

HOWARD J. WIARDA

Political Culture, Political Science, and Identity Politics

An Uneasy Alliance



POLITICAL CULTURE, POLITICAL SCIENCE, AND IDENTITY POLITICS

“Culture counts!”—it being an essential ingredient for studying the politics of other countries, asserts Howard J. Wiarda in this insightful and important text. His convincing and well-written account nicely synthesizes all realms of political culture, from cultural anthropology to national character studies, a complete digest the reader will find stimulating, productive, and well-balanced.

Phil Kelly, Emporia (Kansas) State University, USA

The value and effectiveness of political culture as an evaluative tool and predictor of national policy outcomes has become a point of scholarly disagreement among the practitioners of comparative politics and area studies. Howard J. Wiarda provides a comprehensive discussion and analysis of the historical evolution of political culture and points out the strengths and weaknesses of this analytical approach. Although he is a supporter of the uses of political culture, his study is balanced and carefully crafted. Wiarda by no means settles the argument over political culture but he has certainly presented a clear, credible and provocative overview.’

Michael Kryzanek, Bridgewater State University in Massachusetts, USA

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HOWARD J. WIARDA
University of Georgia, USA

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Published by
Ashgate Publishing Limited
Wey Court East
Union Road
Farnham
Surrey, GU9 7PT
England

Ashgate Publishing Company
110 Cherry Street
Suite 3-1
Burlington, VT 05401-3818
USA

www.ashgate.com

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

The Library of Congress has cataloged the printed edition as follows:

Wiarda, Howard J., 1939-

Political culture, political science, and identity politics : an uneasy alliance / by Howard J. Wiarda.

pages cm

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 978-1-4724-4228-4 (hardback) -- ISBN 978-1-4724-4229-1 (ebook) -- ISBN 978-1-4724-4230-7 (epub) 1. Political culture. 2. Identity politics. I. Title.

JA75.7.W53 2014

306.2--dc23

2014011767

ISBN 9781472442284 (hbk)

ISBN 9781472442291 (ebk – PDF)

ISBN 9781472442307 (ebk – ePUB)

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Preface

If you are a writer or scholar, you are always a prisoner of your own earlier writings, reviews, and the footnote references to your work. You cannot escape these and you live with them forever. In my case, I am known as a “political culture guy.” Or, more simply, as a “culturalist.”

That is not, actually, an accurate representation of my views or work. It is true that I have written extensively about what we political scientists call “political culture”—the values, ideas, beliefs, and behavioral orientations that undergird political behavior.¹ It is also true that, in some of my writings, I have concentrated, because I find them interesting, worthwhile, and fun to research, on political-cultural factors.² But close readers of my larger *oeuvre* will know that I have always believed in and pursued multi-causal explanations. No one factor, be it culture, institutions, structure, or class analysis, explains everything. There are always, or let us say to be safe “almost always,” a complex of multiple causes shaping the great movements of history. As social scientists, it is our duty and obligation to weave these complex causes together into an explanation that best approximates reality.³

While on the one side, I am sensitive to the mislabeling of my work as “culturalist,” I am also aghast at those who would undervalue culture, as not having any explanatory power at all. Not only are they critical of culture as providing even a partial, let alone an all-encompassing, explanation, but they tend to dismiss culture, and sometimes those who write about it, as not having social science value. In the Marxist tradition, for example, culture is viewed as part of the “superstructure” and subservient to economic and class factors; among institutionalists, culture is usually treated as a “dependent variable” or else is redefined, as Nobel prize-winning economist Douglas North did,⁴ as just another “institution.” Neither of these latter two approaches strikes me as particularly

1 Howard J. Wiarda (ed.), *Politics and Social Change in Latin America* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1974); later editions published by Westview Press and Praeger Publishers.

2 Howard J. Wiarda, *The Soul of Latin America* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001)

3 My longest and most detailed effort in this direction is Howard J. Wiarda, *Dictatorship, Development, and Disintegration: Politics and Social Change in the Dominican Republic* (Ann Arbor, MI: Center for Latin American Studies, University of Massachusetts, University Microfilms, 1975, three volumes).

4 Douglas North, *Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

valuable or useful. Clearly, culture is important, the only question being how much. And equally clearly, culture needs to be treated as an independent variable, not just a reflection of economic or institutional factors, whose importance will vary over time and circumstances, and that needs then to be treated as part of a complex of other explanations.

But there's more to it than that. The dismissal of culture as an explanatory factor is part of a trend in political science and the other social sciences to emphasize scientific, empirical, and rational-choice explanations at the expense of analysis, interpretation, and assessment. In this approach, political culture somehow does not count, even though in recent work on the subject by Robert Putnam,⁵ Ronald Inglehart,⁶ and Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba,⁷ which may be unknown to scholars of this orientation, political culture can be studied just as systematically and "scientifically" as can other political phenomena. I have found that many of these more "scientifically"-oriented scholars would rather stay at home and work on their "data sets" or manipulate their computers than go abroad to actually experience another culture.

When I hear these arguments, including from some of my own colleagues, I want to scream and pull my hair (actually, quite a bit of it is still remaining). "Have you never been abroad?" I want to ask. "Do you understand *anything* about foreign cultures?" "Do you not realize that in every country, region, and culture-area such as Latin America, East Asia, or the Middle East, the sights, sounds, dress, smells, language, and behavior are very different?" "Have you no respect or understanding of cultures, including academic cultures, other than your own?" To me and to most others, I suspect, the answers to these questions are so obvious as to be not even worth discussing. Except that to too many of today's social scientists, they are not obvious at all.

Therein lies a dilemma, a puzzle. Why is it that social scientists are so averse to explanations that advance culture as a possible explanation. Are they all secret Marxists still influenced by Marx's shopworn and too-simple ideas about substructure and superstructure? Are they still, as a legacy of the Nazi regime and World War II, concerned that what were then called "national character studies," will lead to ethnic stereotyping and, hence, to mass extermination of Jews, gypsies, and others? Or are they so PC that, having mistakenly conflated culture and race, they fear above all—the unpardonable sin—of being labeled "racist." One can legitimately argue the degree of importance of culture as an explanatory factor but, in considering cultural explanations, it has become clear to me that something

5 Robert Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).

6 Ronald Inglehart, *Culture Change in Advanced Industrial Societies* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990).

7 Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba (eds), *The Civic Culture* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963); also, by the same editors, *The Civic Culture Revisited* (Boston, MA: Little Brown, 1980).

more than “mere” science is at work here. Something else, something deeper, is afoot. Is it ideology; is it psychological; is it political correctness; what is it?

I think I know the answers to at least some of these questions. And since I have myself studied, researched, and written about various aspects of political culture, I thought I would try my hand at an explanation. This study is thus a product of what I and others, critics as well as advocates, have written about cultural explanations. The present book is, therefore, not so much a report on new or original research, of my own and others, on political culture; rather, it is an analysis and synthesis of both the history and more recent work and research in this field.

As a Washington think tanker and professor of political science, I am mostly what we call a “barefoot empiricist.” I *love* to go out and explore new countries and regions, do research and interviewing there, and then write about it. My fields are foreign policy, comparative politics, and international relations; I am interested in comparative political development, particularly of Third World nations where cultural factors are especially important. I have traveled, worked, and done research in over 90 countries on all the continents save the Arctic and Antarctica.

But sometimes I feel compelled to do more general, theoretical, and conceptual work. There are times, thus, when I feel the need to grab my own profession by the scruff of its neck, shake it up, and try to teach it some lessons. I had done that earlier with my work on Latin America,⁸ American foreign policy,⁹ democracy promotion,¹⁰ comparative politics,¹¹ corporatism,¹² and civil society.¹³ I do not know if the profession is any better off or more enlightened after one of these outbursts but, rather like cussing or exploding at a lame bureaucracy, *I* feel better once having done it.

This is one of those books. It is an overview of the entire field of political culture studies. It is not a polemic; rather, I seek to be fair and balanced. My purpose is to assess what political culture can teach us and what are its limits. I am not trying to “get” anyone, settle scores, or engage in ideological or methodological battles. I try to be straightforward and even-handed with regard to all points of view. But

8 Howard J. Wiarda, *Politics and Social Change*; also “Wiarda, *Corporatism and National Development in Latin America* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1981).

9 Howard J. Wiarda, *Foreign Policy without Illusion* (Chicago, IL: Little Brown/Scott Foresman, 1990; later editions by Harper Collins, 1996, and Potomac Publishers, 2009).

10 Howard J. Wiarda, *Democracy and Its Discontents* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1995); Wiarda, *Cracks in the Consensus: Debating the Democracy Agenda in U.S. Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1997).

11 Howard J. Wiarda (ed.), *New Directions in Comparative Policies* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985); and Wiarda, *Introduction to Comparative Politics* (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing, 1999).

12 Howard J. Wiarda, *Corporatism and Comparative Politics* (New York, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1996); also Wiarda (ed.), *Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America—Revisited* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 2004).

13 Howard J. Wiarda, *Is Civil Society Exportable?* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2002).

where there is cant or stupidity, I am not above pointing that out. Or sticking the knife in to destroy an argument.

I have been writing about political culture for a long time but never considered myself a “political culturalist”—whatever that may be. I think of political culture as an approach to understanding, one among many, and not a full, all-encompassing, complete, or sufficient explanation. Many factors go into understanding other nations and other cultures, of which political culture is one. Some scholars, however, think that factor is the most important one in explaining why some countries succeed and others fail. Others are less convinced of that argument. I fall somewhere in-between.

While I was never self-consciously a “culturalist” writer, I have over the years become more interested in the debate as well as what underlies the various positions. Political culture was always *one* (of nine or ten) of the approaches I taught in my graduate Comparative Politics Seminar;¹⁴ but then last year (2012), for the first time, I taught a semester-long seminar devoted entirely to Political Culture. That seminar, and the excellent graduate students in it, constituted the origins of this book.

I am grateful to those students—Hasan Ahmed, Nancy Arrington, Patrick Howell, Sarah Hunter, Megan Lounsbury, Bailey Sanders, Jan Yamauchi, Jongmin Yi, and Weigi Zhang—and the comments, oral presentations, and papers they offered. This book would not have been possible without their detailed reports.

I am also grateful to the top-ranked (#4 in the country) School of Public and International Affairs (SPIA) at the University of Georgia, now my “home” institution, which provided me with a named professorship (the Dean Rusk Professor of International Affairs), generous research and travel funds, a light teaching load, and a hospitable climate for research and writing. My fellow faculty members in the Department of International Affairs, one of the three departments within SPIA, have been wonderful colleagues, even while I use them as sounding boards and, occasionally, foils for my own ideas. Doris Holden has been my typist, editor, and generous friend and adviser for going on 35 years. My wife, Dr. Iêda Siqueira Wiarda, the other political scientist in the family, shares my belief in the importance of culture and has over the decades been my lifetime companion in the many travels and cultural encounters we have had in following our separate research paths. None of these individuals or institutions is in any way responsible for the analysis that follows, however; for good or ill, that is a product of my own “political culture.”

Howard J. Wiarda
Athens, Georgia, and
Washington, D.C.

14 The published version of this ongoing seminar is Howard J. Wiarda (ed.), *Grand Theory and Ideology* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).

Chapter 1

Introduction: The Culture Debate— Political Culture and Comparative Politics

Political culture is important. Or, as a recent book title puts it, “Culture Matters!”¹

Culture is an important variable in political, social, and economic analysis. Culture *counts*! Some social scientists think of culture, along with structure and institutions, as one of the three most important factors in determining political outcomes. Others go farther with the claim, supported by considerable evidence, that culture is *the* most important factor. Modern statistical and computerized multivariate analysis help validate this claim.

Yet others dispute these claims of the importance of political culture. They say culture does not count, that only structural and/or institutional factors matter. Some of these counter arguments are rational; others, downright irrational. In this book we seek not only to explain political culture but also to wrestle with the issue of why that topic evokes so much hostility among some scholars.

When we speak here of *political culture*, we are referring to the deep-seated ideas, beliefs, values, and behavioral orientations that people have, or carry around in their heads, toward the political system. We are not talking about culture *per se*—dance, music, paintings, art—although all or any of these may have an effect on the overall political culture. No, our focus is narrower: those aspects of art, religion, music, beliefs, ideology, etc. that specifically affect the political system, political processes, or policy outcomes. Political culture has to do with political values, beliefs, and mindsets, not with paintings on a wall or musical notes, no matter how glorious.

Political culture is learned. So far as we now know, political culture is not genetic—although there is new but still inconclusive research that may point in this direction.² It is not, we think, inherited through your DNA, although sometimes in popular commentary people will say that their beliefs and values are part of their “character.” No, political culture is generally understood to be incorporated through the learning process, which we call “political socialization,” which begins at birth. People are *socialized* into a prevailing political culture through the immediate family, the extended family (clan groups), the school system, Boy or Girl Scouts, Little League, friends and neighborhoods, peers and classmates. The society, the class or caste into which you were born, the identity, ethnic or

1 Laurence E. Harrison and Samuel P. Huntington (eds), *Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress* (New York: Basic Books, 2000).

2 Nicholas Wade, “Human Culture, An Evolutionary Force,” *New York Times* (March 2, 2010), D1, reporting on the new research.

otherwise, which you take on, and the nation and world in which you grow up—all have a strong impact on your political belief system and political culture.

Political culture usually has to do with fundamental core beliefs. These are essential, often existential, beliefs related to who you are as a person. They are not fleeting or superficial likes or dislikes. They are not whether you like a particular person, president, candidate, or colleague on a daily basis. Rather, core beliefs include your basic attitudes toward democracy, authoritarianism, or freedom. Political culture and political culture studies seek to tap your attitudes toward the fundamentals, not the superficial or ephemeral.

Although political culture is learned and probably not genetic, it does not usually change easily or quickly. The learned beliefs that are part of a political culture may go on for generations, even millennia, if the culture is isolated enough such as some tribes in the South Pacific or the Amazon jungle. Once a set of beliefs and practices is imbedded in a political culture, it is very difficult to change it. Think of the difficulties of bringing democracy and human rights to such historically authoritarian political cultures as Russia, China, or the Arab Middle East. Or the near impossibility that the United States has faced in trying to change quickly the political cultures of Iraq or Afghanistan and implant democracy there.

While political culture changes slowly, usually requiring two, three, or more generations, it does change. Often almost imperceptibly. Political culture changes under the impact of urbanization, industrialization, and overall societal modernization. Globalization, war, and occupation may also change a political culture. The media have a strong effect in changing a political culture, so does the worldwide web, the internet, and social media. For example, the so-called “Arab Spring” of 2011 which toppled a string of Middle Eastern dictators and brought social and political change was stimulated and spread by social media. Hence, while political culture usually changes quite slowly, it can go through a quite rapid and radical transformation. On the other hand, radicals and revolutionaries often find, to their consternation, that the political culture of their country changes far more slowly than does the leadership, the regime, or the country’s political institutions.

Political culture is not to be confused with racism, although one needs to be especially careful and sensitive when stepping into this terrain. Nor are political culture studies the same as ethnic stereotyping. Nor should they be confused with the older and now generally discredited national character studies.

Culture is one thing, race another. If I say, “all blacks” or “all Greeks” are this or that, that is racism, unacceptable ethnic stereotyping. But if I say, “Blacks tend to identify with and vote for, in ratios of nine- or ten-to-one, the Democratic Party,” that is not a racist comment. That is a tendency statement, a factual statement, and a matter of identity, culture, or self-interest politics—perfectly acceptable. What we now call “identity politics,” to which political culture studies are closely related, is similar. No stereotypes are used; voting behavior is analyzed; percentages are used. We are not saying *all* blacks or *all* Greeks are this or that or vote in a certain way; we are using sociological tendency statements. But you can probably guess that,

in popular commentary and conversation, a factual, statistically derived tendency statement may sometimes begin to shade over or be expressed as a perceived racist statement. We need to carefully guard against such slippage or the confusion of race and culture.

To further distinguish race from culture, let us consider recent immigrants into the United States. Many of these immigrants, of whatever race, color, or identity, absorb one political culture in their home countries, but when they arrive in the US, they must adjust to and absorb another political culture. They cannot change their race or ethnic identity but they do change their culture. Think, for example, of former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, both very Germanic and very American in his behavior.

Many of these immigrants, recently arrived, carry elements of both their old and their adopted countries' political culture. Some of them fall so in love with America that they become, as the saying goes, "more American than the Americans." Many of these immigrants become very successful in this country as they leave their former values behind and adapt to take advantage of the opportunities available in America. Their children, born here and socialized in America, are usually bi-cultural in language and family loyalty but are also thoroughly American in how they think and behave. By the time we get to the grandchildren, the pressures are enormous to be completely American, forgetting or refusing to speak the old-country language, inter-marrying with Americans often of other ethnicities, and completely identifying with American values.

All this has to do with culture, culture change, and assimilation, not race. The values (authoritarianism, hierarchy, and ascription) and social structures (two-class, top-down, elitist) that once held you back in the former country no longer exist in egalitarian and upwardly mobile America, giving you the opportunity, once you have adjusted, learned the language, and mastered the system, to move up in the social scale. It is culture and cultural adjustment that account for your new-found prosperity, no longer—or at least not so much—your color or ethnicity.³

Perhaps here, albeit not yet systematically, we have some hints as to why some people, despite all the evidence of its importance, still dislike the use of political culture as a behavioral explanation. First, we have all by this time, after the horrifying experiences of Nazi Germany and of racism, been brought up ("socialized") to be suspicious of anything that smacks of racist or ethnic stereotypes. No matter how much we say we are only dealing in tendency statements and using statistical correlations, when we say "Blacks tend to vote Democratic" or "Jews tend to be oriented toward social justice," it raises deep suspicions in some quarters. We need to be very careful and sensitive when we employ this kind of analysis.

Second, it will be noted from the paragraphs above that culture change usually takes a long time, often two or three generations. It is a gradual process and can

3 Cultural anthropology has led the way in distinguishing between race and culture. We discuss the issue in more detail in Chapter 3.

seldom be hurried; even the great revolutions in Russia, China, and Cuba *struggled* to change their countries' political culture and even after many decades of trying were not very successful at it. But if you are a radical, a revolutionary, or a social reformer, two or three generations, 50 to 75 years, is way too long. You cannot and do not want to wait that long. You want to get on with the job, to advance your reform program. Political culture, hence, becomes your enemy, something to be opposed to rather than adjusted to, a barrier to your agenda. Hence, political culture, those who study it and those who say it is important, have to be rejected, repudiated, maybe even shouted down—not a very scholarly attitude.

A third possible reason for opposing or rejecting political culture explanations, not unrelated to the previous point, emerges from this discussion. Since World War II and the emergence of the welfare state, more so in Europe than in America, the sense has grown strong that we can adjust and change almost anything—education, health care, housing, etc.—through social policy. Through our institutions and social engineering, the belief is, we can change or reform anything, to do away with poverty, racism, sexism, etc. But that may be true only in rich countries (Norway and Sweden) which have the wealth to do all these things. It may also be true mainly in the Western world and not in the non-West where other values and other cultures prevail. Surely we need to be sensitive to these other cultures and values, and to the level of development of their societies, before we, Westerners, rush in to impose our values and change everything. Once again that “pesky” factor of culture enters in.

Well, there we have it, some of the arguments, at least preliminarily, both for and against political culture. Let us go into these in a bit more depth.

Culture and Politics: The Popular Discourse

Almost everyone at the popular level understands that culture counts, culture matters, culture makes a difference. This is good, plain, old commonsense. This popular, common-sensible approach to culture may be closer to the truth, may be more honest, more accurate, and more valid, than the anti-culture views of some social scientists.

Culture, cultural differences, and culture clashes are with us every day. Almost every school, business, or workplace has its own distinct culture.⁴ It is possible to assess these differences with some accuracy, and social scientists, business gurus, and CEOs are busily doing that on a constant basis. You need to be able to adjust to the prevailing culture of your new school or job; alternatively, as a manager, you may need to introduce changes into the culture of your institution.

Cities have distinct cultures as well. New York (finance) is very different from Washington (politics). Miami (Hispanics) is very different from New Orleans

4 For example, Anjali Raval, “Lessons That Cross Borders,” *Financial Times* (April 9, 2012), 11.

(French). Los Angeles (entertainment) is a quite different city from Seattle (high tech). Chicago (Midwestern) is quite different from the cities on either coast. Detroit (automobiles) is not at all like Pittsburgh (steel) or Philadelphia (the founding fathers). We identify Boston with New England and its great universities, in contrast to Baltimore about which acerbic writer, H.L. Mencken, said, “There is no there there.”

Different regions of the country also have distinct cultures. Of course, in this book we are mainly interested in their *political* cultures, and recently there has been a spate of innovative books, employing census and other data, on the subject.⁵ New England, the Mid-Atlantic, and the West Coast are all quite liberal—“blue states.” Appalachia, the South, the Central Plains, and the Mountain West tend to be conservative—“red states.” The Midwest is home to most of the swing states, while Louisiana, with its French-Canadian background, is a region unto itself.

Most of us who live there know that there are vast cultural differences *within* our respective states. We cannot go through all of these here; a few examples will suffice. Thus, New York City is very different from the rest of or “upstate” New York State; Boston is very different from Western Mass.; South Florida (Miami) is very different from North Florida (“cracker”); Eastern Michigan (union), very different from Western Michigan (rock-hard Republican); Southern California (laid-back), not at all like Northern California (entrepreneurial).

In the state where I currently live, Georgia, we have coastal Georgia, piedmont Georgia, mountain Georgia, and then greater Atlanta—each with its own history, sociology, and culture. When I travel from my home in Athens, a liberal academic community (like Ann Arbor, Bloomington, Madison, Austin, Amherst, Berkeley, or others you can name) to my summer retreat in the North Georgia mountains (now considered by census returns to be part of greater Appalachia), it is like going to a different country. The politics, sociology, culture, economy, and even language are all very different.

When it comes to international travel and the culture differences between countries and regions (the main focus of this book), the variation is even more pronounced. For student exchanges as well as tourist travel, we like Canada, Great Britain, Australia, and New Zealand in part because they speak our language and their culture is similar to our own. When we travel to the European Continent, however, the differences between countries become more pronounced. Just landing at the airport, you know immediately that you are in another country and another culture: the smells, sounds, and sights are all different in Europe North and South and East and West. And yet here you are still within “the West”; when you get to the non-West, it is really, as the saying goes, “another world”—i.e., another culture, another civilization.

5 Gertrude Himmelfarb, *One Nation, Two Cultures* (New York: Knopf, 1999); also Colin Woodard, *American Nations: A History of the Eleven Rival Regional Cultures of North America* (New York: Viking, 2011).

It amazes me that even those social scientists who travel abroad for research (a dwindling number) tend not to give serious attention to culture variables. Are they blind; do their senses not function; are they unaware of what's going on around them? For such regions or culture areas as Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, and the Arab Middle East are so fundamentally different from the West that it boggles the mind that one could miss or ignore these differences. Indeed, these distinct areas or civilizations are so far apart culturally that it is hard, and then only with strong qualifications, to draw comparisons between them. It is like comparing apples to oranges to kumquats. Indeed, in this book (Chapter 8) we go as far as to suggest a separate, distinct model of development for each of these major culture areas.

The issue is not just culture, however, and our frequent lack of understanding of other countries. The issue has critical foreign policy implications as well. Take Iraq or Afghanistan, for example. Both of these countries could be considered failures of American foreign policy. And why did we fail to achieve our goals there? In large part (1) because we never understood or came to grips realistically with the underlying culture of these two countries, and (2), related to the first, we tried to construct in these countries a model of democracy, governance, human rights, women's rights, etc. based on the US example or model that had almost nothing to do with Afghan or Iraqi reality. Ask yourself, how many of our four-star generals in Iraq, how many foreign aid officials in Afghanistan, how many persons in Congress or the White House spoke Arabic or Pushkin and really understood these two countries and their cultures? The answer is: almost none. We need not go much farther for an explanation of our foreign policy failures, in the Middle East or elsewhere, than that.

A main theme of this book is that culture matters. Culture counts! It counts much more than many scholars and government officials are willing to admit. Culture is not everything but it is a lot. It is a lot not just in terms of our understanding, analysis, and assessment of foreign countries and areas but also of our foreign policies. Good or bad policies and success or lack of success in policy often hangs on our understanding of other countries and cultures: how they think, what motivates them, what makes them tick. Failure to understand produces bad, often failed, policies.

To hint at the importance of cultural considerations, I have culled from my files, collected over the last year or so, a diverse assortment of newspaper and other headlines or titles related to these themes. These headlines provide a sense not only of the essential nature of culture as a factor or variable but also the many-faceted aspects of culture as it plays out in the workplace, in domestic affairs, and especially in international and foreign policy affairs. These headlines do not necessarily "prove" anything at this point about culture but they are illustrative of culture's importance. Additional proof of the argument for culture is offered in the body of the book and its conclusion.

Herewith some examples, chosen for their variety:

"A Cultural Gulf Separates France and Germany," *Financial Times*

“Economic Culture and Economic Performance: What Light Is Shed on the [European] Continent’s Problems?” Venice Conference

“Foxconn [a Chinese company] Faces Cultural Clash as Its Global Reach Grows,” *Financial Times*

“Bombing Shakes Pakistan’s Political Culture,” *Washington Post*

“A True Culture War! Should Anthropologists Help the Pentagon in Iraq and Afghanistan?” *New York Times*

“Professor Outlines the Secret to Effective Intercultural Communications,” *Columns*

“The Culture of Conspiracy,” *Wall Street Journal*

“Spain, Italy, and Identity Politics,” *Financial Times*

“Culture War,” *Washington Post*

“What a Headscarf Can Mean: It’s all About Culture and Identity,” *Washington Post*

“Doctors Miss Cultural Needs, Study Says,” *New York Times*

“National Culture a Factor in Power Politics or Business,” *Financial Times*

“The Triumph of Culture Over Politics,” *Wall Street Journal*

“It Does Not Matter How Senior Your Leadership Team Is, if the Culture They Create and the Protégés They Develop Do Not Lead to Better Development,” CNBC

“The Violence Is Rooted in the Culture, Not the Gun Store,” *Washington Post*

“Cock Fights [Human] and Culture Clashes,” *Financial Times*

“Black Culture Beyond Hip-Hop,” *Washington Post*

“A Culture War Treaty,” *Washington Post*

“For NIH Chief, Issues of Identity and Culture,” *New York Times*

“Putting ‘Culture’ onto the Middle East Agenda,” Woodrow Wilson Center Program

“For American Workers in China, a Culture Clash,” *New York Times*

“Yum! Brands’ New Corporate Culture,” *The Economist*

“Health Opens a New Front in America’s Culture Wars,” *Financial Times*

“Finding the Payoff in Knowing What and How Another Culture Is Thinking,” *New York Times*

“Cultural Attitudes and Rumors Are Lasting Obstacles to Safe Sex,” *New York Times*

“Leisure Is the Vital Ingredient in Nordic Success,” *Financial Times*

“Cultural Development,” Fareed Zakaria, *Washington Post*

“Who Draws the Borders of Culture?” *New York Times*

“Idea of a ‘Culture of Poverty’ Makes a Comeback,” *New York Times*

“All Hail the American Work Ethic,” *Athens Banner-Herald*

“A Culture of Criminality on Wall Street,” *Wall Street Journal*

“This Raging Fire: The Cultural Change That’s Needed to Save Black Children,” *New York Times*

“Human Culture, an Evolutionary Force: Biologists Cite Evidence That Culture Has Been Interacting with Genes,” *New York Times*

“The Return of History,” *New York Times*

“Cultural Change Is Key to Banking Reform,” *Financial Times*

Obituary: “A French Thinker [Lévi-Strauss] Who Crossed Continents and Cultures,” *New York Times*

“A New Culture War Is Brewing over Capitalism,” *The Economist*

“The Culture Wars Shift to School Halls,” *New York Times*

“Looking to Moscow or Washington? History, Culture, and Foreign Policy Orientation in Eastern Europe,” Term paper title, University of Georgia

“The Sound of Silence: The Culture Wars Take a Break,” *New York Times*

“Republicans Discover Home Truths in Book on Afghanistan: It’s All About Culture,” *Financial Times*

“Greeks and Germans,” *New York Times*

“When the Spirits Talk, as They Frequently Do, Thais Are Eager to Listen,” *New York Times*

“To Reach a Distant Workforce: Rapid Globalization Is Teaching Multinationals How to Translate Their Corporate Culture to New Territories,” *Financial Times*

“China’s President Lashes Out at Western Culture,” *New York Times*

“Let’s Stop ‘Civilizing’ Afghanistan,” *Washington Post*

“Europe’s Far Right: Culture Matters More,” *The Economist*

“It’s the Culture [of Italy], Stupido,” *Washington Post*

“Culture Blame Games Are No Way to Prevent Future Crises,” *Financial Times*

“Culture Turned Fukushima from Nuclear Disaster to ‘Made in Japan’,” *Financial Times*

“One Leadership Model Cannot Fit All Cultures,” *Financial Times*

“Culture Shock: A Dutch Social Democrat Questions the Benefits of Immigration,” *Financial Times*

Well, there we have it, a collection of recent random headlines and other titles drawn from my clippings files.

