorter) and the wisdom itself imitable.²⁰ That

18. Martin (2004, p. 38).

19. Martin (2004, p. 36). He later calls this the “captatio principle,” and explains, “If the adviser is to be trusted, it is because he, too, has been there, at the low level of his advisee; starting from nothing, he can now tell all” (p. 50).

20. A point made perfectly clear, Martin explains, by the poet at lines 293–297: “The man is altogether best who considers all things himself and marks what will be better afterwards and at the end; and that one is also good who obeys a good speaker; but whoever neither

wisdom consists of the poet's cosmic vision and his art of speaking. So far, then, we see that the poet uses his frame effectively to condition his brother (and external audience) for an engagement with wisdom rather than as a mere recipient of instruction. The frame informs the structure and content of the indirect and direct exhortation, while at the same time making it attractive and understandable. The frame also intermittently pops up throughout the direct exhortations as a reminder of how pertinent these exhortations are to the big and small pictures, that is, cosmic order and agreement between two equals.

Let me offer one final note on this didactic symmetry between brothers in *Works and Days*: Hesiod appears to use the same device to single out and outstrip his poetic rivals. In the seafaring passage he describes his own short trips to a poetic contest in contrast to the storm-plagued, epic expedition to Troy (*Op.* 650–662).²¹ When he arrives in Chalchis at the games of Amphidamas, he wins the victory song and tripod, which he dedicates to the Muses. As he puts it, “such is all my experience of many-pegged ships.” Following Rosen (1990), who suggests, after a careful study of diction, that the passage differentiates the dangerous poetic sea of epic from the “seasonable” launch of Hesiod's performance, Martin ties this passage to the *Contest of Homer and Hesiod* and, more generally, to his notion of didactic symmetry. He does this in order to propose a new reading of *Works and Days*. Among other things, he suggests that, since the *Certamen* makes contemporaries of Homer and Hesiod, the narrative frame of two feuding brothers may be substituting Perses for Homer—that is, as Hesiod's poetic “brother.”²² Hesiod demonstrates through his innovation of didactic symmetry that he can meet with and master any

thinks for himself nor keeps in his mind what another tells him, he is a useless [ἀχρήσιος] man.” Martin explains, “Of the three characters . . . Perses can now be assumed to have chosen the middle role, encouraged by the ideal of the first and dissuaded by the last” (p. 49). In spite of the fact that didactic symmetry makes this path more accessible, the temporal disjuncts of the poem also suggest that we find Perses at different occasions after he has taken up certain injunctions; in other words, he quickly finds the path to transformation, but the transformation itself is gradual.

21. West (1978) notes that the fourth-century sophist Alcidas used the passage as the starting point for his story of a contest between Homer and Hesiod (p. 319). As Proclus records, however, Plutarch rejected the passage entirely as an interpolation.

22. The performer of the *Odyssey* must also “become” Odysseus, the city-sacker who wrecked Troy (Τροίης ἱερὸν πτολίεθρον ἔπερσε); in other words, the performer of epic “becomes” Perses and his song, the song of sacking. See Martin (2004, pp. 50–51), where he cites Rosen (1990, pp. 99–113).

rival: a quarrelsome brother, competitive discourse, or, it seems, anyone else who might prove injurious and in need of wisdom.

This inventive use of exhortative and agonistic doubling has corollaries in the protreptic discourse of fourth-century philosophical prose; in fact, as we shall see, Hesiod (along with other paraenetic poets like Phocylides and Theognis) is celebrated by Isocrates as a paradigmatic advisor. We shall also examine how Plato explicitly integrates this strategy into the contest between Protagoras and Socrates. But before we move on to what differentiates protreptic prose from its poetic and prose predecessors, we will look more briefly at one further example of instructional and exhortative poetic discourse. Appropriating Homeric phraseology and imagery, and concepts of sage-rivals, Parmenides's poem tells of the poet's wondrous journey, carried (με φέρουσιν) by mares and guided (ἡγεμόνευον) by the daughters of the Sun, out of the phenomenal world, "far removed from the steps of men" to the House of Night.²³ Once there, the poet is addressed by a Goddess, who takes his hand and vows that he will learn (πυθέσθαι) the "unshaken heart of well-rounded truth" and the unreliable "opinions of mortals" (DK 1), that is, the "Way of Truth" and the "Way of Seeming," respectively. The rest of the poem is the report of the Goddess's speech. She commands the poet to preserve her account (κόμισαι δὲ σὺ μῦθον) of the "Way of Truth," which consists of two paths of enquiry (ὁδοὶ . . . διζήσιός): the first, "[what-is] is and cannot not be," and the second, "[it] is not, and it is necessary that [it] not be" (DK 2). The Goddess commands the poet to heed the first path of enquiry (τά σ' ἐγὼ φράζεσθαι ἄνωγα) and keeps him from (σ' ἄφ' . . . <εἴργω>) the second. And she also turns him away from a third path of enquiry, which the Goddess describes as follows (DK 6):

that on which mortals with no understanding stray two-headed, for perplexity in their own breasts directs their minds astray [ιθύνει πλακτὸν νόον] and they are borne on [φοροῦνται] deaf and blind alike in bewilderment, people without judgment, by whom this has been accepted as both being and not being the same and not the same, and for all of whom their journey turns backwards again [πάντων δὲ παλίντροπός ἐστι κέλευθος].

23. On Plato's literary and philosophic appropriation of the chariot motif, see Slaveva-Griffin (2003). For other transformations across different periods of Plato's reception of Parmenides, see Plamer (1999).

This is the “Way of Seeming,” which two-headed, backward-turning mortals find in the phenomenal world, trusting in their senses rather than in right thinking, and confusing “what is” with “what is not.” In the end, the Goddess maintains, there is only one authentic path of enquiry left after much “contending investigation” (πολύδηριν ἐλεγχον, DK 7)—“only one story of the way [that] is left” (DK 8).

Let us consider several features of this journey and divine discourse. First, there are many modes of compulsion both in the poet’s first-person account of his preliminary journey and in the divine account of the paths of enquiry. Let me cite several key examples of this point. The poet is carried and guided to the House of Night, and yet, as Coxon points out, his journey to the gateway “must represent an experience or activity which Parmenides believed had enabled him or would enable him to achieve this awareness . . . [perhaps] an account of the way in which the poet at some moment actually experienced his past pursuit of the philosophic life.”²⁴ That is, the poet is very much in control of his narrative. Once in the House of Night, the poet is compelled by a series of direct injunctions—to turn away from incorrect paths of enquiry and thinking, and to turn toward the “true.”²⁵ The Goddess shows him these alternative paths but warns him not to take them. Their meeting is not a dialogue, but the discourse is dialogic, particularly in relation to the poet’s prologue. A. P. D. Mourelatos (1970) describes a concept of “systematic ambiguity,” or “systematic equivocity . . . between different levels of knowledge,” which is a result of the “parts” of the poem dialogically interacting. The discourse of the Goddess appropriates the discourse of the poet’s prologue. Mourelatos continues: “[T]he dialogic practice of Socrates was not the only source for Plato’s conception of homonymous and graded levels of understanding,” and adds, “The goddess of Parmenides’ poem was also one who had spoken as an ironist.”²⁶ The daughters of the Sun may unveil

24. Coxon (1986, pp. 12, 17).

25. Blank (1982) argues that the motifs of belief or faith and persuasion in the proem ultimately present a “claim to urgency on the level of his competition, the mystery religions and Pythagorean teachings to which [his] disciples were constantly exposed in southern Italy” (p. 168). Like Hesiod, Parmenides strikes at his competitors by carrying their language into new didactic environments and configurations.

26. Mourelatos (1970, pp. 262–263); cf. Miller (2006). I would add, however, that this final point on the Goddess’s irony misses something essential: even the authority of the Goddess is not spared by the same systematic equivocity and dialogic interaction at work between the fragments. If she is ironic, we cannot entirely know her unironic position. Note, for example, her apparently “back-turning” assertion that, “it is all the same to me where I start

and reveal themselves “in an uncommon intimacy” and “establish a relationship of mutual trust,” and the Goddess herself may “extend” something of this relationship when she takes the narrator’s hand.²⁷ But the discursive strategies of the Goddess establish her authority; this, in turn, establishes the authority of Parmenides.²⁸ But the poem fundamentally does not operate, like the *Works and Days*, by virtue of didactic doubling; authority trickles down and does not invite debate.²⁹

We also hear of the deluded mortals who are turned by perplexity in every wrong direction—a kind of *peritrepsis*. They are carried in bewilderment along a path of enquiry that turns back on itself, that is, the *παλιντροπος κελευθος*. In fact, their two heads—one for “what is” and another for “what is not”—cause them to wander, turning one way and then in the other direction. Parmenides (or the poet’s report of the divine speech) does not identify who these people are exactly, but he does make clear that the Goddess is describing paths of philosophical enquiry. Coxon (1986) explains that “his criticism is directed at all philosophers who believe in a sensible reality and who suppose that one thing can change into another.”³⁰ I will not attempt here to determine exactly whom the poet has in mind (though we should note that this is an antecedent to commonplaces in late fifth-century and fourth-century philosophical invective, which often remains vague in its slander).³¹ The point is that the poem explicitly and metapoetically targets alternative paths to wisdom. We should add that Parmenides’s appropriation of Homeric phraseology and themes, not only in the prologue but throughout the divine speech, signals another professional rivalry. The semimythic quality of the journey suggests a reconceptualization of the mythic world.³²

from; for I shall come back there again” (DK B5). See Sedley (1999) for a convincing but only partial resolution of this tension.

27. Blank (1982, p. 170, 172).

28. On the extension of the “Word of the goddess” to the “Word of Parmenides,” see Blank (1982, p. 172).

29. Cf. Martin (2004, p. 41).

30. Coxon (1986, p. 18). He suggests, “especially Anaximenes and Heraclitus.” Mourelatos (1970) also claims that Parmenides “asserts that the philosophers he is criticizing suppose that what is real is and is not the same and not the same” (p. 185; cf. *Resp.* 479c).

31. See Owen (1983).

32. A. P. D. Mourelatos (1970) argues, “The myth and topography of the journey must have a certain impressionistic, sketchy, dreamy quality precisely to prevent identifications with persons and places familiar from the epic. Such identifications would have gotten in the way of using the traditional material to formulate new concepts. Parmenides *can* write clearly

The poets and the sages are wandering around in every wrong direction while Parmenides, partly of his own volition, partly dragged there by mares, comes to receive an authoritative but dialogic account of the one way of philosophical enquiry.

These innovations in archaic instructional, exhortative, and agonistic poetry deserve a more thorough study. I have introduced this sketch only in order to suggest that many of the features of the emerging genre of protreptic philosophical discourse in the fourth century can be found in some distant relatives. The self-referentiality of this poetic discourse gives the poet room to situate his wisdom and craft both in his own generation and among competing factions; it also makes an analysis of the shape of his discourse part of the discourse. We shall see that fourth-century protreptic prose experiments with similar dynamics.

3 *Genre Theory and Προτρεπτικός Λόγος*

Plato uses *προτρεπτικόν* to distinguish one kind of skill and exhibition from others, and this is, as far as we know, the first time such a distinction has been made in written discourse. In the *Euthydemus*, Socrates argues that the eristic sophists “said they would display their exhortative skill [*ἐπιδείξασθαι τὴν προτρεπτικὴν σοφίαν*]; but instead, it seems, they thought it necessary to make fun of you first. Now, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, enough of these games, for that’s probably been enough. What you should do now is give a demonstration of exhorting [*προτρέποντε*] the boy as to how he should cultivate wisdom and virtue” (*Euthyd.* 278d). It is natural for us to wonder what the designation means. Is Socrates working from an established type of demonstrative discourse, with essential characteristics and commonplaces? Or does Plato have his fifth-century hero developing a uniquely fourth-century type of discourse? Or is this Socrates improvising a novel type of discourse which is simply appropriate for getting a certain kind of work done in a particular situation? These questions lead to the thorny discussion of essentializing types or genres of discourse. I will

when he wants. The vagueness is intrinsic to the proem. The attempts of modern scholars to reconstruct itinerary and topography by inference could seem to go against the intent of the poet’s language” (p. 41). Mourelatos suggests that this vagueness serves philosophical ends. K. A. Morgan (2000) takes the angle that this appropriation works apologetically: “When philosophical discourse claims to be authoritative and to present language that corresponds to the way things are, myth ensures that we do not take too optimistic a view of the potential successes of this enterprise” (p. 17).

argue that protreptic discourse in the fourth century is not yet a genre in form or content; it is a “rhetoric of conversion” which generates the development of complex secondary genres which later begin to crystallize. Protreptic discourse in the fourth century is only a genre in the making.

To explicate this point, I will draw on three discussions of genre in order to construct a distinct theory of genre which better accounts for this process. I will begin with Cairns (1972) who offers a relatively static theory of genre that cannot account for important features of protreptic discourse in the fourth century.³³ I will then examine aspects of Aristotle’s discussion of rhetorical genres, which allows for greater fluidity and coincidence of categories both in theory and in practice. Finally, I will draw on the work of M. M. Bakhtin for an account of how novel experiences and ways of seeing the world disrupt generic order and generate the development of new and hybrid forms of discourse.

Before I begin my discussion of these three accounts, I will make a few preliminary remarks about what makes protreptic practices unique. These remarks will be explained and demonstrated later in great detail, but for now they will guide our discussion of the key elements of protreptic discourse. (1) *Protreptic is dialogic*. While it may not take the shape of a formal dialogue, protreptic discourse is always a hybrid discourse which contains the voices of its competition. (2) *Protreptic is agonistic*. Protreptic

33. Slings (1999, pp. 59–93, esp. 67–76) provides the most comprehensive discussion of a προτρεπτικός λόγος and relies on the concept of genre found in Cairns (1972). Slings does not discuss Cairns’s principles of reaction and inclusion, and makes no explicit mention of our guiding features. The other full-length seminal work on protreptic—Gaiser (1959)—of course, does not work from Cairns’s model, but does similarly reconstruct a genre of sophistic προτρεπτικός λόγος, the logical structure of which becomes the foundation for Socratic dialogue. Jordan (1986) rejects the simplified formulation of genre theory found in Cairns (1972), though this work is not mentioned. Hartlich (1889) provides a survey of developed and “formally” distinct protreptic and paraenetic genres; based on Isocrates’s use of the terms “προτρεπτικός λόγος” and “παραίνεσις,” Hartlich argues that the formal protreptic genre consists of *verba* arranged into an encouraging address, while the paraenetic genre consists of impersonal precepts (pp. 221–222). Vetschera (1912) supported the formal distinction by concluding, upon examination of Isocrates and Iamblichus, that paraenesis “übertrifft den Protrepticus an Vielseitigkeit des Inhalts” and is “eine Sammlung von Vorschriften für das Verhalten in allen möglichen Lebenslagen . . . ein Literaturzeugnis, das nach seiner Anlage und seinem Zwecke eine Sammlung von Vorschriften darstellt, die sich durchwegs auf die praktische Lebensführung beziehen, bestimmt, die, die es angeht, zu fördern und zur Tugend zu führen” (pp. 6–7). While Vetschera includes objective in his study of a formal paraenetic discourse, the clearly versatile and sometimes prescriptive content of the protreptic discourse which we will consider forces us to look beyond formal characteristics. Burgess (1902) reminds us that Hartlich’s formal distinction “gives an impression of uniformity in the use of [“paraenesis” and “protrepsis”] . . . which is not warranted by the usage” outside of *ad Demonicum* (p. 229n.2).

discourse is not only dialogic; it is also in a dialogue with other competing προτρεπτικοὶ λόγοι and traditional discourses in the rhetorical situation of the marketplace of ideas.³⁴ (3) *Protreptic is situational*. The shape and content of a protreptic discourse are determined, in large part, by the milieu of its competition and audience. A protreptic text certainly can be read in a different time and place and still produce an effect, but it is moveable because the scenario of potential conversion which it dramatizes for the reader is contextually rich. Decontextualized, nondramatic arguments about the uselessness of wealth without wisdom, the dangers of power without virtue, do not motivate in the same way. Protreptic discourse presents situations of conflict, dispute, competing claims, and uncertain futures. (4) *Protreptic is rhetorical*. A protreptic discourse has a unique objective and persuasive means appropriate to achieving that objective with regard to a particular audience. Whatever its theoretical considerations or demonstrative powers, protreptic discourse is ultimately pragmatic and deliberative, that is, concerned with adopting a future course of action.³⁵ These guiding features are, of course, not exclusive to protreptic discourse, but taken together, they describe a distinct arena of the emerging “philosophical” utterance in competition with other discourses in the marketplace of ideas.

Let us turn now to genre. Cairns (1972) introduces a framework for identifying and composing genres which consists of: (1) primary or logically necessary structures, which an ancient audience and writer recognized as genre-making; and (2) *topoi* or secondary elements—commonplaces that appear in different forms in different examples of the same genre but that can also be found in other genres.³⁶ *Topoi*, he claims, always

34. See Lloyd (1996) on the effect of agonism on the structure of Greek philosophy and methods of demonstration. Similarly, see Griffith (1990) on the impulses of conservatism and innovation in dramatic contest-pieces over the factual, moral, and aesthetic categories of *sophia* (p. 189).

35. Gagarin (2001) argues that sophistic rhetoric was concerned less with persuasion and deception, as Plato and Aristotle would have it, than with demonstrating intellectual virtuosity through rather implausible, shocking, and pleasing arguments. Protreptic discourse often presents shocking arguments, and interlocutors internal to dialogues are variously intrigued or repelled, while few if any are persuaded, if by persuasion we mean conversion. Still, the texts promote ways of living, however unconventional and unpersuasive they may be to some, with the aim of conversion and recruitment. Our study dismisses the possibility that the texts under consideration make displays of ingenuity in an effort to “hook” students for the study of esoteric and unwritten doctrine.

36. Cairns (1972, p. 6).

serve to reinforce the generic identity which the primary structures alone decide: *topoi* either confirm a genre when they occur alongside the logically necessary structure or they do not confirm but allow for originality within generic composition when they are introduced from outside the genre.³⁷ As Cairns argues, *topoi* do not jeopardize generic identity. Even when *topoi* are combined, arranged, or altered in novel ways, they do not determine generic identity.³⁸ The primary structures are “the only final arbiters of generic identity.”³⁹ Moreover, even when a primary structure is imported into, or “included” in, another primary structure, the two structures are not inextricably intermingled, but the import is subordinated to its host, which “fully retains its own generic identity and function.”⁴⁰ Imported genres, he claims, do not jeopardize generic identity. Finally, even when the writer makes a speaker or addressee react to or call into question the primary structure of the generic situation, the reaction does not jeopardize the primary structure, but connects the inviolable primary structure to its larger “imaginary life context,” that is, to an imagined world in which different primary structures are in play, though one is principally chosen.⁴¹

What are these primary structures, and what accounts for their inviolability? Cairns provides two answers: one which he believes was true for ancient audiences and another which is sociological. He explains that ancient audiences and critics, like Menander Rhetor, believed the primary structures of poetry (and of rhetoric therein) were invented by Homer: the divine poet was the first to compose the genre (τὸ εἶδος) of the farewell

37. An example of *topoi*, which Cairns does not give, may be most of Aristotle’s inartificial proofs of forensic oratory (laws, witnesses, oaths), which may also appear in deliberative oratory (1375a26) but are always in forensics.

38. Cairns (1972, p. 99). On the original uses of *topoi*, see pp. 98–124.

39. Cairns (1972, p. 6).

40. Cairns (1972, pp. 158–159). On the principle of inclusion, see pp. 158–176.

41. Cairns (1972, p. 138). On the principle of reaction, see pp. 138–157. Cairns explains that scholars who fail to understand the commonness and nature of the “reaction” go so far as to divide texts, such as Ovid *Amores* 3.11, in spite of the resumption of the primary structure. The reaction does not introduce another primary structure, so the generic identity remains intact. The speaker or addressee changes his mind, but only for a moment or several moments, returning to language and concepts that “correspond” with his initial position and “overall genre” (p. 158). If the primary structure has been abandoned or trumped by concerns, we are left to imagine either that we have misidentified the primary structure or that the writer is (if we are charitable) not writing in ways we are prepared to understand.

speech (430.12–13) and the genre of the lament speech (434.11–12).⁴² Later authors inherit and work over these raw forms, heeding the rule of the art (τὸ θεῶρημα) which the poet provided (16–18).⁴³ The primary structures are forms which Homer conceived and provided for us; according to Menander, they should be followed because they are a sacred inheritance. Cairns makes this explanation the basis of his investigation, though he also provides an alternative answer, which he argues was not unknown in antiquity: the primary structures of genre arise in “important, recurrent, real-life situations.”⁴⁴ These situations recur and call for regular responses because they are expressions derived from cultural and religious rituals. By this account, genres were not invented wholesale, but arose out of social values and patterns of behavior.

In Aristotle, nearly six centuries earlier, we find a more nuanced rendering than the sociological explanation proposed by Menander Rhetor. Aristotle suggests that the poetic genres of invective, hymn, and encomium originated from a human instinct starting in childhood to “imitate” nature and from a common enjoyment of recognizing the objects that mimesis represents (*Poetics* 1448b). In his view, we get pleasure from these genres because we have seen their subjects before (προεωρακώς) and can link the mimetic artwork to its original model. The prehistoric poets first brought these genres of praise and blame into being out of imitating and improvising (ἐκ τῶν αὐτοσχεδιασμάτων) the praxis of people, and all of the other poetic shapes (σχήματα) followed through the dramatization (δραματοποίησας) of other situations in life, such as the laughable and the serious.⁴⁵ Homer may have been the first to mark out the shapes of comedy, but he did so according to recognizable, recurrent, real-life situations. In my interpretation of Aristotle’s *Poetics*, genre must already be a way of seeing the world before it is a mimetic art. Genre imitates those real-life situations which stand out and are recognized as important and persistent.

42. *Peri Epideiktikōn* (ed. Spengel) 430.12–13, 434.11–12.

43. Cairns (1972, pp. 34–37). On the antiquity of genres, see pp. 34–69.

44. Cairns (1972, p. 70; cf. 34, 138).

45. ἀπαντοσχεδιάσαι is, incidentally, just the word Socrates uses to describe his own efforts at giving a demonstration of exhortative skill (ἐπιδείξασθαι τὴν προτρεπτικὴν σοφίαν, 278cd). If Aristotle is giving voice to a long-prevailing view of the formation of genres, is Plato’s Socrates imitating and dramatizing a recurrent life-situation?

We come now to the forms of rhetorical discourse. These originate in lived experience—in important, recurrent, real-life situations. They are incorporated in literary genres secondarily. Rhetorical forms are concerned with means of persuasion; some artistic discourses serve this end. Aristotle does not discuss the origins of these genres in his *Rhetoric*, but he does explore what happens to them when they are applied to real-life situations.⁴⁶ The shapes of discourse may originate in the particulars of recurrent situations, but a rhetorical form typically cannot be applied to particular situations without cross-fertilization from other rhetorical forms (and the rhetorician must understand what the particular situation requires for persuasion). We will look more carefully at the kinds of cross-fertilization which Aristotle has in mind, but it poses a dilemma for rhetorical theories. As Socrates suggests in the *Phaedrus* (271c–272a), those cunning writers of technical rhetorical manuals (τέχναι λόγων) do not learn the appropriate contexts for making use of their art. They do not possess the δύναιμις of discourse because they have generalized real-life situations without “observing these things as they both are in real life and are actually being put into practice, and [without] developing the ability to follow them with keen perception.” A rhetorician can persuade only when he has learned to apply the appropriate rhetorical genres (εἶδη) in a public context (272a). The rhetorician learns the logical structures of discourse that belong to situations in general, but has to apply these structures in particular situations in which addressees exhibit a wide range of often irrational and unintelligible behaviors and reactions.⁴⁷ For the rhetorician,

46. Cicero remarks that Aristotle located the origin of systematic rhetoric in the efforts of Corax and Tisias to assist citizens who had returned from exile after the expulsion of the tyrants and who wished to recover their property. Corax and Tisias prepared a teachable rhetorical system which could deal with particular problems that were to be expected under these circumstances (*Brut.* 12.46). They offered a general solution inferred from particular solutions for particular problems. This *aition* for a formal system does not appear in the *Rhetoric*, which has a more organic approach to rhetoric both in theory and in practice. For more on the origins of speech-making, from models to handbooks, see Cole (1991).

47. Socrates proposes that knowledge of the simple sorts of souls is possible, though how simple tripartite souls might be remains unclear. The correspondence of types of speech to types of souls is not one to one; even a simple soul is persuaded by more than one form of speech (cf. *Phdr.* 271e, 272a). And by persuasion, he means planting discourse (accompanied by knowledge) in the soul of the audience (276e). Gorgias in his treatise *On Not Being* (DK 3) raises an insurmountable problem of not being able to make anything evident to another regardless of how much you know about your subject and audience: the rhetorician cannot put what he wants into the minds of his audience because “things are not words and because no one has the same thing in mind as another.” But Gorgias likely teaches rhetoric. Mourelatos (1987) argues that the aim of rhetoric is not to put something (like the art of rhetoric) in the mind of the audience but merely to influence behavior, which is the basis of

generic discourse exists in and for situations which require many ways of seeing the world to be in play at once. The rhetorician does not observe the inviolability of a genre; he speaks in order to achieve his end under shifting and complex circumstances.

Our second model of genre reveals this coincidence of theoretical forms in practice. Aristotle theorizes three genres (εἶδη) of rhetorical discourse—the deliberative, forensic, and epideictic—each with its own sort of context, temporality, and τέλος (*Rh.* 1358a–1359a). The orator must master and implement every discourse that will serve his objective. Deliberative rhetoric consists of either exhortation or dissuasion (τὸ μὲν προτρεπὴ τὸ δὲ ἀποτρεπὴ); this is directed at a judge (κριτής)—a single official or an assembly—about the future according to the τέλος of what is expedient or harmful.⁴⁸ Forensic rhetoric consists of either prosecution or defense and is directed at a judge about the past according to what is just or unjust. Finally, epideictic rhetoric consists of either praise or blame and is directed at a spectator about the present according to what is honorable or shameful. According to Aristotle, this spectator is also a judge, but more a judge of the ability of the speaker rather than of the honorable or shameful nature of the things made present through *epideixis* (*Rh.* 1358b, 1368a). Of course the orator may include in a speech different rhetorical τέλη (the expedient, the just, the honorable, and their contraries) and every temporality (the past, present, and future), but only as accessories to one specific τέλος (which cannot be sacrificed; προΐενται, 1358b). In short, one rhetorical τέλος and temporal aspect is based on inviolable and logically necessary structures. For instance, a deliberative orator may argue that the enslavement of his neighbors is not an act of injustice, but he may also sacrifice the τέλος of justice because he is bound to consider only the expedient.

Aristotle alludes to the brutal Athenian envoy in Melos, but the details of the account that Thucydides provides complicate the point: an orator

meaning rather than reference or mental image (p. 136). On this account, generic discourse might form regularly effective strategies for conditioning and thereby communicating with an audience.

48. It is important to note briefly the chief differences between προτρεπὴ and προτρεπτικός λόγος, particularly as the former is used here by Aristotle. Προτρεπὴ covers every example of exhortative speech. Προτρεπτικός λόγος clearly belongs to this set, but is different from other exhortative speeches and, as we shall see, engages in other forms of rhetorical discourse, which serve not only as accessory forms to deliberative discourse, but also as forms which act equally and in common with deliberative discourse.

may subvert the rhetorical genre of his opponent, but he will find it difficult to subvert every rhetorical situation. The Melians argue against the Athenians in the fashion of forensic orators, over questions of justice (Thuc. 5.86). When the Athenians force them to debate in terms of survival and expediency, the Melians respond with the argument that it is inexpedient or harmful to appear unjust (5.90). We must remember that Thucydides reports this dialogue in order to illustrate how much more brutal, irreverent, and senseless the Athenians had become since the near massacre of Mytilene.⁴⁹ The use of deliberative rhetoric in order to determine policy and future relations seems natural enough; but within the larger narrative of growing irreverence and tyranny, the choice of deliberative rhetoric in this instance appears to reflect a pathological contempt for justice. An orator may apply every end to a rhetorical situation, but he may inadvertently, or in this case willfully, misidentify the rhetorical situation. The Melians are attempting with forensic rhetoric to draw attention to a growing body of evidence that suggests that the Athenians have violated what is right (*themis*). Past actions have made impossible a discussion of the future. The sense of outrage lies in the fact that the rhetorical situation should be inviolable: the Athenians should be on trial, the terms of the discussion should concern justice rather than expediency. The misapplication of generic discourse works against the foremost objective of rhetoric—to produce conviction (*πίστιν*) and to bring about the “right” choice (*ἔνεκα κρίσεως*, 1377b). Indeed the rhetorical situation already implies the terms of an urgent choice: the subversion of that situation with another “alien” discourse that does not address the concerns of the audience at hand will very likely be ineffectual.

We should note one last complicating feature of Aristotle’s theory of rhetorical genre: what I will call an “effective unity” of generic forms. This unity is illustrated by an example of the common form (*κοινὸν εἶδος*) of praise (which belongs to *epideixis*) and deliberative discourses (1367b–1368a). Aristotle argues that the discourse of deliberative rhetoric, with its attempt to counsel (*ὑποθήκη*), can be “turned” or “transposed” (*τῇ λέξει μετατιθέναι καὶ στρέφειν*) into encomiastic discourse, just as encomium can be transposed into deliberative discourse. In general, the phrasing of deliberation includes prohibitions while that of the encomium does not. The orator can simply transform the nonprohibitive phrasing of an

49. On Thucydides’s secular sense of reverence, see Woodruff (2001).

encomium to achieve a prohibition, but the desired effect of the rhetoric is the same. The generic difference is found not in the force or intended effect of the utterance but in the form of the utterance. What makes the forms of praise and counsel, epideixis and deliberative rhetoric, common is that they aim to influence the audience to behave in the same way. Aristotle provides examples of this effective unity: an orator may suggest that one ought not to pride oneself on goods which are due to fortune, but he may praise one who was proud, not of goods which were due to fortune, but of the goods which were due to himself alone (1368a).⁵⁰ Counsel is a *directive*, which tries to get the audience to do something. The encomium is an *assertive*, which commits the speaker and aims to persuade or create belief.⁵¹ Still, both modes of discourse do the same work. They present the audience with a choice, demonstrate that the speaker has made the choice, and attempt to cause a change in the audience's behavior. The two modes express particular propositions with the same objective of turning audiences to a particular end.

Let me offer an example of this issue. In the *Clitophon*, for instance, Plato shows a similar interaction between the generic forms of epideixis and deliberative rhetoric. Clitophon contends that Socrates provides the most beneficial protreptic (προτρεπτικωτάτους) arguments that virtue is teachable and that one should care for oneself above all else (*Clit.* 408b7–c2), and that Socrates turns (προτρέπειν) others to a devotion of virtue (410b5). He is effectively making use of deliberative rhetoric to offer this protreptic, but he also praises justice (ἐγκωμιάζεις, 410c4).⁵² Clitophon does not suggest that Socrates alternates between exclusive, inviolable forms, or that one is more necessary or primary than another. Socrates persuades

50. The examples appear nearly verbatim in Isocrates: the prohibitive suggestion in his list of what makes men educated (*Panath.* 32) and the nonprohibitive encomium in his Gorgianic praise of Evagoras (*Evag.* 45). His encomium is not meant to be an epideixis, as he makes clear when he explains to Nicocles that he is the first to praise (ἐγκωμιάζειν) the virtues of a man in prose. He argues that those who busy themselves with “philosophy” had never done this before (*Evag.* 8), but they of course had, including one of his models. Isocrates is making the distinction between epideixis and deliberative generic forms. Gorgias and other sophists had composed epideictic prose encomia for spectators who judged their proficiency in speech. Isocrates, on the other hand, is writing deliberative discourse in the shape of encomium. He may wish to win points for proficiency in speech, but only insofar as he is thought persuasive, for he chiefly wants to turn Nicocles to a path of expediency. Generic forms are easily turned and mixed, even in a single occasion, to achieve a single effect.

51. Categories of speech acts from Searle (1979).

52. The elision belongs to Plato even if the dialogue does not; see, for instance, *Resp.* 362e–363a and 363d.

while he praises. Of course, as we have seen, encomium belongs to epideixis, and epideixis aims to influence a spectator's judgment of the speaker's proficiency in speech, rather than focusing on the ethical issues at hand. In fact, Clitophon accuses Socrates not only of engaging in epideixis, but also of carefully training people (καταμελετῆσαι) in the art of encomium instead of acquiring knowledge about the thing he praises—justice.⁵³ Clitophon implies that Socrates (1) engages in deliberative rhetoric, using the end of expediency in order to provoke the choice of a future way of living which he knows nothing about; and (2) makes an exhibition of his skill in speech without knowing his subject (which may very well be part of Clitophon's misunderstanding of the Socratic protreptic).⁵⁴ As I argue, many people are confused by what Socrates is doing and trying to do because in dramatic, real-life situations they are confused by *how* he is speaking. They cannot pin him down. Using multiple rhetorical modes to address his audience (sometimes multiple audiences at once, as we shall see), Socrates essentially ignores the effective unity of generic forms. This rhetorical aspect of Socratic discourse might very well serve the so-called “double objective” of the *elenchus*: “to discover how every human being ought to live *and* to test that single human being that is doing the answering.”⁵⁵ These objectives could very well be differentiated in terms of Aristotelian εἶδη and τέλη: how every human being ought to live

53. Justice is the τέλος of the third and least noble form of rhetoric—forensic discourse—which consists of either prosecution or defense regarding past events (*Rh.* 1354b, 1358a–1359b). Socrates himself is being prosecuted by Clitophon, who resembles Socrates in many ways, with forensic discourse as well. Socrates remarkably does not answer the charges, but he does speak in his own defense on other occasions, and part of protreptic is always a sort of prosecution—getting the audience to judge unjust, unreasonable, and unfit their past actions and ways of living. While Socrates in his defense may parody Gorgianic defense and by telling the truth offer a “critique of an immoral system of rhetoric . . . [which cares for] the semblance rather than the substance of truth” (Coulter, 1964, p. 299; cf. Riddel, [1877] 1973, pp. xx–xxv, Burnet, 1924, p. 147), he is earnest in his implicit prosecution of his audience on the same occasion and in other protreptic situations.

54. That Socrates belonged in many ways to the sophistic tradition is undeniable, and that Plato is interested in fashioning the most effective, memorable, and inimitable ambassador for his new discursive discipline and ethical and political project—effective particularly among sophistic competitors—is equally so. See Nehamas (1998) on the discursive art of constructing and exhibiting an unforgettable and inimitable self. Nietzsche considered Socrates “the last one in his line”—a group of pure types who together comprised “the Republic of geniuses from Thales to Socrates,” while Plato represents the first philosophical hybrid (Kaufmann in Nietzsche and Whitlock, 2001, pp. xiv–xv). Other scholars have tried to reconstruct a historical Socrates who resembles more the sage of *metis* than the theorizing constructivist in the most popularizing accounts.

55. Vlastos (1983a, p. 37).

is epideictic and concerns what is honorable, while how the interlocutor ought to live is deliberative and concerns what is expedient for acquiring virtue and living a good life.

Before we consider our third and last model of genre, we should note that Aristotle's model strictly concerns rhetorical discourse as a part, likeness, and offshoot (παραφνές, 1356a) of dialectic. As he claims, rhetoric and dialectic are not sciences (ἐπιστήμαι) of anything definite, but both are faculties (δυνάμεις) of providing inductive arguments and on both sides (1356a, 1355a).⁵⁶ Rhetoric is at the same time a counterpart (ἀντίστροφος, 1354a) of dialectic. It is concerned with the real and apparent means of persuasion, though it may also make use of syllogism; it can be founded on either sound argument or conduct (κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν), however fallacious the arguments; and it employs both enthymemes and particular examples as proofs of particular conclusions. Dialectic is concerned only with the real and apparent syllogism. It is founded only on sound argument (or else it is sophistry) and employs only enthymemes as proofs of general conclusions (1355b–1356b). It is crucial to note that any of the three forms of rhetoric can incidentally engage in dialectic or apparent dialectic as another persuasive strategy, for an audience can, of course, find dialectic or dialectic-like discourse persuasive. But dialectic is not concerned with means of persuasion.

Rhetoric is also an offshoot of politics (which includes ethics), but again only insofar as it orients itself toward politics (1356a). Politics, like statesmanship and household management, is a practical science which deals both in near-universal accounts of actions and the particular actions themselves; the latter have no fixed answers and cannot be easily summarized in a formula (*Eth. Nic.* 1104a3–7, 1109b21). Rhetoric may often have recourse to general terms concerning actions (*Rh.* 1374ab), but it is under no compulsion to search for practical wisdom. Like dialectic, it is not a science. Unlike dialectic, it can look like a science. The key point here is that neither dialectic nor the sciences are candidates for protreptic discourse because they are never concerned with persuasion. Rhetorical discourse, by contrast, can participate in these nonrhetorical forms; it can

56. Aristotle explains that the ability “to discern and hold in one view the consequences of either hypothesis” should be followed by a “correct choice of one of them” (*Top.* 163b9–12). Dialectic comes to a natural conclusion after *endoxa* on both sides have been modified or clarified, partly accepted or rejected (*Top.* 164b6–7). But this conclusion still belongs in the realm of *endoxa*. Dialectic merely provides a way to discuss the first principles in each science through finding the most compelling *endoxa* (*Top.* 101a26–b4).

draw general conclusions, offer near-universalizing accounts, use syllogisms, and use any discourses that seem to be the most persuasive for a particular audience.

While Cairns argues for the inviolability of generic forms, Aristotle describes the transposition of phrasing (τῆ λέξι μετατιθέναί καὶ στρέφειν) that is unique to one genre into the phrasing of another, provided that this phrasing serves the rhetorical objective. Cairns describes one genre hosting and subordinating another genre. Recall that the host genre “fully retains its own generic identity and function.” Aristotle, on the other hand, presents us with a model for the effective unity of genres. Different types of utterances can be deployed to attain the same end. Speech types are effectively hosted and subordinated by rhetorical objectives. Both counsel and encomium, for instance, present the audience with a choice.

Our third and last model of genre is more organic and fluid than those of Cairns and Aristotle. As we will see, it is closer to the model of effective unity that we find in the latter. The Bakhtin circle formulated theories of genre which are grounded in the expanding and shifting compass of human experience. Genres—that is experiences, attitudes, and practical ways of living—cluster and knit together *without design* to produce ways of speaking that are far more complex than a system of genre can describe.⁵⁷ Genres never sit still, and their possibilities are inexhaustible. They are always incorporating new experiences and encompassing alternative ways of seeing the world. New genres arise from the absorption and digestion of others. Bakhtin (1986) describes the formation of complex speech and literary genres—such as poems, novels, dramas, scientific discourses, commentaries, and so on—which arise out of the combination and reaccentuation of simpler and *relatively* more stable types of speech exchange.

57. Morson and Emerson (1990, pp. 290–297, esp. 293); Bakhtin (1986, pp. 60–102). The physiological metaphor is strange. Morson and Emerson suggest that Bakhtin uses *srastat'sja* (which means “to knit together” or “to inoculate”) “to avoid suggesting that these languages [of experiences and attitudes] are systems or subsystems of the whole. Insofar as there is a whole, it is a growing together of numerous elements, which have themselves been formed by inoculation, that is, by a *daily process of adjustment and growth*” (p. 141, my emphasis). The metaphor evidently suggests also the activities of interpenetrating and growing continuous, but not of mending and becoming whole *again*; it also suggests that these accretions happen around a marrow: “Always preserved in a genre are undying elements of the *archaic*. True, these archaic elements are preserved only thanks to their constant *renewal*, which is to say, their contemporization” (Bakhtin, 1984, p. 106). Genres are renewed and grow because they deal with the concrete but messy stuff of life. Note in Aristotle, for instance, that the *ergon* of rhetoric is to deal with the innumerable things about which we deliberate, but for which we have no rules (*Rh.* 1357a).

While primary genres take form in “unmediated speech communion,” secondary genres “absorb and digest” primary genres to form highly organized and mediated cultural communication.⁵⁸ Secondary genres accomplish new objectives under new circumstances using conventional primary genres when the prosaics or activities and wisdom of everyday life grow and become more complex.⁵⁹ Important and recurring real-life situations accumulate concrete expressions and attitudes, and thus become a new hybridized way of reflecting the world. Ways of visualizing human experience change as experience changes, and as they change, speakers and writers must rearrange and build upon old generic resources.

These hybridizing and developing genres compete with primary genres and other secondary genres as the best way to visualize particular aspects of social life. Bakhtin argues that the “organic poetics” of Aristotle “are permeated with a deep sense of the wholeness of literature, and the harmonious interaction of all genres . . . as if [he] literally hear[s] this harmony of the genres.”⁶⁰ Although Aristotle, as we have seen, does seem concerned about the uses and subversions of rhetorical genre, it is clear that he does not hear any “disharmony” caused by competing prosaic genres. Each new prosaic genre tries to disrupt generic order, and aims at becoming the center of the discursive universe.⁶¹ But no new genre ever supplants or replaces old ones: “at the same time each fundamentally and significantly new genre, once it arrives, exerts influence on the entire circle of old genres: the new genre makes the old ones, so to speak, more conscious; it forces them to better perceive their own possibilities

58. Bakhtin (1986, p. 62).

59. On prosaics in Bakhtin, see Morson and Emerson (1990, pp. 15–36). Prosaics, as opposed to poetics, is everyday speech, the ordinary (and noteworthy because it is ordinary) activity of everyday moments.

60. Bakhtin (1981, p. 5).

61. Nightingale (1995) explores the amalgamation strategies that appropriate—by imitation or parody—competing genres of discourse in order to define in the fourth century the new discursive practice called philosophy. Beginning with Plato, but also found in the other contemporaneous “schools” subsequent to his inaugural successes, the writing of philosophy involved an intergeneric and intertextual approach, in which “Plato found a vehicle for criticizing traditional genres . . . and for defining a new kind of wisdom in opposition to the varieties on offer” (p. 12). The generic boundaries between the philosopher’s new commodity and the wares of other contemporaneous performances of wisdom—e.g., drama, epic, symposia, sophistic demonstrations—are “created, disrupted, and created afresh” (p. 195). The next best thing becomes the best only through a process of explicit appropriation of and interaction with what either is already recognized or concurrently seeks recognition.

and boundaries, that is, to overcome their own naiveté.”⁶² In this way, new, competing genres can, sometimes inadvertently, awaken old genres, old ways of seeing the world. These old ways are exposed, marked out, and made strange, and as such are seen for the first time; when they are seen, they can be chosen and engaged with in a thoughtful and dialogic way.⁶³ New secondary genres put various discourses in dialogue with conventional genres. Genres do not die, but they are not inviolable either. They can be grafted on to new hosts, digested into new and more complex attitudes, and even reanimated to grow and incorporate more attitudes and experiences.

These physiological metaphors for the processes of genres knitting together, being digested, grafted, and inoculated, provide some direction not only for how genres develop but also for how users of speech and readers of literature might theorize and identify genres and their salient features. The metaphors point to genre as a living organism composed of organs that are functioning but changing and responding to internal and external pressures. Identifying these organs (inasmuch as they and their functions can be identified *in flux* and apart from the organism) will tell us nothing about these pressures nor, more importantly, about the life, health, and identity of the organism. Put another way, genre must be assessed not from “part to whole” but from “whole to part.”⁶⁴ Genre is, after all, according to Bakhtin, a way of conceiving a particular vision of the world. Bakhtin and Medvedev were opposed to the linguistic reductionism of the Formalists, who argued that a literary work—its theme and meaning—could be calculated as the “sum of the themes of its constituent parts.”⁶⁵ This principle loses sight of the fact that utterances and

62. Bakhtin (1984, p. 271).

63. This exposure is often achieved through a fool figure, who is uncomprehending of conventions. The fool fails “to understand languages that are generally accepted and that have the appearance of being universal,” and through him, the maker of new prosaic genres exposes conventional genres “physically as objects, to see their relativity, to externalize them, to feel out their boundaries, that is . . . to expose and structure images of social languages” (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 404, cf. p. 273). Socrates or an apologetic Isocrates fulfill this role, but Bakhtin conceives of Socrates instead as a monologic, conventional figure who performs “the chronotope of ‘the life course of one seeking true knowledge,’” which is represented in the *Republic* as “broken down into precise and well-marked epochs or steps. His course passes from self-confident ignorance, through self-critical skepticism, to self-knowledge and ultimately to authentic knowing (mathematics and music)” (p. 130).

64. See Morson and Emerson (1990, pp. 272–275).

65. Morson and Emerson (1990, p. 272).

genres have real meaning in the world. Utterances divorced from their context (e.g., the elements in Slings [1999] of “explicit” protreptic) “can be imagined as having meaning only ‘by imagining these parts to be separate and finished [whole] utterances independently oriented in reality.’”⁶⁶ The meaning of the parts of a Platonic dialogue is neither the meaning of the dialogue, nor is it the meaning that sophistic predecessors intended.

In summary, we have seen that Aristotle, Cairns, and Bakhtin agree that generic structures arise in recognizable, recurrent, real-life situations. Aristotle and Bakhtin note, however, that particular situations often require many ways of seeing the world at the same time. The rhetorician does not observe an inviolability of “orthodox” genres; he says what he must to achieve his objective under complex and uncertain circumstances. Sometimes, to achieve his overall objective, he uses one rhetorical genre, though accessory genres are also employed. The choice of style and genre is often arbitrary, and one can be transposed into another in a particular situation to achieve a single objective, and the speaker is under no compulsion to finish his discourse as he started, that is, in the same genre. The speaker’s objective is primary. This objective may sometimes be at odds with the rhetorical circumstances which already demand by nature a particular genre and way of speaking, as the Melian dialogue demonstrated. The speaker or writer may employ multiple rhetorical genres (e.g., encomium, exhortation, forensic defense) and nonrhetorical genres (e.g., dialectic and theoretical and practical sciences) in an effort to get an audience to see the world in a new way.

The whole of this account of rhetorical genre and objective can be articulated in this way:

- (1) Genre is an accretion of shifting ways of seeing and conversing about recurrent, real-life situations.
- (2) Genre is not inviolable. Multiple genres may mix without violating conventions, but they may also mix in disruptive and objectifying ways.
- (3) A rhetorical objective may generate the development of a secondary genre out of relatively static, conventional genres.

We have formulated a coherent and more practical theory of genre because this is what the study of protreptic discourse demands. As I argue,

66. Morson and Emerson (1990, pp. 274), citing Medvedev (1985).

the most influential studies of the genre of fourth-century philosophical protreptic discourse—those offered by Gaiser (1959) and Slings (1999)—prove insufficient for capturing the complexity of protreptic practices. Gaiser argues that poetic *παράνεσις* enters into prose and joins with encomiastic discourse—a combination that results in a fixed sophistic genre of “Werbereden” (which he calls *προτρεπτικός λόγος*, from which the Socratic dialogues of Aeschines and Plato arise and further refine the previous generic tradition).⁶⁷ Writers of Socratic dialogues, in other words, inherit a conventional genre and associated motifs (“Protreptik”), and when they are not using these conventions, but are nonetheless attempting to “turn” an audience, they are engaging in the prose form of archaic advice poetry (“Paränese”).⁶⁸

Slings offers a more complex account, arguing for a fixed, “explicit” genre of protreptic in the fourth century which has its roots in the “implicit” types of protreptic—for example, encomium—found in sophistic and Socratic forerunners. He connects this explicit protreptic with Gaiser’s “Protreptik,” and associates the implicit types of protreptic with “Paränese” and *elenchus*. Explicit protreptic “purports to state, prove, or convince by other methods that one must adopt a certain line of behaviour or pursue philosophy,” while “Paränese” and *elenchus* do these things indirectly.⁶⁹ Slings further maintains that a defined corpus of explicit protreptic cannot fulfill Cairns’s criteria for identifying genres because we do not have enough texts to enable us to identify necessary logical structures. Also, this corpus contains *topoi* which appear elsewhere. Slings also argues that this corpus cannot be identified by the “external criterion” of the use of the words *προτρεπτικόν* or *προτρέπειν* because these terms may not have been ancient generic identifications. Nor can the genre of protreptic be identified by the “internal criterion” of exhorting an audience (because a given text or discourse may have another intention).

Nevertheless, Slings considers certain texts to belong to a genre of philosophical protreptic according to these criteria because “we cannot afford to be too particular.”⁷⁰ Slings proceeds then on the following

67. Gaiser (1963, pp. 25–28).

68. Gaiser (1963, pp. 30). For a discussion of the Homeric tradition of stirring and *entertaining* paraenetic “pep-talk” speech, see Latacz (1977).

69. Slings (1999, pp. 59–66, 63n.109, 61).

70. Slings (1999, pp. 67–69).

grounds: (1) three philosophers—Antisthenes, Aristippus, and Aristotle—wrote books entitled Προτρεπτικός; (2) the *Euthydemus* and *Clitophon* seem to contend with a genre; (3) Demetrius (*Eloc.* 296–298) “appears to describe the different species of the genus protreptic”; and (4) the texts he has collected “constitute a rather coherent fund of motifs,” which can be “explained as due to the influence of generic composition.”⁷¹ The titles (point [1]), of course, appear in later accounts, when προτρεπτικός λόγος had become a more stable literary genre. Point (2) depends on where you begin to build your genre and suffers from the failures of both the “internal” and “external” criteria. Point (3), like point (1), is a later account, likely first century AD (see Paffenroth, 1994), though it does reiterate Aristotle’s theory of the effective unity of genre with regards to the styles of Aristippus (accusation), Xenophon (admonition), and Socrates (elenctic and aporetic), which suggests more of a protreptic objective than a genre. And finally, point (4) appears to constitute a coherent fund of motifs because, as with point (2), the model finds the fund of motifs with which it started. In sum, the bulk of this corpus consists of texts which Slings calls “protreptic dialogues,” and these he is willing to call “explicit” protreptic, though they use implicit means.⁷²

The primary problem with these speculations about a protreptic genre in the fourth century is that they merely find those motifs with which they started. Moreover, these scholars locate “a separate genre of philosophical literature in the fourth century,” when “philosophy” itself as a discursive and social practice is just being defined through hybridizing conventional genres, and not just by Plato.⁷³ Both Gaiser and Slings work from the assumption that Plato is the most outstanding successor to a simple sophistic genre. Slings is chiefly concerned with the *Clitophon* and uses motifs from this dialogue as his starting point to define the corpus, in spite of the fact that the motifs in this text are not genre-defining. Indeed, this

71. Slings (1999, pp. 67n.117).

72. Slings (1999, pp. 62, 71–74). He admits that the distinction between explicit and implicit, strict and wider protreptic is difficult to make (pp. 61–62). The following fragments are designated as “protreptic dialogues”: the Socratic episodes of the *Euthydemus* (278e3–282d3; 288d5–292e7; 306d6–end); small fragments of Socrates’s speeches from the *Apology*, which Slings calls “protreptic” (29d7–e3; 30b2–4, 36c5–d1); the fragments of Aeschines’s *Alcibiades*; and Xenophon’s *Memorabilia* 4.2. The extant remainder of his corpus consists of the pseudo-Platonic *Alcibiades* 1 and those fragments of Düring’s arrangement of Aristotle’s *Protrepticus* which contain protreptic motifs, finding again those things with which he started.

73. Slings (1999, p. 67). See Nightingale (1995) on Plato’s dialogue with traditional genres.

storehouse of motifs includes the following problems: (1) amassing wealth without knowing how to use it; (2) leaving money rather than wisdom to children; (3) neglecting to have one's children and even oneself instructed in wisdom; and (4) asking whether virtue is acquired by nature or through teaching or training. These motifs are, for the most part, uniquely Platonic concerns, but the ownership of the title "philosophy" is not. As for other writers with "statements on προτροπή and προτρέπειν," Slings argues that they use the terminology merely as orators, and therefore "shed no light on *Clitophon*," that is, on philosophy.⁷⁴ This is, of course, true only if one believes in Plato's discursive and practical vision of "philosophy."⁷⁵ Not only would many in the fourth century have had a difficult time distinguishing in this way between oratory and philosophy (as the Platonic dialogues themselves show), but it is far more likely that more young men subscribed to Isocrates's practically convenient, "more true and profitable" program than to Plato's lifelong and "disputational" (*Antid.* 84) course of learning.

Our more fluid model of rhetorical genres offers a better account for the emergence and development of a protreptic genre. We are not forced to draw firm lines between explicit and implicit protreptic, external and internal criteria—and then transgress them—because protreptic discourse in the fourth century is not yet a genre in form or content; it is rooted in a speaker's objective and shift in attitude, which generate the development of complex secondary genres which later begin to crystallize. Protreptic discourse in the fourth century consists of competing ways of seeing the world, and at this point in time is only a genre in the making. Detaching a storehouse of motifs from a few and largely fragmentary texts of Socratic philosophers misses one of the most important features

74. Slings (1999, p. 63n.110). Isocrates's and Aristotle's theories of rhetoric are dismissed as nonphilosophically protreptic. Προτροπή appears as a part of deliberative rhetoric, not forensic (p. 63n.110), and it has a great deal to do with distinguishing the boundaries of new discursive and social practices called "philosophy."

75. Slings explains that Isocrates's criticism of those who profess to turn (προτρέπειν) men to a life of moderation, justice, wisdom, and virtue "seems to ignore exhortation to philosophy (in the stricter sense)," that is, as Slings explains following Einarsen (1936), "a theoretical science dealing with nature, truth, and things divine" (Slings, 1999, p. 91). Far from ignoring this aspect of the Platonic program, Isocrates calls it "mental-juggling" (*Antid.* 285), "exact knowledge of the useless" (*Helen* 5), and in connection with protreptic, a kind of useless knowledge which is ignored by the rest of the world (*Antid.* 84). Isocrates calls what Slings calls philosophy in the stricter sense merely "preparation for philosophy" (Slings, 1999, p. 266).

of protreptic discourse.⁷⁶ Protreptic is dialogic and can be understood only if we realize that it works by virtue of its inclusion of and interaction with competing voices and conventional genres. With this in mind, we can now examine the social context of protreptic discourse in order to better understand how protreptic, in addition to being rhetorical, is dialogic, agonistic, and situational.

4 *The Rhetorical Situation and Objective of Προτρεπτικός Λόγος*

When we speak of protreptic discourse in the fourth century, we may mean: (1) a direct speech that tries to turn someone else to a new way of living, or (2) a reported and dramatized speech in which someone turns or tries to turn someone else to a new way of living.⁷⁷ We distinguish between direct and reported protreptic discourse through a difference in the level and kind of performing. Examples of direct protreptic discourse include Isocrates's attacking other systems of education and promoting the principles and methods of his "philosophy" in his protreptic pamphlet *Against the Sophists*, or trying to persuade the citizens of Athens to turn away from the teachings of his rivals and adopt his education and way of life, in *Antidosis* 7. In each case, Isocrates speaks in the first person, "performing" his text himself and addressing his audience directly under particular external circumstances (a courtroom, an intellectual "marketplace") with his philosophically protreptic objective.⁷⁸ The circumstances

76. Slings (1999) argues that the protreptic speeches that define his corpus are "detachable from their contexts" because they are marked as protreptic by the external criterion, while "protreptic situations" (all of which are in Platonic dialogues: *Gorgias*, *Laches*, *Phaedo*, *Protagoras*, *Symposium*, and *Republic*) are not. That these speeches are marked under agonistic circumstances makes it all the more imperative that they be considered in context.

77. An interesting addendum to both the direct and reported protreptic speech is an account of someone wrestling with a pledge made after a reported protreptic encounter; for instance, in the *Symposium*, Alcibiades explains how he goes back to his old ways when Socrates is not around on the occasion of Socrates competing with other accounts of beauty and trying to turn his audience to the multitudinous sea of τὸ καλόν. This account highlights problems with particular rhetorical protreptic strategies. We will address these accounts at the end of this introduction.

78. Isocrates explains that the extract from *Against the Sophists* provided in his *Antidosis* does not begin at the beginning—"I begin at this point"—and expresses only his own views without, he says, his accusations against others, which would be too long for the present occasion (*Antid.* 194). The beginning addressed his audience—πρὸς τοὺς βουλομένους πλησιάζειν (195)—and might have done so directly just like nearly every other oration. Isocrates states that *Against the Sophists* was written at the start (ἡρχόμεν, 193) and height (ἀκμᾶζων, 195) of

may be fictional (e.g., a fictitious capital charge), but they are imagined as external to the text. On the other hand, one can find examples of reported and dramatized protreptic discourse in Plato's *Euthydemus* and *Phaedrus*. In the former, Socrates attempts to persuade Cleinias and Crito to adopt a lifestyle that features the love of wisdom, devotion to virtue, and care for oneself.⁷⁹ In the *Phaedrus*, Socrates attempts to turn Phaedrus away from the love of rhetorical speeches to the love of wisdom. In either case, Plato addresses his audience only indirectly, using dramatic dialogues rather than speaking in his own voice. He thus attempts to convert fictionalized audiences under circumstances internal to the text.⁸⁰

As I have suggested, protreptic discourse is used in many circumstances, both internal and external to a given text. In the case of Isocrates we find "external" scenes such as fictional trials (*Antidosis*), imagined marketplaces (*Against the Sophists*), and courts of young kings (*Ad Nicoclem*, *Nicocles*, *Ad Demonicum*). In the case of Plato, we see (or hear about) conversations taking place in gymnasia (*Euthydemus*, *Theaetetus*, *Lysis*), the palaestra (*Charmides*), festivals (*Republic*, *Symposium*), court and prison (*Apology*, *Crito*, *Phaedo*), sophistic battles (*Euthydemus*, *Hippias Minor*, *Protagoras*), in the countryside (*Phaedrus*), private homes (*Protagoras*), in or at the edges of marketplaces (*Euthyphro*, *Theages*, *Parmenides*, *Gorgias*). We also find Socrates performing on the road to many of these places, as busy people or people looking for diversion come and go. In the *Apology*, Socrates systematically (ἐφεξῆς, *Ap.* 21e) seeks them out wherever they are as they travel the "course of life."⁸¹ Of course these conversations are found in texts, and the texts can be read aloud or mimetically performed in other settings for other audiences seeking diversion or doing

his career. His epideictic *Helen* (generally dated to the very beginning of his career) does not make a direct address, but his epideictic *Busiris* directly addresses Polycrates, his rhetorical opponent.

79. Protreptic occurs at different narrative levels in the *Euthydemus*; we will differentiate these in chapter 1.

80. Henderson (1991) describes the notional audience as the audience for whom the implied author writes (p. 134). Blondell (2002) argues there may have been different notional audiences for different Platonic dialogues "depending, for example, on the level of intellectual sophistication they require" (p. 28). Usener (1994) also argues for an abstract, notional audience for Isocrates, with whom he communicates through indirect speech of careful public readings.

81. Blondell (2002, p. 64). The metaphor often appears in Plato as a way to "ground the doing of philosophy in the *process* of human life."

and learning the philosophies these texts relentlessly suggest.⁸² In fact, as Socrates famously argues, written texts can indiscriminately roll around not knowing to whom they should and should not speak without help from their fathers (*Phdr.* 275e). But sometimes even engagement with a written text by the notional reader begins first with *hearing* the text performed in impressive ways: Phaedrus, for example, had Lysias repeat his speech over and over (πολλάκις) before he took and pored over the book himself (*Phdr.* 228ab); and Socrates heard a reading of Anaxagoras, and eagerly acquired all of his books (*Phd.* 97c–98b, cf. *Ap.* 26e).⁸³ The point is that the events in these texts happen or are about protreptic discourse happening in a variety of places, and the texts themselves can also be read aloud, whether in mimetic ways or not, under different circumstances for any audience, public or private, even if the direct protreptics generally take greater pains to refer themselves to particular audiences.

Apart from narrative stylistic differences, we see that these protreptic texts present competing ways of seeing the world, but they rarely find audiences who are attentive or desirous of being persuaded. Protreptic texts more often find passing innocents who are not on the market for a new

82. See Usener (1994). Blondell (2002) suggests that a single narrator in Plato's day read aloud (perhaps with mannerisms and modulations of voice) the complex narratives of *Symposium* or *Parmenides*, and even the more direct dialogues, citing the opening of the *Theaetetus* as the best evidence (p. 24). A slave reads a direct speech—written without, Euclides says, “the bits of narrative in between the speeches . . . whenever Socrates mentions his own part” (*Tht.* 143c). Blondell further suggests that “repeating philosophical dialogues may make us more philosophical . . . the activity represented and the activity of representing (through reading or performance) arguably converge” (p. 27). The suggestion that these texts were read aloud, even with modulations of voice, privileges the language of the dialogue over the bodily performance and practice of the dialogue, as scholars are wont to do. But there is enough in these dialogues to lead the body through a philosophical performance; in fact, philosophical conditioning of the body might just outlast what is written, given both the latter's susceptibility to critique and revision and the ease with which the former is, relative to the ideas of the text, unthinkingly assimilated. Few these days would suspect that the actions, gestures, motions, and rhythms of a philosophical performance could guide a person to philosophical living long after the external marks of the text have been disparaged and forgotten. Few of us today learn the speech and action of philosophy, how to “incorporate” philosophy. Cf. Nietzsche and Arrowsmith (1973/1974, p. 311).

83. See Usener (1994): on reception and reading in the *Phaedo* episode (pp. 161–164 and 182–183), on reception in the *Phaedrus* (pp. 183–191). Cf. Antiphon's (reported) report of Socrates going to hear Zeno publicly read his book in the Keramikos outside the city walls (*Parm.* 127c). Socrates also buys the works of Anaxagoras in the busy and at one time (perhaps as late as the early fifth century) dramatic orchestra of the agora; see Rehm (2002) on the overlap of commerce, dramatic and political performance (p. 43). Plato is more mistrustful than Isocrates of what happens through engagement with texts as unassisted readers, as we read (cf. Nehamas, 1998, pp. 46–47).

way of living. Jordan (1986) suggests that the protreptic author is speaking in situations in which he “confronts a hearer whose choice is the target of many other persuasions. The unity of philosophic protreptic—and its great rhetorical interest—would seem to lie in . . . the hearer’s moment of choice before ways-of-life.”⁸⁴ This suggestion is based on Lucian’s model of competing philosophers being auctioned off. The problem with this rhetorical analysis is that both the direct and reported protreptic discourses rarely address someone who is ready to make a choice or who even recognizes that there is a choice to be made. Isocrates calls attention to the fact that the young king is “ripe for philosophy” (*Ad Dem.* 3), and Socrates describes his fear that someone might get to the young man, turn him, and ruin him before he has had a chance to present the case for virtue (*Euthyd.* 275b). The competing protreptics do not always, as Jordan argues, “see a ‘recurring situation’ calling for discourse,” but instead try to initiate a moment of choice under entirely different circumstances. Moreover, when the audience finds itself having been drawn into this situation, it is likely to deem the ends unconventional (which they are), and may consider the speech deceptive, inexpedient, or dishonorable. The popular theme of weighing the merits of particular modes of living appears notably in tragedy, comedy, and forensic rhetoric, but the urgency and demonstration of a choice for an audience of philosophical protreptic discourse is different.⁸⁵ The hybridizing force of protreptic discourse brings conventional choices together in order to deliver an entirely new choice which it both embodies and markets. The philosophical convert must choose a way of life and a course of study; dramatic and forensic discourse does not elicit this kind of choice. The unsuspecting audience which philosophical protreptic discourse addresses may be on the market for diversion or even for principles, but it is not ready for the situation in

84. Jordan (1986, p. 331). Jordan adds to the view that the protreptic author has two kinds of audience: those who do not yet subscribe to his philosophical program and those who do. The former require exoteric protreptic and the latter, esoteric, because there is a difference between attracting new students and keeping them. If we cannot find a way of differentiating between what is exoteric and esoteric in the extant literature (cf. Gaiser, 1963), we must assume that everything we have is exoteric. Protreptics can highlight the problem of students not staying. They do this to raise the stakes, showing would-be students the perils of walking away without making a pledge. They also present students with a study of character succeeding and failing to maintain a pledge.

85. See Blondell (2002, pp. 27–28); Nightingale (1995, chap. 2); McDonald (1931).

which it will suddenly find itself—at a loss and in need of that steady guidance which the protreptic embodies and recommends.

It is worth noting at this time the sorts of competition with which philosophical protreptic discourse must contend in the marketplace. Rather than the internal circumstances of reported protreptic or the original circumstances surrounding direct protreptic, we are talking here about the circulation of the protreptic texts themselves. Inflamed by hearing about Anaxagoras's theories, Socrates buys philosophical books in the orchestra of the agora; they are not protreptic, for they merely teach natural causes without competing with other accounts by explaining how their causes are best (*Phd.* 97d–98b). Still, they are in the marketplace alongside all sorts of other useful or spectacular wares and activities: political administration, legal trials, ostracism, imprisonment, religious ceremonies, processions, gambling, torture, bidding for contracts, prostitution, asylum-seeking, begging, haircutting, cock-fighting, as well as stalls selling food, flowers, or perfume.⁸⁶ The Athenian agora was a distinctively “‘democratic space’ . . . a neutral stage” for competition, which individuals had to maneuver with care and *metis*, not only to get the best bargain, but also to stay focused and keep their heads.⁸⁷ A sale of anchovies or a sophistic display might make citizens forget themselves (Aristophanes, *Equites* 642–675). The marketplace was so popular and accessible that philosophers of the fourth century considered it a threat to their ethical and political programs: Aristotle argues that the vulgar laborers who wander around the agora not only lack in virtue, but can easily attend the assembly given its proximity, thereby turning the polis into mob rule (*Pol.* 1319a19–30). He observes that elsewhere one can find a separate “necessary agora” for these loiterers and a “free agora” for truly free and superior men (1331a30–b14). Plato sought to limit interactions in the agora calendrically for his ideal state as well (*Leg.* 849b–850a).⁸⁸ Written or reperformed protreptic discourse must vie with these “illiberal” wares and activities for the attention of the liberal elite in the absence of these philosophical market reforms. In a “free agora,” philosophically protreptic discourse would not have to compete with the

86. Millett (1998) provides a longer catalog of wares and activities based on literary references (pp. 215–217).

87. Millett (1998, pp. 219–220). Millett contends that buying and selling were “late arrivals on the agora-scene” (p. 219), but when the market is most full of this hustle-and-bustle, we see the climax of Athenian democracy (p. 220).

88. See Millett (1998, pp. 218–224: “Ideology in the agora”); cf. Collins (2014).

sale of anchovies and prostitutes; in fact, it may not be necessary at all, for the liberal citizens would be supervised by officials who engendered “true shame” and the kind of fear appropriate to free people.

Since a philosophical program is sold side by side with things for sale, philosophical or otherwise, philosophically protreptic discourse must take into account potential distractions. Aristotle makes clear this feature in the case of any deliberative rhetoric (*Rh.* 1360b):

Nearly all men, individually and in common, have some aim in the attainment of which they choose certain things and avoid certain things. This aim, briefly stated, is happiness [εὐδαιμονία] and its component parts . . . All who exhort [προτροπαί] or dissuade [ἀποτροπαί] discuss happiness and the things which conduce or are detrimental to it. For one should do the things which procure happiness or one of its parts, or increase instead of diminishing it, and avoid doing those things which destroy or hinder it or bring about what is contrary to it.

The τέλος of deliberative rhetoric is the expedient, and Aristotle argues that there is both a universal audience and a universal method for the kind of deliberative rhetoric which concentrates on what is expedient for acquiring happiness. To address this universal aim, the method exhorts and dissuades, is protreptic and apotreptic. Philosophical protreptic exhorts its audience to adopt one way of living that leads to a specific kind of happiness and dissuades them from alternative ways of living which are detrimental to that happiness. This typically includes not only its market competitors, but the way of life which its distracted audience is presently living.

Protreptic discourse identifies and indicts both (1) the present behavior which it seeks to change and (2) the range of other possible behaviors which it deems detrimental to happiness. The person whom the protreptic intends to change cares about one thing, but should care about another. And yet, he should not make the mistake of replacing one set of inexpedient and destructive cares with another. The mistake in making this substitution lies at the heart of protreptic rhetoric. Protreptics do not merely aim to replace the care for one thing with that of another. They both direct the audience from their bad lifestyles and navigate them through the treacherous waters of a whole host of competing protreptics and the alternative but bad or even worse values that they propagate.⁸⁹ For the protreptic to

89. Protreptic cannot be too concerned with its competition, particularly with the myriad

succeed in this competition, it must strip its audience of their present cares and be the most attractive and only acceptable substitution.

The inclusion of competing voices serves the protreptic objective and provides more opportunities for the audience to be in dialogue with the discourse. Sometimes these competing voices are kept relatively separate and rendered powerless through parodic objectification. A philosopher can distort these competing voices by taking their styles and logics to their furthest extremes in an effort to invalidate them, thus revealing a potential and unattractive content. These apotreptics do not offer positive content since they are simply making competing voices laughable. At other times, these competing voices are permitted to move more freely and interact with the philosopher's voice. Indeed, a given protreptic can perhaps go so far as to call attention to its own potential pitfalls and formal limits, and even point up its own laughable inadequacies.⁹⁰ These protreptics are more dialogic, but greater dialogism is a risky business which draws attention to the contestability of the protreptic voice. The inclusion of more attractive and vociferous opponents may put the protreptic voice more in the position of requiring a champion and defender.⁹¹

In this busy marketplace, each school advertises its unique philosophical end through a uniquely hybridized protreptic rhetoric in competition with the goals and ideologies of other rhetorical discourses. These respective "wares" are, of course, not like figs and haircuts: they are ideas, types of character, political ideologies, as well as practical and contemplative activities. These things are useful in some ways, useless in others. Protreptic is rhetorical, and rhetoric is useful (*χρήσιμος*, *Rh.* 1355b), so it too must be useful. But for what exactly is protreptic useful? When we talk about a commerce of ideas, we are of course not talking about selling things—not even, in the end, books—but rather ways of seeing and living in the world, attitudes, experiences, and possible communities of shared

ways in which its competition could respond to the charges made by the apotropaic functions of the protreptic. When rhetoric becomes preoccupied with trying to outfox possible rejoinders, it begins to substitute itself for reality and direct its objective inward—toward fantasy—rather than outward—toward the world it hopes to change.

90. This is especially true of the third kind of protreptic discourse, which provides an account of someone wrestling with a pledge made after a protreptic encounter (e.g., Alcibiades in the *Symposium* or Clitophon).

91. See Martin (2004) for a similar treatment of Hesiodic rhetorical "doubles," which present a kind of wisdom that is "not simply authoritative truth handed down . . . [but] wisdom that invites debate, an 'open' format that is stylized, in the *Works and Days*, as a continuing *neikos*" (p. 41).

inquiry. The consumer does not necessarily offer money in exchange, but respect, time, and attention (which means turning away from other diversions and the things to which he formerly attended). He hears and repeats the protreptic, and in certain ways becomes the unique philosophical end which the protreptic promotes.⁹² Protreptic offers the clearest demonstration that philosophers are engaged in this “commerce” and that they care about the “sale”. In fact, even the most analytical philosophers are not entirely disinterested seekers of wisdom.⁹³

But what exactly are they marketing, and how do consumers know that the transaction is complete, that they are in possession of the thing being marketed? Does protreptic include any guarantee or criterion for success? Consumers may certainly know that they are situated in (but not yet part of) a new community. But consumers of these ways of seeing and living in the world cannot examine the new set of skills and attitudes without examining themselves, and they can understand the force of the ideology only much later, when these skills and attitudes have been integrated into the fabric of their daily lives. Perhaps philosophical protreptic appears often to fail due to this delay of noticeable change, and even more so due to the fact that consumers who begin to search themselves only see themselves with shame prior to the hard work of this integration. Exploring an “economy” of protreptic amounts to an investigation of the processes of the intake and embodiment of new genres—attitudes and ways of seeing.

92. See Blondell (2002, pp. 26–29); Gonzalez (2002) argues that “knowledge of how to desire and pursue virtue is itself a knowledge of virtue” (p. 178n.27). The search for virtue is virtue, and a protreptic discourse not only shows audiences how to search for a particular kind of virtue, but through mimetic performance, a philosophical convert can *do* the philosophy he is reading. Aeschines’s *Alcibiades* depicts Socrates saying, “And so although I know no science or skill [μάθημα] that I could teach to anyone to benefit him, nevertheless I thought that in keeping company with Alcibiades I could by the power of love make him better” (fr. 11). Gonzalez (2002) argues that this fragment suggests that desiring virtue in a certain way is knowing virtue in a certain way (p. 181n.35). I am suggesting that if we mimetically perform this desire, we are perhaps in a way becoming philosophical and possessing virtue. Cf. Gaiser (1959, p. 195).

93. On the disinterest of theoretical philosophers, see Nightingale (2004), especially chap. 5. For an economic model of the commerce of philosophy, see Bragues (2004), who argues that philosophical supply is “generally motivated by the quest for followers, status, money, and power. The market fails to produce truth precisely because the pursuit of truth is far from the only incentive operating on the demand and supply sides. Instead, the popularity of philosophical schools depends on how well their attributes meet consumers’ mostly nontruth preferences” (p. 229). For a bibliography of marketing theories for material and nonmaterial consumption, see Strasser (2003).