What do we learn from these headlines? First, that culture is an important topic, certainly in the media and in the popular consciousness. Second, that culture deals with important issues: business, sex, high politics, communications, party politics, international relations and foreign policy, understanding other countries, war, the internet, the worldwide web, social media, etc. It is not a factor that can be ignored. Third, we learn that the concept of culture is used in a great variety of ways and circumstances; it is often employed loosely, and, in these headlines at least, without much definitional rigor or precision.

How can we solve these problems? First, while we can probably all admit that culture is important, we need to weigh the cultural explanation against other important factors, like geography and the environment, the class or social structure of a given society, and the way its institutions are organized, to see which of these factors carries the most explanatory power. Second, we need to focus: while culture deals with a variety of important issues, the particular focus in this book is on *political culture*: the values, beliefs, and behavioral orientations that affect people’s *political activities*. Third, since culture in the headlines

listed above is used in a variety of ways, we need to be *rigorous* in the use and measure of political culture. Can we rely on the *impression* of people, even trained observers like cultural anthropologists, sociologists, and political scientists with a comparative politics and international relations specialization, or should we rely on more precise, measurable, and scientific resources such as interviewing, public opinion surveys, and computer analysis.

The Plan of the Book

The book is organized, in general, on an historical basis; that is, it proceeds from the beginnings of anthropological and cultural studies up to the present. But it is also organized topically; that is, each chapter raises complex and controversial issues for us to wrestle with.

We begin in Chapter 2 with an historical overview of political culture studies. We trace the origins of political culture all the way back to the beginnings of political science in Plato, Aristotle, and the ancient Greeks and Romans, *all of whom* recognized the importance of underlying values, beliefs, and overall political culture in helping to determine a country's or society's prevailing political system. We then trace these developments through the medieval period and on into early modern times in the writings of Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes, and John Locke. We next analyze the Enlightenment and the great nineteenth-century theorists, Karl Marx, Auguste Comte, and Max Weber.

Chapter 3 picks up where Chapter 2 leaves off, in the latter part of the nineteenth century. For that is when the mainly European explorers, archeologists, and travelers set off to discover the world, wrote some of the first studies of non-Western peoples, and when the field of cultural anthropology was founded. Cultural anthropology was the precursor of political-culture studies and taught political scientists a lot about methodology and how to study Third World countries. Our analysis deals mainly with such leading anthropologists as Franz Boas, Margaret Mead, Ruth Benedict, and Clifford Geertz.

It was but a short step, traced in Chapter 4, from cultural anthropology to the often very controversial "national character studies" of the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s. National character studies were controversial because of the stereotyping involved ("all Frenchmen or Germans are this or that") and, especially, because of the Holocaust, when entire categories of people—Jews, blacks, gypsies, and homosexuals—were condemned to persecution or the gas chambers simply because of their race, ethnic identity, or sexual orientation. Such stereotyping of whole groups of people was seen as misleading and downright dangerous.

By the middle of the twentieth century, a greater sense of cultural relativism had set in. Most cultural anthropologists and many other social scientists had come to the position that they should not judge other cultures on the grounds that every society eventually finds its way to the cultural equilibrium that, functionally, is best for it. We should not, it was argued, make moral judgments of superiority

or inferiority, “primitive” or “civilized,” regarding other cultures. In addition, societal values began to change, away from racial or ethnic prejudice, away from stereotyping of whole groups, and toward greater tolerance and understanding of people as individuals. Multiculturalism, similarly, makes us reluctant to judge other people’s cultures.

Nevertheless, as we also see in Chapter 4, many travel writers, journalists, and scholars continued to write good books on individual countries and cultures that were perceptive, made good reading, and were quite benign as compared to the race- and ethnic-baiting of earlier decades. In addition, there was a reaction against the more extreme forms of cultural relativism, with leading anthropologist, Ruth Benedict, for example, arguing that some cultures may be better or worse than others. At about the same time, the economics profession rediscovered culture as a factor in economic development in the form of Edward Banfield’s analysis of trust, Robert Putnam’s rediscovery of civic virtue, and Nobel prize-winning Douglas North’s analysis of culture as an institution.

A major breakthrough came in the 1960s, as shown in Chapter 5, with the publication of Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba’s *The Civic Culture*. Heretofore, political culture studies had been largely based on in-depth interviewing and participant observation and was largely impressionistic and, therefore, subject to different interpretations or, far worse, stereotyping abuse. But Almond and Verba’s massive study relied on large-scale, public-opinion surveys, empirically and scientifically based and, therefore, grounded in precise measures, correlation analysis, and tendency statements instead of stereotypes. Henceforth, all political culture studies would have to use, in whole or in part, such survey data in order to be credible. There followed from this pioneering 1963 work a whole wave of political culture studies in the 1960s and 1970s that led directly to Ronald Inglehart’s equally massive, late 1980s empirically based work and to his rich World Values Surveys, now covering over 100 countries.

In Chapter 6 we take a step back from this history and progression to deal with the criticisms of political culture. The usual criticisms are already familiar to us: that political culture studies involve stereotypes, that they are vague and impressionistic, and that they ignore other important factors. In this chapter we try to respond honestly and straightforwardly to these and other criticisms. But we try to go beyond that response to explore why it is that some of these criticisms are so basal, so vituperative, and so nasty. Some of the reasons have to do with the familiar criticisms noted above; some have to do with the rise in the 1970s of alternative dependency, Marxist, rational choice, and institutionalist explanations; some have to do with the greater sensitivity and cultural relativism mentioned previously. But some are so deep-rooted that there seems to be something primal or even psychological about them.

Chapter 7 deals with what has been called “The Renaissance of Political Culture.” Beginning in the late 1980s and continuing to today, political culture studies enjoyed a revival. The main writers in this tradition include also some of the leading figures in political science and history more generally: Ronald

Inglehart, Samuel P. Huntington, Francis Fukuyama, Robert Putnam, Peter Berger, Lucian Pye, David Landes, Geert Hofstede, and many others. In these writers, the argument for the importance of political culture requires no apologies; indeed, in quite a number of them political culture is said to carry more explanatory power than any other variable.

Chapter 8 represents still another new departure. For in much of the non-West and the Third World, culture, specifically the local culture, has also become an important subject of recent discussion. Many leaders and intellectuals in these countries have concluded that neither of the main models they had aped and imported in the past, the Marxian and the Western developmentalist model, is right for them. Hence, the call has gone out in all these areas—Latin America, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East—to let us do it *our way*. That is, let us develop and find our own route to modernization based on home-grown practices and institutions. This plea, for a Latin American, an African, an Asian, and an Islamic model of development, is not, as we shall see, without its own problems. Nevertheless, we must recognize this global moment for what it is: a plea for greater cultural understanding and for each region or culture area to find its own path. Once again, this is an argument about culture, specifically non-Western culture, and the effort to find value there.

In Chapter 9 we explore political culture as it has been expressed in other fields. “Identity Politics,” which mainly focuses on society’s subgroups—women, racial and ethnic minorities, and gays and lesbians—provides a way of studying the values, beliefs, and ideologies of these groups; in short, political culture but without calling it that. Similarly in the field of international relations, “constructivism,” which focuses on the values, beliefs, ideology, and domestic political orientation of different countries—again, it sounds like political culture to me—has recently offered a challenge to the realist, neorealist, and liberal-internationalist approaches in IR. But are identity politics and constructivism really new or are they just new wine in the old political-culture bottles? Chapter 9 presents a provocative argument on these themes, bound to stimulate discussion.

In the Conclusion, we review all these arguments, reemphasize the importance of political culture, and wrestle with the issue of whether culture is a full and complete argument unto itself, or whether it must be combined with other explanations.

It is a long but an enlightening and entertaining journey. We hope you’ll come along for the ride.

Chapter 2

The *Long* Debate Over Political Culture

The debate over political culture and its importance has been with us for a very long time. Indeed, this debate goes back to the beginning of recorded history and of systematic political analysis in the ancient Greeks and Romans.¹ Aristotle, Plato, and Socrates, the founders of political science, wrote and spoke about political culture and its influence in the early Greek city-states. So did the Roman writers, Cicero, Tacitus, Cato, and Marcus Aurelius.

During the Middle Ages, *all* of Western Christendom was undergirded by Christian beliefs, religion being one aspect and often a particularly potent one—witness the importance of Islam in shaping the Middle East even of today—of political culture. Early modern political scientists, like Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Locke, began to separate politics from religion or else showed how religion and political culture could be put at the service of politics. The debate continued through the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries with Montesquieu, Comte, and de Tocqueville and reached its culmination in the epoch debate between Karl Marx, who emphasized the material basis of politics and saw culture as unimportant, and the equally great German sociologist, Max Weber, who elevated culture to the most important factor in explaining political life. The debate continues to this day.

The issue becomes even more interesting when we consider the non-West. In East Asia, the ideas of 2,500-year-old Confucius, who emphasized both culture and institutions, continue to influence the politics and societies of all the East Asian countries. In the Middle East, who could doubt the ongoing influence of Islam on politics, economics, and society? Latin America is predominantly Western, but it is a product of Southern European, Mediterranean, and Catholic political culture, as compared to the predominantly Anglo-Saxon and Protestant culture of Northern Europe and North America. Africa, too, is powerfully shaped by local or subnational political and ethnic cultures that often defy nationalization. Throughout the Third World, the cry has gone out for home-grown, culturally sensitive solutions to issues of national development—let us do it “our way”—rather than continued borrowing from ill-fitting, often-imposed solutions from outside.

In this chapter we survey some of this long and diverse theoretical and cultural history. Our purpose is not to present a complete history of political philosophy

1 In researching the chapter, I have gone back to the original writings of the authors discussed as well as to the textbooks used when I studied political theory: George H. Sabine, *A History of Political Theory* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1961); and Sheldon S. Wolin, *Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought* (Boston, MA: Little Brown, 1960).

but only some of its abiding themes. These include the separation of politics from other parts of life; the influence of culture, history, and context upon politics; and the emergence of political culture as a powerful and autonomous variable undergirding and explaining economic and institutional life.

The Ancients

Discussions and discourse about politics go back a long way before the founding of political science in Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. In the absence of very many explicit and surviving writings, what are usually called the pre-Socratics (prior to Socrates) were concerned with some of the perennial questions that political science has raised: the nature of the state, the qualities of a good or ethical life, and the social, economic, historical, and cultural bases of society. As soon as you start talking about the historical, ethical, and cultural bases of the state and society, you are talking about political culture.

Plato's *Republic*, and later on *The Laws* and *The Statesman*, was the first, and indeed highly original, body of writings to raise all these issues in a systematic and analytical way. Writing in the fifth century B.C., and in the context of the then-flourishing Greek city-states, Plato sought to offer a picture of an ideal, even idealized, republic. In the process of presenting this picture, Plato had a lot to say about many aspects of social, political, and cultural life.

Plato was an idealist and used a deductive method of reasoning. That is, he started off with a "truth"—the ideal republic—that he wanted to present, and from that truth he deduced many important ideas. In using the deductive method, Plato stood in contrast to his equally great student, Aristotle, who employed more of an inductive or scientific method. Aristotle, whom we discuss shortly, also sought the best achievable form of government; but his method was to collect all the Greek constitutions available at his time, study them, and then make recommendations as to the best form of government based on these empirical observations. Today's political scientists would call Aristotle a "barefoot empiricist"; few of them would have much use for Plato's idealism or his deductive method.

The ancient Greeks were concerned with the nature of order in nature and society. They sought a life of harmony shared with all of society's members. They were concerned with justice. They wanted everyone to be secure in his or her station in life. They were also curious about other cultures and societies, thus giving rise to what today we would call the "comparative method." They collected anthropological lore and were interested in the "strange" customs and manners of other people. Behavior which in one country was condemned, the Greeks saw, might in another culture be condoned and even admired. Each man, the early Greek philosophers concluded, with particular implications for this book, prefers his own country's customs, yet there was also in these writings of the ancient Greeks a form of cultural relativism that is quite surprising for its day.

Plato, however, would have none of this. He already *knew* the right answer, the particular form he wanted society and government to take. Part of Plato's "idealism" involved abolishing private property as well as marriage. It is amusing to think of Plato as a "communist" but, since that came over 2,000 years later, not a "Marxist."

Plato, like *his* teacher, Socrates, believed that virtue is knowledge. His virtuous leader, his "philosopher king," must use his knowledge to achieve virtue. He wants *good men* to achieve the *good life* within a *good* or *virtuous state*. Hence, in Plato's reasoning and book we see the interweaving of psychological, social, ethical, and political considerations. Or what we would call "political culture."

In his ideal state, Plato seeks both harmony and justice. All people must accept their station in life and not rebel against it. He prefers a well-ordered, functionally based, even corporatist organization of society. At the same time, Plato is not much concerned with public opinion because he already has his own vision of the good state. His notion of "the good" is implicit in all society. Anticipating Durkheim, Plato writes at length about the division of labor in society and how tasks become specialized, with the ruling philosopher-king arranging all these in the most harmonious way.

Nor is Plato much concerned about law. In his scheme of things, law is not much needed. For if Plato's philosopher-king is both knowledgeable and wise, then there is no reason for him to be held in check by law and lawyers. He already *knows* what is best. Plato's position in this regard stands in contrast to most political philosophy which has less faith in individual rulers and greater confidence in the rule of law. Later on, in *The Statesman*, even Plato will restore law to an important place in his theory.

Important for our purposes is that Plato largely accepted the three-part classification of governments, and their corrupt or perverse forms, that had been around in Greek philosophy for some time and may have even gone back to the Persians. The three forms are monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy. The three corrupt forms of these are tyranny, oligarchy, and mob rule. Plato's ideal state is monarchy led by a philosopher-king; he sees that as "divine" but unlikely in the real world. Although those aspects are much more worked out and detailed by Aristotle, Plato begins the process of analyzing the six forms above in terms of their underlying social and economic conditions, physical conditions and topography, and their "spirit" or political culture.

Plato is concerned not just with classification, however—that is what empiricists do. Instead, he wants to rank order states in accord with his ideal vision. Thus, monarchy under his ideal philosopher-kings can lead to either tyranny or timocracy, a military state. Oligarchy (government by the wealthy) is a corruption of timocracy. Democracy, when it degenerates into mob rule, is also a form of tyranny. Retreating in later life from his hope for an ideal type (rule by philosopher-kings), Plato now seems inclined to accept realistically a mixed form of government where the rule of law is enshrined.

Since that is a part of political culture, we are particularly interested in Plato's writings in his analysis of religion and its relation to the state. In *The Republic*,

Plato had not paid much attention to religion but in his later writings, belatedly recognizing its importance in shaping political behavior, he did. However, Plato’s purpose is not to praise religion but to subordinate it to his ideal vision. Thus, Plato wants an official state religion, priests licensed and subordinated to the state, and other religions besides the official one outlawed. Plato is not, in respect to religion, a great civil libertarian. But late in his life he came to recognize the power of religion as constituting an influential part of the political culture; hence, his desire to suppress all but the official belief system.

Aristotle was Plato’s greatest student. Some would argue that Aristotle’s *Politics* is an even greater book than Plato’s *Republic*, but there is room for disagreement here. Both may be included on a list of the ten greatest books ever written.

Plato and Aristotle are in agreement that the ultimate purpose of political inquiry is ethical: to establish the *best* state possible. Both are in agreement that political science should have a moral basis. However, while Plato seeks to establish an ideal state and his methodology proceeds deductively from that premise, Aristotle, always the scientist, collects hundreds of Greek constitutions, examines them closely, and then proceeds inductively from there. As a result, Aristotle’s “ideal state” is always only second best to Plato’s. That is because Aristotle’s empirical, scientific method grounds him in reality while Plato’s “ideal type” is always unattainable.

Aristotle follows Plato and the earlier Greek/Persian intellectual tradition of classifying political systems into six types. As in Plato, there are three good forms and three corrupt or degenerative forms, as follows:

Good Forms	Corrupt Forms
Monarchy	Tyranny
Aristocracy	Oligarchy
Democracy	Mob rule

Of course, since Aristotle was an empiricist, he also finds examples of many mixed forms in the constitutions he has collected.

Most important for our purposes in this book is Aristotle’s examination, again scientifically based, of the social, economic, and *cultural* basis of all three political systems. He looked at the *ethical basis*, the *moral requirements* and the *condition of human nature* underlying these constitutions. He examined the *values*, the *belief systems*, and the *behavior* of the peoples in all these political systems. All these terms emphasized above—ethical bases, moral requirements, values, beliefs, etc.—are all what we would today call “political culture variables.”

Our purpose here is not to delve overly deeply into ancient Greek philosophy. But it is to show that, right from the very beginning of political science as a discipline, it was recognized that *cultural factors*—and others—were important

determinants of the nature, quality, and type of the political system. In addition to structure and institutions, in order to have a complete picture you had to know the values, beliefs, religions, and customs of other societies.

When we get to the Romans, the nature of political inquiry shifts quite dramatically. The Greeks, particularly Aristotle, living in a context of small, competing city-states, were in a perfect position to do comparative research into the nature and functioning of all these distinct political systems. But the Roman writers and jurists, such as Cicero, Cato, and Marcus Aurelius, lived in a context of a *universal empire*, the Roman Empire. The Roman Empire constituted all of the then-known world.

The Romans, therefore, were not interested in the kind of empirical research in which Aristotle had engaged in collecting all those constitutions. Nor were there other constitutions for them to examine, for the Roman Empire encompassed *all of civilization*. There were no other constitutions out there among the distant “barbarian” tribes. Hence, the Roman jurists did not and could not do Aristotle’s type of comparative, empirical research; rather, they were interested in finding the best form of government and establishing the rule of law *within* the Empire. And in pursuing that goal they were just as much concerned with values, ethics, and political culture as had been the Greeks. Unfortunately for them, not all their rulers were quite so virtuous.

The Christian Middle Ages

With the breakup, division, and collapse of the Roman Empire, power began to shift away from the Mediterranean and toward Northern Europe. The Christian Church split into its Western Catholic and Eastern Orthodox parts, while political power flowed northward toward France and Germany. Nevertheless, the dream of spiritual and political unity remained intact: in religion, the One, Holy, Roman Catholic Church and, in politics, a resurrected Holy Roman Empire.

In this context, the emphasis was on what unites people—Medieval Catholicism. For over 1,000 years during the so-called Middle Ages, from the fall of Rome in the fifth century A.D. to the rise of the modern world in the sixteenth, Christianity was the one universal and unifying factor in an otherwise divided and disjointed Western world. Hence, there could be no comparative politics as Aristotle had understood it, since there were at this time no other polities to compare. Instead, there was only one faith, one church, and one (hoped-for) empire. As Augustine had taught in his *City of God*, there was only a single Christian society which included, potentially, the entire world. Heretics and nonbelievers residing in other parts of the world were not to be studied neutrally and scientifically; rather, they were seen as eventually being absorbed into a single, universal, Christian empire—as began to happen when Columbus discovered and colonized America.

The individual who both personified and best articulated this vision of Christian global unity was the great, twelfth-century scholar of the Dominican

order, Saint Thomas Aquinas. At the heart of Thomas's philosophy was a universal synthesis of all existing knowledge centered in Christian religious faith. His was an all-embracing system in which the whole of human knowledge was of a single piece. All fields of inquiry—medicine, astrology, and politics—were subsumed under a single Christian vision. And this vision of a Christian commonwealth was applicable to the whole world.

In Thomas's view, the universe forms a natural hierarchy beginning with God at the highest level and eventually working its way down to men. But men were also organized hierarchically, from rulers down to peasants and slaves. All men were required to accept their station in life as natural and God-given and not rebel against it. Society, therefore, would be static and unchanging, generation after generation and century after century. Man's duty was to obey God's law and keep His commandments. Hence, the legal system was also organized hierarchically: God's law at the top, then Divine law as revealed in the *Bible*, natural law derived from using "right reason" to interpret God's law, and finally human law which was lower than and subordinate to the other three.

Thomas's formula for social and political life followed from his overall conception of a Christian universe. Rulership is an office of trust to benefit the whole community of believers. The ruler must govern for and in the name of the common Christian good. He must rule so as to benefit every class and group so that men may live a happy and virtuous (Christian) life. Peace and order are necessary in order to assure human happiness. Life and governance have a moral purpose, so power ought to be limited and it ought to be exercised according to the rule of law. In Thomas's view, there is only one law, one right, and one justice—all of which, of necessity, must be Christian. More than any other thinker, Thomas's philosophy expresses the moral and religious conclusions upon which Christian, medieval civilization was based.

Thomas was not an empiricist in the same way Aristotle was; instead, he already *knew* what the best form of government—a universal Christian commonwealth—was. Nor was Thomas a comparativist; if there is only *one* Christian kingdom and you already know the best form of government, what is the point of comparing it with others? It is the Christian's duty, as with later missionaries, to bring others around to your point-of-view, not to be neutral or objective toward non-Christian people. Thomas's position is definitely not one of moral or political relativism or even of scientific detachment; instead, his is the one true way which it is the duty and obligation of all peoples everywhere to accept.

How is all this relevant to political culture? Although it may sound obscure, the answer is really quite clear. *All the world* is to be animated by a *single, universal, Christian political culture*. As with other things Thomistic, there is only one, global political culture, and that is a Christian one. Remember St. Thomas was not interested in comparative political analysis or in comparing distinct political cultures; rather, he was interested in only a single Christian political culture and belief system that was assumed, in the context of the times, to be universal. In fact, to Thomas and other Medieval Christian writers, political culture was

essential. The difference was that they believed there was only a single, legitimate, Christian political culture. And that Christian vision would or should animate the whole world.

Modern Political Science

For a very long time, roughly 1,000 years, what we will call the “medieval consensus,” centered around the Catholic writings of St. Augustine, St. Thomas, and the other Church fathers, held. Of course, there were ups and downs, religiosity waxed and waned, and Church and state were not always—to say the least—in exact harmony. Nevertheless, in the long sweep of history, it is quite remarkable that this Christian world view, this uniquely Christian political culture which its apostles held to be universal, managed to hold on for so long—1,000 years. Even today, in a very diverse universe as well as a much more pluralistic America, this unified Christian conception remains powerful.

Eventually, the assumptions and presumed universality of this prevailing Christian conception began to be questioned. It was questioned, though seldom challenged frontally, by the Renaissance, the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century, the Enlightenment, and, eventually, in the nineteenth century, by Marxism and rising secularism. Alongside these others, it was challenged in the political realm as well.

Niccoló Machiavelli (1469–1527) is usually considered the first modern political scientist. He is thought of as the first “modern” because of his radical separation, unlike Saint Thomas and the “medievals,” of religion from politics. His main interest in his most famous writing, *The Prince* (1513), was political power, how to achieve it and how to hold it. In this task, Machiavelli saw that religion could be used by rulers to manipulate allies and acquire and keep power. It was not that Machiavelli was against religion *per se*; his position was one of moral indifference. His goal was to strengthen the state in his native Italy, then torn by division and weakness, and to show rulers how to increase their power. One technique—heretical at the time—was to use religion to sway the masses, build unity, and increase central power.

Machiavelli was a shrewd observer of politics in his home city of Florence and in Italy more generally. He was not an empiricist, collecting and analyzing constitutions, in the same sense that Aristotle was; rather, he used historical examples to bolster the conclusions that his sharp observations had already led him to reach. Nevertheless, Machiavelli was a particularly clever and astute political observer, convinced that man’s “natural aggressiveness” made struggle and competition an everyday fact of life. And in this struggle, rulers may, and even are obliged to, utilize religion as an instrument of state power and control.

Politics to Machiavelli is an end unto itself. It is not just a means to serve God or the Church. That view is what makes Machiavelli so modern, as breaking so completely with the medieval past. He is interested almost exclusively in the

mechanics of government. *The Prince* is concerned with how states can be made strong, how they can extend their power, and how to avoid decay and revolution. In this effort, religion may play a major role. But Machiavelli's interest in religion was instrumental, not whether it was true or false. He wanted to *use* religion in the interest of state power, and that is what made his views so controversial.

Machiavelli was not a comparativist; his sole concern was Italy and why it was so weak and powerless. And in dissecting Italian politics, Machiavelli presented a particularly shrewd, political-cultural-based explanation. Italy, he said, was a brilliant and artistically creative society—witness the Renaissance, centered in Italy. Yet it was also the victim, then as now, of the worst kinds of political corruption and moral degradation. It had emancipated people and a cool, detached spirit, yet it was politically underdeveloped compared to the rest of Europe. Its leaders were selfish, self-centered, and often debauched. The Roman Catholic Church in Rome, Machiavelli shockingly argued, was the main cause of Italian disunity. The Church was corrupt as was Italian society more generally. Only a prince educated and presumably trained by Machiavelli could unite Italy and rescue it from degradation and political decay.

Only four years after Machiavelli wrote *The Prince* came another of those great revolutions that we associate with the making of the modern world: The Protestant Reformation. The Reformation, beginning in 1517, attacked the corruption of the Catholic Church and its clergy and gave rise to the formation of national Lutheran, Calvinist, and other Protestant sects. It also led to a profound religious and cultural divide between Northern (Protestant) Europe and Southern (Catholic) Europe. In the hand of the great, nineteenth-century sociologist, Max Weber, as we shall see, this religious and political-cultural divide would help explain why Germany, the Netherlands, Great Britain, Switzerland, and Scandinavia were destined to forge ahead socially and economically, while Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Ireland were fated to lag behind. We will have more to say on this theme later in the book.

The next great political philosopher to demand our attention is Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679). Hobbes wrote in the midst of the seventeenth-century civil wars in England; his purpose was to defend the monarchy against those who had challenged it. In this sense he was like Machiavelli, an advocate of strong, central, royal rule. In his focus on England, Hobbes was, continuing a long tradition, a student of local and national political culture. But, again like Machiavelli, his political philosophy rose above national considerations to advance a political science that had international implications.

Hobbes was a nationalist and a strong advocate for individualism. He built his argument on the basis of rational, calculating self-interest. He was, once more like Machiavelli, an analyst of political power: how to achieve it and, especially for Hobbes, how to hang onto it. His most famous book, *Leviathan*, was a political science study in strong state power. We would probably label him a “tough guy” for his powerful defense of absolute monarchy. We would also think of Hobbes as a thoroughly modern political scientist because, regardless of religion or morality, he sought to make his argument broad enough to be universal and

thoroughly scientific, taking into account both human nature and all the facts of human behavior and political culture in both their individual and social aspects. The structure of power and of a powerful state created in the *Leviathan* is quite awesome. Hobbes is a cool customer, thoroughly modern and secular.

By this time in European history, political science had become, increasingly divorced from religion or morality, truly a science, mainly a science of power. Yet its foremost practitioners—and this is our main point—never lost sight of their grounding in local politics and their own distinct political culture. While advancing what they conceived (hence, the “science” in political science) as universal principles, they never ignored the fact that their advice had to be adapted to local conditions. It was no good offering counsel to kings and rulers if what they advised would not work in local circumstances. Indeed, that may be one of the key principles of political science: that *all* prescriptions for power, policy, and political institutions must, if they are to be effective, be adjusted to native conditions on the ground, to local values and beliefs. Indeed, that is precisely the definition of political culture.

All the great political scientists from Plato and Aristotle on understood this principle of universal prescription adapted to local political culture. Thus, Machiavelli emphasized the general principle that politics rested on force and selfishness, but he was always careful to adjust his analysis to the realities of his native Italy. A noted French political theorist of the time, Jean Bodin, writing in the midst of the sixteenth-century French wars of religion, sought similarly to strengthen the power of the monarch; but he always couched his argument in the realities of French culture and society. Bodin, like Aristotle, also sought to show how the various types of government had to adapt to the social, economic, military, climatic, and moral (political culture) in which they found themselves. Similarly, Grotius, thought of as the father of international law, sought to advance universal principles by which all states should abide, but his system was also highly local, designed to protect small states (his native Holland) against the incursions of larger powers (England, France, and Germany). And then there is Hobbes with his emphasis on absolute, state-building, royal power designed specifically to be of service to the English monarchy.

The next great theorist in our gallery of major political scientists is John Locke (1632–1704), writing about 40 years after Hobbes and in sharp contrast to him. Whereas both Machiavelli and Hobbes, completing their great works in periods of national disunity, were advocates of strong, central, royal authority, Locke, writing to defend democracy, civil society, and constitutionalism in the English revolution of 1689, was an apostle of limited government. Locke was, moreover, the philosopher above all to whom the American founders looked a century later when they launched their own revolution against England and established a new constitutional democracy.

Locke was an empiricist, a nationalist, and a product of British law and tradition. In his *Second Treatise on Government* (1690), Locke vigorously sought to defend the revolution of the previous year in England that had established limited,

constitutional monarchy. In doing so, he stood in marked contrast to Hobbes who four decades earlier had, equally vigorously, rationalized absolute monarchy. Locke was a pragmatist, a man of common sense, a cautious observer of politics and change. In his system of natural law, in contrast to Hobbes's who famously saw life as solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short, Locke championed life, liberty, and estate (by which he meant private property) as the main guarantors of freedom as against encroaching state power. He also championed democratic civil society (political parties, interest groups, and community organizations) as against Hobbes who, correctly, saw all these pluralist groups as a threat to absolutism.

We emphasize Locke here not least because of his importance to our theses about political culture. Locke was *the* philosopher bar none of both the English (1689) and the American (1775) revolutions. He was an advocate of liberty, freedom, and limited constitutional government: *the* basis of the American political system. As such, he is probably *the most important figure* in the *Anglo-American* tradition of government and politics. But there are other traditions out there: the German bureaucratic and nationalist tradition; the French tradition of alternating periods of strong, central government and weak parliamentarianism; and the Spanish-Portuguese tradition of updated, Catholic, Thomistic authority.

I have myself written extensively of the differences between the Lockean principles as carried over from England to North America and the Spanish and Portuguese systems as implanted in Latin America.² The point is that, while all these great philosophies claimed to have universal applicability, in fact they were all rooted in their own local, political culture and national tradition. Wiarda's law says: *all* political theory, while claiming universality, is ultimately always a product of local cultures and traditions.

Moving to the eighteenth century and the Enlightenment, we see a lot of sharp analysis (Rousseau, Voltaire, and Diderot) but few grand systems of theory as we are used to in Plato, Aristotle, St. Thomas, Hobbes, or Locke. One of the few who attempted such a grand philosophical synthesis was Montesquieu, known to most Americans as the advocate for a three-part separation of powers (executive, legislative, and judicial) as found in our own constitution.

Montesquieu was very close to the position presented in this book. His concern was not just institutions but the *conditions of society* underneath the institutions. He said that, since institutions must operate in different environments, they must adapt to these distinct conditions. In Montesquieu's analysis, climate, soil, occupations, commerce, history, religion, and customs—are all important in determining a country's laws, institutions, and constitutions.

Hence, the laws of a country must be adapted to a variety of both physical and cultural circumstances. Therefore, while Montesquieu adopted Aristotle's classic, six-part division of types of government, he said they needed to be modified by the influence of their environment and local conditions.

2 Howard J. Wiarda, *The Soul of Latin America* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001).

While Montesquieu was on the right track in pointing to underlying social and cultural conditions, his analysis was not very systematic by today's standards. Nor did he have the empirical base of *facts* available to today's social scientists. He had traveled in Continental Europe between 1728 and 1731 and lived in England where he admired the "spirit" of limited government (from Locke) underlying the British constitutional system. He also relied for his information about different countries on the many travel books on Africa, Asia, and Latin America that were beginning to be written in the eighteenth century. So as a writer myself of travel books,³ I was greatly interested in the kind of information he gleaned from these accounts. Montesquieu's other famous book, *Persian Letters*, shows the influence of these travel books on his understanding of other, more exotic cultures and their governments. What Montesquieu did, therefore, based on these accounts, was to show empirically the variability of the main types of government in the world and the multitude of circumstances (context and political culture) to which all these regimes are forced to adapt.

In the nineteenth century, political theory went in a variety of directions, largely following distinct national norms and traditions. We have the English utilitarians and spokesmen for liberalism, Bentham, Hume, Mill, and T.H. Green; the German tradition in Kant and Hegel; and in France, both the revolutionary tradition stemming from 1789 and a revived Catholic, conservative, corporatist, royalist, and/or strong government (Napoleon I and III) tradition.

In America during this period of the early-to-mid-nineteenth century, the main interpreter of our society and political system was Alexis de Tocqueville. De Tocqueville was a French intellectual who traveled widely in the United States during the 1830s and then wrote about it. De Tocqueville was interested in all aspects of America but particularly in our unique political culture. He especially emphasized the aspects of free speech, egalitarianism, religiosity, and lack of rigid class consciousness—all aspects of the distinct American political culture—that he found in America. And in doing so, de Tocqueville probably came closer than just about anyone to describing what is particular, unique, and glorious about America. In today's time, we would say that de Tocqueville is an analyst of and an advocate for American exceptionalism.⁴

Our focus here is mainly on a mid-century French philosopher, Auguste Comte, whose philosophy of positivism is almost completely unknown in England or the United States but was extremely popular in Continental Europe and still has many followers there. Not least for our purposes here, Comte was a student and philosopher of political culture whose writings serve as a major counterpoint to those of his better-known radical contemporary, Karl Marx.

Comte could be considered the father of modern sociology. His goal was to discover a *science of society* and to have it elevated to a position equal to the other

3 Howard J. Wiarda, *Adventures in Research* (Lincoln, NE: iUniverse, 2006–7). Four volumes—*Latin America, Europe, The Wider World, and Return Trips*.

4 Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* (New York: Vintage, many editions).

natural sciences like physics or chemistry. Comte's concept of society was that of a collective entity which has its own properties and values (political culture again) and which overarches the values of its individual members. In searching for these collective identities, Comte was close to Rousseau's "General Will," but his analysis was much more systematic than was Rousseau's. Comte studied, analyzed, and sought to place in perspective different societies and nations. He was another empiricist but also had his own point of view.

Comte was one of the first to analyze how societies grow and develop. He was interested not just in societies at a fixed point in history (usually the present) but how they improve and modernize over time. His "science of society" was thus wedded to another idea: that societies grew and developed according to certain laws of evolution. Comte found three stages in his evolutionary theory: first, a primitive or animistic stage; then, a speculative or religious phase; and, at the end, a scientific stage—i.e., one based on his own science of society. Note that the driving force in Comte's theory of change was religion or belief systems, always considered a political-cultural factor or variable.

Presumably, allowing for some variation, every society would go through these three stages. Although modern cultural anthropology mainly rejects the idea that all societies pass through the same stages, Comte's formulation is nevertheless very close to modern development theory as in W.W. Rostow's *The Stages of Economic Growth* and in the assumptions underlying US development assistance or foreign aid. That is, that, societies and political systems go, or can be engineered to go, from traditional and underdeveloped to modern and developed.

Comte's "positivist" philosophy was very popular at the time and remains so in Europe and Latin America, though not the United States. Not only did it purport to offer a "science" of sociology but it was also gradualist, evolutionary, and conservative. As such, it appealed especially to Catholics and conservatives who felt themselves under attack, first by the French Revolution and in the late nineteenth century by Marxism. In Comte's scheme, not only would change be gradual but it would be carried out from the top down by scientific elites who knew the laws of social change. A philosophy of leadership and change carried out by elites will always find favor with the elites charged with carrying it out.

Montesquieu and Comte, building on a long tradition of political thought recounted here going back to Plato and Aristotle, are the closest figures historically to what a modern student of comparative politics and political culture would seek to do. Both of them were empiricists; that is, they collected empirical data about a great variety of political systems. They then sought to organize and analyze that data scientifically in accord with their hypotheses about the development of society.

For both, the laws, constitutions, and institutions of government were insufficient by themselves as explanatory paradigms. Rather, for Montesquieu and Comte, they were concerned with the basic values, beliefs, and cultures that undergirded society and its institutions. To them, political culture—ideas, religion, and beliefs—was the driving force in history. But that approach would now be challenged by a powerful alternative approach: Marxian. Throughout the rest of

the nineteenth century and continuing to today, the rival Comtean (later, Weberian) culturalist approach and the Marxian materialist or structuralist approach would fight it out tooth and nail, with much of world history riding in the balance.

The Marxian Critique

Up to this point, all of classical political theory, from Plato and Aristotle to Comte at mid-nineteenth century, had thought of culture as one of the great determining forces in history. Along with climate, topography, sociology, economics, and politics or institutions, culture was either *the* driving force or *one of* the major influences on history. *All* the great philosophers, even while concentrating on politics, saw culture along with society, climate, topography, institutional design, and these other factors as strongly shaping the political arena.

At mid-nineteenth century, at precisely the time Comte was publishing his seminal work and partially in answer to him, Karl Marx began publishing his at least equally great work. Marx turned Comte and virtually all of previous intellectual history on its head. Instead of ideas, culture, and moral values as the, or among the, leading driving forces in history, Marx said it was economics, specifically class structure and class conflict that accounted for change. Moreover, Marx was not interested, as almost all analysts before him had been, in multi-causal explanations; for him, it was *all* about economics, materialism, class struggle, structure. In the Marxian system, the underlying substructure was *all* about economics; the “super-structure” (values, beliefs, and culture) was *determined* by economic forces.

Marx replaced the old struggle of nations, values, religion, and cultures with the struggle of social classes. Economics and class struggle were the driving forces in history, not nations, politics, or religion. Religions and moral beliefs were only a reflection of the underlying class system. It was class structure that determined belief systems, politics, and the actions of nations. Change would come by revolutionary means as a result of class conflict. Ideas, values, beliefs—in short, political culture—were all secondary, a product of class configurations.

Marx was an economic determinist. Economics drives and determines everything else. The agency of this force in history is class and class struggle. Marx’s theory was what we would call economic determinism. Moreover, his view of history is that it proceeded by a process of dialectical materialism: One class against another constantly throughout history until it produced a final clash between the capitalist class and the proletariat resulting in socialism. Earlier theorists who had used the dialectical method (Hegel) had said it was ideas and political culture that were the driving force in history, but Marx famously turned Hegel on his head by saying it was class struggle, not ideas. In Marx’s view, all these were scientific concepts; the dialectical march of history in the direction of socialism was inevitable.

In Marx, in contrast to Comte, the stages of development in history were determined by economics: slave society, feudalism, capitalism, and then,

finally, triumphant socialism. Material forces were the instruments that drove this history. Religion and culture had no place in Marx's scheme other than as part of the superstructure. Indeed, Marx's thought, unlike Comte's, involved a radical rejection of religion and culture. In their place stood the class structure and material or economic forces. Marx's system had no interest in values or beliefs—except his own, of course.

For Marx, it is not men's consciousness, beliefs, or religion that determined their existence; instead, it is their social or class status that determines their consciousness. "Cultural development," so called, is only a reflection of how goods are produced and exchanged—i.e., by the ownership of production. The process of development is by means of the dialectic: thesis, antithesis, and synthesis; then a new antithesis; and so on throughout history until we get to socialism. In this process the forces of production are always primary, as compared with other ideological, religious, or cultural considerations.

Marx's thought, therefore, represents a radical departure from all previous history. He downgraded religion, culture, and even politics to mere epiphenomena, subservient to economics. In modern social science terms, economics and class structure are now the only independent variables; everything else is dependent variables. In practical terms, it means Marxian social scientists, on every issue, must look first and exclusively for the underlying economic and class factors. If beliefs, religion, or culture seem to be important, that is mistaken; it means you have not looked deep enough to find the class conflicts underneath. In this way, the Marxian system is monocausal and highly deterministic.

Whether you are a Marxist or not, Marx changed the way we think about and look at the world. From his time on, social scientists, even non-Marxists, would not be content to look only at religion or culture in isolation. Rather, they would now almost always be examined within their social, economic, and class contexts. If values or the culture changes, we would now almost automatically want to know what are the underlying socioeconomic changes causing that change. As President Richard Nixon once said about state interventionist economist, John Maynard Keynes ("We are all Keynesians now."), we can also say about Marx: "We are all Marxists now." The big difference, of course, is whether we think economics and class are the *only* driving forces in history or, accepting that economics and class are important, nevertheless accepting a more complex, multi-causal explanation. And that leads us to the great German sociologist at the end of the nineteenth century, Max Weber.

Marx and Weber: Thesis and Antithesis

In the decades during which Marx was writing and then after his death, from the mid-nineteenth century up until World War I, working-class movements and trade unions were being organized at an increasing rate, especially in Europe and the United States. As industrialization proceeded on a large scale, these trade

unions grew larger. Many of them were organized around the Marxian principles of class conflict and revolutionary action. As the more radical Marxist, anarchist, and syndicalist labor movements grew and were perceived as a threat to existing society, Catholic, conservative, and Protestant trade unions also emerged as alternatives to the Marxist unions.

The social sciences in the late nineteenth, early twentieth centuries also had to explain the new, emerging social and political conditions. Thus, Emile Durkheim, following after Marx, showed how economic growth and industrialization give rise to an increasing division of labor in society in which new functions and jobs emerged and men were obliged to specialize in particular areas of economic activity. Ferdinand Tönnies, a great German sociologist, was a major contributor to social theory and was famous for his distinction between *gemeinschaft* (community) and its values and *gesellschaft* (society) and its interests. But perhaps the greatest of these sociologists of the emerging new economic order, of class and social change, and of the impact of these on government, bureaucracy, and political institutions was Max Weber.

Max Weber (1864–1920) was a German sociologist who wrote during a time of German unification, industrialization, and Bismarckian authoritarian politics in the period leading up to World War I. Weber was a keen observer, a great but complex writer, and the most subtle and sophisticated sociologist of his times.

Weber was a student, albeit several decades later, of the same phenomena Marx had written about. That is, the social, political, and cultural implications of the industrial revolution then sweeping the developed nations of Europe. But whereas Marx was a materialist, an economic determinist, a believer in the inevitability of his own theory, Weber was more sophisticated and complex. He did not believe in, nor did his mammoth research agenda lead him to the conclusion that, economics and class struggle determine everything. Instead, Weber advanced a more complex, multi-causal explanation. He wove together economic, social, cultural, and institutional causes into a sophisticated picture of the modern world.

While Marx had argued that economics and class struggle were always the ultimate explanation for everything, Weber was more careful. Obviously, economics and industrialization were important explanatory causes. But Weber showed that social change was not always the exact mirror of economics. He also demonstrated quite clearly that government, bureaucracy, and political institutions often had a life of their own, were often independent from underlying class structure, and, in social science parlance, constituted independent variables, not just dependent ones subservient to economic forces. Rather than the superstructure (culture, religion, and politics) always being subservient to the substructure (the means of production and distribution, class structure) as in Marx, Weber knitted all these factors together in a complex, less deterministic, more open-ended causal relationship.

Weber's studies of religion, a part of political culture, are of special interest to us here. Weber embarked on a massive study of comparative religions (Protestantism, Catholicism, Islam, Hinduism, and Confucianism) and their relations to economic

growth. He found that Catholicism, Islam, Hinduism, and Confucianism all had elements in them that, at the time, hindered economic growth. Either they put impediments in the way of economic growth, or they discouraged entrepreneurship, or they were not supportive of banks and financial institutions, or they discouraged the kind of risk-taking necessary for economic growth. Of course, today, 100 years after Weber wrote, we know that economic growth can and does take place in all these distinct cultures; witness especially the success of East Asia.

Weber was particularly interested in the differences between Northern and Southern Europe, between the Protestant and rapidly industrializing North and the Catholic and still poor South. Weber saw the main difference in terms of their distinct cultures, values, and religious beliefs. Weber never argued that Protestantism *causes* prosperity and Catholicism *causes* poverty and underdevelopment; he was too sophisticated an analyst for that. Instead, he said there was a *correlation* between wealth and the kind of probity, hard work, diligence, honesty, and industriousness that Protestantism, especially in its Calvinist versions, encourages. More than out of class struggle (Marx), Weber saw economic growth emerging out of a *variety* of causes, including values, religious beliefs, and political culture.

Social scientists tend to prefer Weber over Marx. That is because Weber presented a more complex, open-ended, flexible, and multi-causal explanation for the modern world than did Marx. Marx is closed-minded, didactic, a determinist, and the apostle of a rather simple, and simplistic, mono-causal explanation. In contrast, Weber is complex, sophisticated, and not a determinist; he lets the evidence and the *facts* speak for themselves. Hence, his greater appeal to modern social scientists. Weber weaves all these factors together—social, economic, cultural, and institutional—into a multi-causal explanation that most of us find particularly compelling.

For 100 years, from Weber's day to today, these two great paradigms, the Marxian and the Weberian, have continued as the two great explanatory systems in the social sciences. It is obvious that I, and most social scientists, much prefer Weber over Marx, even though I recognize that some scholars and others continue to find inspiration in the Marxian message. Nevertheless, our approach here remains closer to the Weberian tradition that includes political culture as one of the, if not a main and essential, elements in a multi-causal approach. Hence, in the next chapter we take up the next main current in this tradition: the rise in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries of cultural anthropology as an independent discipline.

Chapter 3

Cultural Anthropology: A Precursor to Political Culture

The field of cultural anthropology—Franz Boas, Margaret Mead, Ruth Benedict, George Foster, Clifford Geertz, to name just a few of the field’s major figures—had a profound effect on political culture studies. Cultural anthropology emerged as a major subfield—maybe *the* major subfield—in the discipline of anthropology in the early twentieth century, mainly in the period between World Wars I and II. As overseas transportation flourished, as people explored and traveled more and more to the far corners of the earth, as they became curious about “exotic peoples” in exotic lands, cultural anthropology emerged to explain it all to them.

The mushrooming field of cultural anthropology, moreover, raised all the questions that later plagued political culture studies: what is culture, how do you study or measure it, is it a scientific field or merely impressionistic, can we eliminate ethnocentrism and really understand cultures other than our own, are there universal processes of change involved or is each culture unique, are all cultures to be treated equally and without prejudice concerning their values (cannibalism, female mutilation, for example) or must we inevitably draw lines and make judgments? Many of these issues and controversies are still with us today.

Cultural anthropology came to political science and, specifically, to comparative politics via a circuitous, indirect route that is still not much known even to political scientists. The key figure linking the two was an otherwise obscure academic working at the Ford Foundation in the 1950s, Francis X. Sutton. As a foundation official, Sutton did not write or publish much, but what he did write had an enormous impact on comparative politics in the 1950s, 1960s, and beyond,¹ through the influence of Gabriel A. Almond and the hugely influential Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research Council (CCP/SSRC). For several decades, this group largely dictated how we thought and wrote about the new comparative politics field of modernization theory or developing countries.²

Sutton had been a student of famous Harvard sociologist, Talcott Parsons, in the 1950s. Among other things, Parsons was famous for two major ideas that

1 Francis X. Sutton, “Social Theory and Comparative Politics.” Paper prepared for the Committee on Comparative Politics, Social Science Research Council, Princeton University, 1954.

2 For an overview, see Howard J. Wiarda, *Introduction to Comparative Politics* (Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt Publisher, 2000).

strongly influenced political science and its subfield, comparative politics.³ One was *systems theory*: the idea, now all but universally accepted, that societies or nations constitute a *system* of flow consisting of “inputs” or influences on politics, the “black box” (government or bureaucracy) where decisions are made, outputs in the form of policy decisions, and feedback loops—because policy decisions eventually have a “feedback” effect on the inputs. Systems theory, as brought to political science via David Easton,⁴ had a huge impact on the discipline. See Table 3.1.

Table 3.1 A Systems Model of National Politics

Inputs	Decision-Making	Outputs
Interest Groups	Government	Health Policy
Public Opinion		Social Security
Political Culture		Education Policy
Political Parties	Bureaucracy	Foreign Policy
Feedback Loops		

The other major influence from Parsons via Sutton was what the former called “pattern variables.” Although Parsons sometimes changed his mind about the number and nature of his pattern variables, in his writings he usually listed three. Moreover, Parsons argued that individuals as well as countries went through these same pattern-variable changes, from ascription (whom you know) to merit (what you know), from particularism (the family or small village) to universalism (a larger or global view), and from functionally diffuse to functionally specific. See Table 3.2.

Table 3.2 Parsons’ “Pattern Variables”

Traditional Aspects	Modern Aspects
Ascription	Achievement, Merit
Particularism	Universalism
Functionally diffuse	Functionally specific

3 Talcott Parsons, *The Social System* (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1951).
4 David Easton, “An Approach to the Study of Political Systems,” *World Politics*, 9 (April 1957), 383–400.

What Sutton now did, in the context of the 1950s era emergence onto the world scene of a host of new nations coupled with the new comparative politics preoccupation with developing countries, was to link Parsons' pattern variables to the study of the politics of the emerging nations. Thus, in the traditional societies of developing countries we would expect to see ascriptive, functionally diffuse, and particularistic politics. Whereas as countries that had made the transition to modernity and development, they would tend to become merit-based, functionally specific, and universalistic in their outlook. As countries developed and modernized, they would presumably go from the first set of traits to the second.

Both these ideas, systems theory and the pattern variables as applied to nations, had a tremendous impact on the pioneering work of Gabriel A. Almond, the CCP/SSRC, and the hugely influential *Politics of the Developing Areas*,⁵ which shaped an entire generation of young scholars of comparative politics and the developing nations. Close readers will have noted that *all* of Parsons'/Sutton's/Almond's pattern variables involve beliefs, values, orientations, political behavior, and how these change over time—precisely our definition of political culture. And all of this, in turn, came out of the pioneering work done a generation or so earlier by cultural anthropology.⁶

Cultural Anthropology

Cultural anthropology goes back a long way. It could be said that it goes all the way back to Aristotle and his attempt to collect all the constitutions of the Greek city-states in existence at that time, and to examine the culture and social structure that undergirded them.

As a professional student and scholar of Latin America, I have what may be a unique perspective on cultural anthropology's origins and history. I think its origins go back to the friars who accompanied Columbus and the Spanish *conquistadores* on their epic journeys of discovery and conquest to Africa, Asia, and Latin America. While the *conquistadores* were often cruel and greedy, the priests, often the only literate men on these voyages, were fascinated by the indigenous peoples they discovered. They studied the Indians, learned their languages, defended them, and

5 Almond (ed.), *Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1950).

6 It is difficult to find a published copy of the Sutton paper that so strongly influenced Almond's famous introduction to *The Politics of Developing Areas*. Almond refers to it as an unpublished paper, and for a long time it was confined to the CCP/SSRC group and the desk drawers of the Ford Foundation. I once heard Sutton speak, on these themes and the patterns of influence his paper generated, at the high-level Joint (Harvard-MIT) Seminar on Political Development (JOSPOD) and I have found a published version, not at all well-known though surely deservedly so, in Harry Eckstein and David Apter (eds), *Comparative Politics: A Reader* (New York: The Free Press, 1963).

wrote some of the world's first, lengthy, anthropological studies about them. For some three centuries of Spanish and Portuguese explorations and rule in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, the friars compiled a large body of quite sophisticated studies of Europe's first encounters with what we would today call non-Western peoples.

The initial sixteenth-century explorations, and often conquests, of large tracts of Africa, Asia, and Latin America stimulated even more explorations and conquests in the centuries that followed. This was the beginning of what we think of as the "modern period" in world history (sixteenth century to today) and of what we might call the "Europeanization" of the globe. Along with the conquests and exploitation came enormous advances in our knowledge of the world's geography, topography, climate, and peoples. Global trade expanded exponentially. Our knowledge of foreign cultures, native languages, and other lands and countries vastly broadened our horizons.