This anxiety and lasting frustration may be one of the most important features of a protreptic encounter. Protreptic discourse aims to cause lasting change. To do this, it must have the capacity to continue to function in some way in the absence of its designer. The protreptic must exert some sort of pressure even when an unaffected audience or newly turned student is no longer being operated upon. The protreptic must leave on the newly turned student a psychological print—an operative memory tied to certain desires and feelings of shame and honor. Consider, for example, Isocrates's claim that Demonicus should be able to recall (*ἀναμνηθεῖς*) his father's principles and conduct (*προαιρέσεις*) in order that his own house should become an example (*παράδειγμα*) of Isocrates's protreptic discourse (*Ad Demonicum* 9). If Demonicus remembers these things, he will embody the deeds of his father and the protreptic and thus be a living record of virtue. As we see in Plato's *Symposium*, by contrast, Alcibiades already agreed that he needed to do something about his way of life, but in Socrates's absence, he goes back to his old ways (*Symp.* 216bc). The protreptic, in this case, leaves no operative memory. Alcibiades feels shame only when he sees Socrates again. Protreptic discourse must rather be something like that sown discourse which is capable of helping itself as well as the man who planted it (*Phdr.* 276e–277a). In short, Plato, Isocrates, and Aristotle are all concerned with what happens after protreptic encounters in the marketplace: are their “turned” audiences staying turned and practicing the discipline consistently and correctly? In other words, has the discipline to which they have been “turned” become an earnest pursuit and object of careful attention and diligence (*ἐπιμέλεια*)? And, if so, how are they faring? Protreptics can fail in the short and long run after they have momentarily persuaded someone, and these professional philosophers highlight the possibility of failure even while they are advertising their disciplines.

PART ONE

Platonic Protreptic

Levels of Discourse in Plato's Dialogues

WE BEGIN OUR investigation of protreptic in the Platonic dialogues by distinguishing the shapes and levels of the narratives in these texts. As I argue, an examination of narrative levels reveals the functions of the narrator that are especially important for a discourse which aims to appropriate and characterize the discourse of competitors. In some dialogues there are multiple protreptics, which variously succeed and fail at different narrative levels. Indeed, the boundaries between narrative levels may be breached in order to draw the audience at one level into the audience of another. Finally, Socrates's choice of narrative style appears to violate his prescription for narrative poetics at *Republic* 392c–394c. In a dialogue like the *Euthydemus*, the plot sounds simple enough: Socrates narrates to his friend Crito a public contest that he has taken part in on the previous day with a visiting pair of eristic acrobats. Socrates and Crito evaluate the contest and consider how various spectators reacted. Socrates, using his characteristic irony, urges his friend to enroll together with him as students of the eristic sophists. This simplicity is deceptive, for the interaction between narrative levels and the attention to dramatic details within one of these levels make this dialogue one of the most complex and artful of all.

Narrative levels can be distinguished on the whole from one another through a notion of “embeddedness” and often by spatial and temporal differences, real or imaginary. A narrator and narratee occupy one time and place. But the story which the narrator tells and the narratee “sees” occupies another. The narrator and narratee live in one world but are partially and momentarily transported into another—the world of the

narrative. An account which portrays this shift from one world to another contains different narrative levels. Gérard Genette distinguishes these levels as *extradiegetic* and *intradiegetic*: “the world in which one tells, the world of which one tells.”¹ The author of a narrative occupies the particular time and space of one world but narrates the events or story of another. For instance, Plato typically writes about fifth-century events and characters for a fourth-century audience, and half of his dialogues are delivered indirectly, that is, they are reported by someone who either witnessed the event firsthand or heard about it from someone else. Moreover, if a character *within* the story tells another narrative, the world about which he tells becomes in turn the world in which another character may speak; in that case, the level that is *intradiegetic* relative to the author becomes *extradiegetic* relative to the characters of the embedded narrative.² Plato’s indirect dialogues provide remarkable instances of these embedded narratives. For instance, we find in the *Symposium* the story of Apollodoros (1) reporting to a friend the story that he had reported (2) to Glaukon the other day, which Aristodemos (3) had reported (and part of which Socrates [4] later confirmed) concerning a dinner party at Agathon’s at which Socrates (5) reported the account of the rites of love which Diotima (6) had offered him as a youth. We do not hear all of these narrative events directly, but we are to imagine that every instance of narration and confirmation (not to mention moments of incubation in each respective speaker and responsive audience) has an effect on the shape of the account to which we do have access.

Most of the dialogues upon which we will focus in this section offer unusual examples of this complex narrative structure, but the first of these—the *Euthydemus*—is a protreptic which advertises one brand of philosophy by comparing different philosophical protreptics to one another. A narrator attempts to convert an audience at an extradiegetic level by reporting the attempted conversion of another audience at an intradiegetic level. As we will see, Plato’s *Euthydemus* competes with, among

1. Genette (1980, p. 236).

2. Genette calls the embedded narrative *metadiegetic*, but it is clear that the narratives more often come to us and are reported through more than two embedding frames. The distinction of *metadiegetic* at least establishes a relation of the embedded narrative with the frame-narrator and highlights a chain of responsibility for the utterance. Embedded narratives are still uttered by one mouth. Responsibility does not establish intent.

other things, Isocratean discourse in the fourth-century marketplace of ideas.

The conversation between Socrates and Crito about the events of the public contest which had unfolded the previous day constitutes the extradiegetic level. Crito had been at the event but had been unable to hear the verbal contest because he was too far away from Socrates and the sophists. In short, Crito had been at the event but needed to hear an account of it from Socrates. Let us look first at the intradiegetic level, which consists of two reports of those events, both delivered in a mixed style of narration and mimesis: the first—a battle between mismatched contestants (Socrates and the eristic duo) in front of an impulsive crowd of spectators—is reported by Socrates; the second—a critique of the contest delivered in private afterwards by an Isocratean bystander—is reported by Crito. The Isocratean critique hovers between the extradiegetic level of Socrates and Crito and the intradiegetic level of Socrates's narrative because, as reported speech, the critique occupies another world about which Crito tells. Also, as a synoptic evaluation of the contest of speeches between Socrates and the sophists, the critique both occupies a world that is temporally closer to the world which Socrates and Crito occupy and is a commentary on the whole world which Socrates has reported.³ The events of Socrates's narrative thus enter into the Isocratean critique. The intradiegetic world of Socrates's narrative is swallowed up by the intradiegetic world of Crito's narrative; the Isocratean critique is extradiegetic relative to the events which Socrates reports but intradiegetic relative to Crito and Socrates. Thus, Crito's conversation with the Isocratean is a commentary (after the fact) on Socrates's performance.⁴

We are concerned with distinguishing between narrative levels of the *Euthydemus* because each level contains a distinct protreptic or set of protreptics and apotreptics. For instance, in the intradiegetic level of discourse, Socrates attempts to win a boy, Cleinias, to his way of doing philosophy, while at the same time trying to turn him away from his opponents. He also tries to convert the eristic sophists themselves. Finally, he

3. See Genette (1990) on the difference between "discourse time" or "narrative time" and "narrated time." Cf. Wolfsdorf (2007, pp. 182–183).

4. It is significant, as we shall see, that Socrates's report is not the same as Isocrates's report of the same past event. Isocrates experiences the event as a spectator. Socrates occupies the same space as an interlocutor, performer, director, and spectator. Additionally, they perceive the event through respective lenses of radically different notions of "philosophy."

targets members of the audience, particularly Ctesippus. The sophists, for their part, succeed at winning over the crowd (and Ctesippus manages to pick up and use their methods, though he does this as a game). Finally, at the intradiegetic level that follows the events which Socrates narrates, the Isocratean attempts to win over Crito and dissuade him from the eristic display which Crito had not been able to hear. We can see, then, that the protreptics of the intradiegetic level constitute a fifth-century sphere of public contest. In the extradiegetic level of discourse, by contrast, Socrates tries to involve Crito in the debate which he is reenacting (i.e., the events from the intradiegetic level) and to turn Crito away from the Isocratean critique and vision of philosophy. The protreptics of the extradiegetic level between Socrates and Crito then reflect a fourth-century concern of how both to navigate the marketplace of ideas and to attract potential converts through private and discursive means.

In the *Euthydemus*, Plato competes with those philosophical disciplines and their discursive innovations (which are represented in the dialogue) for the title of philosophy. This protreptic consists of a pragmatic project (attracting potential converts to Platonic disciplines in the Athenian marketplace) and a literary project (constructing a way, *the way*, of doing philosophy through writing and performance). The different protreptics of the extradiegetic and intradiegetic levels of discourse are portrayed as succeeding and failing with respect to their particular audiences. In the intradiegetic level, Socrates characterizes the reactions of his opponents, audience, and even himself to the protreptics offered by himself and by the sophists. Socrates, Crito, and the Isocratean also provide explicit evaluations of the motives and effectiveness of the protreptics occurring in the intradiegetic level. Finally, Plato's characterization of Crito and Socrates in the extradiegetic level gives us a sense of the success of the protreptic.

It is predominately through these skillful characterizations that we have a sense of how narrators at any level intervene in their narratives. Some narrators carefully draw attention to these interventions, thereby recognizing the bridge between the extradiegetic and intradiegetic.⁵ Genette offers a useful discussion of this issue. He notes several narrative functions that go beyond the basic role of a narrator (whether he is present

5. E.g., Euclides's expedient omission of names of speakers from his reported speech in the prelude to the *Theaetetus* (143c) or Socrates's adaptation of Thrasymachus's reluctant responses under the summer sun (*Resp.* 351cd). See Blondell (2002, pp. 41–48) on narrative function and the authoritative position in Plato's dialogues.

in the text or not). These include: (1) the *directing function*, whereby the narrator interrupts the story to comment on the organization or articulation of his text; (2) the *communication function*, whereby the narrator addresses his audience directly; (3) the *testimonial function*, whereby the narrator affirms sources of information and expresses emotions about the story; and (4) the *ideological function*, whereby the narrator interrupts the story to provide instructive comments.⁶ All of these functions call attention to the narrative as a narrative in progress and to the narrator and listener as corresponding but unequal participants in the narration. These functions offer evaluations or, in the case of the communication function, they invite the audience to become involved and come up with their own evaluations.

These evaluative interruptions are essential to narrative success. As William Labov (1972) demonstrates, such interruptions continually “ward off” the listener’s question of “so what?” by showing “why the events of the narrative are reportable” and worth telling and hearing.⁷ Evaluative narrative functions may be easy to spot, as (1) external interruptions which stop the narrative altogether, or (2) suspensions of action which call “attention to that part of the narrative and indicat[e] to the listener that this has some connection with the evaluative point.” But as (3) embedded interruptions that offer evaluations during the narrative itself (or that introduce a third party who offers an evaluation for the narrator) or as (4) dramatic evaluations provided through the reactions of characters, these functions may also be particularly difficult to extract from the polyphony of narrated dialogues as narrative functions. Still, these functions are unmistakably present in a protreptic discourse which aims to appropriate and characterize the discourse of competitors.⁸ The narrators exercise all of these functions in the extradiegetic level of discourse—directing, communication, testimonial, and ideological—while dramatizing events for one or more listeners.

In the indirect dialogues of Plato (i.e., those that contain narrative frames), each reporter has a hand in controlling the basic story (which I call the “embedded story,” because it is the core story contained in all the narrations). The narrator closest to the embedded story may appear to be privileged most of all due to his interjections, but every narrator of Plato’s

6. Genette (1980, pp. 255–256).

7. Labov (1972, pp. 366, 370).

8. For the external, embedded, and dramatic evaluative interruption and suspension of action, see Labov (1972, pp. 371–374).

indirect dialogues performs the embedded story, and as performers, they make certain choices as they adopt different roles. Rather than “further distancing Plato as author from the voices of his characters,”⁹ we see his artfulness in the ventriloquisms of all those who contribute to the narration. And when we examine the protreptic writings of Plato’s competitors for the title of philosophy and look at how they are incorporated into his dialogues, we see that his writings themselves are ventriloquisms.

It should come as no surprise that in everyday speech, “no less than half (on the average) of all the words uttered by [any person] will be someone else’s words (consciously someone else’s), transmitted with varying degrees of precision and impartiality (or more precisely, partiality).”¹⁰ Our daily discourse is full of the discourse of others. In this way, the world of which one tells is, in part, the world *in* which one tells; it is, in part, the world of which others have told. These aspects of everyday speech are also found in literary discourse. According to Bakhtin, both everyday speech and literary discourse may consist of: (1) an unmediated type of discourse which does not aim to highlight the use of other people’s words; (2) a represented discourse, which highlights a character’s way of speaking for an audience; and (3) the “double-voiced” word, which is achieved when the author makes use of “someone else’s discourse for his own purposes by inserting a new semantic intention into a discourse which already has, and which retains, an intention of its own.”¹¹ It is through this third type of discourse that “stylization” and direct and indirect parody are achieved. Let me turn now to Bakhtin’s notions of “stylization” and parody, which are often found in protreptics. In “stylization,” the speaker constructs his utterance so that the voice of the other person will be heard to sound along with his own; the voices are more or less in agreement, but the speaker’s voice casts “a slight shadow of objectification” over the other person’s style as something chosen, tested, and provisional rather than authoritative.¹²

9. Blondell (2002, p. 20).

10. Bakhtin (1981, p. 339).

11. Bakhtin (1984, pp. 186–189). Voloshinov (1973) regards the prevalence of double-voiced stylization over the direct, “declaratory” word as immoral (pp. 158–159), while Bakhtin (1981) considers the plurivocality of the dialogized word provocative, playful, and liberating, the only means we have of fulfilling our respective projects of selfhood (pp. 342–355); cf. “Toward a Philosophy of the Act” (1986) in Morson and Emerson (1990, p. 31).

12. Bakhtin (1984, p. 189). If the predecessor’s voice ceases to sound as another’s and merges entirely with the speaker’s voice, the discourse no longer plays host but becomes single-voiced and mere imitation (p. 190).

In direct parody, the parodist lays siege to the set of attitudes which he finds objectionable, uses another person's discourse in the mode of attack, introducing into it a "semantic intention directly opposed to the original one . . . and forces [it] to serve directly opposing aims."¹³ In the indirect parody of a hidden polemic, the other person's discourse "is not reproduced with a new intention, but it acts upon, influences, and in one way or another determines the author's discourse, while itself remaining outside it."¹⁴ In his characteristically vivid and playful fashion, Bakhtin describes indirect parody in terms that illustrate a particularly important feature of protreptic discourse:

The other's thought does not personally make its way inside the [author's] discourse, but is only reflected in it, determining its tone and meaning. One word acutely senses alongside it someone else's word speaking about the same object, and this awareness determines its structure.

Internally polemical discourse—the word with a sideward glance at someone else's hostile word—is extremely widespread in practical everyday speech as well as in literary speech, and has enormous style-shaping significance. Here belong, in everyday speech, all words that "make digs at others" and all "barbed" words. But here also belongs all self-deprecating overblown speech that repudiates itself in advance, speech with a thousand reservations, concessions, loopholes and the like. Such speech literally cringes in the presence or the anticipation of someone else's word, reply, objection.¹⁵

Protreptic discourse uses both direct parody and the indirect parody of the hidden polemic. In the *Euthydemus*, a protreptic about contesting protreptics, Plato parodizes the speech of both Socrates's eristic competitors and his own Isocratean competition and forces them to fulfill objectives to which they are opposed.¹⁶ But we must add that protreptic discourse

13. Bakhtin (1984, p. 193).

14. Bakhtin (1984, p. 195).

15. Bakhtin (1984, p. 196).

16. While we may imagine that Plato constructs solely through stylization a Socrates with whom he is in agreement, he often presents occasions on which others construct his teacher through parody. Bakhtin (1981) notes, "While creatively stylizing upon and experimenting with another's discourse, we attempt to guess, to imagine, how a person with authority might conduct himself in the given circumstances, the light he would cast on them with

tends to gird up in anticipation of the competition. It strikes out against *potential* competition and even concedes some ground with self-criticism. Protreptic discourse is agonistic discourse and as such is defined by a sense of its competition—what one's rivals have said and might say in response.

Thus far, I have argued that (1) narrated discourse is shaped by voices other than those that are represented in the narrative, particularly by the directing comments, testimonials, and ideologies of the narrator or multiple narrators, and (2) when that voice is a protreptic voice, it is shaped as much by its objective to attract potential converts as it is shaped by the voices—past and potential—of its competition. Narrated discourse can be dissociated into intra- and extradiegetic levels, but the core, “embedded” events in fiction are still linked to the most distanced external narrator. Some literary scholars make a point of keeping the world in which one speaks entirely separate from the world of which one speaks and warn against “assuming partial vertical relations between elements of the higher-level and lower-level communications [which] invariably causes a short-circuit in literary analysis.”¹⁷ While it is true that we ought to distinguish, for instance, between the two Socrateses of the extradiegetic and intradiegetic levels of discourse in the *Euthydemus* (the latter being a character fashioned by the former), we ought also to examine the ways in which narratives are shaped by the objectives of narrators. Plato and his historical context—his competitors, his objectives and anxieties—produce an account of a fifth-century contest framed by events which allude to a fourth-century contest. As we shall see, the Socrates of the extradiegetic level is hopeful that his narration of the events in the intradiegetic level will engage with his present audience just as, we may imagine, Plato is hopeful that his characters can inflame and convert his readers to a new pragmatic and discursive project.

his discourse. In such experimental guesswork the image of the speaking person and his discourse become the object of creative, artistic imagination. In Plato, Socrates serves as just such an artistic image of the wise man and teacher, an image employed for the purposes of experiment” (pp. 347–348). But it is through the parodizing rather than stylizing efforts of characters like Clitophon and Alcibiades—characters who have been influenced by his protreptic—that we hear his speech serving different, perhaps opposing, ends.

17. Slings (1999, p. 37).

Narrative between Socrates and Crito

NOW THAT WE have determined the narrative structure of the dialogue between levels and within levels, we need to determine the nature of the characters in each narrative position and how each has a hand in shaping the narrative. As we have seen, protreptic typically happens between multiple participants—the potential convert, the true philosopher, the pretenders—some of whom may not even be present but who still determine the shape of the discourse.¹ Socrates of the extradiegetic narrative level provides an account of the protreptic discourses performed in a dramatic competition (in the intradiegetic level), and he takes great care to characterize the participants in order to demonstrate to Crito what sorts of souls are suitable for effective protreptic. He also attempts to exert pressure on Crito to perform particular roles in his own protreptic at the extradiegetic level.

This meeting between Socrates and his old friend is a private conversation, but a third participant will join them through Crito's ventriloquism of an Isocratean bystander who had weighed in on the live performance. We will explore later the consequences of this addition to the narrative. As we will see, the addition of the Isocratean critic is necessary for the narrative at the extradiegetic level to be a protreptic of the sort we are

1. In addition to the sideward glance at someone else's hostile word, Serres (1997) describes a more mysterious aspect of pedagogy when he proposes that "the game of pedagogy is in no respect a game for two, voyager and destination, but for three. The third place intervenes, there, as the threshold of passage. And, most often, neither the student nor the initiator know where this door is located nor what to do with it" (p. 9). The student and initiator may fulfill the roles proper to a fruitful interaction but may have failed either to locate the middle path or to work with it in the appropriate ways.

investigating—a protreptic that advertises one brand of philosophy by comparing different philosophical protreptics to one another. At the extradiegetic level, Socrates needs an opponent. Crito will provide this opponent by reporting the Isocratean apotreptic of the public contest, and Socrates will ventriloquize this opponent’s protreptic and offer an “apotreptic” of that protreptic. For now, though, we have two old friends: one who cannot help but always be on protreptic duty and another who is, like most Athenians, a sucker for spectacle.

2.1 *Crito and his Agenda*

Crito is an inquisitive φιλοθέωρος of sorts, confessedly φιλήκοος (*Euthyd.* 304c). Although he could not hear Socrates and his competitors at the contest, he was able to see a good deal of the event. The dialogue opens with him asking, “Who was it, Socrates, with whom you were talking yesterday at the Lyceum? There was such a mob standing around you that when I approached wishing to listen, I could hear nothing clearly” (271a). He goes on to explain that by craning over the heads of the crowd, he had been able to see his way down to Socrates speaking with a stranger. “Who was he?” Crito asks. At the end of the event, he set off from the spectacle for a walk and an Isocratean bystander parted company with the mob and approached, having misidentified the source of Crito’s frustration. Ready to turn Crito off from what he would have heard had he been able to hear, the Isocratean asked, “Are you not an auditor [ἄκροᾶ] of these clever men?” The Isocratean began his apotreptic by claiming ironically that the dialogue had been worth hearing (ἄξιόν γ’ ἦν ἀκοῦσαι). “What was it?” an insatiable Crito asked. The Isocratean said that the performers in the contest had been “babbling and making a worthless ado about nothing of consequence” (304e). Crito retorted that this business called “philosophy” was an agreeable (χαρίεν) thing rather than worthless.² He agreed with the Isocratean that one ought not to participate publicly in verbal contests (305b) and said he would prefer to suffer eristic refutation than to

2. More than a thing of pleasure, Plato, Isocrates, and Aristotle use *χαρίεις* to describe the sort of thing a man of culture and taste would appreciate, though they disagree on what the *χαρίεις* thing is. Socrates asks that the eristic sophists more than entertain (*χαρίασθον*, 274d) but educate those ready to learn (*ἔτοιμοι εἶεν μανθάνειν*, 274cd) with a demonstration (*ἐπιδείξασθον*) of protreptic. Gagarin (2001) argues that such displays of intellectual virtuosity may have been produced primarily for entertainment and pleasure. And yet we must not underestimate the protreptic power of pleasure.

use eristic arguments himself to refute others (304cd). But he continued to insist that the business of philosophy was a serious and worthy practice. Merely as an artfully produced spectacle and narrative, and as something his sons might undergo, philosophical demonstration was something in which this busybody found pleasure.³

In this (and other) dialogues, Crito is a representative of other conservative attitudes as well. In his namesake dialogue, we find Crito advocating that Socrates commit a crime (escaping from prison), though he is persuaded by Socrates to throw in his lot with the few people (ὀλίγοις τισί) who believe one should never do wrong in return (*Cri.* 49cd). We also learn of Crito's distrust of the democratic masses: "one should care about the opinion of the many [τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης μέλειν] . . . who can inflict . . . the greatest of evils if one is slandered among them" (44d). In the *Euthydemus*, Crito was concerned for welfare of his sons, for their upbringing and education which are, Crito insists later, the hardships that a good and courageous father must suffer (συνδιατάλαιπυρεῖν, *Cri.* 45cd).⁴ This is not the first time that Crito has confessed to having been at a loss about his sons; he has *always* admitted it to Socrates (*Euthyd.* 306d), perhaps because Socrates has a tendency to prompt such a crisis. We may find it admirable that Crito attempts to prompt a similar crisis in Socrates with his opening arguments in the *Crito*. And we can see that he has indeed learned something from Socrates. His education is nonetheless modest

3. In the *Republic*, Socrates attacks not only this sort of engagement with philosophy, but every conventional kind of engagement that leads to this tourism from an early age: "At present, those who take up [ἀπτόμενοι] the philosophical way of life [ἐπιτηδεύματος, cf. ἐπιμελεία] do so as young men who have just left childhood behind and have yet to take up household management and money-making. But just when they reach the hardest part—I mean the part that has to do with giving a rational account [τὸ περι τοὺς λόγους]—they abandon it and are regarded as fully trained in philosophy [φιλοσοφώτατοι ποιούμενοι]. In later life, they think they're doing well if they are willing to attend as auditors [ἀκροασταί] when others are doing philosophy, for they think they should do this only as a sideline [πάρεργον]. And with few exceptions, by the time they reach old age, their eagerness for philosophy is quenched more thoroughly than the sun of Heraklitos, which is never rekindled" (*Resp.* 6.497e–498b). To get to Crito and Crito's sons, Socrates must undo years of conventional "philosophical" training; he begins by turning Crito's attention to how he attempts to get Cleinias to take up the philosophical way of life.

4. Compare with concerns for status and wealth (*Euthyd.* 306de). Hawtrey (1981) notes the Athenian "habit" of attention to external goods and reputation, and neglect of a philosophical education at *Prot.* 319a–320b and *Meno* 93bff (p. 195). Of course, Isocratean philosophy held the cultivation of reputation in high regard, and met that so-called habit well. In the *Phaedo*, Crito also expresses concern for the welfare of Socrates's own children as well as carrying out the customary burial rites (115b–116a).

(which is perhaps just what a conservative elite reader of Plato would prefer to see). He is neither a firebrand nor a fool. Hawtrey (1981) suggests that Plato would have had in mind when he wrote the *Euthydemus* these “many respectable Critos of Athens” (p. 15), all seeking instructors for their maturing Critobuluses. Thus Crito is figurative—a fifth-century point of reference for anxious fourth-century fathers.⁵

While Crito proves to be—like Socrates’s more mature and “expert” interlocutors—skeptical and evasive at critical moments (which we will discuss later at length), he is in many ways more like Socrates’s younger and more receptive interlocutors. Socrates typically targets the pretensions of the former; as Blondell puts it:

[We find Socrates] excoriating the obtuse, the self-important and the hostile (Hippias, Euthyphro, Thrasymachos, Kallikles), and treating promising and friendly youths more gently (Lysis, Charmides, Kleinias) . . . [because of] the fact that the young have had less exposure to formative experiences, and are therefore generally less sure of their own prior wisdom and hence more susceptible to future influences—more malleable like wax or clay.⁶

Crito’s nature seems more like that of the friendly youths. He is without pretension. Socrates does not attack him or stand him on his head. He does not use the elenchus with Crito, though he gets Crito to doubt some of his attitudes and past decisions. With one notable exception, Crito merely listens as an attentive and impressionable spectator. While he maintains a conventional sense of propriety, he is led by Socrates’s narrative to seek unconventional paths for his sons. He expresses outrage at the start of the dialogue for Socrates placing himself at an old age in the care of instructors (*Euthyd.* 272b). Socrates explains that he persuaded some elderly men to attend harp classes with him, and he will again try

5. As a figurative vessel, Crito can contain much more. Diogenes Laertius cites Idomeneus of Lampsacus, the third-century BCE Epicurean, who claimed that Aeschines had rather been the one to advise flight from prison. Plato gave the words to Crito because he disliked Aristippus who was friends with Aeschines. Plutarch writes that Idomeneus’s account of Pericles cannot be trusted (*Per.* 10.6). But if Diogenes is right about Aeschines, Crito appears even more of a literary device. For these testimonia, see Riginos (1976, pp. 96–97).

6. Blondell (2002, p. 119). Also noted are the chief exceptions of young men who are more defined and self-assured: Meno and Polus, “a generation younger than Socrates, but still no mere boy” (p. 120n.40; Blondell refers the reader to Dodds [1959, p. 11]).

to persuade another set of elderly men to be fellow disciples of the eristic sophists (272cd). He sneaks Crito's sons into the affair as bait, and Crito agrees to it all (ἀλλ' οὐδὲν κωλύει) as long as Socrates first gives a full narrative (διήγησαι) of the eristic skill and thereby demonstrates what the whole group will learn (μαθησόμεθα). By the end of the narrative, Crito is persuaded that he will happily (ἡδέως) learn from them, but merely as an auditor (cf. φιλήκοος, 304c). Without hostility, Socrates obliquely disposes this impressionable spectator to confess that he has neglected the training of his sons, and that he is struck with panic (ἐκπέπληγμαι) when he glances across the freakish (ἀλλόκοτος) field of so-called educators (306e). He declares, "Whenever I am in your company, I am disposed to think it is madness [μανίαν] to have taken such pains in every direction for the sake of my children" (306d). In the presence of Socrates, this receptive old man has been led into empty-handed despair over how *he* will profit his son, how *he* will turn (προτρέπω) his Critobulus to philosophy (307a).⁷

2.2 Socrates the Storyteller

In the *Euthydemus*, Socrates behaves in unusual ways. Grote (1865) suggests that there is something altogether different about Socrates in the *Euthydemus*:

The fact is, that the Platonic Sokrates when he talks with the two Sophists in the dialogue *Euthydēmus*, is a character drawn by Plato for the purpose of that dialogue, and is very different from the real historical Sokrates, whom the public of Athens saw and heard in the market-place or gymnasia. He is depicted as a gentle, soothing, encouraging talker, with his claws drawn in, and affecting inability even to hold his own against the two Sophists: such indeed as he sometimes may have been in conversing with particular persons (so Xenophon takes pains to remind his readers in the *Memorabilia*), but with entire elimination of that characteristic aggressive Elenchus for which he himself (in the Platonic *Apology*) takes credit, and which the auditors usually heard him exhibit.⁸

7. Again, a fourth-century reader with similar anxieties might be sympathetic to this confession while surveying the field of conventional educators, only now seeing a fourth-century Isocratean personality in a fifth-century landscape of impostors.

8. Grote (1865, vol. 1, p. 536).

This account focuses on the peculiar nature of the Socrates of the intradiegetic level who talks with the eristic duo. But as we shall soon see, there are fingerprints of the extradiegetic-level Socrates all over the intradiegetic-level narration. Indeed, this ubiquitous character orchestrates a good deal of the marketplace contest both while he is engaged in it and when he narrates it later. The extradiegetic-level Socrates, who speaks with Crito, narrates the events of the dramatic level, competes with the Isocratean in his absence, and also champions one way of doing business. Ironically, in Grote's view, both of these Socrateses whom we have identified as fashioning protreptics that advertise one brand of doing philosophy by comparing different philosophical protreptics mark a departure from a "real historical Socrates" of the public *marketplace*.⁹ I believe that we should revise our view of this Socrates. The *Euthydemus* is, in part, Plato's attempt to highlight Socrates's role in a marketplace of ideas, a role which can be identified in public and private spaces, in gentle and aggressive speech.¹⁰

The Socrates of the extradiegetic narrative level does not engage in his typically aggressive elenchus but begins with a report of a demonstration of his more gentle elenchus with an attractive boy. Socrates shows how he

9. On a historical Socrates, see Levy (1956), Guthrie (1969), Lacey (1971), Vlastos (1983b).

10. Crito begins the *Euthydemus* with the question, "Who was he, Socrates, with whom you were talking yesterday?" It is a question which Strauss (1985) assigns to the "sphere of gossip, of ordinary curiosity," a sphere of which Plato is contemptuous but takes full advantage (p. 68). Ober (1989) explains that in classical Athens "[m]uch depended on rumor and gossip, which were particularly important in a society that lacked organized news media. It is impossible to determine just how rumors were spread in Athens, but we know they did spread rapidly and crossed class lines easily" (p. 148). Ober cites Isocrates's (7.15) description of rumor running rampant in the *ergastêria*, where citizens complained about politics. These are just the sort of places in which Socrates spoke—in the marketplace by the banker's tables (ἐν ἀγορᾷ ἐπὶ τῶν τραπεζῶν, *Ap.* 17c9)—and he speaks there, as he explains, with the language of the marketplace rather than with the language of the law court. It is not only in the marketplace, through the language of the marketplace, that reputations are made and broken. The marketplace is also a normative institution of the political ethos: Socrates tells the Athenians that his accusers "have been at it for a long time and spoke to you at an age when you would most readily believe them, some of you being children and adolescents, and they won their case by default, as there was no defense" (*Ap.* 18c). The normative institution of φήμη also leads to the "pernicious praise of wealth" which establishes an "incorrect education" and "a million cravings that are impossible to satisfy" (*Leg.* 870a). Φήμη characterizes and evaluates men in their absence, often distorting them to extreme simplifications in order to reveal their potential content: Socrates was a "student of all the things in the sky and below the earth, who makes the worse argument stronger" (*Ap.* 18c). So Socrates is reduced to an un-Athenian ignorance of human affairs and sophistic relativism. It is in this world, where Socrates talks the talk and is talked about, that the contest of protreptics takes place.

failed with the crowd and the self-important, but succeeded with a single youth who is the same age as Crito's son. This Socrates is the master narrator of a highly dramatic event.¹¹ Again, Crito says he will more than audit but will participate in protreptic competition only after Socrates has told the story (διήγησαι) of what they can expect to learn (*Euthyd.* 272d). Socrates agrees to tell it in full from the beginning (ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἅπαντα διηγῆσασθαι, 272e). After his *exordium*, he searches for the right way to proceed with his report of the competing demonstrations themselves (275cd):

What ensued, Crito, how am I to relate in proper style [πῶς ἂν καλῶς σοι διηγησαίμην]? For no slight matter it is to be able to recall in detail [ἀναλαβεῖν διεξιόντα] such enormous knowledge as theirs. Consequently, like the poets, I must begin my narrative [τῆς διηγήσεως] with an invocation of the Muses and Memory.

As a rhetorical and literary device, his prayer marks the transition from *exordium* to *narratio*, from pure reporting to a great deal of mimesis. Socrates begins to perform this contest of protreptics in character. Plato's dialogue is a literary narration about a live, public performance. And our narrator is controlling all of the characters, including his own self-representation, all of whom are colored by his agenda. It is rare for Socrates to ventriloquize others, especially to this extent.¹² By presenting protreptics in action for an internal audience who is φιλικός, the Socrates of the extradiegetic narrative level reminds his interlocutor that philosophy can be as much story, gesture, voice, and appearance, as it is thought and argument.

We should now note the sort of care with which Socrates assimilates voices into the narrative of his protreptic discourse. I will briefly draw

11. See Chance (1992) for an inventory of the rhetorical divisions of Socrates's *narratio* (p. 211); cf. McCabe (1999).

12. Notable are his conjuring of Protagoras, even at one point from the underworld (*Tht.* 171cd) after not being able to speak for himself (166a–c). On this absence and ventriloquism, see Blondell (2002, pp. 303–313), and on the extraordinary image, see Ford (1994). In the *Symposium*, even though Apollodorus makes it clear that Socrates would never be caught dead narrating the contest (διηγείτο, 173a), when it is Socrates's turn, he reports in detail Diotima's speech (δαῖ . . . ὥσπερ σὺ διηγῆσω, διελεθῆν αὐτόν, 201d) and her long, embedded narrative of how Eros was born (Μακρότερον μὲν, ἔφη, διηγῆσασθαι· ὅμως δέ σοι ἐρῶ [203b]). When Socrates ventriloquizes his competition, they are rarely themselves present for the performance. The exceptions occur when dialogue cannot move forward, and Socrates "provides" the voice of his interlocutor for a grotesque continuation of the elenchus, for example, of Callicles in the *Gorgias*, of Meletus in the *Apology*.

on Socrates's account of narrative from the *Republic*.¹³ We recall that in the *Euthydemus*, Socrates is presenting to Crito what he said, what his opponents said, what Cleinias and Ctesippus said, and how the audience responded—nearly the entire discourse of the contest takes the form of protreptics. Socrates also mixes into this narrative what he thought at the time about how the spectacle appeared to take shape, how people appeared to present themselves, how one should deal with monstrous eristic practitioners, overconfident boys, and somewhat brave but young and reckless candidates for philosophy. We also see the spectacle through the eyes of a distant Crito and a critical Isocratean. But we *hear* the entire dialogue from Socrates's mouth. And we may be surprised by his willingness to play all of these parts, even inconsistent and harmful parts, *in character*, particularly when we consider how Socrates in the *Republic* designates mimetic performances (396bc):

There is one kind of style and narrative [λέξεώς τε καὶ διηγήσεως] in which someone who is really a gentleman [καλὸς κάγαθός] would narrate [διηγοῖτο] whenever he wanted to say [λέγειν] something, and another kind, unlike this one, which his opposite by nature and education would possess and in which he would narrate [διηγοῖτο].

A man of good taste narrates in a particular way, while his opposite narrates in another. Socrates proceeds to divide style (λέξεώς) into mode and rhythm (ἁρμονίαν καὶ ῥυθμὸν, 397b), and he then turns to narrative, dividing it into narrative proper (διήγησις, or reporting not in character) and imitative narrative (μίμησις, or reporting in character). Narrative proper, given “a musical mode and rhythm appropriate to it,” necessarily refrains from making use of every mode and rhythm, but only expresses a few minor changes (397b6–7), while imitative narrative has a mixed style (ὁ κεκραμένος, 397d6) that “requires all modes and all rhythms because it contains every type [παντοδαπὰς μορφὰς] of variation” (397c). The person of good taste, who “speaks correctly” (τῷ ὀρθῶς λέγοντι, 397b6), narrates

13. Murray (1996) argues, “We cannot speak of a Platonic theory of poetry, but rather a collection of texts in which various attitudes, images and myths about poetry are expressed” (p. 2). I am merely using Socrates's account of philosophically sound narrative from the *Republic* as a hermeneutic device for emphasizing the strangeness of the Socrates of the second narrative level. For efforts at reconciling the various attitudes about poetry and imitation expressed in the dialogues, see Nehmams (1982), Dyson (1988), Ferrari (1989), Asmis (1992), Rabel (1996).

with little variation in style, that is, using narrative proper, because he has learned (and has acquired the taste for) the limited and measured patterns of good philosophical living. He does not imitate a variety of types because he knows that one tends, Socrates argues, to identify with and become what one imitates, in voice, gesture, appearance, and thought (393c, 395c, 396cd). The person of good taste wishes to become or remain whole and integrated rather than divided by qualities which are not appropriate to his nature (395bc).

But the account of moderate and philosophical narrative permits one further variation: not only may the gentleman narrate a long story in his own voice with small variations in mode and rhythm, according to characters not “unworthy of himself” (τινα ἑαυτοῦ ἀνάξιοι, 396d), but he will also “be willing to report them as if he were that man himself” (396c7) for a short while. In short, “there will be only a little bit of imitation in a long account” (ἐν πολλῷ λόγῳ, 396e7). The majority of what the gentleman narrates will vary little in style and will be narrated in his own voice, but he will indulge in that little bit of imitation which shame permits (396c). In other words, he uses predominantly δῆγησις and a bit of μίμησις. This bit of μίμησις is the imitation of a good man who only “behaves in a faultless and intelligent manner” (396d1); therefore, this bit of μίμησις does not have a mixed style, but is a μίμησις limited (like δῆγησις) to the mode and rhythm of the goodness of a good man.

But, as we will see, Socrates sneaks in two nearly concealed provisions which threaten to obliterate this comprehensive account of narrative: the moderate narrator (1) will be “unwilling to make himself *seriously* (σπουδῆ) resemble an inferior character” (396d4), and he (2) will despise imitating a worse person “unless it is just done for the sake of play” (παιδιᾶς χάριν, 396e2). The moderate narrator will narrate a lot and imitate a bit according to the limits constrained by the mode and rhythm of goodness, *except* for when he is not serious and narrates for the sake of play. Perhaps, then the whole of the *Republic*, especially Book I, is narrated for the sake of play. A narrative about a bad person like Gyges is related in indirect discourse and so avoids the harm that would come from imitating the life of a worse person.¹⁴

The Socrates of the extradiegetic narrative level in the *Euthydemus* is doing something quite unusual: he uses a lot of μίμησις and a bit of

14. On the discursive strategies and effects of the myth, see Davis (2000), Danzig (2008).

διήγησις. Is this narrative merely for play? Does Socrates make himself resemble his opponents in earnest? More importantly, is the integrity of his appearance and thought jeopardized by his imitation of qualities which are not appropriate to a man of good character? Crito and the Isocratean bystander find something distasteful in the contest: a man of good character should not publicly engage in this activity. And Crito clearly disengages himself from the elenctic discussion (which interrupts the narrative of the second Socratic demonstration) because the issues dealt with there appear to him as mere sport. Moreover, there appear to be curious intersections between Socratic and eristic tactics and arguments in the narrative, which may be an indication of just how difficult it is to avoid contamination while imitating slippery characters. We will return to the extradiegetic narrative level—particularly as it overtly resurfaces in the middle of the narration and as it becomes prominent when the dramatic contest comes to a close—after our discussion of the intradiegetic level.

From Narrative to Drama

INSIDE THE INTRADIEGETIC LEVEL

3.1 *Characters on Stage: Sophists, Socrates, Cleinias, Ctesippus*

Surprisingly, Socrates allows the two colorful sophists, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, to steal the show. Before we examine how Plato, Socrates, and the Isocratean present them in our dialogue, we should briefly consider the few other sources which attest to their historicity and character. Plato refers to Euthydemus only once elsewhere, at *Cratylus* 386d. In that dialogue, the belief that “everything belongs equally to everyone at the same time and always”—a sophism which does not appear in the *Euthydemus*—is attributed to this Euthydemus, and is dismissed by Socrates and Hermogenes on the heels of the rejection of Protagoras and his doctrine that “man is the measure of all things” (*Cra.* 386a). Euthydemus and his implausible doctrine belong in the company of others who believe, against their better judgment, that such things as radical relativism afford refuge from the rigors and uncertainty of philosophical investigation.¹ We also find evidence in Xenophon (*Mem.* 3.1.1), where Socrates tells the story of a Dionysodorus arriving in Athens and teaching, for a fee, the business of generalship to a young companion who covets the office of general, in order that he hold the office primarily without

1. On the arguments for and against relativism in Plato and sophistic predecessors, see Kerferd (1949), Bett (1989), Woodruff (1999), Woodruff (2001), chap. 9, Long (2004).

shame or punishment.² Dionysodorus teaches tactics alone, and Socrates later takes the boy to task for not learning, in addition: (1) how to judge the character of his men in order to build viable military formations and (2) where and how to deploy and modify these formations. Both deficiencies in his education involve a lack of flexibility when it comes to applying tactical lessons to the particulars of practical situations. But the first deficiency also reveals an indifference toward moral education and the tools necessary for ethical investigation. Finally, Aristotle twice catalogs a fallacy of Euthydemus—combining things divided and dividing things combined—that also does not appear in Plato’s dialogue (*Soph. el.* 20.177b 12ff. and *Rh.* 1401a 26ff.). These three accounts comprise all we know outside of our dialogue of each member of the eristic duo; in fact, that the two sophists were related as brothers is unconfirmed outside the *Euthydemus* and some scholars have gone as far as to doubt it.³ Still, at the very least, the descriptions and contexts of these eristic arguments, especially as I have presented them here, agree with a great deal of Socrates’s account in the *Euthydemus*.

It also seems that, as other scholars have remarked, the rich portraits and details of origin for these two sophists which Socrates provides in our dialogue must confirm their historicity.⁴ How could Plato have described with such specific and vivid detail someone who never existed or was radically different from the portrayal? Of course, we do not have to go far in Plato’s dialogues to find evidence of characterizations that depart from the accounts of his contemporaries.⁵ But these departures can be accounted for by Plato’s development of an ethical, political, and metaphysical philosophy and are therefore not confined to a single dialogue. For no other single character (shown in a single dialogue) do we find such a rich portrait. The eristic brothers come from Chios, they emigrated to Thurii and were later exiled from there, and finally adopted the itinerant life of sophists,

2. Dionysodorus makes it clear that one should succeed at generalship if one wishes to hold the office and escape shame which is the chief motivating factor.

3. See Keulen (1971, pp. 8–16), on the possibility that the relation is a bit of *Schalkhaftigkeit*; cf. Palmer (1999, pp. 124–126).

4. Hawtrey (1981) 13. For a more thorough account of the testimony, see Hawtrey (1981, pp. 13–14), Praechter (1932), and Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1920, Vol. 2, pp. 155ff.). Chance (1992) notes how these brothers—remarkable in so many ways—are nevertheless absent from every compilation of and bibliography on the sophists.

5. For Plato’s tools for characterizing his Socrates, see Blondell (2002, pp. 67–80) and Nehamas (1998, pp. 19–45).

wandering Greece in search of students who are willing to pay for instruction (*Euthyd.* 271c, 272a). We know also from Socrates that, once before, they came to Athens selling instruction both in martial arts (271cd, 273c) and in how to deliver and compose the sort of speeches suitable for the law courts (272a). But now (*vōv*), as Socrates claims, they have put the finishing touch to their pancratic art and are skilled in “fighting in arguments and in refuting whatever may be said, no matter whether it is true or false” (272ab). Also, they are perhaps old enough (*γέροντες*, 272b) to have known Protagoras at Thurii and to have become familiar with his arguments, in much the same way as Hermogenes did in the *Cratylus*: suspending disbelief and easily finding safety in those arguments when confused. The news of their latest skill in argument and their marketable wisdom, however, has only just reached Socrates (273de). And it is with this skill that they shamelessly overturn and humiliate others for spectacle (278b). And, as Socrates points out, they also overturn themselves, both in argument (288a) and in lifestyle: they bounce from one diversion (*παρέργους*, 273d) to the next. In some ways they resemble other sophists, like Protagoras, but they do not, over time, resemble even themselves.⁶ The point here is that Socrates has managed to provide Crito with a portrait full of vivid, particular features which, taken together, do not comprise a complete and clear likeness: we know where the brothers come from, but we do not know where they gained their skills, and it seems they do not know what or where they will turn to next.

We should not expect the eristic duo to claim an intellectual lineage, but there is something peculiar in the way that they not only capriciously bounce from one skill to the next but also represent ideas from various thinkers without regard either for consistency or for character as an extension of belief. We must remember that there were no formal disciplines or institutions of philosophy existing in the fifth century BCE.⁷ Analytical inquiry at this time still took the form of the enactment and competition of wisdom in words and deeds by itinerant performers who

6. Hawtrey (1981) notes that our eristic sophists “may not be as pompous as Protagoras or as pretentious and humorless as Hippias, but their arrogance and discourtesy make them the equal of any of Plato’s other sophists” (p. 14). Their arrogance is matched only by their incoherence as they mix up multiple aspects of the sophistic enterprise and demonstrate, like other financially successful sophists, their faith in “passive memorization that aligns [them] with traditional educational methods” (Blondell, 2002, p. 128).

7. Again, see especially Lynch (1972) and Watts (2007).

claimed success not for or by a tradition but rather for and by their own charismatic authority.⁸ The “wisdom” of this charismatic figure was critical and unconventional, breaking ranks with and often disparaging his charismatic predecessors. These sophistic performances rarely entailed “a unique set of ethical and metaphysical commitments that demanded a whole new way of living.”⁹ The eristic duo and perhaps the historical Socrates himself belong to this generation of performers. But as we shall see, the elenchus of Plato’s Socrates demanded a strong and clear set of commitments. As Gregory Vlastos (1983a) argues, “The elenchus has a double objective: to discover how every human being ought to live *and* to test that single human being that is doing the answering—to find out if *he* is living as one ought to live.”¹⁰ An interlocutor must offer only propositions which he truly believes. Failure to defend his propositions under scrutiny meant a very real failure of his life, and demanded that he adopt a new art of living. Through this charismatic figure, Plato sought to define the new formal discipline and life called “philosophy.” It is no surprise, then, that in the *Euthydemus* Socrates calls attention to and makes fun of the duo’s lack of consistency and their confusion about intellectual pedigree and bearing.

The eristic duo, then, is characterized as uniquely aimless and laughable, but also relentless. We could argue, in fact, that they are characterized as a repository of multiple, even incompatible sophistic voices. Blondell (2002) notes how Plato’s characters paradoxically “embody generic and individual identities simultaneously.” His Socrates—both the philosopher par excellence and “by far the most fully realized of Plato’s characters”—embodies this tension best, but other characters, like Hippias, also have, in spite of their representative status, a distinctive identity,

8. Weber (1956/1978) describes a “charismatic authority” which has as its source small communities of inquiry with “devotion to the exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person, and of normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him” (p. 215). The message of such a figure, for Weber, is largely unsystematic but comes to be dogmatized and made routine by his devotees. But this model does not fit with the intellectual practices of the fifth century BCE. Devotees at this time do not, as far as we can tell, routinize their teachings, and the teachings themselves are already extraordinarily “explanatory and systematic . . . coherent and argumentative,” not to mention comprehensive: an account of all things in nature (Long, 1999a, p. 13). For discussions of the performance of wisdom before Plato, see Long (1999a, pp. 1–12), Martin (1993), and Nightingale (2000).

9. Nightingale (1995, p. 10).

10. Vlastos (1983a, p. 37).

“easily distinguishable from Thrasymachos, Gorgias, or Protagoras.”¹¹ However, due to the multiple voices represented by their catalog of sophisms, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus have another complicating layer of characterization. They not only represent the sophists, but they speak indiscriminately and battle as many sophists in one, as a sort of hybridized, two-bodied, many-headed beast locked in combat with that “marvel of miscegenation”—the sometimes seemingly “Typhonic” Socrates.¹² The eristic duo are a composite made up of Thrasymachus, Gorgias, Protagoras, Antisthenes, and Parmenides (by argument), and are likened to Medea (285c), shape-shifting Proteus (288b), a gigantic crab, and that monstrous child of Typhon, the “she-sophist” (σοφιστρία, 297c) Hydra, all rolled into one detestable creature. All of these distinct sophists take turns rather than act at the same time in the two-bodied hybrid. This monster is schizophrenic. While Socrates develops multivoiced discourse, and cares about what sort of character and way of life result from the union of discourses, this eristic monster has no regard for its boundaries and compartment; it even goes as far as to strike against and overturn itself, one brother against the other (297a), knocking itself down (288a).

The intradiegetic Socrates is much like his extradiegetic puppeteer. However, because he comes to us as a self-characterization, Crito and the reader are permitted to know his thoughts while he is competing with the sophists. Were the *Euthydemus* to consist only of the intradiegetic level without the running commentary which the framing encounter provides, the contest would not be half as vivid. Characters would appear colorless in comparison; for example, we would not hear the sophists described as *διδασκάλω* (276b) and skillful dancers who give a double twist (*διπλᾶ ἔστρεφε*) to their questions (276d). These artful touches highlight the whimsy of the sophists while also demonstrating that their work is at odds with Socratic philosophy. Without the narrative frame, the differences of objective and method (at least as Socrates sees them) would be more difficult to determine. And the extradiegetic frame shows us something of Socrates’s own motives, however ironic and adjusted for a different

11. Blondell (2002, p. 68–69).

12. For a description of Typhon, see Nightingale (1996, p. 134). On the plurivocality of Socrates in the *Phaedrus*, see pp. 133–171. The point here is that Socrates does his best to “rid himself . . . of the alien voices within” by subjecting them and himself to a lifetime of scrutiny (pp. 165–166). Moreover, “it is the alien discourse in our own souls that must be our first concern.” Socrates spends his life trying to become un-Typhonic.

audience and different occasion at the extradiegetic (and textual) level. For instance, consider this moment in which the sophists have twice already overturned Cleinias. As Socrates explains (277cd):

Euthydemus was proceeding to throw the youth, taking him down for the third time like in wrestling, when I, perceiving [γνοὺς] the boy going under, and wishing to give him some relief in order that he not play the coward for us, said encouragingly [παραμθούμενος], “Cleinias, do not be amazed that these arguments seem unusual to you.”

His words of encouragement signal the end of the first eristic demonstration and the beginning of the similarly encouraging Socratic protreptic. We hear how Socrates imagines himself and his opponents: the sophists are a vicious, tag-teaming pair who are on the verge of annihilating the very one whom they pledged to incite to philosophy. Socrates enters the ring to provide relief and will do so again as a substitution for Cleinias in the middle of the second eristic demonstration (285bc). If the brothers have one another, even if they quarrel and knock themselves down, Cleinias needs a partner too. In fact, when Socrates and Cleinias agree that one must prepare oneself by all means to become as wise as possible, the difficult question of the teachability of wisdom suddenly arises. Cleinias answers that it seems teachable to him; Socrates, pleased (ἡσθεῖς) by this, then responds: “you speak well, my fine fellow, and you have done well by relieving me [εὖ ἐποίησας ἀπαλλάξας με] of a long investigation of this very point” (282c). Cleinias provides relief from having to enter into a long investigation which would have been inappropriate for this context and more appropriate for a discussion with more serious intellectuals, including the Isocratean critic who would have something to say (were he willing to debate such things in person) about the best way to incite and train wisdom.¹³ Socrates does not wish to compete with the eristic sophists over the question of whether knowledge can be taught. With Cleinias’s perhaps unexpected help, Socrates wants to use this public forum to demonstrate how and how not to bring someone to recognize and profess a desire for

13. Cf. *Against the Sophists* 21: συμπαρακελεύσασθαι γε καὶ συνασκήσαι; *Antidosis* 274–275. Crito is dismayed by the field of those who profess to educate (παιδεύσαι) but seem to him monstrous (ἀλλόκοτος, 306e–307a). He confesses that he does not know how he himself can turn his sons to philosophy, but he also doubts that any of these so-called educators are able to teach anything either.

wisdom. He praises and encourages Cleinias for letting an inappropriate (if philosophically important) matter pass without further discussion. Socrates constantly reassures Cleinias that he will never find himself alone in danger, and it seems that Cleinias is there to save his partner in inquiry as well.

The performance of the intradiegetic Socrates raises another simple but significant point: this Socrates displays a willingness to engage in a public contest while the extradiegetic Socrates is more akin to the elenctic Socrates of other dialogues, who insists more on private and personal examination. Socrates, Crito, and the Isocratean highlight this difference in various ways. Only when the contest has ended does the intradiegetic Socrates warn the sophists that their business, which can be, as Ctesippus demonstrates, imitated and easily imparted (τὸ ταχὺ παραδιδόναι), is not suitable for public discussion. He advises that they “beware of speaking before a crowd of people, lest they easily learn everything from them and not give credit” (304a). With his final words at the intradiegetic level, he urges them to talk to each other by themselves in private (αὐτῶ πρὸς ἀλλήλω μόνω). Of course, his warning is an ironic effort at “apotreptic,” to turn the sophists away from public demonstrations and contain the spread of the eristic threat. If the sophists would be less liberal with their business, Socrates would not have to engage in these public spectacles and contests. At the extradiegetic level, Crito admonishes Socrates for his willingness to converse with such scoundrels in front of so many people (305b). Crito echoes the Isocratean critic here. But, as Socrates points out, the Isocratean is not an orator and has not made public appearances in court, but he is reputed to know about such business and to compose clever speeches (305c). Socrates describes to Crito this private and literary man as located at the “border-ground between philosopher and statesman” (μεθόρια φιλοσόφου τε ἀνδρὸς καὶ πολιτικοῦ). He is the sort of man to be cut off short (κολούεσθαι) by the likes of Euthydemus and other sophists when confronted in even a private conversation (ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἰδίοις λόγοις, 305d). The implication is that Socrates’s versatility gives him a more legitimate claim to the title of philosopher, either in private discussion or while venturing into public arenas. Socrates aims to protect the unformed and impressionable souls of the city’s young men from sophistic predators and any others who might turn inclinations to an unphilosophical course of life, and so destroy them. As we shall see now, the intradiegetic Socrates has the ability to create private, intimate spaces and moments even in an overwhelmingly public spectacle. He remains as ironic and provocative as he

is on trial, but in these private spaces, he is an encouraging and supportive collaborator.

3.2 *Dramatic Elements: Staging, Cheering, Seating*

The setting of the narrated events of the *Euthydemus* is not unique for a Platonic dialogue, but its staging and structure are. The dramatic action of the *Lysis*, *Theaetetus*, *Charmides*, and *Laches* is set in gymnasia or palaestra but, as in the *Euthydemus*, the narrative of this action takes place elsewhere. The prologues to many of the dialogues remove the narrative frame in sophisticated ways from the time and place of the dramatic action (e.g., the *Symposium* and *Theaetetus*). The *Euthydemus* is one of the few Platonic dialogues wherein this displacement is broken for a return to the narrative frame, a fact which as we shall see is significant, given the protreptic purpose of the dialogue. But the detailed way in which the prologue of the *Euthydemus* stages the dramatic action of the dialogue is unparalleled. We see the staging first from the perspective of Crito, more precisely *through his eyes* as a distant spectator (271ab):

CRITO: Who was it, Socrates, with whom you were talking yesterday at the Lyceum? There was such a mob [ὄχλος] standing around you [περιεστῆκει] that when I approached [προσελθὼν] wishing to listen [βουλόμενος ἀκούειν], I could hear nothing clearly [σαφές]. But by stretching and peeping over [ὑπερκύψας] I could see my way down [κατεῖδον], and it seemed to me [μοι ἔδοξεν] to be some stranger with whom you were speaking. Who was he?

SOCRATES: Which one do you mean, Crito, for there was not one but two of them?

CRITO: I mean the one who was sitting two away from you on your right. In between you was Axiochos's boy, and he seemed to me [μοι ἔδοξεν] to have grown a lot [ἐπιδεδωκέναι] and is not that different in age from our Critobulus, who is, however, thin while this one is well grown [προφερής] and noble in appearance [τὴν ὄψιν].

SOCRATES: Euthydemus is the one you mean, Crito, and the other sitting on my left was his brother, Dionysodorus. He also has a part [μετέχει] in our discussions.

The dialogue begins with Crito making his way toward a spectacle but being unable to hear, and only managing to see the event (κατεῖδον) with

some effort. Crito's viewing the four characters around whom the crowd has gathered has variously been translated as "getting a look," or "getting a glimpse," stressing the idea of achievement which the *kata*-prefix in compounds may convey.¹⁴ But these translations miss the overall effect that Crito is making his way *down* with his eyes over the heads of other spectators (ὑπερκύψας) towards the not so distant but inaudible seated spectacle.¹⁵ It is for this reason that Crito can discern only the relative sizes, positions, and appearances of the four players on the stage: two to the right, well grown (προφερης), with noble appearance (τὴν ὄψιν). Crito does not know, but rather is of the opinion (ἔδοξεν), that one character played the part of a stranger, another played the part of one just having come of age (ἐπιδεδωκέναι). The four characters all have parts (μετέχει) in the discussion, but Crito cannot hear what is happening in this orchestra of the Lyceum's undressing room (272e2). He only sees, and sees because he desires to hear (βουλόμενος ἀκούειν) and so makes an extra effort.¹⁶

After we hear of the previous skills of the eristic duo (described above), Socrates reconfigures the stage to encompass more space and to add relevant details from an earlier time, that is, from the beginning

14. Hawtrey (1981, p. 40). But κατείδον may appear without an object in order to capture perspective: e.g., νεμέσησε δ' Ἀπόλλων / Περγᾶμιον ἐκ κατιδών, Τρώεσσι δὲ κέκλετ' ἄψσας (Il. 4.507–8), where the preposition ἐκ or alternately the additional prefix ἐκ- (in ἐκκατιδών) and the genitive also note *the place from which* Apollo looked down and shouted. κατείδον may also appear with the preposition ἐς and an object of the thing upon which one looks: e.g., Histiaeos has Aristagoras shave the hair of a slave and "κατιδέσθαι ἐς τὴν κεφαλὴν" (Hdt. 5.35), which also carries the sense of a more sustained looking—an examining or inspecting, and in this particular case, a *reading* of στίγματα.

15. Crito reiterates to Socrates his relation to the stage when he says to his unnamed critic, "There was such a crowd that I was unable to hear, even though I stood quite close" (304d).

16. I am aware of Plato playing with the dynamics of being a spectator moving *through* a theater in only one other place, which Paul Woodruff has brought to my attention: the way in which the chariot-souls follow the gods in procession with great effort to the high ridge of heaven (πόνος τε καὶ ἄγών ἔσχατος, *Phdr.* 247b5) whence they behold the spectacle (θεωροῦσι, 247c1) of the things outside appears to be an inversion of the direction of the effort with which rowdy spectators—"terribly noisy, very sweaty, and disorderly"—struggle to see the stage of the dramatic contest. In this case, the stage lies outside the theater, and the spectator "raises [ὑπερῆρεν] the head of the charioteer to the place outside" and "just barely has a view" (μόγις καθορῶσα) of the show. Those who cannot see "after so much trouble leave the sight of reality unsatisfied, and when they have gone they will depend on what they think is nourishment—their own opinions [δοξαστή]" (248b4–5). Crito similarly cannot discern clearly what is happening on stage, albeit in this case it is his faculty of hearing which fails him. His *view* of the stage informs his opinions, and he too is left so unsatisfied that he must get the details from Socrates.

of the entire event (ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἅπαντα διηγήσασθαι, 272e1). Socrates sits on stage alone, stands, and then is seated again when his customary divine sign keeps him from leaving the undressing room. A little later (ὀλίγω ὕστερον, 273a), the eristic duo enter accompanied by many disciples (μαθηταί), and the pair alone proceed to walk around a course (δρόμους περιελυθότε) two or three times.¹⁷ Then Cleinias makes his appearance, also accompanied by many lovers, and his appearance is noted immediately. Socrates observes, for example, that Cleinias has indeed “grown a lot.” Among Cleinias’s lovers, Socrates notes the character Ctesippus, who is also noble, but noble by nature (καλός τε κάγαθός τὴν φύσιν) rather than in appearance, as Crito also noted (273a, cf. 271b). Not a word has been spoken in this setting yet. Indeed, we find yet more details about the way that this group ends up gathering together (273b):

From the doorway [ἀπὸ τῆς εισόδου] Cleinias caught sight [ιδῶν] of me [Socrates] sitting alone and came straight up [ἀντικρυς ἰὼν] and sat down on my right, just as you [Crito] described it. When Dionysodoros and Euthydemus saw [ιδόντε] him, at first they stood talking [διελεγέσθην] to each other and glancing intently at us time and time again [ἄλλην καὶ ἄλλην ἀποβλέποντε εἰς ἡμᾶς]. I was paying close attention to them [πάνυ αὐτοῖν προσεῖχον τὸν νοῦν]; thereupon [ἔπειτα] they came over and one of them, Euthydemus, sat down next to the boy, and his brother next to me on my left, and the others found places where they could [ἐτύχχανεν].

Socrates’s staging of events for Crito is full of spectacle, but also of spectacles among spectacles. This is because various audiences (who are spectacles themselves) make a choice to attend and/or participate in the event based on spectacles which present themselves. After he and his adoring followers have entered, Cleinias sees Socrates and turns directly (ἀντικρυς) toward him. Socrates sees Cleinias do this. The eristic duo first see Cleinias, and while speaking with one another, they then repeatedly and intently glance at the new pair—Cleinias and Socrates. And the duo are watched by Socrates who, as Hawtrey (1981) notes, applies his mind rather than merely his eyes (p. 49). The eristic duo then split up and each is

17. The language of *dromos/stadion* belongs to the larger discourse of spectating and theater; cf. Romano (1993, p. 41).

recognized separately. Both the disciples of the eristic duo and the admirers of Cleinias—who entered the area as groups recognizably distinct from one another—are now indiscriminately positioned by chance no longer as two camps but as mixed together—soon to be faithfully attentive, but already assiduously watched by our narrator. Crito hears more about the events he witnessed—Socrates verifies details which Crito had described (273a5, 273b2–3)—but he also effectively sees these details through the eyes of one of the characters.¹⁸

After the eristic duo—who look at one another, laughing (ἄμφω βλέψαντε εἰς ἀλλήλω, 273d2)—briefly introduce their new occupation, Socrates presents another way into the spectacle: through the eyes of the audience over the heads of which Crito will make some effort to see. Socrates singles out (δεικνύς, 274b5) Ctesippus from Cleinias’s admirers again, this time not for his noble nature, but because Ctesippus leads a charge of admirers to take a front-row seat (274b–d):

[The lovers of Cleinias] already happened to be grouped around us. This had come about because Ctesippus had taken a seat a long way [πόρρω] from Cleinias, and when Euthydemus leaned forward in talking to me, he apparently [δοκεῖν] obscured Ctesippus’s view of Cleinias [ἐπεσκότει τῷ Κτησίππῳ τῆς θέας], who was sitting between us. So Ctesippus, who wanted to look [βουλόμενός τε οὖν θεάσασθαι] at his darling, as well as being interested in the discussion [φιλήκοος], sprang up first and stationed himself right in front [καταντικρύ] of us. When the others saw [ιδόντες] him doing this, they gathered round [περιέστησαν] in the same way [οὕτως], not only Cleinias’s lovers but the followers of Euthydemus and Dionysodorus as well.

Through Socrates’s narrative, Crito sees the stage through Ctesippus through Socrates, who conjectures (cf. δοκεῖν) that the lover’s line of sight had been disturbed by movement onstage. The movement onstage triggers a movement and reorganization of the audience, who are now recognized again as two camps, faithfully attentive and jockeying for position. Socrates notes explicitly how Ctesippus desires to behold his beloved as a spectator (βουλόμενός θεάσασθαι), and his primary desire to see is accompanied by a desire to hear (φιλήκοος), as it is for Crito, but erotic in nature.

18. See Goldhill and von Reden (1999) on the dynamics of erotic exchange.

Cleinias's lovers, watching Ctesippus rather than the four on stage, imitate Ctesippus and gather around too (οὕτως . . . περιέστησαν). Ctesippus's erotic desire, to behold his beloved, organizes the audience *as an audience* not of his beloved but of a staged dramatic event. The overlapping of spectacle, in this case, becomes so complicated it is laughable: Crito sees through Socrates seeing the audience seeing Ctesippus trying to see Cleinias seeing Socrates. The competing attractions and spectacles have begun before the protreptics proper have begun, before they have even been solicited.

Before the prologue is complete, Socrates resets the stage one last time with this solicitation, this time not merely as a narrator of events for Crito, but also as a director orchestrating the spectacle of competing protreptics proper which is about to begin. He acts simultaneously as narrator, character, and director. Socrates has directed the audience to "be ready to learn" (ἔτοιμοι εἶεν μανθάνειν, 274c7–d1). He uses discourse and gestures (e.g., by pointing, δεικνὺς, 274b5) to galvanize his audience, and the group in turn "altogether exhorts [ἐκέλευον] the duo to demonstrate [ἐπιδείξασθαι]" their wisdom (274d2–3). Socrates again charges the sophists to give a demonstration (ἐπιδείξασθον) "to gratify these people and for my sake" (τούτοις χάρισασθον καὶ ἐμοῦ ἕνεκα, 274d5). As he says: "put off your demonstration for us [ἡμῖν] of the other things and give a demonstration of this one thing: persuade [πίσαιτον] this young man right here [τοντονί] that he should love wisdom and have a care for virtue, and you will gratify both me and all the present company" (275a4–6). In this case, the director stipulates both that the eristic duo are to persuade Cleinias, and that this act of persuasion should itself be designed in such a way as to serve as a demonstrative and protreptic spectacle for those gathered around, including himself. A protreptic for one must also protrepticize many.¹⁹ Socrates has defined the performance space and dynamic, and simultaneously cast himself as a member of the audience, however uniquely qualified, and by his stipulations and oversight established his role as a director and arbitrator. Thus the boy is to be put on trial (λάβετον πείραν, 275b) in the presence of others (ἐναντίον ἡμῶν) for their sake as much as for his.²⁰

19. An impossible feat given the requirement that is made explicitly in other dialogues (e.g., *Phaedrus*, *Gorgias*) and implicitly in others including the *Euthydemus* that for a speech to be persuasive and commanding, that is protreptic, broadly speaking, it must be tailored to the soul or perhaps handful of souls for whom it is intended; the δῆλος is right out.

20. But the audience is to be *gratified* while the defendant is to be questioned, provoked, and found unknowing by eristic, and then in turn as the insufficient outcome of the eristic

With the prologue coming to an end, we see how an effectively “peristrophic” introduction—that is an introduction that turns attentions in every direction at once—might prepare the way for more concerted protreptic work, that is work that turns and focuses attention in one way with a lasting effect, a method executed by the major intellectuals of fourth-century Athens. The *peristrophê* identifies and redefines a field of desire and foregrounds any consistent effort to focus in one direction. The prologue attempts to destabilize—to define, interrupt and blur, and redefine—the setting and roles for performing “wisdom.” As we will see, this destabilization carries over into the protreptics proper and throughout the interludes.

Following the first line of Euthydemus’s epideixis—“Which are the men who learn, the wise or the ignorant?”—Socrates’s narrative interjection notes that Cleinias, “being confronted with this great question, blushed and glanced straight at me in his helplessness” (*ἀπορήσας ἐνέβλεψεν εἰς ἐμέ, 275d*). Cleinias looks to the director when he is confused at the start about the role he is supposed to play in this trial and spectacle. It is telling that when the *eristic* protreptic kicks off the competition, Cleinias is still turning to Socrates, this time not from the door with a clear path or with confidence, but in his seat, trapped and in trouble. Hawtrey (1981) claims that “Cleinias in his difficulty instinctively looks to Socrates for support” (p. 61) but misses the more subtle point that just as Socrates has provided directives for the other players on stage and has even brought together disparate audiences in complicated ways, he has “peritrectically” directed Cleinias into confusion: (1) by previously providing the implicit instruction that the boy should be, as the audience is for him, *afraid* of being turned in a ruinous way (*φοβούμεθα . . . μή . . . τρέψας αὐτοῦ τὴν διάνοιαν καὶ διαφθείρη, 275b*); and (2) by citing the boy’s being “bold enough to answer” (*ἐπεικῶς θαρρεῖ τὸ ἀποκρίνασθαι, 275c4*). Cleinias’s helpless gaze transforms the director’s description into a normative suggestion to display those virtues: “Be daring and decide bravely” (*θάρρει . . . καὶ ἀπόκριναί ἀνδρείως, 275de*). Note that Socrates had, only moments before, ironically mentioned these as qualities of Euthydemus’s speech (275b8–c1): “at the same time bravely and with daring [*ἄμα ἀνδρείως τε καὶ θαρραλέως*], Euthydemus said, ‘It doesn’t matter as long as the kid is willing to answer [*ἀποκρίνεσθαι*].’” Socrates has

requires (according to the director *and* one ungratified member of the audience—Socrates) by the *elenchus* with *different purposes and methods*.

provided both the instructors and the student with the same direction (to be daring). Through this repetition, he has forged a connection between daring (θάρρος), courage (ἀνδρεία), and making decisions (ἀποκρίνεσθαι). The “peristrophic” setting, then, has foregrounded Socrates’s stealthy but consistent effort to tie together particular virtues and actions, not only before the occasion for the second scene—his explicit enunciation of a proper protreptic—but in the opening words of the prologue (which occurs well before the eristic epideixis). He also highlights these philosophical virtues by way of offering brief interjections even after the first scene with the eristic duo has officially begun.

Socrates shows, by way of continued interjections in the first scene, how the various audiences and players are unaware of his stealthy protreptic efforts, and he highlights the fact that the sophists (wrongly) believe that they are directing the action. For example, after Socrates directs Cleinias to decide bravely and with daring, Dionysodorus says furtively in Socrates’s ear (again while changing his position by leaning inwards, προσκύψας, 275e3) that the boy will be refuted (ἐξελεγχθήσεται) whichever way he decides (ὁπότερ’ ἂν ἀποκρίνηται). Dionysodorus’s eristic method and protreptic objective is at odds with Socrates’s newly established nexus of daring and decision, for nothing can be dared, nothing lost or won by a decision that is shown to be taken up or disposed of without consequence. In spite of this, the eristic sophist on stage, with his whisper and smile, believes that he is in charge.

Let us look now at one audience in particular—the followers of Dionysodorus and Euthydemus—which responds to its teachers with great pleasure (276bc):

[They] broke into applause and laughter, just like a chorus at a sign from their director [ὥσπερ ὑπὸ διδασκάλου χορὸς ἀποσημήναντος, ἅμα ἀνεθορόβησάν τε καὶ ἐγέλασαν]. And before the boy could well recover his breath [πρὶν ἀναπνεῦσαι], Dionysodorus taking him up again [ἐκδεξάμενος] said, “Well then, Cleinias, when the writing master gave you dictation, which of the boys learned the piece, the wise or the ignorant?”

“The wise,” Cleinias said.

“Then it is the wise who learn, and not the ignorant, and you did not decide well just now for Euthydemus [οὐκ εὖ σὺ ἄρτι Εὐθυδήμῳ ἀπεκρίνω].”

Socrates dramatizes for Crito how the followers of the eristic duo distinguish their teachers as directors, that is, as the dramatic poets or διδάσκαλοι, from whom they will take their responsive cues. The followers behave like a chorus in response to their directors, whom they gather around, as Crito's initial dramatizing narrative locates them in the orchestra at the palaestra. But the dramatizing narratives do not have any of the chorus members recognize Socrates as the διδάσκαλος of the unfolding spectacle who is working stealthily to lead the dramatic action.²¹ In addition, Dionysodorus uses ἀπεκρίνω in a way that does not pick up on the connection with courage and daring which Socrates is trying to forge; these διδάσκαλοι are missing their cues.

Socrates's further interjections punctuate the narrative of the first scene and direct Crito and the reader toward adopting a perspective on the spectacle, a conditioned perspective which does settle points of argument. Note, for example, that the followers of the eristic duo applaud and laugh a second time, but their laughter differs from the choral cheer enunciated only moments before (276d):

Whereupon the supporters [ἐρασταί] of the pair laughed and applauded very loudly [μέγα ἐγέλασαν τε καὶ ἐθορύβησαν] indeed being struck with wonder by their cleverness [ἀγασθέντες τῆς σοφίας αὐτοῖν]. We on the other hand were knocked out [ἐκπεπληγμένοι] and silent [ἔσιωπῶμεν]. Euthydemus seeing [γνοὺς] how we were knocked out [ἐκπεπληγμένους], in order that we would be more astonished [μᾶλλον θαυμάζοιμεν], would not let the boy go [οὐκ ἀνίει], but continued with his questions and, just like skillful dancers [ὡσπερ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ὀρχησταί], gave a double turn to his questions on the same thing [διπλᾶ ἔστρεφε τὰ ἐρωτήματα περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ] and said . . .

This time, their applause is not signaled by a διδάσκαλος but comes from being struck with wonder by the duo's cleverness (276d2). ἀγαμαί in Plato entails an especially positive emotion of being struck with wonder and pleasure by a particular deed or nature. Typically, the one who is struck

21. This διδάσκαλος represents another Socrates, who appears to mediate between the intradiegetic and extradiegetic Socrateses. He is the Socrates obscured by the irony of the public performer—present but unseen in the spectacle. Crito must recognize that Socrates was handling the crowd through his protreptic maneuvers, but only as a διδάσκαλος in the intradiegetic world. As we shall see, Crito refuses to perform for this διδάσκαλος at the extradiegetic level.

ends up giving a gift in return.²² This positive sense of ἄγαμαι involves the meaning of the related ἀγάλλομαι—to exult in and pay honor to something, typically a god, or object or image of worship, that is the ἄγαλμα. One is struck with wonder and pleasure *as a spectator* beholding a divine spectacle with a gaze of reverence.²³ Prier (1989) notes how ἄγαμαι is nearly synonymous with θαυμάζω (pp. 78–81)—to wonder—and yet in this scene, we see that these two reactions stand distinctly apart from one another. The ἐρασταὶ of the sophists wonder at the *agalmata* with laughter and applause while Socrates and Cleinias feel wonder in silence. The boy is restrained and questioned in order that they both be more incapacitated by wonder (ἔτι μᾶλλον θαυμάζοιμεν).

As I argue, we should not read Socrates's wonder entirely as ironic, for while he is not pinned with the boy and may not be incapacitated by the art of the double turn, he must be stunned and troubled by the spectacle of the young man's trouble. We see once more how the privileged narrative voice transforms a competing protreptic effort into confusion through "peritrepis," through defining multiple spectacles at the same time: how cleverly the duo perform, how the *erastai* of the sophists react, how the boy reacts, and how Euthydemus and Socrates react in response to Cleinias's reaction. The competing senses of wonder also suggest the problem of identifying what is worthy of reverence and determining which of these spectacles is most divine.

In this narrative passage within the first scene, Socrates further divides and muddles the spectacle of the eristic demonstration by mixing metaphors for those skills which the duo formerly taught. Socrates characterizes the duo in the beginning of the dialogue to Crito as omniscient pancratiasts (πάσσοφοι . . . παγκρατιασταί, 271c6–7) skilled all round in fighting (κομιδὴ παμμάχῳ), strongest in the battle of the law courts (τὴν ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις μάχην κρατίστω, 272a1–2) and in the battle of arguments in general (ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, 272a8). To Cleinias, Socrates introduces them as men who know good generalship, that is, troop arrangement, commanding an army, and all that should be taught to fight in armor (τάς τε τάξεις καὶ τὰς ἡγεμονίας τῶν στρατοπέδων καὶ ὅσα ἐν ὄπλοις μάχεσθαι διδακτέον, 273c6–7). The duo reply

22. Cf. *Phdr.* 259b, *Symp.* 179c, *Gorg.* 526c, although, in each of these examples in Plato, divine or superhuman entities, rather than mortals, are struck and grant gifts (the cicadas, the gods, and Rhadamanthus respectively). See Nightingale (2004) on theoretic wonder, especially pp. 157–168.

23. On divine participation in ἀγάλματα and other images, see Vernant (1991, chap. 8).

with a laugh that they are no longer serious (οὔτοι . . . σπουδάζομεν, 273d3) about such things but regard them now as derivative (παρέργους).²⁴ Rather than characterizing themselves as specialists of a primary art, the eristic duo resemble the democratic youth of the *Republic* who “yield day by day to the desire at hand” (561c). And yet, Socrates narrates their protreptic effort as a combination of their previous arts; he makes their primary art of eristic derivative of their past intellectual and athletic talents. Like a tag-teaming pair of pancratiasts, Dionysodorus receives (ἐκδεξάμενος) from Euthydemus the boy who is out of breath.²⁵ When the boy and Socrates are knocked out (ἐκπεπληγμένοι, 276d), Euthydemus takes control and will not release (οὐκ ἀνίει) the boy, but “like a skillful dancer he gives a double turn to his questions on the same thing” (ὥσπερ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ὀρχησταί, διπλᾶ ἔστρεφε τὰ ἐρωτήματα, 276d5–6). The pancratiast has been conflated with the hoplite dancer.

Note that the duo’s talent at battling in question and argument does not protrepticize, that is, turn people in a single direction with sustained effort, but rather twice goes round the same thing with the brief and amusing leap of a dancer. *Protrepsis* must be differentiated from *dipla-strepsis*. These eristic sophists cannot protrepticize because they themselves have been distracted by many pastimes which diffuse their efforts. In fact, their attention here is split between pinning Cleinias and making their questions turn. They are distracted and in turn distracting. Their sort of ὀρχηστοπάλη seems to Socrates like some grotesque entertainment and spectacle for an audience of supporters who are similarly distracted in life but momentarily entranced in pleasure and wonder.²⁶ The characterization

24. On the poetics of work and side-work, see Collins (2014).

25. Commentators have variously noted that ἐκδεξάμενος refers to the argument being taken up as it is in the ball game at 277b4: e.g., ἐκδεξάμενος “turns the discussion by implication into the ball that it explicitly becomes” (Hawtrey, 1981, p. 63). But this ἐκδεξάμενος has no object, and follows immediately on the neuter subject—τὸ μαιράκιον—of the previous clause, which describes the boy as out of breath.

26. It is worth noting briefly at this point that this spectacle which Socrates arranges for Crito and the reader appears to dramatize particular problems which Plato will later theorize in the *Laws*. The Athenian Stranger describes in Book 5 how the legislator will, like the model protreptic as we shall see, be concerned with listing and classifying (διαριθμούμενος) certain things as disgraceful and wicked, and others as fine and good (728a). The citizens of Magnesia, in turn, are concerned not only that they themselves do not pursue the most dishonorable of these things, but that their fellow citizens do not as well:

A man who commits no crime is to be honored; yet the man who will not even allow [ἐπιτρέπων] the wicked to do wrong deserves more than twice as much respect. The former has the value of a single individual, but the latter, who reveals the wickedness

which Socrates provides at the extradiegetic level transforms intradiegetic competitors into unappealing alternatives. Only Crito as an extradiegetic interlocutor and spectator, and we as readers, have access to these characterizations which the extradiegetic Socrates provides. We witness more of these protreptics in conflict.²⁷

Let us turn, now, to Socrates's explicit protropetics. Socrates presents his protreptic model (παράδειγμα) in the second and fourth episodes, but, as I argue, the protreptic has begun well before the second episode. Socrates's explicit protreptic contains formal features which certain scholars have identified by specific *topoi* or motifs. Some scholars consider this to be the earliest extant example of the genre of protreptic discourse; others claim that they find its antecedents in "die sophistische Werberede" of *technai* and *Sokratikoi logoi*, its cousins in other contemporaneous Socratic texts, and its direct descendants in the protreptics of Late Antiquity more

of another to the authorities, is worth a legion. Anyone who makes every effort to assist the authorities in checking crime [συγκολάζων] should be declared to be the great and perfect citizen of his state, winner of the prize for virtue (730d).

The priamel for the greatest and most just pursuits becomes subsumed in another enumeration of citizens who themselves do no wrong but variously allow or do not allow others to do wrong. Citizens are evaluating one another, and the citizen who evaluates well is in turn evaluated as the most virtuous. They perform great deeds, the greatest of which is to make sure others perform great and presumably the greatest of deeds. Performing well is chiefly performing the role of spectator well. Rather than calling the just unjust and the unjust just, like spectators of a race at Olympia who unconscionably call the fastest slowest and slowest fastest, citizens must learn to apply (προσάπτειν) their encomia correctly (ὀρθῶς) and agreeably (προσφιλῶς, 7.822b). In the *Euthydemus*, the spectators of the contests of protreptics perform badly, and the narrating Socrates invites Crito (and Plato, the reader) to evaluate not only the contest but the evaluations of the contest, evaluations given in the immediate performance context of the *agôn* by various audiences and afterwards by the Isocratean. As we shall see, Socrates dramatizes the contest with athletic metaphors like the Athenian Stranger: the eristic sophists, who themselves were skilled in and formerly taught the pancration, throw and pin their opponents in argument. Moreover, just as Socrates tries to prevail on Ctesippus at times to be more generous when the youth berates the sophists, the *Laws* warns against φθόνως in the competition of virtue (731a): "The jealous man, who thinks he has to get the better of others by being rude about them, makes less effort himself to attain true virtue and discourages his competition by unfair criticism. In this way he hinders the whole state's struggle to achieve virtue and diminishes its reputation, in so far as it depends on him."

27. Nightingale (2004) notes how much Socratic narrative techniques draw on the cultural practice of *theoria*: both activities emphasize "autopsy or seeing something for oneself: the *theoros* is an eyewitness whose experience is radically different from those who stay home and receive a mere report of the news" (p. 68). The dramatic presentation of the dialogue of protreptics involves spectating and witnessing, sometimes (as is the case with Crito) even participating, rather than merely listening; see Collins (2012). Witnessing this spectacle like witnessing those of *theoria* also involves greater risk.

than 900 years later.²⁸ This treatment of isolating the second episode in the *Euthydemus* as protreptic proper takes Socrates at his word in the same way that his eristic opponents do, and similarly fails to take into account how much protreptic is being orchestrated outside of the second scene. This treatment also affords a limited view of protreptic as a routine discourse rather than an experimental and shifting intergeneric event. In the *Euthydemus*, the dramatic structure and narrative interjections which surround the explicit protreptic have the effect of reorienting the interlocutors and readers in the philosophical competition. Indeed, before the reader arrives at the protreptic παράδειγμα, Socrates has already (1) offered a protreptic model of effective elenctic dialogue (which is dramatic by nature) coupled with a rhetorical account of what constitutes a “serious” and genuine philosophical endeavor (in the prelude, first scene, and interludes preceding the second); (2) recast the protreptic of the eristic display into something undesirable—an apotreptic—through a master *narratio* and ventriloquism, which respectively subsume and characterize the competition; and (3) prepared the way for more overtly formal protreptic work with dramatic tools like “peritrepis.” The formal features of the παράδειγμα extend from these protreptic elements. The παράδειγμα is not merely a negative exemplum of the eristic offerings in the first and third episodes. Taken in isolation, it cannot provide a full account of the protreptic art—its tactics and designs—nor how much is at stake in this competition for “philosophy.”²⁹

28. See Gaiser (1959); Düring (1961, pp. 19–20) for “typical protreptic”; Slings (1999, p. 105) for the three protreptic “motifs”: (1) amassing wealth without knowing how to use it (280b8–d7); (2) how it is better to leave wisdom than money to children (282a7–8, 306e1–3, which lies outside the παράδειγμα but is identified as a “protreptic situation”); and (3) how one ought to have not only one’s children but oneself instructed in wisdom (307c3–4, also not in the παράδειγμα). The argument is for an established protreptic genre in the fourth century, but motifs of this supposed genre are located outside of what Socrates identifies as a model protreptic in the intradiegetic level of discourse; moreover, Slings has combined motifs from different protreptic situations and two different narrative levels. Slings and Düring are interested in the παράδειγμα only insofar as it sheds light on the problems of the *Clitophon* and *Protrepticus* respectively.

29. Chance (1992) notes that the use of vocatives outside the second episode designates multiple addressees, and thus keeps us from the “tendency to detach the first episode from the second and to seek some positive doctrine in the latter without having to account for its relation to the former; after all, both episodes qualify each other in important respects by their sameness and difference” (p. 54). But we will see how much protreptic work the proceeding episodes and interludes do before the second episode. Chance argues the second episode illustrates the “proper dialectical correctives to the destructive elenchus displayed by the brothers” (p. 55). But correctives are being deployed all along

3.3 *Apotreptic in Protreptic Discourse*

Before we examine these formal features of the protreptic παράδειγμα, we should briefly examine this notion of apotreptic as a necessary part of protreptic work in the *Euthydemus*. We have already noted in Aristotle's account that deliberative rhetoric consists of either exhortation or dissuasion (τὸ μὲν προτρεπὴ τὸ δὲ ἀποτροπή, *Rhet.* 1358b). But the deliberative orator can easily transpose (μετατιθέναι καὶ στρέφειν) the imperative into nonimperative language (τὸ μὲν κωλύον τὸ δὲ μὴ κωλύον μετατεθῆ), and deliberative discourse or counsel into encomiastic epideixis (1368a). It is quite easy to imagine that the same speaker might make a deliberative suggestion against a particular course of action (ἀποτροπή) while also describing and praising a man who chooses the preferred course. In effect, he offers a sort of epideictic προτρεπή. More fundamentally, as Aristotle explains, προτρέπειν and ἀποτρέπειν naturally go hand in hand for the deliberative orator who offers counsel about happiness (1360b):

Nearly all people have some aim, in the attainment of which they choose [αἰροῦνται] or avoid [φεύγουσιν] certain things . . . One should do [πράττειν] the things which procure happiness . . . or increase instead of diminishing it, and avoid doing [μὴ πράττειν] those things which destroy or hinder it or bring about what is contrary to it.

The task for a person offering counsel on happiness is to establish both what one should do or how one should act and what one should not do or how one should not act. Thus the narrating Socrates offers to Crito a drama of counsel and demonstration, imperatives and nonimperatives, about how one should and should not live. It is for this reason that when we examine certain formal features of the protreptic παράδειγμα which fall more squarely within the domain of deliberative rhetoric, we will make constant reference to a different kind of rhetoric outside of the παράδειγμα, that is epideictic rhetoric (which praises or blames qualities of characters who do not participate in the more intimate, discrete, and deliberative space within which Socrates and Cleinias are intellectually and erotically bound).

making the “interconnected and interpenetrating” (p. 54) aspects of these episodes far more complicated.

Few scholars have recognized the large part that apotreptic plays in the *Euthydemus*, in part, because none have recognized that apotreptic is a predictable and fundamental part of every instance of protreptic discourse in the fourth century.³⁰ Instead, Chance (1992) argues that “Plato turns the tables on our expectations by presenting the inversion of the protreptic, or its antithesis, the apotreptic.”³¹ Chance also argues that Plato is not only unusual for his attention to the apotreptic function, but his “inimitable powers of invention” are to be praised for artfully characterizing the discourse of the sophistic duo as that of comic actors.³² Chance takes up again the idea of apotreptic when he argues that “the main burden of [the Socratic narration’s] function is to dissuade the reader from exercising a logical procedure that is perverse to the extreme, one which deserves to be ridiculed, but which cannot be swept aside with a casual nod in the direction of historical accidents.”³³ While Socrates’s parodic account

30. For a role of apotreptic in the *Euthydemus*, see Chance (1992, pp. 14, 19, 191). Chance also explains that “the first event in the plot of this dialogue is apotreptic, that is, a divine warning against turning away from an encounter with eristic wisdom” (p. 201), that is, an apotreptic of an apotreptic. That is not exactly what happens. Socrates had been sitting alone (μόνος) in the *apoduterion* and was just thinking of standing up. But as he rose, he says, “μὲν ἐγένετο τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖον τὸ δαιμόνιον” (272e), so he sat down again. A little later (ὀλίγω ὕστερον) the sophists, then their pupils, then Cleinias, then his troop of lovers enter. The *daimonion* turns him away from leaving, but he has no premonition that eristic sophists in particular will enter, just that there will be, we may safely presume, an occasion for philosophical investigation, perhaps with others. The Platonic Socrates elsewhere famously describes his *daimonion* as always having an apotreptic function—ἀεὶ ἀποτρέπει με τοῦτο ὃ ἂν μέλλω πράττειν, προτρέπει δὲ ὅποτε (Ap. 31d)—but in the *apoduterion*, turning him away from leaving amounts to encouraging him to do something positive: staying and waiting for an occasion to search for wisdom. The *daimonion* of Xenophon’s Socrates appears to play a protreptic role at times; e.g., καὶ πολλοῖς τῶν συνόντων προηγόρευε τὰ μὲν ποιεῖν, τὰ δὲ μὴ ποιεῖν, ὡς τοῦ δαιμονίου προσημαίνοντος (*Mem.* 1.1.4), which also suggests that the *daimonion* speaks for others. The Socratic Euclides proposed that “each of us without distinction has been assigned a double genius (*duplicem genium*)” (Censorinus in Brancacci, 2005), that is, personal *daimonia* with both apotreptic and protreptic functions. Regardless of whether this daimonic, first event in the intradigetic plot of the *Euthydemus* is apotreptic or protreptic, its function is more general than the specific function with which we are concerned—the function of turning away from and toward different philosophical disciplines. Michelini (2000) proposes that the more general sense of προτρέπειν as “encouragement” is a “back-formation of ἀποτρέπειν” (p. 510), i.e., that first there was apotreptic, then a general protreptic; and then, I would add, a developing secondary genre of philosophical protreptic discourse.

31. Chance (1992, p. 14).

32. Chance (1992, pp. 191–192): “the misuse of verbal triggers, the devious employment of ambiguous words and syntax, incomprehensible talk, non sequiturs and sophisms, even radically abrupt transitions, insults and slanders of every description, eristical dodges, puns.”

33. Chance (1992, p. 19).

of the three eristic episodes of the intradiegetic level of discourse may primarily have an apotreptic function which characterizes and scorns eristic sophistry, other characters in the intradiegetic and extradiegetic levels are also responsible for apotreptic discourse. As we shall see, Ctesippus apotreptically exposes Dionysodorus as a preposterous two-headed weasel (300d), and the Isocratean critic offers only apotreptic, part of which Crito endorses. Socrates ends the dialogue with an ironic and unusual imperative for Crito to turn everyone away from (πάντ' ἄνδρα ἀπότρεπε) philosophy if he should find, after testing it well and truly, that it is a trivial or useless business (φαῦλον, 307c). This imperative is the only use of the word ἀποτρέπειν in the dialogue, and it pushes the spectator of protreptic competition to act only after philosophical protreptics (including their apotreptic functions) have succeeded in persuading him of the exceptional worth of philosophical activity, but have turned out to be deceptive in their persuasion. In other words, after protreptic discourse has turned him both away from unphilosophical activities and toward the business of philosophy, and after the new initiate has thoroughly tested the business itself and judged it to be useless, should he attempt the apotreptic business of dissuading others from a philosophical life. Aristotle's *Protrepticus* later calls "turning away" from philosophy a philosophical issue, but other Platonic dialogues (e.g., the *Clitophon*) problematize the difference between protreptic and the business of philosophy to such an extent that an initiate can never arrive at that kind of apotreptic.

In protreptic discourse, all sorts of dissuasion must come before a new activity is targeted and a commitment extracted. As Aristotle explains, the acknowledgement of those things which hinder or outright destroy well-being and which one should avoid accompanies the promotion of activities which procure well-being. The apotreptic function of protreptic may include the practices that competitors promote, which one should avoid, for several reasons: (1) to differentiate the targets and methods of competitors; (2) to inform consumers of costs; (3) to question the quality of what the competition has to offer; and (4) to influence consumers to identify its activities with a questionably appealing experience or personality.³⁴ Conventional

34. In their study of US newspaper regulation, Lacy & Simon (1993) describe these advertising functions respectively as awareness ads, price ads, quality ads, and identity ads (pp. 41–42). Price is clearly of concern in fourth-century education. Isocrates, in particular, tried to develop a market for his brand of philosophy at a high cost, while the Platonic Socrates criticizes broadly the sophistic practice of offering training for a fee. Identity advertising is of especial interest to us, since all of the writers of protreptic both attach their

economic theory asserts that competition is found in marketplaces in which consumers believe they can perfectly substitute one product or service for another. But the disciplines which occupy the marketplace of ideas fundamentally disagree not only on which practices best procure well-being but also on what well-being is. Practitioners of protreptic discourse walk a tightrope. On the one hand, they make their activities similar enough to those of others to give the impression of substitutability, to build and expand a market for liberal education, to appeal broadly to consumer preferences, and to dissuade consumers from traditional activities. On the other hand, they must highlight the distinctiveness of their respective disciplines and objectives in order to bring into question the very idea of substitutability and competition. In other words, they must *appear* in some ways to be similar but offer something very different. In the end, the discipline must stand apart and above all others as the only legitimate education and the activity that is most suitable to the consumer's goals and tastes. Suitability can be demonstrated either by endorsing these goals or by way of apotreptic which, in addition to dissuading him from competitors, turns the consumer away from his habits and reconfigures his desires. This apotreptic reconfiguration can be achieved subtly and in increments. For example, in the *Euthydemus*, Socrates offers a hierarchy of goods and leads Cleinias to desire wisdom above all. The ineffectiveness of Socrates's relentless irony to lead the spectators away from their lust for spectacle and eristic triumph would be an example of a failed apotreptic at the intradiegetic level were it not for his constant reference to the priority of his objective to secure a commitment from Cleinias alone. Even Cleinias reverts when he is overcome with pleasure for Ctesippus's eristic triumph (300d). In an ideal world, the apotreptic function of protreptic discourse must sweep clean the field of all possible competitors and the soul of incompatible habits and distracting desires.

A particularly useful tool for achieving the apotreptic function of safeguarding a discipline's distinctiveness and inimitability is irony, particularly refined or complex irony (*urbana dissimulatio*) which is, according to Cicero, saying something other (*alia*) than what one means (*De or.* 2.67.269–271). This kind of irony introduces an incongruity between what a speaker means and what an audience understands. The precise meaning of such an ironic statement can remain hidden even from those who know

activities to artfully produced and compelling spokespersons and devote a good deal of attention to the pleasures of their respective practices.

full well that you are being ironic. This kind of irony suggests that you are holding something back, something you do not consider your audience worthy of knowing or yet capable of understanding. It constitutes a refusal to put yourself on the same level as your audience. And even though it may intimate that you may be uncertain about your own intention, this irony still produces the impression of difference.³⁵

In a good deal of the rhetoric of Socratic protreptic, we find Socrates ironizing his authority in an effort to give the interlocutor the impression that he and Socrates are championing the thing they seek—wisdom—together as equal partners.³⁶ But his apotreptic rhetoric goes beyond deriding his competitors. Socrates even offers an apotreptic of himself and of his protreptic.³⁷ A good deal more may be hidden by this ironizing strategy. As natural as it is for agents of protreptic discourse to engage in apotreptic and turn their audience away from the competition, it is also natural to use “internally polemical discourse . . . self-deprecating overblown speech that repudiates itself in advance, speech with a thousand reservations, concessions, loopholes and the like . . . [speech that] cringes in the presence of the anticipation of someone else’s word, reply, objection.”³⁸ Socrates makes very clear at the extradiegetic level that his protreptic performance is largely a failure in this public setting, and in the contest, he often qualifies his performance as amateurish, improvisational, and laughable. This irony turns us away from the protreptic as something insufficient, but an audience or reader who is accustomed to Socratic irony cannot be sure, in this instance, if the protreptic is laughable and insufficient merely in the context of this public competition or, as Clitophon argues, in every instance. This irony is a reflection of

35. Nehamas (1998, p. 63).

36. For a Hesiodic model, see Martin (2004).

37. See Michelini (2000) on Socratic buffoonery. Additionally, Plato apparently ridicules tenets of his own philosophy by placing them into the mouths of the eristic competition. The *Laws* warn that “if we intend to acquire virtue, even on a small scale, we can’t be serious and comic too, and this is precisely why we must learn to recognize buffoonery, to avoid being trapped by our ignorance of it into doing or saying anything ridiculous when there’s no call for it” (*Leg.* 7.816e). See Nightingale (1995, Chapter 5) for a careful discussion of comedy’s privileged place as a complex generic voice in Athenian democracy, and Plato’s appropriation of its “mixed” formal structure, contest of public voices, and self-effacement—all elements Plato uses to construct the protreptic discourse of the *Euthydemus* though he unequivocally condemns comedy in *Republic* 10.

38. Bakhtin (1984, p. 196).

objections—imagined apotreptics—which are not actually uttered by the competition but are nevertheless incorporated into the protreptic discourse. The effect of partly turning an audience away from one’s own protreptic is to rob the competition of ammunition.

3.4 *Formal Features of the Protreptic Παράδειγμα*

The arguments of the Socratic protreptic with Cleinias in Scene 2 (278e–282d) proceed in the following way: We wish to prosper (εὖ πράττειν), and to prosper is to have many good things (ἡμῖν πολλά κάγαθὰ εἶη). But what are these goods? Wisdom is among them and is the same as good fortune. Goods must benefit (ὠφελοῖ) us to be goods, and they can be of some benefit only if we use (χρησθαι) them. Goods are not goods in themselves or by nature (καθ’ αὐτὰ πέφυκεν). If they are guided by ignorance, they are greater evils than their opposites. But if understanding and wisdom (φρόνησις τε καὶ σοφία) guide them, they are goods. In themselves, they are of no worth. So we wish to be happy (εὐδαίμονες μὲν εἶναι προθυμούμεθα), and we can only be happy by not merely using things, but using them correctly (ὀρθῶς). Knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) provides correctness (ὀρθότητα), so we must prepare ourselves (παρασκευάζεσθαι) by all means to get this knowledge and be as wise as possible (σοφώτατος). Since wisdom alone makes men happy, it is necessary to philosophize (ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι φιλοσοφεῖν).

The protreptics of the dialogue of Scene 4 (288d–293a) with Cleinias (and then with Crito in the extradiegetic level) pick up where Scene II left off (πόθεν τότ’ ἀπελιπομεν). Socrates says that one ought to pursue knowledge (φιλοσοφετέον), but asks what sort of knowledge we should acquire to be happy.³⁹ This must be knowledge in which there is a union of making and knowing how to use the thing made (συμπέπτακεν ἅμα τό τε ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ ἐπιστασθαι χρησθαι τούτῳ), that is, of making and using things well. The poetic and acquisitive (κτήσεται) *technai* of speech-writing (λογοποιεῖν) and of generalship (στρατηγική) do not constitute this knowledge on the grounds that neither knows how to use the thing made or sought in the hunt (ἢ ποιήσασα ἢ θηρευσασμένη). The arts of kingship (τὴν βασιλικὴν τέχνην)

39. In addition to Cleinias and Crito in Scene 4, Socrates makes explicit targets of the eristic duo—“If I might rouse [ἐκκαλέσωμαι] them to action and in hopes that out of pity and commiseration for my earnest endeavor, they may be earnest themselves” (288cd)—a point to which we will return later. It is important to note, however, that the Socratic protreptic continues from Scene 2 with the same intent but aimed at multiple parties including the eristic competition.

and statesmanship (ἡ πολιτική τέχνη) manage the products of other arts, but what do they themselves produce? Whatever the product (ἔργον) of kingship, the art must be beneficial (ωφέλιμον) and provide something not only neutral but good (ἀγαθόν γέ τι δεῖ ἡμῖν αὐτήν παραδιδόναι), and nothing can be good but some sort of knowledge (οὐδέν εἶναι ἄλλο ἢ ἐπιστήμην τινά). Kingship does not impart every sort of knowledge, such as shoe-making, and it does not make all men good in all things. It provides no other product or knowledge but itself (ἐπιστήμην δὲ παραδιδόναι μηδεμίαν ἄλλην ἢ αὐτήν ἐαυτήν). By this knowledge, we make (ποιήσομεν) other men good, and they make others so, and these again others.⁴⁰ But good at what? What this knowledge is that makes men good and happy (ἡμᾶς εὐδαίμονας) remains a mystery. Socrates relates that he then called upon the eristic Dioscuri to save him and Cleinias from the disorienting wave of argument. The sophistic brothers must demonstrate (ἐπιδείξαι) the knowledge by which people could well pass the remainder of their lives (ἂν καλῶς τὸν ἐπίλοιπον βίον διέλθοιμεν).⁴¹

The logical highpoints of the Scene 4 synopsis could be summarized as follows: they moved from speech-making and generalship to kingship, which (1) alone manages and knows how to use the products of the other arts, (2) must produce something good and beneficial which must be knowledge (but knowledge of what besides itself?), and (3) has a product or function (ἔργον) of making men good (but good at what besides making other men good?). These features of the art of kingship are not so much arguments as questions, and questions which lead to a regress, largely due to the ambiguity of ἔργον—both a product and a function. Socrates misleads his audience by introducing the notion of production, relating the art of kingship to the first-order arts of shoe-making and agriculture, that is, tangibly productive arts, rather than investigating the *function* of second-order arts which, in this case, function to make (ποιέω) men good.⁴² The confusion, which Socrates intends, initiates Cleinias into the rigors of philosophical investigation after he had made an earnest pledge to pursue knowledge at the end of Scene 2, which was more logically straightforward.

This synopsis of arguments in Scenes 2 and 4 does not, of course, retain the dialogic nature of events in the contest, particularly in Scene

40. Cf. *Gorgias* 515c. See Gonzalez (2002), Orwin (1982) on the perpetual chain-letter of this protreptic art.

41. For schemata of the Socratic scenes, see Festugière (1973, pp. 25–31).

42. On confusing first- and second-order arts and their ἔργα, see Sprague (1976, p. 52).

4, where a break in the narrative frame and a remarkable second-level exchange occur.⁴³ The synopsis of Scene 4 also does not give a sense of how much the participants are at a loss and struggling. We must factor this in as we discuss the protreptics in this text. Socrates produces a spectacle of confusion for the benefit of those present at the competition. And the exchange at the extradiegetic level with Crito is a reminder that Socrates is narrating events to someone, Crito, for a reason.⁴⁴ Mere arguments, motifs, or set-pieces do not make protreptic. We must also focus on how the unconverted are engaged and redirected by the protreptic, and ultimately how the reader is engaged and redirected.

I have identified a set of formal features in the protreptic παράδειγμα which elicit responses from an unconverted audience and are contested by competitors. These formal features are located in the ethical and dialogic dimensions of the παράδειγμα—that is, in what happens between people who work together to articulate a way of living—and they include adaptability, an operative psychological account, the establishment of a range and hierarchy of goods, and a rhetoric of usefulness which differentiates other activities (e.g., sophistry, carpentry, generalship, statesmanship) from philosophy. We also see Socrates using a particular kind of democratic rhetoric that is found in traces of the archaic institution of the *ephebeia*. And, we also find Socrates attempting to get his interlocutors to make an oath.

3.4.1 Oath-Seeking and Credible Commitment

When Socrates answers the first eristic display of protreptic with his own competing demonstration, he sets up his efforts in much the same way as he wraps them up. Consider his opening and closing remarks (278c_e, 282d_e):

So now, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, let's be done with your sport [πεπαίσθω] for I daresay you have had enough [ἴσως ἰκανῶς ἔχει]. What you have next to do is to give us a display of exhorting [ἐπιδείξατον προτρέποντε] this youth as to how he should devote himself to wisdom and virtue [ὄπως χρῆ σοφίας τε καὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπιμεληθῆναι].

43. See the discussion of narrative “metalepsis” in Chapter 4.

44. Crito's interruption is not there merely “to close the fourth episode and to effect a transition” (Chance, 1992, p. 126). His immature remarks are juxtaposed with the younger Cleinias's responsible pledge to philosophize from the first half of the Socratic παράδειγμα.

But first I will give a demonstration [ἐνδείξομαι] to you how I regard this matter and how I desire to hear it [ἐπιθυμῶ ἀκούσαι]. If I strike you as treating it in an unartful [ιδιωτικῶς] and ridiculous manner, do not laugh me to scorn; for in my eagerness [προθυμίας] to listen [ἀκούσαι] to your wisdom [σοφίας] I shall dare to improvise [τολμήσω ἀπαντοσχεδιάσαι] opposite you.

Pleased to hear this [ἄσμενος ἀκούσας], I said: There is my model [παράδειγμα], Dionysodorus and Euthydemus, of what I long [ἐπιθυμῶ] for a protreptic argument [προτρεπτικῶν λόγων] to be, just so, unartful [ιδιωτικὸν] and labored, perhaps, and long. Now let either of you who wishes [βούλεται] to do so give us a demonstration [ἐπιδειξάτω] of an artist's handling [τέχνη] of the same thing. If you do not wish to do that, let your demonstration begin where I left off, and show the lad whether he ought to acquire every kind of knowledge, or whether there is a single sort of it which one must obtain if one is to be both happy and a good man [εὐδαιμονεῖν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα], and what it is. For as I was saying at the outset [cf. 275ab], it is really important to us [περὶ πολλοῦ ἡμῖν] that this youth should become wise and good [σοφὸν τε καὶ ἀγαθόν].

The discourse of protreptic (προτρέπω), demonstration (ἐπιδεικνυμι), desire and earnestness (ἐπιθυμῶ, βούλομαι, προθυμία), satisfaction (ικανῶς ἔχω, ἄσμενος), artfulness or vulgarity (τέχνη, ιδιωτικός, ἀπάυτοσχεδιάζω), and caring about (ἐπιμελέομαι, περὶ πολλοῦ ἡμῖν) wisdom, virtue, and goodness (σοφία, ἀρετή) appears before and after the demonstration. Hawtrey (1981) notes a symmetry in some of these echoes (p. 39), but the arrangement of this discourse produces an imbalance and uneasy tension by juxtaposing different objectives and issues. Socrates claims to improvise as an amateur (ιδιωτικῶς), while his competitors affirm that they possess an “art [τέχνης] which has the function [ἔργον] of persuading that virtue is teachable and that [they] are the ones from whom one may best learn it” (274e).⁴⁵ Socrates

45. The eristic sophists never directly call what they do a τέχνη—Socrates reports that “they said that their newly discovered art [τέχνην] was to turn useless men into good” (285b), and even their “pancratic skill” in the law courts is a detail provided by Socrates—but they do not deny that this is precisely what they believe they possess. Socrates describes it as a self-defeating art as well (288a). He calls his own demonstration an improvisation—ἀπαντοσχεδιάσαι (278e)—which captures the sense of an artless or untechnical but guided performance. *LSJ* describes this particular use of the word ἀυτοσχεδιάζω as having a bad sense: to speak unadvisedly, to try rash experiments. But the experiment is not thoughtless.

is filled with daring (τολμήσω), earnestness (προθυμίας), and thumotic longing while he is unclear after the first eristic demonstration as to what it is his competitors want exactly (except, perhaps, to play).⁴⁶ He says that he longs to hear the wisdom of the sophists, but he is actually pleased to hear something entirely different. For Socrates, the contest and dialogue come down to the need for conversion and an oath.

While Socrates demonstrates how to bring someone around, the sophists have demonstrated skill at spinning people round and round. The first eristic demonstration ends not because Cleinias has shown any signs of conversion, but because Socrates steps in to provide some relief (277d). The boy loses his breath once (276c), is knocked out again (ἐκπεληγμένοι, 276d)—because Euthydemus applies a double turn (διπλᾶ ἔστρεφε) to his questions—but before the boy can be knocked down a third time and drowned (τὸ τρίτον κατὰ βάλων . . . βαπτιζόμενον, 277c), Socrates stops the demonstration.⁴⁷ Although the eristic sophists would never tire of “tripping up and overturning” (ὕποσκε λίζων καὶ ἀνατρέπων, 278b) the boy, Socrates says to them that they have done enough (ἴσως ἰκανῶς ἔχει, 278d). What they are doing, he explains to Cleinias, is playing games, dancing around him like the celebrants of the Korybantic rites “with a view to subsequent initiation” (277e). Protrepetic and the serious rites for conversion will, he suggests, come later, after the *anastrepsis* and sport.⁴⁸ But his eristic rivals have their hearts set on turning not only Cleinias

If the word is at all critical together with μόλις and μακρός, we see the self-deprecation of indirect parody which anticipates criticism (Bakhtin, 1984, p. 196). Improvisation is the play of a disciplined imagination, attention and faithfulness to present circumstances, and involves surrendering many of your expectations and much of your control for collaborative success. For more, see Johnstone (1979) and Nachmanovitch (1990).

46. On the perhaps primary goal of entertainment in sophistic demonstration, see Gagarin (2001).

47. The detection of the third fall happens between the first and second scenes just as the detection of the overwhelming third wave of argument (ἐκ τῆς τρικυμίας τοῦ λόγου, 293a) happens between the fourth and fifth scenes. Socrates saves the boy from the third fall and calls in turn, but with irony, upon the eristic Dioskuri to return the favor and save the boy and himself from the *aporia* which results from his second demonstration.

48. Recall that Thrasyllus groups the *Euthydemus* with the *Gorgias* and *Hippias I* and *II* in the category of ἀνατρεπτικοί or refutative dialogues, rather than μαιευτικοί or obstetric dialogues like *Alcibiades I* and *II*, *Theages*, *Laches*, and *Lysis*. This ancient distinction focuses on the eristic refutation of argument, however incorrect and unbecoming, and perhaps the second-order refutation of philosophical disciplines. Socrates is at a loss in the ἀνατρεπτικοί dialogues to make his interlocutors recognize their special kind of ignorance. Elenchus (*Soph.* 230b–d) typically isolates inconsistencies between a person’s opinions in such a way that this person recognizes them, grows severe with himself (ἐαντοῖς μὲν χαλεπαίνουσι) but calmer toward others (πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἄλλους ἡμεροῦνται), removes the inconsistencies, is both cleansed and prepared, on the one hand, and himself cleans and prepares, on the other,

but the whole audience to their method.⁴⁹ Cleinias is only a prop, and as such stands to be *humiliated*, not brought around to virtue, by the eristic duo. Socrates attempts to save him even from this slight injury, but he wants to save him from something far more dangerous.

The dramatic contest between demonstrations begins with Socrates identifying unseen opponents who are, like him, targeting the boy (*Euthyd.* 275ab):

I and all of us here at this moment long for him to become as good as possible. He is the son of Axiochus (son of the old Alcibiades) and is cousin to the present Alcibiades: his name is Cleinias. He is young [νέος]; and so we have fears for him, as one naturally is about a boy of his age, lest someone get in ahead of us and turn his inclinations to some other course of life [ἐπ' ἄλλο τι ἐπιτήδευμα τρέψας τὴν διάνοιαν], and so corrupt [διαφθείρη] him.

Young men like Cleinias and his ilk have not yet had their minds “turned” and set on a particular course (ἐπι-τρέπω). Their fates have yet to be decided. But apart from these visiting sophists and Socrates, there are countless other more flattering competitors waiting in the wings, figuratively and literally, as we will discover after Socrates’s narrative.⁵⁰ Socrates fears that these young

for instruction in the most important things (τὰ μέγιστα, 230e1), and is prepared and prepares for future efforts and the advantages which these accrue—beauty and happiness. In the *αναπρεπτικοί* dialogues, the elenchus cannot give Socrates’s opponents the power to correct themselves, to have a hand in their own apotreptic from obstructive and wandering opinions.

49. This difference in protreptic focus defines the dramatic tension of the *Euthydemus*. While the eristic sophists are not targeting Cleinias with protreptic, they are targeting the audience and are very successful. Socrates targets Cleinias (who will, if he is anything like his cousin, become a wretched man, in spite of his pledge), but could not possibly be satisfied with letting so many other young men be turned and corrupted, particularly out of their pleasure for seeing one of their own and best made a laughing stock. But we have Socrates fail elsewhere in his appeal to a large crowd. Of course, Crito could not from his distance hear what was happening, so the sophists could not get to him. On the later occasion of Socrates narrating and recasting the whole ordeal, Crito finds himself in a position similar to Cleinias: alone with Socrates while others watch, while we watch. But Crito is older and experienced, has unshaped sons himself, and is inclined toward certain things already. Socrates can know the shape of his soul, and can take a longer path of sowing seeds appropriate to that soul.

50. Cf. *Alcibiades I* (135e):

ALCIBIADES: Well, that is the position, and I shall begin here and now to take pains over justice [ἄρξομαι γὰρ ἐντεῦθεν τῆς δικαιοσύνης ἐπιμέλεισθαι].

men will fall prey to the latest fashion or be turned toward every conventional course at once (athletics, money-making, rhetoric, generalship). They thus resemble the democratic youths of the *Republic*—“kaleidoscopic . . . of many different humors, fair and colorful as the city itself” (*Resp.* 561e). So in this brief window of opportunity, while Cleinias is certainly not under immediate threat of finding the eristic path of instruction attractive, this gentle and encouraging Socrates tries to find the right path for eliciting a commitment and an oath to strive constantly for wisdom, to take up his brand of philosophy. Moreover, Socrates’s model protreptic aims for this oath to stick, to mean something, not merely at the time that it is uttered in the presence of the protrepticizing practitioner, and certainly not for the sake of victory in the competition, but for the rest of time. Socrates means for young souls both to make this pledge and to strive in accord with that pledge *even in his absence*. The protreptic path must condition the young man to identify on his own when he has turned away from the right path, that is, when he begins to relapse.⁵¹

We can identify this crucial difference between the relative objectives of the eristic and Socratic demonstrations by noting how, in contrast, the protreptic παράδειγμα of Scene 2 ends. The sophists do not interrupt Socrates’s performance the way that he did theirs. But Socrates is not fully responsible for bringing things to a close. After Cleinias and Socrates agree that wisdom alone makes men happy, we find the following passage (282d):

would you say anything other than that it is necessary to practice philosophy and don’t you yourself have in mind to do just that? *Yes, by all means*, he said, *Socrates, as much as is possible*. Being pleased to hear this, I said: There is my model . . .

ἄλλο τι ἢ φαίης ἂν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν νῶ ἔχεις αὐτὸ ποιεῖν; *πάνυ μὲν οὖν*, ἔφη, *ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς οἶόν τε μάλιστα*. *κἀγὼ ταῦτα ἄσμενος ἀκούσας, τὸ μὲν ἐμόν, ἔφην, παράδειγμα . . .*

SOCRATES: I should like to think you will continue to do so; yet I am apprehensive, not from any distrust of your nature, but in view of the might of the state, lest it overcome both me and you [μὴ ἐμοῦ τε καὶ σοῦ κρατήσῃ].

51. This is part of the effect of establishing a range and hierarchy of goods (see below): when one diverts attention (ἐπιμέλεια) from wisdom and the self to the other more common, material ambitions which have also been included in the chorus of goods, one remembers and is filled with shame for desiring wisdom’s relatively useless, lesser neighbors.

Thus, Cleinias brings the παράδειγμα to an end. Socrates has not arrived at the predetermined end of a scripted dialogue. He is, after all, “improvising” his protreptic discourse. The boy’s response signals that which Socrates has been seeking even before his improvised demonstration began. I will argue that, in this context, Cleinias’s response should be taken as a proper oath and *telos* for all of Socrates’s efforts. In other words, Socrates is calling this response his παράδειγμα. The language which Socrates uses in the frame surrounding his first demonstration teases out Cleinias’s response by alluding to and inverting the language of the ephebic oath which Socrates parodies on other relevant occasions.

The ephebic oath provides an important aspect of the cultural context for these spectacles which has gone unnoticed. This oath was a military, civic, and religious contract—to defend the fatherland, obey the law, and honor the state’s cults—which every Athenian male youth was required to enter into in order to become a citizen and enjoy the benefit of political rights. While the extant inscriptions for this oath of allegiance are dated to the late fourth century, Siewert (1977) uncovers an earlier tradition.⁵² An inscription of the ephebic oath runs:

I will not disgrace [οὐκ αἰσχυνῶ] these sacred arms, nor will I desert [λείψω] the comrade at whose side I shall be stationed. I will defend our altars and hearths, and will not leave [παραδώσω] the country smaller, but greater and better [πλείω δὲ καὶ ἀρείω], so far as I am able by myself and with the help of all [κατὰ τε ἑμαυτὸν καὶ μετὰ πάντων]. I will obey [εὐηκοήσω] those who always rule wisely [ἐμφορώς], the established ordinances, and those which will in the future be wisely established. If anyone seeks to destroy [ἀναρείῃ] (them) I will not give way [ἐπιτρέψω] so far as I am able by myself and with the help of all. I will honor [τιμήσω] the cults of my fathers. Witnesses [ἱστορες] of these shall be the gods . . .⁵³

This oath was taken as part of a two-year collective training which initiated young citizens into a lifelong process of practical political education.⁵⁴ It

52. See also Mitchel (1964).

53. Lykurgos, *Leokrates* 1.76–78 76–77; Stobaeus, *Flor.* 4.1.8; Pollux, 8.105.

54. On the late fourth-century customs of the *dokimasia* and *ephebeia*, see Plescia (1970, pp. 16–17). Cf. Ober (1989, p. 160n.14 for the literature on the ephebeia; pp. 157–165 on the institutions for political education).

was the first of many collective decisions with normative functions, and perhaps the most formalized. Ober (1989) argues that in lieu of a “formal state-run system of formal education, the demos itself, through the Assembly and the courts, took on a large part of the task of instilling social values in the citizens.”⁵⁵ The collective decisions of juries, tribal assemblies, and the Council of the demos reflected an ideological consensus which played a normative and didactic role in the moral education of citizens, young and mature alike. The ephebic oath is the first decision a citizen would make to protect and better his comrades and polis and, in so doing, himself. Moreover, the oath serves a normative function of reminding citizens that they too once swore to uphold the same social values.

Plato repeatedly evokes the rhetoric of this oath and foundational political institution in an effort to elevate his new cultural and discursive practices. For instance, in the *Apology*, after recognizing the educational role of every other state institution—law, jury, Council, assembly (24d–25a)—Socrates proceeds to invert the language of the *ephebeia* in the description of his divine mission (29de):

Gentlemen of the jury, I am grateful and I am your friend, but I will obey [πέισσμαι] the god rather than you, and as long as I draw breath and am able [οἷός τε ᾧ], I shall not cease to practice philosophy [φιλοσοφῶν], to exhort you [παρακελευόμενός], and in my usual way to demonstrate [ἐνδεικνύμενος] to any one of you whom I happen to meet: Good Sir, you are an Athenian, a citizen of the greatest city with the greatest reputation for both wisdom [σοφίαν] and power; are you not ashamed [οὐκ αἰσχύνῃ] of your care [ἐπιμελούμενος] to possess as much wealth, reputation, and honors [τιμῆς] as possible, while you do not care for [ἐπιμελῆ] nor give thought [φροντίζεις] to wisdom [φρονήσεως] or truth, or the best possible state of your soul [τῆς ψυχῆς ὅπως ὡς βελτίστη ἔσται]?

Young Athenian men pledge not to be a disgrace (οὐκ αἰσχυνῶ) while they are shamelessly devoted to wealth, reputation, and honors that are far less honorable than those which are due the cults. They pledge to better the country while they do not care for the best possible state of their souls (τῆς ψυχῆς ὅπως ὡς βελτίστη ἔσται). They promise to obey those who rule

55. Ober (1989, p. 162).

wisely (ἐμφρόνως) while they do not give a thought (φροντίζεις) to wisdom (φρονήσεως). They too will perform these tasks to their utmost abilities. And perhaps the most interesting allusion: while the ephebe will not yield (ἐπι-τρέψω) to those who intend to destroy (ἀναρῆι) all those things to which he is devoted, Socrates pledges to exhort (προτρέπω) those who are under threat of being turned to some other course in life and thereby destroyed (ἐπ' ἄλλο τι ἐπιτήδευμα τρέψας τὴν διάνοιαν καὶ διαφθείρη, *Euthyd.* 275b). Although Socrates embraces his fellow citizens and holds them dear (ἀσπάζομαι μὲν καὶ φιλῶ), he makes his pledge to Apollo rather than to them. And while it is important that a citizen abide by the laws of his country as long as he chooses to benefit from them, what is most important to Socrates in his mission is that he and those with whom he collaborates become wise and good (282de). He both chooses and has been placed by a commander in this station (*Ap.* 28d); he places others in this station as well by leading them to make a choice in public. In this passage, when Socrates clearly targets the language of the *ephebeia*, he inverts the very foundation of political life in Athens.⁵⁶

When we return to the *Euthydemus* and the language which Socrates uses in the frame surrounding his first demonstration to tease out the boy's public oath, we see that Plato is not only targeting the language of the *ephebeia* but is also evoking the alternative oath which Socrates takes and for which he is condemned. Just as Cleinias cannot help but say that ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι φιλοσοφεῖν and intend to do this as much as is possible (ὡς οἶόν τε μάλιστα, 282d), so does Socrates vow to φιλοσοφεῖν and παρακελεύομαι (cf. προτρέπω) for as long as he lives and is able (ἕωςπερ ἂν ἐμπνέω καὶ οἶός τε ᾧ). In the context of his trial this means, of course, that is not for much longer. Socrates's oath increases the weight of the boy's utterance. Socrates will demonstrate to everyone that they do not, but should, care (ἐπιμελέομαι) for wisdom and virtue, just as he exhorts the sophists to demonstrate. In addition to the eristic sophists teaching the wrong ἐπιμέλεια, the foundational and normative political institutions of Athens are turning the young toward goods and activities which Plato either excludes

56. The later Hippocratic oath is sworn with a witness (ἰστορας), also according to one's ability and judgment (κατὰ δύναμιν καὶ κρίσιν ἐμὴν). This pledge makes a distinction between the oath (ὄρκον τόνδε) and the contract (συγγραφὴν τήνδε). The former appears to designate the speech act while the latter is what stipulates, "To hold him who taught me this art equally dear to me as my parents, to be a partner in life with him, and to fulfill his needs when required." The συγγραφὴ would be out of place in the context of fifth-century intellectual life, but may be appropriate to the rise of intellectual disciplines in the subsequent generation.

from his ideal *paideia* or attempts to reconceive. Socrates is trying to exact an alternative oath from Cleinias before the polis or any foreign element can “turn his inclinations to some other course of life [ἐπ’ . . . τρέψας], and so corrupt him” (275ab).

Considered apart from this resonance with the ephebic oath and Socrates’s own in the *Apology*, Cleinias’s response seems ambiguous. A witness would not be able to determine exactly what it is that Cleinias is affirming and how far his commitment goes. The boy answers a question which comes in two parts: one gnomic—ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι φιλοσοφεῖν—and the other a personal commitment to a future course of action: αὐτὸς ἐν νῶ ἔχεις αὐτὸ ποιεῖν. He responds, πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς οἶόν τε μάλιστα. The assentient μὲν οὖν with an intensive adverb often responds to a *nonne* question but may also (1) express a feeling that the first speaker’s expression is agreeable but inadequate (in which case the second speaker provides a stronger expression), or it may (2) communicate a preference for the second of two stated alternatives.⁵⁷ Cleinias may mean that the activity and his own ability are limited: he indicates that it is necessary to practice philosophy as much as this is generally possible and intends to do it as best as he can. Or if he is expressing preference for the second half of the question, he may mean that he cannot yet weigh in on the gnomic alternative (perhaps because he does not yet know what φιλοσοφεῖν means) but he intends to do everything he can to continue down the path on which they have only just embarked.

In order for Cleinias to trust in the value of the activity of philosophy, he must know what that activity is. While some scholars believe that he demonstrates rapid advances in philosophical understanding through his unbelievably eloquent responses in the second Socratic demonstration, it is clear even in these instances that something far less intellectual is driving Cleinias’s devotion.⁵⁸ The boy and his Socrates are flanked by jackals. Not one of his many lovers has yet to come to his aid. The rest of the spectators thunder with applause and laughter like pranksters who are “pleased . . . when they see someone overturned, lying on one’s back [ὑπτιον ἀνατετραμμένον]” (278c).⁵⁹ The conditions are right for Cleinias to swear just about anything

57. Denniston (1954, pp. 475–478), cf. πολὺ μὲν οὖν at *Ar. Pl.* 412.

58. See Chance (1992, pp. 123–124) on Crito’s disbelief.

59. In his critique of the first eristic scene, Socrates differentiates their sport of overturning (ἀνατετραμμένον) with what they had promised to demonstrate, i.e., their protreptic skill (ἐπιδείξεσθαι τὴν προτρεπτικὴν σοφίαν, 278c), and what he proceeds to deliver, i.e., his protreptic account, broadly speaking (τῶν προτρεπτικῶν λόγων, 282d). Of course, our argument

to one who appears genuinely to care for his welfare, particularly while the boy is being pinned and drowned. Socrates also recognizes the value in extracting this vow not only in public but in front of the boy's *erastai*. The humiliation Cleinias is suffering due to jugglers' tricks should, in Socrates's view, pale in comparison with the humiliation the boy should feel if he reneges, chooses someone else's wares, and appears to everyone who cares for his welfare to be bent on self-destruction (that is if they too have been turned away from conventional pursuits and agree on the merits of this unfamiliar activity called φιλοσοφείν).⁶⁰

When Socrates's longing has been momentarily satisfied by this public oath, he turns additionally to pushing the eristic pair toward the objectives and practices (however unartful, labored, and long) of an exemplary protreptic.⁶¹ He challenges them either (1) to give a demonstration with art (τέχνη) that has the same good effect, that is, eliciting such an oath, or

is that he has been engaged in a more narrow sense of protreptic discourse from the very beginning, orchestrating the spectacle of competition between philosophical rivals. But the distinction between anatreptic and protreptic discourse was not one which ancient scholars made. In Thrasyllus's tetralogic divisions, the dialogues are divided across tetralogs into eight kinds: λογικός (*Cratylus*, *Sophist*, *Statesman*, *Parmenides*), πειραστικός or tentative (*Euthyphro*, *Theaetetus*, *Charmides*, *Meno*, *Ion*), ἐνδεικτικός or critical (*Protagoras*), political (*Republic*, *Minos*, *Laws*, *Epinomis*), φυσικός or natural science (*Timaeus*), and three further categories with which we are especially concerned—ethical (*Apology*, *Crito*, *Phaedo*, *Philebus*, *Symposium*, *Phaedrus*, *Hipparchus*, *The Rivals*, *Menexenus*, *Critias*, the *Epistles*, *Clitophon*), μαιευτικός or obstetric (*Theages*, *Laches*, *Lysis*, *Alcibiades I* and *II*), and ἀνατρεπτικός or refutative (*Gorgias*, *Hippias Major* and *Minor*, *Euthydemus*; *Diog. Laert.* iii.58–61). *Alcibiades I* was long considered the introduction to philosophy. Proclus made it “the beginning of all philosophy,” and Slings (1999) calls it “the only protreptic text from the pre-Christian era which has been preserved un mutilated” (p. 73). We regard the dialogue as protreptic predominantly only in a broad sense. The fact that Thrasyllus gives the name ἀνατρεπτικός to the *Euthydemus* strikes us as peculiar (even if the text consists largely of argumentative fallacy) given that Socrates so clearly differentiates his παράδειγμα from eristic “overturning.” Our working definition of protreptic as an emerging genre of dialogic, agonistic, rhetorical, and situational discourse makes the *Euthydemus* protreptic, which contains anatreptic, apotreptic, exhortation, and even “peritreptic.” We should note that the contents of texts like the *Clitophon*, *Gorgias*, *Phaedrus*, *Apology*, and *Republic* are related and thereby pull into the protreptic constellation Thrasyllus's categories of ethics and politics.

60. An oath to be devoted to wisdom, to φιλοσοφείν, cannot be entirely like a lover's vow, for “according to popular wisdom, the gods will forgive a lover even for breaking his vows—a lover's vow, our people say, is no vow at all” (*Symp.* 183b). If the allure of wisdom fades—a genuine concern for our author, who repeatedly reminds us of those who swore but failed once Socrates was absent—the lover of other goods may relapse, “his promises and vows in tatters behind him” (183e). See Chapter 5, Section 4, *Clitophon* and after the Protreptic Sting.

61. Perhaps the distinction Dodds (1959) makes between the corrective and regulative arts is useful for distinguishing between the two intents of the same protreptic: to *regulate* or *guide* Cleinias; to *correct* the eristic pair.

(2) to continue his demonstration where he has left off, that is, with the primary objective of getting the boy to commit to a course of action which will make him wise and good rather than corrupt. Socrates invites them to use the encouraging method and rational line of reasoning that he himself has employed. With this primary objective and through imitation of method and manner, the sophists could also be initiated into that “perpetual chain-letter of exhorting” which Socrates and Cleinias find in Scene 4: this knowledge which we seek provides no other product but itself, and only by this knowledge do we make other men good. In turn, they make others good, and these again others (292de, cf. *Resp.* 505bc). Socrates tries to exact the same oath from his competitors—to practice philosophy—as he has sworn to do.⁶²

3.4.2 Fitting and Dynamic Logoi

Another hallmark of the protreptic παράδειγμα that contrasts with the eristic demonstration is the care with which a sustained line of argument is tailored to the interlocutor—his psychology, emotions, responses. This should come as no surprise given Socrates’s insistence on other occasions that discourse proceed in ways appropriate to the character of those involved. He wants his interlocutors to become as happy as possible by virtue of using *and analyzing* philosophic discourse. We have already seen in our analysis of the narrative which Socrates performs for Crito (with the aid of Socrates’s account of narrative from the *Republic*) that the shape of a discourse and how it is performed (e.g., narrated or imitated, in earnestness or in jest) have a direct and profound impact on the character of the performer and those for whom the discourse is performed. Nightingale (1995) argues that “no Greek thinker understood more than Plato about the ways in which society—and especially the discourse that it uses—determines the ideas and desires that make up the human psyche.”⁶³ It certainly makes sense that Plato should relentlessly develop discursive strategies for hybridizing every conceivable genre of fourth-century Athens. His brand of philosophy is at once an ethical and metaphysical project concerned with the condition and improvement of the soul, and

62. Orwin (1982) locates a perpetual chain-letter of exhortation in the *Clitophon*. On the paradoxically inimitable nature of Socrates’s mission, see Nehamas (1998).

63. Nightingale (1995, p. 162).

an innovative and self-reflexive discursive project (since discourse is the very thing to which the soul is most vulnerable). Written discourse (and some spoken discourses) may address the first point without attempting the second. As Socrates argues in the *Phaedrus*, written and certain kinds of spoken discourse which are delivered “only for the sake of persuasion without investigation and teaching [ἀνευ ἀνακρίσεως καὶ διδαχῆς]” cannot bear fruit in the souls in which they are planted. Plato is interested in fashioning a “legitimate” discourse which has the potential to be “clear and steadfast [σαφὲς καὶ βέβαιον],” “distinct, well formed, and worth serious attention [τό τε ἐναργὲς εἶναι καὶ τέλειον καὶ ἄξιον σπουδῆς]” (*Phdr.* 277e, 275c, 278a). His discourse achieves this legitimacy “not by virtue of packaging the truth in some finite (and final) set of formulations, but by its ability to keep the pursuit of truth in motion.”⁶⁴ Like the dialectician whom Socrates describes, Plato mixes genres to produce a seed of hybridized philosophic discourse which can be sown into a soul appropriate to it and there interact with other discourses in order to render the one in whom it grows as happy as any human being can be (*Phdr.* 276e–277a). This hybridized seed provokes the sort of investigation and scrutiny which will make the thing reared—growing philosophic discourse—a legitimate child, a discourse which the budding philosopher can rightly call his own. On the contrary, discourse which comes indiscriminately to a student, full grown and monologic, does not provoke investigation. It constrains the mind, and makes instruction, particularly self-instruction, doubtful regardless of the extent to which it claims to be concerned with the condition and improvement of the soul. The *Phaedrus* highlights particularly these deficiencies of the written word, but it is in the *Euthydemus*, as we shall see, that Plato condemns something far worse—public speech that has the same deficiencies as the written word.

Plato is not alone in his condemnation of the written word and fixed kinds of speech which resist scrutiny and target audiences indiscriminately. Even before Plato discussed this issue, Alcidas (a student of Gorgias) had reviled written speech for its immobility and silence relative to improvised speech: writing is a useless copy, outline, and imitation of the true body of the spoken word (εἰδῶλα καὶ σχήματα καὶ μιμήματα λόγων . . . μιμήματα τῶν ἀληθινῶν σωμάτων . . . χρῆσιν δ' οὐδεμίαν; Alcidas, *Soph.* 27). Written speech not only fails to lend fluency and swiftness of

64. Nightingale (1995, p. 168).

thought to speech makers, but works to make the progress of the mind slow (βραδείας) and “produces a helpless practice and fetters the soul” (τὴν ἄσκησιν ἄπορον καὶ δεσμῶτιν τὴν ψυχὴν, 17). Those who contend in disputes μετὰ τῶν γραπτῶν λόγων have a difficult time fitting their speech to a given occasion, κατὰ τρόπον (25), because written speech itself “keeps a single posture and arrangement or position . . . and is unable to move with regard to occasion and conferring no help to its possessor” (ἐνὶ σχήματι καὶ τάξει κεχρημένος . . . ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν καιρῶν ἀκίνητος ὧν οὐδεμίαν ὠφέλειαν τοῖς κεκτημένοις παραδίδωσιν). This contrasts with living speech, which comes directly to the mind and keeps pace with events (28).⁶⁵ The extemporaneous speaker can give a demonstration (ἐπιδείξω) that goes well beyond the unmoving, unresponsive, unhelpful written word (30). The awe-inspiring speaker (ρήτωρ δεινός) and master of occasion stands apart from common writers (ποιητὴς λόγων) and their restrictive desire for accurate diction (τοῖς ὀνόμασι λέγειν ἀκριβῶς) because he attends to writing as merely “an amusement and pastime” (ἐν παιδιᾷ καὶ παρέργως, 34). Not only are unmoving *logoi* a dispensable part of rhetorical training and live performance, but they immobilize a performer and earn the reproach of an opponent (τὸν φθόνον ἀνταγωνιστήν). In short, they harm the mind. What is important to recognize in Alcidas’s rhetoric of immobility and helplessness is that these characteristics of the written word tend to carry over into those live performances which depend on them for training and livelihood. Alcidas takes great pains to distinguish himself in his text from these lowly kinds of writer. Andrew Ford (2002) writes,

A professional teacher and public performer, Alcidas is concerned that he not be taken for a sophist hawking his texts. As popular as such writings evidently were, producing them was regarded as an unsavory occupation for a gentleman. For all writers about speech at this time, and for their students, defining the role of such

65. This fourth-century critique reverses the Thucydidean preference of writing over occasional performance: Thucydides’s history is composed “not as an essay which is to win the applause of the moment, but as a possession for all time” (1.22.4). Thucydides’s Cleon targets the critics of oral performance who are “spectators of words and hearers of deeds,” easily swayed and “in thrall to the pleasures of the ear” and imaginary worlds rather than the circumstances at hand (3.38.7). This oral performance clouds judgment and obscures the occasion. But Thucydides’s composition, on the other hand, curiously aims to make proper use of occasions while also standing as a monument for more sober readers of all times. Plato and Alcidas resist the idea that written discourse has this much power, except perhaps their own novel kinds of prose.

texts required tact. As a whole, *On the Sophists* functions not only as an essay in pedagogy but as an outline of the position a gentleman might take if he were a devotee of this form of literature but did not wish to descend to the class of professional wordsmith.⁶⁶

Alcidamas uses writing only to make the point that careful writing is preferable to careless speaking (*Soph.* 29), because he needs writing to reach those who have not heard him speak (31) and, finally, because writing makes it easier to compare former discourses and ideas with present ones and thereby behold the advance of intelligence (32). Alcidamas makes it clear that rather than peddling pamphlets, he is concerned with creating a new cultural practice for a shrewd and celebrated self-evaluating master of occasion.⁶⁷

This rhetoric of immobility and helplessness, of course, resonates with Plato's famous appraisal of writing in the *Phaedrus*. Socrates explains to Phaedrus (a lover of all kinds of discourse) (275d):

You know, writing shares a strange [δεινὸν] feature with painting. The offspring of painting stand there [ἔστηκε] as if they are alive, but if anyone asks them anything, they remain most solemnly silent [σεμνῶς πάνυ σιγᾷ]. The same is true of written words. You'd think they were speaking as if they had some understanding [φρονοῦντας], but if you question [ἔρη] anything that has been said because you want to learn more [μαθεῖν], it continues to signify just the very same thing forever. When it has once been written down, every discourse rolls about [κυλινδεῖται] everywhere, reaching indiscriminately those with understanding no less than those who have no business with it, and doesn't know to whom it should speak and to whom it should not. And when it is faulted [πλημμελούμενος] and attacked unfairly [οὐκ ἐν δίκῃ λοιδορηθεῖς], it always needs its father's support [πατρὸς αἰεὶ δεῖται βοήθου]; alone, it can neither defend itself nor come to its own support [οὔτ' ἀμύνασθαι οὔτε βοηθῆσαι δυνατὸς αὐτῷ].

66. Ford (2002, p. 235).

67. On *metis* and the archaic masters of *kairos*, see Martin (1993).

Like the offspring of Alcidas's mere ποιητής λόγων, writing is helpless and is available to anyone regardless of occasion or familiarity with the subject. Written discourse appears to possess the power of thought (φρονούντας) and other animating faculties of its own, and thus those who wish to learn and possess understanding themselves ask this standing εἰδῶλον questions, then insult and abuse it in its speechlessness and helplessness.

While the *Phaedrus* emphasizes the deficiencies of the written word, the *Euthydemus* condemns something far worse—public speech that has the same deficiencies as the written word.⁶⁸ As Alcidas describes the unresponsive speaker who is made sluggish by his laborious pursuit of accurate diction (λέγειν ἀκριβῶς), Socrates portrays the sportive leaps (ὄρχεῖσθον παίζοντε) of the acrobatic duo who make a demonstration of the correct use of words (περὶ ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητος, *Euthyd.* 277e) as an ineffectual performance and self-immobilizing motion. This deployment of the catalog of sophisms that also aim at accurate diction (ἀκριβειαν λόγων) trips itself up while knocking others down (288a), upsets (ἀνατρέπων) not merely other views but itself as well (286c). In short, it stitches up (ξυρράπτετε) its own mouth while silencing those who have come to learn (303de).⁶⁹ The acrobatic duo are also likened to beguiling Proteus (τὸν Πρωτέα μυμείσθον τὸν Αἰγύπτιον σοφιστὴν γοητεύοντε ἡμᾶς, 288b) who famously shape-shifts when he has been restrained.⁷⁰ In the *Phaedrus* the offspring of painting and writing that appear on the surface to live and move are in fact incapable of doing any of these things when attacked and interrogated; in the same way, the clever Proteus and his imitators shift on the surface without being able to extricate themselves from a trap. Of course, unlike the

68. Socrates argues elsewhere that poetry cannot help itself in its author's absence (*Prt.* 347c–348a), again an assessment of a kind of oral performance that displays deficiencies of written discourse.

69. The sophists do not speak with understanding but, as Ctesippus exclaims, babble trifles or nonsense (παρρηρεῖν, *Euthyd.* 288b). Recall those kinds of discourse that “are recited in public without questioning and explanation, in the manner of rhapsodes, [and] are given only in order to produce conviction . . . [A]t their very best these can serve only as reminders to those who already know” (*Phdr.* 277e–278a). The eristic sophists are one worse than the rhapsodes, for they spew the trifling discourse of their playbooks not to produce conviction but to humiliate some and entertain others.

70. Socrates elsewhere famously describes Love (and himself) similarly as “a master of jugglery, witchcraft, and artful speech” (δεινός γόης καὶ φαρμακεὺς καὶ σοφιστής), but Love is also, and unlike his eristic competition, “brave, bold and vehement, a famous hunter, always weaving some stratagem; desirous and resourceful of wisdom, throughout life pursuing the truth” (ἀνδρείος ὢν καὶ ἰτης καὶ σύντονος, θηρευτὴς δεινός, αἰεὶ τινας πλέκων μηχανάς, καὶ φρονήσεως ἐπιθυμητής καὶ πόριμος, φιλοσοφῶν διὰ παντός τοῦ βίου, *Symp.* 203d).

written word, Proteus truly can and does speak with understanding when he is restrained; but, like writing, the eristic sophists (who trap themselves) merely say the same thing forever. That these sophists formerly taught forensic composition (συγγραφεσθαι λόγους) and how to speak in dikastic contests (272a) establishes a precedent for their peculiar kind of helplessness.

Socrates levels these critiques at his eristic competitors during the contest, but of course does not offer an explanation of how his own discourse escapes the same problems. An account of philosophic discourse that is any more explicit than what he offers by way of demonstration would allow for the discourse to be made formulaic. This would compromise the dialogic discourse which rouses the student to scrutinize the authority of a given discourse. We can, however, discern in Socrates's παράδειγμα differences from the eristic demonstration. And it is well worth noting here what I will call a difference in *method*. Nehamas (1999) argues that the “proper contrast” between antilogic or eristic and dialectic “is not between two different methods of argument, but between two purposes that argument can serve, one serious and the other not.”⁷¹ To be sure, Socrates and his eristic competitors plainly have different purposes in their respective interactions with Cleinias: as we have noted, the former hopes to encourage the boy and turn him to a life spent in pursuit of wisdom while the latter aim to overturn and humiliate him in their effort to attract bystanders. However, while the *Euthydemus* makes clear that “the method of question-and-answer is not the exclusive province of Socrates,”⁷² there are in fact distinct differences between the kinds of questions Socrates and the duo ask and the kinds of answers each expects.⁷³ The sophists do engage in

71. Nehamas (1999, p. 115).

72. Nehamas (1999, p. 11).

73. The distinction between eristic and dialectic is made also in the *Philebus* (e.g., 17a) and subtly in the *Sophist* and *Statesman*. Thompson (1868) explains, however, that “these are dialogues beyond the popular comprehension; and the *Euthydemus* seems to have been written to make the distinction palpable to ordinary minds” (p. 179). The distinction is still made implicit as a matter of method. If “method” means, as it does in the *Republic*, a process of *investigation* or *inquiry* which, as in dialectic, proceeds to an ultimate end through the use of skills for *helping and assisting in converting others*, the sophists do not possess a method at all, for they do not engage in any activity which can rightly be called an investigation or inquiry in this sense: ἡ διαλεκτικὴ μέθοδος μόνη ταύτη πορεύεται, τὰς ὑποθέσεις ἀναίρουσα, ἐπ’ αὐτὴν τὴν ἀρχὴν ἵνα βεβαιώσῃται, καὶ τῶ ὄντι ἐν βορβόρῳ βαρβαρικῶ τινι τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ὄμμα κατορυγμένον ἡρέμα ἔλκει καὶ ἀνάγει ἄνω, συνερίθους καὶ συμπεριαγωγούς χρωμένῃ αἰς δῆλθον τέχνας (*Resp.* 7.533cd). This manner of investigation also “gently draws and leads up the eye of the soul.” Contrast ἡρέμα not only with the manners of the eristic sophists who humiliate their interlocutors, but also with the unkind question-and-answer of Socrates on other

a kind of question-and-answer, but they ask questions for answers which they already know and demand to be supplied—they are working from a predetermined catalog of questions and answers. Reference to former arguments, qualified answers, or questions given in response to a claim spoil their version of question-and-answer. For example, Dionysodorus, in an attack on Socrates, urges him simply to forget about the things that have been said before: “Are you such a square as to recollect now what we said at first, and will you now recollect what I may have said last year, and yet be at a loss how to deal with the arguments urged at the moment?” (287b).⁷⁴ Instead of playing along, Socrates also persists in asking questions when he should be answering (287d, 295b) or he does not answer at all (297b).⁷⁵ Socrates exclaims to Euthydemus (who is exasperated by these interferences) (295bc):

Very well, I said. But how am I to behave? I will do just as you command [σὸ κελεύης]. When I do not understand what you are asking, do you command me nevertheless to answer without asking anything about it? . . . If you ask a question with one meaning in your mind, and I conceive of another meaning, and then I answer to the latter, are you content [ἔξαρκεῖ σοι] that I should answer nothing to the point?

When Euthydemus responds that he would indeed be content but knows that Socrates would not, we see his recognition of a difference in how question-and-answer should go in addition to a difference in purpose. Contrary to the eristic game, Socratic question-and-answer can very well run question-and-question. However, as Chance (1992) explains, “Once an eristic argument is set in motion, the rigid form of its line of questioning does not permit freedom to recall outside points of interest or to

occasions. In his exploration of protreptics in contest with one another, Plato takes care to make the Socratic protreptic uniquely supportive.

74. For Socrates as the square participant who will not play along, and persists in upsetting the eristic game, cf. 272b–d, 285bc, 295cd.

75. When Socrates commands the sophists to make a trial of Cleinias and converse with him, Euthydemus assents saying, ἐὰν μόνον ἐθέλη ἀποκρίνεσθαι ὁ νεανίσκος (275c) which is perhaps intentionally ambiguous. They appear to suggest that they are willing to converse if only the boy is willing; the tacit suggestion is that they are willing to make a trial of the boy if he is willing to give answers only.

reformulate positions in light of second thoughts.”⁷⁶ The motion of eristic question-and-answer follows a bifurcating track but always to the same destination, and never moves critically back toward itself.

This eristic trick of “fighting in verbal battles and refuting anything that is said [ἐν τοῖς λόγοις μάχεσθαι τε καὶ ἐξελέγχειν τὸ αἰεὶ λεγόμενον] whether it is true or false” (272ab) always rolls forward, regardless of who questions and who answers. Presented with two options, any interlocutor will always be refuted (ἐξελεγχθήσεται), whichever way he answers (275e). He is trapped like a hunted animal. The sophists stare down other questions “like boars when they are driven up to the attack” (294d), and Socrates finds them ready in turn to trap more feeble prey: Dionysodorus “wanted to surround me with words and so hunt me down” (με θηρεῦσαι, 295d). But Socrates thwarts him by refusing to answer. He flees from their traps (297b) because he can tell where the net of their arguments lies once it has been cast: “Because I suspected that the argument would arrive where in fact it ended, I tried to escape by some desperate turn [ἄπορόν τινα στροφήν], twisting about [ἔστρεφόμην] as though I were already caught in the net” (302b). Socrates does more than dodge the nets of their eristics with some twist of his own. He and Ctesippus demonstrate that the eristic machine ends up rolling over the sophists. No longer brave boars, the sophistic duo flounder in their own nets. Dionysodorus twice derails the eristic question-and-answer: once after forcing an answer upon Socrates—“You will always know all things, *if I wish it*” (ἄν ἐγὼ βούλωμαι, 296d)—and then inadvertently allowing him to argue the opposite and conclude that he is at the same time knowing and unknowing (296e–297a). A second time, when Dionysodorus recognizes that Ctesippus is leading him into a verbal trap, rather than choose one of the two options, he breaks his own rules, absurdly snatches up (ὕφαρπάσας) both answers at once, and makes the argument ambiguous (ἐξημποτέρικεν τὸν λόγον, 300d).⁷⁷ After

76. Chance (1992, p. 59).

77. Hawtrey (1981) explains that ἐξαμφοτερίζειν is only found here in the classical period and “sounds like a technical term of eristic” (p. 173). He invites comparison with ἐπαμφοτερίζειν of *Resp.* 479bc which is what one entertains with at dinner parties, like children’s riddles. The eristic sophists similarly entertain rather than investigate. Nightingale (1995) notes that ἐπαμφοτερίζειν (which is used to describe how Phaedrus “goes in two directions,” i.e., between Lysias and Socrates) is also a technical term in Aristotle for plants and animals “whose anatomical features place them in two different categories of being” (p. 146n.26). The dual nature of these creatures makes them unclassifiable and more importantly in the contexts of the *Phaedrus* and *Euthydemus* monstrously complex and freakish.

the first ambush, Euthydemus chides his brother for destroying the argument (297a), and after the second, Ctesippus teases that Dionysodorus himself has been worsted and destroyed (300d). Both Socrates and Ctesippus have acquired the playbook for eristic and lead the sophists into the familiar trap of contradiction.