By the seventeenth and, especially, the eighteenth century, once most of the initial colonial conquests had taken place and some degree of peace had been established in these far-flung, non-Western lands, it became possible for civilian travelers to visit them. Improved transportation also helped in this endeavor. For example, in the 1740s, Juan and Ulloa visited Spain's colonies in Latin America and wrote a detailed penetrating report on Spanish colonial administration. Recall also that Montesquieu, in his *Persian Letters* as well as *The Spirit of the Laws*, relied heavily for his analysis of the Middle East on the accounts of earlier French travelers to that area. Voltaire, the great Enlightenment *philosopher*, argued that it was not dynasties, kings, and battles that changed history but rather *culture*, in the form of customs, beliefs, and underlying values. And let us not forget that another Frenchman, de Tocqueville, when he wrote his masterful account of US democracy, one of the best if not *the* best books ever written about America, was essentially writing like these others as a French "tourist," traveling around the United States and jotting down his impressions.

Anthropology as a separate discipline, and cultural anthropology as the main field within it, began to emerge in the nineteenth century.⁷ In this regard, anthropology was not all that different from other disciplines—law, geography, sociology, economics, eventually political science—that also during this period began to claim disciplinary autonomy and develop their own professional standards.

Anthropology, like a number of these other disciplines, had its origins institutionally in natural history and archeology. Today, many cities still have museums of natural history, although now that is considered an old-fashioned view. Natural history included the study of rocks, minerals, flora, fauna, geography, typography, and eventually the culture of other lands and peoples. Studying the language, culture, psychology, and behavior of other peoples was presumably seen

7 A good introduction to anthropology and its early founders is A.L. Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn, *Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions* (New York: Vintage, 1952).

as akin to studying their rocks, flora, and fauna. Eventually anthropology would break out of this natural history grouping to become a discipline in itself.

The “culture” part of cultural anthropology goes back at least as far as Edward Taylor’s 1871 book, *Primitive Culture*, in which culture is defined as “that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society.”⁸ People and societies acquire culture through education, socialization, and inculturation. People living in different locales or in different circumstances, such as Eskimos or Amazonian tribes, will acquire or develop different cultures. Hence, the *comparative study* of distinct cultures.

It needs to be said that, as political scientists, we are not interested professionally in *all* aspects of culture, only those aspects that affect or reflect politics and governance. Hence, the term *political culture*. Therefore, we are not interested in ballet per se or music per se or various art forms—unless those also reflect or have an impact on the political culture. I may be *personally* interested in ballet or painting or theater, but as a political scientist I try to restrict my research work to the study of those cultural manifestations that impact politics. Thus, history, religion, beliefs, values, ideas, and psychology are all a part of political culture, but *not necessarily* ballet or other art forms.

Cultural anthropology emerged as a separate disciplinary field in the last third of the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century. Part of the reason for its emergence at that time was better transportation which enabled researchers to travel to the far corners of the earth. Another part of the reason was European and American colonialism which put the West often in intimate contact with a variety of non-Western peoples under their control. A third reason was the spreading influence of social Darwinism and the growing tendency to classify peoples and nations into “primitive” and “civilized.”⁹

This latter tendency was especially dangerous and was so recognized by cultural anthropology’s founders. Because social Darwinism, unlike Darwin himself, sometimes conflated race and culture. That is, because the peoples of the so-called “primitive cultures” also tended to be darker, it was often assumed that a low level of, or primitive, culture was associated with racial characteristics. This dangerous association often led in the early twentieth century to the practice of eugenics—i.e., the selective breeding and even elimination of peoples using racial or biological criteria. In its worst form, this association between culture and race could lead to the attempted elimination of entire peoples as in the Nazi holocaust and other genocidal regimes. We will have occasion to revisit this issue in the next chapter which deals with national character studies.¹⁰

8 Taylor, *Primitive Cultures* (New York: Putman, 1871).

9 Mike Hawkins, *Social Darwinism in European and American Thought, 1860–1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

10 Daniel Kelves, *In the Name of Eugenics: Genetics and the Uses of Human Heredity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).

Cultural anthropologists vigorously rejected these notions. Their focus was on culture, not race. They amassed a wealth of evidence to show that when so-called “primitive” peoples, or those with dark skins, moved to more advanced countries, they soon did just as well as the locals. In other words, they and their descendants rapidly adapted to their new culture. It was *culture* that counted, not some presumed racial or genetic characteristic. In the great debate between nature and nurture, cultural anthropologists focused almost exclusively on the nurture or culture part; the nature (genetic) part was left to the biologists and the geneticists to worry about.

The methods developed and employed by the cultural anthropologists 100 years ago were precisely those that comparative politics scholars ought to employ today. They are:

- Learn the language of the group or society studied.
- Develop empathy for the group studied.
- Use interviewing techniques.
- Use participant observation; i.e., live among your subjects.
- Combine with archival/library research.
- Live abroad, in the group or country studied for an extended period.
- Use all the techniques of ethnography or close observation.
- Use the comparative method; that is, compare and contrast societies contemporaneously and over time.

Cultural anthropology was really a precursor to what we in comparative politics, especially political culture studies, do today. That is, we seek to study other cultures, nations, and societies on their own terms and in their own languages and settings, without imposing the scholar’s own cultural lenses or value judgments. While we utilize the above anthropological techniques, today’s political scientists also have the advantage of using statistics and computers to advance their research.

Political culture, it needs to be emphasized, refers to essential or basic values, not ephemeral ones: whether people accept or conform to the basic premises of their political system, not whether one approves of the particular government-of-the-moment. Students of political culture tend to think that it is values, beliefs, and ideas that drive the political system as well as material and institutional ones, or usually some combination of these.

Major Figures

The field of cultural anthropology is full of colorful, often swashbuckling characters, rather like Indiana Jones. In part, this is due to the fact that they often explored and wrote about previously unknown cultures and peoples and frequently raised headlines and got in trouble as they did so. Here we feature only a few of the most prominent of these founding figures of cultural anthropology.

Franz Boas

Franz Boas (1858–1942) may be considered the founder of cultural anthropology in the United States, maybe even the founder of anthropology worldwide. German-born, he came to the United States in 1884 at age 29. His Ph.D. degree in Germany was in physics; he later studied geography. As a result of this early scientific training, he sought to apply scientific rigor, as distinct from anecdotal or impressionistic viewpoints, to the study of human culture and societies.¹¹

Boas was a giant in the anthropology field, comparable in importance to Marx, Weber, and Freud, who also, almost single-handedly, founded entire, new fields of study. He did pioneering work among indigenous communities, was one of the first to study non-Western areas and was a champion of environmentalism 100 years before that became fashionable.

After teaching for a time at Clark University in Massachusetts, Boas was appointed to Columbia University in New York in 1896. There he created a new anthropology department, became its first chairman, and developed the first Ph.D. program in anthropology in America. He was also instrumental in organizing the American Anthropological Association (AAA), the professional association for the field.

Boas divided anthropology into four subfields: physical anthropology, linguistics, archeology, and cultural anthropology. At different points in his career he did pioneering work in all four fields. Our main concern here, however, is his research in cultural anthropology. In this subfield Boas was again a leader in developing the participant observation method of field work, the concept of cultural relativism, and the local or contextual approach to culture.

Even while still a student in Germany, Boas had done research on Baffin Island in northern Canada on the impact of the environment on native Inuit (Eskimo) immigrations. He returned to Baffin Island several times subsequently and published his first books on the peoples of that area. But his main research interest after coming to the US was the indigenous peoples of the Pacific Northwest, specifically the Nuxált Nation of Canada's British Columbia. He published extensively on these peoples and many of his main ideas as a cultural anthropologist came from these studies.

One of Boas's most important books, based on his earlier fieldwork on both Baffin Island and in British Columbia, was *The Mind of Primitive Man*.¹² Here Boas set forth his main ideas concerning the development of cultures and established an agenda and research priorities for cultural anthropology that would be dominant for at least the next half-century. In this book Boas argued that the biological, the linguistic, the material, and the cultural are all autonomous aspects of human society. Each of these is an important characteristic of human nature but no one of them is dominant over, or subsumes, the others. No one of these

11 Douglas Cole, *Franz Boas* (Washington, DC: Douglas & MacIntyre, 1990).

12 Boas, *The Mind of Primitive Man* (New York: MacMillan, 1911).

dimensions is reducible to another nor is any one of them superior to, or carries more explanatory power than, the others. Refuting Marx, Boas said that culture is an independent variable in its own right; it does not depend just on material forces. Culture, biology, language, and material forces, of course, all influenced each other but, based on his studies of indigenous peoples, Boas could not say that one explanation was more important than the others. Culture, however, was an autonomous or independent variable.

Boas went on to argue that the characteristics of any group of people are the result of historical development. This involves both cultural and non-cultural (biological, linguistic, and national) forces. Moreover, his research led him to conclude that the world consisted of a variety, or pluralism, of cultures. No one of them was necessarily superior—hence, his cultural relativism. Each culture was specific to its own context, itself shaped by many factors. The specific cultural environment of a society structures a great deal of individual behavior. All these ideas, widely accepted now, were revolutionary at the time Boas formulated them.

In order to understand the behavior, beliefs, and symbols of a specific culture, Boas argued, one had to examine these in their local contexts. Not through the eyes, brains, terms, and prejudices of the outside investigator but in the local context, using the local language, on its own terms, without prior prejudice. Cultures, he argued, can also change over time, as a result of both local and external (globalization, interdependence, and outside intervention) forces; but culture change usually takes a considerable period of time—decades, generations, or centuries rather than weeks or years.

Boas's investigations led him to conclude that individual activities and behavior are in large part a product of the social and cultural environment in which the person finds her/himself. Anthropology must, therefore, document the way individuals respond to their entire socio-cultural environment. But while the individual is a product of his environment, he also by his actions impacts that environment, thus lending a dynamic and changing element to culture. There is no absolute stability in any society; rather, all cultures are in a constant state of flux.

As part of his cultural relativism, Boas argued that literate and non-literate societies should be studied in the same way. Anticipating the later comparative politics distinction between developed and developing societies, Boas saw many of the same functions being performed in both. Therefore, and again without prejudice, both developed and developing nations can be analyzed using the same research tools and methodologies. Of course, the specific techniques used may be different but the basic methodologies of value-free research, interviewing, participant observation, empathy, cultural relativism, etc. should be, in their essentials, everywhere the same.

Throughout his career as an activist as well as a scientist, Boas was instrumental in combating racism, Nazism, Hitlerism, and the use of national stereotypes to typecast whole groups of peoples. He was particularly forceful in distinguishing race from culture. He saw no differences between races, nations, or peoples in terms of intelligence or potential. He did not want race to be confused with

culture. Culture was permeable; it could change; it could not be identified with any particular race. While first-generation immigrants from one culture to another often had difficulty assimilating initially, by the second or third generation they tended to be thoroughly assimilated, often becoming more “native” in terms of their values and adherence to the culture than the natives themselves. Boas strongly opposed the conflating of culture and racial stereotypes.

Boas was a “scientist” in the best sense of the word, but he never believed that anthropology should use the same methodologies as the physical sciences. Unlike other social scientists who were frequently hung up on whether their enterprise was a science or not, Boas, perhaps because of his earlier training as a physicist, had no such hang-ups. He did not believe that quantification, mathematics, and empirical studies were necessary to make anthropology a science. He simply assumed that, because the subject matter of anthropology was different from that of physics or chemistry, it would require different techniques and methodologies. Hence, his emphasis in anthropology on interviewing, participant observation, and the other techniques already mentioned. Boas even went so far as to use statistical techniques to demonstrate that science itself was context-dependent. Indeed, that the variation among societies and cultures was so great that to use methodologies from the natural sciences to study them was, in fact, non-scientific.

Boas was clearly a giant in the field. More than that, he all but single-handedly created the fields of anthropology and, especially for our purposes, cultural anthropology. His major contributions, of special interest to political scientists and students of comparative politics, included the following:

- The comparative method.
- Field work.
- Empathy, understanding.
- Interviewing techniques.
- Cultural relativism.
- Participant observation.
- The establishment of culture as an autonomous variable independent from class and other considerations.
- Native language skills.
- Ethnography.

Boas was a great scientist but, more than that, he was a great humanist who cared deeply about the peoples he investigated *and* his own students. As part of this sensitivity he developed strict rules for anthropological research and the treatment of its subjects. He insisted on transparency in the conducting of research, honesty and openness, and that researchers could not interfere in the lives of their subjects. He was also opposed to research in the service of governments or big corporations as inherently corrupting. As part of his work as department chair at Columbia and as head of the American Anthropological Association, he developed a nine-page set of rules governing research behavior by anthropologists, anonymity of sources,

dissemination of the research results, etc. Many of these rules would also carry over as part of the canon of ethics of political science research.¹³

Not only was Boas a pillar of his field and a creative genius, comparable to Freud in psychology, Marx in economics, or Comte or Weber in sociology, but his work also lived on through his students. It is not commonly known or appreciated that professors actually often learn from the good questions and comments of their students; and that especially through their graduate students and their own research contributions, the work of the professor also gets carried on. Such was the case with Boas, who not only made great contributions in his own right but also trained many of the greatest cultural anthropologists of the next generation.

Ruth Benedict

Ruth Benedict (1887–1948) was born in New York City, graduated from Vassar College in 1909, and ten years later began graduate studies at Columbia University. As a student of Boas, she received her Ph.D. and joined the Columbia faculty in 1923. Boas was her mentor as well as teacher; and from him she took her passionate humanism along with her commitment to cultural anthropology, the comparative method, and cultural relativism.

Though partially deaf, Benedict carried out pioneering field research, wrote some wonderful books, and was a leading figure in the anthropology profession. She rose to be the first woman president of the American Anthropological Association *and* the first woman president of *any* learned profession. Throughout her life she championed women's rights and careers, fought against racism, and was a leading public intellectual. However, when Boas retired in 1937, though she continued to teach at Columbia, she did not get the chairmanship of the Columbia anthropology department which many thought she deserved.

Her most famous book was *Patterns of Culture*,¹⁴ a comparative study of culture in different parts of the world based on field work carried out by herself, Boas, and other Columbia anthropology graduates. Benedict tended to view culture as “personality writ large.” She wrote that “a culture, like an individual, is a more or less consistent pattern of thought and action.” Every culture chooses from, or is shaped by, a variety of influences or traits from what she called “the great arc of human potentialities.”

Every culture is unique. At the same time, cultures are dynamic, changing, and, unless they are completely isolated, shaped by outside influences—what we would today call globalization. Cultures are made up of a syndrome of traits. Only a few of these traits may be enough to designate a culture as unique or distinctive. These traits comprise what Benedict called an “interdependent constellation of aesthetics and values” in each culture. Together, these traits form a unique *gestalt* or culture.

13 Franz Boas, *Race, Language, and Culture* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1940).

14 Ruth Benedict, *Patterns of Culture* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1934).

For example, in the Pueblo culture of the American Southwest, Benedict found a definitive trait to be calmness and *restraint*; but in the Indians of the Great Plains, the dominant characteristic was one of abandon, wildness, and letting go. Similarly, she found some cultures to be dominated by a desire for order and top-down authority, whereas other cultures were comfortable with grassroots consultation and more democratic participation. In her studies, Benedict and other anthropologists of the time described in great, ethnographic detail the various rituals, beliefs, personal preferences, and values of a variety of cultures to show that each culture had a distinct “personality” that was also encouraged and present in each individual member of that culture.

Like Boas, Benedict was a believer in cultural relativism. *Patterns of Culture* endeavors to show that every culture behaves differently and has its own moral imperatives. Some of these moral imperatives may not make sense to outsiders and may even be distasteful—e.g., cannibalism, the stoning of women, or the cutting off of hands or heads as a form of punishment. One understands these practices, however, only in the context of the whole culture.

Benedict believed it was wrong to disparage the cultural practices of others, even if we as Westerners found them unacceptable. We should, therefore, not try to judge other cultures by our own standards or morality. Even those practices we find unacceptable had a value to the people who practiced them that we should not trivialize or dismiss. With great force she argued that morality and religious practices were *relative* to the values of the culture in which one functioned. *All values*, even when they seem strange and foreign, were to be understood and respected within their own cultural context.

Benedict’s descriptions of these distinct cultures are vivid, beautifully written, and easy to relate to. Readers of *Patterns of Culture*, some 80 years later, continue to find her arguments regarding culture and cultural relativism quite persuasive. In addition, here and in other works, Benedict, like her mentor, Boas, warned against racism and the confusion of race with culture. Race is a physical trait but culture is environmentally shaped and determined. Race is a “mark” but culture is learned. You carry your race with you, but your cultural beliefs may be changed over time. Each generation in a culture must relearn or be re-socialized into that culture; but if and when a person leaves the culture in which he was born, he takes on some of the traits of his new culture. Hence, one should never think of race and culture as synonymous.

Benedict was a partner in, and carried on, Boas’s great work. She was his student but also a profoundly influential voice in her own right. She accepted almost all of Boas’s pioneering breakthroughs—the comparative method, cultural relativism, field work, etc.—and carried them through to new heights and into new field situations. In her work the field of cultural anthropology became institutionalized, professionalized, a new and accepted discipline within the social sciences. And then, like Boas before her, Benedict trained a whole new generation of young anthropologists who soon went on to even greater heights.

Margaret Mead

The field of anthropology during the pre-World War I and interwar (between World Wars I and II) periods was full of colorful characters—often even more colorful than the Harrison Ford/“Indiana Jones” movie series. Anthropologists, especially cultural anthropologists, fanned out to the far corners of the earth looking for new “tribes” to investigate and new cultures to discover. Often, like Indiana Jones, they got involved with the local and international conflicts of the times. Some of these efforts, as in the book and later movie, “The Last Tribe,” were downright comic-opera, as anthropologists competed to find and study the one, last, non-Western tribe, deep in the Amazon jungle, in the heart of Africa, or on some neglected South Sea island that no one else had yet discovered.

One of the greatest of this new, third-generation group of anthropologists was undoubtedly Margaret Mead (1901–1978). Mead was a student of Boas, also a student (and, reportedly, a lover) of Benedict, and a colorful character in her own right.¹⁵ In her later years she carried not a cane but a long, six-foot, crooked staff and often dressed in the colorful costumes of the peoples and cultures she had researched. Mead spent many profitable years on the lecture circuit; she sometimes joked that she did not really need the staff to walk but found it useful to nudge her way to the front of the cocktail and appetizer lines!

Mead, like so many other early cultural anthropology pioneers, received her Ph.D. from Columbia. An innovative researcher, she was also a popularizer of anthropology’s new research findings, especially about sex. Her first books, especially *Coming of Age in Samoa* (1928),¹⁶ analyzed the sexual mores of South Sea Islanders as well as the peoples of Southeast Asia. Mead did not just analyze, however, she also championed the freer sex life of the Samoan adolescents whom she studied. Her work helped inspire the 1960s sexual revolution; the topic also explains her popularity on the lecture circuit.

Like Boas and Benedict, Mead was a scholar of *culture*. Like these others, she championed culture as an independent variable. Culture was to be distinguished from topography, geography, race, and class. Culture was autonomous. To study foreign culture you needed to go there, learn the language, live among the people, and study their behavior and the *internal logic* of their culture.

Boas, Benedict, and Mead all tried to study isolated tribes and cultures, largely untouched by Western civilization or globalization. That way they could study a pure culture, unadulterated by modern and outside ways. That is why Boas first went to Baffin Island, Boas and Benedict to the American Southwest, and now Mead to the South Sea Islands. They wanted to get there before their subjects had been tainted or “corrupted” by colonizers, missionaries, or radio and television.

15 Mary Catherine Bateson, *With a Daughter's Eye* (New York: William Morrow, 1984).

16 Margaret Mead, *Coming of Age in Samoa* (New York: Morrow, 1928).

Mead set out for Samoa in 1925. She was then only 24 years old. The Samoa research was part of her work for her doctoral dissertation which she received in 1929. In her research Mead found that young South Sea Islanders were much freer sexually than their American teen-aged counterparts. The community largely ignores them until they are about fifteen or sixteen. Then they must observe community norms but until then they are free to experiment, including sexually. In contrast to the strict prohibitions of American society, Samoan teens had virtually no supervision and no prohibitions. Moreover—and this was shocking to her strict, Victorian, American readership—they were no worse off, and maybe better off, psychologically for this early promiscuity. Mead's findings were shocking to American audiences, especially the mothers and fathers of teens. Mead concludes that, while some behaviors and practices are universal, standards also differ in non-Western societies, *and may be equally valid*. Culture, she argues, is unique, particular, and often independent of other factors.

Not only was *Coming of Age* controversial, especially in its time, but some 60 years later it ignited a new controversy when it was challenged as being inaccurate, misleading, and essentially a hoax. Mead's critics charged that she had been naïve and had been duped by her own subjects. That the Samoan adolescents whom she had interviewed had conspired to feed her a line about their sexual exploits. They had told her what they thought she wanted to hear, even if it was untruthful. The argument has gone back and forth for decades and is still unresolved. But it indicates the dangers of the kind of field research carried out by Mead and the need by scholars to build safeguards into their interviews and participant observation.

Mead did not publish a lot; through her speeches and media appearances, she was more of a popularizer of the new field of anthropology. She lectured all over the world and became a kind of guru on child-raising, sex, and family practices. Meanwhile, her own family life was extremely complicated: three marriages all ending in divorce, many affairs, and several short- and long-term lesbian relationships. Nevertheless, she was very popular as a public speaker, succeeded in popularizing the growing cultural anthropology field, and convinced many young people that they ought to major in anthropology. Margaret Mead died in 1978.

Clifford Geertz

Clifford Geertz (1926–2006), before his recent death, was probably the country's and the world's best-known anthropologist. He was an innovative thinker, published a lot, and was a leader of the anthropology profession. He was one of the few anthropologists, after Boas, Benedict, and Mead, known outside the profession as well as in it. But Geertz was a Harvard Ph.D., one of the few pioneers in the field not to be trained at Columbia.

Geertz's primary areas of field research were North Africa and Southeast Asia, especially Indonesia. He spent many long years in both these areas; they provided

the case study material for his later forays into grand theory.¹⁷ Here we are mainly interested in Geertz's ruminations, sometimes vexing, about anthropology, research, and theory.

Geertz was a champion of field work. Of getting your hands and feet "dirty" (not literally) by doing first-hand research in the field. The conditions in some of these far-away places are not ideal, indeed they are often infested with disease, parasites, and bad food and water. But Geertz went out there anyway because he believed, as I do, that was the only way to do research, to get a feel for the place. To learn how real people live, away from the air conditioners, the cocktail parties, and the comforts of the capital city. He was a champion of ethnological techniques. He called his methodology "thick description"—i.e., getting *inside* a culture and writing down all the facts. Even if they do not always seem relevant at the time. He was, like Max Weber, a follower of a *verstehen* approach, roughly translated as soaking up a culture and immersing oneself in it.

Geertz was a champion of Weber in more ways than one. He liked Weber's scientific method. He liked the fact that Weber was open-minded about causation. He also liked, as many of us do, Weber's relativity, his openness to complexity and contingency, and his approach from the point of view of multi-causality. Like Weber, he was interested in the role of religion and saw religion as a distinct cultural system. As a Weberian, Geertz tended to be anti-Marxian; within anthropology, he was particularly opposed to the structuralism of Claude Lévi-Strauss.

Geertz was particularly interested, as many students of political culture are, in understanding and appreciation. He sought to understand the underlying motivations and guiding symbols of distinct cultures. Like Boas and Mead, he championed cultural relativism. And like Boas, he saw cultural anthropology as an interpretive science, not an empirical or experimental one. You cannot confine a culture to a scientific laboratory, he said, and, therefore, you need a different kind of insightful, integrative methodology. Geertz wanted to view distinct cultures from the inside, through their own internal perspectives, and not from the point of view of an outsider using Western lenses. He sought to gain access to the internal workings of other cultures and to understand *their* conceptual and cultural world.

Geertz, like us, was interested in the cultural factors underlying economic development. No one, universal, economic model will do; instead, economic policy has to be adapted to each individual country or culture. Much the same applies to politics. You cannot take democracy and human rights as they were defined and fought over for centuries in the West, and plop them down in some non-Western culture without adjusting and adapting them to local circumstances. In his field work, Geertz saw how often American policy in the Third World had produced unanticipated consequences.

In his later work on Bali, a majority-Hindu island in the midst of the mainly Muslim country of Indonesia, Geertz formulated a conception of what he called a

17 Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures* (New York: Basic Books, 1973).

“theater state.”¹⁸ The theater state governed through spectacles and was an entity based on spiritualism. Indeed, the Balinese were so spiritual, Geertz found, spending all of their day in ritual and worship, that the usual social science paradigms—class analysis, institutionalism, and structuralism—did not apply. The king was viewed as a god-figure, obliged to display his divinity and to set a godly example for his people and their worship. Geertz argued that the Balinese theater state was so radically different from governance in the West that ultimately it was religion and culture that shaped politics and economics, and not the other way around.

In his study of Bali, Geertz found that culture, in this case religion or spirit-worship, was the driving force in society, not money, power, politics, or economics. That is so strange and “foreign” to us that we are hesitant to accept it. Nevertheless, that is Geertz’s finding: that *culture* is the driving force, that culture is the independent variable and not these other factors. It is a theme to which we return later in the discussion.

Most of us in the social sciences admire Geertz. He was inquisitive, open-minded, and a true scholar. He got his hands dirty in field work. He used case studies to advance more general and theoretical propositions, like Weber and Boas whom we also admire. Geertz was an apostle of contingency, complexity, and multi-causation. In both his field work and theoretical formulations, Geertz could have been a comparative politics scholar.

We have concentrated here on the Columbia “troika” of Boas, Benedict, and Mead, plus Geertz who, though not trained at Columbia, was very much in the Columbia anthropological tradition. Indeed, Columbia was at the forefront of anthropological studies for most all of the twentieth century. But there were other major figures in the anthropological field as well, including Raymond Firth, Bronisław Malinowski, Alfred Kroeber, Melville Herskovits, Mary Douglas, Gregory Bateson (Mead’s third husband), Ruth Landes, Claude Lévi-Strauss, Edward Sapir, George Foster, David Maybury-Lewis, and many others. These scholars, whether trained at Columbia or elsewhere, succeeded in establishing the new discipline of anthropology, its separate subfields including cultural anthropology, its ground rules, and its methodologies.

Conclusion

This is a book about political science and political culture, not about anthropology or even cultural anthropology. We are, of course, interested in our sister social science of anthropology and its development, but we are more interested in the impact of anthropology on political science, especially the mushrooming field of comparative politics.

And that influence was profound, especially as comparative politics emerged in the 1920s and 1930s as a separate subfield, just as anthropology and its approaches

18 Clifford Geertz, *Negara: The Theater State in Nineteenth Century Bali* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980).

and methodologies were emerging. Let us count the numerous influences that anthropology, especially now cultural anthropology, had on comparative politics:

1. The comparative method itself: The methodology that enables us to compare political systems, both spatially across continents and over time.
2. Emphasis on field work: The necessity of *going there*, seeing what you write about, and experiencing it personally.
3. Empathy: The necessity of understanding your subject on its own terms, empathetically.
4. Advanced interviewing techniques: Open-ended, designed to solicit information; distinct from polling, which is not possible or so useful in many Third World settings.
5. Participant observation: *Being there*, observing, taking notes, and absorbing the culture; yet still detached, scholarly, and objective.
6. Cultural relativism: Recognition that other cultures have value equal to your own and are functional on their own terms.
7. Language: Be able to function fluently in the language of the society studied. Language is a part of culture.
8. Ethnography: Immersion in the life of the society or country studied. A qualitative research design aimed at exploring cultural phenomena.
9. The establishment of culture as an independent variable, not a mere reflection of class structure, society, institutions, or material life.
10. Developing areas: The cultural anthropology approach outlined above is particularly relevant to developing, Third World nations where more refined statistical, empirical, and mathematical data and techniques are unavailable or of limited usefulness. Cultural anthropology had a huge impact on Gabriel A. Almond and others in the 1950s and 1960s, when they were formulating their own pioneering work on the developing areas.
11. Ethics: Cultural anthropology developed a code of ethics also relevant to comparative politics: honesty in the reporting of data, transparency, full disclosure of sponsorship, anonymity of sources, respect for the peoples studied, etc.; what we would today call “human subjects safeguards.”