A playbook for Socratic question-and-answer must be something entirely different: the elenchus is in pursuit of an object which it knows to be elusive, and therefore asks questions for which it does not have firm answers. The elenchus may appear at times to move forward rather rigidly, refusing to dwell on outside points. For instance, in the παράδειγμα, Socrates and Cleinias set aside the matter of whether virtue can be taught and thus free themselves from a supplementary and certainly long inquiry (ἀπαλλάξας με σκέψεως πολλῆς, 282c). But Socrates in the middle of his account of the παράδειγμα at the extradiegetic level intentionally passes over the details of how the investigation developed—“We came to an agreement, I do not know how, that this was in general so” (280ab)—presumably because the question-and-answer took many turns which were not relevant to his narrative for and protreptic of Crito. Still, in spite of the fact that the elenchus can seem to move forward in a rigid way, in fact we find that it moves backward and sideways at times. In fact, Socrates is, at times, immobilized in aporia even as his discourse is fraught with dynamic dialogic forces. Socrates explains to Crito that just as he and Cleinias had agreed on some point, he began “to inquire of him over again what we should think of our previous agreements” (πάλιν ἐπυνθανόμην αὐτοῦ τὰ πρότερον ὠμολογημένα πῶς ἂν ἡμῖν ἔχοι, 280b). Previous questions and answers must be reconsidered in light of new conclusions and commitments. Unlike the set playbook of eristic argument, when something laughable (καταγέλαστον) pops up (like having gone over the same ground twice, δις ταῦτὰ λέγειν, 279d), the participants in the Socratic elenchus backtrack, bring attention to their mistakes and limitations, and then cover new ground from a new position that is more self-aware and self-possessed. This mode of question and answer invites investigation not only of the condition of the soul and how it might be improved, but also of the discursive gains to date; that is, it requires investigation of itself as it unfolds, even if it must risk self-refutation. Even when the elenchus *appears* to have made no progress, that is, to have not moved at all,⁷⁸ it is continuously engaged in a retrospective

78. Cf. 291bc: “We were in a most laughable state; like children [ᾧσπερ] who run after crested larks, we kept on believing we were always [ἀεὶ] just about to catch this or that one of the knowledges, while they always [ἀεὶ] slipped from our grasp . . . When we supposed we had

and introspective motion that makes every participant responsible for the issues at hand. They must consider what has been lost or gained. And every participant must orient himself towards these two shared objectives: wisdom and the best philosophic discourse. In other words, the *methods* of eristic and Socratic question-and-answer differ primarily in that the latter discourse investigates and corrects itself while the former is not self-critical and is therefore self-immobilizing. Eristics are thus helpless even when their limitations and faults lie in plain sight.

The Socratic elenchus is also at odds with eristic question-and-answer in its insistence that an interlocutor supply answers to which he is personally committed as a matter of principle rather than answers which he has provided without reflection. As Gregory Vlastos (1983a) argues, “In eristic, where the prime object is to win, one is free to say anything that will give one a debating advantage. In elenchus, where the prime object is to search for the truth, one does not have that option. One must say what one believes—that is, what one thinks true—even if it will lose one the debate.”⁷⁹ To be more precise, one cannot give an honest answer to win in eristic; the questions and answers are predetermined. In eristics, one is never constrained by the rule to say what one believes. A comparison of how the sophists and Socrates respectively describe the mastery of an argument demonstrates this difference. In the second eristic demonstration, Euthydemus refers to Ctesippus’s account in an effort to move the eristic game forward (284c):

No one, I suppose, speaks what is not—for thereby he would be making something; and you have agreed [σὺ δὲ ὠμολόγηκας] that one cannot so much as make what is not—so that, by your account [κατὰ

arrived at the end, we twisted about again [περικάμψαντες πάλιν] as though [ὥσπερ] we found ourselves [ἀνεφάνημεν] at the beginning of our search, and just as sorely in want [τοῦ ἴσου δεόμενοι] as when we first started on it.” The two similes demonstrate a concern to describe what the experience of this paradigmatic philosophic discourse or question-and-answer is like. It does not truly end at the beginning the way eristic argument does (cf. 302b), but it is sort of like that. This twisting around (cf. *peritrepis*) is a self-reflexive process—“we found ourselves [ἀνεφάνημεν]”—which not only reinforces a desire and orientation, but *rewrites* the narrative of who the participants were before they started: the unconverted did not possess or likely did not know they possessed this desire before the question-and-answer began. The larks of wisdom and philosophic discourse are caught for a moment but leave these hunters with a retrospective sense of themselves and their limitations.

79. Vlastos (1983a, p. 36).

τὸν σὸν λόγον], no one speaks what is false, while if Dionysodorus speaks, he speaks what is true and is.

The sophists force Ctesippus to accept one argument after another in order that they can continuously overturn and humiliate him. Ctesippus responds to their bullying first with a warning (ἐάν μοι πείθῃ, εὐλαβήσει εἶναι) and then with abuse (λοιδορεῖ, 284de). An astute and proud interlocutor such as Ctesippus feels anger rather than shame for being forced to provide answers that will lead constantly to his defeat. On the other hand, Socrates interrupts the same eristic demonstration with an appeal to Dionysodorus to defend as a personal principle the Protagorean argument which the sophist used to silence Ctesippus (286de):

SOCRATES: Is it merely to save your statement, Dionysodorus, that you state it so [Λόγου ἔνεκα . . . λέγεις τὸν λόγον]—just to say something startling—or is it really and truly your view [ἢ ὡς ἀληθῶς δοκεῖ σοι] that there is no such thing as an ignorant man?

DIONYSODORUS: But you are to refute me [Ἄλλὰ σὺ . . . ἐλεγξον].

SOCRATES: Well, is there such a thing as refutation according to your argument [κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον] if no one speaks falsely?

Dionysodorus objects that Socrates is not supposed to ask about whether he truly believes what he says but is rather supposed to advance the game and to try to turn the sophist on his head before he can do the same to him. Socrates uses the phrase κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον to overturn not just Dionysodorus but that very argument itself (τοῦτόν γε τὸν λόγον) which he has heard often (πολλάκις), of which the followers of Protagoras and others before him have made great use (σφόδρα ἐχρῶντο). As he says, he has always found this argument bizarre (ἀεὶ θαυμάζω), particularly for the way that it overturns itself as well as others (ἐμοὶ δὲ ἀεὶ θαυμαστός τις δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ τούς τε ἄλλους ἀνατρέπων καὶ αὐτὸς αὐτόν, 286c).⁸⁰ Dionysodorus has made use of an argument which has a long tradition of which Socrates is well aware. And because the sophist has laid claim to this argument, Socrates ironically insists that Dionysodorus answer for it and that Socrates learn from him (παρὰ σοῦ) the truth of it all. Socrates presumes that if someone is going to use an argument which is so notorious for overturning the

80. On the use of κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον in the *Hippias Minor* (365e1, 366a8, 370a2, 373b7), see Blondell (2002, p. 138n.135).

very people who use it, he must have given it a good deal of thought and must be able to defend both it and his use of it. Instead of advancing to the next anatreptic throw as the sophists do, Socrates dwells on the point. He (ironically) asks for forgiveness for his inability to understand sophistic things (τὰ σοφὰ ταῦτα), for his slow (παχέως) thinking, and for his clownish questions (φορτικώτερόν, 286e–287a). He then proceeds to the fact that this Protagorean argument—Dionysodorus’s argument—does not fit with the claim which the sophists themselves made at the beginning of the contest: that they can best impart virtue to those who wish to learn (287b, cf. 273d–274b). If there is no such thing as an ignorant man, there should be no need for teachers of anything, let alone virtue. Dionysodorus protests that this idiotic Socrates brings up what was said earlier, ignoring the fact that what was said before is the foundational claim for their discipline and business. Again, reference to former arguments spoils the sophistic version of question and answer. But the more important point is that the sophists (who are characterized, as we have seen, as many sophists rolled into one) are exposed once again as mixed up and incoherent, and their proclaimed objectives and discipline, suspect. While Socrates seeks knowledge of truth and a consistency of character through an examination of both what people hold to be true and his methods of examination, the sophists play games of contradiction to win and entertain.⁸¹

Socrates also makes use of the suggestive power of mythical allusions to frame the protreptic παράδειγμα and to disrupt the eristic demonstrations. He does this, in part, to make his own discourse fit the souls of his interlocutors. Although these allusions are brief, they delight and have the capacity to express a great deal to the souls of his interlocutors.

Before we examine the mythic references in the *Euthydemus* (which does not provide any explicit commentary on the use of myth), let me briefly explore accounts of myth and myth-making in other dialogues.⁸² In the *Protagoras*, Protagoras claims that giving a demonstration by means

81. Cf. *Resp.* 539c on the folly of engaging in games of contradiction. Nehamas (1999) argues that if “the test of truth in the elenchus is essentially dialectical, then the truth can be established only to the extent that you continue to win the argument . . . Both Socrates and his opponents, therefore, necessarily aimed at victory” (p. 115). But, Nehamas continues, “Socrates seeks victory for the correct argument, not for himself,” which is a distinction many of his interlocutors who had been “reduced to embarrassing and humiliating perplexity by him” failed to recognize (pp. 116–117). We are reminded that the Socrates of the *Euthydemus* and his question-and-answer in this contest of protreptics are unusual.

82. Brisson (1998), Morgan (2000).

of a myth (as an old man is accustomed to do for the young, *πρεσβύτερος νεωτέρους*) is more pleasing (*χαριέστερον*) than developing a logical argument (*λόγῳ διεξελθῶν*, *Prot.* 320c). In the *Timaeus*, Critias says that he finds myth a marvelous (*θαυμαστόν*) means for remembering childhood lessons (*τὰ παιδῶν μαθήματα*); indeed, he reports that it was “with a good deal of childish pleasure” (*μετὰ πολλῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ παιδιᾶς*) that he listened to the myth of Atlantis (*Tim.* 26bc). Myth is pleasurable and leaves a lasting impression on children or a childlike part of the soul. In the *Phaedrus*, Phaedrus prizes what he calls the noble (*παγκάλην*) and playful (*παίζειν*) but not trivial (*φαύλην*) art of telling myths (*μυθολογοῦντα*) about such things as justice. Socrates argues that telling myths about justice is certainly more noble than indulging oneself in drinking parties, but more noble still is the dialectic art (*τῇ διαλεκτικῇ τέχνῃ*), about which one should be more serious (*σπουδῇ*, 276e–277a):

The dialectician chooses a proper soul and plants and sows within it discourse accompanied by knowledge [*μετ’ ἐπιστήμης λόγους*]—discourse which is capable of helping itself as well as the man who planted it, which is not barren but produces seed from which more discourses grow in the character of others, discourses enough to make the seed forever immortal, discourses which make those who possess them as happy as anyone can be.⁸³

In other words, the dialectic works with *logoi* which do not exist in the soul as mere impressions but are accompanied by knowledge, grow into mature discourse, and produce seed from which other related discourses grow. In her interpretation of this passage, Nightingale (1995) adds that some *logoi* are *discovered* (*ἐὰν εὑρεθῆις ἐνῆ*) in the soul of the philosopher who, in turn, offers his seeds and helps others find the offspring and brothers of those *logoi* in themselves. The discourse which one “discovers” through dialectic is “not invented or created by the soul but rather found

83. Compare this organic discourse with Bakhtin’s (1981) “internally persuasive discourse” which is “half-ours and half-someone else’s. Its creativity and productiveness consist precisely in the fact that such a word awakens new and independent words, that it organizes masses of our words from within, and does not remain in an isolated and static condition” (p. 345). Such discourse comes into contact with others alien to it within an individual revealing “ever new ways to mean” and both an “unfinishedness” of the word and the “inexhaustibility of our further dialogic interaction with it” (p. 346). On serious games in Plato, see *Leg.* 1.644d, 7.803c–804a, *Symp.* 216e.

in the process of recollecting the Forms.”⁸⁴ I propose that mythical discourse and the childlike pleasure which it excites (taken together with the dialectic art) are especially effective tools for triggering this process of recollection. The *Phaedrus* is a good example of how a complex speech should be arranged for a complex soul (278c)—a soul which requires the mixing of *logoi* and *muthoi* to discover ideas within himself. Socrates’s second speech “mixed together a not altogether implausible *logos* [κεράσαντες οὐ παντάπασιν ἀπιθανον λόγον] and sung playfully, but appropriately and respectfully, a mythical hymn [μυθικόν τινα ὕμνον]” (265bc). This hybrid of dialectic and mythic discourse which is appropriate to a lover of discourse such as Phaedrus is never unhybridized to reveal a simple seed of discourse “accompanied by knowledge” in separation from myth. If the maker of any discourse—mixed or unmixed—gives over what he has created or discovered both to his own analysis and to the criticism of others, and if he can successfully defend it, he would appropriately be called by Socrates a “lover of wisdom.” The myths found in hymns, epic, and drama as well as any other traditional kind of discourse may very well play a crucial part in philosophical discourse as long as it can survive such dialogic scrutiny.

In the protreptic contest of the *Euthydemus*, Socrates deploys mythic discourse at pivotal moments either in the frames of his protreptic or in the middle of his opponents’ arguments in an effort to rouse his audience to analyze how discourse is being used.⁸⁵ The *Euthydemus* also takes up an advanced problem dealing with the Theory of Forms and so is not without the objective of locating effective tools for awakening internal discourse and triggering the process of recollection.⁸⁶ A particularly vivid instance

84. Nightingale (1995, pp. 167–168).

85. Hawtrey (1981) finds it significant that these mythical moments coincide with the points of “structural articulation” (p. 116) which characterize the interludes or frames, but he does not suggest how the coincidence is significant. The myths and mythical allusions no doubt signal a departure from Socrates’s more deductive process of dialectic. Mythical discourse is often signaled at moments when the argument is in jeopardy of being lost, particularly at its end. In order that the argument not be lost, myth is used as a cap and sometimes with the proverbial directive that it too not be lost (*Resp.* 621b, *Tht.* 164d, *Phlb.* 14a). Save the myth, and you save the argument. The placement of myth at the boundaries of argument serves, among other things, to preserve and reactivate the deductive process. Luc Brisson (1998) argues, “When the deductive method reaches its limits, it abandons reason to return to myth” (p. 11); this is true only insofar as the appetitive and spirited parts of the soul search for something other than deductive logic. Reason, in this case, is not abandoned; it is only enhanced with seductive powers for leading mixed constitutions toward rational pleasures.

86. See Hawtrey (1981) for the relation of the Theory of (transcendent) Forms to *Euthyd.* 300e (pp. 5, 173–175). Friedländer (1958, Vol. 2, pp. 192f) calls the reference “undeniable” and

of a rousing mythical allusion occurs when Socrates interrupts the second eristic demonstration in order to substitute his own life for Cleinias's and reassert his earnestness against Dionysodorus's arguments (285c):

Let them destroy the boy for us, and make him sensible [φρόνιμον] and all the rest of us likewise. If you boys are afraid, let the danger go to me as to a Karian slave. Being old, I am ready to run the risk, and I surrender myself to this Dionysodorus just as to Medea of Kolchis. Let him destroy me, or if he likes [βούλεται], boil me, or do whatever he wants [βούλεται], only he must reveal goodness [μόνον χρηστὸν ἀποφινάτω].

The protreptic function of this mythic allusion has not received its due attention: Chance makes no mention of it and Hawtrej merely states that "Socrates' advanced years make him an appropriate guinea pig, but the fate of Pelias adds an ominous note to an otherwise cheerful parallel."⁸⁷ But the allusion is critical and the reaction to it is remarkable. Socrates surrenders himself to the manipulative witch—Kolchian Dionysodorus—in the place of Cleinias, but among fearful youths who should have, like the shameful daughters of Pelias, rejected witchcraft and recognized the sorcerers' true intentions no matter how thrilling the exhibition is.⁸⁸ The first eristic exhibition serves as Medea's rejuvenation of the old ram: the unreasoning children desire easy and implausible results—a transformation in appearance rather than any essential quality which, in this case, is not (as we have been led to expect) becoming εὐδαίμων or βέλτιστος, but χρηστός—a quality here less of moral goodness than of effectiveness, which appears in the dialogue only in this brief interlude (three times) and at the very

Hawtrej finds that Sprague (1967) agrees when she demonstrates that Dionysodorus like Parmenides makes a problem of how particulars participate in the Form by taking Socrates's use of παρουσία to be physical rather than metaphorical. I will argue that Chance (1992) overstates the case for Socrates prompting the process of recollection and philosophical development in Cleinias at 290a–d (pp. 123–124).

87. Hawtrej (1981, p. 105).

88. The ability to identify and safeguard against counterfeit goodness is of great concern for Socratic protreptic. It is also a concern that Medea herself voices about Jason, though we come to wonder the same for her and other deceptive women in tragedy: "O Zeus, why, when you gave to men sure signs of gold that is counterfeit, is there no mark [χαρακτήρ] on the human body by which one could identify base men?" (516–519, Trans. Kovacs). Socrates is in the business of identifying such marks, and Plato is a master of such characterization.

end (with regard to the worth and usefulness of philosophers).⁸⁹ In every case except this mythical allusion, χρηστός appears opposing πονηρός. And χρηστός appears to be related to ἔμφρων (285a), that is, sensible and judicious. Socrates argues that the eristics claim to possess an art of destruction or undoing by which they bring ruin to a πονηρός man and reveal him again χρηστός, that is, make capable men from bad (285b). Of course, Socrates would never suggest that he himself was πονηρός.⁹⁰ The allusion does not fit the occasion. This old ram cannot be destroyed before being revealed whole again. He has surrendered himself to these manipulative and deceitful destroyers to be revealed as he already is. There are, of course, others nearby who will be ruined if they are not more cautious and reasonable than the daughters of Pelias.⁹¹

Consider the context of this myth: Socrates interrupts the second eristic demonstration first by playfully poking fun at Ctesippus (προσέπαιζόν, 285a), and then soothing the boy (κατεπράυνον, 288b). In the interim, he uses a mythical allusion to undo the ruinous, stupefying charm which the eristic art exerts. Ctesippus has reacted appropriately to the eristic game of contradiction with revulsion, but Socrates is worried that even he may be ruined and that his outrage may compel him to defeat these offenders in order that he might restore his honor. Socrates fears that Ctesippus might try to bring good sense back *by any means*, even by abuse, without discretion, and worse, by acquiring their skills and trying to surpass them with their own playbook. Ctesippus will, in fact, become ensnared by this withcraft while trying to outstrip it. In spite of Socrates's efforts, Ctesippus will eventually come to pander to the desires of the crowd with the charms of eristic sorcery. Socrates notices that he becomes especially excited (ὑπεραγωνιᾶν, 300c) on account of his beloved watching. Ctesippus's eristic question-and-answer builds to such a successful climax that he destroys and belittles Dionysodorus (ἀπόλωλέ τε καὶ ἤττηται, 300d) with the witch's

89. For early references to this episode of Medea and the Peliades, see Pindar, *Python* 4.250, and the fragmentary hypothesis to Euripides's *Peliades* (test. 111a). Cf. *Medea* 11–13.

90. Cf. *Ap.* 38ab: καὶ ἐγὼ ἄμα οὐκ εἴθισμαι ἑμαυτὸν ἀξιούν κακοῦ οὐδενός.

91. Medea herself warns against not speaking one's mind out in the open: "I have come out of the house lest you find some fault with me. For I know that though many mortals are haughty both in private and in public, others get a reputation [δύσκληϊαν] for indifference [ῥαθυμίαν] to their neighbors from their retiring manner of life [ἀφ' ἡσύχου]" (*Med.* 214–218, Trans. Kovacs). Socrates hopes that those both watching the spectacle unfolding and sensing that something is wrong (perhaps even Crito in the extradiegetic level of discourse) will not retire, but will speak up.

own tools. He wins Cleinias's delight for the humiliating upset and puffs up ten times bigger (δεκαπλάσιος). In this instance, the myth is reversed: a young and innocent yearling is destroyed and revealed to be as wicked and clever as the old sophistic rams.

Before Ctesippus is entirely infected with the contagion, before Socrates notices how manipulative and πανούργος he has become after having acquired their sorcery, something in Socrates's mythical allusion to Medea and Pelias moves Ctesippus to respond with a mythical allusion of his own. He had become abusive (λοιδορή, 284e) and increasingly savage (ἀγριωτέρως, 285a), but Socrates's myth momentarily causes him to retract his abuse and to temper both his own and his opponents' positions (285cd):

I too, Socrates, am ready to surrender myself to the strangers to be skinned still more than they are now doing if they wish, as long as my skin is not to end up as a wine-skin like that of Marsyas but in the shape of virtue. And yet this Dionysodorus believes that I am angry [χαλεπαίνειν] with him. I am not angry; I only contradict [ἀντιλέγω] those things which seemed to me to be improperly aimed at me. But you, my fine Dionysodorus: do not call contradiction abuse, for abuse is something quite different.

We see perhaps something of that fertile discourse which can help others discover related *logoi*. With a mythical allusion, Socrates challenged and appealed to the fearless boys to rise to the occasion, to surrender themselves for their own benefit and on behalf of their beloved, but most of all to guard themselves against deception. Ctesippus has also challenged his supernatural competition—witches now transformed into equally savage Apolline deities—to rise above their petty impulsiveness and improve rather than destroy him.⁹² Unlike Marsyas, he will defeat these Apollos at their own game. But in prolonging Socrates's mythical moment, he calls

92. Dover (1968) suggests that both allusions recall Strepsiades surrendering himself to the *Clouds* in order that he be made best in speaking among the Greeks: "I give up this body to them to be beaten, to be troubled with thirst and hunger, to be squalid, to shiver with cold, to flay into a wine skin, if I shall escape entirely from my debts, and appear to men to be bold, eloquent, daring, shameless, brutal, a fabricator of lies [ψευδῶν συγκολλητής], inventive of words [εὐρησιεπής], a scoundrel in lawsuits . . . a slippery knave, a dissembler [εἴρων] . . . a twister [στρόφις]" (440–450). Ctesippus becomes quite a scoundrel (πανούργος) with eristic, but his challenge was to be made virtuous.

on his opponents, in effect, to produce something more musical, more measured and meaningful: their discourse should know the difference between abuse and contradiction, destruction and improvement. The eristic art, if it is to flay these young men, should, like Socrates's protreptic, be guided by an earnestness to improve oneself and others. It should include an understanding of types of discourse and when and to what extent they should be applied. There is a good deal to admire in the spirited challenge of Ctesippus's mythical discourse (which Socrates has inspired), not least of which is how the boy vigorously aligns himself with the Socratic cause in the middle of and against an eristic exhibition! But Dionysodorus is quick to dodge and defuse the challenge with another sophism—against the possibility of contradiction (285d–286b)—which puts Ctesippus in the hot seat with his beloved looking on. Once again, he is roused to adopt eristic strategies and to become abusive. And as he is being destroyed and reconstituted as a sophistic ram, Socrates's efforts to appeal to his better, more moderate parts with mythical discourse are quickly forgotten.⁹³

3.4.3 The Arrangement of Goods

Another formal aspect of the Socratic παράδειγμα which stands apart from the eristic demonstrations (and from examples of Isocratean protreptic, which we will examine in Part Two) is the hierarchical arrangement of goods and the process by which this hierarchy is determined. We recall that the παράδειγμα begins with the agreement that we do indeed wish to prosper, and to prosper is to have many good things. Socrates proceeds to assemble, with Cleinias's approval, a catalog of those things we hold to be good: wealth (τὸ πλουτεῖν); health, beauty, and the other bodily things (τὸ ὑγιαίνειν καὶ τὸ καλὸν εἶναι καὶ τὰλλα κατὰ τὸ σῶμα); good birth; talents; influence and honors at home (εὐγένειαί τε καὶ δυνάμεις καὶ τιμαὶ ἐν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ); and,

93. Other mythical allusions include the “bewitching sophist” Proteus (288b, cf. Hawtrey, 1981, pp. 117–118), the Dioscuri (293a), and the Hydra, Hera and her crab, Heracles and his Iolaus (297cd, cf. Hawtrey, 1981, p. 159). Dionysodorus, at one point, recognizes the distinctively hymnic (ἕμνηται) quality of this discourse and waits for it to pass. I don't have room here to explore these other allusions, but they also make for interesting inversions of the traditional myths which speak in ironic ways to the desperation of the occasion. The notion of revelation plays an important role in these allusions as well: the bad man is revealed (ἀποφῆναι) as good, and the sophistic shape-shifters must not be released until they reveal (ἐκφανήτων) what it is they are earnest about. These Dioscuri do not save anyone from the third wave of argument, but turn out to be destroyers themselves, worse than the third wave arising from the sea (ἐκ θαλάττης ἀφιγμένω), with innumerable and insufferable heads of debate (εἰ μίαν κεφαλὴν τοῦ λόγου τις ἀποτέμει, πολλὰς ἀντὶ τῆς μίας).

finally, being temperate, just, and brave (τὸ σῶφρονά τε εἶναι καὶ δίκαιον καὶ ἀνδρείον, 279ab). Not only has no clear hierarchy yet been determined, but it seems that some goods which seem to belong together have been set apart from one another. Hawtrey (1981) notes the difficulty that ancient commentators had with such lists of goods:

[They] did not sit too happily in an implicit threefold classification, made explicit by Iamblichus in his paraphrase of this passage as τὰ κατὰ σῶμα, τὰ ἐν τοῖς ἐκτός, and τὰ περὶ ψυχὴν . . . Iamblichus omits wealth (which would be in the second category) altogether.⁹⁴

External goods (wealth and reputation) are divided by bodily goods, and the virtues of σωφροσύνη and δικαιοσύνη stand unexpectedly close to reputation, that is, goods which determine one's public standing in political affairs. Additionally, health and bodily beauty have been grouped together in spite of the distinction made elsewhere, namely in the rising scale of psychic constitutions in *Republic* 8 and 9, between unnecessary goods (e.g., wealth) and necessary goods (e.g., health).⁹⁵ Bodily beauty is not a necessary good, as Socrates himself famously demonstrates.⁹⁶ Thus, we

94. Hawtrey (1981, pp. 78–79). Slings (1999) notes the scale χρήματα—σῶμα—ψυχὴ “worked out extensively in *Alcibiades I*, where ψυχὴ is equated with Man himself (130e8–9 . . .), body is τὰ αὐτοῦ (131a2 and passim), wealth ἐτι πορρωτέρω τῶν ἑαυτοῦ (131c1; cf. a1) or τὰ τῶν ἑαυτοῦ (133e1–2; cf. d8; d12)” (p. 100). Cf. Plato, *Phlb.* 48de, *Menex.* 246de, *Leg.* 697ab, 743e, and Aristotle, *Protrepticus* (Dcms 79.15–80.1), in all of which there is a hierarchy (p. 100n.184). This recurrent tripartite division helps Slings make sense of the division in Clitophon's report of Socratic protreptic between *oratio recta* (407b1–e2) and *obliqua* (407e5–408b5); the former speaks to a shameful regard for wealth while the latter deals with the discipline of the body and neglect of the soul. The Platonic writer of the *Clitophon* makes use of Platonic patterns in protreptic for a parodic effect (Slings, 1999, p. 102).

95. Socrates defines three simple classes (γένη) of men—rational lovers of wisdom, spirited lovers of honor and victory, and irrational lovers of gain (*Resp.* 9.581c)—and further divides the things desired by the last class into necessary (τὸ ἀναγκαῖον) and unnecessary pleasures, and the latter still further into, on the one hand, unnecessary but lawless (παράνομοι) pleasures and, on the other, unnecessary pleasures “curtailed by law and better desires in accord with reason [κολαζόμενα δὲ ὑπὸ τε τῶν νόμων καὶ τῶν βελτιόνων ἐπιθυμιῶν μετὰ λόγου]” (8.558d–559b, 9.571a–572b). These subdivisions, in sum, correspond to five unmixed but descending psychological (and political) constitutions: (1) those ruled by the rational part (aristocracy); (2) those ruled by the spirited part (timocracy); and those ruled by the appetitive part, who are further divided into: (3) those ruled by the necessary appetitive part (oligarchy); (4) those ruled by the unnecessary but lawful appetitive part (democracy); and (5) those ruled by the unnecessary but lawless part (tyranny).

96. Sprague (in Cooper & Hutchinson, 1997) translates τὰλλα κατὰ τὸ σῶμα here as “the other things the body needs,” missing the conflation of necessary and unnecessary goods in this grouping.

have started with a somewhat unorganized group of goods which begs for rearrangement into categories, particularly if the trichotomy of goods is traditional.⁹⁷

In order to subordinate all of these conventional priorities to his conception of wisdom and his manner of attaining that wisdom, Socrates introduces the idea of hierarchy into the jumble of goods. He does this first indirectly with a question about how goods relate to one another. Socrates then asks directly, “Where in the χορός [of these goods] shall we station wisdom? Among the goods, or how else would you say?” (τὴν δὲ σοφίαν ποῦ χοροῦ τάξομεν; Ἐν τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, ἢ πῶς λέγεις; 279c). The notion of a χορός of goods at first glance might merely suggest a row of goods, like a χορός ὁδόντων (cf. *Ar. Ran.* 548) or a χορός σκευῶν (*Xen. Oec.* 8.39), or as the *LSJ* has it in this instance of the *Euthydemus*, a class—“In what class shall we place wisdom?” However, as we have already noted, in the previous scene Socrates has just had a great deal of fun comparing the “diplatreptic” brothers to skillful dancers (ὡσπερ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ὀρχησταί, 276d), describing their followers cheering “like a chorus at the signal of their director” (ὡσπερ ὑπὸ διδασκάλου χορὸς ἀποσημήναντος, 276b). He identified the eristic demonstration as dance (χορεία) and games (παιδιά): the sophists do nothing other than perform a chorus around the boy and play at dance (χορεύετον περὶ σὲ καὶ οἷον ὀρχεῖσθον παίζοντε, 277de). Given this choral language immediately preceding the arrangement of goods, Chance (1992) argues that “it has been Plato’s intention all along to picture Socrates, in direct contrast to the brothers, as the true leader of the philosophic chorus.”⁹⁸ While it is certainly the case that the χορός of goods resonates with the language of dance, the idea that Socrates and the sophists are strictly contrasted with one another as competing διδάσκαλοι is not supported by the text. The first two comparisons are not spoken in the intradiegetic level; neither Cleinias nor the audience hears this choral language, so the effect of these instances is meant primarily for Crito. It is Crito, after all, who sees the eristic διδασκάλω and ὀρχηστά, who double-turn their questions around the same point. For Cleinias, Socrates describes the sophists not at all as διδασκάλω, but only as ὀρχηστά who dance and sing around the boy: “Where in the χορός of these goods shall we station (τάξομεν)

97. Slings (1999) writes that while some suggest the divisions may be not only traditional but Pythagorean and “Orphic,” “there is no indication that it did not originate with Plato or Socrates” (p. 101).

98. Chance (1992, pp. 64–65).

wisdom?” The more important point is not so much that Socrates makes himself out to be a better and more crafty διδάσκαλος than the eristics here, but that he is trying to make Cleinias a fellow leader both of dancing men and the χορός of the best things in life.

After Cleinias stations wisdom as one good among many, Socrates finds a more direct way to introduce the idea of hierarchy into the jumble of goods and to make a διδάσκαλος of the boy. He recalls (ἀναμνησθεῖς) another good, the “greatest of goods,” which the two of them are in danger of omitting (κινδυνεύομέν . . . παραλιπεῖν, 279c). At this point, Cleinias does something which the eristic duo plainly does not permit: he asks a question—“What is that?”⁹⁹ Socrates responds that εὐτυχία is that good which “all men, even the most foolish [καὶ οἱ πάνυ φαῦλοι], refer to as the greatest of goods.” When Cleinias assents, Socrates again reconsiders (πάλιν μετανοήσας) and says, “We have almost made ourselves laughable, both you and I, son of Axiochos, in front of our visitors” (279d). Cleinias responds to this with yet another question. In addition to engaging in two protreptic activities which eristic forbids—ἀνάμνησις and μετανοήσις, Socrates has not left the boy “anatrepticized” and floundering alone under the shame-inducing gaze of the sophists’ devoted fans. He has instead placed himself alongside the boy in imminent danger and disgrace, and in return, has won a partner in this protreptic inquiry. Socrates and Cleinias were at risk of forgetting something which even the most foolish call the greatest. And they nearly made themselves foolish in front of the sophists for saying the same thing twice (αὐθις περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐλέγομεν . . . δις ταῦτα λέγειν) and not catching it.¹⁰⁰ Socrates goads Cleinias into asking him to

99. On answering the “grudging and obstructing” (297d) manner of eristic questions with earnest questions, see also 287d, 295bc.

100. Again, Chance (1992) may overstate the connection by confusing the extradiegetic and intradiegetic audiences when he argues that “the criticism he aims at himself and Cleinias for saying the same thing twice is also directed at Euthydemus for twisting questions around the same topic” (p. 59). Socrates describes the sophists as “diplatreptic” and skillful dancers only to Crito (276d), who is plainly meant to make the connection. Dionysodorus has indeed confided in Socrates that “whichever way the boy answers, he will be refuted” (275e), but there is a distinction between, in this case, the ability to defeat both possible answers with lines of questioning and, in the case of Socrates’s μετανοήσις, the trouble of apparently giving two names to the same thing. The connection between “diplastrepsis” and δις ταῦτα λέγειν may be found more simply in the ubiquitous play of duals in this contest: the two sophists can follow two possible responses with two lines of questioning while the newly formed partnership of Socrates and Cleinias relentlessly doubles back to reassess its own arguments in an effort to eliminate repetition. The partnership ultimately strives for unity and coherence.

clarify again and again the laughable state in which they find themselves regarding the greatest of goods: “Surely it is ridiculous . . . even a child would know” that σοφία is εὐτυχία. Cleinias is amazed and perhaps embarrassed by the equivalence which everyone but he and Socrates has managed to see. Socrates emphasizes the equivalence in order to lead Cleinias into agreeing to a complete substitution. He begins by ostensibly clarifying the equivalence with an examination not of the abstract chorus of goods but of a practical chorus of professionals—flute-players, grammarians, pilots, generals, and doctors—all of whom fare better and make others fare better in fortune because they possess technical knowledge. Each example is confirmed by Cleinias’s own understanding (ἀρ’ οὐκ οἶσθα), preference (ἄν ἡδιον), and daring (ἄν ἡδέως κινδυνεύοις), to the point that Socrates concludes that “wisdom everywhere causes men to be fortunate” (εὐτυχεῖν ποιεῖ, 280a).¹⁰¹ As with the professionals, wisdom or knowledge comes before good fortune; they are causally related. In fact, Socrates and Cleinias somehow agree to the stronger conclusion that “when wisdom is present, he with whom it is present has no need of good fortune” (280b).¹⁰² Σοφία and εὐτυχία are not the same, but the former produces the latter (and incidentally reveals its derivative nature as a good). Not only has a complete substitution been achieved, but good fortune has been altogether expelled from the chorus of goods.

The rest of this collaborative inquiry aims at subordinating nearly all of the other goods to the choral leader σοφία. As wisdom has been determined a greater and non-derivative good, Socrates encourages a joint μετανόησις of the field of dancers: “I began to inquire of him over again [πάλιν ἐπυνθανόμενῃ] how we should consider [πῶς ἂν ἡμῖν ἔχοι] the things upon which we previously agreed” (280b). In this reassessment, Socrates includes wealth,

101. On the rarity of Socratic induction, see Hawtrey (1972).

102. Socrates proleptically explains to Crito, Συνωμιολογησάμεθα τελευτώντες οὐκ οἶδ’ ὅπως ἐν κεφαλαίῳ οὕτω τοῦτο ἔχειν. Chance (1992) argues that “there is a dramatic break in the narrative where Plato allows us to imagine that the boy resisted Socrates’s conclusion on the infallibility of wisdom so that the two had to follow out another line of thought that eventually reached a conclusion acceptable to both” (p. 63). But Cleinias has yet to show such initiative, and if I am correct that his supposed “advances” in the second Socratic demonstration are merely a narrative device for eliciting a reaction from Crito at the extradiegetic level, then Plato does not allow us to imagine resistance. In fact, the prolepsis might have been a failed earlier attempt to provoke Crito, to whom Socrates has promised to tell the whole story: “I not only attended closely but remember and will try to expound the whole thing from the beginning” (ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἅπαντα, 272de). Socrates describes the tactic which finally does awaken Crito also as a lapse in memory.

health, and beauty (281a), and notably excludes the other goods ἐν τοῖς ἐκτός (good birth and talents or influence and honors at home) and τὰ περὶ ψυχὴν (the other virtues of σωφροσύνη and δικαιοσύνη). One necessary and a several unnecessary goods remain, and they are all finally determined to be, like good fortune, subordinate and derivative (281de):

If ignorance guides them, they are greater evils than their opposites, inasmuch as they are more capable of serving their evil leader; whereas if understanding and wisdom guide them, they are greater goods; but in themselves neither sort is of any worth [αὐτὰ δὲ καθ' αὐτὰ οὐδέτερα αὐτῶν οὐδενὸς ἄξια εἶναι].

The conclusion, at least regarding fortune, wealth, beauty, and health, which only participate in goodness when they are led by wisdom, is that “every man should prepare himself by all means so that he may be as wise as possible” (282a). In other words, everyone should φιλοσοφεῖν. Honors and the other virtues remain in the chorus of goods, their relation to wisdom uncertain although presumably in some way subordinate if wisdom has truly regained its throne from the usurper called εὐτυχία. If doing well is to have good things, and the goodness of good things comes from the greatest goodness of wisdom, then wisdom is the only thing we should strive to possess. Socrates progressively turns Cleinias away from derivative goods until the two of them have placed honors, temperance, and justice under the guidance of wisdom. The two of them have collected these “dancers” of good things, auditioned them, as it were, and organized those who made the cut into leading and supporting roles. In this hunt for the proper ἐπιμέλεια in life, they have determined a range and hierarchy of things to which one should truly be devoted. The proptreptic παράδειγμα takes into account that people, particularly in this highly eroticized and agonistic space, desire many things for different reasons. Socrates turns Cleinias into both a διδάσκαλος of these things which people desire and, in effect, a διδάσκαλος of his own desires. Feelings of pleasure, shame, and daring serve the process of desiring wisdom. Socrates leaves honors in the chorus because they are an undeniable part of the psychology of young men.¹⁰³ While the eristic sophists publicly humiliate their target with a

103. One of the goods, ἐν τοῖς ἐκτός (good birth), appears again at the extradiegetic level when Crito casts doubt on it. Crito says to Socrates, “When I am in your company, the effect on me is such as to make me feel it is mere madness to have taken ever so much pain in various directions for the good of my children—first in so marrying that they should be of

strictly bifurcating track, Socrates encourages the boy to determine the order of a wide range of goods by making Cleinias's φιλοτιμία serve the greater and explicitly more useful process of philosophy: wisdom leads honor and correctly uses those things which are not good in themselves.

The second Socratic demonstration, however, leads to aporia and emphasizes some of the difficulties involved in trying to attain the greatest good of wisdom. At this point, a question arises about what the philosopher pursuing this track is meant to take away. What Ctesippus takes away from his eristic training is evident. Clitophon famously attacks Socrates for not providing a bottom line in his protreptic. Every conclusion which Socrates and Cleinias reach does not stand as a readymade precept which one can grasp and memorize, but rather is an occasion to reassess everything that came before. Every conclusion carries a compulsion to reengage with the philosophical process.

The protreptic toward wisdom also leads to a question about how we ought to live our lives while we are searching for wisdom. Some are led to wonder how we are supposed to get through the rest of our lives while pursuing the highest good. This question is part of the Isocratean critique: eristic and Socratic talk amounts to “babbling and making an insignificant seriousness about useless things” (304e). As we shall see, Isocrates himself argues that while those “contending subtly about trifling matters” (*Ad Nic.* 39) search for the chorus-leader called wisdom, they neglect the other, more practical goods. Isocrates believes such a marvelous and fantastical notion of wisdom (τερατολογία) “ignores our practical needs” (τοὺς δὲ τῶν μὲν ἀναγκαίων ἀμελοῦντας) and is “no help [ὠφελοῦσαν] in the present either in speech or in action” (*Antid.* 285, 265–266). This subordination of every practical good to a theoretical good resembles the practices of other disciplines which gather “precise knowledge about useless stuff” (*Helen* 5) but they get in the way of the practical and essential business of managing private households and the welfare of the city.¹⁰⁴ Finally, Isocrates insists that opinion rather than precise knowledge arrives at the best course in life (*Antid.* 270–271). Of course, Socrates demonstrates in

very good blood on their mother's side; then in making money so that they might be as well off as possible” (306de). Crito can exclude good birth and wealth together from the chorus of goods. But Socrates uses Cleinias's parentage and sense of honor as a way to elicit questions from the boy.

104. All of these references do not unambiguously refer to the Platonic discipline. We will take a closer look at Isocratean protreptic in the Part Two.

the παράδειγμα that nothing could be more useful than this wisdom or, more precisely, that nothing at all could be useful or good or fortunate without this wisdom. While Isocrates, at one point, specifically targets the theoretical accounts of those old sophists (τοὺς λόγους τοὺς τῶν παλαιῶν σοφιστῶν)—sophists who do not profit their pupils but attract crowds as wonder-workers—he argues broadly that theoretical disciplines are merely good preparation (παρασκευὴν) for his more practical philosophy. Isocrates insists that one should not pursue these disciplines for their own sakes, for “it is necessary for those wishing to do something of consequence to banish from all of their interests frivolous speculations and those activities which have no bearing on our lives” (*Antid.* 269). An Isocratean protreptic provides less intellectual discussion and more gnomic exempla (which are to be memorized and internalized in order to get on in the best way with the conventional ἐπιμέλεια of life). Not surprisingly, memory and recollection play a very different role in the *Euthydemus* and other Platonic dialogues.

Return to the Extradiegetic Level

METALEPSIS, PROTREPTIC, AND APOTREPTIC

4.1 *From Spectator to Judge to Interlocutor: Crito's Turn in Scene 4 (Euthyd. 289d–293a)*

Genette (1980) describes *metalepsis* as “any intrusion by the extradiegetic narrator or narratee into the diegetic universe (or by diegetic characters into a metadiegetic universe, etc.), or the inverse.”¹ This intrusion may be accomplished in a number of ways. For instance, the narrator may make reference to the fact that his narrative is his own invention, thereby “undermining the realistic expectation that the narrator merely tells a story over which he has no power.”² The narrator and narratee may also intrude into the intradiegetic world and interact with intradiegetic characters.³ Or the narrator may involve the narratee

1. Genette (1980, pp. 234–235). For a fuller treatment of *metalepsis* in Plato and other philosophical texts, see Collins (2012).

2. “Authorial *metalepsis*” (type 1) in Fludernik (2003, p. 384). Genette (1980) calls this a trick of the narrator’s Gygean ring borrowing from Théophile Gautier’s description of the narrator and narratee being present and omnipotent in the intradiegetic level but imperceptible to the intradiegetic characters: “Gautier will use this technique to the point of a flippancy that ‘bares’ it, as the Formalists would say: ‘The Marquis inhabited a separate suite, which the Marquis did not enter unless he was announced. We will commit this impropriety that authors of all times have allowed themselves, and without saying a word to the buttons who would have forewarned the lodger, we will penetrate into the bedroom, sure of disturbing no one. The writer of a novel naturally wears on his finger the ring of Gyges, which makes him invisible’ (*Le Capitaine Fracasse*, Gamier ed., p. 103). Later we will again meet this trope, the *metalepsis*, with which the narrator pretends to enter (with or without his reader) into the diegetic universe” (p. 101n.33).

3. Fludernik (2003, pp. 384–385): “Ontological narratorial *metalepsis*” (type 2).

in the intradiegetic world or, conversely, may involve an intradiegetic character as a narratee in the extradiegetic world.⁴ We have already noted how the narrating Socrates frequently draws attention to his role as narrator in the extradiegetic level and as διδάσκαλος in the intradiegetic level. But we have not examined the last two instances of metalepsis—a sort of physical intrusion—that occur in the continuation of the protreptic παράδειγμα of the first Socratic demonstration into the second.

In the dialogue of the second Socratic demonstration (*Euthyd.* 288d–293a), the illusion of an inviolable intradiegetic universe is broken. The narrating Socrates upsets the intradiegetic world when he deliberately misattributes discourse to Cleinias in order to draw Crito into the investigation. When Socrates and Cleinias are searching for a kind of knowledge in which there is a union of the art of production and the art of use, much to Crito's disbelief, Socrates tells of how Cleinias very eloquently and verbosely ruled out the poetic *technē* of speech-writing (λογιοποιεῖν, 289d) and then the acquisitive (κτήσῃται) *technē* of generalship (στρατηγική, 290bd) on the grounds that neither knows how to use the thing made or hunted and acquired. Previously, Cleinias had only answered all of his interlocutor's questions with simple though significant responses. Thus, when Cleinias makes these philosophical comments on *technai*, Crito says that Cleinias is speaking rather like someone who “has no need of education from Euthydemus or anyone else” (290e). What is going on here? Why does Cleinias suddenly speak like a philosopher? The narrating Socrates might here willfully misattribute mature and thoughtful remarks to a young and overwhelmingly reticent character in order to provoke a response from Crito in the extradiegetic level and thereby make the transition from the relatively passive act of relating an event to more actively engaging with his interlocutor. Chance (1992) argues that Crito's disbelief that Cleinias uttered this philosophical discourse rests on his inability to recognize that he has just witnessed Cleinias bridge the gap between learning and knowing by “coming to know” through a cooperative process in which Socrates induced the lad to hunt down and to capture realities that are not part of his everyday conscious awareness and that will lose their tether to conscious moorings and submerge once again into forgetfulness, unless he

4. Fludernik (2003, pp. 385–386): “Ontological lectorial metalepsis” (type 3).

receives continued support from a skilled questioner over a long period of time. In short, not recognizing that Socrates can trigger the recollection process best of men and most quickly, Crito has failed to see that Cleinias is, in part, responsible for his answers, but that his progress is only temporary.⁵

We may hope that Cleinias is on his way to bridging this gap and will no doubt require continued support to maintain and build upon this progress. But we should not miss the opportunity that this very rare event presents to the reader: we must consider that Socrates has deliberately and masterfully deployed this device for several reasons. First, to remind Crito the reason why the story of this protreptic competition is being told, how much is at stake in it, and how much more important it is for one to be engaged in the pursuit of wisdom than to hear stories about others doing it.⁶ Socrates and

5. Chance (1992, pp. 123–124); similarly, “Socrates will orchestrate other conversational techniques, the cumulative effect of which will be to stimulate Cleinias’s philosophical awareness to such a degree that he will confidently seize the reins of the discourse on his own” (p. 60). Cf. Hawtrey (1981), who argues with the help of R. K. Sprague that Plato is making a joke by placing “such comparatively advanced doctrine into the mouth of a novice” and thereby “emphasizing the dialectic/eristic contrast—if they want speed, here it is” (pp. 129–130). Both miss the more obvious and far more important point that Socrates has the resources to bait the listener of a reported dialogue into doing the more significant work of entering into a dialogue of his own. These scholars are also wed to a developmental notion of the Platonic canon which pulls the rug out from under the *Euthydemus* and makes it a mere stepping stone to more crucial, advanced doctrine, such as “the recollection process.”

6. Generally, the interruption of the intradiegetic level and return to the narrative frame is an extremely rare event in Plato’s dialogues. Echecrates interrupts Phaedo’s long report twice: the first time, he remarks that while he is listening, he “finds himself saying to himself” that he is “once again in need [πάνν δέομαι πάλλιν], as if from the beginning, of some other argument to convince me [με πείσει]” (*Phd.* 88d). The language of this interruption resonates with the description of the labyrinthine search which Socrates gives at *Euthydemus*. 291bc to mark the transition from the perikamptic struggles of others to a new search with Crito. Phaedo responds to Echecrates, “What I wondered at most in [Socrates] was the pleasant, kind, and admiring [ἡδέως και εὔμενώς και ἀγαμένως] way he received the young men’s arguments, and how sharply he was aware of the effect the discussion had on us, and then how well he healed our distress and, as it were, raised us from our flight and defeat and turned us around to join him in the examination of their argument [ἀνεκαλέσατο και προύτρεψεν πρὸς τὸ παρέπεσθαι τε και συσκοπεῖν τὸν λόγον]” (89a). Again, Socratic protreptic is encouraging and kind. Echecrates cannot join Socrates in a new protreptic and examination, but the interruption demonstrates that Echecrates is eager to do work of his own. Rowe (1998) explains that he “speaks as if he were himself present at the conversation, so demonstrating his full involvement in it: for him, as of course for us, as readers, the arguments are of more than historical concern” (p. 211). Crito instead will demonstrate that he prefers to be present for the reporting rather than the doing. Instead of warning Crito against misology as he warns Phaedo in the return to the intradiegetic level, Socrates provides Crito with a sample of argument in the intradiegetic level which fills him with revulsion. Crito knows what he wants to

Crito plainly acknowledge the potential misattribution through a playful exchange of ironies (291a):

SOCRATES: But then, Heaven help me! I wonder if it was Ctesippus who said it, and my memory fails me.

CRITO: Which Ctesippus?!

SOCRATES: Well, of this at any rate I am certain, that it was neither Euthydemus nor Dionysodorus who said. Tell me, divine Crito, was it some superior power that was there to speak it? For that speech I heard, I am sure.

CRITO: Yes, by god, Socrates: I fancy it was indeed some superior power—very much so. But after that, did you all go on looking [ἐζητήσατε] for a suitable art? Did you find [ἤύρετε] one which you had as the object of your search [ἐζητεῖτε], or did you not [οὐχ ἤύρετε]?

Crito knows full well that of all the people in this narrative, only Socrates could have said such things. He may be interested in the outcome of the contest as a spectator and perhaps even as a father who is concerned about his sons' education, but he demonstrates that he is in no way present for the investigation as a participant ready for work. Crito believes that the search belongs to one or another of the characters in the intradiegetic level. Through his narrative, Socrates has already defined the exemplary space for interactions in protreptic discourse; by this willful misattribution of a philosophical discourse to Cleinias, he has tried to lure his narratee, Crito, into this space.

Although Crito resists getting involved as a participant, he still wants to know what those in the protreptic drama have worked hard to find. Crito wants the final answer—the happiness-producing art that Socrates and Cleinias were seeking (ἐζητεῖτε, 291a)—without having made the earnest and most important pledge to pursue knowledge that the boy made at the end of Scene 2. He wants to go back into the narration to see the solution, but Socrates describes only confusion and need—a second twisting around and return to poverty—rather than the apprehension of a readymade solution (291bc):

Find it, my friend! We were in a most laughable state; like children who run after larks, we kept thinking we were about to catch this or that one

avoid, but he evades the Socratic alternative. A second, more brief interruption in the *Phaedo* reiterates how Echecrates is engaged with the report—even one as treacherous as the second sailing (99c–102a)—as an eager interlocutor: Socrates made his case perfectly clear to those who were present and for us “who were not present but hear of it now” (102a).

of the knowledges, but they would escape from us. What need to tell you the whole story? When we reached the art of kingship, and were looking at it from every angle to see whether it might be the one which provides and produces happiness, at this point we fell into a labyrinth of sorts: when we thought we had arrived at the end, we twisted round again [περικάμπσαντες πάλιν] and reappeared as if [ὥσπερ] at the beginning of our search, and just as much in want [τοῦ ἴσου δεόμενοι] as when we first started it.

CRITO: How did this happen to you [ἡμῖν], Socrates?

SOCRATES: I will tell you.

Περικάμπω is related to προτρέπω; the latter is a turning toward one thing (and implicitly away from another), while the former is a bending or twisting back around.⁷ Socrates explains that after Cleinias was turned toward the pursuit of knowledge, the two of them together embarked on the pursuit but were then turned back to the point of departure. Protreptic leads to more trials—trials far less satisfying than making the pledge to suffer them if that is in fact what one pledges to do—and through these trials, protreptic leads back to itself, back to square one, perhaps even to a moment in which one repeatedly affirms both one's ignorance and one's desire for the supreme and most desirable value of wisdom. The return to the beginning also describes the retrospective element of the Socratic question-and-answer. Socrates attempts to provoke Crito toward a dialogue of his own, and not simply through this brief break in the narrative, but also, as the break itself reminds us, through the ongoing narration.

The interruption of the intradiegetic level into the extradiegetic continues through a more overt physical intrusion: Socrates invites Crito into the narrative ostensibly as a judge of passing events to make him an interlocutor in the dramatic space. When Crito asks how it was that Socrates and Cleinias got lost in their labyrinth of argument, Socrates pretends to resume his narration—"I will tell you [φράσω]. It seemed to us [ἔδοξε γὰρ δὴ ἡμῖν] that the arts of statesmanship and kingship were the same"—but for some reason, Crito is prompted to ask, "So what?" (291c). Socrates might

7. Κάμπω appears elsewhere and often with the preposition περί + accusative or simply with the genitive of the thing around which a horse, chariot, or ship doubles back. But it also appears with the preposition πρὸς + accusative remarkably at *Resp.* 6.494e: when a youth "is bent and drawn towards philosophy" (κάμπηται καὶ ἔλκεται πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν). We are also to recall the double twists (διπλᾶ ἔστρεφε) of the skilled eristic dancers (οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ὀρχησταί, 276d), pitiful in comparison.

be stalling to elicit the question, but his next remark follows on the ἔδοξε without a connecting particle, as though Crito out of some impatience has interrupted a thought in progress.⁸ After Socrates explains that the art of kingship seemed to him and Cleinias to manage the other arts and to be the cause of right conduct in the state, he directly quotes in support of their conclusion a line of Aeschylus which any φιλοθέωρος and conservative representative of Athens like Crito would be sure to recognize.⁹ It seems Socrates has revealed yet another way to bait his narratee into the action of the narrative. When Crito eagerly interjects, “And surely the notion seemed excellent to you” (οὐκοῦν καλῶς ὑμῖν ἔδοκει, 291d). Socrates responds (291de),

You shall judge [σὺ κρινεῖς] of that, Crito, if you care to hear what befell us thereafter [ἐὰν βούλη ἀκούειν καὶ τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα συμβάντα ἡμῖν]. For later on we reexamined it somewhat in this manner [αὐθις γὰρ δὴ πάλιν ἐσκοποῦμεν ὧδέ πως]: Look now, does the art of kingship, that rules over all, produce any effect or not? Certainly it does, of course, we said to one another. Would you not say so too, Crito?

Once again, the question-and-answer turned back on itself to reconsider previous agreements in light of new conclusions and commitments (cf. 280b). But this time, Crito will simultaneously judge and be responsible for the reexamination. At first, he is invited to hear once again as a narratee, and then to judge, offering an approximation (ὧδέ πως, cf. ἀπαντοσχεδιάσαι, 278d) about what happened to those within the drama (τὰ συμβάντα ἡμῖν). But as soon as Socrates launches into the approximation, he makes a substitution, in much the same way as he had previously done when he relieved the humiliated Cleinias and put himself in the hands of Dionysodorus as an experimental subject (285c). But this time, Crito will take the place of Cleinias and find himself in the hands

8. Cf. Hawtrey (1981, p. 132).

9. Socrates explains that the art of kingship “is seated alone at the helm of the city, steering the whole, commanding the whole, and making the whole useful” (μόνη ἐν τῇ πρύμνῃ καθῆσθαι τῆς πόλεως, πάντα κυβερνῶσα καὶ πάντων ἄρχουσα πάντα χρήσιμα ποιεῖν, 291d). Editors cite a likely source: “Κάδμου πολῖται, χρὴ λέγειν τὰ καιρία / ὅστις φυλάσσει πράγμιος ἐν πρύμνῃ πόλεως / οἶακα νωμῶν” (Plut. *Conv. sept. sap.* 1–3). Socrates makes a direct reference to poetry only one other time in the dialogue, to Euthydemus, but as a σφραγίς to the δῆγησις delivered to Crito: “For it is the rare, Euthydemus, that is precious, while water is cheapest, though best, as Pindar said” (304b). This is the language of the respectable Critos of Athens.

of Socrates and as a collaborator in the pursuit of wisdom rather than as a target for humiliation. In this reexamination, Crito will play the active role of interlocutor rather than the passive role of spectator, at least for as long as he can bear it.

We must remember that Crito has yet to make the significant pledge which Cleinias made—ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι φιλοσοφεῖν, φιλοσοφητέον—to signal the principal objective of the Socratic protreptic. Crito will undertake the reexamination as an interlocutor but at some remove; as soon as things get difficult for him, he can and will easily extract himself from the investigation without the shame that a Cleinias or Alcibiades might feel. The elenchus moves forward kindly enough, and at every point, Crito accedes with simple replies (like Cleinias) or does not respond at all because, as he admits, he “cannot quite supply the answer” (ἐμπορεῖς, 292a). Socrates curiously admits that he and Cleinias were not ready with answers either, as though the investigation from the previous day were occurring simultaneously and in the same way as this investigation in private: the extradiegetic and the intradiegetic have effectively merged.

Socrates continues, “And you know we agreed with each other, Cleinias and I, that nothing can be good but some sort of knowledge,” to which a judicious Crito responds, “Yes, so you said” (292b), recalling both numerous agreements in the first Socratic scene and the challenge which Socrates makes to the sophists to continue where he left off with a demonstration of “whether the boy ought to acquire every kind of knowledge, or whether there is a single sort of it which one must obtain if one is to be both happy and a good man, and what it is” (282e). Socrates folds Crito into the reevaluation of narrated agreements and questions of which he was previously only a spectator. Crito maintains some of this distance by responding to Socrates neither as an interlocutor nor as a passive narratee but again as a judge: “These things are true, so at all events you agreed then [ὅμιν ὠμολογήθη], by *your report* of the discussion” (ὡς σὺ τοὺς λόγους ἀπήγγειλας, 292c).¹⁰ This judge has no objections, but the discussion which is reported

10. Socrates summarizes that the art of kingship “ἔδει δὲ σοφοῦς ποιεῖν καὶ ἐπιστήμης μεταδίδοναι, εἴπερ ἐμέλλεν αὐτὴ εἶναι ἢ ὠφελοῦσα τε καὶ εὐδαίμονα ποιοῦσα” (292bc), where the object which is made wise, provided with knowledge, benefited, and made happy is not made explicit. The nearest plural object is τοὺς πολίτας, but it seems by Crito’s response that he assumes Socrates means ἡμᾶς and strictly within the confines of this reported event, i.e., Socrates and Cleinias. The brief summary begins with generalizing present optatives (φαίη, εἶη) but these are subordinated to secondary tenses toward the end (ἐφάνη, ἔδει, ἐμέλλεν). Because Socrates is not yet asking pointed questions, it is easy for Crito to remain outside of the action of the investigation.

still belongs to others. Socrates tries one more time to engage Crito as an interlocutor and this time the question-and-answer briefly gathers some steam, but it ends up dying out, at which point Crito excuses himself.

Socrates engineers this exchange at the extradiegetic level in order to test Crito's engagement.¹¹ If he is to do well as an interlocutor, he needs to have performed well as a proper spectator and to possess and exercise the proper criteria for correct judgment. In this metaleptic episode, Socrates has entered into a brief exchange without having secured an earnest oath from Crito in parallel to that of Cleinias. The extradiegetic investigation appears to leave off precisely where the intradiegetic did. But there is a key difference: Crito has retreated into his familiar role as a passive spectator while Cleinias is retained through his oath. What follows demonstrates both how half-heartedly Crito is engaged in the elenchus and how thoughtlessly he is engaged as a spectator (292e–293a):

SOCRATES: . . . it is merely a case of the proverbial “Corinthus, son of Zeus”; and as I was saying [ὅπερ ἔλεγον], we are equally or even worse at a loss to know what that knowledge can be which is to make us happy [ἡμᾶς εὐδαίμονας ποιήσει].

CRITO: By god, Socrates, you yourselves came [ἀφίκεσθε] to a whole lot of trouble [ἀπορίαν].

SOCRATES: So then I myself [ἐγώ γε οὖν καὶ αὐτός], Crito, since I had fallen [ἐνεπεπτώκη] into this trouble, began to exclaim with all my voice, begging the two strangers as though I were calling on the Dioscouri to save us, the boy and me [ἡμᾶς, ἐμέ τε καὶ τὸ μενράκιον], from the mighty wave of the argument, and to be earnest in every way . . .

Socrates provides the clue that this regressive turn is not as final or useless as it seems. “Corinthus, son of Zeus” amounts to repeating the same

11. Chance (1992) argues rather that the break in the narrative is needed to articulate the dramatic structure of the dialogue: “In the face of this difficulty, Plato takes command of his dialogue” (p. 126). To close the fourth episode and to effect a transition, he has Crito retreat from the *aporia*. Similarly, “Plato does not permit Socrates to solve the regress because he wants to reserve that honor for the brother-pair” (p. 126n.44). For Chance, the break and regress are tools for Plato merely to position the eristics for a fall. We cannot forget, however, that Socrates would prefer to be searching for wisdom with an eager interlocutor rather than telling stories of searching for wisdom with an eager interlocutor to an auditor who does not appreciate what Socrates might be trying to achieve through uncharacteristic modes of discourse: public, epideictic wrangling and as a narrator, δῆγησις with a bit of μίμησις.

old story.¹² But Socrates reminds Crito that he has described himself and Cleinias in this situation before (ὄπερ ἔλεγον) when they had “twisted back again and found [themselves] at the beginning of the search” (291bc). More importantly, it is a formal feature of the Socratic elenchus to reevaluate past arguments in light of present conclusions. This trouble is not precisely the same old story because it highlights the self-reflexive nature of philosophical discourse—an understanding which continuously escapes the eristic sophists and Crito—and tests a person’s commitment to the pursuit of wisdom. But Crito has not recognized the philosophical merit of returning to the beginning of the investigation with new insight. He has been an unphilosophical auditor. He also fails to acknowledge that he has momentarily had a share in the dialogue and trouble. He fails the test when he judges the dialogue worthless and considers it a problem which belonged entirely to Socrates and Crito in the narrative. The narrative had temporarily become a dialogue between Socrates and Crito, with the role of Cleinias having been assigned to Crito, but now that Crito has given up the dialogue reverts to back to the intradiegetic narrative.

In this brief transition, Socrates now appears to have fallen into trouble all by himself. When he reports that he called upon the Dioscuri for help (and makes explicit that he and the boy are in trouble—ἡμᾶς, ἐμέ τε καὶ τὸ μειράκιον), he brings the metalepsis to a close, restores order to the narrative boundaries, and lets Crito off the hook.

When the intradiegetic and extradiegetic levels temporarily intersect and Crito is made part of the collaborative search for wisdom, the trouble which arises in the arguments evinces a serious problem for protreptic—a problem perhaps second only to the serious challenge of securing an oath.¹³ The new convert is sworn to find a solution to this problem, to philosophize, to search for that knowledge by which one “could well pass the remainder of life” (ἄν καλῶς τὸν ἐπιλοιπον βίον διέλθοιμεν, 293a). But the arguments end in confusion about the nature of the thing sought: The art

12. On the scholiast’s understanding of ὁ Διὸς Κόρινθος, see Allen, Burnet, & Parker (1938), and Pindar, *Nem.* 7: ταῦτὰ δὲ τρις τετράκι τ’ ἀμπολεῖν / ἀπορία τελέθει, τέκνοισιν ἄτε μαψυλάκας “Διὸς Κόρινθος” (104–105). When the Megarians revolted, the Corinthians repeatedly appealed to the authority of ὁ Διὸς Κόρινθος, but in vain. Saying it over and over again will get one nowhere.

13. This is the entire point of the *Clitophon*: initiates have made an oath to philosophize, but struggle with the next step. What precisely is the knowledge they have sworn to attend to, and how does one acquire it? We take these questions up in Chapter 5, *Clitophon* and after the Protreptic Sting.

of kingship must produce something (292a), and that something must be knowledge because its product must be good and nothing but knowledge is good (292b). In citizens, it produces no other kind of knowledge but itself. By this knowledge, we make (ποιήσομεν) other men good, and they make others so, and these again others. But again, good in what way or at what? The confusion here lies primarily in the understanding of the *ἔργον* of this supreme knowledge: is it a product, function, or entirely intransitive activity?¹⁴ What does it do? At the start, Socrates challenges his eristic opponents to “make a man good” (*ἀγαθὸν ποιῆσαι ἄνδρα*, 274d), and in this later episode, Socrates, Cleinias, and Crito are in search of that art and knowledge which is the “cause of right conduct [*αἰτία τοῦ ὀρθῶς πράττειν*] . . . [that is, a wisdom that,] seated alone at the helm of the city, steering the whole, commanding the whole, makes the whole useful [*πάντα χρήσιμα ποιεῖν*]” (291d). But how precisely this knowledge makes people good and right and useful remains unclear. This knowledge makes citizens good, and they in turn make others good. But how does this goodness relate to the products, functions, and activities of the other arts and knowledge which this supreme knowledge commands? How does the knowledge which philosophical protreptic targets relate to practical affairs? Clearly, there is something different about this kind of knowledge which Cleinias has made a pledge to pursue to the extent that he is able.

4.2 *Isocratean Apotreptic and Private Program* (304c–305b)

After Socrates has rounded off his narrative, he renews his appeal to Crito to join him in taking lessons (*συμποιτήσεις*, 304b) from the sophists who will teach for a fee regardless of character or age a kind of wisdom—their own brand of wisdom (*τὴν σφετέραν σοφίαν*)—which will not preclude money-making (304c). They possess an accessible and very accommodating (*εὐπετῶς*) kind of wisdom; it will not upset the success of any respectable citizen who is able and willing to pay. Crito responds that he loves

14. On searching for second-order arts among first-order arts and their first-order products, see Sprague (1976, pp. 48–56). This knowledge may be akin to the *ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστήμης* of the *Charmides*, but it is, for Sprague, in the *Euthydemus* and *Lysis* that Plato considers more thoroughly the nature of genuine second-order arts through *ἴνως* (of what)-words, regresses, reflexivity, and a rhetoric of uselessness. This art of kingship stands above the arts of the sophist, orator, general, and statesman because its *ἔργον* is that most useful product of good men. Cf. Nightingale (2004) on the debate of utilities of philosophical knowledge.

listening (φιλήκοος) and would be pleased to learn (ἡδέως ἄν τι μαθήνοίμι), but what it is exactly that he would be pleased to learn is unclear. He states plainly that there are two kinds of people—those who are like Euthydemus (τῶν . . . ὁμοίων Εὐθυδήμου) and those for whom it is “more pleasing [ἡδίων] to be refuted than it is to refute with such arguments” (304d), echoing the apotretic assessment Socrates made at the intradiegetic level (303d). Crito places himself in the second camp and, following the lead of a critic who approached him afterwards, he admonishes (νουθετεῖν) Socrates for conversing with and perhaps being in many ways indistinguishable from the shameful sophists. Crito will assume the roles of a bystander to and critic of the contest in a brief intradiegetic foray of his own in order to explain what he finds so disgraceful and unpleasant about the activities of Euthydemus and his ilk. It becomes clear that Crito would be happy to learn an activity or business other than the public demonstrations of the eristic sophists, but he remains muddled about the alternatives because he has been unable to make clear distinctions between objectives and methods. He has a sense that to admonish Socrates for associating with the sophists in public, or perhaps even to admonish Socrates at all, is laughable (γελοῖον, 304d). But there does seem to be something correct (ὀρθῶς, 305b) in the Isocratean bystander’s critique.

Crito slips into the roles of a critic through a narrative which he delivers (ἀπαγγεῖλαι) to Socrates in an effort to express his own misgivings and offer a stronger, more partisan view. The Isocratean critic is not named, and a good deal of ink has been spilled trying to deprive him of his anonymity.¹⁵ While it is important to understand the function of this unnamed figure within the dialogue itself,¹⁶ it is also important to note that this figure provides a context for the intradiegetic drama—a context which suggests the larger sociopolitical role of contests such as this. The critic offers a window onto the sociopolitical context for protretic spectacle. While the unnamed critic speaks through Crito’s narrative at an intradiegetic level, he speaks as a critic of the entire contest which the synopsis of the extradiegetic

15. For a survey of this literature, see Chance (1992, p. 200n.14). Scholars have variously argued for Lysias, Antiphon, Polycrates, Thrasymachus, and most persuasively of all, Isocrates (Field, 1930/2012; Grote, 1865; Shorey, 1933; Thompson, 1868). For a discussion of commonplaces and conventions in intellectual slander, see Owen (1983).

16. Wilamowitz-Moellendorf (1959, Vol. 2, pp. 165–167) and Friedländer (1958, Vol. 2, p. 194) preserve some of the anonymity and argue for, at most, a *type* of critic who serves a function within the dialogue itself (cf. Chance, 1992, p. 200).

Socrates provides. He offers a commentary on, context for, and interpretation of the events which Socrates represents (faithfully or not) in his narrative. Crito listens to Socrates's narrative of events already conditioned by a critical (and, we learn, persuasive) assessment. Instead of appearing in person as an interlocutor with Socrates and Crito, Plato has the critic appear and promptly disappear in a way that is also convenient. The critic offers an apotreptic of the dramatic spectacle without being there on hand. When Crito finishes his report, Socrates is free to present a parody of this Isocratean who thinks himself very wise (ἀνὴρ οἰόμενος πάνυ εἶναι σοφός, 304d), that is, who is known for celebrating and advertising his own wisdom. Socrates is also free, at the same time, to add his apotreptic of this Isocratean protreptic in the critic's absence. While this critic remains unnamed in the dialogue, there is only one critic available to us who with such tremendous vanity regularly and so outspokenly promotes his own rhetorical and political brand of philosophy as *the* philosophy in a field of competing disciplines.

The attitudes expressed in this small part of the dialogue and the details which Socrates provides about the unnamed critic echo a complex set of attitudes which Isocrates expressed throughout his long career as a “philosophical” writer and advisor. Before we examine the function of this critic within the dialogue, I want to argue that Plato wanted his reader to have clearly in mind a particular contemporary rival, not merely a *type* of opposition. Crito makes a point of directly quoting the critic and drawing attention to his style; when asked what it was that the wise men displayed in action, he reports, “Merely the sort of stuff, [the critic] said, that you might hear such people always babbling about [ληρούντων] and making an inconsequent ado about matters of no consequence [περι οὐδενὸς ἀξίων ἀναξίαν σπουδὴν ποιουμένων] (in some such parlance he expressed himself)” (οὕτωςι γὰρ πως καὶ εἶπεν τοῖς ὀνόμασιν, 304e). Here Crito draws attention to an Isocratean style. Thompson (1868) recognizes this in the last clause: “a false antithesis . . . the smoothness of the rhythm, and the frequent alliteration naturally suggest Isocrates.”¹⁷ Moreover, when Socrates asks if the critic belongs to “that clever sort who competes in courtrooms—some orator, or to that sort who send those orators into battle [εἰσπεμπόντων]—a composer of speeches [ποιητῆς τῶν λόγων] by which these orators compete,” Crito does not hesitate at all to identify him as one who “by Zeus,

17. Thompson (1868, p. 181).

is reputed to profess knowledge [ἐπαίειν αὐτόν φασι . . . νῆ τὸν Δία] about the business [of the contests of the courts] and to be a clever person who composes clever speeches” (305bc).¹⁸ The critic is not merely a type, nor merely one of those who train others for discursive battles, nor just any composer of speeches. He is recognizable given his reputation for being involved in these battles *always* from a distance: “For sure, not at all an orator,” Crito says, “I don’t think he has ever appeared in court.” This critic is known for hanging around contests, marshaling others to fight with his tactics, but never getting directly involved. At all times, he remains outside the border of live discursive combat. He shrewdly surveys the battlefield, arming others with his own writing and rhetoric. Socrates surveys this theater of discursive combat from a distance too when he narrates the contest of protreptics at the extradiegetic level. However, in addition to participating in the live, public contest and feeling compelled while in the fray to call on reinforcements to face the danger *with* him, Socrates also characterizes different protreptic discourses for apotreptic and protreptic effects in the live, albeit private, discussion in the extradiegetic level.¹⁹ Socrates hopes to turn Crito to the pursuit of wisdom not with writing but with a provocative narrative and mimetic performance.

Crito’s imitative portrayal of the Isocratean character and adoption of Isocratean argument suggests a great deal about the critic’s character, business, and protreptic methods. Many clues are stacked up even in the introduction (304d):

Of those leaving your discussion, you know that one approached me as I was taking a walk [προσελθὼν τίς μοι περιπατοῦντι]—a man who thinks himself very wise [πάνυ εἶναι σοφός], one of those who are so clever [δεινῶν] at arguments in the law courts—and said, Crito, you are not an auditor [ἄκροᾶ] of these wise men [τῶνδε τῶν σοφῶν], are you?—No, by god, I said. I was not able, though I was standing near, to hear what was happening below [κατακούειν] because of the

18. On the ineffectiveness of the ποιητῆς λόγων, recall Alcidas, *Soph.* 34.

19. We have seen already that Cleinias relieved Socrates of a long and inappropriate inquiry (282c). Socrates would also have called on his own Iolaus if it did not seem to him that he “would do more harm than good” (πλέον ἂν θάτερον ποιήσειεν, 297d). Hawtrey (1981) argues that, while some scholars believe Ctesippus to be his Iolaus, the use of optatives in this case helps “to clear Socrates from the charge of ingratitude” and makes the case rather that “no one present is referred to” (p. 159). Of course, whatever Socrates meant by it, Ctesippus quickly jumps into the fray and Socrates’s place, perhaps spurred on by his mythical allusion.

crowd.—Oh, but it was something worth [ἄξιόν] hearing, he said.—
What was it? I asked.

We have already brought attention to aspects of this introduction—the high self-regard, the profession of forensic speech-writing. But we see that in the same space of this brief introduction, the critic is also identified as a meddlesome, decidedly un-Platonic, and rather sarcastic recruiting officer. Crito had been walking about when he was approached by the critic, just as he had previously approached (προσελθὼν) the crowd in the hope of listening (271a). The approach is an important part of protreptic discourse. Socrates conspicuously does not make an approach in this dialogue. Although the dialogue appears to begin *in medias res*, Crito asks the same questions which he initially had for the critic only after being accosted himself. His encounter with the critic compels him to make an approach and seek clarification.²⁰ In the *apoduterion*, after the sophists and their followers walk around (περιεληλυθότε), it is Cleinias who approaches Socrates straightaway (ἄντικρυς), and the sophists who circumspectly approach Cleinias (273ab). The Isocratean, however, targets people whom he knows to have been in attendance at the protreptic contest, stragglers who perhaps seem estranged by a spectacle (cf. τῶνδε τῶν σοφῶν). Crito left because he could not hear, but we learn, after he hears the reperformance of the contest from Socrates, that as much as he loves listening to “philosophical” dialogue, he is indeed repulsed by the idea of participating. The critic makes his approach with the hope of taking advantage of this sense of shame. He also approaches as something of a paradox, at least as Socrates surely would see it, and perhaps also Crito, who reports that he was a man who considers himself σοφός but is δεινός—that is, merely armed with practical skills which others will put into practice. Socrates has great fun with the σοφός-δεινός opposition in this dialogue and others.²¹ The critic clearly claims expert knowledge about what sorts of discourse are, in fact, worth hearing; this public dialogue and “philosophical” business are decidedly “worthless and ridiculous” (305a). The critic’s sarcasm—“Oh, but it was something worth [ἄξιόν] hearing”—is an apotreptic tool for further dissuading the disaffected from live, intellectual contests. And most

20. Chance (1992) writes, “We should imagine that after a nights [sic] sleep, Crito awoke and went searching for Socrates to question him about what took place in the Lyceum” (p. 201n.16).

21. Cf. *Phdr.* 245c; *Th.* 164d.

importantly, the critic (particularly if we are to identify him as an Isocratean) uses ἀκροᾷ to describe the activity of being in regular attendance as an auditing student at such gatherings.²² Crito misses the point when he responds that he was unable to hear on this occasion because of the crowd.²³ As we shall see in the next part, Isocrates has a great deal to say about proper and improper auditing of worthwhile and worthless philosophical disciplines.

The Isocratean's brief apotroptic continues with more of this rhetoric of worth and usefulness. After the critic describes not only this particular contest but the regular discipline as “babbling about” and “making an inconsequent ado about matters of no consequence” (περὶ οὐδενὸς ἀξίων ἀναξίαν σπουδὴν ποιουμένων), Crito argues that the business of philosophy is nevertheless something that is worth a gentleman's time, something elegant and accomplished: Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἔφην, χαρίεν γέ τι πράγμα ἐστὶν ἡ φιλοσοφία (304e).²⁴ The Isocratean refuses to believe that something so worthless and shameful can be a delight to a man of taste (304e–305a):

Worthwhile [χαρίεν] how, my unbelievable friend? It is worthless [οὐδενὸς μὲν οὖν ἄξιον], and if you had been present just now, I think you would have been especially ashamed [αἰσχυνθῆναι] for your friend: he was so indecent [ἄτοπος], willing to give himself over to those men who don't care at all [οὐδὲν μέλει] about what they say, but fasten on any phrase. These, as I just said, are in the vanguard of “the wisest men” of our day [ἐν τοῖς κράτιστοῖ εἰσι τῶν νῦν].

The critic tries to turn Crito away from all of the practices of this public contest: sophistic demonstration, an indecent willingness to get involved, presumably even the rejoinders of the Socratic παράδειγμα. It is all the same to him—ungentlemanly, worthless, shameful, and indecent.²⁵ These

22. Apart from the forensic uses of the word, cf. uses of ἀκροάομαι in Xenophon (*Symp.* 3.6) and Isocrates (*Panath.* 86.1, 271.4). We will examine in great detail the Isocratean practice of auditing, reading, and revising in Part 2. Recall that those who conventionally “practice” philosophy later in life from the sidelines (πάρρηγον) of public dialogue think they are doing well to be willing to attend as auditors (ἀκροαταί) when others are doing philosophy (*Resp.* 6.497e–498b).

23. Crito answers the present ἀκροᾷ with a past οἴος τ' ἢ κατακούειν: “Are you not an auditor?” “No, I could not hear.”

24. On the entertainment value of sophistic demonstration, see Gagarin (2001).

25. In the *Republic*, Socrates will call the paid sophists “indecent teachers” (ἄτοπος . . . παιδευτήης) for their habit of teaching nothing other than “the convictions that the majority

so-called “wisest men” indiscriminately grab hold of any speech and do not have any regard (οὐδὲν μέλει) for their own discourses—they consume and produce speech without any sense of style. The balanced assonance of the earlier statement—these men are “about things of no worth and are worthlessly serious”—emphasizes the value of literary style to the Isocratean. These graceless men babble, and thus could not possibly know anything about those things which they claim to teach and which men of true culture, taste, and literary style value. They are only “most wise” in that kind of speaking (νῦν σοφώτατοί εἰσι τῶν περὶ τοὺς τοιοῦτους λόγους, 304E) which men of taste should consider indecent and avoid using, particularly in public, that is, among other men of taste. The Isocratean appeals to Crito’s tastes; in turn, Crito reports the apotrepitic in an effort to appeal to Socrates’s tastes. While Crito does not find fault with the business of philosophy, presumably even with its language, style, and methods (at least as he has just heard them performed, narrated, characterized, and framed by Socrates), he does find something distasteful about doing this in public. Even after Socrates’s apotrepitic of the Isocratean apotrepitic, Crito argues, “You must really admit that the account of men [like this critic] has some plausibility” (ἔχει τινὰ εὐπρέπειαν, 305E). The Isocratean has successfully persuaded him of the tastelessness of publicly engaging in pseudophilosophical contests, but this apotrepitic has not provided Crito with a clear sense of what exactly it is that one should avoid. Although something on the surface of what the critic said seems right, Crito is unable to determine what it is about pursuing this activity in public that seems so shameful. It seems that he is still unable to dissociate the methods and objectives of the Socratic παράδειγμα from those of the eristic demonstrations and to recognize the grand scope of the Socratic protrepitic which necessitates collaboration with people of all ages and in a variety of circumstances, public

express [τὰ τῶν πολλῶν δόγματα] when they are gathered together. Indeed, these are precisely what the sophists call wisdom. It’s as if someone were learning the moods and appetites of a huge, strong beast that he’s rearing . . . he calls this knack wisdom, gathers his information together as if it were a craft and turns to teaching [ἐπὶ διδασκαλίαν τρέπειτο]. In truth, he knows nothing about which of these convictions is fine or shameful, good or bad, just or unjust, but he applies all these names in accordance with how the beast reacts—calling what it enjoys good and what angers it bad. He has no other account to give these terms” (*Resp.* 6.493a–c). Those who are ἄτοπος and tasteless, in this case, are those who thoughtlessly feed brute, conventional tastes, even if beasts should not be reared within the state (*Ar. Ra.* 1431). Interestingly, these tasteless teachers rear the beast by turning themselves to teaching. Rather than turning anyone else, they are turned by the convictions of others. Rather than performing protrepitic, they merely reinforce the conventional convictions they have gathered.

or private, adversarial or collaborative, in order to disengage individuals from conventional or new but competing values and systems of education.

4.3 *Socrates's Apotreptic of the Apotreptic* (305b–307c)

A good deal of the face-off between Socrates and the Isocratean is analogous to the public contest of protreptics in the *apoduterion*. The Isocratean's refusal to engage in public competition necessitates that he be "present" only intradiegetically in the extradiegetic level. But, in this scene, protreptics will follow one another separated by apotreptic interludes just as they did in the dramatic contest. Socrates will once again "improvise" a response. Socrates and the Isocratean critic also engage in the rhetoric of worth and usefulness. And what is more, in this Platonic-Isocratean confrontation, the implicit debate between Socrates and the eristics over which activity better constitutes the activity of "philosophy" is made far more explicit. Crito presents the Isocratean apotreptic which already implicitly suggests (and protrepticizes him toward) a program of private rhetorical training. Nevertheless, Socrates aims to make the protreptic explicit, albeit in an unflattering and apotreptic way. Socrates will make Crito produce an equally *ἄτοπος* or, as he says here, strange (*θαυμάσιοι*, cf. *Grg.* 496a) protreptic on behalf of the critic by asking leading questions: "Did he belong to that clever sort who competes in courtrooms—some orator, or to that sort who send those orators into battle [*εἰσπεμπόντων*]—a composer of speeches [*ποιητῆς τῶν λόγων*] by which these orators compete?" (305b). Crito answers that he is a composer of speeches which he himself does not use. He professes knowledge (*ἐπαῖεν*) about the business (*πράγματος*) of forensic competition (305c). But rather than engage in it himself, his business is to arm others for oratory, and not through public demonstration, but by the power of his compositions (*συντιθέναι*). While Socrates introduced his own protreptic *παράδειγμα* to the eristic sophists as an earnest improvisation (*τολμήσω ἀπαντοσχεδιάσαι*) which may seem unartful (*ιδιωτικῶς*) and laughable (278de), he improvisationally introduces the activities of the critic as expert but decidedly insincere and indecent. He delivers his leading questions after confessing that he does not yet know what he shall say in response to the critic's apotreptic (*ἀτὰρ οὕτω οἶδα ὅ τι μέλλω εἶρεῖν*, 305b). He has not heard the critic's protreptic yet. His improvisational interlude tries to locate a definitive target from which he can dissuade Crito. Once Crito

has decided that the Isocratean alternative is the banausic trade of mere speech-writing, Socrates understands (*μανθάνω*) the kind of apotreptic he must deliver in return. This is an apotreptic which, in part, echoes the distinction made protreptically in the second Socratic demonstration between the arts of production and use (289a–290a).²⁶ It turns out that the protreptic toward the Socratic way of doing business was effectively *dissuading* people in the audience from engaging in the activities of unidentified challengers also in attendance. The Isocratean delivers his apotreptic in response to implicit apotreptic functions found in the Socratic protreptic.

Crito has repeatedly failed to demonstrate that he has engaged with, grasped, or assimilated any of the Socratic performance in a way that has influenced his concerns (*ἐπιμέλεια*), and yet he is able to quote the Isocratean critic verbatim. And he even feels compelled to admonish his friend for pursuing an activity in certain ways. He finds the Isocratean apotreptic plausible in some key ways. Socrates fastens on his rival's rhetoric of taste and usefulness as the primary culprit, and devises an apotreptic to invert and outstrip this language. He begins by bringing into the contest another teacher of rhetoric who nevertheless emphasized the correct use of words. According to Socrates, this rival belongs to the sort of people whom Prodicus describes as living in the land between philosophy and politics (*μεθόρια φιλοσόφου τε ἀνδρὸς καὶ πολιτικοῦ*). Each of these domains includes respective risks and competitive struggles (*κινδύνων καὶ ἀγώνων*), but the Isocratean remains apart (*ἐκτός*) from all of these because he participates (*μετέχειν*) in each domain only as much as he needs (*ὅσον ἔδει*) in his efforts to gather the fruits of wisdom (*καρποῦσθαι τὴν σοφίαν*, 305e). People like the Isocratean regard this limited participation as a moderate (*μετρίως*, 305d) and most wise position. The implication is that participating either in philosophy or in politics without some restraint and good sense prevents those who most require wisdom for their own welfare and the welfare of the state from easily grasping it. Engaging in philosophy or politics excessively makes one unfit and useless for political

26. Crito's description prompts Socrates to confess that he was just going to talk about speech-writers (*περὶ τούτων καὶ αὐτὸς νῦν δὴ ἐμέλλον λέγειν*, 305c). Hawtrey (1981) argues that when Socrates asked his questions, he was already "reasonably sure, but not quite certain . . . who the critic was, or at least to what category he belonged" (p. 192). A richer interpretation, however, would be to say that Socrates knows full well who the critic is but wants Crito to recognize the pertinence of arguments which he has just witnessed. Socrates again and again prompts Crito to be more than *φιλήκοος*. And yet, not only does Crito not recall the relevant parts of the intradiegetic performance, but he remains convinced that something of the critic's assessment is plausible.

action. Occupying the middle ground and remaining outside the risks and contests of philosophy and politics make one more fit for these endeavors; they can defeat their opponents who dwell within both realms without fully participating in either (305cd):

They suppose [οἴονται] that they are the wisest of all men, and, in addition to being so, that they seem so to a great many people, so that they suppose that none but those busy with philosophy are an impediment to their universal renown. They believe [ήγησονται] that, if they can eclipse the latter in reputation [εις δόξαν καταστήσωσι] by making them appear worthless [μηδενός δοκεῖν ἀξιους εἶναι], then according to everyone, they will carry away without dispute or further delay [ἀναμφισβητήτως] the prize of victory for first place in wisdom [τὰ νικητήρια εις δόξαν οἴσεσθαι σοφίας πέρι]. For they consider themselves to be in truth the wisest, but find that, when caught in private conversation [ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἰδίοις λόγοις], they are cut off short by those about Euthydemus [ὑπὸ τῶν ἀμφὶ Εὐθύδημον κολούεσθαι].

Reputation is built upon appearances, and it is in a game of apparent worth that the critic tries to defeat his rivals. The Isocratean believes he is wisest, believes he seems so to most everyone else, and attempts to secure this renown by *appearing* to surpass those who “immoderately” pursue such knowledge by ridiculously enduring the dangers and contests entirely within their respective realms. They claim the prize of wisdom by criticizing and reducing the worth of their opponents behind their backs. However, the moment that these critics are forced to step foot into the domain of philosophy and engage face-to-face with their rivals, all of the reputations which they have cultivated behind the scenes are shattered. Socrates goes so far as to suggest that even private conversation with one of those devoted spectators who surround Euthydemus might be enough to silence the Isocratean. Of course, hidden in this part of the apotrepitic is an admonishment of Crito for reporting the critic’s rebuke when he ought to have himself recognized and cut short the Isocratean apotrepitic. After all, the Isocratean was “in attendance” at the competition of the sophists and all of the other characters in the contest.²⁷

27. A further implication of the Socratic apotrepitic of the Isocratean apotrepitic is that the domains of philosophy and politics are entirely separated by some distance. The Isocratean is inferior to both domains because he remains in the distance between them. If both domains are good (as, he argues, they surely are), one must choose to be in one in order to

Once Socrates has turned Crito away from the Isocratean apotreptic, Crito confesses that it remains difficult for him to determine the right protreptic path for his sons, but he does not receive the readymade answer—that plausible protreptic discourse—which he is seeking (306e–307a):

When I examine some one of those who profess to educate people, I am struck with panic [ἐκπέπληγμαι], and feel that each one of them, upon examination [σκοποῦντι], is utterly unsuitable [ἀλλόκοτος], if I may be honest with you. So I cannot see how I shall protrepticize the boy to philosophy.

Socrates has dispelled the plausibility (εὐπρέπειαν) of the Isocratean critic, and has made the eristic methods and objectives laughable and shameful through artful characterization and analysis. Crito believes that this examination has revealed no plausible, suitable, or tasteful alternative. If we are charitable, we might argue that his inability to see a Socratic alternative is a result of the open-ended and occasional nature of Socratic protreptic, something Clitophon addresses with great frustration. Although Socrates has not been able to get Crito to engage properly with the dramatic narrative, we learn that Crito is already often in doubt (ἐν ἀπορίᾳ) about what to do with his sons, particularly when he is in Socrates's company (ὅταν σοὶ ξυγγένωμαι, 306d). But something in this encounter makes him more lost and panicked than ever. On the heels of Socrates's apotreptic of the Isocratean apotreptic, Socrates provides a protreptic, but an unusual protreptic (307ac):

In every practice [ἐπιτηδεύματι] there are many who are bad and worthless, while the earnest are few and worth anything . . . Do not do what is not necessary, Crito, but let those who practice philosophy have their tastes, whether they are useful or useless; and when you have tested the business itself well and truly [αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα

be good in respect of the object for which either statesmanship or philosophy is important (306c). Of course, Socrates will suggest elsewhere in passages relevant to the *Euthydemus* that the activity of philosophy is essential to good statesmanship. In the *Republic*, Socrates argues against the critics of philosophy that the “uselessness” of the philosopher is only an apparent uselessness, which should be blamed on the “ignorant,” “who do not know how to put him to use” (489b). When “those who are called useless stargazers” are recognized as “the true steersmen” (489c), then philosophy might even create the ideal polis. As long as one vigilantly pursues philosophy, and commits to and engages with it in public, then one may also find political fitness.

βασανίσας καλῶς τε καὶ εὖ], if it seems to you to be useless, turn everyone away from it, not only your sons. But if it seems to you to be such as I think it is, courageously pursue and practice it [θαρρῶν δίωκε καὶ ἄσκει], both, as they say, you and yours.

The contest of protreptics ends with a turning toward a quest for and the examination of protreptic. Only after thoroughly testing the business of philosophy and finding it to be useless can one engage in the apotreptic of the whole activity. But as long as it seems otherwise, one must pursue and practice it, that is, continue to examine the protreptic discourse of others in action.

Creating Consumers and Consensus in the Protagoras

NOW WE WILL turn briefly to another narratively complex dialogue that once again shows Socrates attempting to convert multiple audiences by characterizing, dramatizing, and ventriloquizing his competitors. Only in the *Protagoras*, Plato's Socrates takes great pains to present the professional claims, methodologies, and personalities of multiple rivaling sophists in a more private venue than the gymnasium: the home of the wealthiest man and greatest benefactor of higher learning in Greece. Additionally, the contest between rivals takes place not among potential students but organized factions of attentive converts already devoted to Protagoras, Hippias, Prodicus, or Socrates. Ultimately, there are no free agents in sight. As such, Socrates's characterization of the rivalry focuses more on how consumers and converts in their turn become advocates and in this capacity contribute to the growing discourse of protreptic. The discourse of praise (*ἔπαινος*) now has a part to play in this emerging genre. Socrates reports to an anonymous friend—an *ἐπαινέτης* of conventional matters like Homer and beautiful boys as well as of the new sophistic displays of Protagoras—not only the events of this contest and the various efforts to mediate between the competitors, but also his own efforts to prepare a young and suggestible Hippocrates for the contest before it has begun.¹ Hippocrates is also already an ardent fan of Protagoras, ready

1. We find only a few direct addresses to the anonymous friend and the world in which Socrates is narrating, and these do not have consequences for the progress of the narrative: e.g., 316a3–5 and 335d1. Grote (1865) noted that the *Protagoras* presents “more frequent breaks and resumptions in the conversation, than any dialogue of Plato.” And it is in these

to bankrupt himself and his friends for his association, though he has yet to see him or hear him speak. Socrates attempts to insulate him from the spectacle by suggesting the possibility of a knowledgeable (ἐπιστήμων) consumer—a figure that foreshadows the culminating art of measurement that makes mere appearances lose their power (356c–357e). Finally, the most significant departure of the *Protagoras* from the contest and concerns of the *Euthydemus* is the recurring emphasis on collaboration in competition. Spectators and contestants alike insist on not breaking the meeting prematurely. The company exerts pressure rather to build consensus between differing methods, objectives, and beliefs. The push and pull of this collaboration highlight not only the differences between Protagorean speech and Socratic dialectic, but also the plausibility and seriousness of Protagoras’s claims and, more importantly, the kinship (however troubled) between two revered teachers of the New Learning.²

In what follows, I will examine: (1) the unique setting of the *Protagoras* and characterization of converts; (2) the preparation of Hippocrates for this setting and its potentially protreptic effect on the extradiegetic anonymous spectator—both cheerleaders for Protagoras; and (3) the kinship among rivals who need one another in order to create the new enterprise of higher learning. Ultimately, the *Protagoras* provides fewer insights into the characterization of recruiters and recruits, and more into the worlds of celebrity and partisan, interdisciplinary conflict, both of which arise as a result of protreptic. The skirmishes in the portico of Callias’s house and the preparations for entering that private space highlight professional differences among professionals.

5.1 *Staging a Contest among Converts*

I have just examined the elaborate ways in which the dramatic action of the *Euthydemus* is staged, first by Crito, who makes his way toward the spectacle but is unable to hear and can only discern the relative appearances

spaces where we find Socrates urging toward and against particular paths of thought and interpretation. Denyer (2008) thus describes a mere *τοῦτοῦ* as an effort on Socrates’s part to “direct his anonymous companions’ attention” in the framing conversation, and on Plato’s part “to mark a break in the flow of conversation narrated by a break in the flow of narrative” (335d2n). Denyer underscores this interruption of the inner conversation with a note on how Socrates again reminds his audience (and Plato, his readers) of themselves (339e4n).

2. See Woodruff (2010).

of four players on stage; then by Socrates, who stages spectacles among spectacles before the protreptics proper have begun. I described Socrates's efforts in the prologue of the dialogue as preparatory and "peristrophic." His efforts turn the attention of Crito (and the reader) in every direction at once in order to draw attention to concerted work that turns and focuses attention in one direction. In the gymnasium of the *Euthydemus*, through these dramatic stagings, we encounter many disciples (μαθηταί) of the eristic duo. The μαθηταί move like a chorus at a sign from their director (276b6–7). But we also encounter the many lovers of Cleinias. Both groups of admirers eventually situate themselves wherever they can, and mingle indiscriminately. At the edge of this great crowd, we also find Crito, who remains undecided about teachers for his sons even after Socrates's dramatization. And we encounter another educator who attended the discussion but with the goal of picking off stragglers for his own brand of wisdom. In other words, many in attendance have made no commitments to professional intellectuals. The young among them presumably undertake the conventional, physical training and submit to the moral supervision of formidable gymnasiarchs and specialists at the Lyceum. But they are not yet μαθηταί. The eristic duo is there with the express purpose of attracting new students: "to give a demonstration, and to teach, if anyone wants to learn" (274a10–b1). And Socrates is quick to identify their target audience both broadly (274b–d) and narrowly by singling out Cleinias: "persuade this young man here ὡς χρὴ φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, and you will satisfy me and all the present company" (275a5–7). As I have argued, in this context, the protreptic demonstrations are designed to attract initiates: the demonstrations of the eristic duo, to attract from among the uninitiated spectators at the Lyceum, and the protreptic παράδειγμα and larger narration of Socrates, to attract the extradiegetic Crito.

In the *Protagoras*, however, in the house of Callias, Socrates finds only attentive audiences, advanced initiates, and spellbound followers. Pausanias, Agathon, the two Adeimantuses, and others are gathered inside a storage room, seated on couches near the all-knowing and divine Prodicus, who is still in bed and bundled for their conversation (διελέγοντο, 315e5–6). Eryximachus, Phaedrus, Andron, a number of Elians, and other foreigners are seated on benches round an enthroned Hippias with questions on physics and "something or other astronomical about the things up above" (τῶν μετεώρων ἀστρονομικὰ ἄττα, 315c5–6)—topics or τέχναι from which, Protagoras says, young men flee in youth but which sophists like Hippias inflict on them against their will (318e). Protagoras

suggests that no one willingly wishes to learn about these matters (318e5), and yet here Hippias's associates are the ones to propose such topics, and he responds to each point by point. In fact, Hippias explains on another occasion his habit of "offering to speak about anything one wishes that he has prepared for display, and to answer any questions anyone wishes" (*Hp. mi.* 363d), that is, to deliver set-pieces and to speak extemporaneously on demand. If there is any compulsion, it comes from *spectators* to whom Hippias submits and whom, he says, he himself should hardly flee given his professional claim. These questions that here seem to Socrates unintelligible—*ἀστρονομικὰ ἄττα*—and elsewhere irrelevant, come from those assembled to hear him speak.³

In setting the scene Socrates reserves the greatest devotion for the followers of the enchanting Protagoras. When he and Hippocrates find him, he is walking about the portico (*ἐν τῷ προστώῳ περιπατοῦντα*) and two groups are walking about with him in lines (*ἐξῆς δ' αὐτῷ συμπεριεπάτουν*, 314e).⁴ Before we hear anything about their motivations, we see his followers reproducing his movement (*συμπεριπατέω*) in order—each from whoever is in front. A follower in one group, Antimoerus of Mende, Socrates explains, shines (*εὐδοκίμει*) the most of Protagoras's students and "is studying for professional purposes to become a sophist" (*ἐπι τέχνῃ μανθάνει, ὡς σοφιστῆς ἐσόμενος*, 315a4–5)—a motivation explicitly distinguished earlier from pursuing a "general education fitting a gentleman" (*ἐπι παιδείᾳ, ὡς τὸν ιδιώτην καὶ τὸν ἐλεύθερον πρέπει*, 312b3–4). We encounter the groups that surround Protagoras as mimes. Some cannot even make out what their prototype is saying: *ἐπακούοντες τῶν λεγομένων*. His words are unintelligible, perhaps due to the distance and commotion in these long lines, and yet the followers are not dissuaded from tracking his movements (315a5–7). Protagoras leads them, Socrates says, from their cities through which he travels by enchanting them with his voice like Orpheus (*κηλῶν τῇ φωνῇ*, 315a8). These foreigners follow his voice while under his spell (*κεκληγμένοι*, 315b1). His words are unintelligible to them, and they themselves follow

3. On the impracticalities and relative insignificance of the study of astronomical and natural phenomena, see e.g., *Ap.* 26d–e, *Tht.* 173e–174b, *Phdr.* 229d–230a.

4. Socrates and Hippocrates themselves had been similarly strolling about (*περιμόντες*) before embarking for Callias's (311a), further contrasting the ways that Socrates productively passes time. He has an interlocutor; Protagoras has followers. See Section 5.4 on consensus building.

without intelligence.⁵ Socrates compares the whole throng to a chorus, the sight of which delights him as the followers carefully move apart to avoid obstructing their διδάσκαλος (315b3–4). Bodies in orderly motion make way for their prototype when he turns around (ἀναστρέφοι, 315b5). The sound of his voice, whether intelligible or not, directs their attention while his movement constitutes his παράδειγμα. His change in direction does not interrupt the mimetic performance: his listeners (ἐπήκοοι, though they cannot hear clearly) split into two in an orderly way (ἐν κόσμῳ περιεσχίζοντο), circle around (ἐν κύκλῳ περιμόντες) to his rear, and beautifully arrange themselves again (καθίσταντο κάλλιστα, 315b). Thus, his followers are not obstacles to one another; they are, as Denyer puts it, “systematically subordinated.”⁶ Each person occupies his proper place, even when the target around which the chorus organizes itself and from which the chorus takes its physical cues changes direction. Far from the chaotic, riotous scene in the *Euthydemus*, the followers of Protagoras move in a highly organized and attentive way—focused primarily on the movements of Protagoras *around* whom they move, secondarily on the movements of one another *with* whom they move.

The chaotic movements and motivations of the eristic duo and the various groups in attendance contrast with the orderly movements around Protagoras because the latter in this setting is not concerned with initiation.⁷ The eristic duo applied a double turn (διπλᾶ ἔστρεφε, *Euthyd.* 277c) to knock out Cleinias, and would never tire of “tripping up and overturning” (ὑποσκελίζων και ἀνατρέπων, 278b) and dancing around (χορεύετον περι) “with a view to subsequent initiation” (ὡς μετὰ τοῦτο τελούντε, 277e). While the followers of Protagoras move like a chorus around their διδάσκαλος, the eristic duo were themselves the dancers. Socrates did remark how the followers of Dionysodorus and Euthydemus at one point broke into a loud cry and laughter “like a chorus at a sign from their director” (ὥσπερ ὑπὸ διδασκάλου χορὸς ἀποσημήναντος, 276b6–7). But their riotous response was not orderly. Socrates described the setting as chaotic before the contest had even begun—for example, Socrates saw the audience seeing Ctesippus

5. On the Homeric allusions in the *Protagoras* that make Socrates both an Odysseus capable of resisting enchantment and a Hermes capable of counteracting the forces that lead others astray, see Segvic (2009).

6. Denyer (2008, p. 82).

7. Guthrie (1975) is mistaken when he identifies in the *Protagoras* “the competitive atmosphere of a *public* gathering of Sophists” (p. 235, my emphasis).

trying to see Cleinias seeing Socrates—and the initiates continued to clamor for the sportive leaps of their teachers while the lovers were quick to anger and threaten violence (283d). Moreover, the dancing sophists performed their sportive leaps, and tripped up and overturned Cleinias with a view to the subsequent initiation not of the boy, but (as Socrates made clear) of others spectating his humiliation. Cleinias lost his breath, was knocked out again (276cd), and was almost drowned by the application of the double turn in order that the sophists might demonstrate their skills for onlookers and exhort them. In the courtyard of Callias's house, however, we find groups of initiates attentively engaged with and systematically subordinated by their teachers. This kind of attention, no doubt from Socrates's perspective, leaves something to be desired: initiates move in an imitative way even when they cannot hear what the teacher is saying. But even Socrates's most devoted fans famously fall for his charms on other occasions rather than scrutinize the man and his ideas with dialectic, and they too join this spectacle, close on his heels at Callias's.⁸

Before Socrates disrupts the tranquil scene and baits Protagoras and the other sophists into a discussion about the benefits afforded their initiates, he and his entourage—Hippocrates, Alcibiades, and Critias—all move through the space freely and go themselves unnoticed while inspecting different things. There is no mad rush for uninitiated Hippocrates. Instead, Socrates and his group “passed a little time over certain things and examined them” (ἐτι σμίκερ' ἄττα διατρίψαντες καὶ ταῦτα διαθεασάμενοι, 316a). We do not hear what these things are. Perhaps Socrates and his friends observe more of the different sophistic camps—each like a tableau vivant from which, after all, nothing distinct can be heard either: Prodicus's booming voice blurs what is being said, the followers of Hippias ask something or other astronomical, and even members of Protagoras's group, as we have noted, cannot make out what their teacher says. So Socrates and his group continue to examine the spatial arrangements and relationships in these scenes of orderly motion and devotion. And Socrates and his group for a time form another camp from which we hear nothing in the narrative. Their examination is, in this brief prologue, already the third episode

8. Similarly, Alcibiades in the *Symposium* confesses to being struck out of his senses and possessed (ἐκπεπληγμένοι ἐσμὲν καὶ κατεχόμεθα, 215d). His reaction is physical—his heart starts racing and tears stream down his face—and yet inactive—he fears that his life might pass him by (καταγηράσω) as he sits captivated by Socrates (216a). This inactivity is juxtaposed with an alternate life pursuing politics—τὰ δ' Ἀθηναίων πράττω—which suggests the question: what is the activity of self-care, particularly for someone who is knocked senseless?

of Socrates and Hippocrates passing some time in discussion before engaging Protagoras: first, while strolling in the courtyard before dawn as Socrates examined Hippocrates's motivations and determination (*ἀποπειρώμενος τοῦ Ἱπποκράτους τῆς ῥώμης διεσκόπουν αὐτὸν*, 311b); then, in the doorway of Callias's, where they stood "discussing some point which had come up along the road and which [they] did not want to leave unsettled [*ἀτελής*] before entering" (314c); and now in the portico. These unreported conversations are significant for reasons we will consider shortly: namely, the preparation of young Hippocrates as a potential consumer of *μαθήματα*, and a solution to the impasse at which Socrates and Protagoras arrive at the abrupt end of the dialogue. But it is worth noting here the ease with which both a competitor and a free agent can navigate and examine this sophistic space without upsetting the orderly movements and focus of teachers and students alike.

The scene begins to shift to one of exhibition and competition once Socrates introduces himself and the young Hippocrates. Protagoras immediately asks, "Do you wish to converse (*διαλεχθῆναι*) with me alone or in the company of others?" (316b). After Socrates responds that it does not matter which, we learn quickly that Protagoras merely uses the question to introduce a set-piece on the nature of sophists and how he stands apart from his competitors. Whether alone or in the company of others does not matter to him either, much like the eristic questions that end in refutation no matter the answer (*Euthyd.* 275e). Socrates explains that Hippocrates believes he will stand a better chance of becoming a man of respect (*ἐλλόγιμος*) by associating (*συγγένοιτο*) with Protagoras (*Protag.* 316c). This time, Socrates asks Protagoras to decide whether their conversation should happen in private—*σὺ σκόπει*—and Protagoras responds with appreciation for his foresight, that is his Promethean power (*ὀρθῶς . . . προμηθῆ*). While the sentiment kicks off an important motif that reverberates through the whole dialogue, it makes little sense under the circumstances and thereby betrays Protagoras's intent: to deliver a rehearsed, formal, and shocking introduction of his profession, its history and objectives, and his excellence in the field.⁹ Though it is not dialogic, his speech is an apotrepic and protrepic of sorts in miniature. He begins by linking other public

9. On the other hand, the introduction of promethean qualities points to the artfulness of our storyteller, who begins to weave in motifs that will determine the dramatic and philosophical outcome. It seems that *this* dialogue never happened, at least not as gloriously as it is reported.

intellectuals and their trades with his own, and then condemns them all for adopting disguises (προσχήματα), and ineffectual disguises at that: their failure aroused hostility toward the trade of sophistry at large—a profession which he is here constructing.¹⁰ Without delay, Protagoras by way of introducing himself assembles a broad field of unlikely competitors, and then dismisses them as frauds and failures. They may have called themselves poets, healers, athletes, physicians, musicians, and teachers of these, but these trades were screens (ταῖς τέχναις ταύταις παραπετάσασιν ἐχρήσαντο, 316e); they were really educators of a different sort, and they failed both at disguising themselves and at accomplishing their actual objectives.¹¹ He rather admits of being a sophist and broad educator (παιδεύειν) of men, and to have been in the trade (ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ) for many years (317bc). This short speech constitutes a business card of sorts—his trade and profession, his collaborators, his expertise—all of which is slightly shocking and outrageous (Homer, Orpheus, Iccus, and Protagoras engaged in the same pursuit of liberal education!), potentially dangerous for the practitioner (the envy, ill-will, and treachery which the pursuit has historically aroused), and as we shall see avowedly damaging to conventional social structures.

While Protagoras calls the education of young people (παιδεύειν) a trade (τέχνη), and calls the very thing that young men receive by associating specifically with him a greater capacity in household and political affairs—which Socrates calls skill in citizenship (τὴν πολιτικὴν τέχνην)—the dialogue leaves unanswered the question of what a follower receives by association with technicians of education. Before embarking for Callias's, Hippocrates had blushed at something in the idea of associating, like Antimoerus, with sophists in order to become a sophist (312a). Socrates suggested that the source of his embarrassment was the motive of “learning by way of a trade to become a skilled technician” (ἐπι τέχνην ἔμαθες ὡς δημιουργὸς ἐσόμενος), rather than “learning by way of παιδεία what is appropriate to a private and free individual” (312b). Hippocrates gushed with some relief that the latter constitutes the μᾶθσις he hopes to have from Protagoras. He wishes

10. The notion of trade or τέχνη as disguise or show (πρόσχημα) takes on special significance given Socrates's previous observation of the sophistic camps, especially the camp surrounding Protagoras, as mimes and choral dancers.

11. Plutarch reports that Damon—under the guise of an athletic and music trainer (ἀλείπτης καὶ διδάσκαλος), from behind his lyre—taught Pericles political ambition and a love of tyranny, and was ostracized for these objectives (*Pericles* 4.1–2). Damon was apparently the pupil of Lamprokles who was the pupil of Agathokles (Schol. in *Plat. Alcib.* i. 387) whom Protagoras also has using music as a front (πρόσχημα, *Protag.* 316e); see Wallace (2004).

to become by association certainly not a *banausic* technician, but a gentleman and someone of esteem; these are to him entirely incompatible results.¹² And yet, Protagoras claims to practice a τέχνη and to deliver a τέχνη—the process of which he calls παιδεία. Hippocrates is prepared to bankrupt himself and his friends (310e1–2), and Protagoras asks that initiates give up much more: he “persuades” (πείθοντα) young men to abandon their accustomed associations and to associate rather with him for improvement (συνεῖναι ὡς βελτίους ἔσομένους, 316cd).¹³ But what is the other side of this transaction? What is the nature of the παιδεία, the improvements that the follower undergoes? What does a follower get after a protreptic has achieved its objectives? This portico is full of teachers and their followers. Can any one of them explain what is given in exchange for their money, their dissolution of conventional associations, and their adoption of a new family?

Protagoras’s response is, once again, both apotreptic and protreptic in one sense—he characterizes himself as doing one thing and his competitors as doing another, and only one of these is desirable. But we also see that he bypasses much of the typical talk of protreptic. It is not that his competitors advertise their wares one way and he another. He does not have to advertise at all. His competitors also do not advertise, but rather bully people into adopting their pursuits, and the pursuits themselves are also demeaning (318de):

If Hippocrates comes to me [παρ’ ἐμὲ ἀφικόμενος] he will not experience what he would if he associated [συγγενόμενος] with some other sophist. The others abuse young men, leading them back again against their will and casting them [ἄκοντας πάλιν αὐτῶν ἄγοντες ἐμβάλλουσιν] into τέχναι from which they have escaped [πεφευγότας], teaching them arithmetic, astronomy, geometry, and μουσική—and here he glanced at Hippias—“but if he comes to me he will learn only what he has come for [περὶ οὗ ἦκει]. What I teach is sound judgment [εὐβουλία], both in domestic matters—how best to manage one’s household—and in public affairs—how to be most capable in political debate and action.

12. On the rhetoric of *banausia*, see Nightingale (2004, pp. 125–127).

13. Socrates claims that if Hippocrates is willing both to pay the price in silver and to win him over (ἀν αὐτῷ διδῶς ἀργύριον καὶ πείθης ἐκείνον), Protagoras will be willing to make him wise (310d7–8); thus, Hippocrates, already himself persuaded, must expend both financial resources and energy to persuade Protagoras.

Socrates calls this formulation of εὐβουλία a trade or skill of citizenship (τὴν πολιτικὴν τέχνην), and Protagoras concurs. But Protagoras in this speech and in others appears to be drawing a distinction between τέχναι—specifically, the sorts of tedious things children are *forced* to pursue in school—and what we might call these days a cognitive skill, εὐβουλία, which enables his students to pursue better the sorts of activities that they are already inclined to pursue as mature men. His competitors defy the wills of their students, abuse them, and infantilize them with tedious lessons from which they had previously fled. All the while, Protagoras does not need to advertise in this scenario; students come to him willingly with their own designs, and they accomplish precisely what they had wished when they came to him.

Again, it is striking that this portrait is decidedly not dialogic. His competitors do not offer lessons but force them on (cf. ἐμβάλλουσιν) others; they lead them back (πάλιν αὖ ἄγοντες) to activities from which they had turned and fled—an interesting spin on the ideas of *apotreptic* (fleeing) and *anatreptic* (leading back). The competing sophists thus do not persuade but coerce their students. Protagoras does not ventriloquize them, and with a sharp glance at Hippias to round out his critique, he does not even allow for a response, that is, his speech neither is dialogic nor does it invite dialogue. He characterizes his competitors as brutish technicians—a critique that looks forward to commonplace accusations of βαναυσία, barbarism, and treachery in partisan philosophical invective.¹⁴

Protagoras creates two strikingly different kinds of education and educators with one short stroke: one that pursues and constrains, even enslaves (ἐμβάλλουσιν), students, and another that empowers and waits for students to come. As Denyer (2008) notes, ἐμβάλλειν “can be used of casting someone into slavery, and into places of detention and execution” (p. 29). This passage is the second of Protagoras’s speeches to make use of the “run-away” motif. The competing sophists who use other trades as screens “cannot run away while trying to run away” (τὸ οὖν ἀποδιδράσκοντα μὴ δύνασθαι ἀποδρᾶναι, 317a). Hippocrates also announced before dawn that he had gone after (διωξοίμην) his slave Satyrus who had run away (ἀπέδρα, 310c). Now he is chasing after Protagoras (cf. ἐνδον καταλάβωμεν, 311a). Young people come running to Protagoras without his having to recruit them: Hippocrates exclaims, πάντες τὸν ἄνδρα ἐπαινοῦσιν καὶ φασιν σοφώτατον εἶναι λέγειν (310e).

14. See Owen (1983).

Socrates perhaps deploys this motif for his unnamed audience (and Plato, his reader) in order to draw attention to all the running around that is going on in the world of education even without the dialogic, agonistic, rhetorical advertisements by which intellectuals actively recruit, grow a market, and seize a more sizeable market share.¹⁵ According to Protagoras, either celebrity or intimidation may suffice. An educator either can drag runaways back to the schoolroom or can claim to offer (or fashion a reputation of offering) something else that will help them succeed privately and publicly, something that they themselves already desire, and simply wait for them to come to him.

Of course, Protagoras talks of the sophist's attempt to "persuade the best of the young men (πειθοντα τῶν νέων τοὺς βελτίστους) to abandon their associations . . . and to associate with him on the grounds that they will be improved by this association" (316cd). And in the same speech, he also notes how the masses perceive nothing but what powerful men (τῶν ἀνθρώπων τοὺς δυναμένους) announce (317a). So this is his strategy laid bare: persuade leading men, and then let his reputation do the rest. At a certain point in a profession devoted to the right people, exhortation and advertisement is no longer necessary; this claim is itself, of course, an advertising strategy. But Hippocrates is already an ardent fan, never having ever heard or seen him (310e), and Socrates reports that both Hippocrates and he have come to see Protagoras as devotees (ἐρασταὶ αὐτοῦ ἀφιγμένοι εἰμεν, 317cd).¹⁶ Protagoras's strategy has been effective, and he takes an active role (when the opportunity presents itself) in cultivating his reputation. When Socrates approaches Protagoras, he introduces Hippocrates as a member of a great and prosperous family, a young man unsurpassable (ἐνάμιλλος) by nature, and one who wishes to be held in high repute (ἐλλόγιμος) in the city. Socrates says that he surmised that Protagoras wished to show off (ἐνδείξασθαι καὶ καλλωπίσασθαι) in front of Prodicus and Hippias just what

15. Cf. *Resp.* 6.495cd: small-minded technicians run from their trades to philosophy for the finery of the profession. "The little men who are most refined in their little trades [τεχνίον] seeing the space unoccupied but full of fine names and outward appearances [προσηρημάτων], gladly leap from their trades to philosophy just like prisoners running [ἀποδιδράσκοντες] from jail to a temple for refuge. In spite of her present poor state, philosophy is still more high-minded than these other crafts, so that many people with defective [ἀτελεῖς] natures desire to possess her, even though their souls are broken and crushed by the banausic nature of their work, in just the way that their bodies are damaged by their trades and labors."

16. Again, the anonymous friend to whom Socrates narrates is also already an ardent fan (309d–310a).

sort of men come to learn from him, so Socrates proposes that all of the sophistic camps gather around for the discussion. Protagoras wishes then to make a formal demonstration of his own abilities simply by introducing his ἐρασταί. Recruitment happened long before Hippocrates walked into that portico. And as long as Protagoras and the other sophists here maintain ardent and eminent fan-bases, others will continue to seek them out ready with devotion.

5.2 *Preparing Consumers for the Marketplace of Ideas*

Since then we find ourselves in a space where recruitment is less an issue, Socrates is keen to move past advertisements to the products themselves. Hippocrates is already an admirer. He has not been persuaded by protreptic, but has fallen for celebrity. Socrates cautions that he may not know what he is getting into. He effectively wants to roll back the effects of the sophist's reputation by urging scrutiny. Moreover, this scrutiny is a communal effort among the very associates with whom Protagoras urges young men to part. Before they leave for Callias's, Socrates wants Hippocrates to take pause to examine with family and friends what he will end up purchasing and consuming in this transaction (313a–313c):

Do you see what kind of danger you are about to put your soul in? If you have to entrust [ἐπιτρέπειν] your body to someone and risk its becoming healthy or ill, you would consider carefully [πολλὰ ἂν περισκεψῶ] whether you should entrust it or not, and you would summon your family and friends for counsel and deliberate for days on end [εἰς συμβουλήν τοὺς τε φίλους ἂν παρεκάλεις καὶ τοὺς οἰκείους σκοπούμενος ἡμέρας συχνάς] . . . You don't confer [ἐπεκοινῶσω] with your father or brother or a single one of us who are your friends whether or not to entrust [ἐπιτρέπτέον] your soul to this recently arrived stranger. No, you hear about him in the evening, as you say, and the next morning, here you are, not to talk about or seek counsel [οὐδένα λόγον οὐδὲ συμβουλήν ποιῆ] as to whether it is a good idea to entrust yourself to him or not, but ready to spend your own money and your friends' as well, as if you had thought it all through already [διεγνωκῶς] and, no matter what, you had to be with Protagoras [πάντως συνεστέον Πρωταγόρα], a man whom you admit you don't

know [οὔτε γινώσκεις] and have never conversed with [διελεξαι], and whom you call a sophist, though you obviously have no idea what this sophist is to whom you are about to entrust yourself.

Hippocrates should slow down, seek counsel, even make his own παράκλησις to family and friends to examine what is at stake in, and what is the likely outcome of, the transaction. In other words, while Protagoras has made no exhortation in this instance, Socrates urges Hippocrates to urge others to help him examine the man. Interestingly, Socrates urges not an aporetic (although this may ultimately be the result of the examination) but effectively a prolonged look at the sophist from a safe distance, a protreptic from afar. Turning oneself over to a teacher without even having heard a formal exhortation, and more importantly without having examined the likely pragmatic ramifications of the association, is, Socrates says, dangerous. Hippocrates has prematurely made up his mind (διεγνωκώς) without any arguments and counsel among friends, without conversation (διελεξαι) with the man himself, without even having seen him or knowing what or who he really is. The use of the verbal adjectives ἐπιτρεπτόν and συνεστέον has a special meaning in this context. Philosophical protreptic typically ends, as we have seen, with the conclusion φιλοσοφητέον. But Hippocrates has decided ἐπιτρεπτόν and συνεστέον without any familiarity, reasoning, or deliberation.

However, Socrates identifies another danger waiting for Hippocrates, apart from his eagerness to rush into the company of someone he has never met. It is a related danger, but one that anyone would face without exposure to celebrity or protreptic discourse. The problem with any teaching, says Socrates, is how communicable it is, regardless of its potential effect. It seems that it would be better not to enter the marketplace of ideas at all.¹⁷ Again, before he and Hippocrates depart for Callias's, Socrates cautions (313c–314b):

Beware, or the sophist might deceive us in advertising what he sells [ἐπανῶν ἃ πωλεῖ], the way merchants who market food for the body do . . . If you are a knowledgeable consumer [ἐπιστήμων], you can

17. The debate about what constitutes a “market” in Classical Athens has grown increasingly complex in recent years; see, for example, Millett (1990), Morris (2002), Bang (2006), and Morley (2006). However, I use the term “marketplace” here merely to describe the conceptual space represented here by Plato’s Socrates for the sale, purchase, exchange, and consumption of goods, which appear, at least here, to include ideas.

safely buy teachings [μαθήματα] safely from Protagoras or anyone else. But if you are not, please do not risk what is most dear to you on a roll of the dice, for there is a far greater risk in buying teachings than in buying food. When you buy food and drink from a retailer or merchant [καπηλίου καὶ ἐμπορίου], you can take each item back home from the store in its own container and before you ingest it into your body [δέξασθαι αὐτὰ εἰς τὸ σῶμα], you can lay it all out at home [καταθέμενον οἴκαδε] and seek consultation, summoning an expert [ἔξεστιν συμβουλευσασθαι παρακαλέσαντα τὸν ἐπαίοντα] as to what should be eaten or drunk and what not, and how much and when. So there's not much risk in your purchase. But you cannot carry teachings away in a separate container. You put down your money and take the teaching away in your soul by having learned it [τὸ μάθημα ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ λαβόντα καὶ μαθόντα], and off you go, either helped or injured.

The distance between the advertisement (here, *ἔπαινος*) and consumption of the product vanishes. *Μαθήματα* cannot be put down for examination, and there is no opportunity to summon and consult experts (again, the consumer's *παράκλησις*). In this scenario, there is no gap between things taught and things learned; both are *μαθήματα* and instantly transmitted. Any student or experienced teacher should be shocked by what Socrates describes here: there is no process of hearing (itself a recurring problem, we have seen, in the portico), of learning, of assimilation. Following his metaphor of ingestion (*δέξασθαι αὐτὰ εἰς τὸ σῶμα*) to the end, also missing are the vital processes of chewing, swallowing, and digestion, not to mention the possibilities of indigestion and regurgitation. To hear is to learn. Exposure means ingestion. Hippocrates should slow down before racing off to Protagoras not only because he has not examined his motivations and the likely outcomes, but also because once he comes into contact with this merchant of *μαθήματα*, there will be no chance to inspect his products. Perhaps Socrates is suggesting to Hippocrates an examination of what the young man hopes to gain easily by merely paying and associating with Protagoras. The result is the same: take some time to consider the outcome of the association, because (1) you have not met him, and (2) whatever lies at the end of this road may not improve your situation, or worse yet may cause you harm.

Socrates proposes that a prospective consumer first assess the value, in consultation, of what he will learn. Socrates tries to contain the merchants

of μαθήματα by getting at what lies between their reputations and the effects of their products with the elenchus. The dialogue ends with the suggestion that our salvation depends on applying a science of measurement (ἡ μετρητικὴ τέχνη) to pleasures and pains in order to prevent being overcome (356d–357e). Before possessing this vital τέχνη, Hippocrates had been prepared to empty his own pockets and the pockets of his friends. Socrates has effectively not only inserted himself into the transactions between elites and sophists, but has suggested the existence and necessity of a new τέχνη that enables one to assess the claims of merchants of all kinds. And this τέχνη can and should be applied from a distance with others—family and friends, or at the very least the equivalent of an expert (τὸν ἐπαίοντα) on the effects of comestibles.

5.3 *Protrepitic that Builds Consensus*

Socrates appears to aim in the dialogue always at building community and consensus.¹⁸ Hippocrates should consult his friends and family, should find a way to assess with the aid of experts μαθήματα before ingesting them. He should devise his own παράκλησις, his own way of urging family and friends to offer counsel (συμβουλήν) and to deliberate with him (σκοπούμενος) the merits of sophists and their teachings for days on end (ἡμέρας συχνάς, 313a–313c). Hippocrates should devise arguments and seek counsel (cf. οὐδένα λόγον οὐδὲ συμβουλήν ποιῆ) with him about the merits of entrusting oneself to Protagoras. He should not decide (διεγνωκώς) his associations based on hearsay. And he is, in fact, as we have seen, pursuing this course: he examines his own motivations and determination with Socrates while strolling in the courtyard before dawn; he discusses some point in the doorway of Callias's which he and Socrates both (διαπερανάμενοι) did not want to leave unsettled (ἀτελής, 314c); and he and Socrates, together with Alcibiades and Critias in the portico, “passed a little time over certain things and examined them” (ἔτι σμίκρ’ ἄττα διατρίψαντες καὶ ταῦτα διαθεασάμενοι, 316a).

And apart from Hippocrates, in his dealings with Protagoras himself, when the sophist begs to proceed with the discussion without making a personal commitment to answers he is providing, Socrates exclaims, “Don’t do that to me! It’s not this ‘if you want’ or ‘if it seems so to you’

18. For more on the flexibility of characters, see Long (2005), Schofield (1992).

business that I want to test (ἐλέγχεσθαι), but both you and me. It's the 'me and you' I am talking about, and I think that our argument will be tested best if we leave the 'if' out of it" (331cd, cf. 333c). As Vlastos (1956) puts it, when you converse with the elenctic Socrates, "whatever decision you take will have to be yours." Both interlocutors must be present for and invested in their conversation. No belief should be left unaccounted for.

Similarly, after the separate displays of poetic analysis, Socrates expresses a desire to return to the joint investigation of virtue and learning in order that they might reach a conclusion (ἡδέως ἂν ἐπὶ τέλος ἔλθοιμι μετὰ σοῦ σκοπούμενος, 347c). He continues (347d–348a):

But when well-educated gentlemen drink together [συμπόται καὶ πεπαιδευμένοι εἰσὶν], you will not see girls playing the flute or the lyre or dancing, but only the company contenting themselves with their own conversation [διὰ τῆς αὐτῶν φωνῆς], and none of these childish frivolities—each speaking and listening decently in his turn [ἐν μέρει . . . κοσμίως], no matter how heavily they are drinking. Ours is such a group [συνουσία] if indeed it consists of men such as most of us claim to be, and it should require no external voices [ἄλλοτρίας φωνῆς], not even of poets, who cannot be questioned [ἀνερέσθαι] on what they say. When a poet is brought up in a discussion, almost everyone has a different opinion about what he means, and they end up discussing some business about which they can never decide [περὶ πράγματος διαλεγόμενοι ὃ ἀδυνατοῦσι ἐξελέγξαι]. Cultured people renounce [ἑῶσιν χαίρειν] such discussions and associate directly with one another relying on their own powers of speech to test each other by turns [αὐτοὶ δ' ἑαυτοῖς σύνεισιν δι' ἑαυτῶν, ἐν τοῖς ἑαυτῶν λόγοις πείραν ἀλλήλων λαμβάνοντες καὶ διδόντες]. These are the sort of people whom we should imitate, both you and I [μιμῆσθαι ἐμὲ τε καὶ σέ]. We should put aside [καταθεμένους] the poets and converse directly with each other, testing the truth and our own ideas . . . We can go through in detail where we stopped halfway and try to reach a conclusion [περὶ ὧν μετὰξὺ ἐπαυσάμεθα διεξιόντες, τούτοις τέλος ἐπιθεῖναι].

Any beliefs which cannot be claimed personally by anyone present, Socrates calls external or alien voices. The orderly choral dance around (ἐν κόσμῳ περιεσχίζοντο, 315b) Protagoras by initiates who cannot make out what he says gives way to an orderly discussion among all participants who equally and in turn submit to and perform examination (ἐν μέρει . . .

κοσμίως . . . λαμβάνοντες και διδόντες). If someone cannot be questioned, his voice should be put aside (καταθεμένους). External voices introduce uncertainty which prevents effective examination and consensus; there can be no conclusion. The gathering should thus turn away from external voices (i.e., ἀποτρέπειν), and instead turn toward scrutinizing only and all of those who are present. In fact, if they require more guidance than this, they should turn toward and imitate models of such behavior—the sorts of people they claim to be (347e1–2), well-educated gentlemen (347d3). This suggestion recognizes a gap between the sort of person some claim to be and the activities in which they engage. What sorts of matters should learned people pursue? The question deftly involves the two very questions that loom large throughout the dialogue: (1) What do students get practically speaking from education? (2) What do these particular students get from their particular associations? The exhortation to examine the questions of what learned people do and what they themselves are doing demonstrates the so-called “double objective” of the elenchus: “to discover how every human being ought to live *and* to test that single human being that is doing the answering—to find out if *he* is living as one ought to live.”¹⁹ The objective of sticking with voices that are present and testing each one in turn not only builds community and consensus among participants, but provides each person an opportunity to achieve coherence both among his beliefs and between his beliefs and his behavior.

Of course, Socrates may aim at building community and consensus, but we often encounter tensions between characters, tensions that sometimes abruptly threaten to engender violence. When the discussion between Protagoras and Socrates on the unity of virtue frustrates the former, Socrates recognizes his frustration (δυσχερώς), drops the point under consideration, and picks up another (τοῦτο μὲν ἐάσωμεν, τόδε δὲ ἄλλο ὦν ἔλεγεσ ἐπισκεψώμεθα, 332a, cf. ἔξ ἀρχῆς, 333d). Protagoras grudgingly (ἀκόντως) assents to conclusions (333b). Socrates explains to his anonymous friend that Protagoras at one point got so worked up and was really struggling that he seemed set against (τετραχύνθαι τε καὶ ἀγωνιᾶν καὶ παρατετάχθαι) answering any more, which prompted Socrates to be cautious and gentle (εὐλαβοῦμενος ἡρέμα, 333e). When Protagoras finally proves unwilling to answer any more questions, at least directly and with brevity, Socrates recognizes the time for dialectical work in his company has passed, and gets

19. Vlastos (1994, p. 10).

up to go (335b). But Callias seizes his wrist with one hand, his cloak with the other, and holds him hostage (335d, cf. 338b). Meanwhile, Alcibiades accuses Protagoras of evading or beating off (ἐκκρούων) questions because he does not want to be accountable (διδόναι λόγον, 336cd); Prodicus urges the two to “dispense with strife” (ἐρίζειν, 337b1), to be friends rather than enemies at odds; and Hippias “begs and advises” Socrates and Protagoras “to be reconciled [συμβῆναι] under our arbitration [διατητῶν], as it were, on some middle course” somewhere, as Hippias puts it, between dialectic and rhetoric. (337e). He suggests that an arbitrator of some kind—even one who can use force (cf. 338a8)—should keep speakers from clashing in disgraceful ways (337e).

Socrates rejects Hippias’s suggestion of a compromise between dialectic and rhetoric, but not of a supervisor. The conversation should proceed in such a way that Protagoras may first ask questions while Socrates not only answers but demonstrates (δείξει) to Protagoras how an answerer should answer (338d). Protagoras will have to abandon delivering long speeches and assent to question-and-answer, even if he is calling the shots. When Protagoras has finished, Socrates will then ask the questions, and if Protagoras refuses to answer those questions directly, Socrates says, “You and I will unite in begging him [καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ ὑμεῖς κοινῇ δεησόμεθα αὐτοῦ], as you have begged me, not to ruin our conference” (συνουσίαν, 338d). In other words, they will only move forward with dialectic, but Protagoras will start with the questions, primarily so that Socrates can show him how to answer when it is his turn to ask. Between his demonstration and the subsequent supervision by the whole group, Protagoras finds himself in a tight spot—“he wanted no part of it, but he had to agree” (ἠναγκάσθη ὁμολογήσαι, 338e). Socrates enlists everyone to compel him to agree. He redirects toward Protagoras the begging and violent reaction that prevented him from leaving; the συνουσία will remain intact if it can beg (δεησόμεθα) and even force (ἠναγκάσθη) Protagoras to participate, and participate in the right way. Indeed, when Alcibiades judges that the conversation has given way to exegesis and demonstrations, even from Socrates (διεξελθεῖν, 342a), and further notes that Protagoras is behaving badly by not making clear whether he will participate, he, Callias, and nearly the whole gathering shame (αἰσχυνθεῖς) Protagoras into, oddly enough, exhorting himself (προυτράπετο) to resume the dialogue and urging (ἐκέλευεν) that questions be put to him (347b–348c). It is perhaps another sign of the old master’s pride (cf. 335a) that Protagoras is compelled finally not by the συνουσία but by his own πρότρεψις and παράκλησις.

Still, what is most remarkable about these episodes of disagreement and conflict is how much the rest of the dialogue effectively identifies adversaries with one another. Several points of this identification are subtle, but taken together they make a strong case for interrelatedness and kinship. In this context, attempts at building consensus may ultimately take on a greater comic flavor. We can certainly find analytical evidence for what Gagarin (1969) calls the “basic continuity between Protagorean and Socratic thought.”²⁰ Socrates imagines the outcome being the dialogue itself wagging a finger at them both for having in the end swapped positions (361a–c). And the sophist’s claim—that virtue is widespread and already practiced well, but without refinements, which are teachable and advantageous—appears so plausible and compelling that the whole dialogue may be reduced to the examination of a man who may have hit the mark, even if in the end he appears incapable of giving a full account.²¹ But arguments aside, there is a bigger story here about the interrelatedness of characters in the *Protagoras*. And this story further supports my understanding of Plato’s *Protagoras* as a dialogue that deals less with protreptic marketing, and more with the world of celebrity and partisan professional disputes. The *Protagoras* dramatizes what happens after conversion, when competitors and initiates have more in common with one another than they do with civilians, as it were, who seek conventional goals in conventional ways.

In what follows, I will demonstrate not only the interrelatedness of characters in the *Protagoras*, but also the ways in which characters are busy defining and negotiating that interrelatedness. Plato likely invests so much into characterization in this dialogue, more than in any other, in order to highlight differences among similarities. To understand the relationship between Socrates and Protagoras in this dialogue, we must turn to Hesiod’s *Works and Days*. To the direct and indirect literary entanglements with Aeschylus, the comedies of Eupolis and Aristophanes, Epicharmus too and the mimes of Sophron, and other Platonic experiments with public protreptic contests, like the *Euthydemus*, we must of course add Simonides and traditional wisdom literature (i.e., Homer and Hesiod). I am going to draw our attention briefly to two readings of the myth of Prometheus: the first, which we have already examined, Martin

20. Gagarin (1969, p. 134).

21. Cf. Denyer (2008, p. 4).

(2004) on *Works and Days*, and the second, Miller (1978) on the *Protagoras*. These two interpretations taken together not only complicate the relationship between Socrates and Protagoras, but I believe show what Hesiod's epic meant to Plato as he composed his dialogue.

Martin (2004) recognizes that, especially when considered alongside other archaic performances, there is something very distinctive and inter-related about the characters and narratives—even the ongoing arguments, where the constative becomes directive—in *Works and Days*.²² To begin with, “when compared with other wisdom texts from traditional cultures the *Works and Days* frame narrative stands out because it does not represent the message of the poetry in the form of instructions by a father to a son, king to prince, or tutor to pupil . . . [or, in other words] asymmetrical, generational transmission.” Rather, the frame narrative gives us sibling rivalry—two brothers in an ongoing dispute—and a model of symmetrical transmission and ready wisdom. The poet has “constructed his authority as equal to that of Zeus, but [has] also ironized it nearly out of existence.” He achieves this equalization by “structur[ing] his composition in such a way that the cosmos itself emerges as ineluctably double (with consequent dilemmas)” (pp. 35–36). The sibling rivalry of the frame narrative establishes what Martin calls a “sibship function” that is revealed by the didactic doubles of the rest of the narrative. Epimetheus, heedless of a brother's advice, figures as prominently as his brother in the Pandora myth of *Works and Days*, while he is only mentioned in the *Theogony* and apart from its full treatment of Pandora (511–512). But additionally, Martin shows that the sibship function is also played out between Prometheus and Zeus who emerge in this narrative as roughly equal creator-craftsmen. By alternate accounts, both Prometheus and Zeus are responsible for flawed creations.²³ The sibship and rivalry of brothers echoes throughout

22. “Already at the head of the stream of didactic in European literature, Hesiodic poetry displays the *high-style of epic, the stylized first-person of lyric, and—the focus of this paper—a dramatic structure enacted as a two-way conversation* of which we are privileged to hear just half, but meant to know the rest. Why not read it with at least the same attention one gives Baudelaire?” (p. 32, my emphasis).

23. Based, in part, on a strong reading of *heteros logos* (εἰ δ' ἐθέλεις, ἕτερόν τοι ἐγὼ λόγον ἐκκορυφώσω, *Op.* 106). What follows: by one account, “the gods produce people; in the Prometheus story, the son of a Titan makes them as his private amusement . . . whereas the Promethean creation is spoiled by a brother's one failure of foresight, the attempts by Olympians multiply, degenerate and end in entropy” (Martin 2004, p. 40).

the cosmos. As Martin puts it, the “myth” of Perses and his brother is the message. Rough equivalence between rivals is the story and the lesson.

It is perhaps for this reason that Plato (and his Protagoras) redeploys this myth, not for clear correlations between intradiegetic and extradiegetic characters, but for the motif of the sibship function. When Gagarin (1969) argues for the “basic continuity between Protagorean and Socratic thought” (p. 134), he notes how Protagoras both (1) thanks Socrates for his foresight, that is, for his promethean qualities, and (2) warns Socrates of the dangers of the profession thereby “also displaying foresight on Socrates’ behalf” (p. 140). And when Socrates characterizes Protagoras’s wish to speak in public as “a desire to show off” (cf. 317c), Gagarin suspects that he also aims to “[gratify] his own wish for an audience as much as Protagoras” when he assembles the sophists and guests. From the beginning of the contest, “in spite of a certain rivalry between the two men, they are essentially in the same position; both are openly [publicly] committed to educating young men, and both face the same sort of reaction from a generally hostile public” (pp. 140–141). Gagarin notes how Socrates implies at the end of the contest that he would play the part of Prometheus to Protagoras’s epimethean oversight of the nature of virtue (p. 161). So they are brothers, and as brothers, they even share the genetic quality of foresight at turns.

This ambivalence within the Hesiodic and Platonic heroes is a possibility that Miller (1978) playfully explores at length. Again, Zeus and Prometheus are co-benefactors with complementary wisdoms in Protagoras’s retelling (p. 23). But more importantly, Prometheus and Epimetheus “in spite of their names and dominant capacities . . . are revealed by Protagoras (and Plato) as composed of epimethean and promethean aspects. After all, what led to Epimetheus’ impasse? Prometheus’ lack of foresight in acceding to his request—Forethought should have known better” (p. 24). Epimetheus distributes talents, but Prometheus has to check over the results and compensate for his brother’s lack of foresight. When it comes to the world in which the *muthos* is told (i.e., the extradiegetic world of the contest), this ambivalence repeats. Although Protagoras greets Socrates as Prometheus at the beginning of the contest, the greeting is a demonstration of foresight, for he will use the myth “to outdo the Prometheus he recognized in Socrates” (p. 26). For Miller, there is much more to this story, but in the end, he argues that while “each interlocutor has displayed a combination of epimethean and promethean moments as they conversed . . . both end rather dissatisfied” (p. 29). And Zeus, who in the *muthos* compensates for

the oversight of both brothers, does not bestow his gifts on this company. On this reading, the sibship function of *Works and Days* has been mapped not *onto* the rivals but *into* each of the rivals.

Thus the intergeneric dialogue with Hesiod puts in relief various problems of resemblance between rivals, and of course makes the spectacle of one-upmanship all the more captivating. Now, it would be one thing if the text merely *illustrated* these problems of resemblance; the reader would be the only one to see the problem. But the text illustrates roughly equal rivals who both (1) refer to other roughly equal rivals (as we have seen) and (2) explicitly discuss and express anxieties about the resemblance. Both readers and characters are aware of the problems. Characters in the *Protagoras* explicitly discuss the problems of marketing the discursive and social practices of competing (but in many ways, whether just apparently or essentially equivalent) disciplines. Protagoras claims to teach refinements to the practice of virtue, and Socrates exhorts each of us to cultivate virtue (ἐπιμέλεια τῆς ψυχῆς). Socrates may not be sure that he or anyone else he meets possesses such virtue (and, thus, that it can be taught or transmitted), but Protagoras proposes they all do; this is one of the genetic differences between these brothers. And this difference, of course, precipitates the conflict between the professor and the skeptic.

5.4 Clitophon *and after the Protreptic Sting*

It is worth noting, in the end, that Plato is as keen to highlight the ultimate failure of Socrates's protreptics in the *Euthydemus* as he is in other dialogues. In the *Clitophon*, a former student of Socrates asks him what happens after someone has been "converted" by a protreptic and has made a pledge to change his life—what philosophical life does one adopt after protreptic persuasion, and how does the convert sustain that life? This student skillfully parrots the protreptic discourse that Socrates typically uses to win young minds for his philosophic lifestyle. But the student then proceeds to grill Socrates, demanding an account of the knowledge and practical lifestyle that one can expect to find after conversion. The dialogue as a whole offers a meditation on the nature and efficacy of the protreptic: what is protreptic, how does it work, and what are its lasting effects? Both the *Euthydemus* and the *Clitophon* are protreptic discourses about protreptic. Socrates uses protreptic discourse but also reflects upon the efficacy of this discourse. In both of these dialogues, Plato includes

voices that criticize Socrates's position. He artistically integrates the protreptic discourses of his opponents in his attempt to define his own intellectual and cultural practice, but he also recognizes that there is a threat to this constructive project from the resulting polyphony within.

The *Clitophon* begins with Socrates admonishing his former student Clitophon for a discussion he was reported to have had with Lysias about Socrates's faults in speech and Thrasymachus's talents for instruction. Clitophon offers to report exactly what he said, and Socrates agrees and thus submits himself in person to Clitophon's praise and indictment. Socrates does not speak for the rest of the dialogue. Clitophon delivers a report that quickly transitions into and out of a dramatic, intradiegetic space. He begins his reperformance of his previous conversation with Lysias by way of a demonstration in praise of protreptic; this demonstration consists of an imitation of Socratic protreptic in *oratio recta* (407b–e) and a summary of other Socratic protreptics in *oratio obliqua* (407e–408b). Both imitation and summary are subsumed into one speech (ὁ λόγος οὕτως σοι, 408a). Clitophon caps this performance with praise for Socratic protreptic (408bc).

Next, and still in his reperformance, Clitophon transitions from summary back to the Socratic style (τρόπος, 408d), but in his imitation, he presents a Socrates who scrutinizes his own protreptic by posing leading questions to his companions. Before Clitophon begins, he has difficulty defining the relationship of Socrates's companions to Socrates himself (408c). It is to these that he addresses his critique, exhorting them to discover the next step after Socrates's protreptic. He speaks in (1) *oratio recta* (408d–409a), then in (2) a combination (409a–410b) of *oratio recta* (409a–c; 409c–d) and *oratio obliqua* within a narrative. This combination of *oratio recta*, *obliqua*, and narrative is addressed directly to Socrates, and it concludes with Clitophon's report of a conversation he and Socrates shared (410ab) in which Socrates was defeated (perhaps by the elenctic skill just demonstrated by Clitophon against Socrates's companions).

Clitophon concludes this largely intradiegetic demonstration of the critique of protreptic with a direct critique in the extradiegetic frame. He begins by professing his *impatience* (410b), and accuses Socrates of either not knowing what justice is or knowing but being unwilling to share this knowledge with Clitophon. Clitophon is lost (ἀπορών, 410c) because the protreptics do not end. He thinks he might find an end in them with Thrasymachus for a teacher, and threatens to defect. Clitophon tries to turn Socrates away from using protreptic discourse, and exhorts him to

provide instead an account of the nature of the soul and what sort of care it requires (410cd):

However, if you are really willing to refrain at last from addressing to me these hortatory discourses [ἐπει εἴ γ' ἐθέλεις σὺ τούτων μὲν ἤδη παύσασθαι πρὸς ἐμὲ τῶν λόγων τῶν προτρεπτικῶν], and just as you would have followed up the hortatory discourse [τὸ ἐφεξῆς ἂν τῷ προτρεπτικῷ λόγῳ ἔλεγες], suppose you had been exhorting me in respect of gymnastics that I should not neglect my body, by explaining the nature of the body and the nature of the treatment it requires [οἷας θεραπείας δεῖται]—so let the same course be followed in the present case.

We see here Clitophon's apotreptic from protreptic discourse which, as we know, contains professional and psychagogic apotreptic. Socrates had better put a stop to his usual way of doing business and get on with what comes next, or else his impatient student will take up with a professional rival.

Clitophon threatens in closing that he may also keep going to Lysias and reperforming this praise and blame, demonstration and critique (410e). His ultimate point is that Socrates is good at philosophical marketing but bad at delivering the product of well-being; Socrates is worthy of praise for the former but the latter is disgraceful:

For I shall maintain, Socrates, that while you are of untold value to a man who has not been turned, to him who has been turned you are almost an actual hindrance in the way of his attaining the goal of virtue and becoming a happy man [σχεδὸν καὶ ἐμπόδιον τοῦ πρὸς τέλος ἀρετῆς ἐλθόντα εὐδαίμονα γενέσθαι].

We recall Isocrates's assessment of sophistic arts which can, at best, be called preparation for philosophy (*Antid.* 271). Clitophon argues that Socratic protreptic is, in the end, an apotreptic from εὐδαιμονία. After having made a pledge, Clitophon is nonetheless languishing in ἀπορία: he seeks θεραπεία. The dialogue ends with an admonishment and threat to find another kind of philosophical practice. Socrates does not respond. And the reader is left wondering how Plato could leave his hero in the lurch.

It is one thing to wonder what Plato might have meant by this assessment, particularly if we are to believe that the *Clitophon* serves as an entry into other (perhaps esoteric) discourses, and it is another to investigate,

as we have done with the *Euthydemus*, the strategies that Plato uses to construct the discursive practices of a literary project and, dare we say, program. The *Clitophon* and *Euthydemus* simply make room for other discursive protreptic exploits which build upon these strategies. Gaiser (1963) and Kahn (1996) may find esoteric doctrine and training beyond Clitophon's appraisal. Slings (1999) may conclude that the *Clitophon* condemns Socratic protreptic while sparing Socratic ethics.²⁴ And González (2002) may argue that the dialogue offers an occasion for dialectical conditioning in the search for virtue. But we are not so much concerned with speculation about what practices lie beyond engagements with the text, except insofar as the texts themselves portray characters engaged in particular "philosophical" and "unphilosophical," "useful" and "useless," "tasteful" and "common" practices. Our study remains focused on the discursive practices of a discursive institution. These protreptic texts which compare different competing protreptics to one another emphasize the artfulness of Platonic literature. We shall see that Isocrates will make more explicit the point that, in an important sense, protreptic highlights the artfulness of a new discursive art called *philosophia*.

24. Slings (1999, p. 213). Woodruff (1982) raises the serious question of whether Socrates is genuinely concerned with the improvement of his interlocutors: "Since none of these characters shows any sign of improvement under Socrates' purgative treatment, charity forbids our taking their improvement to be part of his goal" (pp. 135–136). He continues, "The role of teacher and arranger of other people's lives is not for him" (p. 141). Of course, Nehamas (1998) argues that the Socratic project is primarily about an inimitable and largely literary *self-fashioning*. Both views suggest to me that the question of a Socratic *ethos* remains a literary question.