This is obviously a huge impact. It includes not only an approach to studying comparative politics but a number of useful methodologies, the establishment of culture as an autonomous variable, a way of thinking about other societies, advanced research and interviewing techniques, a body of ethics for the researcher, and more. Of course, now we have computers, more advanced statistical techniques, multivariate analysis, polling, survey research, advanced data storage and analysis, etc. All these newer techniques are useful; we analyze a number of them later in the book. But they *build upon* and are *complementary to* the approach and methods first developed by cultural anthropology. That field, as we see in Chapter 5, has made a *huge impact*, especially on development studies.

Chapter 4

National Character Studies

At about the same time that cultural anthropology was emerging, growing, and becoming established as a separate discipline—that is, in the decades leading up to World War I and then in the interwar period—some other and often disturbing trends were also occurring. These included the rise of social Darwinism, the eugenics movement, racism and hate crimes, ethnic prejudice, genocides, and eventually, during World War II, the Holocaust.

It is profoundly disturbing to think that both of these, the emergence of cultural anthropology and the eugenics movement and the other hateful crimes mentioned, came out of the same historical milieu and, in part, from some of the same intellectual currents. These included imperialism, colonialism, Darwinism, rising racism, ethnic prejudice, and the greater contact between Western and non-Western peoples. But while cultural anthropology developed strict research rules, a code of ethics, and profound respect for other peoples and cultures, these other movements did not. Indeed, in the wrong hands, they would lead to mass ghettoization, killings, inhuman medical and other experiments, and the effort to eliminate entire classes and races of peoples. All this led to unspeakable evils.

Our focus in this chapter is on what are called “national character studies.” That is, the efforts to identify entire peoples, ethnicities, and races with certain presumably indomitable “cultural” characteristics. While most of these studies are benign, some are not. And, given the evil and terrible results mentioned above, they raise the question of whether such national character studies ought to be attempted at all. In this chapter we seek to examine both the evil strands of history, which the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries set loose, and the more benign versions of the national character studies, as well as the differences between the two. For, while there were, and still are in the post-World War II period, good, careful, and entertaining studies of national character, there are also profound dangers and evils lurking in the background. It is crucial that we know the differences between the two.

Social Darwinism

In 1859, Charles Darwin had published his famous book, *On the Origin of Species*. In it he set forth the concepts that we all know as Darwinism: evolution, natural selection, and the survival of the fittest. By this point, almost everyone accepts evolution as a *fact*; it can be shown, demonstrated, and tested empirically. However, there is still some dispute as to how far Darwin’s theories can be taken, and in some quarters the entire theory and evolution itself are rejected.

It is not our purpose here to debate the truth, validity, or limits of Darwinism. Instead, we are concerned with a particular—and dangerous—offshoot of Darwinism, social Darwinism, which emerged about a decade after Darwin's well-known book.

Social Darwinism is a view of society that takes Darwin's biological concepts and applies them to society and politics.¹ For example, if one country defeats another in war, then by the law of the survival of the fittest that must "prove" that the victorious country is at a higher stage of evolutionary development than the defeated one. Another example: if one country is at a higher level of economic development than another, then by the tenets of social Darwinism, that shows that the first country is more advanced than the second. In other words, "underdeveloped country" soon translates as "underdeveloped peoples"—and think of how dangerous that concept is. Still another example: rich and successful people under social Darwinism are presumably more advanced on the evolutionary tree than are poor people and, therefore, perhaps they should have more power, special privileges, maybe two votes at election time instead of just one.

Now let us carry the argument a step farther. Suppose those poor and "less-developed" peoples, both in the United States as well as in non-Western or Third World countries, also tend to black, darker, or of a mixed social background. Are they also inferior and lower on the evolutionary tree, not just because of their poverty but also because of their race or color? Whoa!!! That sure sounds like racism to me. Can you see why social Darwinism, in the wrong hands, can be such a dangerous concept?

Unfortunately, social Darwinism came along at precisely the same time, beginning in the 1870s and continuing thereafter for roughly the next 70 years, that cultural anthropology was emerging as a separate discipline and that anthropologists were for the first time fanning out to the four corners of the earth. There they were discovering new societies that had never been discovered or described before, societies that were often not just poor but also underdeveloped and primitive by our standards, and that were also often, darker-complected. Although *all* the main cultural anthropologists starting with Boas, Benedict, and Mead fought strenuously against this form of racism, we can also see how easy it would be for some social Darwinists to conflate race and underdevelopment. Their theory said that, because these newly discovered peoples were both poor and dark, therefore their poverty, underdevelopment, or "primitiveness" must be due to their color. They were farther down on the evolutionary tree. And all manner of evil could be justified from this view: not just racism but also imperialism, colonialism, slavery, repression, imprisonment, sterilization, even genocide against these poorer and darker peoples.

In some, perverted ways, social Darwinism may be seen as the logical extension of Darwin's evolutionary ideas. Social Darwinism often uses the concepts of

1 Peter Dickens, *Social Darwinism* (Philadelphia, PA: Open University Press, 2000); Robert Bannister, *Social Darwinism: Science and Myth in Anglo-American Social Thought* (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1989).

struggle for existence and survival of the fittest to classify people along class, developmentalist, and racial lines. They imagine a social hierarchy with wealthy, white, European, and American peoples at the top; Asians, Arabs, and Latin Americans somewhere in the middle; and Africans at the bottom. Moreover, this social hierarchy was locked in place; there could be no change.

Meanwhile, serious biologists, historians, and cultural anthropologists saw social Darwinism as a perversion of Darwin's theory. They found no basis for the conclusion that race and culture amounted to the same thing. Instead, culture was one thing and changeable while race was a genetic condition. Recall the insistence by Boas, Benedict, and Mead on cultural relativism: the idea that all cultures were functional on their own terms, and that one could not say, using race or other features, that one was superior to another. Cultural anthropology argued that using Darwin's ideas of biological evolution to justify unequal or inhumane treatment for any group of people was both bad science and bad public policy.

Nevertheless, in the periods from the 1870s up through World War I, during the interwar period, and on through World War II, social Darwinism and the racism to which it gave rise remained very popular in many parts of the world. It attracted many of the world's leading writers and theorists, including Herbert Spencer, social Darwinism's main proponent; German philosopher, Friedrich Nietzsche; family planning advocate, Margaret Sanger; and many others. Many governments also took up the idea in the form of forced sterilization of those deemed mentally enfeebled; racial and ethnic minorities; and even the poor and sick.

The worst oppressor and practitioner of social Darwinism was the Nazi regime in Germany. It had proclaimed Aryans to be a superior race; all others could be eliminated. That meant Jews, gypsies, homosexuals, the old, the enfeebled, and all non-Germans. In the name of German superiority and of "purifying" the race, Germany practiced all manner of unspeakable crimes on these "lesser" peoples: genocide, torture, mass persecution, human experimentation, brain surgery, sterilization, etc. Nor were the Germans alone in many of these practices: think of Joseph Stalin in Russia, the colonial powers in Africa, Japan in its World War II conquest of China, the *Apartheid* regime in South Africa, or the treatment of blacks in the US South. Few countries have entirely clean hands in these regards.

Cultural anthropology was aghast at and opposed these practices right from the beginning. Again, Boas was the key figure, along with his students. They opposed the theories of cultural, biological, and physical evolution set forth in social Darwinism. They fought against the eugenics movement. They made a sharp distinction between biology and culture and warned against conflating the two. Biology was inherited, a product of genetics, while culture was learned. The two should not be confused or tied together. Actually, Boas was a supporter of Darwin's evolutionary theory but he did not believe, nor did his research lead him to conclude, that it also applied to cultural or historical development.²

2 Franz Boas, *Race, Language, and Culture* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1940).

Boas rejected the idea that all societies could be strung out, so to speak, on an evolutionary continuum going from primitive to developed. He similarly rejected the social Darwinist idea that all societies passed through the same stages on their route to development. For example, the social Darwinists saw the Inuit whom Boas had studied on Baffin Island as a “less developed” or more “primitive” society, as compared with “modern” Germany or America. The Inuit were thus at an early stage in their evolution whereas Germany was at an advanced stage. But Boas’s cultural relativism rejected both this “stages” theory and the idea of cultural evolution. Nor could he find anything in Darwin that supported these views. They represented, by the social Darwinists and the popular press, a misreading (or no reading at all!) of Darwin that suggested that human beings are descended from apes. *In fact*, what Darwin had actually written was that *both* apes and man were the products of evolution, not that one evolved into the other—although the latter was the popular view.

Boas was, in fact, a close student of Darwin, both because he recognized its implications for his own field of cultural anthropology *and* because he recognized the dangers inherent in Darwin’s theory. Boas’s research led him to conclude that the patterns or structures of a culture were not a product either of conscious design or of inevitable evolution. Rather, they were the outcome of various influences and mechanisms, including both diffusion of certain practices and independent invention, and shaped by the context and environment in which the culture had emerged. This view of society and culture was very different both from Darwin’s biological theories and from the social Darwinists.

It should be said, in concluding this section, that not all social Darwinism leads necessarily to the genocide, racism, and oppression described here. In fact, much of social Darwinism is quite benign. After all, societies and cultures do evolve, change, and modernize. But not according to the rigid, regimented, racist, or automatic stages that many social Darwinists set forth. However, there is enough danger in the theories of the social Darwinists that we need to be exceedingly careful in our use of them. And we need continuously to be on guard not to confuse the findings of cultural anthropology with the theories of social Darwinism.

The Eugenics Movement

The eugenics movement was a logical outgrowth of both Darwin’s evolutionary theories and social Darwinism.³ Although one could trace the idea back to Plato who believed the state should monitor and control human reproduction, in its modern form eugenics became widely popular in the early decades of the twentieth century. Essentially, eugenics is a science, or perhaps better a pseudo-science, that advocates reproductive control to improve the genetic composition of a population.

3 Richard Lynn, *Eugenics: A Reassessment* (New York: Praeger, 2001); Edwin Black, *War Against the Weak* (New York: Four Walls, Eight Windows, 2003); Ruch Engs, *The Eugenics Movement* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2005).

Though building upon both evolutionary theory and social Darwinism, modern eugenics also built upon the scientific findings of geneticist, Gregor Mendel.

One can easily, as with social Darwinism, recognize the immense dangers inherent in the practice of eugenics. If the goal is to improve the genetic composition of the population, then someone, presumably the state, must decide who can marry whom. But who within the state will decide, and under what pressures and influences? Presumably we would want intelligent people to marry other intelligent people and handsome and fit people to marry other handsome and fit people. But what of those who are not intelligent, handsome, or fit? Can they marry only each other? Or, to improve the gene pool, should they not be permitted to marry at all?

Now, as we did with social Darwinism, let us introduce issues of race, culture, class, and underdevelopment into this consideration. Suppose we believe, as many people did in the early twentieth century, that low intelligence is correlated with darker skin color, then should we prohibit those with darker skin from reproducing? Or if we believe that some tribes are more primitive, less civilized than others, should they also be prohibited from reproducing? How about lower-class people, those with mental or physical deformities, or homosexuals? How about Jews, gypsies, or other “inferior” peoples whom others, thinking of themselves as “superior” wish to get rid of, especially if the latter have numbers, power, and the state behind them? The dangers, civil liberties violations, and sheer horror inherent in the eugenics movement are, if anything, even greater than those inherent in social Darwinism.

Given these dangers, it is amazing to consider the number of prominent people—and their governments—who bought into the eugenics movement. The list includes Theodore Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, John Maynard Keynes, H.G. Wells, George Bernard Shaw, Linus Pauling, Sidney Webb, and, again, Margaret Sanger. Of course, its most famous advocate and practitioner was Adolf Hitler who included the ideas of earlier eugenicists in *Mein Kampf*. He also carried out programs for the mass sterilization or killing of those whom he had designated as “defectives.”

For several decades eugenics was practiced by various governments around the world, including not just Nazi Germany but also the United States, Great Britain, Japan, Sweden, and others. Influential individuals as listed above as well as, usually, well-meaning hospitals and mental institutions also carried out eugenics programs, usually in the form of mass sterilizations.

Its advocates thought of it as a progressive program to improve human heredity by means of promoting greater reproduction in some groups of people, while reducing reproduction in others with, supposedly, less desirable traits.

But think of the potential in this program for massive human rights violations and even genocide. While eugenics flourished in the early twentieth century, today it is thought of as a bad and brutal idea that inflicted widespread human rights violations on millions of often unsuspecting and uninformed people. What were called “interventions” by the eugenicists involved, first, the identification and classification of various “undesirable” individuals and their families. These included poor people, racial minorities, particular ethnic groups, the mentally ill, blind people, the deaf, persons with deformities, homosexuals, and even

promiscuous women. These individuals and groups were then to be segregated or institutionalized. The final step involved their “treatment”: sterilization, euthanasia, or, in the extreme case of Nazi Germany, mass exterminations.

Today almost all the practices engaged in by eugenicists are condemned as violations of human rights. These practices included violations of privacy, the right to life, freedom from torture, the right to found a family, and racial, gender, and ethnic discrimination. In the United Nations charter, all these practices are condemned; as a result of these practices on a massive scale during the War, genocide is also outlawed by international law.

After World War II and the enormous abuses especially of the Nazi regime, the practice of eugenics went into a steep decline. You cannot do those things anymore; nor, even if we take the context of the early twentieth century into account, should eugenics ever have been able to flourish. What the Nazis practiced—racial “hygiene,” human experimentation, the extermination of “undesirable” human groups—are just so far beyond the pale of civilized behavior that they cannot be permitted or tolerated. Nevertheless, quite a number of countries, most notably China, but also Japan for a time, the Soviet Union, even the United States before the civil rights movement, continued to practice one or another form of eugenics. And maybe we and other societies still practice a *de facto* kind of eugenics, in the growing tendency of college-educated persons to marry other college-educated persons.

One can readily recognize the dangers the eugenics movement posed for the emerging field of cultural anthropology. These include, as they did with social Darwinism, racism; the conflation of race with culture; national or ethnic stereotyping; the condemnation or even extermination of entire groups of peoples, the misuse of evolutionary research, the conflating of underdeveloped countries with supposedly underdeveloped peoples, and so on. It is small wonder that even today many people remain suspicious of social Darwinism, eugenics, and even cultural or ethnic explanations.

The fact that all these movements—evolutionary theory, social Darwinism, the eugenics movement, *and* cultural anthropology—were emerging in roughly the same time period, 1870–1940, added further to the confusion. Cultural anthropology tried mightily to separate its science (historical, based on participant observation) from Darwin and the natural sciences, and also to denounce the dangerous pseudo-sciences of social Darwinism and eugenics. In these endeavors it was not always successful, for at times cultural anthropology got tarred with some of the same brushes as these others. Indeed, for a time after World War II, because of the dangers listed above, cultural anthropology as a field went into decline. It has since revived but some of the old dangers and fears are still present.

National Character Studies

What we here call national character studies were pretty well discredited by the War, the Nazi experience, and the Holocaust. You cannot use racial, ethnic, or national character traits to describe and typecast whole groups of people. That is too dangerous; World War II demonstrated that it leads to persecution, torture, and the attempted mass extermination (genocide or holocaust) of entire races, ethnicities, or nations.

It is quite obvious that we cannot, or should not, use such stereotypes against any minority, race, ethnicity, or people. Nevertheless, we continue to engage in more benign forms of national characterization: “all” Englishmen are polite, tweedy, and drink tea; Frenchmen are great lovers; Spaniards are hot-tempered; Italy cannot govern itself; Germans are authoritarian and bureaucratic; etc. Moreover, those stereotypes continue to find their way into books about these and other countries.

Here we review some of these national character studies that continued to find their way into print even after the wartime experience had led to their discrediting. First, even recognizing the dangers involved, many of these studies, in the proper hands, contain insights into these nations that are still valuable. Second, some of these studies, particularly those reviewed here by Glen Dealy and Edward Banfield, became quite insightful and sophisticated. Third, we find it interesting that some national character studies continued to be used by the United States government to better understand our enemies. And fourth, these early national character studies of the 1950s served as forerunners to the much more nuanced and sophisticated studies of political culture of the 1960s which, based on public opinion survey data, avoided the dangers of the national character studies by using trend analysis and tendency statements.

*Salvador de Madariaga, Englishmen, Frenchmen, Spaniards: An Essay in Comparative Psychology*⁴

Salvador de Madariaga was Spanish by birth and a “Renaissance man,” at home in literature, culture, and politics but not trained as a specialist in any of these. A loyalist to the losing Republican cause in the Spanish Civil War of the 1930s, Madariaga was forced into exile by the dictatorship of General Francisco Franco and lived for many years in Paris and London. Hence, his fascinating national-character study of *Englishmen, Frenchmen, Spaniards*.

Madariaga’s book is well-written and entertaining. These kinds of national character studies often supplanted the more serious academic studies of the time by cultural anthropologists like Benedict and Mead. Their methodology was often not very sophisticated: as Madariaga calls it, it is a “method of the living witness [himself] for purposes of knowledge.” He says that it is “not a ‘scientific’ work

4 Madariaga, *Englishmen, Frenchmen, Spaniards* (New York: Hill & Wang, 1969).

based on statistics or the comparative study of facts.” The author acknowledges that basing his interpretations on personal understanding and experience is a possible source of error.

In his Foreword, Madariaga refers to his book as a study in national character. He says, “Strange as it may seem, national character is not universally accepted as a fact of nature.” Madariaga strongly disagrees. He calls national character “a subconscious underworld of instincts and tendencies.” He goes on, national character is “a distinctive attitude which determines [a nation’s] natural and spontaneous reactions toward life.” These reactions, he says, “spring from a characteristic impulse, manifesting itself in a complex psychological entity, constructing standards of behavior, the key to emotions and the spring of its pure thoughts.” Wow! That sentence could have been written by today’s social scientists.

Madariaga then goes on to compare his three countries along three main dimensions. First, *The System*. Englishmen, he says, believe in *fair play*. He refers to it as “the perfect adaptation of the player to the ‘game’ as a whole: a sense of balance between the individual and the community.” In contrast, Frenchmen believe in *the law* and *intellect*, an *idea* about how to solve that same problem of balance between individual and community. Whereas in the Spaniard it is *honor*: passion for life, a kind of extravagant (yet, at the same time, pragmatic) idealism.

Madariaga next turns to what he calls the “tendencies” of these three nations. The Englishman is a “man of action.” It comes from his education, his sense of self-control, his indifference toward theories and logic, his pragmatism and utilitarianism. He has a genius for cooperation even in the face of opposition. However, the Frenchman is a man of thought, of logic, and a chess player. He thinks for the pleasure of thinking and sees in potential problems an opportunity to theorize. Political life is strictly ordered, imposed from above, respected below, and highly regulated. Now for the Spaniard: he is a man of passion, spontaneous in action. He is composed of conflicting tendencies: resigned and rebellious, highly individualistic and at the same time a conformist, energetic, and indolent. He is often indifferent, lazy, and passive, but with an adventurous spirit. His politics is personalistic.

These three national cultures manifest themselves in different social structures. England is autocratic-organic. The English “race for spontaneous organization” lead society to naturally adopt a hierarchical social order. It rests on continuity and tradition. The social order is divided into classes and sub-classes. The king is the apex, the aristocracy provides the leadership, while the rest of the masses follow.

France, in contrast, he says, is bourgeois-mechanical. The law, rather than custom, is most important. The general principles of government have been well thought out but are constantly debated. Equality is the most sacred French principle; the state is a “purely official pyramid.” Collective life is “mechanized.”

Spain, in contrast with the other two, is *popular-anarchic*. It lacks, he says, all sense of order and hierarchy. Equality is a “living sense” that is unconsciously

assumed and regulates all human relations. Spanish collective life relies on the Army and the Church to “superimpose” cohesion.

Well, there we have it: a book on comparative national character that is well-written, entertaining, often insightful, witty, and full of fun stories. But it is also, in contrast to the ethnographic and cultural-anthropological studies we have reviewed, entirely anecdotal, impressionistic, and devoid of methodology or systematic analysis. At the same time, it entirely lacks any of the dangerous currents that we saw in social Darwinism and eugenics. So let us take Madariaga for what he is: a talented and insightful writer who offers us glimpses into the political culture of these three countries but lacks the methodological sophistication, the systematic analysis, and the tendency statements of modern political culture studies.

*Luigi Barzini, The Italians*⁵

Barzini’s well-written and enjoyable book confesses right up front that it is *not* a scientific treatise. He says it is “no more ambitious nor accurate than the opening chapters of a leisurely nineteenth-century novel where the author describes at length the country in which his story unfolds, the historical moment, and the people themselves.” And unlike Madariaga, Barzini makes no pretense that his is a comparative study. But at least it is not fiction.

No, Barzini’s is a single-country study of Italy, *his own country*, entirely impressionistic, by a well-informed journalist. His subject is *cose all italiana*: the habits, traits, tendencies, and practices that are unmistakably “our own,” Italian. By pulling all these traits together, by learning them slowly, Barzini begins to see a pattern.

Barzini begins by talking about all the foreign tourists who have flocked to Italy in recent decades. Among these, especially the English-language readers, his book has become a best-seller and Barzini, a wealthy man.

He talks about the Italian love of *spectacle*, which forms such an integral part of Italian life that it is hard to separate spectacle from reality. He says that is why Mussolini, the quintessential showman, remained in power for over two decades. Or why Silvio Berlusconi, the colorful and outrageous former prime minister, remains popular despite his extravagant and often scandalous lifestyle.

Next comes *glory*. He says that Italian art as well as politics are dedicated to praise of the strong and powerful while directing derision at the weak and defeated. Italian painting, he says, is founded on the glory of the flesh and especially on the “harmonious beauties of the naked female body.” But then Barzini turns serious, saying that the reality is that millions of Italians struggle for survival with, at the time he wrote, the second lowest standard of living in the Western world.

5 Barzini, *The Italians* (New York: Athenium, 1964).

More interesting for our purposes are Barzini's comments on politics. He says there is "no trust" in the Italian system beyond the family, the clan, and the local community. The system is based on a cold, calculated approach to the defense of self and family against society, the state, and all public institutions. That explains, Barzini says, the high levels of corruption in Italy, the distrust of all impersonal institutions including the government, and the inability of the state to collect taxes. Barzini's insights on these matters help us understand the present economic and political crisis in Italy.

Barzini's book is rich in detail, description, and insight. But it is not very systematic, analytic, or scientific. It lacks even Madariaga's feeble attempt at a methodology. It also lacks any pretense to comparative analysis. It is just journalism—good journalism at times, but still only reportage, without larger insights.

Barzini provides his own conclusion. He says the Italian way of life consists of spectacles, self-indulgence, the pursuit of self-interest, and the defense of self and family against society. In his view, Italian society is not a success (the book was written before the drive to prosperity of the 1980s and 1990s); instead, it creates poverty, tyranny, and injustice. In a final comparative thought, Barzini wonders why Italy is not as successful as Nordic or Core Europe but he lacks the knowledge of those other societies to pursue that idea.

Thus we have it: another "national character" study: impressionistic, unsystematic, not very analytic, non-scientific, and non-comparative. A good read if you are going as a tourist to Italy for the first time, but not to be taken overly seriously. At the same time, the book is quite benign and certainly not dangerous as many of the earlier social Darwinian, eugenics, and Nazi-era national character studies were.

*Edward Banfield, The Moral Basis of a Backward Society*⁶

In 1954–55, Harvard Government Professor Edward Banfield, his Italian wife, and their children lived in a poor village in Southern Italy. The village, Montegrano (not its real name) had no newspapers, an illiteracy rate of 50 percent, and few opportunities for schooling beyond the eighth grade. Not only was Montegrano poor but it was also isolated, largely unintegrated into the larger, national Italian, let alone global, society.

Banfield was interested in why it was, and remained, so poor. His hypotheses centered on two factors: (1) a lack of organization and (2) a lack of trust among its citizens. Except as people can create and maintain what Banfield called "corporate organization," or what we would call "civil society," they cannot have a modern economy. As Banfield explained, the higher the level of living they wish to attain, the greater the need for organization. And for organization or civil society to succeed, the greater the need for trust among neighbors and fellow citizens. Montegrano had none of these. Through in-depth interviews as well as

6 Banfield, *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society* (New York: Free Press, 1958).

town records, Banfield set out to find out why. His approach—interviews, local records, participant observation, the comparative method—was close to that of the cultural anthropologists studied in the previous chapter, except that Banfield was a political scientist.

Banfield's research puzzle was this: what part does *culture* play in a society's ability to effectively organize? He already knew and had factored in the other usual causes: poverty, illiteracy, class structure, centuries of oppression, fatalism, and the conservation of peasants who own even a small plot of land. Banfield found truth in all six of these explanations but found them insufficient as explanations. Hence, his hypothesis centered on culture: that Montegrano act as if they lived by this rule: "you should maximize the material and other short-run advantage of your nuclear family, and you should assume all others will do likewise." Banfield famously called this attitude "amoral familism." It sounds very much like Barzini.

In Italy, Banfield says, the family comes first, far above all other considerations. You must take care of your immediate family above all else; no one else outside the family can quite be trusted. But there was a second circle in this analysis: close friends, neighbors, subordinates, drinking buddies, and the local community. None of these others was at the level of the family but they occupied an intermediary position. Not to be trusted at all were outside politicians, or political parties, the central bureaucracy, tax collectors, census takers, the national government, or anyone from outside the village.

Note how close Banfield's work, as a political scientist, is to that of the cultural anthropologists studied earlier, and how different it is from the national character studies of Madariaga and others. First, the work is systematic, analytic, and scientific—not "mere" journalism or impressionistic. Second, it uses the classic ethnographic methodologies—field work, history, interviews, participant observation, learning the language, and soaking up the culture. Third, Banfield is self-consciously comparative at two levels: (1) a comparison of Montegrano with other communities within Italy, and (2) an explanation of why Italy is still poorer than other areas in Europe.