PART TWO

Isocratean Protreptic

We have seen that Plato's protreptic discourse can include the protreptic discourse of competitors through an artful and elaborate architecture of narrative levels and dramatic characterization. In the *Euthydemus*, Socrates attempts to convert an extradiegetic audience by narrating the events of an attempted conversion of an audience at an intradiegetic level. This extradiegetic audience introduces the apotreptic discourse of an Isocratean, thereby framing the discursive practices of protreptic competition in the more immediate cultural context of the fourth-century debate over which practices and concerns constitute good φιλοσοφία and παιδεία. Of course, Plato himself is absent from the debate which he presents in his dialogue. But Isocrates makes a good part of this sort of protreptic explicitly about himself, and as an important part of his discipline. He shows up to this public contest, as it were, in his own literature even if his voice was not suited for public debate.¹ Rather than evaluating protreptics through a surrogate in dialogue, Isocrates puts himself in his written protreptics with a "manner and tone that are consciously reminiscent of public speech," while still avoiding direct contact.²

1. For his self-proclaimed small voice and lack of assurance, see *Antidosis* 190–192, *Ad Philippum* 81, *Panathenaicus* 9–10, and *Epistulae* 8.7. See Ober (1989, pp. 113–114); see Too (1995) for an examination of both the ancient biographical tradition regarding the weakness of his voice and his rejection of public speaking, particularly of loud and aggressive public speaking (pp. 74–112), and how Isocrates uses the "small voice" of writing to forge a new kind of political activity (pp. 113–150).

2. Halliwell (1997, p. 110). Public spaces were the place to debate the sort of virtues with which Isocrates is chiefly concerned. As Ober (2004) notes, "major speeches to large audiences were occasions for public deliberation on the core values that underpinned the democratic polity and the relationship of those values to practices, public and private: how individual Athenians acted and behaved in institutional contexts and in their everyday lives . . . Isocrates sought to reconcile the aims of personal betterment of the superior individual (what we might call

Halliwell (1997) argues that Isocrates manages to present arguments and counsel which were “couched in the form of fictional engagements of public oratory and were thus at one remove from the practical.”³ Of course, as we shall see, Isocrates is predominately concerned that the *logos* of φιλοσοφία and παιδεία be, above all, practical.⁴ And yet, as we shall also see, his *logos*, particularly his protreptic discourse, comes to the prospective student more directly (i.e., as more easily identifiable as an occasion for author and audience) than the dramas created by an entirely absent Plato. Still, Isocrates indulges in literary devices which similarly highlight the familiar problems of the impracticality and incompleteness of protreptic discourse.⁵

We must begin, however, with a brief and unfortunately still necessary justification for why a good part of the Isocratean canon not only belongs in a discussion of philosophical protreptic but ought to be promoted as a collection of perhaps the most successful examples of this complex secondary genre that merges other genres and presents a hybrid of discourses and social languages. We recall that some scholars designate not only the statements on προτροπή and προτρέπειν in Isocrates but additionally his educational aims as nonphilosophical protreptic, that is as mere

“soul-saving”) and the public good (or “polis-saving”). He sought to conjoin the ends of the just polis with the integral soul and thereby allow for a politics that was at once personal and public, leadership that was at once beneficial and legitimate” (pp. 21–23). Plato did not participate in these spaces because he did not share in the same confidence that democracy and its institutions and underpinnings could contribute to “soul-saving.”

3. Ober (2004, p. 109).

4. Practical both in the sense that it can be used in the real world for success (εὖ πράττειν) and in the sense that it is a feasible and convenient program of education, i.e., that it will not interfere with conventional pursuits. Isocrates trains people to do well within the context of the political and social practices of the Athenian democracy. And his students train with him for three or four years, though they remain loyal to him for life (*Antid.* 87–88). The lifelong educational program of Plato’s *Republic* is not practical, an Isocratean would argue, in either sense of the word: Plato asks too much of his students and makes them unfit for practical affairs. The *Republic* argues that the uselessness of the philosopher is merely apparent and to be blamed on the “ignorant” “who do not know how to put him to use” (489b). When “those who are called useless stargazers” are recognized as “the true steersmen” (489c), then they might even create the ideal *polis*. Plato’s philosopher stands apart from conventions and aims to realize a different constitution.

5. The devices which we will examine include, for example, framing the conspicuously more private and injunctive discourse of his paraenetic letters to princes with a programmatic discourse for a broader readership. Buchner (1958) notes a related framing technique around the epideictic speech of the *Panegyricus* (20–128) which leads to inconsistencies. Edwards (2004) notes the relevant uses of narratorial interventions. There are, in fact, as many literary devices in Isocratean prose as there are in the many poetic and prose genres which he embraces.

oratory, which ignores and appears at times to disparage the theoretical science of the Platonic program.⁶ It is, of course, true both that Isocrates constructs and promotes a different kind of education and that he seems often not to engage in direct combat with a Platonic program, or, that is, with the terms which are so crucial to the definition of a set of cultural and discursive practices which we imagine are at the heart of a Platonic program. Nevertheless, the Isocratean project encompasses more than defining and teaching rhetorical skill, and he is certainly an expert competitor in the contest of protreptic discourse. His own views on the role of *προτρεπτικός λόγος* and what constitutes good philosophy are complicated and at times seemingly inconsistent, particularly between different speeches, and the fact that Plato and Isocrates engage in different and mismatched hybridized genres makes the story even more complicated.⁷ But the similarities between internal audiences or addressees of these protreptics and the pragmatics of these innovative texts, that is, the work that they are expected to do in the marketplace of ideas, suggest that these respective philosophical disciplines are competing with one another for the same prospective students.⁸ Plato writes protreptic dialogues which compare protreptic discourses and the characters who deliver them, but it is typically not to these dialogues that scholars turn in order to piece together a Platonic philosophical program. They go elsewhere, stepping past the

6. E.g., Slings (1999, pp. 63n.110, 91). In any case, as we have seen, very little of the Platonic protreptic in the *Euthydemus* can rightly be called theoretical science.

7. While the rhetoric and genres fail often to overlap, a good deal of work has been done to demonstrate precisely where the literary constructs of the two intellectuals meet. See Eucken (1983) for stimulating speculation of precise intertext, and the contest over the terms “philosophy,” “sophist” (pp. 6–8), and “eristic” (pp. 44–47); Nightingale (1995, pp. 28–29, 40–43), on the intertextual relationship of the *Antidosis* and *Apology*, through which Isocrates forges a “rhetoric of legitimation” with which he is able to “negotiate a place for [his] philosophy in the social and political practices of the Athenian democracy” (pp. 40–41); Ober (2004) on the “verbal misperformance” or “alternative iteration,” which monumentally outperforms Plato in style and length, and strives to be a more “authentic union of theory and practice” (p. 38); Ober (1998, pp. 260–263). For a recent examination of the ways Isocrates alone uses the term *philosophia*, see Wersdörfer (1940), Livingstone (2007).

8. They may, however, target different consumers at different times. Plato appears to make more of an effort to court the many respectable Critos of Athens with the extradiegetic level of the *Euthydemus* while the intradiegetic level explicitly targets young, volatile souls. Isocrates makes more of a regular and concerted to court individuals who value the conventions of democratic and hegemonic Athens, i.e., Hellenic patriarchs seeking tutors. Even his epistles to young kings are plainly meant for circulation among fathers of young democratic youths. On this transferable and “cosmopolitan” *παιδεία*, see Ober (2004, pp. 28–31). On his multiple audiences, see Morgan (2003, pp. 184–190); Usener (1994, pp. 31–38).

first step of the chain of exhortation in the *Euthydemus* and *Clitophon*. The *Republic*, for instance, appears to point toward φιλοσοφία beyond protreptic, and the end of Socrates's speech in the *Symposium* notably describes a mystery which lies beyond conversion. At the same time, these dialogues bring attention to the shortcomings of those scoundrels who turn away from protreptic encounters. Isocrates, on the other hand, gives us protreptic in the forms of polemic and invective (*Against the Sophists*), epistles (*Ad Demonium*, *Ad Nicoclem*, *Nicoles*), and other fictional performances of public oratory (*Antidosis*, *Panathenaicus*), all of which appear to suggest more of a philosophical program and discourse, even if a Platonist (or a scholar faced with the task of reconstruction) might regard these as unphilosophical. As Halliwell puts it: "Isocratean logos—whether construed as speech, argument, or rationality—operates only within the construction of specific pieces of deliberation, the application of ethical and political principles to particular situations, and, at most, the highly generalized statement of those principles."⁹ Isocratean protreptic provides a way of doing business that is too attached to speech and action in the present—too much of this world for a Platonist. In short, it is too devoted to older, more commonplace, conventional rhetoric to be of as much interest to scholars of ancient philosophy, let alone of fourth-century protreptic discourse.

The professional philosophy which Isocrates promotes must look enough like the professions of his many philosophical competitors to be recognized as a substitute but must also at the same time differentiate itself from the competition as the only legitimate philosophical activity and most suitable to the consumer's preferences.¹⁰ Isocrates attempts to cast the net widely enough to ensnare many conceptions of education and cultivation—all of which he calls philosophy—from the most traditional to the latest sophistic trend. He claims that some of his critics publicly slandered him for rejecting all of these models (*Panath.* 18–19):

9. Halliwell (1997, pp. 116–117). For a full and persuasive defense of the authenticity of the *Ad Demonium*, see Sandys (1868, pp. xxxi–xliv).

10. Much of the time, we can only speculate about whom exactly Isocrates has in mind when he rather indiscriminately targets his opponents as relatively anonymous groups. Plato, at least, presents colorful, individual characters, even if they are nameless. The guesswork of the identity of Isocrates's rivals is more wildly speculative; e.g., Eucken (1983) believes Isocrates's general indictments principally target Antisthenes and Plato rather than Polycrates and Alcidamas, even though we know very little of Antisthenes and the indictments are indirect enough to target any of the new sophists and theorists who wander too far from more traditional, occasion-based, and utility-driven performances of wisdom.

For some of my friends met me and related to me how, as they were sitting together in the Lyceum, three or four of the common sophists [τῶν ἀγελαίων σοφιστῶν]—men who claim to know everything and are prompt to show their presence everywhere—were discussing the poets, especially the poetry of Hesiod and Homer, saying nothing great about them, but merely chanting their verses and repeating from memory the most pleasurable things [τὰ χαριέστατα μνημιονεύοντες] which certain others had said about them in the past. It seems that the bystanders applauded their performance [διατριβήν], whereupon one of the sophists, the boldest among them, attempted to stir up prejudice against me, saying that I would do away with all the systems of cultivation [φιλοσοφίας] and education [παιδείας] which others offer, and that I assert that all men talk nonsense except those who partake of my business [τῆς ἐμῆς διατριβῆς].

Isocrates appears to be troubled by several things here: for one, the apotretic accusations were made in his absence by sophists who have had some success with their demonstration. As he goes on to explain, “These aspersions, according to my friends, were effective in turning a number of those present against me” (διατεθῆναι πρὸς ἡμᾶς, *Panath.* 19). Common sophists can win the hearts of prospective students through a public and not so revelatory engagement with traditional kinds of wisdom, and they then set about ruining the reputation of others who also advocate traditional values. As we shall see, the Isocratean protreptic exhorts young men to become habituated to virtuous living through certain kinds of interactions with the living wisdom of gnomic poets, including Hesiod. He is further troubled by his apotretics from his competitors being construed too broadly. He admits to “waging war against the false pretenders” (τοῖς ἀλαζονοιμένοις πολεμῶν, 20) and, as we shall see, he also targets esotericism and the dogma of ethical and rhetorical systems, but his discipline does not reject the values of all educational systems, only those of his own day. He can thus use “philosophy” to describe cultivation more generally and thereby define the market, but also use “philosophy” to describe bygone systems of education—wherein rhetoric and reasoning are both necessary—and his own related, and in his day, he argues, more authentic and appropriate, way of cultivating young souls.¹¹

11. For these uses of φιλοσοφία and παιδεία, see *C. soph.* 1, 11–18, 21; *Evag.* 8, 81; *Paneg.* 6, 10, 47; *Antid.* 30, 42–50, 162, 168, 176, 181–192; and *Panath.* 9. On these uses, see Eucken (1983, pp. 5–35); Batstone (1985). On the φιλόσοφος, see Nightingale (1995, Chapter 1); Ford (1993a, pp. 33–41).

We might attribute Isocrates's success and wealth primarily to this rhetoric: he sells his discipline as the only viable link with the past and therefore the only path to success in the present. His rivals are ignorant of or indifferent to the past and ways of using the past to find an advantage in present circumstances. At a time when the concept of "philosophy" is still unstable, Isocrates aligns himself with the conventional, everyday rhetoric of the social and political institutions of Athenian democracy, identifying himself not only as a philosophical educator but as the only rightful heir to a conventional wisdom which is slipping away.¹²

The philosophical business to which Isocrates turns prospective students, then, is predicated largely on a review and rejection of contemporary innovations and a "rediscovery" of ancient learning in a modern context. The wisdom of ancient texts must become a living paradigm, and readers must learn how to emulate what is exemplary in them. His aporetic warns people away from those who cloud judgment by instilling rigid ethical or rhetorical systems which, for Isocrates, "do not have any autonomy or independence from success and the common world."¹³ But what he promotes is variously described by scholars as unoriginal, superficial and, even by his advocates, as poorly set down.¹⁴ I will briefly sketch some of the more positive and thus far neglected aspects of the Isocratean program: his use of protreptics. To begin with, Isocrates claims on occasion that he is, in fact, not one of those who write προτρεπτικοί λόγοι or invent hortatory discourse (παράκλησιν εϋρόντες), for these texts and inventions demonstrate by what means the young may practice skill merely in argument (τὴν δεινότητα τὴν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἀσκήσουσιν, *Ad Dem.* 3–5). He instead writes παραίνεσις, which improves moral conduct (τὸν τρόπον αὐτῶν ἐπανορθοῦσι) and counsels young men on the things—activities, conduct,

12. Stowers (1986) argues that *Ad Nicoclem* is not "conversion" literature, which attempts to "turn" to a new life, but "confirmation" literature, which preserves cultural values (*Ad Nic.* 91–92). It is important to note, however, that Isocrates is reconstructing the cultural past (and present) in innovative ways, and, in fact, turning his audience with innovative discourse toward his vision.

13. Batstone (1985, p. 99).

14. Hudson-Williams (1940): "Isocrates was not an original thinker, his views are in some ways commonplace and superficial, but the versatility of his genius entitles him to a special position . . . [W]hatever his subject, he was always conscious that his mission was to educate Greece, whether states as a whole or individuals" (pp. 166–167). Even Halliwell (1997) is ready to recognize the "symptoms of an imperfectly clarified set of educational aims and cultural ideals" (p. 109). Jebb (1876/1962) calls "Isocratic" the "absence of harmony" between "loftiness and meanness," "practical morality and higher sentiment" (p. 87).

philosophical disciplines—to which they should aspire (ὀρέγεσθαι) and from which they should abstain (ἀπέχεσθαι).¹⁵ His counsel serves protreptic and apotreptic functions, but Isocrates hides his inventiveness under the established genre of παραίνεσις—a formalized presentation of ὑποθήκαι—which features commands and counsel to a specific addressee. Παραίνεσις is associated with the language of Hesiod, Theognis, and Phocylides, all of whom Isocrates claims as models (*Ad Nic.* 3, 43). The name for this language had become by the fifth century a “marked generic term . . . [which] signals to its audience the introduction of *hupothēkai* into Pindar’s [sixth *Pythian*].”¹⁶ It is important to recognize that Isocrates uses this marked nominal form and claims this genre and pedigree in the appropriate context of advising the young king Demonicus. On other occasions, such as in his assessment in the *Antidosis* of his own oration *On the Peace* or his protreptic of the young king Nicocles to virtue (ἐπ’ ἀρετὴν προτρέψειεν, *Ad Nic.* 8), he uses the unmarked παραινέω as a synonym with ἐπιπλήττω, συμβουλεύω, διδασκῶ, χρησιμὸν τι λέγω, and even παρακαλῶ (*Antid.* 65; *Ad Nic.* 46). Isocrates uses παραίνεσις, then, in a single instance to differentiate a part of his protreptic discourse to young kings—that part which makes use of traditional ὑποθήκαι to improve conduct—from the new-fangled, rootless rhetorical and eristic discourse of his competitors. His uses of προτρέπω paint a broader picture with strokes that capture both admonition of the competition and an explicit alternative. Isocrates turns people toward virtue, exhorts them to take risks for their country and to exert noble leadership (*Antid.* 60, 86; *Ad Nic.* 8). He ends up championing the noblest and worthiest pursuits (ἐπιτηδευμάτων) of παιδεία and philosophical training (*Antid.* 304), common wisdom (84) and the practical needs of cities and households (287, cf. *Areop.* 48, 51). To achieve these ends, individuals are exhorted and urged (παρακαλέσαι καὶ προτρέψαι) to remember and heed counsel (*Nic.* 12), and are turned not only by ὑποθήκαι (μὴ μόνον παραινοῦντες) but also by the living example of conduct (περὶ τὰς πράξεις ὑποδεικνύοντες, 57). As we shall see, these uses of προτρέπω resonate with Isocrates’s more extensive rhetoric of philosophical conversion. As I will argue, in one case he carries us into a normative psychology and art of reading for proper engagements with his literary protreptic discourse.

15. Cf. *Ad Nic.* 46, 54.

16. Kurke (1990, p. 91).

Isocrates not only encourages prospective students to follow the protreptic texts he provides, but he also encourages them to behave in such a way that their own lives, in turn, become protreptics for posterity. Protreptic texts can be transformed into protreptic lives, which can engender new protreptic texts. In his epideictic and eulogistic *Evagoras*, Isocrates presents this transmission of wisdom (76–77):

I have undertaken to write this discourse because I believed that for you, for your children, and for all the other descendants of Evagoras, it would be by far the best incentive [παράκλησιν] if someone should assemble [ἀθροίσας] his virtues, give them verbal adornment [κοσμήσας], and submit them to you for your contemplation [θεωρεῖν] and study [συνδιατρίβειν]. For we exhort [προτρέπομεν] young men to philosophy by praising [ἐπαινοῦντες] others in order that they, emulating [ἴνα ζηλοῦντες] those who are eulogized, may desire to adopt the same pursuits [ἐπιτηδευμάτων ἐπιθυμῶσιν], but I exhort [παρακαλῶ] you and yours, using as examples [παραδείγμασι χρώμενος] not aliens but members of your own family, and I counsel you to take heed [συμβουλεύω προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν] that you may not be surpassed in either word or deed by any of the Hellenes.

Isocrates exhorts young men through *παραδείγματα* as well, but in a different way than Plato, whose *παράδειγμα* in the *Euthydemus* serves explicitly as an example to the sophists and implicitly as an example of what a prospective student might expect in a protreptic encounter. Isocrates instead uses *παραδείγματα* and *τύποι* (*Evag.* 74) explicitly as models for students to emulate. The difference with his competitors, at least in this case, is made implicit: there is something distinctive about the way in which he directs the mind to the past in order to condition an individual for the present. In the *Evagoras*, his *παράκλησις* does not present ancient *ὑποθήκαι* but fashions such injunctions (albeit transposed into encomium) out of the memorial of a more recent hero's virtues.¹⁷ He begins by collecting easily imitable attributes of character and thought (75) which belonged to one who far surpassed the natures

17. Advice which appears elsewhere as injunction to the young successor Nicocles can be transposed into one attribute among many worth eulogizing (cf. *Ad Nic.* 10; *Evag.* 41). Sections 41–46 of the *Evagoras* provide many examples of succinct expressions which could easily be turned into prohibitive phrasing. Recall that Aristotle explains how deliberative *ὑπόθεκη* can be transposed and turned (τῇ λέξει μετατιθέναι καὶ στρέφειν) into encomium, just as encomium can be transposed into deliberative discourse (*Rh.* 1367b–1368a).

of others (πολὴν τὴν τῶν ἄλλων φύσιν ὑπερβάλλειν, 45) and enhances those attributes with the power of his *logos*.¹⁸ This union of heroic virtue and literary adornment constitutes a mobile παράδειγμα which subsequent generations can study and then emulate in word and deed to the point that they become consummate and noteworthy themselves.¹⁹ In addition to adorning departed heroes, Isocrates elsewhere explicitly offers himself through his texts as a παράδειγμα to be imitated (μιμήσασθαι) by his students and from which they take shape (ἐκτυπωθέντας, C. soph. 18). His students are marked with dynamic stamps of his literary character and thoughts. We will look in greater detail at how this process works in his letter to Nicocles, wherein Isocrates exhorts the young king and explains precisely what he must do in order to embody ancient wisdom and thereby leave to subsequent generations “memorial images” and “an undying memory of [his] soul” (*Ad Nic.* 36–37). For now, the point is clear that Isocratean παραδείγματα leave an impression on students in order that their character and thoughts might be refashioned and thereby leave an impression on others, whether in action or by becoming the themes of future texts. It is in this way that we find something akin to the perpetual chain-letter of exhortation in Platonic protreptic, though it is texts that play an explicit and privileged role in the Isocratean chain.

18. At one point, Isocrates curiously adorns his account of Evagoras’s return from exile with a passage from the *Panegyricus*: “The confusion [θορύβους] attendant upon such occasions, the fears [φόβους] of his followers, the exhortations [παρακελεύσεις] of their leader—why need I take the time to describe?” (*Evag.* 31; cf. *Paneg.* 97). Norlin (1928–1929) notes that *Ad Philippum* 93–94 justifies such “autoplagerism.” Isocrates argues here that only writers of epideixis “scrupulously avoid” (διαφεύγειν) repetition, while he sticks with what is “already well said” (καλῶς ἑτέρως εἰπεῖν) and suitable for the occasion. He chooses to adorn the life of Evagoras with the common wisdom which is to be found not in Hesiod or Theognis but in his own enduring writing.

19. Isocrates remarks on the mobility of images in words (*Nic.* 74): “I know that reliefs [τύπους] must of necessity remain solely among those in whose cities they were set up, whereas speeches can be published [ἐξελεχθῆναι] throughout Greece, and having been spread abroad [διαδοθέντας] in the gatherings of enlightened men, are welcomed among those whose approval is more to be desired than that of all others.” Usener (1994) argues from this passage that it mattered more for his work to be circulated widely “in Form von Besitz oder Weitergabe privater Exemulare” than the fact that many auditors at the same time could participate in a reading of his work (p. 66, cf. p. 106). While these memorial images can be published widely, Isocrates exhorts Nicocles “using as examples [παραδείγμασι χρώμενος] not aliens but members of [his] own family.” The literary image of his own dead father must leave a deeper impression, but it is also important for the young king to inherit “the noblest and greatest examples of excellence,” which his father had inherited from the sons of Zeus (*Nic.* 12). Nicocles receives legitimacy from the memorial image, and the account is made more attractive to other young men who might lack such an inheritance but nevertheless long for repute; on Isocrates speaking to a broader public beyond an ostensible addressee, see Usener (1994, pp. 20–46).

After we examine the agonistic rhetoric of Isocratean protreptic and his reconfigurations of ancient wisdom for present circumstances and future glory, we will explore another mode of engagement with παραδείγματα in his later writings. Plato suggests that the proper engagement with his protreptic discourse is not as a passive bystander, for example a φιλήκοος like Crito or a φιλόλογος like Phaedrus, but as someone who bravely enters the fray and commits to a course of investigation. While we can only speculate about how Plato meant for us to engage with his texts, we see clearly how one ought and ought not to enter into a dialogue with his champion.²⁰ Isocrates is far more explicit about how his audience ought to engage with his texts, particularly the longer and later texts which mix genres and are too long to listen to in one sitting. He encourages reading aloud in ways which do not strip a text of its power to make an impression on an audience; he encourages a kind of selective, private reading according to a reader's preferences and the defined objectives of the discourse. Isocrates thus establishes and authorizes multiple venues for protreptic encounters with the same text. Ethical habituation to the values endorsed in a given speech can be achieved only through listening, reading, rereading, and performing. Through these practices, students come to appreciate common judgment, relevance, usefulness, and the profound effect that good counsel and performance can have on the soul. Isocrates is criticized for his lack of sincere self-criticism or justification, particularly when it comes to his uncritical adoption of common and practical discourse: "Isocrates repudiates the central element in the Socratic paradigm of philosophy," that is, his *logos* lacks "a serious capacity to scrutinize, regulate, and where necessary revise its own guiding principles."²¹ Isocrates does assemble a lifetime of work without the apparent problems of coherence that we find in, for instance, the Platonic canon and even individual works. But in prescribing the ways in which his audience should engage with his text, Isocrates does openly expose vulnerabilities of his *logos* in action. It is true that he is never lost in perplexity, especially when he claims to be.²² But he readily acknowledges how his unified discourse might leave an indifferent

20. See Usener (1994, pp. 198–230) and Blondell (2002, pp. 22–27) on the likelihood of a single reader in public and further private textual study.

21. Halliwell (1997, pp. 121, cf. pp. 116–117, 120). This deficiency is perhaps what accounts for the Isocratean's moderate share in philosophy (*Euthyd.* 305d).

22. See, for instance, *Evag.* 69, *Antid.* 153, and especially *Panath.* 74–75 and 84–90, which some scholars believe to be confessions of weakness in old age, while Race (1978) argues that they have rhetorical motivation. Interestingly, his student finds himself in perplexity perhaps with equal insincerity (*Panath.* 216).

impression if performed or read poorly. He therefore focuses his scrutiny and regulation on how one properly enters into his enterprise. Just as Plato dramatizes how people can fail miserably to get involved in and sustain protreptic discourse, Isocrates draws attention to how audiences are prevented from being turned or, when converted, from observing his philosophical discipline consistently and correctly. But Isocrates does not express any reservations about the traditional wisdom which his discourse promotes; students must scrutinize how they perform the wisdom rather than the wisdom itself, which they take for granted.

“Professional” Protreptic

AGAINST THE SOPHISTS

6.1 *Challenging the Instructor’s Pledge*

In *Against the Sophists*, Isocrates systematically objects to the professions of his competitors—both what they claim to do with excessive promises and the actual work they do to give every school of φιλοσοφία and παιδεία a bad name in the popular imagination. Just when Isocrates is presumably first trying to make his mark as a philosophical educator, he notes that “the bad repute which results [from these excessive promises] does not affect the offenders alone, but all the rest of us who are in the same profession [διατριβήν] share in the opprobrium” (*C. soph.* 11). Isocrates is concerned primarily by the enmity which the public feels toward educators, even those who enter into the marketplace of ideas with more moderate and conventional advertisements. Wilcox (1943a) calls the written and published discourse less an indictment than an “exhortation” to his competitors “to mend their ways and to overcome the popular prejudice against higher education.”¹ His competitors who promise more than they perform are giving education a bad name, even to those (like Isocrates) who can deliver what they promise. Isocrates tries to prevail upon them to be more careful about how they advertise themselves in order to increase the credibility and accessibility of his own program. His protreptic discourse effectively apotrepticizes his competitors from their protreptic discourses while at the same time protrepticizing disillusioned citizens, that is prospective students, to a business in which they can believe. He describes

1. Wilcox (1943a, p. 115).

these two parts of the discourse in his *Antidosis* as “censure for those who make unwarranted promises [μείζους . . . ὑποσχέσεις ἐπιτιμῶν]” and a declaration of his own ideas (τὴν ἑμαυτοῦ γνώμην, 193–194). This discourse then serves a greater purpose beyond the reconciliation of the public to instructors at large; the public can now find a sincere and profitable profession by one instructor. Isocrates moves past the rhetoric which establishes resemblance among philosophical disciplines to a rhetoric which demonstrates the matchlessness and preeminence of his new discipline.

Before Isocrates presents an advertisement of his new program, he begins with an attack on his competitors’ promises and professions or advertisements (ὑπόσχεσις and the more marked ἐπάγγελμα respectively). We recall that Socrates expresses disbelief that the two eristic sophists could on one occasion advertise (ἐπαγγελλομένῳ) the relatively trivial skill of fighting under arms, and on another could make the great and unbelievable guarantee (ὑπὸ γὰρ τοῦ μεγέθους τοῦ ἐπαγγέλματος οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν ἀπιστεῖν) of being able to transmit virtue in a fine and speedy manner (*Euthyd.* 273d–274a).² Ἐπαγγέλματα always belong to competitors, and Plato is not alone in targeting them. *Against the Sophists* assails competitors for their excessive advertisements. As Too (1995) argues, this discourse is “undeniably . . . an anatomy of the unfulfilled promise.”³ Isocrates rarely uses this marked language elsewhere, but *Against the Sophists* is remarkable for its unrelenting attack on the claims of competitors.⁴

2. The *Gorgias* opens with Socrates wishing to know what Gorgias advertises and teaches (τί ἐστιν ὃ ἐπαγγέλλεται τε καὶ διδάσκει, 447c). The sophist professes to answer any question anyone might ask (ἐπαγγέλλει ἀποκρίνεσθαι ὅτι ἂν τις σε ἐρωτᾷ, 447d, 448a, 458d), boasts of being an orator, and claims to be able to make others orators (449b2). The Eleatic visitor and Theaetetus agree that the sophist is a wage-earner who professes to deal with people for the sake of virtue (ἐπαγγελλόμενον μὲν ὡς ἀρετῆς ἔνεκα τὰς ὀμιλίας ποιούμενον, *Soph.* 223a; cf. *Meno.* 95b; *Lach.* 186c). Socrates explains to Glaucon that some people falsely profess that education is putting knowledge into souls that lack it (*Resp.* 7.518b). Finally, Socrates understands Protagoras to be “talking about the art of citizenship and to be promising [ὑπισχνέσθαι] to make men good citizens,” to which Protagoras proclaims, “That is exactly the profession I profess” (τὸ ἐπάγγελμα ὃ ἐπαγγέλλομαι, *Protag.* 319a). In all of these instances, ἐπαγγέλματα are the domain of sophistic pretenders, just as they are for Isocrates.

3. Too (1995, p. 157).

4. Isocrates’s *Helen*, like the *Euthydemus*, censures the eristic sophists for their ἐπάγγελμα. But in the encomium, rather than advertising the ability to transmit virtue, they claim (ἐπαγγέλλονται) to possess knowledge περὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν (*Hel.* 9). An interesting exception, and perhaps grounds for doubting the discourse’s authenticity, is to be found in *Ad Demonicum*: “Do not hesitate to travel a long road to those who profess [ἐπαγγελλομένους] to offer some useful instruction” (*Ad Dem.* 19). Nowhere else does Isocrates favor ἐπαγγέλματα.

His attack on those who give παιδεία a bad name for “making greater promises [μειζους ποιεισθαι τὰς ὑποσχέσεις] than they can fulfill” begins with the eristic sophists pretending to search for truth while trying to deceive with lies as the starting point of their professions (ἐν ἀρχῇ τῶν ἐπαγγελμάτων, *C. soph.* 1). These sophists try to persuade prospective students that if they associate with them “they will know what to do in life and through this knowledge will become happy and prosperous” (3). They prop themselves up (καταστήσαντες) as διδάσκαλοι and masters of such precious goods, claim (λέγουσι, cf. ἐπαγγελουσι) that they do not want money, and disparage wealth, but still sell this knowledge for a mere fraction of its worth while promising to make their disciples all but immortal (μόνον οὐκ ἀθανάτους ὑπισχνοῦνται τοὺς συνόντας ποιήσιν, 3–4). The disparity between what they claim to offer and what they accept in return is so great that prospective students should, Isocrates warns, avoid making payment in advance, particularly to those who have never received the advertised instruction (5–6). Isocrates argues that these sophists “do the opposite of what they advertise” (τῷ δ’ ἐπαγγέλματι τάναντία πράττοντες) when they claim to instill virtue and moderation but do not trust their own students. They make money from a bogus introduction and straightaway do not demonstrate any faith in the power of their instruction. We have seen that some sophists follow even a much applauded performance with apotretic slander of competitors; they thus betray the fact that they know their initial ἐπαγγέλματα to be fraudulent. Before he moves on to the next group of impostors, Isocrates provides a summary of what any inexperienced (ιδιωτῶν) person might observe of the eristic sophists (7–8):

that they are on the watch for contradictions in words but are blind to inconsistencies in deeds, and that, furthermore, they pretend [προσποιουμένους] to have knowledge of the future but are incapable either of saying anything pertinent or of giving any counsel regarding the present, and when he observes that those who make use of their judgments [τοὺς ταῖς δόξαις χρωμένους] are more consistent and more successful than those who profess to have exact knowledge [τοὺς τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν ἐπαγγελλομένους], then he, I think, appropriately despises such studies and regards them as idle and frivolous

Part of the sentiment belongs, as Norlin notes (15), to Theognis 71–72, which does not, however, use the language of profession or advertisement.

talk [ἀδολεσχίαν καὶ μικρολογίαν] rather than a devotion to the soul [τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπιμέλειαν].

Isocrates appeals to the layman to recognize how these sophists are charlatans: they not only claim and advertise knowledge and insight which they do not have, but plainly are at a loss to speak aptly and offer useful advice, particularly to ἰδιῶται who depend on commonsense. He has yet to disclose the details of his program, but we begin to see, even in his aporetic discourse, which scorns the advertisements of others, the suggestion of an alternative path to better counsel and a true τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπιμέλεια based on δόξα and τὰ παρόντα.

The next group of impostors consists of those sophists who profess to teach “political speeches” (τοῖς τοῦς πολιτικούς λόγους ὑπισχνουμένοις, 9). It is in his critique of these sophists that we find the greatest if still indirect elucidation of his new philosophical program in this discourse. This is due, in part, to the fact that Isocrates also lays claim to πολιτικοὶ λόγοι as educational tools: the discourse ends with the belief that devotion to or cultivation of political speeches (τὴν τῶν λόγων τῶν πολιτικῶν ἐπιμέλειαν) can especially help to incite and train (συμπαρακελεύσασθαι γε καὶ συνασκήσαι) the virtues of temperance and justice which cannot simply be implanted or transmitted (21). In other words, cultivation of the soul can be aided by cultivation of political discourse. His sophistic competitors exhort students to the same thing (ἐπὶ τοῦς πολιτικούς λόγους παρακαλοῦντες) but neglect (ἀμελήσαντες) all the good things which political discourse affords (20). Even if their political discourse were to express similar ideas and values, they remain useless and unproductive. Never getting beyond anything but an empty promise, their political discourse fails to give ideas and values agency and fails to enable a reader to put those ideas and values into practice. Once again, Isocrates takes issue with sophists for the smallness of their charges and the magnitude of such false advertisements (μεγέθει τῶν ἐπαγγελμάτων, 9). And once again, any inexperienced person of good sense can see what they are up to and could do better:

[These sophists] are so senseless [ἀναισθήτως] and assume others are also so disposed that, although the speeches which they compose are worse than those which some laymen improvise [τῶν ἰδιωτῶν τινὲς αὐτοσχεδιάζουσιν], still they promise [ὑπισχνοῦνται] to make their students such clever orators that they will leave out nothing which one can find in the business.

Isocrates suggests that studying with these sophists will make citizens less fit to participate in their accustomed political institutions. The imposers advertise a training which can only serve to diminish the natural improvisational skills of their students; in fact, they do not in any way recognize either the natural talent (τῆ φύσει) or real-world experience (ἐμπειρίας) which are essential to success in present circumstances (10, cf. 14). Their impetuous charlatanism (τολμῶντες ἀλαζονεύεσθαι) amounts merely to boasting and extravagant advertisements (διὰ τὰς ὑπερβολὰς τῶν ἐπαγγελμάτων) which cannot even hide the fact that they know less about public speaking than any person with commonsense.⁵ They profess to be able to transmit a theoretical science of speech (τὴν τῶν λόγων ἐπιστήμην . . . παραδῶσειν) as if learning how to perform well in public discourse were as easy as memorizing the alphabet (10). They boast that they possess a transmissible ἐπιστήμη when they have neither examined well (ἐξετάσαντες) the nature of knowledge nor have been able to discover (ἐξευρεῖν) what lies in each of the arts. They are mucking up the business of training people to be better citizens by trivializing political discourse, severing it from good sense and experience, and advertising powers for φιλοσοφία which do not exist (11). While heaping scorn on his competitors for using empty language and turning capable citizens into buffoons, Isocrates attempts to convert popular skepticism into interest in a new program which is rooted in traditional values.

6.2 *Apotreptically Revealing a Profession*

Isocrates does not leave off here with these sophists, but begins to deliver the apotreptic function of his protreptic discourse in a way that suggests an increasingly constructive view of his own educational program. Just as these sophists never make it past the mere exhortation to political discourse due to their misunderstanding of the possibilities and powers of discourse, they also teach a kind of ineffectual speech based on the application of paradigmatic models (τεταγμένην τέχνην παράδειγμα φέροντες)—a practice which is at odds with what ought to be a productive and “poetic” process (ποιητικοῦ πράγματος, *C. soph.* 12). Isocrates returns to the notion that these sophists teach discourse as though it were like the art of using

5. Recall that Plato draws attention to many of the advantages of Socrates’s similarly improvisational (τολμήσω ἀπαντοσχεδιάσαι) and inexperienced (ιδιωτικῶς) discourse in the *Euthydemus* (278de); cf. *Ap.* 17a–18a.

letters, which is “fixed [ἀκινήτως] and remains the same . . . the same ones always being used for the same purposes.” Discourse requires contrary qualities: the ability to innovate (εὐρίσκειν δύνηται) and be original (τοῦ καινῶς), fitness for the occasion (τῶν καιρῶν), and grace (τοῦ πρεπόντως, 12–13).⁶ What is said by one person is not equally useful (ὁμοίως χρησιμόν) to the next speaker. The sophists rigidly apply παραδείγματα, whereas one with an eye to practical success ought to be (and without such training may naturally be) more fluid and attentive to circumstance.⁷ Once again, Isocrates places in opposition to the sophists not one of his accomplished students but a capable everyman of common and streetwise sense (14–15):

If it is my duty not only to rebuke [κατηγορεῖν] others, but also to set forth my own views [τὴν ἑμαυτοῦ δηλώσαι δianoiaν], I think all intelligent people will agree with me [συνειπεῖν] that while many of those who have pursued philosophy have remained in private life, others, on the other hand, who have never take lessons from any one of the sophists, have become clever orators and statesmen. For ability, whether in speech or in any other activity, is found in those who are well endowed by nature [ἐφυέσιν] and have been schooled by practical experience [τοῖς περὶ τὰς ἐμπειρίας γεγυμνασμένοις].

Isocrates claims that it is his duty not only to engage in a kind of forensic discourse of accusation, but it is also appropriate to undertake a demonstration (δηλώσαι, cf. δεῖξαι) of his discipline. And his demonstration is not of clever inventions but the principles which all right-thinking and successful people possess. Isocrates makes less of an effort to display the

6. Cf. *Panath.* 30. Halliwell (1997) notes that Isocrates claims “an old and deeply embedded constituent of traditional Greek patterns of thought” when he appeals to one’s ability to distinguish and master the moment (καιρός). For a discussion of the circumscribed role of καιρός in Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* and an alternative, more productive view of καιρός as Bakhtinian speech genre, which the author locates also in the Isocratean φιληκοῖα, see Haskins (2004, pp. 57–79). White (1987) defines καιρός as “a radical principle of occasionality” that sees “the production of meaning in language as a process of continuous adjustment to and creation of the present occasion” (p. 14). See also Poulakos (1993) on καιρός and τὸ πρέπον.

7. Isocrates expresses wonder (θαυμάζω, *C. soph.* 12) that the sophists treat discourse in this way just after he has explained that they are in the habit of thinking they will astound audiences (θαυμασθήσεσθαι, 10) with the extravagances of their advertisements. We see him having fun with locating wonder in the marketplace in much the same way as Plato: his competitors go for one kind of cheap wonder, but he is shocked and dismayed by something else.

principles themselves than to show how his discipline would be legitimately recognized as an institution comprising traditional values. His discipline speaks with (συνειπεῖν) all those who think, speak, and govern well.

According to Isocrates, many who receive formal instruction do not step into the public arena because instruction cannot fully fashion (ἀποτελέσειεν) those with natural deficiencies into exceptional debaters or “poets” of prose. On the other hand, he claims, there are individuals in public life who excel without any formal instruction because they are favored by fortune and accidentally hit on (ἐντυγχάνουσι πλανώμενοι) what is appropriate in a given situation. Alternatively, they may have been favored by fortune at birth with a natural aptitude and have been well trained by practical experience, that is, they have learned how to make good use of the past. Isocrates subtly shifts from sophistic instruction to true παιδεία and his own course of study, which can make individuals with natural aptitude and practical experience more skilled and resourceful at examining what an occasion requires (τεχνικωτέρους καὶ πρὸς τὸ ζητεῖν εὐπορωτέρους, 15). He professes to be targeting a certain kind of student: talented, practical and alert, and desirous of using discourse in the real world in fluid and suitable ways. He does not describe his program as clearly as he describes the unsuccessful sophistic practice of applying *technai* to variable situations, but Isocrates can perhaps be confident that his own views will be clear enough (cf. δηλώσαι) to prospective students who already have some natural aptitude in and practical experience with using speech successfully in conventional arenas.

Isocrates reveals more of his educational program by suggesting a literary alternative to the rigid sophistic technique of applying paradigms: his cultivation of and success with πολιτικοὶ λόγοι depends on a more nuanced sense of language and its constituent parts. In particular, he claims that one must obtain a knowledge (λαβεῖν τὴν ἐπιστήμην) of particular elements—ιδέαι—which are stylistic elements and larger units of discourse from which we make and compose all discourse (ἐξ ὧν τοὺς λόγους ἅπαντας καὶ λέγομεν καὶ συντίθεμεν, 16). Sullivan (2001) argues that ιδέαι in Isocrates cover a range of distinct units of discourse—“building blocks . . . [which] could almost be written independently of each other and placed in reserve.”⁸ These building blocks may be small stylistic elements

8. Sullivan (2001, p. 88). Ford (1993b) argues that the Isocratean reduction of language to such units and procedures expressed “a need to find a justified economic position for the speech seller in the city” (p. 51).

like “thoughts,” “maxims,” or “gnomai,” as found in the *Panathenaicus*—a discourse which describes itself as “full of enthymemes, no small number of balanced clauses and antitheses, and the other figures [τῶν ἄλλων ιδεῶν] which add brilliance to oratory” (2).⁹ These ιδεῖαι include, then, the building blocks of traditional wisdom found in ὑποθήκαι.¹⁰ The largest ιδεῖαι can be long speeches delivered on one occasion which get embedded in longer speeches, as we find, for example, in the *Antidosis*: “Now, to conceive of such a long speech, and to gather and harmonize together so many scattered ιδεῖαι, and to connect smoothly what follows from what goes before, and to make all other parts consonant one with another was by no means an easy undertaking” (11).¹¹ It is important to note that these larger ιδεῖαι, including a speech as long as *Against the Sophists*, contain the smaller ιδεῖαι of maxims and other stylistic elements. The *Antidosis* does not attempt to work at the level of elements like ὑποθήκαι which prospective students might use for practical living, but rather takes a step back to survey the larger elements which constitute good literary style—a project which is appropriate to the occasion. *Against the Sophists* maintains that a person who wishes to know how to compose and speak well must obtain the knowledge and experience of how to select (προελέσθαι), assemble (μίξει), and properly arrange (τάξει κατὰ τρόπον) building blocks of any size (*C. soph.* 16). He must also learn not to miss what the occasion demands (τῶν καιρῶν μὴ

9. Sullivan (2001, p. 86). Ιδεῖαι λογῶν also appear to denote prose genres, all of which the teachers of philosophy go through in detail (τὰς ιδεῖας ἀπάσας . . . διεξέρχονται, *Antid.* 183).

10. Sullivan excludes the ιδεῖαι of virtues like courtesy or refinement (ἀσπείριος) and dignity (σεμνός, *Ad Nic.* 34) because such “traits” or characteristics “seem not to be technical terms” (81). But in this instance, Isocrates has just explained that a reputation for possessing virtue endures for all time (*Ad Nic.* 32). For Isocrates, virtues are not the abstract entities that exist apart from the everyday world, the way they do for Plato. Rather than existing in a vacuum, they are enduring qualities of a heroic life which is preserved for us in encomium and the traditional wisdom of ὑποθήκαι. So the ιδεῖαι of a virtue comes to us as discrete memories of the words and deeds of heroes. Nicocles does speak of natures, powers, and the uses of affairs participating (μετεχούσας) to different extents in the virtues and qualities, perhaps “forms” (ιδεῶν) of temperance and justice (*Nic.* 30). The language does appear to resonate with Platonic vocabulary, but once again, the focus falls on the renown for these virtues (ἐπι ταύταις ταῖς ἀρεταῖς εὐδοκίμησαν).

11. Sullivan (2001, p. 86). Ιδεῖαι also include the large devices of battle and contest (ἀγῶνας καὶ τὰς ἀμιλλὰς) which Homer and the tragedians use to make fictions (τοὺς μυθωδισταίτους) more pleasurable (*Ad Nic.* 48–49). Ιδεῖαι are not indeterminate “ideas” or Platonic “Forms” or “topical matters of discourse,” but Sullivan goes too far when he concludes that, for Isocrates, “these terms are surely key terms of technical rhetorical doctrine, not what we might think of as a properly philosophical vocabulary” (p. 90). Isocrates utterly condemns technical rhetoric and has more of a share of the fourth-century philosophical market and vocabulary than his competitors.

διαμαρτεῖν) but appropriately to adorn or vary (πρεπόντως . . . καταποικίλαι) the whole speech with striking thoughts (ἐνθυμήμασι, i.e., additional building blocks). Finally, he must also incorporate at the level of words good rhythm and melody (τοῖς ὀνόμασιν εὐρύθμωσ καὶ μουσικῶσ εἰπεῖν).¹² Isocrates describes a process of drawing on a reserve of ιδέαι, arranging the selection, and using other ιδέαι and poetic finish to smooth the selections over in a way that is appropriate to an occasion; this, of course, requires a thorough knowledge of every conceivable ιδέα, a profound sense of what an occasion demands, and an inventiveness which will guide the arrangement and adornment of the discourse.

This proper course of training must be a joint project between a certain kind of student and the instructor. First, the student must possess stamina and a soul made for innovation, conjecture, and survival in the real world (cf. ψυχῆσ ἀνδρικῆσ καὶ δοξαστικῆσ). The application of ιδέαι is, in fact, suited to that sort of character and requires great devotion (πολλῆσ ἐπιμελείασ δεῖσθαι, 17). Isocrates reminds the reader that he is looking for a student with natural aptitude (τῆν φύσιν). And he repeats that knowledge is not simply transmitted: someone with aptitude gives himself over to someone who knows something about ιδέαι (αὐτὸν παραδῶ . . . τοῖσ εἰδόσι τι περὶ αὐτῶν, 16), undergoes demanding training in the different forms of discourse (τὰ μὲν εἶδη τὰ τῶν λόγων μαθεῖν), and is exercised in their uses (περὶ δὲ τὰσ χρήσεισ αὐτῶν γυμνασθῆναι).¹³ The instructor does not make rash and empty promises but actually knows something about ιδέαι, recounting them in a certain way and supplementing that instruction with a different kind of pedagogy (17–18):

The instructor must so enumerate [διελθεῖν] these things [i.e., ιδέαι and how to use them] so precisely [οὕτως ἀκριβῶσ] as to leave out nothing that can be taught, and, for the rest [περὶ δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν], he must provide such an example in himself [τοιούτον αὐτὸν παράδειγμα] that those who have taken form under his instruction [ἐκτυπωθέντασ]

12. Cf. *Paneg.* 9: “For the deeds of the past are, indeed, an inheritance common to us all; but the ability to make proper use of them at the appropriate time [ἐν καιρῶ], to conceive the right sentiments [τὰ προσήκοντα . . . ἐνθυμηθῆναι] about them in each case, and to set them forth in finished phrase [τοῖσ ὀνόμασιν εὐ διαθέσθαι] is reserved for the wise.”

13. I am inclined to take τὰ εἶδη as synonymous with ιδέαι. Sullivan (2001) argues that εἶδος refers not to stylistic devices but to something like “genre” (p. 84). But we have noted that Isocrates uses ιδέαι λογῶν to denote prose genres (*Antid.* 183). The range of the concept is wide, but in each case designates a constituent of effective discourse.

and are able to imitate [μιμήσασθαι] will straightaway show in their speaking more grace and accomplishment than any other.

The course of training grows more complex: when the right student learns all of the things which can be taught (τὰ διδασκτά) in the right way, then the student must also learn the things which cannot be taught. The instructor then offers himself as an example of these additional things for imitation. The juxtaposition of ἐκτυποῦσθαι and μιμήσασθαι draws attention to the passive and active capacities necessary to learning for even the most naturally apt, experienced, vigorous, and inventive soul. μίμησις in this case (and as we shall see in others) denotes a far more inventive and improvisational activity than simple imitation.¹⁴ Students emulate a model of informed and successful “invention.” If they receive a stamp from the teacher, it is the mark of resourcefulness and success in negotiating present life situations with lessons from the past. Student achievements are not mere reproductions of the instructor; they must be exceptional if they are to inspire future generations to a similar devotion to πολιτικοὶ λόγοι, their own well-being, and the welfare of the state. Isocrates caps this foray into a productive educational program with an apotreptic warning: philosophical training which lacks any one of these necessary components will bring its students anything but success. He provides prospective students with clear benchmarks for assessing the possibility of success with a discipline. They should be able to determine easily that, without these necessary components, even disciplines which flourish in his day will all come tumbling down (κατενεχθήσονται, 19).

Isocrates does not spend much time on the third and final group of sophists—those of a bygone generation who wrote oratorical manuals or *technai* for conducting lawsuits—even though on other occasions he repeatedly distinguishes himself from their ilk in contemporary Athens.¹⁵

14. Some of the fifth-century uses of μιμέομαι suggest something of this inventiveness. Crafty Orestes and Pylades “will speak the speech of Parnassus, imitating the accent of a Phocian tongue” (γλώσσης αὐτὴν Φοκίδος μιμουμένω, Aesch. *Cho.* 564) outside the palace in order to gain admission to the palace. The imitation is on the surface, obscuring and in service to an ulterior motive. Herodotus explains that by minting pure silver coins, Aryandes imitated (ἐμιμέετο) Darius, who had minted pure gold. The crafty tyrant of Egypt was executed for his resourceful imitation and one-upmanship (4.166). Euripides’s cunning Clytemnestra protests that when an unfaithful husband rejects his own bed, and his wife is then compelled to imitate (μιμείσθαι) her husband and find another love, she alone receives blame (*El.* 1037). The complaint focuses on what she sees to be a simple imitation but unequal consequence; of course, the imitation was not simple, but mixed with a plan to exact vengeance.

15. E.g., *Antid.* 46–50, *Panath.* 2, 135, 271 on the oratory of the courtroom.

Their advertisement or profession was to teach people how to speak in court (ὑπέσχοντο δικάζεσθαι διδάξειν, 19). In Isocrates’s view, they selected (ἐκλεξάμενοι) the most annoying and shameful words (19) rather than appropriate ιδέαι. And they were worse than the eristic imposters because the latter at least professed, however falsely, virtue and temperance (ἀρετὴν ἐπηγγελλαντο καὶ σωφροσύνην, 20). Those who profess to teach courtroom oratory do not even bother with making virtue a part of their rhetoric. They do claim to exhort (παρακαλοῦντες) people to develop πολιτικοὶ λόγοι, but their discourse is reduced to meddlesomeness and greed (πολυπραγμοσύνης καὶ πλεονεξίας) since they neglect the good things that truly come from political discourse. While the eristic sophists profess care for and devotion to the soul, in truth they perform only idle talk and nonsense. Likewise, the writers of *technai* for courtrooms advertise a dedication to discourse that one can use for success in everyday life, but in actual fact they corrupt and enfeeble the minds of their students and the spirit of state.

Through a systematic campaign of apotretic grounded in popular mistrust of formal education, Isocrates has provided his prospective students with a fairly constructive and far more desirable view of φιλοσοφία and παιδεία. The trend in scholarship since the eighteenth century, however, has been to assert that our text of *Against the Sophists* is incomplete and likely leaves off where we should expect the account of Isocrates’s own principles and rhetorical doctrine.¹⁶ The last section does begin with the phrase ἵνα δὲ μὴ δοκῶ which, as Too (1995) notes, “appears elsewhere in the corpus as a transitional formula . . . mark[ing] a change from one topic to another, or from one way of treating a topic to another.”¹⁷ Here, Isocrates states (22):

But in order that I may not appear to be breaking down the professions of others while myself making greater claims than are within my powers, I think I will easily make it clear even to others why I myself was persuaded to believe these things to be so.

Ἴνα δὲ μὴ δοκῶ τὰς μὲν τῶν ἄλλων ὑποσχέσεις διαλύειν, αὐτὸς δὲ μείζω λέγειν τῶν ἐνόητων, ἐξ ὧν περ αὐτὸς ἐπέισθην οὕτω ταῦτ’ ἔχειν, ῥαδίως οἶμαι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις φανερὸν καταστήσειν.

16. See Too (1995, pp. 163–164) for a review of the major critics. A significant part of Too’s study (pp. 162–199) focuses on the apparent loss of text after section 22.

17. Too (1995, p. 162): *Paneg.* 51; *Hel.* 38; *Arch.* 40; and *Callim.* 45. See also *Hel.* 15, and *Bus.* 9.

This ending certainly suggests that we should expect much more after the transitional formula and beyond the final future infinitive καταστήσειν. Some late-antique sources propose that the abrupt ending was followed by a ῥητορικὴ τέχνη, in spite of the author's expression of contempt for a τεταγμένη τέχνη (12) and the so-called manuals (τὰς καλουμένας τέχνας, 19).¹⁸ A manual might provide a catalog of ιδέαι, but it could not be thorough given the range of stylistic elements. More importantly, a manual cannot convey the ability to innovate (εὐρίσκειν δύνηται) and be original (τοῦ καινῶς), or ways to react to the occasion (τῶν καιρῶν) and achieve grace (τοῦ πρεπόντως, 12–13). It cannot teach the ability to select, mix, arrange, and vary ιδέαι (16), particularly to students who do not possess stamina and the ability to innovate and perform according to commonsense (ψυχῇ ἀνδρικῆς καὶ δοξαστικῆς, 17).

There is also the possibility that the text was meant to be followed by an unwritten and esoteric doctrine, but the testimony for this alternative is even thinner.¹⁹ There certainly are unstated elements in and more specifics to this educational program, but Isocrates has already suggested enough: in addition to a study of stylistic elements, an innovative student requires both an instructional παράδειγμα from which to learn improvisational skill, practical experience, and discursive training. More than this remains unwritten not because it is a secret, but because it cannot be written in inflexible manuals; it must be observed and performed according to innumerable combinations of context and abilities. The specifics also need not be written because they are reflected in the commonsense of citizens who become able and cunning orators and statesmen without

18. For a review of these late-antique critics, see Too (1995, pp. 164–167). Ps.-Plutarch and Photius recount a disagreement in Antiquity between those who say Isocrates composed *technai* (τέχνας . . . συγγεγραφεῖν) and those who say he used practice rather than method (οὐ μεθόδῳ ἀλλ' ἀσκήσει χρήσασθαι, *Isocrates* 32; cf. *Codex* 260).

19. See Diogenes Laertius's passing remark about Kaineus saying that Speusippus first published *παρὰ Ἰσοκράτους τὰ καλούμενα ἀπόρρητα* (4.1.2–3). The sayings of Chilon and Periander respectively assert that a secret is difficult to keep (Diog. Laert. 1.3.69) and ought not to be betrayed (1.6.98). However, the sense of ἀπόρρητα as esoteric doctrines at 4.1 appears again in Diog. Laert., who describes Pythagoras entering Egyptian sanctuaries and learning (ἐμαθεῖν) about their gods ἐν ἀπορρητοῖς (8.1.3). *Ad Demonium* advises that you should confide in your friends matters which require no secrecy as if they were secrets (περὶ τῶν ῥητῶν ὡς ἀπορρητῶν ἀνακοινοῦ) to get a better sense of their character (25). *Ad Demonium* also advises that you should not tell secret things except when it is equally beneficial for you and for those who hear (22). Isocratean ἀπόρρητα, if they existed, might not have been secrets at all, or else it was to no one's advantage to share them, for there are no ancient sources which even speak of an esoteric doctrine.

a formal education (14).²⁰ With *Against the Sophists*, Isocrates begins to turn prospective students away from excessive promises, from litigious and greedy practices, from inflexible “political discourse,” which makes students inept in every part of political life, to what has defined traditional and conventional wisdom and success.

20. Too (1995) argues that *Against the Sophists* deliberately breaks off in order to prevent complete μῦμησις (pp. 184–194). The silence at the end is a “calculated strategy which both announces and enacts a teacher’s attempt to avoid prescribing a singular, inflexible paradigm or discourse” (p. 199). I find this interpretation unnecessary. A student would not be learning how to speak and act from this discourse; it is an ἰδέα (as its incorporation into the *Antidosis* suggests) and may contain helpful ἰδέαι, but the student must learn many more, and more importantly observe and imitate the instructor in his deployment of them to acquire improvisational skill. A student will discover early in his training that he has been following his instructional παράδειγμα too closely when he fails to have success in new contexts, i.e., to display fitness for the occasion.

Paraenetic Protreptic

Τὰ ἀρχαῖα AND EXHORTING YOUNG TYRANTS

ISOCRATES'S EXHORTATIONS TO princes employ advanced literary strategies to speak simultaneously to multiple audiences. These strategies offer interesting analogues to those we have examined in the *Euthydemus*. Before we examine these, however, I wish to make the case for a level of sophistication in these texts which has gone largely unnoticed. Jebb (1876/1962) recognized that a text like *Ad Nicoclem* begins with “a formality which suggests that the writer is either wholly or almost a stranger [to the addressee] . . . [but the] intercourse thus opened appears to have become intimate.”¹ This transition from detachment to familiarity goes unexplained, and yet it is reminiscent of dynamics we have seen in, for example, the reverse transition from injunctions to frame in the advice-poetry of Hesiod. Other scholars have recognized that these letters of exhortation speak to multiple audiences largely on the grounds of what Isocrates has to say about *Ad Nicoclem* in the *Antidosis*: that the discourse will “make clear in what way I am accustomed to associate with both private citizens and dynasts [τοις ιδιώταις καὶ τοῖς δυνάσταις]” (*Antid.* 69–70). Isocrates claims that he addresses kings “as a free man and an Athenian should, not paying court to his wealth or power, but pleading the cause of his subjects.” As Morgan (2003) argues, “An underlying message is that there are no constitutional absolutes. We have merely the wise orator trying to make his way and the implication that it is not necessarily

1. Jebb (1876/1962, pp. 87–88).

a democracy in which one has the most freedom of speech.”² This may certainly be the case, although I am inclined to believe that Isocrates was much less of a political relativist than this. In any event, I am less interested, here, in whatever claims Isocrates made later in life, with however much artifice, about how democratic these exhortations really were.³ What is more interesting for my purposes is how Isocrates uses literary strategies to construct fictive, intimate scenes of prince-instruction that are surrounded by frames which speak to a larger audience. In these more detached frames, Isocrates provides programmatic statements about the nature of his discourse—how it relates to other kinds of discourse, how it should be read. These frames make an intimate exhortation between two parties—advisor and prince—accessible to anyone who is familiar with both conventional genres and, in particular, the didactic configuration of an authority figure who finds ways to establish elements of symmetry in his political intercourse.

7.1 *Protreptic Discourse as Secondary Genre*

For the next quarter-century after the publication of *Against the Sophists*, Isocrates busied himself with perfecting a discourse ostensibly for exhorting young Cyprian kings to study and live exemplary lives of virtue and sound leadership. With their fathers recently deceased, the young tyrants Demonicus and Nicocles required counsel and moral training. Isocrates fashions three epistles—two directly to the young men and one from the mouth of Nicocles to the Cyprians—and an encomium of Nicocles’s father, Evagoras, that consist of of praise (ἐπαινοῦντες, εὐλογουμένους) and exhortation (παράκλησιν, προτρέπομεν). He writes these so that the young

2. Morgan (2003, p. 186). Morgan ties this view into Isocratean ethics: “He is committed to the position that one cannot obtain precise knowledge (ἐπιστήμη). The best one can do is use conjecture (δόξα; *Antid.* 270–271), and try to arrive at the best course. If the best is situational, there will be no absolute standard of constitution against which one can measure excellence. If one is committed to what is best, but wants audiences in Cyprus, Athens, and Macedonia, one must encourage each audience to find at least the potential for the best in itself” (p. 190).

3. Jebb (1876/1962) finds the claim “somewhat exaggerated” (p. 90). And yet, he argues that when Isocrates puts himself “at the king’s point of view, [and] offers a popular plea for Monarchy as against Republic” in the *Nicocles*, he is merely playing the part of “the professional rhetor—it being distinctive of Rhetoric as an art that, like its counterpart Dialectic, it is equally ready to argue either side of a question” (pp. 92–93). Jebb claims that the exaggeration of the *Antidosis* conceals pro-tyrannical sentiments, but then argues that Isocrates is merely engaged in rhetorical and sophistic *epideixis*.

tyrant and subsequent generations might contemplate, emulate, and surpass his father's consummate virtues (*Ēvag.* 76–77).⁴ Isocrates claims to have assembled (ἀθροίσας) and adorned (κοσμήσας) these virtues for the young king and the young king's family (σὲ καὶ τοὺς σοὺς). And yet, he has just explained that memorial discourse far surpasses statues of heroes for both its ability to portray and make imitable their deeds and wisdom, and its mobility throughout Hellas to learned communities (74). The discourse thus functions as an advisory letter and treatise on kingship to a particular addressee, while at the same time speaking to a larger audience as counsel and display piece. Ober (2004) notes that in this period Isocrates had to find ways of making *epideixis* relevant and competitive. The “hypersophisticated disquisitions ‘in defense of Helen’” of the generation before had to undergo transformations in the early fourth century in order to escape the charge of sophistry and word-juggling, and to contend with Platonic dialogues and outstrip the increasingly popular symbouleutic oratory which circulated as “polished written versions of actual speeches delivered in major addresses before the Athenian Assembly and in famous public trials.”⁵ Isocrates draws attention to the deficiencies of these competitors, such as how symbouleutic oratory does not draw on the discourse of encomium and demonstration to make good use of the past (cf. *Antid.* 62), how the trivial pursuits of eristics and dialectic result in useless debate. The letters and direct address of *Ad Demonicum*, *Ad Nicoclem*, *Nicocles*, and *Evagoras* represent Isocrates's earliest efforts to hybridize these competing

4. The sixteenth-century historian Hieronymus Wolf (1570) arranges the *Ad Demonicum*, *Ad Nicoclem*, and *Nicocles* under the heading “Hortatory” while the *Evagoras* is grouped with the *Helen*, *Busiris*, *Panathenaicus*, and *Against the Sophists* under “Epideictic.” “Deliberative” discourse includes the *Panegyricus*, *Philippus*, *Archidamus*, *Areopagiticus*, and *On the Peace*. The remaining texts are “Forensic” (in Jebb 1876/1962, Vol. 2, p. 81). Jebb himself also groups the hortatory letters together, and includes them with the display pieces and “Essays on Education,” that is, *Sophists* and *Antidosis*, under the superheading “Scholastic Writings,” as opposed to “Political Writings” and “Forensic Speeches” (pp. 82–84).

5. Ober (2004, pp. 28–29). In his chronological distribution of the extant speeches of the fourth and last half of the fifth centuries, Ober (1989) groups these four texts—*Ad Demonicum*, *Ad Nicoclem*, *Nicocles*, and *Evagoras*—alone under what he calls a “rather arbitrary” classification: on the one hand, political pamphlet, tract, or set of letters, and on the other, epideictic display speech (pp. 346–347). Together with the *Helen*, they comprise all of the extant *epideixis* from the period 377–356, and with the *Archidamus*, *Areopagiticus*, and *Plataicus*, all of the extant tracts of the same period (p. 349). The rest of the extant speeches from this period belong primarily to the apolitical forensic speeches of Demosthenes and Isaeus (e.g., the speeches *Against Aphobus*, the *Estate of Nikostratus*). Isocrates is also responsible for all of the extant tracts and display speeches before this period (450–378) and after (355–322) with the exception of Lysias's epideictic *Olympiacus*.

discourses into a complex secondary genre. He integrates the formal aspects of these rival and other bygone genres which, he argues, facilitate the care for virtue, the *polis*, and Hellas in general, and rejects those that undermine such care. Isocrates famously highlights the strangeness (ἄτοπος, *Antid.* 1) of his later experiments with mixed discourse, but his discipline has already entered the marketplace of ideas through the mixed media of these earlier orations for princes.

In spite of the fact that Isocrates himself remarks on the hybridity and objectives of these texts, modern commentators often dismiss them for their heterogeneity, apparent discord, and a seeming lack of profundity, dignity, and originality. Norlin (1928–1929) describes *Ad Demonium* and *Ad Nicoclem* as “lacking not only unity of form but unity of spirit.” He continues, “Shrewd advice for getting on in this workaday world is imperfectly harmonized with an occasional note of exalted idealism—a discord which is characteristic of the ‘practical philosophy’ of Isocrates.”⁶ Norlin appears to be passing judgment primarily on what he believes to be a second-rate program resulting from an infelicitous combination of symbouleutic and epideictic genres. Poulakos and Depew (2004) note the inventiveness of the oratorical form and reformist principles of the *Evagoras*, but find the same form being used badly and for ignoble ends in the letters: “The effort to influence the *physis* of the king through education [in the *Evagoras*] was abandoned in the face of the more lucrative pursuit of advising the king how to control the way he was perceived and, in the process, how to produce the most obedient subjects.”⁷ In spite of the fact that the (less innovative) eulogizing of Evagoras was reported by Pseudo-Plutarch to have fetched the extraordinary sum of twenty talents (838a), the suggestion is that the innovative oratorical form is robbed of its capacity to influence and educate when Isocrates turns his pen from instructional encomium (i.e., advice-giving *epideixis*) to simpler but more profitable advice. Konstan (2004), too, finds the pithy advice of the “essay on kingship” superficial and uninspiring, particularly relative to other innovations in prose: “None of this is so profound as to make one wish passionately that one had been a classmate of Nicocles while he was attending Isocrates’ school in Athens, in the way one would give a fortune to have sat in on Plato’s lectures in the

6. Norlin (1928–1929, Vol. 1, p. 3; cf. p. 39).

7. Poulakos & Depew (2004, p. 7).

Academy.”⁸ And yet, Isocrates maintains twenty years later in his synopsis of *Ad Nicoclem* in the *Antidosis* that this unusual form—wherein the discourse is divided into separate κεφάλαια under which multivoiced counsel (ὡν συμβουλευέω) for both princes and private men is said in a few words (διὰ βραχέων)—is the most helpful guide to thoughts and the quickest way to publish his principles (τὴν τε διάνοιαν τὴν ἐκείνου μάλιστ’ ὠφελήσειν καὶ τὸν τρόπον τὸν ἐμαντοῦ τάχιστα δηλώσειν, *Antid.* 68–69). Isocrates insists that the combination, while not the best of his written works (69), is still an especially effective combination of symbouleutic and epideictic discourse. Perhaps he feels compelled to justify the arrangement because contemporaneous critics do not find disjointed, relatively multivoiced discourse particularly effective (cf. *Phdr.* 264bd), but Isocrates finds the manner (τρόπον) of his composition compelling enough to include in the grand acquittal of his prose and profession.

Before we examine how Isocrates portrays the particular generic innovation of paraenetic protreptic discourse, it is worth noting briefly how he describes the practiced and careful articulation of complex and multigeneric texts. His *Panegyricus* is a highly polished mixture of symbouleutic discourse, display piece, and published treatise: he gives counsel in a (fictional) public context (ἦκω συμβουλευέσω) on both the war against the barbarians and Panhellenic accord, displays (ἐπιδεικνύουσι) his oratorical ability while best profiting (ὠφελούσιν) his audience, and sets forth the deeds of the past in finished phrases (τοῖς ὀνόμασιν εὖ διαθέσθαι) as only the most excellent craftsmen can do (τοὺς ἄρισθ’ . . . ἐξεργαζομένους, 3–10).⁹ Isocrates explains that he achieves such a combination not through the simple (ἀπλῶς) speech of ordinary, nonprofessional men who apply the petty and plain standard of forensic oratory to any discourse, but through the exceedingly refined (λίαν ἀπηκριβωμένοις) speech of *epideixis*, which is meant for discerning audiences who will not be satisfied with carelessness (εἰκῆ) of phrase but seek excellence (11–12). Isocrates explains that other orators, in an effort to appease (καταπραΰνοντας) their hearers, conceal their craft with excuses (προφασίζομένους), claim that their preparations

8. Konstan (2004, p. 118). See Bennett (1953) for a study of the formative influence of these exhortative discourses on Shakespeare’s Polonius—that “wretched, rash, intruding fool,” who lacks “the soul of wit” but whose practical wisdom may be “the most often memorized passage the poet ever wrote.”

9. Ober (1989) classifies the *Panegyricus* with *Against the Sophists* and the *Aegineticus* as a pamphlet or tract of the same period (403–378 BCE).

are unskilled, and say that they are speaking improvisationally (13). He does not participate in the same conventions, but rather draws attention to both the magnitude of his subject and his exceptional ability to find or invent (ἔξευρεῖν) a discourse to match. Ford (2002) notes that passages like these “are the first attempt to define a class of prose literature that is worth preserving and passing from hand to hand, at least in part because of the art that has been lavished on it.”¹⁰ Isocrates’s prose-craft does more than measure up to his subject; the rhetoric of his prose-craft and the craft itself make the subject what it is—more significant than orators of the past and their conventions have been able to achieve, and worthy of far more devotion. Rather than obscure the artistry and inventiveness of his prose, Isocrates chooses to celebrate his novel and refined discourse, and elevate it to the level of a cultural and literary artifact which both represents and profits, displays and counsels the best of Hellas.

This great and novel prose, which makes guides of past deeds, claims a kinship not with the “trivial” and “trivializing” prose of contemporary rhetoricians, but with the older poetry of encomium and epic. And yet, even these poetic genres could not possibly do justice to these deeds and the men who performed them. Isocrates is keen to show how his prose can construct greater heroes than poetry, and provide these heroes with a more fitting discourse (ἀρμόττοντες λόγοι) than poetic ἔπαινος (82–84).¹¹ He borrows a great deal from the poets, using more than just the “sonorities . . . verbal fireworks . . . elevated diction and figures of thought” which make his *logos* “a higher kind of prose than sophistic display, and yet not poetry.”¹² In the display which is not just display, counsel which is not just counsel, and letter or treatise which is not just polished artifact, we also find the lofty aims of the epic poet (and in his paraenetic protreptic, as we shall see, the ὑποθήκαι of ἔπαινος and didactic poetry).

10. Ford (2002, p. 239). As for the rhetoric of inventing mixing genres, Ford also notes that “the generation of Gorgias’ successors was more strongly attached than their master to a literary system of distinct prose genres, each requiring its own forms (ιδέαι) of thought and expression” (p. 253). Isocrates had to highlight his resourcefulness and the hybridity of his texts because audiences and competitors of his generation were increasingly wed to generic conventions which did not exist in the fifth century, for prose, at any rate.

11. Sandys (1868) suggests Isocrates means Gorgias among the sophists, and among the poets, Aeschylus (*Persae*) and Choerilus of Samos for his poem on the Persian wars (p. 86). And yet the passage, as we shall see, goes beyond the panegyrics of fifth-century Athenian virtues to a much broader literary program.

12. Ford (2002, p. 256). For more on Isocrates and his rhetorical view of genre, see pp. 252–258.

In the *Panegyricus*, the sophists and poets were unable to speak in a manner worthy of the Athenian achievements because the world had not yet known such heroism, and did not yet know a discourse which could tell of such heroism and match (σύμμετροι) the measure of such men (83). The poets could praise the deeds of the ten-year expedition against Troy, but the Athenians in a shorter span of time had defeated a Panasiatic force and liberated all of Hellas. Isocrates explains how these heroes underwent greater trials in order that they might be recognized with a greater kind of encomium (84):

I think that some god out of admiration for their excellence [ἀγαθθέντα τὴν ἀρετὴν αὐτῶν] brought about this war in order that men endowed by nature with such a spirit should not be lost in obscurity nor die without glory, but should be deemed worthy [ἀξιωθεῖεν] of the same honors as are given to those who have sprung from the gods and are called demigods. For while the gods surrendered the bodies of even their own sons to the doom of nature, yet they have made immortal the memory or their excellence.

In other words, some god initiated a war which far surpasses the Trojan expedition in size, expediency, and effect in order that human excellence might be displayed and celebrated. This was done so that Isocrates might bring about a new, more fitting, and epic version of prose-encomium. As he claims, the Athenians were so given to public spirit (οὕτω δὲ πολιτικῶς εἶχον) and a desire to outstrip (φθῆσονται) one another for the welfare of the state (79) that they successfully educated the young in such habits (τοὺς νεωτέρους ἐν τοῖς τοιοῦτοις ἤθεσι παιδεύοντες, 82), and so surpassed all others in virtue. A god brought about the war as an occasion for a new genre akin to epic but more suited to this combination of exceptional civic pride, competition, education, and excellence.¹³ The epic poets, Isocrates explains elsewhere, wrote not to admonish, advise, or profit but to please (*Ad Nic.* 49). Poetic themes and thoughts, even if deficient in expression (λέξει) and argument (ἐνθυμήμασιν), are thoroughly adorned (διαποικίλαι, κόσμοι) with εἶδη, graceful rhythms, and symmetries which charm (ψυχαγωγούσι) listeners (*Evag.* 8–11). Isocrates means to profit his audience, but he can make use of all of these pleasing adornments to dress and refine more precise

13. Cf. *Panath.* 77–78, where the encomium of Agamemnon and his Greek expedition against Troy becomes instead a παράδειγμα for Panhellenic unity.

and fitting arguments in prose. This new kind of prose is a *logos* for preserving the more profitable memory of true heroes rather than the pleasurable memory of fictions (cf. *Ad Nic.* 48). In my view, Isocrates believes he has integrated aspects of poetic and prose genres which interanimate and reinforce one another in ways that construct and suitably praise inspirational subjects.

Another kind of poetic and generically innovative prose includes his addresses to and from princes. These addresses are some of Isocrates's earliest contenders in the arena of philosophical protreptic. The proems to these innovative texts describe a unique literary program for effectively advising and influencing his ostensible addressee as well as his greater audience throughout the Greek-speaking world. Isocrates begins (and ends) his letter to Nicocles with dissuasion from material tribute and an exhortation to the less plastic but more monumental gift of his prose-encomium and counsel (1):

When men are accustomed, Nicocles, to bring to you who are kings articles of dress or bronze or wrought gold [ἔσθητας ἄγειν ἢ χαλκὸν ἢ χρυσὸν εἰργασμένον] or other such possessions [κτημάτων] of which they themselves have need and you have plenty, it seems to me all too evident that they are not engaged in giving but in bargaining [οὐ δόσιν ἀλλ' ἐμπορίαν ποιούμενοι], and they are much more skillful [τεχνικώτερον] at making a sale than those who profess to drive at a petty trade.

This opening emphasizes the nature of his discourse as an artifact, but one quite different in form and delivery than those who aim to flatter the king: others offer you possessions like clothes, bronze, and gold of which they have quite little while I offer a possession of which I have plenty and am therefore in the position to give freely.¹⁴ The kind of tribute which crafty

14. Norlin (1928–1929) notes that this list of gifts is an echo from Homer (Vol. 1, p. 40; cf. Forster, 1912, p. 110). Odysseus explains to Telemachus that the Phaeacians delivered him to Ithaca with stores of bronze, gold, and woven clothes (χαλκὸν τε χρυσὸν τε ἄλις ἐσθητά θ' ὕφαντήν, 16.231). This treasure sits safe in caves while Odysseus is in need of counsel (βουλεύσωμεν) about the destruction of his enemies. The king of Ithaca has plenty of material wealth; what he needs is counsel for reclaiming legitimacy. He also, incidentally, needs a bard to sing his song so that others might hear the tale: how he spoke and acted like a king even when no one recognized him. I wonder if Isocrates is not suggesting Nicocles would do well to find himself a modern-day bard who might offer him legitimacy through prose-encomium.

and petty tradesmen afford cannot guide princes as well as the treasure which he possesses and freely offers—“the finest, most useful present and the most fitting for [Isocrates] to give and for [Nicocles] to receive—if I could stake out [ὀρίσαι] what pursuits [ἐπιτηδευμάτων] you should aspire to [ὀρεγόμενος] and from what you should abstain [ἀπεχόμενος] in order to govern best your state and kingdom” (2). He has already begun to define the useful and useless pursuits with these opening remarks: don’t mistake material wealth for the best, most useful, and most appropriate thing for young kings. Don’t mistake for “liberal” educators those people who claim to teach skills for attaining material wealth. They make excessive promises to train people to achieve a very limited kind of success. Isocrates, by contrast, is marking out the boundaries of an elite discourse and conduct which are truly monumental, more universal and enduring, and at the same time appropriate to the particular occasion.¹⁵ His poetic prose, with its protreptic and apotreptic discourses, celebrates the speech, thoughts, and deeds appropriate both to young students and philosopher-teachers.

We will now focus on the genres which fall within this horizon (ὀρίσαι) of protreptic discourse. While Isocrates aims to supplant the popular discourse of tragedy and epic entirely, he embraces another poetic tradition—the paraenetic poetry of ὑποθήκαι—which has escaped young princes and been neglected by private citizens. He explains to Nicocles that “a number of bygone poets left injunctions on how to live” (ὑποθήκας ὡς χρῆ ζῆν), and it is from these injunctions, together with an austere lifestyle, laws, and most importantly friendly admonition, that private people “may reasonably be expected to become better human beings” (εἰκὸς αὐτοὺς βελτίους γίγνεσθαι, *Ad Nic.* 3). Whether they choose to make use of these things is another matter. Kings, on the other hand, live without such admonition (ἀνουθέτητοι) because they are deprived of it, surrounded by flatterers. Isocrates’s protreptic discourse will acquaint young princes and reacquaint neglectful readers with the traditional wisdom of paraenetic poets. Private people, Isocrates argues, think this symbouleutic and apotreptic discourse, whether in poetry or prose, is the most useful but least pleasurable (42). They praise (ἐπαινοῦσι) it but choose company which shares in their faults: “As a case in point, one might cite the poetry of Hesiod

15. Cf. *Antid.* 7: an εἰκών “more noble than statues of bronze.” For the universal dimension of occasional epinician—a poetic genre which contains paraenesis and is therefore a relative of Isocratean protreptic—see Nagy (1990, pp. 136–145). On Isocrates’s discursive monument to the “inner, ethical qualities” of a subject, see Ford (1993b) and Ford (2002, pp. 236–240).

and Theognis and Phocylides, since these, they say, have proved the best counselors in human life; but in spite of what they say, people choose to occupy themselves with each other's senselessness [ἀνοίαις] rather than the ὑποθήκαι of these sages" (43, cf. 46). Isocrates puts the problem in yet another way: private people prefer the genre of comedy, even the cheapest (φαυλοτάτης) comedy, to the most skillfully (τεχνικῶς) crafted counsel of exceptional poets (44). This technical skill of refined ὑποθήκαι and γνῶμαι stands in opposition to the lowly discourse of poetry of comedy, in addition to courtroom rhetoric, sophistic displays, and the popular discourse of epic. The illustrious adages of poetic paraenesis have pride of place in Isocrates's polished prose, and yet they are not incorporated verbatim.¹⁶ They are instead, and not surprisingly, taken out of context, transformed into prose, and fine-tuned to a new context and new occasion.¹⁷ Moreover, the spirit or stylistic element (ιδέα) of the ὑποθήκη becomes a template for Isocrates's own crafted counsel. For instance, he recasts his more descriptive sentiments about flattery into a series of brief injunctions (28):

Regard not those who praise [ἐπαινοῦντας] everything you say and do as your most faithful friends, but those who criticize [ἐπιτιμῶντας] your mistakes. Grant παρρησία to those who have good judgment in order that when you are in doubt, you may have friends who

16. Following Sandys (1868), Norlin (1928–1929) notes these echoes: *Ad Dem.* 1 (Theognis 101ff.), 13 (171), 19 (71–72), 25 (415), 26 (869–872), 29 (105–106), 32 (484ff.), 38 (145–148, 315–318), 42 (585, 591ff., 1162). For passages which resonate with the sages, see *Ad Dem.* 17 (Thales, Diogenes Laertes, 1.36), 24 (Solon, Diog. Laert. 1.60), 34 (Cleobulus, Stob. *Flor.* 3.31), 40 (Periander, Stob. *Flor.* 3.56), 41 (Chilo, Diog. Laert. 1.70). See also a maxim which reflects the wisdom of an admonitory Menelaus (*Il.* 13.636) at *Ad Dem.* 20. *Ad Nicoclem* and *Nicocles* are similarly busy with pithy injunctions and the former explicitly refers to Hesiod, Theognis, and Phocylides, but these texts have not been mined for resonance in the same way. Norlin does, however, occasionally note where *Ad Nicoclem* gives a second echo of Theognis through connections with *Ad Demonium*: e.g., *Ad Dem.* 38 and *Ad Nic.* 32, *Ad Dem.* 42, and *Ad Nic.* 39. It would be surprising that Isocrates does not make more use of Homer, say, for instance, Nestor and Phoenix—those “conduits for the genre of paraenetic poetry” (Martin, 1984, p. 31)—were it not for the fact that Isocrates finds, as we shall see, the popular poetry of epic and tragedy unsuitable for instruction.

17. This traditional wisdom was only in the fifth century an increasingly textualized wisdom. Lord (1995) explains that when epic was written down, “the concept of a *fixed text* and of *the text* of a song became current. With that concept arose the need for memorization rather than recomposition as a means of transmission” (p. 102). Isocrates appears to emphasize both means of transmission: a student of philosophy should assemble a storehouse of traditional injunctions (i.e., memorize the lyrical wisdom of the past) for study and contemplation, but should also adorn, recast, and reperform this wisdom in ways that are fitting for particular occasions.

will help you decide. Distinguish between those who artfully [τέχνη] flatter and those who loyally serve you so that the base may not fare better than the good.

We recall here Aristotle's explanation of transposing deliberative discourse into epideictic and vice versa (*Rh.* 1367b–1368a). In Aristotelian terms, Isocrates uses a more descriptive exposition (and the topos of what is honorable) to attack comedy and appropriate the genre of paraenetic poetry. By contrast, he uses the language of deliberative oratory (and the telos of what is expedient) and symbouleutic poetry, to address his audience. The problem with private people (and presumably Isocrates's competitors and critics) is that they praise but ignore the genre of paraenesis—they praise princes but neglect their mistakes, and do not understand the role that admonition must play in eulogy. In other words, they misunderstand and mishandle the genres of praise as well as of reproach. There is an appropriate time for praise and emulation in protreptic discourse (cf. *Evag.* 77), but these multigeneric texts must also accentuate the long road ahead for the prospective student who wishes to imitate and even surpass the celebrated lives of heroes. Encomium alone cannot disabuse people of those pleasures and literary tastes which run counter to their best interests (ἐναντίας τῷ συμφέροντι τὰς ἡδονὰς ἔχοντας); without the incorporation of ὑποθήκαι into Isocratean protreptic (which produces that “strange” hybridity), people will fail to recognize the necessary connection between paraenesis, teaching, and saying whatever is useful and pleasurable in the true sense (*Ad Nic.* 45–46, *Ad Dem.* 45–47). The synthesis of poetry and prose, epideictic and deliberative rhetoric, praise and admonition demonstrate yet another aspect of Isocrates's efforts to negotiate and execute a complex secondary genre with protreptic and apotreptic functions.

7.2 *Circumscribing the Competition*

A good deal of Isocrates's exhortation and rhetoric of conversion, like his competitors' exhortations, advertises one brand of philosophy by comparing alternative protreptics. As we have seen in Plato's protreptic, this business consists of the dual and often incompatible objectives of creating the impression of resemblance and substitutability, while at the same time emphasizing the matchlessness of the new discipline.¹⁸ Protreptic

18. For a speculative study of these exhortations being tied to Platonic discourse through

discourse casts a wide net around the rhetoric used by educators, discussing the promises they make, the discourses which they feel to be most appropriate for the procurement of success (εὖ πράττειν, εὖ λέγειν, perhaps εὖ φρονεῖν) and well-being (εὐδαιμονία). It also draws attention to the dispute over what constitutes success. The effect is an apparent association with competing educators that ends up with the act of dissociating from them. And while this dynamic is a productive tension in all protreptic discourse, some protreptics deal with competitors in more notional, less dramatic and dialogic ways.¹⁹ For example, the Isocratean protreptic for young tyrants, like most Aristotelian treatises, incorporates and compares the discourse of competing protreptics without letting the opponents speak in any way for themselves—the competition is mentioned but suppressed.²⁰ The paraenetic discourse of bygone sages can be incorporated because they are old and recognized, and because (in Isocrates's view) that

what the scholar believes to be a clear and systematic critique of the *Republic* and *Gorgias*, see Eucken (1983, Chap. 6). My own analysis does not depend on a chronology for the Platonic corpus, and instead allows for the preservation of the effective anonymity of Isocrates's invective; again, see Owen (1983).

19. Aristotle remarks that people do things which they believe will procure well-being and avoid doing things which they believe will bring about its opposite, and those who exhort and dissuade (αἱ τε προτροπαὶ καὶ αἱ ἀποτροπαὶ) others concern themselves not only with defining the things which conduce or are detrimental to this end (τῶν εἰς ταύτην συντεινόντων καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων), but with defining the nature of the end itself (*Rh.* 1360b). In other words, they are engaged in what appears to be a shared rhetoric of determining the path to well-being, but they disagree on the destination. He frames traditional notions of well-being—"success with virtue [εὐπραξία μετ' ἀρετῆς], or independence [αὐτάρκεια] of life, or the most agreeable [ἡδιστος] life with security, or an abundance of possessions and slaves with the power to safeguard and make use of them"—with rhetoric which belies these differences of destination: nearly (σχεδόν) all men have the same aim of well-being and nearly (σχεδόν) all men agree (ὁμολογοῦσιν) that this aim is one of these things. The various destinations and paths of those who exhort and dissuade are reduced to a set of basic common beliefs or reputable opinions (ἐνδοξα), that is, the opinion of "everyone, the many, or the wise" (though they may also belong to a minority, *Top.* 100b21–23) and challenged by dialectic. Aristotle begins with these ἐνδοξα but ends with first principles; see Irwin (1988). Isocrates remains well within the realm of traditional knowledge, even if his discourse is innovative.

This brief passage hints at a productive tension of all protreptic discourse, but the rhetoric which frames this tension is more closely related to Isocratean antecedents than Platonic.

20. Isocrates incorporates Platonic voices in his *Antidosis* which we will examine later. But as Nightingale (1995) notes, Isocrates's experiment with parody unravels: "Isocrates' effort to target the *Apology* and other Platonic definitions of philosophy in the *Antidosis*, in fact, might be seen as a sort of failed parody. For Isocrates' speech can neither contain nor control its complex and powerful subtexts" (p. 59). The suppressed voices of these professional and paraenetic protreptics tend still to speak through Isocrates's obvious anxieties, and in this way resist being made into relics.

wisdom does not have professional ambassadors. In these advice texts, Isocrates does not take the same risks as Plato, who gives his competitors speaking parts and starring roles.²¹

Isocrates's paraenetic exhortation begins with an indictment of other writers for neglecting (cf. τὰ παραλελειμμένα) the art of writing codes of conduct for kings (νομοθετεῖν ταῖς μοναρχίαις, *Ad Nic.* 8). But it is not until the end of *Ad Nicoclem*, after a very long list of injunctions, that Isocrates takes up the task of cataloging alternative disciplines and censuring each for their distracting and unsuitable pastimes and genres (39–54). He provides a detailed list (cf. διελεθεῖν) of injunctions concerning the things which a king should aim at and the activities to which he should devote himself (ὧν χρῆ στοχάζεσθαι καὶ περὶ ἃ δεῖ διατρίβειν, 6)—a list which contains both positive and negative commands, that is, προτροπή and ἀποτροπή—and follows this list with a professional apotroptic. On one level, the reader should pursue certain courses of *action* and avoid others; on another level, the reader should avoid harmful *disciplines* and their respective discourses while, of course, embracing the whole account which Isocrates has provided as the true πολιτικός λόγος and ἡ τῶν λόγων παιδεία.²² This professional apotroptic begins: “Make use of these things which I have said or else seek better” (χρῶ τοῖς εἰρημένους ἢ ζήτει βελτίω τούτων, 38). This injunction opens the door to competitors without yet providing criteria for judging the suitability or effectiveness of counsel. Ultimately, a reader must put counsel into practice in certain ways in order to determine its worth.²³ But Isocrates does not hesitate to provide some criteria outside of practical

21. For an examination of how Isocrates incorporates alien voices in his *Panathenaicus*, and to what effects, see section 8.2 “Collaborating with Competitors.”

22. Put another way, Isocrates provides an analogue to the extradiegetic and intradiegetic levels of discourse found in the *Euthydemus*. At the heart of the exhortation of Nicocles lies the paraenetic injunctions between Isocrates and the young prince (11–39)—reminiscent of the “didactic configuration” of Hesiod and Perses (see Martin, 2004), but less dialogic and open-ended than its paraenetic model. We should note the constant use of the second-person singular pronoun in these sections. The part of *Ad Nicoclem* which Isocrates reperforms in the *Antidosis* comes entirely from this paraenetic discourse. Outside of this more private communication lies a programmatic frame which apotropticizes *any* reader from alternative disciplines. Paraenetic lyric and didactic are mixed in the list of injunctions, but the programmatic frame consists of and reflects on genre-mixing. This part of *Ad Nicoclem* is not included in the *Antidosis* perhaps because the latter already includes the apotroptic discourse of *Against the Sophists*.

23. These ways of engaging with the text immediately precede this pivotal injunction which kicks off the professional apotroptic, and will be examined closely in the next section (7.3, Making, Using, Becoming Examples).

experience for sorting through alternatives. It seems that the remainder of this protreptic discourse is devoted to discrediting and obstructing substitutes in order that the reader will take the time that is necessary for the suggested study (φιλοσοφία), practice (ἐμπειρία), and training in this course of conduct (γυμνάζεσθαι) to be useful and transformative (35).

The professional apotreptic of *Ad Nicoclem* begins in familiar territory. The pivotal injunction that the reader should use his ὑποθήκαι or else find a better alternative is immediately followed by a series of brief injunctions which call to mind characteristics of his professional opponents whom we have seen in *Against the Sophists* (*Ad. Nic.* 39):

Regard as wise men, not those who dispute subtly about trifling matters, but those who speak well about the great things, and not those who make promises to others of well-being while themselves being in great confusion, but those who, while making modest claims about themselves, are able to deal with both affairs and men, and are not completely confounded by the vicissitudes of existence, but have learned to bear well and moderately both the good fortunes and unhappy accidents of life.

σοφοὺς νόμιζε μὴ τοὺς ἀκριβῶς περὶ μικρῶν ἐρίζοντας, ἀλλὰ τοὺς εὖ περὶ τῶν μεγίστων λέγοντας, μηδὲ τοὺς τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις εὐδαιμονίαν ὑπισχνουμένους, αὐτοὺς δ' ἐν πολλαῖς ἀπορίαις ὄντας, ἀλλὰ τοὺς μέτρια μὲν περὶ αὐτῶν λέγοντας, ὀμιλεῖν δὲ καὶ τοῖς πράγμασι καὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις δυναμένους, καὶ μὴ διαταραττομένους ἐν ταῖς τοῦ βίου μεταβολαῖς, ἀλλὰ καλῶς καὶ μετρίως καὶ τὰς συμφορὰς καὶ τὰς εὐτυχίας φέρειν ἐπισταμένους.

This reckoning of disciplines uses familiar rhetoric to locate both Isocrates and the paraenetic discourse which he has just delivered as the only legitimate educator in a field of opposing professions and discourses. The reader might seek better counsel, but this injunction cautions against recognizing other claimants of wisdom and their respective discourses as anything other than imposters. Isocrates once again inveighs against the eristic sophists and their subtle and trivial discourse, their business of making excessive promises in spite of their poverty, and the irrelevance of their discourse (cf. *C. soph.* 1–8). But the paratactic and chiasmic syntax creates a number of oppositions that go beyond the profession of disputation,²⁴

24. Norlin's translation of *Ad. Nic.* 39 misses the complexity of this structure by apparently

and for that matter, any other easily identifiable group.²⁵ Isocrates serially attacks those who make excessive promises of well-being (who can, as we have seen, mean sophists broadly) and those who, in their lives, seemed confounded by reversals of fortune. The chiasmic structure reveals other broad and crucial differences which promote a special kind of *logos* and understanding. Eristic quibbling is opposed to a refined *logos*. Living ἐν πολλαῖς ἀπορίαις—certainly a jab at writers of paradox or Socratic dialogue who might claim to deal with εὐδαιμονία while ending in confusion—is opposed to a more measured and moderate *logos*. Mere promises are opposed to practical power and aptitude (δυναμένους). And an unmistakably elenctic confusion is opposed to understanding (ἐπισταμένους).²⁶ Isocrates pits a singular refined, measured, and powerful *logos* against disparate and alternative discursive practices. If a reader of these injunctions searches for substitutes in the marketplace of ideas, he will find only vulgar, unsuitable,

reading the passage against the background of the invective against the eristic sophists alone: his translation of τοὺς τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις εὐδαιμονίαν ὑπισχνουμένους, αὐτοὺς δ' ἐν πολλαῖς ἀπορίαις ὄντας—those who “being themselves in sorry straits, hold forth to others the promise of a prosperous fortune”—carries over the eristic economy of charging very little for important lessons though these sophists are in poverty, even when εὐδαιμονία and ἀπορία clearly have greater significance in this context.

25. Too (1995) notes that in the invective of *Against the Sophists* Isocrates presents anonymous rivals for effect: “Invective, as a discourse, produces stereotypes and so it has a tendency to efface the distinctive differences between the individuals it targets. It tends to lump its victims together into broad, readily identifiable classes, transforming them into something ‘other’ to be dismissed” (pp. 160–161). Following the work of Owen (1983) to identify the commonplaces of philosophical invective—e.g., accusing competitors of slander (p. 17), of being a slave, barbarian, low tradesman, common thief and plagiarist, sexual deviant, enemy of the people, unpleasant in appearance, effeminate, a *rhapsaspis* (p. 15), and associate of tyrants (p. 9)—Too adds the charge of “producing an exaggerated promise and charging fees” and concludes that these commonplaces in *Against the Sophists* “prevent [Isocrates’s] reader from reducing the text to a pointed attack on a few particular individuals” (Too, 1995, pp. 160–161). I appeal to this principle of invective in my reading of *Ad Nicoclem*.

26. Smith (1903) notes that when Socrates avoids further confounding (διετάραττεν) an earnest Euthydemus and instead speaks simply (ἀπλούστιατα, *Mem.* 4.2.40), we are to read the former as ἐλέγχων and the latter as speaking without irony (p. 214). Given the rarity of διατάρασσω, the opposition with ἐπισταμένους may also suggest the difference between Socratic dialogue which cripples students and this privileged *logos* which makes them fit for life. It seems unusual that Isocrates lays claim here to an ἐπιστήμη given his insistence elsewhere that “it is not in the nature of man to attain a science [ἐπιστήμην] by the possession of which we can know positively [εἰδεῖμεν] what we should do or what we should say” (*Antid.* 271); one must use powers of conjecture (τοὺς ταῖς δόξαις . . . δυναμένους) to determine the best course; cf. *C. soph.* 16, *Helen* 5. Jebb (1876/1962) argues that Isocrates does not deny the existence of such an ἐπιστήμη; rather, “His contention is that this knowledge, supposing it attained, is worth less than judicious, though inexact, opinion on the affairs of practical life” (p. 52). *Ad Nic.* 39 appears to suggest something else however. A more thorough study of this vocabulary is required. On the consistency of Isocratean rhetoric, see Morgan (2004).

and impotent disciplines, and will run the risk of acquiring such undesirable qualities.

A brief digression will illuminate one of the most fruitful oppositions in this reckoning of disciplines and discourses. The separation of those who are confounded by the vicissitudes of existence (διαταραττομένους ἐν ταῖς τοῦ βίου μεταβολαῖς) from those who know how to bear reversals of fortune in a measured and exemplary way is a topos which Isocrates uses for different effects throughout his long career. There is, of course, a broad and commonplace point to be made about how one ought to respond to events over which one has no control. The sentiment of responding well and serenely after calamity is an echo of Archilochus and Theognidean injunctions in *Ad Demonicum*: “Consider that nothing in human life is stable, for then you will not be exceedingly joyous in prosperity, nor excessively grieve in adversity. Rejoice in the good things which come to you, but grieve in moderation over the evils which befall you, and in either case, do not expose your heart to others” (42).²⁷ This sentiment aside, however, the rhetoric of μεταβολαί τοῦ βίου marks key moments in Isocrates’s literary development which reinforce his critique of alternative disciplines in *Ad Nicoclem*. Reversals of fortune, whether those of someone else or his own, provide Isocrates with occasions for taking up and mixing new genres. Over a decade before the composition of *Ad Nicoclem*, it is a reversal of fortune (τὴν τοῦ βίου μεταβολήν) which prompts Polycrates to take up the profession of teaching philosophy for personal gain and to make a mess of genres, creating an indictment when he had intended to write a defense (*Bus.* 1). Polycrates responds badly to the reversal, and Isocrates, in turn, engages in and provides a demonstration (his earliest extant example of *epideixis*) of how the sophist might have at least composed a true defense.

Nearly a decade after he wrote *Ad Nicoclem*, Isocrates begins the rhetorical exercise of the *Archidamus* with a programmatic statement about

27. Cf. *Panath.* 31, *Ad Nic.* 35. The sentiment can also be found, for instance, in the steadfast and measured devotion of the speaker of the earlier *Aegineticus* to Thrasylochus even after the speaker’s reversal of fortune (22). Cf. the later *Archid.* 43, 48, and *Areop.* 8. Of course, Isocrates also recognizes elsewhere that there are better, more industrious ways of escaping altogether or even controlling such a reversal: the later *De Pace* 60 and *Archid.* 50, respectively. And Isocrates sometimes uses the rhetoric of reversal of fortune to provoke immoderate but still suitable responses; for instance, the young Alcibiades laments and feels indignation for his downfall while trying to elicit feelings of outrage and pity with forensic discourse (the earlier *de Bigis* 48). The contemporaneous and ostensibly deliberative but also epideictic *Plataicus* gives good reason for mourning a reversal of fortune amid the blessings of others (47). And Evagoras and Conon were filled with grief and indignation over the fall of Athens to Sparta, but acted fittingly (54).

an entrance into deliberative oratory: the young prince remarks that the Spartans might be surprised (θαυμάζουσιν) by his foray into offering counsel (παρελήλυθα συμβουλευέσων), particularly on matters which even the elders hesitate to discuss (1). It is a reversal of fortune—the decline of Spartan power after the defeat at Leuktra and the subsequent Theban invasions—which brings about a change (μεταβολήν) in the prince’s (and Isocrates’s) manner of speech. Isocrates enters into a discourse which others are accustomed (εἰθισμένων) to use but have not, on this occasion, used in a way worthy of the state (ἄξιως ἦν τῆς πόλεως, 2). Again, Isocrates provides an innovative *logos* to demonstrate how one might escape being utterly confounded by the vicissitudes of existence.

Over another decade later, and after a personal reversal of fortune, Isocrates takes up a genre which was familiar to him as a logographer but, on this occasion, he engages in it in a literarily innovative way (*Antidosis*). And still another decade later, he describes a different kind of personal change which marks his entrance into a kind of discourse which was not typical for him in the great span of his profession (*Panathenaicus*). We will soon look at Isocrates’s response to these μεταβολαί in greater detail (Chapter 8, Judging Protreptic), but it is worth noting now that it was a change (μεταβολήν) in how Athenians viewed wealth—a change from admiration to suspicion—that led them, Isocrates claims, to prosecute him (*Antid.* 159–161). This change compelled him to take up “forensic” oratory on his own behalf in a creative way in the *Antidosis*. And it was the loss of his patrimony in the Peloponnesian War which, he says, led him in the first place to enter into and excel at the profession of philosophy (162). Isocrates expected that he would have been admired for bearing the unhappy accidents of life with such excellence and moderation, for having built such a distinguished career out of writing and teaching well. Finally, in the *Panathenaicus*, while in distress about attacks on his immoderate treatment of the Spartans—“in this state of confusion [ταραχή], shifting from one impulse to another [μεταβολὰς ποιουμένων πολλὰς]”—Isocrates calls in his former students for their judgment (*Panath.* 229–233). Here, Isocrates portrays himself in the throes of doubt and ends up adopting a more *dialogic* discourse primarily in an attempt to respond to those critics and competitors who claimed that Isocrates promoted only his instruction and speech (19). With this foray into philosophical dialogue, Isocrates wished to demonstrate that he knew how to bear the slander of rivals, how to listen to and incorporate the criticism of students, and when to remain silent. All of these reversals of fortune and troubles provide occasions for

innovative discourse, and it is precisely through such innovations that a person can, Isocrates suggests, master circumstance and find success.

When we return, then, to the chiasmic structure of the reckoning of disciplines in *Ad Nicoclem*, it seems that every alternative profession is opposed to Isocrates's unique *logos*. Subtle disputation and aporetic dialogue are explicitly opposed to refined and measured speech. However, the abilities to deal with public affairs (ὀμιλεῖν δὲ καὶ τοῖς πράγμασι καὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις δυναμένους) and to bear the vicissitudes of existence also depend on the ability to use conventional discourse in unconventional ways. If the reader seeks alternatives outside of the creative arrangement of traditional values in this paraenetic protreptic, he will find only empty promises and mute, confounded competitors. Isocrates emphasizes at once both the traditional and original contribution of his discourse (40–41):

Do not be surprised [μὴ θαυμάσης] that in what I have said there are many things which you know as well as I. This is not from inadvertence on my part, for I have realized all along that among the great number both of private individuals [τοσοῦτων ὄντων τὸ πλῆθος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων] and of their rulers, there are some who have uttered one or another of these injunctions, some who have heard them, some who have observed other people put them into practice, and some who are carrying them out in their own lives. But the truth is that in discourses of this sort [ἐν τοῖς λόγοις], we should not seek novelties [ζητεῖν τὰς καινότητας], since in these discourses it is not possible to say what is paradoxical or incredible or outside the circle of accepted belief [οὔτε παράδοξον οὔτ' ἄπιστον οὔτ' ἔξω τῶν νομιζομένων οὐδὲν ἕξεστιν εἰπεῖν]; but, rather, we should regard that man as the most accomplished [χαριέστατον] who can collect [ἀθροῖσαι] the greatest number of ideas scattered among the thoughts of others and present them in the best form [φράσαι κάλλιστα].²⁸

According to Isocrates, wisdom lies in gathering traditional wisdom and recasting it in a way that is effective and tasteful. In contrast with the sophists, who write paradoxical discourses and articulate far-fetched and disputed ideas primarily for cheap thrills, Isocrates fashions a discourse which, he

28. For the position on novelty, see Cleon in the Mytilene debate (Thuc. 3.37–40).

claims, is well within conventional standards of taste.²⁹ As we have seen, he has just directed the reader who wishes to seek better accounts of wisdom (ζητει βελτίω, 38) to consider only his own *logos* as wise (σοφοῦς νόμιζε, 39). He suggests that readers should not seek novelties (ζητεῖν τὰς καινότητας) but should consider wise (ἡγεῖσθαι τοῦτον χαριέστατον) what both laymen (ιδιώται) and kings can, in the real world, recognize as good sense.³⁰ Isocrates triangulates his paraenetic wisdom from the observations of ιδιώται—sophistically untrained but, at times, naturally talented and successful citizens—and from the lives of their similarly endowed rulers. His protreptic discourse falls within the bounds of conventional taste, he argues, because both laymen and rulers themselves utter these injunctions, hear them, observe them in action, and perform them. Sophistic novelties in discourse, he suggests, cannot be heard or seen as having practical consequences in the affairs of men. Isocrates thus defines his discourse of symbouleutic prose as a repository of wisdom which is, in his day, scattered throughout the sayings and actions of the ιδιώται, wise men, and noteworthy kings. His discipline demands that students comb the Greek-speaking world for these examples and learn how to adorn them in speech and how to emulate them in action.

Once he has separated his *logos* from alternative and new-fangled educational programs, Isocrates proceeds to root out what he feels to be equally seditious genres—comedy, tragedy, and, once more, epic—for the way that they appeal to harmful, lesser pleasures. Everyone agrees, Isocrates asserts, that the traditional knowledge found in the ὑποθήκαι and γῶμαι of the leading poets (τῶν προεχόντων ποιητῶν)—Hesiod, Theognis, and Phocylides among others—have proven “the best counselors [ἀρίστους γεγενῆσθαι συμβούλους] for human conduct” (43–44). But people prefer foolishness to admonition, the ignoble to the noble, pleasure to austerity and labor (45), the affairs of others to their own (46), unrealizable wishes to concrete plans (47), and fictions to reproach and advice (48–49). So they abandon ὑποθήκαι for the spectacle of drama and epic. Isocrates objects to comedy because it delights by staging gossip and fancy, and teaches how

29. Recall that Gagarin (2001) argues that the primary goal of sophistic rhetoric was not to persuade or deceive, but to make a display of implausible and shocking, and therefore entertaining, arguments. Both Isocrates and Plato aim to undermine this kind of sophistic performance by constructing alternative senses of wonder. Isocrates also writes paradox on other occasions (e.g., *Busiris*, *Helen*), but the primary goal of these discourses is to educate audiences in the broad powers of speech rather than to entertain.

30. Forster (1912) notes that some manuscripts read the now familiar and pivotal ιδιωτῶν for τοσοῦτων ὄντων τὸ πλῆθος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων (p. 126).

to give and take slander (47).³¹ Two decades later, Isocrates will chastise the Athenians for eliminating *παρρησία* except that exercised by both reckless orators in the Assembly and the comic poets who are celebrated for publishing the faults of Athens to the rest of the Hellenes. As he adds, those who rebuke, admonish (τοὺς ἐπιπλήττοντας καὶ νοουθετοῦντας), and thereby improve the state are wrongly reviled (*De Pace* 14).³²

Consider his views on comedy. According to Isocrates, popular comic spectacles do more than distract from the traditional forms and values of paraenetic discourse; they represent Athenian recklessness, meddlesomeness, and controversy for the whole world to see while at the same time giving those who use the best of political discourse a bad name. Henderson (1990) notes that the comic poets' "techniques of persuasion and abuse are practically identical with those used in political and forensic disputes."³³ Isocrates emphasizes that those who prefer the pleasures of foolishness to admonition are becoming infected precisely with these contentious elements of social and political critique.³⁴ It is not difficult to see how easily comedy might come to represent many of the troubles which Isocrates believes plague Athens. Citizens become clever in the petty uses of deliberative and forensic genres through the unedifying spectacle of civic failures in comic dramas. By appealing to unwholesome pleasures (*Ad Nic.* 45), popular spectacle like comic drama have the capacity to turn citizens toward novelty rather than tradition, toward dispute, divisive critique, and

31. The fourth-century comic playwright Antiphanes writes that the plots of tragedy are well known to any audience before anyone begins to speak. A single word like "Oedipus" can conjure up an entire situation and resolution. The task of the tragedian is to remind, whereas the comic poet must prepare the audience for his invention (fr. 191, Kock, II). The comic poet deals in daily gossip, but the novelty of his treatment of these hot topics requires a good deal of explanation, even if comedy had its own stock characters and commonplaces.

32. Of course, soon after in the *Antidosis*, Isocrates will also reproach the Athenians for being persuaded by slander *en masse*, suggesting the way that they were persuaded by the comic playwrights of Socrates's "first accusers" (*Ap.* 18d). Comedy is responsible for a long and widely residing slander (19a) with which it is impossible to contend, like fighting shadows (18d). Although Plato condemns comedy, he appropriates its agonistic and formal elements (see Nightingale, 1995, Chap. 5) which we have located in his protreptic discourse. Isocrates's censure of comedy is not similarly accompanied by an appropriation of salvageable elements.

33. Henderson, (1990, p. 273).

34. Comedy may criticize institutions and conventional practices, but Isocrates makes it clear that these popular critical discourses were also responsible for justifying and reinforcing what he felt to be the worst of the establishment.

slander rather than agreement (52), and toward fantasy rather than counsel (οὐ βουλευομένους ἀλλ' εὐχομένους, 47).

Isocrates dismisses the popular spectacles of earliest epic and tragedy for different reasons.³⁵ We have seen that *Ad Nicoclem* begins with an effort to unseat poetry, particularly epic poetry, with paraenetic prose as *the* discourse for training princes. Epic offers songs of undying fame, but Isocrates claims to mark out and fashion a discourse which is eminently more useful for and appropriate to managing a state and kingdom (τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὴν βασιλείαν διοικήσας, 2). He introduces a more monumental discourse which uses a heroic past to speak clearly to present circumstance. However, at the end of this new hybrid discourse, Isocrates expresses anxiety about whether it can compete with the wondrous spectacle of epic and tragedy. Both of these are the most mythical (μυθωδεστάτους) and delight not only the ear but the eye as well because they take the form of contests and competitions (τοὺς ἀγῶνας καὶ τὰς ἀμίλλας, 48). Epic mythologizes (ἐμυθολόγησεν) the struggle and wars (τοὺς ἀγῶνας καὶ τοὺς πολέμους) of the demigods while tragedy makes myths vivid in the form of struggle and dramatic action (ἀγῶνας καὶ πράξεις, 49). In other words, epic fashions contests into mythic narrative while tragedy fashions the myths of these contests into dramatic action. And both epic and tragedy are performed in competition. In these transformations, epic and tragedy have a vividness which the more profitable discourse of admonition and advice does not.³⁶ Isocrates concedes that observations of the human condition (κατιδόντες τὴν φύσιν τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων) lie at the heart of epic and tragedy, but it is their

35. It is significant that Isocrates refers neither to rhapsodic performance nor to the tragedy of his day, but to Homer and the poetry of the first inventors of tragedy (τοὺς πρώτους εὐρόντας τραγωδῶν). He may be reluctant to identify the capacity for making philosophical observations which these bygone inventors possess with the discourse of contemporaneous rivals. Or he may anticipate Aristotle who will argue that the characters of the “old” poets spoke πολιτικῶς while those of the “new” poets spoke ῥητορικῶς (*Poet.* 1450b). Burian (1997) argues, “The contrast implies a distinction between political discourse (the oratory of assembly and public ceremony) and the argumentation of the courtroom, with its litigation of personal disputes” (p. 207). Isocrates might qualify this distinction by locating the oratory of the Solonic age in the πολιτικός speech of the fifth-century poets (cf. *Panath.* 138). The ῥητορικός speech of the fourth-century poets might include both courtroom disputation and the petty deliberative oratory of his day.

36. Cf. the programmatic prologue to the *Panathenaicus*: “When I was younger, I elected not to write the kind of discourse which deals with myths nor that which abounds in marvels and fictions [τοὺς τερατείαις καὶ ψευδολογίας μεστός], although the majority of people are more delighted with this literature than with that which is devoted to their welfare and safety” (σωτηρίας, 1), i.e., πολιτικός λόγος.

dramatic and pleasurable narrative and form rather than their philosophical content which attract and lead popular audiences (ψυχαγωγείν, 48). He concludes his assessment of the genres of epic and tragedy, then, as he had started it: if a reader should seek a discourse which appeals more to the crowd (ὄχλους), he should use the vivid παραδείγματα of Homer and the first tragedians (49). But a reader will not find a better, uncommon, more profitable, and legitimately pleasurable (γνησίως, *Ad Dem.* 46) discourse outside of Isocrates's paraenetic and protreptic innovation. As we shall see, his protreptic discourses not only share in the ability to transform the actions and lives of heroes into myths and παραδείγματα, but have the power to motivate readers to habituate themselves to these examples and thereby become paradigmatic.

Isocrates's circumscription of his competition and their respective discourses in *Ad Nicoclem* ends with a curious twist. He temporarily allies himself with his contemporary rivals to denounce the popular and pleasing but useless discourse of epic and tragedy. Isocrates appeals to the prince (and, by implication, to others who are "not of the multitude" [50]) to abandon pleasure as a criterion for judging discourse (50–52):

You ought not to judge what things are worthy or what men are wise by the standard of pleasure, but to appraise them in the light of conduct that is useful [τῶν πράξεων τῶν χρησίμων], especially since the teachers of philosophy, however much they debate [ἀμφισβητοῦσιν] about the proper discipline of the soul [τῶν γυμνασίων τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς] (some claiming [φασιν] that it is through eristic discourse, others that it is through political discourse, others that it is through other means that their disciples are to attain to greater wisdom), still they all agree [ὁμολογοῦσιν] on this, that the well-educated man must, as a result of each of these disciplines, demonstrate the ability to take counsel and make decisions [βουλευέσθαι δυνάμενον].

Norlin (1928–1929) rightly captures both the receptive and active sense of βουλευέσθαι here; the criterion of practical usefulness requires that the word means "to take counsel and to turn counsel into action."³⁷ Isocrates surprisingly enlists his usual sophistic rivals to turn elite readers away from the distractions and obsequiousness of popular discourse. Although

37. Elsewhere, deliberation may remain distinct from decision making (e.g., βουλευόν and ἐπιτελεῖ τὰ δόξαντα at *Ad Dem.* 34).

these sophists concern themselves with controversy (ἀμφισβητοῦσιν), they are united in denying the criterion of pleasure which the mythic discourse of epic and tragedy, that is popular poetry, affords; instead, they promote the capacity to deliberate and make practical decisions.³⁸ The achievements (πράξεων) of their discourses are more useful than the pleasures of dramatic action (πράξεις, 49). And yet, as we have seen, Isocrates has just argued that these rivals lack the capacities to deal with practical affairs, to bear the vicissitudes of existence, and to do anything other than make empty promises.

If the usefulness of sophistic discourse trumps the pleasures of popular discourse, then Isocratean *logos* trumps them all. We see Isocrates making expert use of what Bakhtin (1981) calls a “dialogizing backdrop.”³⁹ He uses his competitors’ rhetoric to devalue mythologizing discourse, but he frames that rhetoric in such a way that it is distorted and defeats itself. As soon as he has summoned them and made judicious use of their rhetoric, he sends these lovers of controversy (ἀμφισβητοῦσιν) away: “It is therefore necessary to get rid of these controversies and test these things [i.e., what things are worthy or what men are wise] according to what is agreed upon” (χρῆ τοῖσιν ἀφέμενον τῶν ἀμφισβητουμένων ἐπὶ τοῦ συνομολογουμένου λαμβάνειν αὐτῶν τὸν ἔλεγχον, 52). Isocrates further qualifies this examination of worthy things and wise men according to tradition with the suggestion that elite readers study how people use symbouleutic discourse to speak to the occasion (ἐπὶ τῶν καιρῶν θεωρεῖν συμβουλευόντας). Advisors who truly administer the criterion of practical usefulness with an eye to the occasion are able to see more (δυναμένους ὁρᾶν πλεον, 53) of what the occasion requires for practical success.⁴⁰ Of course,

38. In the *Gorgias*, Socrates warns Callicles that it is ignoble to strive to speak in a way that the people find delightful. If a person shamefully wishes to endear himself to the crowd, he must not merely imitate the people, but go as far as to “become like them in his own person [αὐτοφυῶς ὅμοιον τούτοις] . . . be fashioned to be most like them” (τούτοις ὁμοιώτατον ἀπεργάσεται, 513ad). Callicles finds the notion of being converted by the crowd into the crowd appalling, and so not only abandons his argument, but altogether disengages from the dialogue. He also remarks that he has not been persuaded (513c). Socrates uses shame, not argument, to aporeticize Callicles from being converted by the pleasure-mongers of the city (cf. *Alc. I*). He also, perhaps inadvertently, aporeticizes Callicles from productive dialogue. We shall see in Chapter 8 that Isocrates tries unsuccessfully to encourage a proud Timotheus to engage in discourse that is useful and true, but also pleasing to the ignorant crowd (*Antid.* 129–36). Too (1995) argues that Isocrates “ultimately allows the polarity between utility and pleasure to break down” (p. 31). But the polarity is not between utility and pleasure taken as a whole, but between utility and the common, unphilosophical pleasure that fictions afford.

39. Bakhtin (1981, p. 340).

40. Forster (1912) suggests “see farther” for ὁρᾶν πλεον (p. 131; cf. Norlin, 1928–1929), but this seems inconsistent with Isocrates’s condemnation of sophistic claims to prescience (*C. soph.* 1–3). *Ad Demonicum* exhorts the prince to train (ἄσκειν) his intellect in order to attain the

those who pay more attention to casting their speech in myth or spewing useless controversy may have some success in appealing to indiscriminating crowds and gullible students respectively. Isocrates suggests that it is his *logos* alone—with its uncommon blend of poetic style and prose, demonstration and counsel, tradition and alertness to the occasion, to heroic and practical virtues—which can properly lead a person of taste to virtue and success.

7.3 *Making, Using, Becoming Examples*

We have examined how Isocrates shapes his protreptic discourse for princes and addresses a broad readership in different genres (Section 7.1); we also looked at how he defines and expels his competitors while appropriating elements of their discourse (Section 7.2). These efforts define a performance context for his protreptic discourse among competing genres and disciplines in the marketplace of ideas. As we have seen, they are featured primarily in the programmatic frame that surrounds the long list of injunctions delivered by an advisor to a prince (*Ad Nic.* 11–39). But it is in this conspicuously more injunctive, less epideictic discourse that Isocrates gives specific instructions on how one should draw from and make use of his collection of instructions and heroic examples. In other passages which interrupt his direct advice to young Demonicus, Isocrates describes his discourse as a storehouse (ὡσπερ ἐκ ταμείου, 44) of useful things which he gathers up, bee-like (ὡσπερ γὰρ τὴν μελιτταν ὀρώμεν), from far and wide (πανταχόθεν δὲ τὰ χρήσιμα συλλέγειν, 52).⁴¹ And in this discursive treasury, Isocrates explains, the prince will find both counsel for his present life and commands or instructions (παράγγελμα) for the future when he will more readily see their utility (χρειαίν, 44).⁴² It is in making use of these injunctions and examples that the reader will strive for excellence

aptitude to see what is before him (προορᾶν) and what is for his benefit (τὰ συμφέροντα, 40); again, not prescience, but the act of discerning an opportunity in the dimly lit circumstances of the present (cf. Thuc. 7.44.2).

41. Cf. *Ad Nic.* 41—ἀθροῖσαι τὰ πλείστα—where Isocrates also makes the point that collection must be adorned—φράσαι κάλλιστα; *Ep.* 1.4.

42. Isocrates claims that Busiris established laws for the worship of contemptible animals “because he thought the crowd ought to be habituated [ἐμμένειν] to all the commands [παραγγελόμενοις] of those in authority” (26). Παράγγελμα appears nowhere else in the Isocratean corpus, and is perhaps too strong in the context of his paraenesis. But *Ad Demonicum* contains other vocabulary which either does not appear in the corpus or is used much differently elsewhere (e.g., as we have noted, ἐπάγγελμα). Still, the παραγγέλματα of the *Busiris* are to be habit-forming much like, as we shall see, the storehouse of ὑποθήκαι.

of character (οἷς δεῖ παραδείγμασι χρωμένους ὀρέγεσθαι τῆς καλοκαγαθίας) and remain constant (ἔμμένειν) to Isocrates's wise discourse (51). In other words, by somehow using these ὑποθήκαι and παραδείγματα, the reader will be converted to a life of φιλοσοφία. In these lists of principally prohibitory injunctions, Isocrates provides some unusually constructive prescriptions for properly reading and using his paraenetic discourse, and it is to these that we now turn.

The past should be a guide to the present; of course, the past is not a simple given for Isocrates, and so we might do better to say that the philosopher fashions a useful past for the present. Isocrates fills the past with exemplary lives and sayings which may be used to construct exemplary lives and texts in the present. As Isocrates directs Demonicus, "When deliberating, make the past an example for the future [παραδείγματα ποιού τὰ παρεληλυθότα τῶν μελλόντων], for what is unclear may be more quickly discerned from what is apparent" (τὸ γὰρ ἀφανὲς ἐκ τοῦ φανεροῦ ταχίστην ἔχει τὴν διάγνωσιν, 34). The justification for making the past a παράδειγμα takes the form of a sage and time-honored maxim and offers a convenient demonstration of the principle.⁴³ This useful past, for Isocrates, consists of sayings that belong to the poetic tradition and are preserved as part of the common knowledge which Isocrates is constructing. It is important to note how Isocrates's counsel is both deliberative (i.e., for a prospective student of right governance) and epideictic (i.e., for a prospective student of artful speech and writing). As Isocrates maintains, the earliest and leading poets have left such γνώμαι and ὑποθήκαι as rules to live by (ὡς χρῆ ζῆν), even if princes lack exposure to their admonition and ιδιώται prefer less important genres (*Ad Nic.* 3–4, 43). Given that readers are educated and have the freedom to admonish and be admonished, Isocrates claims that it is reasonable (εἰκός) to expect these ancient sayings to improve people (βελτίους γίγνεσθαι, 3). When these conditions are supplanted by πολυπραγμοσύνη and πλεονεξία, and the tastes of crowds and immoderate tyrants, the exemplary injunctions of the past cannot speak.

43. Sandys (1868) suggests the passage echoes Cleobulus: τὰ ἀφανῆ τοῖς φανεροῖς τεκμαίρου (*Stob. Flor.* 3.31). Cf. *Ad Nic.* 35. The use of historical allusion in Greek oratory, particularly in its sociopolitical context, still requires a careful study. Pearson (1941) surveys the orator's skilled use of historical allusions, sometimes the same one for different effects. Perlman (1961) examines such allusions as reflections of contemporary Athenian preferences. Robertson (1976) suggests reasons for the orator's invention in the face of "historical" documents.

Isocrates provides an alternative etiology for these wise sayings, and it is in this account that we can begin to construct and draw on exemplary lives. Wise sayings are distillations of sage lives, or sage lives are composites of wise sayings. Once again, Isocrates emphasizes the power of his *logos* to discern *and* construct what is worthy of praise. Isocrates exhorts Nicocles to “emulate [ζήλου] not those who have most widely extended their dominion, but those who have made best use [ἄριστα . . . χρησαμένους] of the power they already possess.” He then offers clarification: “believe that you will enjoy the utmost happiness . . . if, being the man you should be and acting just as you are now, you set your heart on moderate achievements [μετρίων ἐπιθυμῆς] and fail in none of them” (26). The lesson is put more pointedly again later on: “Choose to fall short rather than overreach” (ἐλλείπειν αἰροῦ καὶ μὴ πλεονάζειν, 33). The lives of others can be mined for and refined into principles and courses of action. Emulation requires excavation, eloquence, and action.

Another case in point involves the distillation of Hipponicus’s life for Demonicus (9–12).⁴⁴ Isocrates explains that if Demonicus were to recall his father’s principles (τὰς τοῦ πατρὸς προαιρέσεις ἀναμνησθεῖς), he would have a noble παράδειγμα of undying glory. He begins to recount in detail all of his father’s deeds (πάσας τὰς ἐκείνου πράξεις καταριθμησαίμεθα) with balanced antitheses—for example, “Nor did he love wealth immoderately, but, although he enjoyed the good things at his hand as a mortal, still he cared for his possessions as though an immortal.”⁴⁵ Isocrates provides these distillations as an example of how one can make particular use of recall of even the immediate past.⁴⁶ He leaves off making a full παράδειγμα

44. Outside the injunctive portion of the text (13–43), but sections 9–12 contain a list of injunctions, and offer, therefore, an instructive miniature of the full discourse; in other words, symbouleutic discourse surrounded by a display frame which is contained within a larger display frame for a much longer injunctive discourse.

45. Norlin (1928–1929) notes echoes of Bacchylides 3.78.

46. A more contemporary past is included in this landscape of history. Isocrates’s sense of history is more difficult to determine than Welles (1966) has it: “Of the earlier periods he knew as much as he needed, what was common knowledge and belief, and he had no idle curiosity to investigate further. From the fourth century he took such events as concerned him; and if they did not always look the same to him, it was because they did have various aspects, depending on the point of view. But there is nothing here to indicate that he deliberately invented or falsified . . . the orator was selective . . . But invent he could not without risking refutation or ridicule” (p. 24). Isocrates does more than select from common knowledge; he constructs common knowledge. He argues that the careful reader will find the *Panathenaicus* “difficult and hard to understand, packed with history and philosophy, and filled with all manner of devices [παντοδαπῆς δὲ μεστὸν ποικιλίας] and fictions [ψευδολογίας] . . . the kind [of fictions] which, used by the cultivated mind, are able to benefit or to delight”

of this life, and offers instead a δειγμα or “sample” of Hipponicus’s nature, “by which you should live [πρὸς ὃν δεῖ ζῆν σε] as according to a παράδειγμα, regarding his conduct [τρόπον] as law [νόμον], and becoming an imitation and emulation [μιμητὴν δὲ καὶ ζηλωτὴν] of your father’s virtue.”⁴⁷ The list of γνῶμαι is, as Isocrates indicates, incomplete. In order for the son to emulate his father’s virtue fully, he must learn to complete the portrait from memory and use these principles of conduct to create laws.⁴⁸ Just as the earliest poets left ὑποθήκαι as rules to live by (ὡς χρῆ ζῆν, 3), so can this prose-poet bequeath a storehouse of virtues for living. Isocrates gives the reader a demonstration of how to become this “poet” by artfully converting past examples into discrete laws and balanced style. The δειγμα is a poetic template. Imitation of the father’s virtue must first be an imitation of Isocratean discernment. This poetry makes a hero of Hipponicus while at the same time constructing a path to greater glory: not only might Demonicus be exemplary in deed if he follows these exemplary laws, but he may also join the pantheon of paraenetic speakers.

Engaging in this process of fashioning refined accounts of virtue from past events conditions the mind to think about virtue, to think and speak about virtue in certain ways, and to discern new and better ways of thinking and speaking about virtue. This last pursuit of invention and improvisation is, as we have seen, an essential part of the Isocratean program, and depends on natural aptitude, practical experience, and the skills and resources which his παιδεία affords (cf. *C. soph.* 15). Students must fill themselves up with these resources—in this case, γνῶμαι and ὑποθήκαι—and it is only after reaching a saturation point that they can eventually

(ὠφελεῖν ἢ τέρπειν, 246; cf. 149). It is through this mixed discourse that Isocrates aims to construct a new belief of Athenian hegemony in the past and present. Isocrates takes a less subtle view of history in his exhortation of young tyrants: “fictions” of the past—at least those from epic and tragedy—afford the wrong kind of pleasure for paraenesis.

47. πρὸς ὃν refers to the δειγμα rather than Ἰππώνικος. Translating it “after whom” rather than “by which” misses the point that Isocrates is providing a template for constructing a full παράδειγμα out of a person’s life. Ἰππώνικος as a παράδειγμα of virtue does not yet exist. Demonicus cannot live according to the principles of his father’s life until he has learned to see and extract all of the principles, and refined them into laws. Cf. *Ad Dem.* 36: μιμοῦ τὰ πῶν βασιλέων ἦθη καὶ δίωκε τὰ ἐκείνων ἐπιτηδεύματα.

48. Isocrates suggests that they might make clear (δηλώσομεν) the details of all the king’s activities on another occasion (ἐν ἑτέροις καιροῖς). When Norlin (1928–1929) explains that “this intention was not, so far as we know, carried out,” he misses the point that Isocrates has in effect tried to create an occasion for and a desire in Demonicus to finish the portrait. Sandys (1868) also notes that we might “have had a laudatory biography of Hipponicus, rivaling that of Evagoras” (p. 11).

surpass the forms and subjects of their models. The δείγμα of Hipponicus gives way to an exhortation to Demonicus to become his father's rival (ἐφάμιλλος). For the prince to be disposed (διατεθῆναι) to surpass his father, his mind must be filled with many noble instructions (πολλῶν καὶ καλῶν ἀκουσμάτων πεπληρωμένον) and his soul augmented or developed with worthy accounts (τοῖς σπουδαίοις λόγοις αὔξασθαι, 12). Of course, the prince has been delegated the task of completing his father's portrait in the ongoing years. But in the meantime, the ensuing, long list of injunctions provides plenty of ἀκούσματα and *logoi* as resources for developing the mind into a reproduction of Isocrates's storehouse of ideas. Needless to say, filling the mind with one set of ideas prevents it from attending to other things.

If we turn briefly to a letter that Isocrates writes late in life to the elder Dionysios, we find the claim that his παράκλησις does not consist of glory-seeking ἐπιδειξεις; this is because the king has had his fill (πλήρης ὢν) of showpieces and artistic compositions. What he and all of Hellas require are practical precepts (εἰσηγημάτων, 2–5). Isocrates's protreptic missive—panegyric but principally symbouleutic (9)—must displace common panegyric discourse in the king's mind. The king (and others like him) possesses the untrained capacity to transform serious words into serious deeds, especially a deed as monumental and visionary as Panhellenic unity. The student must become single-minded in his pursuit of virtue, and in order to achieve this single-mindedness, he must rise above the deeds of his ancestors and the trivialities of his sophistic contemporaries, and he must tune out the power of literary discourses. An ἐπιμέλεια λογῶν becomes an ἐπιμέλεια ἑαυτοῦ—not the kind of introspective devotion to self that we find in Plato, but an aggressive and constructive commitment to originality and personal renown.⁴⁹

The injunctions to Nicocles also provide the resources for political and discursive inventiveness, but they describe in more practical terms how a reader might make use of these resources to condition his mind. Isocrates maintains here and elsewhere that formal study must be tied in with real-world experience for it to lead to thorough understanding (35). Protreptic saturation merely turns a student's attention toward many commendable actions and away from wrongful pursuits. But there is a

49. Even when Isocrates speaks of an ἐπιμέλεια ψυχῆς (*Ad Dem.* 6) or an ἐπιμέλεια which makes us wiser and, with education (παιδείσεως), improves our nature (*Ad Nic.* 12), he means to emulate and eventually surpass those who are superior in nature and action (cf. *Ad Nic.* 13–14).

difference between knowing and following the proper path. The student must somehow make use of and, in the end, as we shall soon see, add to this inventory. As Isocrates urges the prince (37–38),

Do not suffer your nature [φύσιν] to be at once wholly blotted out, but since you were allotted a perishable body, try to leave behind [καταλιπεῖν] an imperishable memorial of your soul. Make it your practice to speak of noble pursuits [Μελέτα περὶ καλῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων λέγειν], in order that your thoughts may through habit come to be like your words [ἵνα συνεθισθῆς ὅμοια τοῖς εἰρημένους φρονεῖν]. Whatever seems to you upon careful thought [λογιζομένῳ] to be the best [βέλτιστα], put this into effect [ταῦτα τοῖς ἔργοις ἐπιτέλει]. If there are men whose reputations you envy, imitate their deeds [ὧν τὰς δόξας ζηλοῖς, μιμοῦ τὰς πράξεις].

These ὑποθήκαι immediately precede Isocrates's apotrepic comments on his competition, and thus provide his final instructions in a more intimate didactic configuration between advisor and prince. We see some familiar exhortations (e.g., to make use of precepts, to imitate the actions of the enviable, to leave behind an undying discursive monument to one's character), and if they are read separately, they might not seem to offer much more.⁵⁰ However, taken together, we find a shrewd explication of an educational program. In order for a student to memorialize his nature, he must be devoted to the pursuit of speaking (Μελέτα . . . λέγειν, cf. ἐπιμέλεια λογῶν) about noble pursuits. This speaking is itself a noble pursuit, and can, moreover, be achieved simply by repeating the things which have been put down in this paraenetic monument. A repetitive and self-reflexive activity conditions (συνεθισθῆς) one's mind to the point that one's thoughts correspond (ὅμοια) with speech. Subsequently, after exercising thought in these ways, the student will begin to perform corresponding actions (ἔργους).⁵¹ A concise and skillfully balanced phrase exhorts the reader to imitate the

50. Forster (1912) notices and tolerates the hiatus between ἐπιτέλει and ὧν "because the new sentence begins a fresh maxim and a pause is necessary before it" (p. 125). This suggests that the paraenetic storehouse in these discourses contains hundreds of discrete ἀκούσματα and λόγοι. Hiatus does not, however, prevent dialogic interactions in the written text.

51. Compare with *Works and Days*: "But you, Perses, lay up these things within your heart and listen now to right, ceasing altogether to think of violence" (Ω Πέρση, σὺ δὲ ταῦτα μετὰ φρεσὶ βάλλεο σῆσι, / καὶ νῦ δικῆς ἐπάκουε, βίης δ' ἐπιλήθεο πάμπαν, 274–275).

actions (πράξεις) of those with enviable reputations. Thus, the reader is once again referred back to the text which is itself a portrait of desirable conduct and style. In short, studied speech conditions thought which, when exercised, corresponds to measured actions which, in turn, refer the reader again to the measured *logos*.⁵²

The passage ends with a note on the need for the student to be constant in his devotion to the foundational pursuit of speaking and also to noble pursuits. He should also attend to what he might say in the future as a result of this conditioning: “Whatever advice you would give [συμβουλευσεως] to your children, require that you remain true [ἐμμένειν] to it yourself.” The passage recalls Isocrates’s instructions to Demonicus: to regard his father’s conduct (τρόπον) as law (νόμον), and become an imitation of and rival to his father’s virtue (9–12). A result of being conditioned by παραδείγματα is that a student in and of himself begins to generate counsel and rules for living. And when the reader counsels others, and converts conduct and courses of action into rules, he must take care to abide by (ἐμμένειν) them too. The courses of action from which he fashions his advice are linked all the way back to the *logoi* about noble pursuits to which the student is devoted out of his desire for immortality. To abide by his own counsel is to remain true to these habit-forming accounts. It may come as a surprise that, as much as Isocrates exhorts his reader to practical experience, the student really needs go no further than to practice the sustained and noble pursuit of noble speech about noble pursuits.⁵³

52. Cf. Dionysius of Halicarnassus on the effects of reading and performing the writings of Isocrates and Demosthenes: “Whenever I read one of the discourses of Isocrates, whether those written for law courts and assemblies or those [written for epideictic occasions] I become serious in mood [ἤθος] and have great steadiness of mind, like those who listen to libation songs played on reed pipes or to Dorian or enharmonic melodies. But whenever I take up a discourse of Demosthenes, I am enraptured and transported hither and thither, partaking of one emotion [πάθος] after another . . . partaking of every emotion that is disposed to rule over human thought; . . . it is not possible for someone to run through [such a discourse] as he wishes, for pleasure, as the words themselves teach how they must be delivered, . . . and all that the style is meant to produce is shown upon enunciation” (*Dem.* 22; cf. *Comp.* 23 on the “smooth” and “florid” style of Isocrates). See Blondell (2002) on philosophical conditioning through philosophical performance (pp. 26–27); cf. Collins (2012).

53. Recall that Isocrates writes the *Evagoras*, assembling and adorning the tyrant’s achievements, for Nicocles to contemplate (θεωρεῖν), busy himself with (συνδιατριβεῖν), and thereby emulate the eulogized and adopt his pursuits (76–77). Isocrates similarly states in the *Antidosis* that “people can become better and more worthy if they might be ambitiously disposed [πρὸς τε τὸ λέγειν εὖ φιλοτίμως διατεθειέν, sc. protrepticized] to speak well” (275). In order to do this, he will “select from all the actions of men which bear upon his subject those examples which are the most illustrious and edifying, and habituating himself to contemplate and appraise [συνεπιζόμενος θεωρεῖν καὶ δοκιμάζειν] such examples, he will feel their

Practical action is necessary but not separate from Isocrates's vision of formal study. The conditioning of mind, subsequent action, constancy, and even that sought-after memorial, all will follow from a devotion to his model *logos*, provided, of course, that the student possesses natural talent.⁵⁴

This desire for commemoration, again, "informs" the injunctions of this paraenetic discourse on many levels. In the *Antidosis*, Isocrates treats the discourse itself as a model *ιδέα* worthy of preservation, study, and imitation, not to mention grounds for his literary and philosophical exoneration and commendation. His new "poetic" prose preserves traditional poetic wisdom for the ages, but outperforms the leading encomiastic, gnomic, and epic poets by creating simultaneously monumental and supple *παραδείγματα* capable not only of speaking suitably on any occasion and circulating throughout the learned communities of the Greek-speaking world but, more importantly, of habituating those communities to model conduct and discourse. Isocrates offered himself as a *παραδείγμα* for students to imitate (*C. soph.* 18), but part of this habit-forming model of conduct and discourse is the desire to break the mold. In fact, in some cases, creativity precedes imitation: "When ordinances and customs are not well established, alter and change them, and moreover become an inventor [εὐρετής] of the best things for your country, or failing this, imitate what is prosperous abroad" (17).⁵⁵ Isocrates comes to the young tyrant just when he is beleaguered by worries. And he tries to appease these worries with one discourse which promises that, if the prince becomes "an auditor and student" of the famous poets and sages, and so conditions (*παρασκευάζει*) himself to be a "critic of the inferior and rival of the superior," he will "quickly become such as we have prescribed [ὑπεθέμεθα]" for a king to be

influence [τὴν αὐτὴν ἔξει ταύτην δύναμιν], not only in the preparation of a given speech but in all the actions of his life" (277). A student who is so ambitiously inclined need not begin with making the observations himself, but would do well to turn to Isocrates's earlier paraenetic discourse (which is included in the *Antidosis*) for training in how both to discern and to contemplate and appraise the most illustrious and edifying examples.

54. Those without natural talent will not be fashioned (*ἀποτελέσειεν*) into good debaters or "poets" of prose (*C. Soph.* 15).

55. Even in this case of imitation, the ruler invents his *πολιτεία*. The injunction is sandwiched between others on the duties of the ruler to care for his people (15–16) and to seek just, expedient, and consistent laws (17). But the language of this particular injunction need not be political—a fine example of using the same discourse to speak to two audiences: the tyrant and the *ιδιώται*. Additionally, Isocrates notes elsewhere that the desire not to be blotted out drives many of our actions including imitation (*Ad Nic.* 37).

(13). In other words, if the prince becomes a student of the paraenetic voices of this polyphonic discourse, he will be habituated in such a way that he will join the immortal ranks of these critics and competitors, and will eventually embody the Isocratean collection and arrangement of *ὑποθήκαι*. He will achieve fame and he will rule well.

But what is more, he will become a *παράδειγμα* and source for, if not author of, rules for living: “Let your own moderation stand as an example to the rest, realizing that the conduct [*ἦθος*] of the whole state is copied [*ὀμοιοῦται*] from its rulers” (31). While drawing on and imitating one collection of wisdom, a person can create another collection for others to imitate. Isocrates adds that, when this paradigmatic display of moderation habituates the people, the ruler should take their moderation and prosperity as a sign (*σημείον*) of his success. The ruler’s success is, of course, a sign of Isocrates’s success. And those who become examples while following the example of the ruler will also be signs of the philosopher’s success. Isocrates’s discursive monument truly does, as he says, grow with use (54). It is when his readers become devoted to his *logos* and then live “as though the whole world would see what [they] do” (*Ad Dem.* 17) that the value of his art rises. And as it rises, legions of auditors and students establish themselves as dynamic memorials to the discipline’s ability to construct and use the past in innovative and practical ways. In their efforts not to be outdone in virtue, they legitimate both their political hegemony and Isocrates’s philosophical authority.⁵⁶

There is no disputing, then, that these exhortations to princes are more than a second-rate educational program of imperfectly harmonized and unoriginal advice. I am particularly interested in the fact that Isocrates uses their injunctions as a defense of his own literary project. Moreover, as we have seen, Isocrates takes great pains in the frames of these exhortations to position his inventive, multigeneric, and “poetic” prose strategically in the marketplace of ideas. With a blend of display and counsel, praise and admonition, poetic conventions and the movable monument of his enduring prose, Isocrates accomplishes a complex secondary genre that merges other genres which contain protreptic and apotreptic functions. His often subtle attacks on competing disciplines and their respective discourses emphasize that a new kind of poet and philosopher—one who reconstitutes traditional values and discourses for modern tastes and practical

56. Cf. Eucken (1983, pp. 226–230).

success—has arrived on the scene. His protreptic discourse, forged in the crucible of competition, turns prospective students away from the subtle disputation of the new-fangled and hypersophisticated disciplines with which he is competing, while at the same time providing formal and constructive guidelines for putting his distinctive *logos* to work. He claims that his discourse has the power to fashion souls worthy of, and capable of producing, other discursive and political memorials. If readers engage with these texts with the right intentions and in a sustained and single-minded manner, they will become consummate counselors—leading “makers” (ποιηται) of political discourse, and living demonstrations of the power of exemplary speech.⁵⁷

57. Cf. *De Pace* 145: “My subject is not exhausted; there are many excellent things to be said upon it, but I am prompted by two considerations to stop speaking: the length of my discourse and the number of my years. But I urge and exhort [παραινῶ καὶ παρακελεύομαι] those who are younger and more vigorous than I to speak and write the kind of discourses by which they will turn [προτρέψουσιν] the greatest states—those which have been wont to oppress the rest—into the paths of virtue and justice, since when the affairs of Hellas are in a happy and prosperous condition, it follows that the state of learning and letters also is greatly improved” (τὰ τῶν φιλοσόφων πράγματα πολλῶ βελτίω γίγνεσθαι, trans. Norlin). That is, his protreptic inspires future protreptics from which both political affairs and philosophy benefit.

Judging Protreptic

ANTIDOSIS, PANATHENAICUS

8.1 Cultivating Critics of Protreptic

This brings us to the more synoptic view of the role which Isocrates expects his hybrid discourse and similarly diversified disciples to play in the social and political world of Athens and Hellas at large. The *Antidosis* and *Panathenaicus*, not surprisingly given their exceptional length and encyclopedic aims, contain and develop every formal aspect of protreptic discourse which we have examined—for example, the comparison of other professional protreptics, the formal framework for the best educational program, the mixing of genres into a new, “poetic” prose. Scholars of Isocrates’s educational program and hybrid discourse have focused more attention on these texts.¹ We will be focusing in this final section, however, on two key issues as they pertain to protreptic discourse. First, by comparing competing protreptics to one another, we will find that these two texts also show that the target discourse and discipline are also under formal scrutiny. Secondly, we will see that these texts are dialogically constructed in ways that require and facilitate unique kinds of reading and interpretation.

Nearing the end of a long and distinguished career, Isocrates creates fictionalized “events” that call for the appraisal not only of his competition and detractors, but of his own discipline and critical discourse. Readers and fictional audiences engage in a critique of a wide range of

1. Hudson-Williams (1940), Wilcox (1943a, pp. 122–133), Usener (1994), Nightingale (1995, Chap.1), Ober (2004).

intellectuals—some of it invited, even prescribed, and well in step with earlier efforts to prepare others for being philosophical critics and rivals (*Ad Nic.* 13). On the other hand, Isocrates constructs another kind of criticism, primarily out of allusions to Platonic dialogue. In texts like his *Antidosis* and *Panathenaicus*, it is clear that Isocrates believes that his literature and protreptic discourse have been falsely accused. These narrative strategies for generating proper and improper evaluation are meant to guide the reception of the cultural and discursive practices of the Isocratean program. In offering these guidelines, Isocrates reveals his anxieties about the various ways in which his protreptic discourse was failing to “convert” his audience.

The *Antidosis* mixes more genres than any other protreptic discourse of the fourth-century to achieve a unique rhetoric of conversion. By incorporating earlier “mixed” discourses in a fictionally dicanic context, Isocrates takes advantage of the strengths of every kind of mixed protreptic discourse he has written in his career, ranging from philosophical polemic (*Against the Sophists*) to symbouleutic display-piece (*Panegyricus*, *On the Peace*) to epideictic counsel (*Ad Nicoclem*). He thus creates a hybrid text that speaks to multiple audiences at the same time. In the preface to the *Antidosis*, Isocrates instructs his readers, in very self-referential ways, to identify his texts as a literary innovation that is novel (καινότητα) and different from (διαφορὰν . . . ἀνόμοιον) anything they have ever seen. It is neither identical with forensic (πρὸς τοὺς ἀγῶνας) nor with epideictic (πρὸς τὰς ἐπιδείξει) discourse. In addition, he indicates, his text is also not merely deliberative.² The *Antidosis* uses each of these kinds of rhetoric, but does not restrict itself to the rules of any one of them. It uses other discourses in surprisingly unconventional ways. Put another way, it also makes use of different rhetorical themes (e.g., the expedient, the just, the honorable) without one necessarily being primary (see, e.g., Arist. *Rh.* 1358b). The *Antidosis* takes generic hybridity to a new level as it executes multiple protreptic and apotreptic functions for respective audiences (e.g., imagined and real, common and elite, critical and supporting, converted and unconverted). With a parade of these different discourses and audiences, Isocrates aims ultimately to demonstrate the consistency of his philosophical discipline, and the benefactions that this mode of education has brought to the city.

2. Cf. *Antid.* 65, 77.

In addition, he aims to harmonize these multiple discourses while also addressing multiple audiences that have different ideological agendas.

In the *Antidosis*, Isocrates uses the fiction of a court case designed to put his *logos* and discipline on trial. As he tells the reader, he was defeated in a real trial by a detractor who, he claims, made no argument on the merits of the case. He was also attacked by the *ιδιώται* who were easily swayed because they were, from the beginning, not properly disposed to him (οὐχ οὕτω πρὸς με διακειμένους ὡσπερ ἤλιπζον) and were utterly misled as to his pursuits (πολὸν διεψευσμένους τῶν ἐμῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων, 4). This dual combination of an old prejudice and a contemporary slanderer (who turns out to be more dangerous than he seemed because of the prejudice) occurs again in the fiction of being put on trial on a capital charge (32). This fiction, as scholars have noted, closely parallels Socrates's trial (*Ap.* 18ab), and was, it seems, not merely a part of, but the grounds for, Isocrates's "misperformance" of Plato's hero.³ Isocrates's starting point is defined by the sudden realization, toward the end of a long career, that people have not been properly informed about or persuaded by his "character, life, and educational program" (*Antid.* 6), and that they are also easily manipulated by insidious exaggeration (*καταλαζονευσμένου*) to act against him (5).⁴ The fact is that his protreptic discourse does not seem to be working while the apotreptic discourse of his competitors, much to his surprise, flourishes. What Isocrates requires is a reconfiguration of his protreptic discourses so that he might turn the tide of public disposition and his regular rivals. The *Antidosis* is his attempt at such a reconfiguration, but it at the same time repeats his past protreptic discourses unaltered in order that he might defend them from professional critique.⁵

3. For Isocrates's "alternative citation of Plato's textual representation," see Ober (2004, pp. 24, 35–38). Isocrates reiterates that it was while he pondered over both the surprising number of people who had mistaken ideas about him (τοὺς οὐκ ὀρθῶς περὶ μου γιγνώσκοντας) and his customary detractors (τοῖς βλασφημεῖν εἰθισμένοις), who got him condemned without a trial (*ἄκριτον*), that the idea occurred to him to adopt the fiction of suffering a more serious charge and literarily more renowned trial (6–8).