Banfield's work, while involving only a single case, is nevertheless a far distance from and *way beyond* the earlier national character studies. Here we have not only a fascinating and systematic investigation of what makes Italy tick, or at least the south or *mesorgimento*, but also a precursor of the studies of developing areas that would come less than a decade after Banfield's pioneering work. Not only did his book have a major influence on the path-breaking *Politics of the Developing Areas* (1960) but it was also recognized immediately that to study emerging nations one would have to use those selfsame cultural anthropological methodologies as did Banfield. For in the developing areas formal constitutions and legalistic institutional arrangements often do not work very well, nor can one count very much on the local statistics. Instead, one has to don the garb of the anthropologist, learn the language, do field work, be empathetic, do the history, and understand the local culture.

*Glen Dealy, The Public Man: A Study of Latin American and Other Catholic Countries*⁷

Glen Dealy is a Professor of Political Science at Oregon State University who mainly studies Latin America. But note how his model dovetails with that of Banfield as well as extending Barzini's analysis to a broader "Latin" culture area.

Dealy argues that Latin America and other Catholic countries—religion here seen as a political-culture variable—do not march to the same drummer as do the Anglo-Protestant countries. They are not particularly enthused about capitalism, democracy to them often seems like a foreign import, and their conception of human rights is quite different from what we found in that great architect of both British and American democracy, John Locke. You can see why Dealy's argument, if accepted, would drive American policy-makers seeking to bring US-style democracy and market capitalism to Latin America crazy.

Dealy says the values of free-market capitalism or American liberalism are not at the height of aspirations for all people. Instead, he presents a contrasting model of what he calls *caudillaje* (strong, charismatic leadership) as common among the peoples of Catholic countries. Think of Venezuela's Hugo Chávez, Cuba's Fidel Castro, Italy's Silvio Berlusconi as examples.

Dealy's writings contradict the prevailing views of "Latin" society as irrational or revolutionary or permeated by a culture of poverty. As a substitute he presents *caudillaje* as a rational cultural ethos that propels Latin man not so much to pursue economic well-being as in capitalism, but public or political influence. *Caudillaje* man must become a leader surrounded by followers—i.e., a "public man," as in Dealy's title. In this system, as in Banfield's, family is all-important because it is the first and strongest base of your following. Neighbors, class friends, schoolmates, and clan loyalists also become part of your cohort. Family connections, friendships, and loyalty are all part of the "currency" that you bring to the table.

In Dealy's world, the foundations of public virtue are rooted in a Catholic ethos, as compared with the predominantly Protestant ethos of Northwest Europe or the United States. The Catholic ethos is grounded in the writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas: hence, the importance of order, authority, and hierarchy. Also important are a sense of fatalism, of accepting your station in life as God-given, and, therefore, not struggling too hard to achieve great wealth, as Americans do. Dealy emphasized Thomas's notion of the "two cities": the "City of God" and the "City of Man," which seldom meet. Dealy is also fascinated by the Catholic institution of the Confession which, conveniently, allows you to keep sinning—again, think Berlusconi—as long as you later confess.

Here are some of the things that follow from Dealy's analysis of Catholic/*caudillaje* culture, so different from the mainly Protestant, upwardly striving North American one. First and most important, an emphasis on manliness or *machismo*, which allows your followers to submit to your will without humiliation. Part of

7 Dealy, *The Public Man* (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 1977).

machismo is individual physical prowess, as in soccer or bull-fighting, but it may be expressed as mental or intellectual prowess as well. Second, the importance of family and strong personal connections. Third in Dealy's model: dignity, meaning good social manners and respecting others' rank and dignity. Losing dignity is unforgivable, rather like losing wealth in American society.

A fourth attribute of caudillaje man is generosity: toward friends, followers, and those below you in the social scale. If you are generous toward your "lessers," then why would you need vast public social programs for the poor. And fifth, there is leisure: leisure time shows you have made it; hence, no need to work any harder, you are secure in your station in life. How different this all is from the Calvinist work ethic of the US society.

The political implications of this are important as well. Who needs democracy if the "public man" or leader looks out for and takes care of his family? Similarly, an inefficient and burdensome bureaucracy is *rational* because it enables our heroic leader to cut through all the red tape and get things done, mainly for friends and family. Also in Catholic political culture, why strive for riches, good government, or advanced social programs here on earth if what really counts is your afterlife, the "City of God"?

Dealy's world is obviously applicable to Spain, Portugal, Italy, Greece, and the Philippines as well as Latin America. Note how closely it corresponds to both Barzini's and Banfield's portrait of Italy. But Dealy—and this is what makes him especially interesting to us—goes beyond a mere single case study or national character analysis to portray an entire *culture area*—"Latin" or "Mediterranean" Europe and Latin America—with these broad strokes. In Dealy's analysis, his culture area or "civilization" encompasses all those countries impacted by Roman Catholic beliefs.

You can also see why Dealy's analysis and model drives US policy-makers to distraction. Indeed, I have been in high-level policy meetings where American foreign assistance officials grind their teeth over Dealy. For in his model of the "public man," you do not need democracy, equality is not taken for granted, human rights are low on the priority list, and public policy to benefit the poor is not highly valued. All this runs contrary to (North) American values and ideas of public policy. But then, remember what the early anthropologists taught us about cultural relativism.

*Samuel P. Huntington, Who Are We?*⁸

Samuel Huntington is a giant in the political science field, the author of many important and influential books, and a mentor to me earlier in my career. Therefore, it hurts me to say negative things about this, his last, single-authored book.

Huntington's thesis is that America's national or "core" culture—what we have here been calling our national character—was forged by a small group of settlers from Holland and England who brought both Christianity and accompanying

8 Huntington, *Who Are We?* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004).

Protestant values to the new nation. But our cultural core, according to Huntington, is now under threat from new types of immigration, new ideologues of diversity and multiculturalism, the Hispanization of US culture, and changing elite commitments. Hence, Huntington's question-mark of a title, *Who Are We?* as a nation and a culture.

The early settlers brought with them Protestant morals and values, a strong work ethic, the English language, British traditions of law, justice, and limited government, and a legacy of European art, literature, and philosophy. Out of this "settler culture" came the American Creed and its principles of equality, strong individualism, representative government, fundamental rights, and private property.

America is overwhelmingly (80–85 percent) a Christian nation but with strong protections built in for minority rights. Our "civil religion," Huntington says, is compatible with each American choosing his/her own denomination, but it is not compatible with atheism or non-belief. America may be an "imagined community" (Benedict Anderson) but it is also a community with a shared history, identity, and political culture.

All this began to fade beginning in the 1960s and 1970s because of the growing popularity of multicultural and diversity doctrines, a new kind of immigration from Mexico and Central America, and changing attitudes among opinion leaders. Multiculturalism, according to Huntington, helped undermine the dominant Western and Protestant culture and belief system, changed immigration rules allowed millions of persons into the country who did not assimilate quickly, and the political and social elites, bowing to the demands of political correctness, have gone along with these changes. The result has been an erosion of American core values, a new and more divided political culture, and a society that no longer has the unity of purpose it once had.

Huntington outlines four possible outcomes. First, America could lose its core culture. Second, we could become bifurcated in terms of language and culture with the Southwest ("America's Quebec") going its own way. Third, there could be a white ethnic backlash that would seek to exclude other racial, ethnic, and cultural groups. Fourth and Huntington's favorite, America could reinvigorate the core culture and return to its "Anglo-Protestant" values. To these four, I would add a fifth: a clever politician (Barack Obama?) will come along who will unite all these ethnic minorities as well as other disaffected groups, create a new coalition, and sweep the older Anglo-Protestant culture out of office.

Huntington is such a great scholar that, in my view, it is unfortunate that he ended his career with this book. Because he is a scholar, he utilized a great variety of public opinion surveys, census and economic data, legislative records, and other materials to bolster his claims about the changing American "national character." However, I believe he greatly exaggerated the perceived threat to American core culture, he woefully underestimates how Hispanics are also becoming Americanized, and at times Huntington's comments verge on racism. To me, this is carrying political culture studies too far; it almost reverts back to the "national character" studies of the 1920s and 1930s that led to stereotyping, the conflation

of race and culture, and prejudice (and worse!) practiced against minority groups. I chose to include a summary of this book in this chapter precisely because it does represent a step backward and because it ignores the much more sophisticated political culture work (see Chapter 5) that began in the 1950s.

National Character Studies in the Service of American Security

We began this chapter with a discussion of social Darwinism, the eugenics movement, and the blatantly stereotypical and racist ideas and studies that led to genocide, mass murder, and the Holocaust. We then discussed a number of what we called “national character studies” (Madariaga, Barzini, et al.), most of them benign and entertaining, but some with decidedly pernicious effects. Now in this last section of the chapter we turn to a special, separate category of national character studies, those produced during wartime to help us understand—and defeat!—foreign enemies.

Most of these studies were produced by scholars under contract to the US government. Recall that Franz Boss, the founder of modern cultural anthropology, warned about the dangers in both his native Germany and his adopted America of this kind of sponsored research. It is almost always corrupting of both the scholars involved and their research; it leads to unacceptable national stereotyping, racism, and prejudice; and, in the service of national security, it may well lead to more killings, strafings, bombings, and torture as in Iraq or Afghanistan. Recall that in the absence of adequate Arabic language training and cultural understanding of Islamic societies among US and NATO military officers and troops, the Pentagon recruited *hundreds* of civilian anthropologists and area specialists to serve as interpreters and go-betweens between military units and the local population. So the dangers described above are still very much with us.

In these pages we do not go into any more depth on the case just mentioned; we await the accounts, testimonials, and data of these events to be offered by the participants. However, we do analyze two very prominent studies in this genre: Ruth Benedict’s study of Japan commissioned during World War II and Nathan Leites’s study of the Soviet Politburo commissioned at the height of the Cold War.

*Ruth Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword*⁹

In our study we had previously (Chapter 3) analyzed Benedict’s justly famous *Patterns of Culture*. But she was also famous for her later book, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword*, completed in 1944 for the US Government but only published in 1946. It is a study of the culture and society of Japan which, however, is aimed at better being able to *defeat* Japan in the war. And that raises a large number of questions.

9 Benedict, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1946).

Remember that Benedict's mentor, professor, colleague, and friend, Boas, had once warned against precisely this kind of work, or cultural anthropology in the service of any government, private interest, regime, or war effort. Benedict actively shared these concerns. But she and Boas, too, were convinced that the Nazi regime, the struggle against fascism, and the defeat of Japan and the Axis powers were so important that they overrode their earlier qualms from a different time and place. Hence, she undertook several projects as part of her war work.

Benedict was not an expert on Japan and had never traveled, visited, or done research there. Her study, therefore, is all the more remarkable and one which we may call "anthropology at a distance." In the absence of field research, she was obliged to study Japanese culture through its literature, newspaper clippings, films and recordings, and a limited number of interviews. She made use of whatever cultural materials she could get to produce the study, even while recognizing it was limited because she did not know the language, could not do participant observation, had violated her own norms of cultural relativism, and was able to conduct very few interviews and those mostly with English-speaking Japanese-Americans. Nevertheless, even with all these limits, Benedict managed to produce, though now obviously dated, one of the best books ever written about Japan. Even the Japanese, including Japanese scholars, now concur in this opinion.

Benedict and the small group who worked with her, including other anthropologists and sociologists who were engaged in a parallel study of Nazi Germany, were charged with studying the root causes of Japanese/Nazi aggression. They wanted to understand the cultural ethos that might be driving their aggression but they also hoped to find weaknesses in that ethos, ways to exploit those weaknesses, and any means of persuasion that the US military itself had missed.

Americans, including American officials at the highest levels, did not well understand Japan. For example, while American POWs wanted their families to know they had been captured but refused to give out any information about the war effort, Japanese POWs talked freely about their country's war plans but did not want their families to know (shame) that they'd been captured. Similarly, why did other Asians, Chinese, and Koreans, not welcome Japan as their liberators from Western colonialism and imperialism; why did they so hate Japan? Benedict set out to explain the "whys" of Japanese behavior; she also was instrumental in arguing that Japanese Emperor Hirohito ought not to be put on trial for war crimes but should be continued in his position to assure continuity after the war.

This is not a book about Japan or World War II, but some of Benedict's findings are so interesting that they deserve brief mention here. For instance, she warned that dethroning the emperor, which most Americans wanted, would humiliate Japan and lead to detrimental effects. She painted a fascinating portrait of Japan as a Confucian, hierarchical society governed by elaborate codes of conduct and where everyone knew their place. She saw Japan as a class-and-caste society, and warned that Americans should not enforce their own notions of equality on the country. She emphasized Japanese politeness but said Americans should not

interpret that as a willingness to accept insults or denigration by their occupiers. In the concept of *Om* or indebtedness to others, Benedict found the basis for the Japanese patronage system, the idea that even the smallest of debts (or insults) must be repaid.

It is a quite remarkable book, made even more remarkable by the fact that Benedict had never done research in Japan, could not speak the language, and had only limited research sources available. But where is the cultural relativism in this study, where the insistence on language skills and participant observation, where the interviews and systematic investigations, and where all the canons of cultural anthropology's scientific method, many of these championed earlier by Benedict herself? And where is the skepticism about government sponsorship, where the discussion of the limits this placed on her research, where the worries that those who sponsor the research will also dictate the conclusions you must reach?

Actually, there is no indication that the government limited Benedict's research or told her what conclusions to reach. Nor, since her services were dedicated to the war effort and the struggle to defeat fascism, should we criticize her overly for violating quite a number of the basic research tenets of her profession. On the other hand, Benedict's remarkable work does in this case bring all these contradictions into full view.

*Nathan Leites and the RAND Corporation, The Operational Code of the Politburo*¹⁰

The RAND Corporation is an Air Force Think Tank created after World War II. It is a high-level research institute that does strategic planning for the Pentagon. At the time of this study (early 1950s), its primary target was the Soviet Union; with the end of the Cold War in 1991, RAND branched out to do other studies (economic policy, social security, and health care) besides those related to defense. Originally located in California, it now has a large Washington office.

The RAND study was only one of many commissioned by the US government during the Cold War to deal with the Soviet challenge. Inside the CIA, the Defense Department, and the broader intelligence community, to say nothing of the hundreds of private contractors that grew up during this period, are hundreds of units dedicated to writing psychological profiles of foreign leaders, assessing foreign threats, and doing national character studies of foreign countries. Think, for example, of the series of country studies, thoroughly researched and often well-written, put out by the Special Operations Research Office of American University. I myself ("truth is advertising"!) have been a participant in some of these studies. So the RAND study reviewed here is not at all unique.

The RAND study sought specifically to understand the behavior of the Soviet Politburo, or the ruling elite of the Communist Party. Was it driven by Marxist-

10 Leites, *The Operational Code of the Politburo* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1951).

Leninist ideology, by Great Russian national ambitions, by fanatics, or what? The study focused on the political strategy of Bolshevism, the rules which the Bolsheviks believe to be necessary for effective political action.

The study found that the Bolsheviks elite was quite pragmatic. It was not driven so much by Marxist ideology as by practical considerations. The ideology was sufficiently flexible that it could be bent or adapted to fit any circumstances. Hence, the Politburo elite should be seen not as fanatics but as rational actors. They were not influenced by moods, feelings, or ideology but by rational calculation. They know how to adapt to new circumstances. Flexibility was seen as a key virtue. Contrary to much public and even elite opinion at the time, the RAND study found that the Politburo was not made up of fanatical communist ideologues but by careful, prudent leaders seeking to advance Russia's national interests.

The RAND study was one of the first to use *psychological profiling*, a strategy later followed by the CIA as well as the Defense Department. It was carried out not by sociologists, cultural anthropologists, or political scientists, but by *psychoanalysts*. They sought, from afar, not on the couch, to do a Freudian, psychoanalytic study of the Soviet elite. Since they did not have access to the leadership directly, they had to do it by studying their writings, speeches, and behavior. They could not use anthropology-like participant observation; instead, excluded from the Kremlin, they had to rely on indirect observation. These limits on the research naturally caused great skepticism in some US policy quarters. If the leadership could not be analyzed up close and personally, the skeptics asked, then of what use was this kind of analysis? Especially subject to derision was the authors' psycho-babble claim (this was a group project; hence, the use of the plural) that Soviet Politburo behavior could in part be explained as "a reaction-formation to latent homosexual tendencies." Wow! Who would have known?

Despite the laughter this last claim evoked, the RAND study of the Soviet Politburo made a major contribution. Especially important was its finding that the Soviet leadership was pragmatic, rational, and calculating. They were not frenzied Marxist-Leninist ideologues. They could be dealt with on a rational, pragmatic basis. In short, they were just like us.

Conclusions

Social Darwinism, the eugenics movement, and the early twentieth-century efforts to stereotype and pigeon-hole people according to narrow racial, ethnic, genetic, and evolutionary categories led to some truly horrifying results. These efforts produced not only the gruesome results with which we are familiar—genocide, the gas chambers, the Holocaust, racism, efforts to eliminate entire classes of peoples (Jews, gypsies, homosexuals, and others)—but to many with which we are less familiar. These included selective human breeding techniques, mass sterilizations of whole classes of peoples, laboratory experimentation on human subjects without their consent, racial and ethnic discrimination, brain and other

surgeries to change human behavior, and other, truly unspeakable acts. The legacy of this era is still with us today in the form of lingering suspicion and hostility to culture-based explanations.

I do not think we have much difficulty in concluding that such acts as described above are unacceptable. In the 1930s and 1940s, they led to the Nazi regime, war, and the mass slaughter of *millions* of human beings. On a somewhat lesser scale, they led even in this country to more violations of civil and human rights.

In the present day, although I may be wrong on this, I do not think we are likely again or at least anytime soon to see a Holocaust on the scale of that earlier one. Furthermore, I believe we have made great strides on the civil rights front and in the struggle against racism. We no longer deal in mass sterilization of supposedly inferior peoples; we no longer do mass brain surgeries to affect behavior; and we have learned the dangers of ethnic, racial, and national stereotyping.

I am not Pollyannish about this; I recognize the grave dangers that still lurk. Therefore, though recognizing the difficulties and dangers still inherent, I am inclined at this time to a mainly benign attitude toward some of the national character studies we have reviewed here. They are fundamentally different from the social Darwinism, the eugenics advocacy, and the racism of the early twentieth century. Many of these studies offer rich insights into foreign countries and trends. Though they do not constitute the whole picture, they are valuable additions to the literature on other countries. Though we still need to guard against the use of national stereotypes, we can nevertheless learn a lot from these books.

Let us make some distinctions. First, men like Madariaga and Barzini offer us rich, entertaining, well-written, journalistic insights into other countries; if we ignore some of their oversimplifications, we can still profit enormously from reading these books. They strike me as essentially benign.

A second category is the writings of Bancroft and Dealy. These are scholars, political scientists, offering more sophisticated analyses than the earlier journalistic accounts. Bancroft and Dealy use a comparative approach, are careful and self-conscious methodologically, and are careful to qualify their conclusions. Essentially, these writers follow the methodological guidelines of the cultural anthropologists—and that is not all bad.

In a third category is Huntington's *Who Are We?* Huntington (now deceased) is a keen observer, a forceful writer, and a leading political scientist. He has in this book amassed mountains of survey, census, and other data. Yet even with all his sophisticated analysis, Huntington here comes very close to falling back into racism, cultural stereotyping, and the conflating of race and culture. It is a set of arguments that we must still seek to avoid.

The fourth category includes national character studies done at the service of the US (or any other) government. These strike me as especially dangerous. Even though in the two case studies reviewed here (Benedict and Leites), the government recruited top-notch scholars, nevertheless the dangers still lurk. First, these are *official* studies; second, the government puts *limits* on what you can research, write, and publish; third, these are designed to *defeat* an enemy in war. It is likely

we can justify these efforts by the nature of the truly evil enemy faced (Japan, Nazi Germany, and the Soviet Union), but one must still recognize the grave dangers involved in this kind of research. And in the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and against terrorism, we know these kinds of national security studies are still going on, now directed at the Islamic world.

Given the dangers *always* inherent in national character studies, our next chapter explores a quantum leap forward that took place in the 1960s that involved the use of comparative public opinion surveys covering many countries. Not only did these surveys yield new and rich data but they also enabled us to avoid national stereotyping by making these studies quantifiable, empirical, and scientific. Instead of stereotypes, we now had—very different—trend lines and tendency statements. The path-breaking book in this regard was Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (1963). Others soon followed. Let us see why this was such a path-breaking volume.

Chapter 5

“The Civic Culture” and the Revolution in Survey Research

The main criticisms leveled against the earlier national character literature were that it was impressionistic, unsystematic, noncomparative, not analytic, dangerous, and unscientific. All true to a certain extent, even though we saw in the previous chapter that these studies could also be insightful, enlightening, and downright fun to read. Certainly, by the 1950s no one thought that there would be another holocaust anytime soon, and the potentially dangerous social-Darwinism and eugenics schools had largely petered out. While the national character studies continued to involve sometimes over-zealous stereotyping, most of those studies were quite benign, harmless, and often downright entertaining.

Now, however, with the 1963 publication of Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba's *The Civic Culture*, as well as a vast number of other new political culture studies in the 1960s and 1970s, and then Ronald Inglehart's series of studies based on his World Values Surveys, political culture studies were about to enter a whole new world. The agency of this revolution was modern, comparative survey research.

With survey research and its new, scientific methods, many of the old criticisms of political culture studies largely went out the window. For now, unlike before, it would be possible to study political culture systematically, comparatively, analytically, and empirically—no longer impressionistically but using the techniques of modern survey research. Of course, some of these newer studies, as we see later in this chapter, might also be open to criticisms; but these would be different criticisms than in the past. At last, comparative politics had a proven and effective way to measure political culture but without that involving the dangerous national stereotyping of many of the earlier studies.

The Politics of the Developing Areas

Modern political culture and socialization (how people learn and internalize political ideas) research has its roots in the 1950s-to-1960s concern and even preoccupation with the developing countries. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, a host of new, developing, or “Third World” nations emerged onto the world scene within a few years. The size of the membership of the United Nations doubled, then it doubled again. Anthropologists, sociologists, economists, and political scientists all scrambled to understand this new phenomenon.

The first books on the subject—those by W.W. Rostow, Everett Von Hagen, Bruce Morris, and Robert Heilbroner¹—were written by economists. In the early literature, the phrases “development” or “developing nations” were thought to refer to *economic* development. American foreign aid programs during this period, largely designed by Rostow, were similarly based on the assumption that economic development came first, then social change, finally, if at all, political development or democratization. The World Bank, the IMF, and the various regional development banks also concentrated almost exclusively on economic aid. But soon the fields of anthropology, sociology, political science, and psychology also weighed into the discussion of development.

In political science, the path-breaking book in the field, edited by Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, was *The Politics of the Developing Areas*.² Though containing rich subsections on all the main developing areas—Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America—the most innovative part of the book was Almond’s Introduction. Here, Almond set forth a new model for the study of developing areas that was quite different from the formal-legal or institutionalist approach that political science, largely focused on the developed countries of Western Europe, North America, and the British Commonwealth, had used in the past. The older approach had concentrated mainly on laws, constitutions, and formal institutions because in the developed nations these institutions largely worked as the laws and constitutions stated. But in the developing areas, Almond argued, laws, constitutions, and formal institutions were weak, nonexistent, or failed to function properly. Therefore, one had to look behind the formal institutions, at more informal practices and ways of doing things that often had more importance than the formal institutions.

Almond identified four “input” functions that all political systems had to perform, even though their precise institutional configurations might differ widely. These were: political socialization, interest articulation, interest aggregation, and political communications. All four of these functions had to do with political culture, which Almond defined as the values, beliefs, opinions, political orientations, and behavior undergirding the political system. That is, how are these values learned or taught (political socialization); how are they articulated (interest articulation); how are they aggregated or brought together (interest aggregation); and then how are they communicated to political decision-makers (political communication)? In formulating this design, Almond relied heavily on the earlier work of cultural anthropologists.

1 Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth* (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1960); Von Hagen, *On the Theory of Social Change: How Economic Growth Began* (Homewood, IL: Dorsey, 1962); Morris, *Economic Growth and Development* (New York: Pitman, 1967); Heilbroner, *The Great Ascent* (New York: Harper & Row, 1963).

2 Almond and Coleman (eds), *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1960).

Almond begins to discuss political culture in Part II of his Introduction. He says that he is not denigrating the importance of political institutions, only asking them to move over to accommodate other approaches. This was part of a general trend in political science at the time away from formal institutions and toward the more informal aspects of politics: political behavior, processes of politics, and decision-making. It was at this step that the institutionalists began to push back, arguing against the inclusion of these "anthropological factors" and in favor of a continued focus on institutions.

Almond says, having offered his definition above, that political culture is always a mixture of traditional and modern aspects. He uses Talcott Parsons's "pattern variables"—ascription-merit, functionally diffuse-functionally specialized, particularistic-universalistic—to differentiate traditional from modern political values and systems. Here again he relies heavily on the research findings and methodologies of cultural anthropology. He says that political socialization (learning) is "the process of induction into the political culture." Its end-product is a set of attitudes or orientations toward the political system, including its various roles and role incumbents, which he calls political culture. Political culture and socialization also include knowledge of, values affecting, and feeling toward the inputs of demands and claims into the system and its authoritative "outputs" or public policies.

Almond's "functionalism" and his reliance on the work of anthropologists, sociologists, and social-psychologists set him apart from the older institutionalist approaches in political science. I believe this was a fundamental split in the profession and led to quite a number of future conflicts, misunderstandings, and fundamental disputes over approaches between the "institutionalists" and the "culturalists."

But remember, Almond was not opposed to institutionalist explanations; he just thought that, especially in the developing areas where institutions did not work well or as expected, the researcher had to be more flexible in his choice of approaches. Instead of concentrating just on formal institutions, scholars of the emerging nations would have to look at more informal groups such as tribes, caste associations, ethnicities, family associations, patronage networks, and the like—all the elements to which cultural anthropology and sociology urged us to be alert. This is a perfectly reasonable position to take.

The Civic Culture

*The Civic Culture*³ was one of those breakthrough volumes in political science that only comes along once in a decade or more. From the beginning, it was heralded as a ground-breaking work, a classic of the comparative politics literature. The book

3 Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Boston, MA: Little Brown, 1963).

is credited not only with popularizing the political culture subfield but also, as the first truly comparative and systematic work in the field, making it scientifically respectable. The edition (1995) that I have in my home library indicates that, in its 25 years of existence, the book had already gone through fourteen reprintings; it has been reprinted several times since then. If there is a “best seller” list in political science, then this book is surely on it.

What made this book so interesting and important? First, it contained a very sophisticated theoretical statement about democracy and how it is created and sustained. Second, it focused on developing countries as well as developed ones. Third, and perhaps most important, it was based on comparative survey research data from five countries: Great Britain, the United States, Germany, Italy, and Mexico.

Over 1,000 in-depth interviews had been conducted in each of these five countries using a comparative framework and employing professional pollsters. This was perhaps the most breakthrough feature of the book. For, instead of writing “just another” national character study or even a comparative one, however impressionistic as Madariaga had done, now we had a scientific survey or as close to one as it is reasonably possible to get, *and* a wealth of data that could be used to analyze trends, processes, and tendencies rather than employing misleading and too-simple stereotypes.

Almond and Verba start off by saying the emerging world situation is one of increasing popular demands for involvement and participation. The emerging nations are currently (late 1950s) presented with two models of the modern participatory state: a democratic model and a totalitarian or Marxist-Leninist one. In order for democracy to prevail, they argue, nations need more than just the institutions of democracy. They also need a *political culture* of democracy.

What does this term, a “political culture of democracy,” mean? How do we define and measure that? The authors say that they are not just talking about institutions or the separation of powers, but about the attitudes and feelings commonly found in a democracy. And there we have our definition of political culture: the values, beliefs (including religious beliefs), orientations, and prevailing behavioral characteristics found in the political system.

The orientation, or political culture, of an individual can be measured systematically if we explore:

- The knowledge level of a person about his/her country (size, structure, location, etc.).
- The person’s knowledge of the structures, roles, and input processes of the system.
- The person’s knowledge of the downward or “output” flow of policy; who is affected, who is involved.
- How the person perceives him- or herself fitting into the system.
- The values, beliefs, orientations, etc. that are part of and go into the system.

Almond and Verba say that there are three types of political cultures:

1. A *parochial* political culture is one in which the individual is only dimly aware of the central government, plays no part in political decisions, and has no specialized political roles. Instead, politics, economics, and religion all merge into one. This is the most traditional or underdeveloped type of political system.
2. In a *subject* political culture, the individual is aware of his government, is oriented toward the *outputs* of the system, and may take pride in the country, but has no inputs or influence. The relationship is passive or one of authoritarian repression. Usually found in transitional societies.
3. In a *civic* culture, the individual is oriented toward both outputs and inputs, is aware of political issues and their effects, and takes a more active role in the political process, either by voting or other means.

Contrary to much of the development literature at the time (Rostow), these three types of political culture do not represent a series of stages, nor does one type definitively replace the other. Rather, in keeping with Almond's formulation in *The Politics of the Developing Areas*, all political systems are mixed and have overlapping political-culture features. But one may be further along toward the civic culture model than others. That is what we mean by a "tendency statement": i.e., country X *tends* toward a civic political culture while country Y *tends* to be parochial or subject. Note how far this is from the stereotyping of a national character study.

I am particularly interested in this three-part classification of political cultures, but Almond and Verba also have a policy goal in mind: they want to advance the cause of a civic or democratic political culture. By that they mean a pluralistic culture based on communications and persuasion, a culture that combines consensus and diversity, permits change but moderates it, is evolutionary (like Great Britain's) rather than revolutionary (like France). For a civic culture to be nurtured and grow, it must be internalized in the cognitions, feelings, ideas, and beliefs of its people.

Having explained the analytic and theoretical basis of their work, Almond and Verba next go on to examine the five countries that are part of their study. They examine in each the patterns of political awareness or cognition, popular attitudes toward government and politics, partisanship, political participation, political allegiance, citizen competence, and involvement in politics. These topics, combined, provide a picture of the civic culture of each nation seen from a comparative and cross-cultural perspective.

They then provide a profile of the individual countries involved. Great Britain comes out the highest on their list, with the strongest civic culture. Great Britain is followed closely by the United States, both with strong civil society and a rich and solidly democratic political culture. With Germany (only West Germany at that time) and Italy, the numbers drop off quite dramatically. Remember, this survey was done in the late '50s, before Germany was as wealthy and as solidly democratic as it is now. Then, Germany, with its long authoritarian tradition, was still somewhat ambivalent about democracy; the term used was "success

democrats”—i.e., Germans who supported democracy as long as Germany was prospering but who could still go in another direction if the economy faltered. German “civic culture” was thus still weak.

If German civic culture was thus still weak, Italy’s was even weaker, almost at Third World levels. Interestingly, these findings, based on survey results, reinforced the “national character” studies of Barzini, Banfield, and Dealy about the importance of parochial (family, clan, village, and region) and patronage values in Italian and, more generally, Southern European or “Mediterranean” politics. Almond and Verba’s findings similarly found low levels of trust or “civic culture” in Italian politics. They attributed this weak civic culture to Italy’s recent Fascist (Mussolini) past, the strength of its anti-system Communist Party which then could count on the support of fully one-third of the electorate, and Italy’s low socioeconomic ranking which then, in the ’50s, placed it at a low per-capita-income level.

If Italy’s civic culture was weak and, therefore, worrisome from a democratic perspective, Mexico, our next-door neighbor, the last country in their survey, was even more worrisome. Mexico was poor, Third World, and with a high illiteracy rate. Its political culture was more “parochial” and “subject” than “civic.” As many people were opposed to the system and viewed it negatively or as illegitimate as legitimate. If your policy concern is democratic stability, Mexico is a very worrisome case. And remember, among emerging or Third World countries, Mexico would rank at the upper end. Hence, if I were a policy official, I would be very worried about this Mexican data. It provides a formula for instability, upheaval, even revolution, not just in Mexico but throughout Latin America. I would not be surprised if this data helped provide the justification for the Alliance for Progress in Latin America as well as for the Agency for International Development (AID, the foreign aid agency), both founded during this period.

In their conclusion, Almond and Verba argue that democracy requires active citizens and a strong, participatory civic culture. Education, literacy, and socioeconomic development provide an opportunity for civic culture to grow. Social trust and cooperation are absolutely required for democracy. The Big Idea here is that democracy, if it is to be established, consolidated, and succeed, must have a strong foundation of civic culture. Without this foundation, any “mere” tinkering with institutional mechanisms (laws, constitutions, elections, and administrative structures) is unlikely to be successful. It is changes in the underlying political culture, toward the goal of a “civic culture,” that really count.

The Civic Culture was a pioneering work. It was pioneering for the following reasons:

- It contained a sophisticated discussion, so far the most detailed and sophisticated, of political culture.
- Its focus was socio-cultural and psychological: the orientation of people toward their political system.
- It involved a genuinely comparative study of five nations. It was not a single-nation “national character” study.

- It was grounded in data—over 5,000 persons from a multitude of backgrounds—rather than just the impressions of the observer.
- The book was empirically based and considered a scientific contribution, or at least as close to science as it is possible for political science and comparative politics to get.
- It took over five years to research and write; the argument and the book were very carefully stated.
- The book pioneered in tendency statements. It did not use stereotypes or overly simple national character traits. Rather, it used statistics and percentages. Thus, it could say something like, "In the absence of a strong civic culture, Mexico could possibly go in either an authoritarian (40 percent) or a democratic (40 percent) direction." Note how this avoids the deterministic national character stereotype of saying Mexico is either "democratic" or "authoritarian"; instead, it says Mexico could (a tendency) go either (40 percent each) toward democracy or authoritarianism. Fortunately, from my point of view, Mexico went toward democracy but, again, at the time (late '50s), that was not so clear.

Political Culture Studies in the '60s and '70s

The Civic Culture was a breakthrough volume. It could be, and was, criticized (see below) on a number of fronts, but everyone in the profession recognized that this was a pioneering work. Never again would political culture studies be the same. Now everyone recognized that, to be credible, political culture studies had to be truly analytic, comparative, careful, and, preferably, based on public opinion survey data. The old national character studies were out; serious political culture search was now in. It might not always be necessary to do the five-nation, very expensive, five-year study that Almond and Verba in *The Civic Culture* did, but you could no longer do the simplistic, often sloppy, single-nation, impressionistic kind of study either. There followed in the next decade a wealth of new, more sophisticated political-culture studies on a wide variety of nations and regions.

Political Culture and Political Development⁴

Leading this charge was the Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research Council (CCP/SSRC), of which Almond was now the chair. The CCP/SSRC was undoubtedly the most influential group of scholars in the comparative politics field during this period of the 1960s and early 1970s, maybe in all of political science. During these two decades, they published a series of books through the prestigious Princeton University Press that importantly shaped

4 Sidney Verba and Lucian Pye (eds), *Political Culture and Political Development* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965).

all aspects of the study of political development and the emerging nations. The series included such titles as *Bureaucracy and Political Development*, *Political Parties and Political Development*, *Communications and Political Development*, *Education and Political Development*, and so on.

And, of course, *Political Culture and Political Development* (1965). This superb book, edited by CCP/SSRC members Sidney Verba and Lucian Pye, was a follow-up to the earlier *Civic Culture*. Many members of the CCP/SSRC, which included many of the best minds in comparative politics, were committed in whole or in part to a political-culture approach.

Lucian Pye, who was born and grew up in China, had done more field work in East and Southeast Asia than anyone in comparative politics and, to my mind, was perhaps the most subtle and sophisticated of all the political-culture writers, wrote the Introduction. In it, Pye argued that political culture provides structure and meaning in the political sphere in the same manner that culture, in general, gives coherence and integration to social life. At the same time Pye said that all political cultures are mixed in varying degrees, and no society has only one or a completely unified political culture. Sometimes more, sometimes less, there is *always* division and contestation over political culture. So political culture has to be a dynamic factor, in that it is always undergoing change. Political culture *can* undergo dramatic transformation but usually it changes more slowly than do institutions. And Pye, like almost everyone else writing in the field during those years, considered political culture an independent variable, not subordinate to class, institutions, or other determinants.

There followed, going beyond the original five-nation civic culture study, chapters on Japan, Great Britain, Germany, Turkey, India, Italy, Mexico, Egypt, Soviet Russia. All these country chapters sought to use *both* interpretive *and* survey data, in keeping with the new requirements set forth in *The Civic Culture*. The contributors included were all the leading lights at the time on their respective countries, and among the leading scholars in comparative politics: Robert Ward, Richard Rose, Dankwart Rustow, Myron Weiner, Joseph LaPalombara, Robert Scott, Leonard Binder, and Frederick Barghoorn. Once again, as with *The Civic Culture*, it was a sophisticated, path-breaking book.

Sidney Verba, of *Civic Culture* fame, wrote the Conclusion. He not only provided comparative context but also returned to some of the main themes of *The Civic Culture*. That is, he first developed a comparative politics model for incorporating political culture into the equation. He looked at long-term history, recent development, the current political system, and then the current political culture and how older traditions interact with newer, modernizing ones. As for policy recommendations, Verba asked if one looks at how a country develops and what kind of political culture emerges, could one also formulate a plan to fashion a civic or democratic political culture? Indeed, in many but not all of these political culture studies, there was a normative basis to the research as well as a purely social science one: how to create, build, and support a more democratic and

participatory political culture. And who, especially at that time (pre-Vietnam, pre-Nixon, pre-Watergate, and pre-counter-culture), could argue with that?

The Transformation of Political Culture in Cuba⁵

In 1969 my friend, colleague, and near-contemporary, Richard Fagen, published what had been his doctoral dissertation on *The Transformation of Political Culture in Cuba*. While Richard and I are close to the same age, we are very far apart politically and ideologically: he is a Marxist and I am not. Now, this is interesting because usually Marxists are opposed to political-culture approaches; they tend to (note the tendency statement!) view political culture as part of the superstructure, dependent on underlying class structure, and, therefore, not worth studying. But Richard is different: in the case of the Cuban revolution, he recognized that political culture is an independent variable, and that changing Cuba's underlying political culture, along with its economics and politics, would be a key to the success of the entire revolution.

Like the Soviet Union which tried to create a new "Soviet man," the Cuban revolution attempted to fashion a new "Cuban man." In contrast to the older Cuban "capitalist" culture which was corrupt, often violent, grasping, acquisitive, elitist, racist, and not a little bit sleazy, the new "revolutionary" Cuban or "socialist man" would be honest, sharing, caring, egalitarian, decent, and humanitarian. In short, Fagen set out to discover how Cuba would radically alter its political culture, and all this to be accomplished almost literally overnight.

He begins by discussing Cuba's advantages in this respect: no unassimilated ethnic minorities, no indigenous peoples, no tribalism or rigid castes, no other languages besides Spanish, no unsettled boundaries or breakaway groups, and no sociocultural cleavages. And now it had a revolution that destroyed the old elite and elite culture, a charismatic leader in Fidel Castro, and a revolutionary regime that initially enjoyed national legitimacy. In seeking to change its political culture, therefore, Cuba had certain advantages over, let us say, the Soviet Union or Communist China.

Fagen then examines political socialization in Cuba. In the wake of the revolution and the exile of the old guard, Cuba was ripe for radical mobilization and accompanying culture transformation. Socialization would be revolutionary and all-encompassing, changing the entire value system of Cuba. This would be accomplished by massive propaganda, re-education of the entire population, and tight control of all information media including the entire school system. The old regime would be painted as unjust, immoral, anti-Cuban, and anti-revolution; it would have to be destroyed. The new "Cuban man," in addition to the traits above, would be trained to follow the dictates of the leaders, support the revolution, and endure willingly the sacrifices they would be called upon to make.

5 Richard Fagen, *The Transformation of Political Culture in Cuba* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1969).

Fagen quotes extensively from the political culture and civic culture literature discussed above, especially Sidney Verba. This is ironic because, while Fagen was a “true believer” in the revolutionary path, Verba was committed (*The Civic Culture*) to democratic outcomes. Using Verba’s own languages against him, Fagen says Cuba is dedicated to “transform both the cognitive and the overt behavior of Cuba’s citizens to a new way of life.” The new (socialist) political culture would form an interlocking system of political values and behaviors dedicated to radical change.

Fagen then examines the instruments of this new revolutionary transformation. He admits that changing an entire political culture is very hard but argues that attitudes, values, and beliefs can be shaped by participation in the new Cuban revolutionary institutions if given proper direction, social suggestion, and peer pressure. To form citizens for the “new Cuba” requires training in revolutionary participation. Thus, the Campaign against Illiteracy launched in 1961 was aimed not just at teaching literacy but at revolutionary indoctrination. The Committees for the Defense of the Revolution were founded in that same, early-1960s period, not just to defend the revolution but to socialize the Cuban people into the ideology of the revolution and, as neighborhood vigilante committees, to guard against backsliding. Similarly, the Schools of Revolutionary Instruction were used for training revolutionary cadres and, within the revolution, as a problem-solving agency.

But is this the way to transform a culture? The revolution in Cuba, according to Fagen, is a “massive attempt by the political elite to forge a new social order by *forming and reforming men* who will then worship new images, behave in new ways, and relate to one another in the context of new institutions.” However, (1) the regime never developed an ideological system that was elegant or complete; it consisted mainly of slogans and rationalizations for decisions already made. (2) It never developed a serious program for moving from the present to the future. (3) It never fully developed the institutions that would make the culture change outlined above possible. And (4) the regime woefully underestimated how difficult culture change is. Even now, five decades and three generations into the revolution, no one is sure if and how much Cuban political culture has really been changed, or if it is the same-old, same-old. After all, Cuba is still an Hispanic or *caudillaje* (Dealy) culture, and Fidel Castro may be a socialist man-on-horseback, but he is still a man-on-horseback.

The Political Content of Public Education in Spain⁶

Ironically, while Fagen was studying the *transformation* of political culture in Cuba, other scholars, including Fagen’s own student, Richard Nuccio, were studying the *continuity* of political culture in other countries.

6 Richard Nuccio, *The Political Content of Public Education in Spain* (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts, Program, in Latin American Studies Monograph Series, 1977).

Richard Nuccio was one of the best undergraduate students I'd ever had at the University of Massachusetts. I sent him out to Stanford to study Latin American politics in their program. But Rick did not like Stanford, the Stanford program, or his professors there. So he got his Master's degree at Stanford but then returned to UMass to finish his Ph.D.

Rick's doctoral dissertation, influenced by the then mushrooming literature on political culture, focused on the political content of public education in Spain under Franco. To that end, he traveled to and lived in Spain in 1972–73. In Spain, he carried out a systematic examination of Spanish public-school textbooks, interviewed teachers and school administrators, and was a participant observer in classrooms and school conferences. He was also one of the young scholars involved in Amando de Miguel's pioneering (the first ever carried out in Spain) public-opinion, political-culture surveys of Spanish attitudes and "Who Governs" ("Los Que Mandan") in Spain.

Not surprisingly, Rick found that the contents of Spanish public education reflected the Franco regime's own values, with its emphasis on order, discipline, authority, Catholicism, hierarchy, and knowing and accepting your station in life. These values fitted the Old Guard's vision of what Spain should be, but they were being inculcated in the schools at precisely the same time (the 1960s to early 1970s) that Spain was undergoing a massive cultural shift *away from* these values. To the extent that once Franco died in 1975, these hidden and long-suppressed values *exploded* into the public discourse and Spain became one of the freest, most progressive, most radical, most libertine countries in the world.

Both of these last studies, that of Fagen and that of Nuccio, raise the question of how much governments can actually change or affect political culture. In Cuba, 50 years after the revolution and despite the regime's strenuous efforts over three generations, no one is quite sure if very much really fundamental in Cuban political culture has changed. In Spain, despite the Franco regime's best efforts to hold back the tides of change, eventually modernization of a quite radical and social-democratic sort came to Spain anyhow. Can it be that culture is stronger than government's effort to change it, that culture cannot be imposed either from above or from the outside, that culture is, and again, an independent force that changes *gradually* over time, by *natural* causes, and resists official efforts to manipulate it? It is a big and important theme, with large policy implications, to which we return in the Conclusion.

Political Culture and Leadership in Soviet Russia⁷

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union was seen as so large and so important that it constituted a separate "area study" (like Latin America or the Middle East) into itself. At Columbia University, Harvard, and other major research universities,

7 Robert Tucker, *Political Culture and Leadership in Soviet Russia* (New York: Norton, 1987).

there were separate, interdisciplinary Russian or Soviet studies centers. And rather like these other area studies programs, it often took a while for new approaches in political science to penetrate these hallowed domains. Except that in the case of the Soviet Union, those who specialized in that “area study” often thought their country was so important that they did not have to learn the newer political science approaches or methodology. Such was the case with political culture studies as applied to the Soviet Union.

It took about 20 years, after the publication in 1963 of the path-breaking *The Civic Culture*, for political-culture studies to have an impact on the course of Soviet studies. Although there had been earlier studies of Russian culture and Soviet behavior, including the RAND study discussed in Chapter 4, the 1987 study by Robert Tucker is the first explicit, full-length study of Soviet political culture. Ironically, Tucker’s book came out only a year or two before the Soviet system began to collapse.

Tucker begins his book with a lament for the lack of political-culture studies on the Soviet Union. Part of the problem is the difficulty of doing serious research, let alone public opinion surveys, in the totalitarian Soviet system. Part of it is the totalitarian paradigm itself through which the Soviet Union was studied which ruled out culture or political culture as an autonomous variable.

The two analytical underpinnings of Tucker’s study are political culture and leadership. He defines political culture simply as a “society’s customary way of life” or as “everything in a culture that pertains to government and politics.” He builds upon both Almond’s analysis of political culture and, for comparative purposes, on Richard Fagen’s previously summarized study of the transformation of political culture in another revolutionary regime, Cuba.

Tucker recognizes he cannot do, à la Almond and Verba or Inglehart, public opinion surveys of political culture attitudes in the Soviet Union. Nor, because of Soviet totalitarianism or near-totalitarianism, is he permitted to carry out free, unbridled, independent research there. His answer is to do a form of historical-sociological-political investigation and analysis, but not employ empirical methods or scientific analysis. As applied to the Soviet system it produces rich interpretation, but it is doubtful if Tucker’s findings have any implications comparatively. Methodologically, it is a throwback to earlier, more traditional research techniques.

Tucker’s chapters also proceed historically beginning with the Russian Revolution of 1917, then Lenin, on to Stalin, the state socialism of Brezhnev, and finally Gorbachev’s failed efforts to change or reform the political culture. The result is an insightful book, well worth reading, by a senior scholar in the field. But not one that represents a breakthrough in the way some other studies surveyed here do.

Tucker produces a quite classical, traditional, but also rich analysis. It is way above most journalistic accounts of the Soviet Union and even farther ahead of the national character studies analyzed earlier. But it is not a path-breaking or breakthrough volume. Rather, it is like a number of other political-culture studies devoted to a single area: East Asia, Latin America, or the Arab Middle East. It

contains a wealth of information and analysis and it is a valuable contribution to the literature. Like much, still ongoing area studies literature, it offers a rich, textured, multilayered, multidisciplinary study. But, as a single case study with little pretension to methodological sophistication or comparative analysis, its contribution to political culture studies is limited.

The Politics of Cultural Pluralism⁸

Crawford Young's *The Politics of Cultural Pluralism*, even though it was published a decade before Tucker's book on the Soviet Union, was a breakthrough volume in ways that his was not. It was a breakthrough volume conceptually, theoretically, and in terms of mapping out a whole new way of understanding African politics; but it was not a pioneering volume methodologically in the same way *The Civic Culture* was. Therefore, we do not consider it quite in the class of *The Civic Culture* but neither is it a part of the later Renaissance of political culture described in Chapter 7. Instead, it is an especially important area studies book but with comparative implications that go beyond the Africa area.

Young begins with the argument of the continuing importance of culture, identity, and ethnicity in post-independence Africa—but not "tribe." Neither the colonial powers which drew the boundary lines across Africa nor the post-independence nation-states which reflected these old colonial lines paid much attention to ethnicity or local culture, after dividing these identify groups across national boundaries or including several of them incompatibly in one nation-state. But Young wants to argue that these ethnic or culture groups are at the heart of African politics. He, like most African leaders and scholars, rejects the tribal designation because of its racist and biased ("traditional," "backward," "primitive," "uncivilized") overtones.

During their independence struggles and the early post-independence period, most African leaders believed that tribal loyalties would disappear. Nationalism was the rallying cry; Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana's first president, exemplified this in his famous paraphrase of the *Bible*, "Seek ye first the political kingdom," by which he meant independence. And equally famous Sekou Toure, Guinea's first president, declared optimistically at the time of independence, "In three or four years, no one will remember the tribal, ethnic, or religious rivalries which, in the recent past, caused so much damage to our country and its population." In short, anti-colonialism and nationalism would eclipse the divisive effects of distinct cultural groups and the strong influence of powerful ethnic and tribal groups.

Young begs to differ. Writing some fifteen years after those great independence movements, he argues that the power of ethnicity, identity, and local culture groups has not diminished. If anything, it has increased. These groups need to be brought into the bureaucracy, given government jobs and contracts, and balanced

8 Crawford Young, *The Politics of Cultural Pluralism* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1976).

off within the cabinet. Elections, when there are elections, consist of coalitions of ethnic groups; political parties are often fronts for the distinct ethnicities. Rather than disappearing as modernization proceeds, the traditional ethnicities have reasserted themselves, themselves modernized in the process, and carried out police functions or delivered social services at the local level. "Tribe" or "ethnicity" in Young's analysis are like caste in India, not being swept away under the impact of change but themselves changing under new pressures.⁹

Young makes a major contribution to political culture theory and methodology. Going beyond Almond's initial work, Young argues that culture is dynamic, that it is constantly undergoing change, and that its main features and boundaries are fluid rather than static. Going further, he argues that the definition of culture is related to power politics and elite rule, that it is as often imposed from above as bubbling up from the grass roots below, that it is manipulated for partisan or class purposes. Wow, that makes culture and specifically political culture a dependent variable as well as an independent one. In formulating this idea of culture and cultural pluralism, Young's work is parallel to that of Benedict Anderson on nationalism—similarly seen as a negotiable item, dependent on constant redefinition, and the product of changing elite rule and power politics.¹⁰

Young goes on to say that cultural beliefs are influenced by a variety of factors including race, religion, ethnicity, class, region, and colonial background. Cultural values are not only found in this matrix of influences, they are also negotiated and renegotiated on an everyday basis. Culture thus acquires not only a dynamic dimension but also a profoundly political one. Culture is not fixed or static but is itself part of the political process and of the give-and-take that goes with politics. Young, hence, puts *change* and *process* at the heart of his conception of political culture.

In this book, Young makes a real breakthrough in political culture studies, one that has not received the attention it deserves, in large part because his focus is Africa which limits his readership. First, in his conception of cultural pluralism, Young goes considerably beyond the work of Almond, Verba, and others who saw political culture in more monolithic terms. Second, his analysis of culture and culture change as part of the political process and shaped by all the myriad influences that shape political outcomes gives us a more complex and dynamic picture of political culture. And third, Young's focus on the role of tribe or ethnicity in Africa, parallel to the work of Lloyd and Susan Rudolph on caste in India, gives us both a non-Western perspective *and* the realization that tribe and caste are not just "traditional" institutions but themselves have the capacity to change and modernize.

9 Lloyd Rudolph and Suzanne Rudolph, *The Modernity of Tradition* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1967).

10 Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (London: Verso, 1991).

Latin America: The Distinct Tradition¹¹

How can I write objectively about my own work? The answer is, let's face it, I can't! But allow me to at least explain what I, often dubbed as a "political culture guy," *tried* to do in my work. I'll leave it up to others to say how successfully this was done.

I grew up as a graduate student in the 1960s. I was armed with the writings of Almond, Rostow, S.M. Lipset, and all the development literature of that decade. But when I went out into the Third World to write my doctoral dissertation on Latin America, I found that little of this literature applied in the countries I was interested in researching. Instead of genuine "development" and an emerging "civic culture" of democracy, I found revolution, incredible poverty, *coups d'état*, rapacious elites, violence, democratic overthrows, authoritarian regimes, repression, widespread human rights violations, and the like. In short, not much "development" or "democracy" or "civic culture." Furthermore, my findings were based on tough, often difficult and dangerous fieldwork, not armchair theorizing as was true of some of the CCP/ACLS group. I also employed interviews, though I must admit that, as a young graduate student, my interviewing techniques were not up to *Civic Culture* standards.

While my original doctoral thesis was concentrated on a single country, it already included research and field work based on study in nine others; and within a year of completing that work, I'd also done field work and interviewing in seven more countries, bringing the total to sixteen. By that point I'd begun to see a pattern in all the upheaval and violence outlined above. That pattern did not lead directly, inevitably, or universally to democracy and pluralism as the political development literature suggested. Instead, it led me to a model based on corporatism, organic-state theory, patrimonialism, and elite and top-down rule. Interestingly, I found these features in regimes of the left and regimes of the right, in military regimes as well as civilian ones. This cannot be mere coincidence, I reasoned. I christened my formulation "the corporatist model." It was very controversial when it first was published because it contradicted so much of the prevailing political development literature. Eventually, I sought to fashion an entirely new conceptual framework or paradigm for Latin American studies.

The first iteration of the corporative model came in 1969 at Ohio State University's Mershon Center; the second was in a monograph on the Brazilian labor movement published in 1969; the third was a paper and presentation at the American Political Science Association in 1972; and the fourth came when an article based on the model was published in *World Politics* in 1973.¹² A year

11 Howard J. Wiarda, *Latin America: The Distinct Tradition* (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 1974; four subsequent editions by commercial publishers).