4. The overblown and hollow statements of his accuser evoke the extravagant claims of his sophistic opponents who dare to make such boasts without regard for the truth (*ἀλαζονεύεσθαι*, *C. soph.* 1, 10, 19; *Antid.* 195; *Panath.* 20). It seems that his petty forensic adversary is synecdochical for his intellectual competition. Isocrates argues that no one can justly believe that his own speech could be considered, after the redeployment of his earlier discourse in this new fictive context, boastful and over-confident (*ὑπέλαβον τότε λίαν*, 75).

5. Cf. *Antid.* 55–56, 170.

The fiction of a capital charge gives Isocrates the opportunity to explore new dimensions of his earlier discourse by assimilating genres and disparate subjects which were theoretically not traditional partners, even if they were individually highly interactive, at least in practice. Isocrates explains that harmonizing and bringing together (συναρμόσαι καὶ συναγαγεῖν) various discourses, and making genres and topics agree with one another (ὁμολογουμένας) was difficult, given that “while some things in my discourse are appropriate [πρέποντα] to be spoken in a courtroom, others are out of place amid such contests [τὰ δὲ πρὸς μὲν τοὺς τοιοῦτους ἀγῶνας οὐχ ἁρμόττοντα], being frank discussions about philosophy and expositions of its power” (10–11). Isocrates makes it seem that courtroom contests distinguish forensic speech from philosophical polemic; but it is certainly not the case that open discussion about the effective power of philosophy did not have a place in speeches in the courtroom. I suspect that Isocrates’s readers may have found the claim of an inharmonious union between these kinds of discourse a bit of an overstatement. As I would argue, forensic oratory provides, in many ways, a very suitable language for philosophical demonstration and contest. Owen (1983) shows that, while punishable *κατηγορία* had become restricted by the fourth century (for example, calling your opponent a murderer), a sophisticated procedure of defaming philosophers by accusing them of slander, of using *διαβολή* (and finding ways to evade it) had nonetheless developed into a traditional part of philosophical epideictic discourse.⁶

Nevertheless, it is with this rhetoric of an unconventional, “mixed” account of forensic and epideictic speech that Isocrates is able to engage his adversaries. And yet this discourse must also speak in an instructive way to his advocates. As Ober (2004) explains,

True dicanic speech (or even seamless dicanic fiction) offered limited opportunities for engaging in extended “high culture” polemics, while epideictic was not aimed at a demotic audience. It was only by inventing a new, hybrid genre that Isocrates could depict himself as a brave, beleaguered . . . hero-martyr who stood in the middle of the battle and at the syntactic center of the antithesis—dealing out telling blows to the ignorant jealousies of *hoi polloi* on

6. Owen (1983, pp. 17–21).

the one hand, while dispatching his pettifogging fellow intellectuals on the other.⁷

Inside the world constructed by this mixture of popular and elite discourse, Isocrates can construct and defeat popular prejudice, and reduce the apotreptic discourse of long-time rivals to petty and outrageous slander. But this fictive world is prefaced by Isocrates's claim at the beginning that the discourse as a whole functions as a greater demonstration—as an instructive image (εἰκῶν) and monumental display (μνημεῖόν) of his thoughts and life that is nobler than statues of bronze (7). We must take this demonstration to be more constructive than the polemic situated between a small-minded public and rival. More than a demonstration of how he and his παιδεία escape the borrowed charge of corrupting the youth, this monument must itself be instructive and edifying in the marketplace of ideas; that is, more than forensic evidence of past discourse improving students, it must itself educate and improve.⁸ Isocrates claims that there is much in his memorial besides dicanic fiction and philosophical controversy which young people should hear before seeking an education (ἐπὶ τὰ μαθήματα καὶ τὴν παιδείαν ὀρμῶσιν, 10). Some part of his memorial discourse will prepare an audience external to the trial for παιδεία.⁹ He explains later in the *Antidosis* that an eloquent and encomiastic (ἐγκωμιάζοντος) epideixis—his *Panegyricus*—has the power to exhort (παρακαλοῦντος) and counsel (συμβουλεύοντος, 76–77). Moreover, he makes clear that *all* of his writings urge readers toward virtue and justice (πάντες οἱ λόγοι πρὸς ἀρετὴν καὶ δικαιοσύνην συντείνουσιν, 65–67). As examples of this exhortation, he provides both the deliberative *Ad Nicoclem* (συμβουλεύων) and the broadly apotreptic and protreptic *On the Peace*, which admonishes

7. Ober (2004, p. 34).

8. Isocrates regularly defends himself from the charge of corrupting the youth by countering that he offers exhortation to virtue: “I beg of you, consider well whether I appear to you to corrupt the youth with my speeches, or, on the contrary, to turn them to virtue [προτρέπειν ἐπ’ ἀρετὴν] and to take risks for their country” (*Antid.* 60); “And yet, when anyone devotes his life to turning [προτρέπειν] all his fellow citizens to be better and more just leaders of the Hellenes, how is it conceivable that such a man should corrupt his followers” (86, cf. 187). He uses portions of speeches that were epideictic on a previous occasion in another way (χρησθαι τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον αὐτοῖς), in order to show that the effective force (δύναμιν) of his *logos* (whatever the shape of its rhetoric) is to improve rather than corrupt (54–56). The appeal to improvement by exhortation reaches beyond the immediate context of the capital charge.

9. This hope is yet another aspect of how Isocrates believes his speeches should be “speech-acts: words that make or remake the world” (Nightingale, 2000, p. 178).

(ἐπιπλήττω) and advises (συμβουλεύω). By describing these hybrid treatises and display pieces as exhortation and counsel, and additionally designating all of his writings as discourse which urges readers toward virtue, Isocrates makes clear that his hybrid texts serve the primary goal of converting readers and subsequent generations to a particularly innovative and virtuous way of living and speaking.

The professional polemic and apotreptic function of the *Antidosis* rehashes a good deal of the polemic which we have already examined; of course, the monumental discourse contains verbatim the explicit apotreptic discourse of *Against the Sophists* and the injunctions of *Ad Nicoclem*. There is, however, one significant modification of the apotreptic rhetoric offered in Isocrates's assessment of his educational program in the *Antidosis*. Isocrates tempers his attack of the teachers of eristic (to which he adds the activities of geometry and astronomy) by granting them a place in education. His former, more dismissive views become the talk of "most men" who call these studies useless "empty talk and hair-splitting" (ἄδολεσχίαν καὶ μικρολογίαν, *Antid.* 262). An associate had once described Isocrates's sophistic rivals as "reviling one another, omitting nothing in the language of abuse, in effect damaging their own cause and giving license to their auditors" to ridicule and despise them (148). Instruction which cannot moderately dissuade students from competitors runs the risk, it seems, of shaping immoderate students and disgracing itself.¹⁰ Isocrates thus puts some distance between his more mature educational program and these less forgiving views (263): "But I am neither of this opinion [of most men] nor am I far removed from it; rather it seems to me both that those who hold that this παιδεία is of no use in practical life are right and that those who speak in praise of it have truth on their side." Isocrates explains that if a student engages in these contending pursuits in the right way—that is, primarily, without letting the mind wander (πεπλανημένην) while it is being "habituated" (συνεθιζόμενοι λέγειν) for speech and "exercised and sharpened" (γυμνασθέντες καὶ παροξυνθέντες) by the "subtlety and exactness" of these disciplines—then he will find in them a "preparation for philosophy" (παρασκευὴν φιλοσοφίας), which "increases aptitude for mastering greater and more serious studies" (264–267).¹¹ Isocrates goes so far as to

10. Aristotle would later argue the effectiveness of abuse which contains a tincture of praise (*Rh.* 1416b).

11. Cf. *Panath.* 26–32. Isocrates argues here that these rival educational programs at least keep young people out of trouble (27). If students persist in these disciplines beyond the

advise (συμβουλεύσαιμι) young people to spend at least some time on these pursuits (268).

We now see clearly that this new position constitutes far more than an effort to produce more moderate students. Isocrates has found a way to contend with his rivals without having to “unconvert” their students from their disciplines. The apotreptic function of his new polemic is to increase his market share by making his three- to four-year course of study the next suitable step in a liberal education which might be initiated by his propaedeutic rivals. Their students need only be, as we have seen, “ambitiously disposed [πρός τε τὸ λέγειν εὖ φιλοτίμως διατεθεῖεν, sc. protrepticized] to speak well” (275). The lesser sophistic arts might habituate students to speak (συνεπιζόμενοι λέγειν) according to set speeches and demonstrations (265). But Isocrates’s exhortation and consequent discipline will give students the ability to do more useful work for themselves: to discern the most illustrious and edifying accounts, and condition themselves to contemplate and appraise them (συνεπιζόμενος θεωρεῖν καὶ δοκιμάζειν). They will thus “feel their effective power not only in the preparation of a given speech but in all the actions of life” (277). Alternative educational programs only *begin* to dispose students properly to argument, speech, and thought, whereas Isocrates’s discipline will help them to approach these things with the love of wisdom and love of honor (φιλοσόφως καὶ φιλοτίμως). Isocrates limits the domain of his competitors and appropriates their students without having to resort to a “common” accusation, even in the fiction of a dicanic speech. He claims to be able to turn the fruits of his competitors’ disciplines into something which will lead young people back to the conventional life of the *polis*; they will become recognizably useful and productive citizens, and their success will bring their community recognizable success.

In addition to these efforts, which give the impression that his protreptic discourse is being put under scrutiny—on trial, and under his own revision—Isocrates effectively calls on his students as evidence of the value of his educational program. Nightingale (1995) describes this evidence as “embodiments of [Isocrates’s] intellectual wealth . . . not just external witnesses . . . [but] the products as well as keepers of his wisdom.”¹²

appropriate age, Isocrates claims that they will be made entirely unfit for everyday affairs and “miss the expedient course of action” (28–30).

12. Nightingale (1995, p. 33).

This embodied evidence is peculiar for the way that it highlights a glaring failure of Isocratean protreptic. If his students embody his wisdom and offer, as Too (1995) suggests, a “veiled encomium” of their teacher, then Isocrates’s account of their failures as much as their successes draws attention to obstacles if not defects in his conception of φιλοσοφία.

When he imagines that his audience might be surprised (θαυμάζειν) by his praise of his student Timotheus, given that the city had condemned the man (*Antid.* 129), we see something of the “sideward glance at someone else’s hostile word . . . speech with a thousand reservations.”¹³ While Timotheus had benefited Athens and tried to secure the same alliances for his city, which had made it great and exceedingly prosperous (121–122), nevertheless, he was, Isocrates explains, “as without natural talent [ἀφύης] for courting the favor [θεραπείαν] of men as he was sharp in handling affairs” (δεινὸς περὶ τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων ἐπιμέλειαν, 131). Isocrates had trained him to develop a shrewd ἐπιμέλεια of many practical affairs, but as hard as Isocrates tried to instill an additional and, it seems, crucial ἐπιμέλεια of the expression of goodwill toward the public and the avoidance of condescension, Timotheus was naturally indisposed to make an effort to relate well to the Athenian public.¹⁴ Timotheus’s refusal to fall in line with popular sentiment (ἐπηκολούθησε ταῖς ὑμετέραις γνώμαις, 121) may have brought Athens military and political success. But, as Isocrates suggests, the appearance of being “one of the people,” that is equal in status, is as essential a part of a successful public life as adhering to principles of virtue and justice (132). This is hardly a Platonic sentiment, but an important part of the parallel defense of a slandered and misunderstood student, teacher, and educational program.

At this point in his presentation of Timotheus as evidence of his παιδεία, failures and all, Isocrates submits in direct speech a sample of protreptic discourse which he was accustomed to give to his student (133–137). In this speech, we find a spin on protreptic of the broad variety: “you care for x but should care for y” becomes “you care for x but should care for both x and y” (133–134):

13. Bakhtin (1984, p. 196).

14. Remarkably, a flaw that opposes the shortcoming of Alcibiades who, according to Socrates, cared more for the feelings of the crowd than for virtue. Socrates understands the power of the city, and portends that it will conquer (κρατήσει) both of them (*Alc. I.* 135e), but of course for different reasons. The *Antidosis* conspicuously becomes an anti-Platonic protreptic.

You have not been devoted [μεμέληκεν] to [cultivating favor], but are of the opinion that if you are devoted [ἐπιμεληθῆς] honestly to your enterprises abroad, the people at home will also think well of you. But this is not the case, and the very contrary is wont to happen. For if you please the people of Athens, no matter what you do, they will not judge your conduct by the facts but will construe it in a light favorable to you.

The point is not that Timotheus should replace his honest ἐπιμέλεια of international diplomacy with an ἐπιμέλεια of the gratification of others. This honest devotion to diplomacy amounts to a desire for other peoples and cities to think well of Athens once again, but Isocrates only hints at the paradox (135). Timotheus ought to cultivate his image at least as much as the image of Athens on the world stage.

Isocrates subsequently introduces a spin on our narrower concept of protreptic—discourse which promotes a discipline by comparing competing protreptic discourses. He introduces rival rhetoricians, popular poets, and public “makers” of prose (λογοποιεῖν, 136–137), and suggests that, in order to care for both x and y, to cultivate both virtue and the esteem of the people, a person must court the favor of those who can court the favor of the people.¹⁵ In other words, a person must enlist the help of those who are capable of performing the discourse which he neglects (ἀμελείς) due either to a natural deficit or pride (καταφρονήσεις, 137). Timotheus appears to suffer from both μεγαλοφροσύνη (131) and an inflexible nature (138). And yet Isocrates has curiously made these public wordsmiths so distasteful—pretentious windbags (πάντα προσποιουμένους εἰδέναι) and architects of lies (ψευδολογίας, 136)—that that they could hardly recommend themselves to someone so proud. But, as Isocrates nonetheless insists (137):

If you will only be persuaded [πείθῃ] and pay attention, you will not despise these men whom the multitude are accustomed to believe [εἶθιστα πιστεύειν], not only about each one of their fellow-citizens, but also about the affairs of the whole state, but you will somehow care about and pay court [ἐπιμελείαν τινα ποιήσει καὶ θεραπείαν] to them so that you may be esteemed [εὐδοκίμησης] both because of your own deeds and because of their words.

15. On the “word-maker” or λογοποιός in Isocrates, see Too (1995, pp. 118–119).

Isocrates engineers a kind of misdirection here akin to the dramatic *περιστρέψις* of the *Euthydemus*. If Timotheus will be persuaded by his teacher to look to the various ways in which people are persuaded by conventional discourses, he will come to enlist those discourses in his own project of self-fashioning. And all the while, he will perform those excellent deeds which Isocrates's *logos* has habituated him to execute. In other words, the student must look to the teacher and thereby look to the popular poets so that the people will look to him: a kind of Platonic protreptic in reverse. Like the eristics in the *Antidosis*, the rival poets and speakers are granted a time and place in ἡ τῶν λόγων παιδεία. Isocrates makes the point that the poets ought to be enlisted not merely because they can endear their subjects to the people, but more importantly because if they are neglected, or worse, attacked (*πολεμείς*, 136), then they are free to slander rather than eulogize (*ὑμνήσοντας*, 137) their subjects. Popular poets should not be left to their own devices. As long as they are working for a man of virtue—a man trained by a true philosopher and poet—then they can do no harm, and indeed can rather influence the imprudent crowd to celebrate sensible subjects.

This *διδάσκαλος διδασκάλων* was, nevertheless, unable to persuade his student Timotheus. Isocrates concludes his sample of instruction with the rider that his student would on these occasions “admit that I was right, but he could not change his nature” (οὐ μὴν οἶός τ' ἦν τὴν φύσιν μεταβαλεῖν, 138). And with that verdict, Timotheus nominally joins the ranks of fourth-century demagogues and leaders who could not be turned by philosophical protreptic. But as part of Isocrates's defense of his own life, the verdict on Timotheus might be worn as a badge of honor, for Timotheus was a *καλὸς κάγαθὸς ἀνηρ*, and a credit to both Athens and Hellas. The lies of the orators and the senseless crowd were ultimately responsible for his ruin (138). Thus, Isocrates is keen to rebuke the Athenians for their undeniably “cruel and abominable” treatment of his student (130). Still, Timotheus was partly responsible for their mistaken judgments (130). In the *Antidosis*, the sample of protreptic discourses which Isocrates provides to his fictional jury draws attention to several possible points of failure: (1) an inflexible and, in some ways, naturally unskilled student; (2) the whimsy of an untrained citizen-body; (3) the jealousy of slanderous rivals; (4) the political power of popular poetry over political action and *πολιτικὸς λόγος*; and (5) the inability of an instructor to orient his students toward his competition in the appropriate ways. All of these problems appear to play a part in

the downfall of Timotheus, Isocrates, and the esteem of his educational program.

8.2 *Collaborating with Competitors*

While the *Antidosis* provides us with this example of how protreptic discourse might fail to turn a student effectively, another late Isocratean text, the *Panathenaicus*, develops a process of successful collaboration even among intellectuals who share deep philosophical and political differences. In this text, Isocrates submits his speech in writing to collaborative revision (ἐπιηώρθουν, 200) with his students, who find that it merely needs an ending; the frame to the speech explains this. It then describes how the speech is submitted to further scrutiny by a former student who objects to its anti-Spartan views. Those objections provoke Isocrates to continue the speech on the spot with a view to correct his pupil. When his performance compels the audience to deal contemptuously with the pro-Spartan, he believes they and he himself are in need of correction for their contempt and lack of moderation (229–230).¹⁶ He steals away, dictates the performance (ὑπέβαλον), reads and examines it thoroughly days later (ἀναγιγνώσκων αὐτὰ καὶ διεξιῶν), and finds that it is indeed immoderate. He feels compelled to burn the whole thing, but is torn when he thinks of how much time he spent on the composition (232). Vexed, he gathers his students for a reading, after which the pro-Spartan delivers an unsolicited and impromptu performance: this supplement includes a reassessment of his former critique; a correction to Isocrates's impromptu performance (and reperformance); some literary criticism;¹⁷ and his advice that the speech be not burned, but revised and supplemented (διορθώσαντα καὶ προσγράψαντα, 262). Afterwards, the other students, adds the frame, congratulate and envy the former student. His speech and the teacher's speech (as immoderate as it was) are both added. Also added is the frame which both explains the motivations for the first speech—a defense of Isocrates's views on education and poetry (19–25)—and records this process of performance, revision, and supplementation.

16. His pupils, in fact, are crooked in their understanding (οὐκ ὀρθῶς γιγνώσκοντες, 229), that is they are in need of correction (ἐπανορθοῦν).

17. For example, the identification of “arguments of double meaning” (λόγους ἀμφιβόλους, 240)—a formal distinction which Isocrates appears to have coined.

This temporalized account of various moments of performance and reperformance, revision, and supplementation sounds so messy, whereas the final narrative which ingests these moments seems on first reading so linear and straightforward. But this is part of the text's artfulness. The *Panathenaicus* presents a relatively open model of textuality: the story goes that readings of texts prompt performances which are incorporated through revision and supplementation into subsequent versions.¹⁸ What is more, the correction of texts is prompted by a desire to correct character: in an effort to improve both his students and himself, Isocrates dramatizes how he made room for the collaborative production of Isocratean discourse. Isocrates continues to give readings of his work, to provoke responses, to vex and be vexed until both he and his star pupil have been corrected and elicit exactly the same response of envy and congratulations (ζηλῶ σε και μακαρίζω, 260; cf. 264). The student praises his teacher for his use of "arguments of double meaning [λόγους ἀμφιβόλους] which are no more for praise than for blame, have the capacity to be turned both ways [ἐπαμφοτερίζειν], and leave room for much disputation" (240).¹⁹ This formal distinction expands to encompass the whole of the *Panathenaicus*, and both initiates and instructor benefit from working together in a space between arguments and between genres. All of this shared work contributes to the success of Isocratean *logos*, but the contents and form of the *logos* is supposed to lead to other successes with dialogue, revision, and supplementation.

The frame narrative demonstrates and offers a defense of Isocrates's pedagogical methods and aims: critical engagement with and collaborative revision of speech results in the revision of character (διορθοῦν or ἐπανορθοῦν). Spectators are compelled to participate according to their own beliefs and talents, and those beliefs and talents are inscribed into the narrative. Those beliefs are corrected by their teacher, by the tastes of their colleagues, and by themselves, and the process of them speaking and correcting speech is inscribed into Isocratean discourse. The former student *imitates* his teacher's discourse and *becomes* Isocratean—a process we have examined in the letters to young tyrants. Of course, the

18. See Gurd (2007) for a related account of "textual collectivization"—the circulation of trial texts to invite and incorporate revision and to negotiate a literary republic—in the works of Cicero. Cf. Habinek (2009).

19. On the Isocratean objective of provoking uncertainty (ἀπορία) and growth with these arguments, see Too (1995, pp. 70–72).

frame narrative finally authorizes a fully revised and complete text, but it is a text full of ambiguities that reward an audience, says the student, only through examination (*ἀκριβῶς διεξιούσιν*) and hard work (*προνούντας*, 246–247, cf. 271). And acts of thorough examination (*διεξιῶν*) lead, as we see in the narrative frame, to the reported process of textual and philosophical revision (231).

The *Panathenaicus* illustrates how an intellectual community might negotiate philosophical and political differences, and together construct a mutually edifying discourse. We can think of this dynamic as protreptic discourse that allows for and encourages divergence in order to define better its goal and to reinforce shared commitments to that goal. This protreptic discourse keeps initiates coming back, and they with their teacher grow together. Turns toward other objectives eventually strengthen shared objectives. Isocratean cultivation and correction of discourse corrects individuals in the community, including Isocrates himself (or so Isocrates's account leads us to believe). The text suggests methods for building both consensus and compelling discourse among initiates and their instructor. When students disagree with their instructor, when they adopt a different intellectual and political path, Isocrates not only listens to their disagreements, but preserves and appears to appreciate their differences of opinion, though these too must undergo scrutiny. The text effectively encourages students to challenge their instructor, even with great enthusiasm and ambition; they should long to elicit envy and congratulations. But they should also long for the rewards of careful examination and hard work. This kind of engagement and disputation prompts Isocrates to refine further his pedagogical and philosophical objectives.

Epilogue

ARISTOTELIAN PROTREPTIC AND A STABILIZED GENRE

AT THIS POINT, I would like to reflect on those moments in the process of generic development of protreptic discourse when the process itself appears to become relatively flattened and standardized. We have seen in Platonic and Isocratean protreptic texts a sustained effort to merge different traditional genres—and their respective literary elements of dialogism, setting and occasion, characterization, narrative complications and resolutions. We have examined specifically Platonic and Isocratean texts that deal explicitly with marketing and conversion strategies through dramatization (e.g., a public contest with sophists or a fictional defense) and the second-order language of advertisement (e.g., the writing or delivery of προτρεπτικός λόγος, παραίνεσις, παράκλησις, ὑποθήκαι, etc.). These texts debate how exhortation should proceed. Following these discursive experiments in the first half of the fourth century BCE, for reasons which we may never understand, protreptic discourse begins (almost as suddenly as it has appeared as the discourse of organizational definition and recruitment) to lose a great deal of its literary diversity. The complexity of the secondary genre that merges different primary and secondary genres suddenly collapses. This catastrophic rather than gradual collapse must have been culturally adaptive, but the details of the relevant cultural pressures perhaps escape us.¹ I make some guesses here, though these questions are of course historical and pragmatic concerns, and thus lie largely outside of

1. I am borrowing here from Netz's (1999) exemplary use of Gould's (1980) biological language to describe the early history of Greek mathematics.

a literary study. But I wish primarily to point out that following the great dialogic experiments of Plato and Isocrates (and perhaps the *προτρεπτικοί* of other Socratics now lost to us), Aristotle picks up this complex secondary genre and *distills* some of its generic elements into his *Protrepticus*.² Later sources appear to identify and reproduce these distilled elements, and thereby provide blueprints for reverse engineering some of what has been lost in the transmission of this text.

The Academic skeptic Philo of Larissa divides *προτρεπτικός λόγος* simply into demonstrative and refutative elements (*ἐνδεικτικός* and *ἀπελεγμῶς* or *ἐλεγκτικός* respectively, Stob. 2.7.2). The former establishes the benefits of philosophy while the latter addresses the claims of detractors. Following the rhetoric of medical discourse which, as Philo has it, must both urge the acceptance of a particular therapeutic regimen by displaying its utility and undermine those urging against treatment, Philo reduces the rhetoric of philosophical conversion to arguments that lead to virtue and arguments for refuting individuals who would disprove the demonstration, make accusations against it, or in any way slander it. Philo adds that ethical teaching requires two other *topoi*: (1) therapeutic discourse that destroys falsely acquired beliefs and inserts beliefs in a healthy state, and (2) preservative discourse that encourages the investigation (*ἐπισκοπεῖν*) of specific and general models and rules for healthy living, that is, whether a specific individual ought to engage in politics, live with leaders, marry, and so on, and generally what the best sort of constitution is. Individuals who do not have the leisure for such investigation will require the additional *topos* of “suggestive speech [*τῶν παραινετικῶν λόγων . . . τὸν ὑποθετικὸν λόγον*] through which they will acquire in short form suggestions [*ὑποθήκας ἐν ἐπιτομαῖς*] that will provide security and correctness in the use of each thing” (2.7.2.47–54). We should note that apart from the “short-form” *ὑποθήκαι*, each *topos* works through an investigation of competing claims: those for and against utility, those acquired falsely and those in health, those models for living that lead to disease and those that lead to health. According to Stobaeus, Philo presents students with choices that require evaluation at every step, and those choices preserve the claims of detractors and alternative lifestyles.

2. Diogenes Laertius records later lost *Protreptikoi*: Theophrastus (5.49), Demetrius of Phaleron (5.81), Ariston of Keos (7.163), another Cynic Monimus (7.83), and the Stoics Persaeus (7.36), Cleanthes (7.175), and Posidonius (7.91 and 129). Aristotle’s “distillation” of generic elements must be differentiated as much as possible, as we shall see, from the transformations for which Iamblichus is responsible.

This skeptical division of protreptic (the display of utility and the refutation of critics), therapeutic (falsely acquired beliefs and those acquired in health), and preservative discourse (lifestyles that promote disease and those that lead to health) no doubt informed Cicero's understanding of ethical teaching.³ He likely used something of the division, together with Aristotle's *Protrepticus*, in creating his *Hortensius*, which Trebellius Pollio described as an *exemplum protreptici* (Mueller fr.8).⁴ Cicero later claimed, *nos autem universae philosophiae vituperatoribus respondimus in Hortensio* (*Tusc.* 2.4), presumably referring to the established protreptic goal of refuting detractors. Philo promoted the representation and evaluation of competing claims for "long-form" learning, and Cicero's account of Charmadas, who was Philo's fellow pupil, describes clearly a *standardized* method of representing and evaluating both sides (*De or.* 1.84–93).⁵ The inclusion and characterization of alternatives, the dialogue between competing views, and the discursive hybridity of ethical teaching then are pedagogical tools for eliciting evaluation of opposing claims, tools that persist in later Academic writers and Cicero's dialogues.

While the relationship between Aristotle's *Protrepticus* and Cicero's *Hortensius* remains elusive, still the flattening of the complex genre—of its dialogism, characterization, and generic hybridity especially—can be observed in the fragmentary remains of both works. The *Hortensius* likely opens with a dialogue among Cicero himself (apparently following the Aristotelian model, *Att.* 13.19), Hortensius, and others, but where this dialogue ends, a long oration by Cicero begins.⁶ The fragmentary remains of the *Protrepticus*, especially following the exemplary reconstructive efforts of Hutchinson and Johnson (2005), maintain a relatively higher degree of

3. See Schofield (2002).

4. On *Protrepticus* as a model for *Hortensius*, see Bernays (1863) and Bywater (1869). Rabinowitz (1957, pp. 3–4, 93–94) and Gigon (1959) argue against a direct correlation.

5. On Philo's division of rhetoric, which concerns either the acquisition of knowledge (e.g., whether virtue is desired for itself or for the sake of something else) or the performance of action (e.g., whether it is proper for a wise man to engage in politics), see *De or.* 3.110–118. The acquisition of knowledge occurs through three *modi*—inference, definition, or deduction—and Philo outlines the sorts of question belonging to each mode, many of which belong also to protreptic discourse.

6. Taylor (1960) argues, "Now it is generally conceded that a *protrepticus* (λόγος προτρεπτικός) among the Greeks was a speech rather than a dialogue" (p. 95). Of the Platonic and Isocratean material, as we have seen, and even, as we shall see, of the Aristotelian material, this in fact cannot be conceded.

dialogism among three speakers: Aristotle, Isocrates, and the Academic Heraclides of Pontus—all notably professional voices. By dialogism here, I mean both that there are regular transitions between speakers (i.e., there is a dialogue and not a single sustained oration) and more importantly that the individual voices are themselves “adorned with polemic, filled with struggle.” Each voice is “accompanied by a continual sideways glance at another person.”⁷ Each character is more than a mouthpiece for arguments. We may not get the colorful characterization of an extradiegetic narrator; or this may very well have been a part of the original dialogue and only removed by Iamblichus. But we do find the conversation of professional struggle and polemic. Demonstration and refutation are integrated.⁸

When we turn to the remains of Aristotle’s attempt at protreptic, we find passages of dialogic discourse which merge the “voices” of rivals in order to negotiate alternative discursive and cultural practices for a new philosophical discipline. Aristotle may or may not formally set these voices apart, but in many cases (some of which we will examine briefly) it is plain to see that he has constructed his treatise out of competing discourses.

We should take a moment to reset the conceptual stage. This study began with a new typology for protreptic discourse, the foundation of which situates a preferred kind of wisdom, and discursive paths to that wisdom, both in a particular performance context and among discursive and disciplinary rivals. Another way of putting this is that philosophical protreptic promotes one way of doing philosophy to a particular audience by comparing the competing and *apparently* substitutable protreptics of the day to one another. No sooner is this substitutability established than it is also effaced to reveal only one discipline and its particular discursive and cultural practices as legitimate. Through an array of artful literary strategies, competing protreptics and their discourses (which themselves

7. Bakhtin (1984, p. 32).

8. Given Hutchinson and Johnson’s reconstruction, and even the fragments included by Düring (1961), Ingram Bywater (1869) appears to take Stobaeus’s account of Philo too literally: “The Dialogue itself was doubtless devoid of the dramatic interest which we are in the habit of associating with the name. There was perhaps some short prelude, after which the chief interlocutor proceeded in oratorical fashion to divide his discourse into two sharply contrasting sections, the first controversial [ἀπελεγμὸς or ἐλεγκτικός], the second constructive [ἐνδεικτικός]” (p. 68). Bywater continues, “The first of these two sections Iamblichus seems to have ignored for a sufficiently simple reason: it could not have edified his readers, and his own sympathies were thaumaturgy and asceticism rather than the subtleties of Aristotelian dialectic” (p. 69). He misses that the elenctic is intertwined with the demonstrative.

contain multiple genres) are included but controlled and even, in some cases, silenced.

As we shall see, Aristotle finds ways to have a hand in this complex secondary genre; but relative to the protreptic discourse of Plato and Isocrates, Aristotle's protreptic reduces rather than cultivates literary diversity. And it is for this reason, I argue, that, in Aristotle's hands, the complex secondary genre begins to crystallize. Far less dramatic than the *Euthydemus* and *Protagoras*, far less autobiographical than the *Antidosis*, and far less paraenetic than the Isocratean exhortation to kings, the *Protrepticus* still provides one of the most popular protreptics of the ancient world. His *Protrepticus* certainly negotiates between Platonic and Isocratean arguments, and is dialogic in this way. But the diversity of discursive forms largely vanishes; and the second-order language that marks discursive forms (e.g., προτρεπτικός λόγος, παραίνεσις) vanishes altogether. There is no debate about how exhortation should proceed within the exhortation.

Why is it that we seldom hear about this wildly popular protreptic? There are two straightforward answers to this question: the first involves a doctrinal issue and the state of Aristotelian scholarship in general, while the second involves the condition of the text. In regard to the first issue, I will say simply and polemically that Aristotelian scholarship has long suffered from a deep prejudice against the *Protrepticus* that stems, in part, from a developmental view of the canon. By this view, of which Werner Jaeger is the most recent and still influential proponent, Aristotle's style and philosophical concepts developed from those of a young Platonist to others of an independent and more mature, detached contemplative philosopher.⁹ The developmental view actually depends a great deal on speculation rather than on a literary reading of the *Protrepticus* and, subsequently, of the other so-called "exoteric" texts of Aristotle, which have been considered as relatively unsophisticated and common works, hardly worth the careful consideration that a science of ethics and physics requires.¹⁰ In this study, I take a more literary approach to the fragmentary remains of the *Protrepticus* for what I believe to be a far more interesting interpretation.

9. Jaeger (1923/1948). See also Nuyens (1948) and Vollenhoven (1950).

10. See Needler (1928) for her brief critique of Gadamer (1928) and Jaeger's view of a slack use of φρόνησις in the *Protrepticus* relative to its uses in the *Eudemian* and *Nicomachean Ethics*. For a careful look at theoretical φρόνησις in the *Protrepticus*, see Nightingale (2004, pp. 193–197). We will return to this question.

This brings us to the second reason for the relative neglect of the *Protrepticus*: the text is preserved in fragments which are difficult to identify. What remains of the *Protrepticus* comes to us out of later *testimonia*, papyri fragments (*POxy.* 3659 and 666), and largely the *Protrepticus* and *De communi mathematica scientia* of Iamblichus, written more than six hundred years after Aristotle. We might also include the fragmentary remains of Cicero's popular *Hortensius*, which was modeled somehow on Aristotle's *Protrepticus*.¹¹ Let us look first at Iamblichus. His *Protrepticus* is designed as a teaching manual for gathering and instructing novice neo-Pythagorean philosophers. Chapters 13–19 of the hugely popular *Protrepticus* of Iamblichus are a patchwork of loosely connected, long protreptic passages taken from Plato's dialogues—some intact, some transformed and reduced (and interrupted by Neoplatonic intrusions), and of course completely recontextualized. In Chapters 6–12, by contrast, we find Aristotelian-sounding passages, some of which are also to be found elsewhere in passages attributed or related to Aristotle by Cicero, Augustine, Proclus, and Boethius. Merlan (1953) describes Iamblichus's text as “a triumph of the paste and scissors method” (p. 148).

How we get from Iamblichus's patchwork to “Aristotle's text” is a matter of great debate. This begins with the “rediscovery” of the fragments by Ingram Bywater (1869), who recognized the treatment of Plato's dialogues in Iamblichus's text. Using *testimonia* of the Aristotelian *Protrepticus* and a method of extraction based on impressions of transformations of Platonic passages, Bywater circumscribed Aristotelian portions of Iamblichus. Nearly a hundred years later, Rabinowitz (1957) attacked the subsequent project of reconstruction by rejecting essentially all of the fragments on the grounds that they do not contain Aristotle's name or the title of the work. The justifications and methods of reconstruction which followed this challenge are of great importance to our literary approach to the *Protrepticus*.

Düring (1961) rechampioned the cause for reconstruction of the *Protrepticus* by isolating and rearranging the fragments to create a continuous text. Düring notes that Iamblichus “follows the original [of Plato's dialogues] pretty closely, suppressing dialogue, cutting down the illustrative examples, and in general omitting negative arguments” (p. 24). Düring also notes, following Rabinowitz, a method of condensing Platonic passages. For example, he turns seventy-six lines of the Socratic παράδειγμα

11. Düring (1961, p. 30); cf. Diels (1888).

from the *Euthydemus* into seven lines of Iamblichus's *Protrepticus*. Düring argues that this cut-and-paste method also contains brief insertions of Neoplatonic diction, and suppresses direct address and rejoinders. Repetition ("monotonous refrain") as well as clumsy diction and inconsistency in passages makes Düring "suspect that they are put together by Iamblichus himself."¹² Based on these impressions of the treatment of the Platonic material and inconsistencies in argument, Düring concludes that Iamblichus carved up and rearranged Aristotle's *Protrepticus*. In a brief discussion of whether the original was a dialogue, Düring argues that Aristotle cannot have written an epideixis which would *only* "[set] forth different opinions concerning the value of philosophy."¹³ He apparently assumes that a dialogue form would have to put different opinions into different mouths for mere intellectual entertainment. He speculates instead that Aristotle took as his starting point an Isocratean προτρεπτικός λόγος:

He saw that the Isocratean παραίνεσις provided a pattern which he could transform into something quite new: a demonstration of the value of philosophy in the form of a message to the educated public, addressed to an individual person. As in many of the treatises in the Corpus, he combined demonstrative reasoning with dialectical and rhetorical arguments, adding a dash of philosophical poetry.¹⁴

So keen is Düring to defy the developmental view of Jaeger and at the same time make the case (against Rabinowitz) for a work of substance that he blames Iamblichus's design for the differing views contained in

12. Düring (1961, pp. 25–30); cf. Jaeger (1923/1948, p. 61).

13. Düring (1961, p. 32). Jaeger argues that the fragments of the *Eudemos* correspond to the *Phaedo* and make a similar use of myth; the *Gryllus* resembles the *Gorgias*, and *On Justice*, the *Republic*, but without the features of "obstetric" conversation and the delineation of character" (p. 29). The texts may not contain obstetric dialogue, but they may very well have been some kind of dialogue. Ancient sources describe an Aristotelian style of dialogue: Cicero explains that Aristotle himself led the discussions in his dialogues (*Att.* 13.19). He also says that his *De oratore* is Aristotelian in style (*Fam.* 1.29), and claims that Aristotle tended to use opposing speeches in his dialogues (*De or.* 3.21.80). Cicero's own exhortation to philosophy, the *Hortensius*, which notoriously converted Augustine, was based on the *Protrepticus*, and is delivered in dialogue form. However, while it is argued that Cicero preserved the argumentative force of Aristotle's text better than Iamblichus (Jaeger, 1948, p. 73), most commentators, albeit with some reservations, consider the dialogue form in the *Hortensius* an innovation.

14. Düring (1961, p. 32).

the later *Protrepticus*. Thus, analytical treatise and Isocratean paraenesis are not only made the order of the day but, as Düring argues, this treatise is the most persuasive discourse for attracting the Cypriot king Themison to a life of contemplation and good argument. Düring sets about reconstructing the text in this image by removing as many inconsistencies as possible and reordering what is left to produce a more logical and univocal progression.

This reordering of the fragments in Iamblichus's *Protrepticus* has been extremely influential and introduced the *Protrepticus* back into Aristotelian scholarship. But a recent study of the Plato chapters of Iamblichus's text (chaps. 13–19) offers support for my claim that Aristotle's *Protrepticus* was not disjointed or inconsistent, but rather dialogical. Aristotle incorporates competing discourses on the value and nature of philosophical enquiry, and thus produces an effective piece of polyphonic advertising. Consider Hutchinson and Johnson (2005), who claim in their careful examination of Iamblichus's methods that the dialogues undergo much less transformation than was previously thought:

Iamblichus simply selected and arranged into a certain order the most protreptic passages that he could find. He modifies the quotation to varying degrees, but these can all be explained in the way we have, as being various responses to the challenges presented by Plato's dramatic dialogue . . . this is the *only* mode of intervention that Iamblichus engages in.¹⁵

They determine that not only have the Aristotle chapters been treated in much the same way—"long passages quoted from Aristotle, surrounded by thin comments by Iamblichus (generally only one sentence)"—but they also hypothesize, based on the fact that Iamblichus appears to have been working diligently from a manuscript copy of Plato, that the compiler "faithfully quoted material from Aristotle" as well.¹⁶ They argue finally that Düring "failed to extricate Iamblichus' interpolations, and he

15. Hutchinson & Johnson (2005, p. 240), their italics. This study provides a complete translation of the Aristotelian material from Iamblichus's *Protrepticus* restored to its Iamblichean order. Larsen (1972) argues, "Jamblique ne présente pas simplement des extraits ni un florilège mais . . . remanie ses matériaux dans sa rédaction et les redonne en les modifiant" (in *Des Places*, 1989, p. 5).

16. Hutchinson & Johnson (2005, pp. 241–242, 281).

worsened things by dividing the work into fragments of arbitrary length, by reordering them according to what he thought was reasonable, and by insisting that he could know the literary form of the work.”¹⁷ So it seems that we have access to significant sections of Aristotle’s *Protrepticus* which contain multiple voices which, furthermore, quite possibly could have been delivered by multiple characters with Aristotle, of course, in charge (both as persona and writer). As I said, Cicero notes the “Aristotelian fashion” of representing dialogue in such a way as to leave for the author himself the leading part (*principatus*, *Att.* 13.19.4). Saying more than this on Iamblichean transformations as I have done elsewhere, would prove a distraction to our study of fourth-century protreptic discourse.

In what follows, I offer a preliminary reading of Aristotle’s *Protrepticus* based primarily on the growing body of reconstructive efforts by Hutchinson and Johnson. My reading in this study is preliminary for reasons I shall explain. In a separate study, I have provided a fuller treatment of the Aristotelian fragments in their Iamblichean context; this study reconstructs the subtleties of the dramatic contest in Aristotle’s *Protrepticus* based not only on identifiable transformations of the Platonic material in Iamblichus’s *Protrepticus*, but also on the dialogic remains of the Platonic passages even after the Iamblichean process of flattening. The dialogic remains in the Platonic passages help us, in turn, to identify dialogic remains of the Aristotelian material of Iamblichus’s *Protrepticus* (chaps. 6–12) and *De communi mathematica scientia* (chaps. 22–27). Then I have modestly amplified those remaining but dampened dialogic qualities that were preserved by (or survived) Iamblichean treatment in order to highlight a separate typology of formal structures of argument represented in the dramatic contest that Aristotle presented in his *Protrepticus*.¹⁸ This work attempts to distinguish between Iamblichean flattening of the Aristotelian text and Aristotelian distillation of the emerging genre. However, again, for reasons that I have already explained, the subtleties of this reconstruction and typology are just that—subtleties—particularly in comparison with, for example, the play of character in Plato or the wholesale appropriation of poetic and prose genres in Isocrates. While I am excited by the new turn in the literary study of Aristotle, which I believe this work and the work of Hutchinson and Johnson represents, the fact remains

17. Hutchinson & Johnson (2005, p. 290).

18. Collins (forthcoming).

that our project at hand—on the *emerging*, complex secondary genre of protreptic discourse—is coming to an end. Where the protreptic experiments of Plato and Isocrates ingest traditional forms of discourse to find new ways to reach out (and to represent reaching out) to prospective students, types of discourse are less in conversation with one another in the *Protrepticus*, and they certainly are not marked as such. Aristotle appears less concerned with negotiating the form of protreptic discourse. Again, the *Protrepticus* represents a distillation rather than an enrichment of literary hybridity.

That is not to say that distinct characters and discursive styles are absent from the *Protrepticus*. In late antiquity, Aristotle's dialogues were recognized for such things. In his *In Categorías*, Ammonius writes that Aristotle “has evidently expressed his views in different ways. In the esoteric works he is terse [πυκνός], compressed [συνεστραμμένος], and full of questions [ἀπορητικός] as regards thought, and as regards the language quite ordinary [ἀπέρητος], owing to his search for precise truth and clearness; he sometimes even invents words if necessary. In the dialogues, which he has written for the many, he aims at a certain fullness [ὄγκου . . . τινός], an over-elaboration [περιεργίας] of diction and metaphor, and modifies the style of his diction [μετασχηματίζει τὸ εἶδος τῆς λέξεως] to suit the speakers, and in short does everything that can beautify [καλλωπίζειν] his style” (6.25–7.4). Elias, also in his *In Categorías*, describes him in the dialogues as “versatile in imitation [ποικίλος ταῖς μιμήσεων], full of Aphrodite and overflowing with the Graces” (124.5). These late critics do not note the features of terseness, compression, plainness, or systematic enquiry within the dialogic framework. Dialogues are altogether separate from scientific treatise; they do not contain a scientific style of demonstration and conviction.

However, Jaeger (1923/1962) argues that these adulatory comments must be understood within the confines of “a new kind of literary dialogue, namely the dialogue of scientific discussion . . . Aristotle set speech against speech, thus reproducing the actual life of research in the later Academy. One of the speakers took the lead, gave the subject, and summed up the results at the end. This naturally put narrow limits to the delineation of personality . . . The dialogue now depended for its effect more on its character (ἦθος) as a whole than on the ἠθοποιία of particular persons.”¹⁹

19. Jaeger (1923/1962, pp. 28–29).

Jaeger explains that historical necessity made inevitable this transformation of the dialogue form, the replacement of “obstetric” conversation with “scientific discussion,” and the abandonment of the delineation of character; first in more monologic, late Platonic dialogues—none of which can be considered protreptic—then in Aristotle’s first literary creations. As Jaeger says, “It was only a question of time before the great art of classical Platonic dramas died out, for its root was dead. This was the moment at which the young Aristotle began to take hand.”²⁰ For Jaeger, obstetric and character-rich dialogue inevitably yielded to scientific discussion. A young Aristotle simply uses an ossified “ready-made form” of dialogue to transcribe scholastic research.

If we set aside all arguments from veneration of the master or from historical necessity, we can indeed identify some particular elements of these literary critiques in the text of the *Protrepticus* itself. It is possible that in the fragmentary remains, for instance, styles of diction are tailored to particular speakers—the designations of whom Iamblichus has removed. Particular passages in the *Protrepticus* and *De communi mathematica scientia* do, in fact, stand apart for their use of lexical clusters, periodic length, and logical forms, including metaphor, use of illustrative examples, deduction, not to mention the rhetoric of encomium and of forensic oratory. Aristotle does use ἠθοποιία to some extent to drive the dialogue. At the same time, Jaeger is right to recognize the prevalence of what he calls “scientific discussion.” But “scientific discussion” or deduction here is itself also a form of diction, and in the *Protrepticus*, though it dominates, it is still only one voice among others. Its prevalence marks a shift away from literary hybridity and thus a crystallization of the genre; but there is nothing inevitable about Plato and Aristotle privileging this εἶδος τῆς λέξεως, or dramatizing how it defeats other forms of persuasion.

I suspect that when Jaeger argues for the effect of the dialogue’s ἠθος as a whole over the ἠθοποιία of particular persons, he means that arguments tell the story rather than the characters to whom the arguments belong. Again, as he puts it, “One of the speakers took the lead, gave the subject, and summed up the results at the end.” If the subject, speech, and results all seem as dispassionate as these terms sound, particularly in the context of previous experiments in protreptic discourse, and do not reflect the ἠθος of a speaker or speakers, then we find ourselves one step closer to

20. Jaeger (1923/1962, p. 27).

Peripatetic lectures. However, one consequence of this developmental and reductive hypothesis—while it incidentally supports the concept of the distillation of discursive hybridity—is that more subtle shifts in discursive forms and structures of argument escape our notice.

In any event, as relatively flattened as this narrative may have been even before Iamblichean transformations, Aristotle's *Protrepticus* appears to have offered relatively distinct philosophical practitioners vying with one another over the history, methods, and ends of liberal education. A principal part emerges that describes a novel intellectual trajectory and pleasure primarily by way of contrast both with the arguments and with speaking styles of close collaborators. Aristotle presents theoretical philosophy not as a fully formed and sequestered activity, but as an evolving response to competing claims for liberal education. Better put, the principal part of Aristotle's *Protrepticus* homes in on a particular set of intellectual aims—for example, intellectual and political “correctness” and exemplarity; achieving the highest forms of life, pleasure, and success; freedom and godliness—and triangulates the *possibility* of an alternative intellectual path to those aims rather than the precise curriculum and methods of that path. A detailed accounting of the way to those intellectual aims (just the sort of thing, we recall, that Clitophon demanded) would speak directly to the concerns of an aspiring theoretician, but it may neither adequately inspire nor contribute directly to, let alone control, the changing professional and public conversation about the value of ideas and intellectual practices.

The dialogue, in brief, runs thus.²¹ After a dedication to a Cypriot king Themison (Stob. 4.32.21), and perhaps a brief and even moveable proem (cf. Cic. *Att.* 4.16.2, 16.6.4) or one that specifically addresses the *προτρεπτικοί* of earlier Socratics, the dramatic portion of the *Protrepticus* kicks off with a stinging rebuke of philosophers in general for their contentiousness (*POxy.* 3659), and then a relatively palliative response that promotes wisdom over, but not to the exclusion of, external goods (*POxy.* 666). External goods in the hands of someone without intelligence (*φρόνησις*) are like a knife in the hands of a child. This voice contains multiple *παροιμῖαι* and illustrative examples, is gnomic in nature, and ends with

21. I am following the exhilarating preliminary work of Hutchinson and Johnson (2013), who include, among other overlapping sources, *POxy.* 3659 and 666 (attributed in abridged form to “Aristotle” by Stobaeus 3.3.25), Iamblichus's *De communi mathematica scientia* (chaps. 22–27), and Iamblichus's *Protrepticus* (chaps. 6–12) in that order.

the formulaic ἀπ[ρο]φασίστως φιλο[σο]φητέον, giving it an Isocratean flavor. Recall that Isocrates exhorts young men to become habituated to virtuous living through certain kinds of interactions with the living wisdom of gnomic poets.

At this point, an encomiastic voice takes over, extolling the virtues of Pythagoras and Pythagorean demonstration (ἀποδείξεων, *Dcms* 67.22) and systemization which produces teachings for the sake of practical affairs (τῶν τε πραγμάτων ἔνεκα) while also apprehending primary causes in a pure way (καθαρῶς ἀντιλαμβανόμενον, 67.27–68.1). This encomium of Pythagoras ends with an exhortation to rebuild this Pythagorean αἴρεσις: since no one ever wrote it down, “setting out from small glimmers we should always build such things into a corpus (σωματοποιεῖν) and help make it grow (συναύξειν) . . . fill in what was left out (τὰ παραλειπόμενα ἀναπληροῦν) . . . guess as far as possible at the opinions (στοχάζεσθαί τε κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν τῆς . . . γνώμης)” of long-lost teachers (68.11–16). While this voice establishes more explicitly than the Isocratean voice the motifs of useful knowledge and pure or theoretical knowledge, and further raises questions that will reverberate throughout the dialogue about the aims of a philosophical community and curriculum in practical terms, its rhetorical position is fundamentally conservative, that is encomiastic and nostalgic. This voice gives the impression that philosophy would be complete or near completion if the Pythagoreans had only recorded their efforts. Pythagorean predecessors profitably applied their discipline to every aspect of their private and public lives (69.13–22). The reclamation of this discipline would profit us as well (69.6–12).

A third voice then emerges which approves of the demonstrative powers of Pythagorean mathematics, but locates it within a broader more liberated and liberating disciplinary trajectory. This character—likely the principal part of “Aristotle” for doctrinal and literary reasons—proposes that the philosopher “possesses an ambition for a certain science (ἐπιστήμης τινός) that is honored for itself and not on account of anything else resulting from it” (71.2–4). He does not pursue mathematics and other theoretical sciences because they are useful, but because in these pursuits he is related to the truth (οἰκείον εἶναι τῆς ἀληθείας, 72.21–22). Because he is “in love with contemplation” (φιλοθεάμονα, 72.25), he pursues sciences full of amazing observations (θαυμασιωτάτων θεαμάτων οὔσαι πλήρεις, 72.25–73.1). Pythagoras appreciated mathematics because of its “power to discover further theorems for problems” (75.11–12), especially those that discerned first principles of all nature (τῆς ὅλης φύσεως . . . τὰς ἀρχάς, 75.16–17). In other

words, mathematics is “useful” for discerning first principles, and there are other similarly “useful” sciences which together the Pythagoreans made a “training” (γυμνασίαν) and “logical workout” (ἐξεργασίαν λογικὴν, 75.25–26). “Aristotle” has effectively reclaimed (or rather reconstructed) the Pythagorean αἴρεσις in such a way that it leads and is subordinated to a science of first principles: the primary goal is “to observe the things that exist as they are” (θεωρεῖν τὰ ὄντα πῶς ἔχει), and numbers, geometrical forms, and ratios of what exists are instrumental (διὰ τούτων) in clarifying these (78.15–18). “Aristotle” does not reject the concerns of encomium and reclamation outright, but instead speaks to them in a way that leads away from the preceding discourse and toward a new hierarchy of theoretical disciplines. The devotion to Pythagoras and the discursive form that makes that devotion clear both become part of the pursuit of first principles (ἐπιμέλεια τῶν ἀρχῶν).

Now we have heard from an Isocratean, a nostalgic Pythagorean, and “Aristotle,” and while we likely hear from each at least once more, the differentiation between discursive forms for which these voices are responsible must increasingly be made in terms of lexical clusters and argumentative structures (which includes what counts as evidence and how that evidence is used), less in terms of traditional genres. There are a few exceptions, and it is to one now that we turn as we resume the dialogue.

The Isocratean has had enough of the discussion between the Pythagorean and “Aristotle” on the role of mathematics in the theoretical sciences, when it seems to him that his initial resolution—that φρόνησις must first be acquired in order for external goods to be beneficial—has been altogether abandoned. The Pythagorean had mentioned, but demoted, practical affairs and profitability in the lost αἴρεσις, but “Aristotle” transformed the instrumentality of knowledge into an entirely theoretical concern. Now the Isocratean balks at philosophers promoting useless ends (79.5–6), and here he includes a catalog of offenders, whose aims are: precision; a science of what is unjust and what is just, of what is bad and what is good; geometry and at other such sciences; intelligence about nature (περὶ φύσεώς)—the sort the followers of Anaxagoras and Parmenides propose (79.9–15). After all, he says, “everything that is good and beneficial in life consists in being used and put into action (ἐν τῷ χρηθῆσθαι καὶ πράττειν), and not in the mere knowledge” (οὐκ ἐν τῷ γινώσκειν μόνον, 79.16–18). As we have seen, Isocrates himself argued that passive theoretical speculation without praxis results only in subtle and useless contention about trifling

matters rather than valuable and productive understanding (cf. *Ad Nic.* 39, 35).

The Isocratean then proceeds to smear more philosophers for much worse: for not only choosing to pursue knowledge alone rather than its application, but for, as a result of that choice, being made unfit to apply the very knowledge they seek. Geometers make poor land-surveyors. Astronomers make poor navigators. Students of the proofs and arguments about harmony make worse musicians, “as if on purpose” (ὡσπερ ἐπίτηδες, 80.20). These sciences are entirely useless for practical activities (πρὸς τὰς πράξεις ἀχρεῖοι παντελῶς, 81.1). His catalog of offenders now complete, the Isocratean rests his case; in fact, his language is clearly forensic in nature: he reviews the past offenses and claims of philosophers (cf. 78.14, 79.10–12, 79.15), demands a review of the evidence (δεῖ δὴ μὴ λεληθῆναι τὸν μέλλοντα περὶ τούτων ἐξετάζειν, 79.15–16), submits the greatest proof for his argument (μέγιστον γὰρ ἔχομεν παράδειγμα, 80.5), and builds consensus (e.g., ὀρώμεν αὐτούς, 80.8). While “Aristotle” responds to the Isocratean’s insistence on utility in philosophy, he does not pick up the *discursive* challenge until later in the dialogue (*Prot.* 52.16ff.)

The Isocratean’s attack here appears to be lifted from Isocrates’s actual attack on Academic philosophy in his faux-forensic *Antidosis*, which we have already examined.²² Recall that Isocrates himself had argued that those “occupied with the subtlety and exactness (περὶ γὰρ τὴν περιττολογίαν καὶ τὴν ἀκριβείαν) of astronomy and geometry” (*Antid.* 264) situate themselves “wholly outside our necessities” (262). While they “have labored (διαπονηθέντες) through their lessons of grammar, music, and other branches, they are not at all better (βέλτιον) in their ability to speak and deliberate on affairs, but they have made themselves the best at learning (εὐμαθέστεροι γίγνονται) greater and more serious studies” (267). A mathematical training is merely “exercise for the mind and a preparation for [true] philosophy” (γυμνασίαν μέντοι τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ παρασκευὴν φιλοσοφίας, 266). The exclusive pursuit of Academic studies means, according to Isocrates, one never gets to true philosophy. A sensible person—a true philosopher no less—should choose even the slightest improvement at speaking and deliberating over excellence in school for more schooling. As we have just seen, Aristotle reproduces this position in his *Protrepticus*,

22. For more on the interrelations between the *Protrepticus* and the *Antidosis*, see Hutchinson & Johnson (201b). For the influence of *Against the Sophists* and *Antidosis* on the later *Ethics*, see Wareh (2012).

and as this voice is certainly the loudest in his dialogue and appears to be motivating most of the conversation, it seems Aristotle wrote the dialogue primarily as a response to Isocrates's *Antidosis*.²³

It is at this point in Aristotle's dialogue that we turn primarily to material gathered from Iamblichus's *Protrepticus* (chaps. 6–12). The bulk of this material appears to come from the mouth of "Aristotle" for its argumentative and stylistic coherence, with only two conspicuous exceptions: the first consists of a catalog of all the conventional concerns and activities that do not contribute to, and in some cases even interfere with, the activity of intelligence (chap. 8). This passage also contains, as we shall see, stirring references to a *muthos*, a grotesque foreign cultural practice, and mystery religion, rhetorical questions, direct quotations from philosophers, and other sacred sayings. The second exception, as I mentioned, is an indignant, direct response to the Isocratean's slander against philosophers who pursue wisdom for its own sake (a large part of chap. 9). Apart from these relatively prominent discursive shifts, we find "Aristotle" constructing a continuous argument for practicing philosophy primarily for its own sake *and* for practical reasons; we should privilege the former over the latter.

In the aftermath of the Isocratean's rebuke, "Aristotle" explains just how these two motivations are related. The person who practices philosophy for its own sake will bring practical benefits to everyone else, provided he rules (39.13–25):

Everyone agrees that the most excellent man and strongest by nature should rule, but that the law rules and should be the only ruler; but it [the law] is a certain intelligence and discourse based on intelligence [λόγος ἀπὸ φρονήσεως]. Still, what is our standard [κανὼν] and what our most precise criterion of good things, except the intelligent man [ὄρος ἀκριβέστερος τῶν ἀγαθῶν πλὴν ὁ φρόνιμος]? For whatever this man will choose if he makes his choice based on his knowledge [κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην] will be good things, and the opposite of these are bad. Since everyone chooses most of all what conforms to his own proper disposition [τὰ κατὰ τὰς οἰκειάς ἕξεις] (the just man to live justly [δικαίως], the courageous man to live courageously [κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν], similarly the temperate man to act with temperance [τὸ σωφρονεῖν]), it is clear that the intelligent man will choose most

23. Cf. Einarson (1936); Düring (1961, pp. 20–24, 33–35); for the opposite relationship, von der Mühl (1941).

of all to act intelligently [τὸ φρονεῖν], for this is the function [ἔργον] of that capacity [δυνάμειος].

Provided that people put this intelligent person in a place of prominence, he will incidentally provide them with a rationale and discourse borne out of intelligence (λόγος ἀπὸ φρονήσεως). They can adopt his speech as law. His disposition and deeds can provide the standard and most precise criterion by which they too can choose good things; he naturally, they by observing and imitating him. The intelligent man incidentally becomes a ὄρος ἀκριβέστερος for others by his observation with precision of first principles and prior things.²⁴

This position has points of contact not only with Isocrates's reproach but also with a middle Platonic position that advocates the impassioned pursuit of philosophy and insists upon its usefulness. Not only does philosophy serve good and naturally inquisitive souls—like Thales, “wild to know [προθυμοῖτο εἰδέναι] the things in the sky” (*Tht.* 174a)—but it also most qualifies philosophers for statesmanship. As Socrates exclaims in the *Republic*, philosophers must “rule as kings” (473c) or else “there will be no end to evils in our cities” (487e). Philosophy can be useful in practical and political affairs, and can even create the ideal state, Socrates continues, when “those who are called useless stargazers [ἀχρήστους λεγομένους καὶ μετεωρολέσχας] [are recognized as] the true captains” (τοῖς ὡς ἀληθῶς κυβερνήταις, 489c). The ignorant—those “who do not know how to put [the philosopher] to use” (489b)—ought to be blamed for his apparent uselessness. In the *Protrepticus*, “Aristotle” supports the view that there are benefits to intelligent people ruling, but he insists that these benefits are incidental. Populations should have the good sense to put philosophers to use, but the philosopher does not rush into practical and political concerns. He contemplates, and by the standard which he provides (and is), others can better manage the city.

24. “Aristotle” adds the wrinkle, however, that “it would be slavish [ἀνδραποδῶδῆς] . . . to follow the opinions of the majority rather than to evaluate [ἀξιῶν] the majority by his own opinions” (40.6–9). Although the φρόνιμος incidentally provides a standard by which others can choose good things, we should by no means use the choices and dispositions of others—or at least of the many—to make our own choices. This paradox draws attention to the fact that, in order to promote the φρόνιμος to a place of prominence and power, one must already possess the standard by which one can identify intelligent activity. And the only way to possess this standard is to seek it oneself.

“Aristotle” at this point turns to professional activities and the shape of a curriculum appropriate to the mathematically educated man (πεπαιδευμένος μαθηματικῶς)—presumably someone on his way to becoming φρόνιμος and acting intelligently. For instance, those who do philosophy do not receive payment, and they require neither tools nor special places for their labor (πρὸς τὴν ἐργασίαν, 40.25–26); in spite of their having no practical resources and having been on the job for such a short time relative to the necessary trades, they still surpass those other trades (ἄλλας τέχνας) in precision, leisure, and pleasure (40.15–41.1, cf. *Dcms* 83.6–22).²⁵ “Aristotle” also delves into technical issues of criteria (again, ὅροι) for judging mathematical demonstrations (*Dcms* 84.25–85.25), and the degrees of necessity and precision in each science (86.4–22). An investigation of these issues is an investigation into what an education should investigate and how (87.5–8). An educated person must begin with investigating what (mathematical) education is and how it proceeds by way of demonstration, argument, and first and second causes. This formulation of education, of course, cannot sit well with the Isocratean, but before we (as readers of Iamblichus) can hear his response, “Aristotle” launches into a series of elegant arguments about what people were in fact created to do. These are the so-called “*ergon* arguments” of the *Protrepticus* (chap. 7), and they turn the investigation of mathematical education back to the fundamental aims not only of a liberal education but simply of being a human being.

Now we arrive at the next discursive departure from the constructive argumentation of “Aristotle” which I have already mentioned: a catalog of everyday concerns and activities that do not contribute to, and in some cases even interfere with, the activity of intelligence (chap. 8). These activities include drunkenness, infantilism, and sleep, all of which constitute deprivations of intelligence. This voice continues, “The fact that most people even flee from death shows the soul’s love of learning (δείκνυσι τὴν φιλομάθειαν τῆς ψυχῆς), for it flees from what it does not recognize . . . and naturally pursues what is evident and recognizable” (46.9). Given the previous talk of criteria for demonstration (ἀπόδειξις), this argument is a strange turn. However, given the previous talk of our natural capacity, a list of activities which inhibit this seems apropos. Still, this voice launches from these impediments into others that stylistically do not fit with the voice of

25. The passage indicates an overlap with the *De communi mathematica scientia*, and it is primarily for this reason that Hutchinson and Johnson include more of the *Dcms* in their reconstruction. On the “work” of philosophy, see Collins (2014).

“Aristotle” or his “*ergon* arguments” which precede (chap. 7) and follow (chap. 9). These include a reference to the mythical Argonaut Lynceus who could see through walls and trees; with such keen (ὀξύ) ability, one would easily see accurately (ἀκριβῆς, 47.12–13) the real worth of physical strength and beauty. This voice asks *rhetorically*, “How could such a sight seem bearable?” (47.14–15). And if we could see through honors and reputations too, “What is great or long-lasting in human affairs?” (47.18–19).

Additionally, this discursive departure includes a reference to what the Mysteries relate (47.23–24), an inspired saying from the ancients (θειῶς οἱ ἀρχαιότεροι λέγουσι, 47.25), and a grotesque bit of ethnography (φασί) about the Tyrrhenian pirates who “torture their captives often by chaining corpses right onto the living, fitting limb to limb” (48.4–7). Add to this hodge-podge of popular sentiments a dash of esoteric learning—direct quotations from philosophers but without clear attribution (48.16–17)—and the eclecticism of content and form in this passage is striking. In the introductory outline of his *Protrepticus*, Iamblichus identifies in these eclectic remarks “common notions (κοινῶν ἐννοιῶν) that encourage (παραμυθούμεναι) the initial longing and choice for oneself of philosophy” (4.5–8).²⁶ If “Aristotle” is speaking here, the eclecticism—a catalog of activities interfering with intelligence, a succession of rhetorical questions, common notions mixed with esoteric learning—marks a clear departure from his discursive method. Hutchinson and Johnson (2013) describe the first of these—the catalog—as a “Pythagorean set of arguments (from opposites).”²⁷ So we may be hearing from our Pythagorean again. Indeed, the discursive shift does seem an interruption, for the *ergon* arguments resume, but not without reworking and responding to the intruding voice.

The voice of “Aristotle” picks up the Pythagorean’s esoteric, somewhat muddled vision of apotheosis, and transforms it into a more restrained but clearly attributable and accessible activity. The Pythagorean says, “a human being seems, compared to everything else, to be a god” (θεὸν εἶναι), for “insight is the god in us,” whether it was Hermetimus or Anaxagoras who says this, and “the mortal life has a share of some god” (48.16–18). “Aristotle” returns to *ergon* arguments (49.3–51.6), as if to say, “So, anyway,

26. The verb παραμυθεῖσθαι appears in the *Protrepticus* only once more, in an excerpt from *Phaedo* wherein Socrates describes the “lovers of learning perceiving that philosophy takes possession of the soul . . . gently encourages it (ἡρέμια παραμυθεῖται), and tries to set it free” (83a, *Prot.* 68.14–16).

27. Hutchinson & Johnson (2013, pp. 52–53).

as I was saying . . .,” but he adds finally that when Pythagoras was asked why—for the sake of what (οὐ χάριν)—nature and the god brought us into being, he responded, “to contemplate the heavens” (τὸ θεάσασθαι . . . τὸν οὐρανόν, 51.8–9). What is more, “Aristotle” continues, when someone put the same question to Anaxagoras, he responded, “to contemplate the heavens—the stars, the moon, the sun” (τοῦ θεάσασθαι τὸν οὐρανόν, 51.13–15). “Aristotle” responds to the Pythagorean, through the clear voice of his master, and with the clarified voice of Anaxagoras, that the purpose of a human being is not to be god but to “be for the sake of some kind of intelligence and learning” (ἔσμεν ἔνεκα τοῦ φρονῆσαι τι καὶ μαθεῖν, 52.5). As he puts it, “Being intelligent is the ultimate thing for the sake of which we have come to be” (τὸ φρονεῖν ἔσχατον οὐ χάριν γεγόναμεν, 52.3–4). We should not wish to be intelligent for the sake of being divine; we should wish to be intelligent, that is philosophize, in order to become that for the sake of which we came into being. Take your eyes off yourself—off that divine part of yourself—and raise them to the stars.

And now, another sudden discursive shift, the last discursive disruption, and the most important of all: “Aristotle” turns his attention back to the Isocratean, back to Isocrates’s *Antidosis*, back to the demand from philosophy for utility above all else (52.16–53.2):

To seek from every kind of knowledge something other than itself and to require that it must be useful is the demand of someone utterly ignorant [παντάπασιν ἀγνοοῦντός τινός] of how far apart in principle good things are from the necessities; they are totally different . . . For this is not valuable because of that, and that for the sake of something else, and this goes on proceeding to infinity—rather, this comes to a stop somewhere. So then it is absolutely ridiculous [γελοῖον οὖν ἤδη παντελῶς] to seek from everything a benefit beyond the thing itself, and to ask, “So, what’s the benefit for us?” and “What’s the use?” For it’s true what we say [ὅπερ λέγομεν]: someone of such a character [ὁ τοιοῦτος] doesn’t seem like someone who knows noble goodness [εἰδότες καλὸν ἀγαθόν], or who distinguishes [τῷ διαγιγνώσκοντι] between a cause and a joint cause.

The tone in this turn is aggressive; the argument, suddenly, *ad hominem*. “Aristotle” has turned to meet his accuser face to face, in the same space, with the same rhetoric, as we last heard from the Isocratean. Not only has he been identified as utterly ignorant of goods—even when he

initiated the conversation with a display of his acumen on the difference between external goods and the good of self-care (*POxy.* 666)—but his ignorance of noble goodness is only to be outstripped by his ignorance of logic: he falls into infinite regress because he cannot discern exactly between causes and joint causes. Perhaps if he conceded more to scientific precision, he would appreciate the difference. “Aristotle” goes so far as to ape his opponents’ questions: “What’s the benefit?” “What’s the use?” The tone seems even breathless, indignant, and uncharitable. Is it surprising that we hear no more from the Isocratean in what remains of the dialogue? The Isocratean’s questions in the dialogue were at heart apotreptic. In the *Antidosis* they seem relatively concessive and collaborative in spirit. “Aristotle” throwing them back in his face represents the apotreptic of his apotreptic with the same rhetoric of that apotreptic.

As if out of embarrassment for his indignation, “Aristotle” immediately mounts a cooler case that runs the course of the dialogue; first, with a stunning argument by analogy for theoretical philosophy (rest of chap. 9); then with a renewal of the arguments for the *incidental* practical and political benefits of this theorizing (chap. 10, cf. chap. 6, 39.13–25); then with arguments for what Hutchinson and Johnson (2013) call the “enhanced vitality” (chap. 11) and success of the philosopher (chap. 12). We do not make pilgrimages to Olympia nor participate in the Dionysia for the sake of anything apart from the spectacle; in this way, we should theorize the universe, and should honor the theorization of the universe above all else (οὕτω καὶ τὴν θεωρίαν τοῦ παντὸς προτιμητέον, 53.25–26). Nevertheless, those concerned with political or practical affairs can and should make use of the philosopher. For if they legislate or act “by looking to and imitating” (ἀποβλέπων καὶ μιμούμενος)—by “building alongside” (παραβάλλων)—other human actions or political systems,” they will produce nothing “immortal or secure” (ἀθάνατον καὶ βέβαιον, 55.14–23). “Aristotle” appears to single out Isocratean claims, for example to teach the ability to leave behind memorial images (*Ad Nic.* 36–37), to cultivate “suitable opinion about useful things” (*Helen* 5), to arrive at the best course in life through approximation (*Antid.* 270–271). But only theoretical philosophy can “produce” anything immortal: “secure laws and correct, noble actions come from the craftsmen of philosophy alone” (τῶν δημιουργῶν τοῦ φιλοσόφου, 55.24–25). Of course, philosophers are not craftsmen; they do not produce. But in addition to the benefits accrued by others who make use of the philosopher, he also happens to be the most fully alive and successful person possible, for he exercises his function best: he who thinks correctly is more alive

(ζη μᾶλλον ὁ διανοούμενος ὀρθῶς, 58.6). After addressing the Isocratean directly, everything “Aristotle” says—and this is a great deal (chaps. 9–12)—speaks indirectly to Isocrates. Enough of demands for utility! Theoretical philosophy achieves more than utility; and, incidentally, the theoretical philosopher can be used by others for the greatest utility. He can be a means to praxis.

These final passages are not without their discursive shifts. But like the shifts that precede them—outside of the more conspicuous shifts which I have outlined here—they are, as I have said, more subtle shifts in structures of argument rather than shifts along traditional genres. Of course, traditional genres themselves are composed of, among other things, many logical structures. But where Plato and Isocrates ingested and brought into dialogue with one another whole genres—some traditional and others themselves emerging—in order to generate new literary forms and protreptic discourse, Aristotle appears to have settled on subjecting the arguments and styles of his opponents to a scientific style of demonstration and conviction. What is more, in his *Protrepticus*, Aristotle makes no attempt to signal *explicitly* a negotiation between traditional and emerging genres; gone is second-order language of advertisement (e.g., the writing or delivery of προτρεπτικὸς λόγος, παραίνεσις, παράκλησις, ὑποθήκαι, etc.). It is perhaps because of the success of this relative monologization of protreptic discourse that many other *Protreptikoi* pop up through the ages by way of imitation.

Then again, Athens continues to undergo profound political and social shifts in the fourth century, even relative to those during the Peloponnesian War. Factionalization and civil strife remain a significant problem.²⁸ This might mean it is as good a time as ever for educators to promote, and for weary citizens to pursue, ἀπραγμοσύνη, unless of course ἀπραγμοσύνη itself is a partisan pursuit among individuals who insist on denigrating the livelihoods and character of everyone else, particularly those who must work for a living.²⁹ The philosophical assault on both βαναυσία and democratic processes likely reduced rather than grew its potential client base. Protreptic discourse, at least with the directions it assumed in the early fourth century, perhaps had worked itself into a corner. Moreover, when Aristotle describes the reformation of the *ephebeia* with the Cleisthenic

28. Cf. Fuks (1984).

29. On the growth of quietism in Athens, see Carter (1986); Netz (1999, pp. 292–298).

reform (*Ath. Pol.* 42), it becomes clear that the *polis*, at a particular point, attempted to provide something of the serious moral and broad political (albeit primarily military) education which a good part of protreptic discourse was trying to construct and offer. When the city's fathers, a generation after Plato's many respectable fourth-century "Critos," assume what appears to be an institutional responsibility of choosing the consummate and most moral leaders (σωφρονισταί) for their sons' training, we must wonder about at least the *pragmatic* place of protreptic discourse. It would make sense under these reforms for professional philosophers and educators to turn away from potential converts and toward one another and to those converts they already have.³⁰

30. Cf. Owen (1983).

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