12 Howard J. Wiarda, "Toward a Framework for the Study of Political Change in the Iberic-Latin Tradition: The Corporative Model," *World Politics*, XXV (January 1973), 206–35.

later, in 1974, these ideas were presented in book form in which, under the title, “Politics and Social Change in Latin America: The Distinct Tradition,” I included the leading essays on Latin American political culture as well as my own ideas.¹³ In the following years I published several articles on corporatism in Latin America, a book in Portuguese *O Modelo Corporativo*, and then a book-length collection of my own earlier essays entitled *Corporatism and Development in Latin America* (1981).¹⁴ I then went on to other research projects but 20 years later I returned to these themes in a book published by Yale University Press, *The Soul of Latin America*,¹⁵ and an edited volume, *Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America—Revisited*.¹⁶

That’s the bibliography, now for the argument. In this series of writings, I argued that Latin America had a unique history, tradition, sociology, and political culture, very different from that of the United States, Western Europe, or other developing areas. That tradition went back to Spanish and Portuguese colonial rule and the quasi-feudal medieval-Catholic (remember Glen Dealy’s *Public Man*) institutions they established in the Americas. That colonial past helps explain why I included Spain and Portugal in the model as well as Latin America. The model I presented was of a pre-capitalist, two-class, authoritarian, hierarchical, Catholic or “*caudillaje*,” and *corporatist* political culture. This culture was not just unique but it was also long-lasting, born in the sixteenth century and continuing in modified form to today. The corporatist model was presented as an alternative to both Almond-Rostow developmentalism *and* to the overly simplistic Marxian categories, then present in emerging “dependency theory.” My model, I thought, explained the nature of Latin American politics and underdevelopment better than these other two; it also explained why Latin America had such a hard time establishing and consolidating democracy.

The model was based on archival research, interviewing, and participant observation—the classic cultural-anthropology methodologies. While the interviewing was in-depth, it was not Almond-and-Verba style survey research. That left the argument open to the charge, which I disputed, that it was “too impressionistic.” Marxists, who are a strong force in the Latin American Studies Association, did not like it either because the model presented an alternative to the Marxist view, and US policy-makers of the “developmentalist” school found it objectionable because it did not lead inevitably to democracy. The model took flack from all sides

The “Corporatist Model” was part of a larger comparative work on Latin America and Southern Europe. My goal *overall* was to understand these

13 Wiarda, *Latin America: The Distinct Tradition*.

14 Wiarda, *Corporatism and Development in Latin America* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1981).

15 Wiarda, *The Soul of Latin America* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001).

16 Wiarda (ed.), *Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America—Revisited* (Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press, 2004).

societies on their own terms, through their own lenses, rather than imposing the framework of American social science upon them. In Max Weber's term, mine was a *verstehen* approach, a sympathetic and empathetic view aimed at getting inside a society and seeing it from the inside out rather than the other way around. Corporatism, political culture, and the approach of state-society relations were all part of this overall methodology. Essentially, I was following the approach laid out earlier by cultural anthropology and adopted by comparative politics for the study of developing areas: learn the language, study abroad, do the fieldwork, be empathetic, do interviews, employ some degree of cultural relativism, be analytic, comparative, and as rigorous as you can. To which, I would now add the need to do scientific, public opinion, survey research as in *The Civic Culture*.

The corporatist model was quite consciously a political-cultural, better a socio-cultural, approach. It was in the tradition, in political science, of Banfield, Almond, Verba, and Pye. Close readers of my work will know that it was also grounded in history, political economy, political sociology, legal studies, and religious studies; but "political culture" was the label that stuck.

The *Corporatist Model* attracted widespread attention and was widely discussed in the fields of Latin American and comparative politics. Later, the corporatist model took on even broader importance in the writings of Martin Heisler,¹⁷ Philippe Schmitter,¹⁸ and others as a truly global model, shaped by but also irrespective of culture. In other words, there could be European, Asian, Middle Eastern, African, and even United States, as well as Latin American versions of the model. And over the next 40 years the corporatist approach, even though still controversial, came to be widely accepted in the discipline.

The Civic Culture Revisited

The Civic Culture (1963) was a pioneering book. Everyone recognized that fact. Utilizing sophisticated theory, a sophisticated methodology, and advanced survey research techniques, the authors, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, wrote a path-breaking and innovative book. Particularly relevant for our discussion here is how they went *way beyond* the older national character literature, with all its manifest flaws, to write a scientific, empirical book, based on percentages and tendency statements, rather than the older nonscientific and impressionistic accounts.

While it was pioneering, the book also had its flaws, as its enemies were quick to point out. The sample size (1,000–1,200 for each country) was probably too small for such five large countries; urban areas were over-represented in the sample; and lower-class persons—workers, peasants—were under-represented. In addition, political scientist Philip Converse complained that the book's theoretical aspirations (global democracy and democratization) outran the empirical materials (only five

17 Martin Heisler (ed.), *Politics in Europe* (New York: McKay, 1974).

18 Philippe Schmitter and Gerhard Lehmbruck (eds), *Trends toward Corporatist Intermediation* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1979).

countries) available. He also complained of too many questions left unanswered. Nevertheless, he found it an “awesome accomplishment” in objectifying cultural differences in a systematic way. He called it a “contemporary classic.”¹⁹

Sociologist Robert Alford weighed in with a stronger critique. He acknowledged the achievements of the book but also pointed out its defects. These included little focus on the structural/historical features of the countries under examination, theoretical statements that were overly abstract, and over-generalization from too few cases. Professor Alford also asked, what happens if the civic culture becomes unbalanced and other options (authoritarianism, breakdown, and failed state) become possible.²⁰

Marxist critics were especially vituperative. Jerzy Wiatr criticized the book for its limited ideological content, its ignoring of the historical and structural roots of democratization, its over-simplifications, and its overall orientation toward the status quo.²¹ Carol Pateman was angry that the word “democracy” was never clearly defined and that the authors engaged in a circular, tautological argument.²² Both authors faulted the book for its lack of emphasis on economic, class, and conflict issues.

One of the strongest criticisms came from Edward Muller and Mitchell Seligson, who had their own, and alternative, democracy/civic culture data base.²³ Their data showed (1) that economic development enhances the viability of democratic institutions, (2) that multiple years of stable democracy produce high levels of civic culture, and (3) that a composite of civic culture indicators had no significant effect on the level of democracy. Therefore, they argued, Almond and Verba had gotten cause-and-effect wrong: it could be that long years of democracy (the US or Great Britain) produces a civic culture rather than the opposite, that civic culture is necessary for democracy.

The *Civic Culture Revisited*²⁴ is not just a new, revised, updated version of the first edition; its structure really makes it a new book. First, after a long introduction by Almond on the history of the civic culture concept, it includes contributions by some of the first edition’s foremost critics—Wiatr, Pateman, et al. Second, it does not present a new, updated, more scientific, public opinion survey. Instead, third, it invites country experts to submit a chapter on their own country of expertise, further critiquing the original version and offering new insights on the original five

19 Philip Converse, Review of *The Civic Culture* in *Political Science Quarterly*, 79, No. 4 (December 1964).

20 Robert Alford, Review of *The Civic Culture* in *American Sociological Review* (October 1964).

21 Jerzy Wiatr, Review of *The Civic Culture* in *Social Science Information*, 4, No. 2 (1965), 220–23.

22 Carole Pateman, “Political Culture, Political Structure and Political Change,” *British Journal of Political Science*, 1 (3), (1971), 291–305.

23 Edward Muller and Mitchell Seligson, “Civic Culture and Democracy: The Question of Causal Relationships,” *American Political Science Review*, (1994).

24 Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture Revisited* (Boston, MA: Little Brown, 1980).

countries. In these country chapters, it is interesting, after assassinations, Vietnam, Watergate, and economic recession, how much the civic culture of both the United States and Great Britain is under stress and has declined. In contrast, with stability and prosperity, German civic culture has increased. At the end, Verba offers a defense of the study saying that, while the study had flaws, its overall approach was basically sound.

Civic Culture Revisited is, to my mind, a disappointing book. It has none of the excitement, the innovative theoretical foundations, the fresh and sophisticated public opinion survey data, or the bold claims of the original book. Its tone is defensive rather than positive and optimistic. While Almond is vigorous in upholding his earlier positions, junior co-author, Verba, offers a rather lame defense.

To my mind, however, the authors of the original, pioneering, *Civic Culture* work have little reason to feel defensive. Of course, the book had flaws, both philosophical and methodological; we all recognized that—the small sample size, the fact it was not fully representative, etc.—right from the beginning. Probably we did not need 20 years later a second and very different edition to remind us of these limitations.

Nevertheless, *Civic Culture* was and *is* a breakthrough volume. Despite its flaws, it remains a fresh, innovative, and pioneering volume. Its discussions of democracy and how best to achieve it are among the most sophisticated ever written. For our purpose here, however, the most innovative breakthrough is the comparative survey data and the way it is used to study political culture. From now on, "mere," impressionistic, national character studies will no longer do. If you are going to study political culture, you had better do it carefully, analytically, systematically, and scientifically. Assertions of opinion are not enough—and can be downright dangerous. So if you "do" political culture, you'd better be very careful. And you need to be prepared to back up your assertions with solid survey data. That is the true contribution of *The Civic Culture*: that it changed the entire way that we study political culture, no longer sloppily, unsystematically, impressionistically, and unscientifically, but now carefully, systematically, scientifically, and, if at all possible, backed up by solid survey data.

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Chapter 6

Criticisms of the Political Culture Approach

Political culture is not without its critics; indeed, they are many. Understand, we are here not talking just about critics of one book, *The Civic Culture*, as in the previous chapter, but about a general and often quite fierce and sometimes mean-spirited critique of the entire political-culture approach. Some of these critics want to do away not only with the whole approach but also, I fear, with those who utilize it.

Of course, there are good and valid criticisms that one can make of the political culture approach; we consider them all in the pages that follow. But something else is going on here, something almost primordial, which remains a bit of a mystery to me. For some of these criticisms seem to be deeply emotional, almost psychological, in the fervor with which they are presented. They seem to bare in some writers their inner soul. As such, they sometimes reveal more about the critics than about the subject of their criticism.

In this chapter, we go through all the criticisms I can find or think of regarding political-culture approaches. We examine all of them closely, as fairly as we can, and weigh them in the balance. Some of the criticisms we will find to be valid; others, less so; still others, not at all. At the end, we will want to assess political culture and see, after all the criticisms (1) what the fuss is all about, and (2) what is left of that approach. In that process, we will also try to explore those deep psychological impulses, if that is what it is, that are mentioned in the previous paragraph that seem to drive some of the critics to distraction.

General Comments and Speculations

Why is it that political culture approaches come in for so much criticism? Why is it that some scholars become almost apoplectic when culture and culture variables are mentioned? I do not have any final answers to these questions but I do have some ideas. Herewith, then, are my ideas and speculations on these issues; comments from readers are invited.

1. *The Times*. The 1950s and early 1960s, from Dwight Eisenhower, through John F. Kennedy and the New Frontier, to Lyndon Johnson and the Great Society, were a time of prosperity, peaceful change, and remarkable consensus in American society and politics. In that hopeful, optimistic time, it was simply assumed that America would lead the world, a role model for others to emulate, as the

development literature (Rostow,¹ Lipset,² Almond,³ et al.) proclaimed. Political culture studies, especially Almond and Verba's pioneering *The Civic Culture*,⁴ were part and parcel of this hopeful, optimistic time, closely linked to the development literature and the belief in inevitable democratic progress. Think of the Peace Corps, the Alliance for Progress, and the Agency for International Development (AID), and all they represented: the effort to bring the American democratic and pluralist model, the best of America, to relieve the poverty and suffering—and, not coincidentally, to serve American foreign policy goals—in the Third World.

But then, beginning in 1965 with the Dominican Republic intervention and then with Vietnam, that would all come crashing down. The assassination of John F. Kennedy, Robert Kennedy, and Martin Luther King, then the burning of Detroit and Los Angeles, the bombing of Cambodia, Nixon, and Watergate—all contributed to the disillusionment with American institutions and the main approaches to studying them. Political development and political culture studies were part of “the establishment”; therefore, they and other models and institutions associated with that older world had to go. And indeed, this is precisely the period when political culture studies began to be criticized and when that approach began a two-decades-long decline.

2. *Fad and Fashion.* Academic fads and prevailing paradigms tend to change over time and go through cycles, not altogether differently than do styles in clothes or automobiles. They go in and out of fashion. The point is not unrelated to the first one: during the 1960s, political culture studies were “in”; by the 1970s, they seemed tired, old-fashioned, and passé. A decade later, as we see in the next chapter, they would stage a comeback, a political-culture “renaissance.”

3. *Radicalization of University Faculties and the General Culture.* It was not just Vietnam that caused a radical change in American society, although that was a big part of it. It was also, as indicated, the assassinations, the Vietnam war, and the protest movements it spawned, the Nixon era, Watergate, Woodstock and sexual liberation, the failures of both the Alliance for Progress and the Great Society. At the time, everything and all institutions seemed to be falling apart. The country polarized; for the first time we had a serious radical movement.

The radicals became ensconced in, and in some cases took over, our universities, departments, faculties, some think tanks, the media, book publishing, the foundations, Hollywood, the music industry, and other areas of the culture. The slow, evolutionary route of democratic politics and of building a consensus-

1 W.W. Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960).

2 S.M. Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy,” *American Political Science Review* (March 1958), 69–105.

3 Gabriel A. Almond (ed.), *Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1960).

4 Almond and Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963).

based civic culture gave way to division, polarization, and demands for a radical and immediate restructuring of the society. Political culture studies were now out; radical, feminist, Marxist, and Third World studies were now in. In this context, political culture studies languished or were not done at all.

I still hear echoes of this radical sentiment today. Despite the fact that the culture has again turned, many of the 1970s radicals, the beneficiaries of earlier tenure decisions, are still ensconced in our universities and other cultural institutions. In department meetings, on thesis and dissertation committees, and in general faculty meetings, the old radical and Marxist critiques of political culture are still present. They are not expressed so often—probably they’ve forgotten the arguments—but there remains this vague, mostly amorphous, but nevertheless still-present hostility to even talking about political culture. The legacy of the 1970s counter-culture is still with us.

4. *The Legacy of the Holocaust.* Not all the fears about political-culture studies are without foundation. After all, look what happened in the 1930s and 1940s as a result of stereotyping of peoples and races: millions of persons, Jews, gypsies, homosexuals, minorities, and other “undesirables” were killed, murdered, and persecuted in the most brutal ways. I have been to Dachau, the Warsaw Ghetto, Auschwitz, and the Jewish Museum in Washington; I have seen the images of the gas chambers, the torture chambers, and the murder fields up close.⁵

My own belief is that those times and practices are mainly behind us. I do not see in the immediate future a major genocide anywhere comparable to the earlier Nazi experience. Nevertheless, I can see how some people, still traumatized by the Nazi experience or fearful that it might be repeated, are frightened of political-culture studies and of anything that even hints of national or ethnic stereotyping. I myself do not share those fears, either of a revival of the Nazi atrocities or of the dangers of political-culture studies; but I can understand and sympathize with those who take a contrary viewpoint. I respect their position.

5. *Cultural Relativism.* By the mid-twentieth century and after, the world, or at least the enlightened parts of it, was both more tolerant and more culturally relativistic. Anthropology led the way in refusing to make moral judgments about other cultures and peoples; political science, including political-culture studies, followed. It was no longer acceptable to refer to other peoples and societies as “uncivilized,” “barbaric,” or “primitive.” Comparative politics sought to get around these prohibitions by using such terms as “developing areas,” “emerging nations,” or “Third World,” but these euphemisms also carried pejorative overtones that many found unacceptable.

Disinclined any longer to say negative things about other cultures or peoples, let alone to rank them on some simplistic continuum from “developing” to

5 Dieter Kuntz (ed.), *Deadly Medicine: Creating the Master Race* (Washington, DC: United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2004); Mark Langert, *Breeding Contempt: The History of Coerced Sterilization in the United States* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2008).

“developed” or from “traditional” to “modern,” cultural anthropologists as well as other social scientists took a more neutral or value-free perspective. Rather than ranking cultures, they argued for value neutrality and the belief that every culture has value for the society in which it is embedded. Every nation finds its way to the culture that is right for it. Moreover, political correctness (PC) and a value-free multiculturalism rule out our evaluating, assessing, or moral or political value judgments about other cultures.

I am not opposed to this more relativistic perspective, particularly as the earlier literature often downplayed or denigrated cultures other than our own. And I am obviously not opposed to multiculturalism; after all, that’s what I have been teaching and writing about for close to 50 years. However, I do believe one can carry the political correctness to absurd extremes. Moreover, I am not completely value-neutral on these matters; as we see later in the discussion, some cultures are more successful at democracy, development, and social modernization than others. And my values lead me to support those kinds of political cultures.

5. *Racism.* Cultural anthropology went through this debate about culture and race 100 years ago. Not much has changed since that time, except now people are more sensitive to the issue. Race and culture are two very different things.

Franz Boas, Ruth Benedict, Margaret Mead, and all the early anthropologists were vigorously opposed to racism, to racial stereotypes, and to racial prejudice in all their manifestations. Boas especially, as a German-born Jew, took early, very public, and sometimes, in the context of the early twentieth century, dangerous stands against Jim Crow laws, segregation, racism, the Nazi regime, and the Holocaust. Neither he nor any other responsible cultural anthropologist mixed up or conflated race with culture. Race has to do with skin color and physical features; culture, with ingrained beliefs, values, and attitudes. Race is permanent, a mark; but culture is malleable; it changes over time; people can transfer from one culture to another.

It is sometimes hard for us to imagine today the forces against which Boas had to struggle in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It was not just the social Darwinists, the eugenicists, and the racists but also such leading lights as Marx and Freud who struggled with the question, often infused with racial overtones, of which cultures were “primitive” and which were “civilized.” Remember, colonialism and imperialism were at their height during this period as was racial segregation. But Boas and the other early cultural anthropologists argued for greater tolerance of other forms of civilization, for cultural relativism, that we should look on other races with greater sympathy and an understanding of their contributions to progress. He said that “*all* races are capable of advancing the interests of mankind if we are only willing to give them the opportunity.”⁶

Boas, from his studies, believed the differences between the races were not immutable and could be bridged. He often expressed his abhorrence of racism and racial inequality. Using statistical methods, he demonstrated, contrary to the social Darwinists, that differences among cultures and races were social,

6 Franz Boas, *Anthropology and Modern Life* (New York: Norton, 1929).

not genetic. Indeed, he took pains to show where the social Darwinists and their evolutionary theories of race and culture were wrong. It is *context* and *culture* that count, he insisted, not race. Boas and other cultural anthropologists should thus be considered heroic figures in the fight against racism. It is, in fact, shameful that some, even modern commentators, still confuse the distinction between race and culture or, cowardly, stay away from the issue altogether.

The problem was, and may still be so, that responsible cultural-anthropology studies got mixed up or confused with the claims of the irresponsible eugenics or social Darwinist movements. There *were* writers of 100 years ago and more, in the wake of Darwin's evolutionary findings, who put all societies on an evolutionary scale, with the darker races *and cultures* at the bottom and the white races and cultures at the top. If one believed that, one can imagine the horrendous consequences that might follow: not just racial prejudice but also sterilization of the darker races, laboratory experimentation on those deemed lower on the evolutionary chart, eugenics laws to eliminate or marginalize entire races and ethnicities, and so on. In fact, there are sufficient cases of these kinds of experiments actually carried out in the past as to be extremely worrisome. Perhaps that helps explain part of the latent hostility to culture studies mentioned earlier.

I myself do not believe there are sufficient grounds today for worry, excessively, over these issues, over the possibility that the evil practices of the past will come back. But then, as a white American, I am not one of the groups likely to be targeted by such practices. If I were, and especially since we know there are a lot of dumb, racist people still around, I would be worried about the issue as well.

The problem for political-culture studies is that these same people still often conflate and confuse race and culture. They may, for example, look at the poverty and disease in Sub-Saharan Africa and say that their poverty is a result of the fact that these are majority-black countries. Or that Detroit is ground down because it is a majority-black city. Educated people do not give credence to these ancient racist myths anymore. But there are still enough of the uneducated kind that, even in contemporary times, racism and racist views and prejudices still need to be combated.

In fact, race and culture, we insist, are two very different ingredients. If I write about South Africa, for example, I must consider the *whole* of South African political culture, both black and white. The same for the United States: American political culture includes white, black, and now Hispanic and other strains, and all of these must be accommodated within a single political-cultural explanation. Of course, in many societies there may also be a majority and a minority political culture or two political cultures side by side. Belgium, for example, has a northern or Flemish political culture and a southern or Walloon one, but this has nothing to do with race.

Culture and race are two quite different things. To talk or write about culture has nothing to do with race. They should not be confused, conflated, or mixed up together. Culture is one thing; race is another. Culture has to do with values, beliefs, and behavioral patterns, while race refers only to skin color or perhaps physical attributes. Ernie Ells, the white golfer, is as much a part of South African political culture as is former president, Nelson Mandela, who is black. They have

different skin color but they share in South African culture. Stereotypes about race and culture have no place here.

Perhaps we have said enough on this issue. In my mind, I see clearly the distinction between race and culture and the dangers of confusing or conflating the two. But I can also see how the two can be mixed up together. Plus, we are now more sensitive about these issues and quicker to react. There is, in sum, enough confusion and danger here that I can see, just as we did with those who worry about a new Holocaust, that in studying political culture one needs to exercise great care and caution to avoid stereotypes, racial profiling, and downright racial or ethnic prejudice. On the other hand, being sensitive to the issues and dangers does not mean we must rule out political-culture studies altogether just because of the dangers of offending some sensitivities. On the contrary, this means we need more political-culture studies, not fewer.

General Criticisms

In this section we deal with some of the general criticisms of political culture. In subsequent sections, we treat of ideological and methodological critiques of this approach, as well as the criticisms that seem to me to have greater validity.⁷

In reviewing this literature or in listening to my colleagues, I am continuously struck by how often the criticisms of political culture are off the mark. They seem to be caught in a time warp, or in ideological or methodological battles that, to my mind, were settled decades ago. Yet the issues keep coming up and in a form that forces us to revisit what seem like ancient controversies. It seems, in some of these disputes, as if the Holocaust were still occurring, Jim Crow segregation was still being practiced, and ethnic and racial stereotypes were still being widely used.

I have come to believe that many scholars formed their opinion of political culture studies a half-century ago, or they were trained by professors from that earlier era. They believe we are still doing old-fashioned, national-character studies. Perhaps they never read, or have forgotten, the breakthrough *Civic Culture* volume of Almond and Verba and the advances in political culture studies since then. They often seem unaware of the newer public opinion survey research that is now used widely to study political culture, the statistical data that provide a wealth of new information, the use of tendency statements instead of national stereotypes, the statistical correlations that can be done, and the regression analysis. Instead, we seem always to be fighting the same old stale wars all over again, as if some of these issues had not been settled long ago. Nevertheless, since many people,

7 Critiques of the political-culture literature include Carol Pateman, "Political Culture, Political Studies, and Political Change," *British Journal of Political Science*, 1(3), (1971), 291–305; Jerzy Wiatr, "The Civic Culture from a Marxist Sociological Perspective," in Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba (eds), *The Civic Culture—Revisited* (Boston, MA: Little Brown, 1990), 103–23.

even scholars, tend to hold these views, we must deal honestly and realistically with the issues.

1. *Too vague.* The first criticism usually expressed of political culture is that it is too vague. People want to know what this new and vague concept—political culture—means. My own view is that this criticism dates back to the old national character studies and the inability of journalists like Barzini or Madariaga to be very precise about what, exactly, they were writing about.

In fact, if one peruses the literature, one finds that political culture, beginning with Almond, has been defined quite rigorously. Political culture, we have said here more than once, seeks to measure the underlying values, beliefs, orientations, and political behavior of a society. In addition, quite rigorous methodologies—interviewing, participant observation, and field work, on the one hand, and opinion surveys, correlations, and regression, on the other—have been worked out to measure political culture. Look not just at the sophisticated, albeit 50-year-old analysis in *The Civic Culture* but, as we see in the next chapter, the more recent political culture studies of Robert Putnam, Ronald Inglehart, Samuel P. Huntington, Francis Fukuyama, and David Landes. These sophisticated studies are widely recognized as not only the best of the political-culture literature but also among the best studies in political science and all the social sciences.

I do not believe the vagueness charge has much validity, certainly not among today's careful scholars of political culture. It may have had some resonance once, during the period of national-character studies, but certainly not since *The Civic Culture*. Of course, you always need to keep improving your definitional precision as well as your measures, but "vagueness" is no longer a charge that recent political culture studies need to respond to.

2. *Impressionistic.* The charge is often leveled against political culture studies that they are "impressionistic." That is, that they are unscientific and based merely on the *impressions* of the writer.

Well, first of all, this is a charge that once again goes back to the old national-culture studies. These earlier studies were often written by journalists, such as Barzini or Madariaga. *Of course*, they are impressionistic. And no one should apologize for that: that is what journalists do—they give us a *first draft* of history. It is not "scientific" but it is often insightful. To the extent these insights are useful to us, we should, with care, utilize them in our studies.

Second, I do not think scholars should apologize when they, sometimes and in the right circumstances, use the kind of data here termed "impressionistic." For example, I am trained in ethnography, participant observation, and in-depth interviews—all the methodologies used first by the cultural anthropologists surveyed in Chapter 3. Moreover, I am a *trained* observer and have been doing this for about 50 years. I think I know what to look for, what to ask, and how to sort out and use any and all available data. In this endeavor, I employ all kinds of data: newspapers, books, reports, impressions, interviews, and statistics. In my mind, scholars need to utilize whatever data helps them answer the questions they are researching, rather than

allowing only a single, narrow methodology to dictate what you should research. That is allowing the methodology tail to wag the substantive dog.

Third, most political culture studies now use survey data to research their findings. Or a combination of survey research *and* more traditional techniques. Take another look at the *Civic Culture* study already examined or Inglehart's World Values Survey. Or the work of Banfield, Robert Putnam, Huntington, Landes, Francis Fukuyama, Harry Eckstein, or Adam Wildavsky. All of these use the combined techniques of interviews, participant observation, and the careful, analytic testing of hypotheses to reach their conclusions. These kinds of studies seem to me to be as good and about as "scientific" as it is possible for political science to get. And certainly the results of the studies mentioned, as everyone would have to admit, are very impressive; these are among the best and most cited studies in all of political science.

3. *Unsystematic*. Political culture studies are often seen as "unsystematic," not very rigorous, or "unscientific." Here again, the charge goes back to the 1950s or even earlier and to the journalistic or national-character studies of that time. *Of course*, these studies were unsystematic and unscientific; they were written by journalists, and journalists are not trained as social scientists. Nor should they be.

I have two initial responses to this charge. First, we should not be dismissive of journalistic accounts. They often offer key insights that political scientists may miss or from which we can learn. Think of the fine books by Hedrick Smith on Russia or Alan Riding on Mexico. These are among the best books ever written on these countries. We should not be dismissive of them.

Second, political culture studies since these earlier times have come a very long way. Think again of the breakthrough *Civic Culture* volume reviewed in the previous chapter or the pioneering "World Values Surveys" considered in the next chapter. Both of these are marvelous studies, and world-class. Of course, they also have some methodological flaws. But no one would say they are unsystematic, not rigorous, or unscientific. In fact, these are about as good studies as it is possible for political science or comparative politics to do.

Now what about those political scientists who continue, in the classroom or in their writing, to use political culture in a sloppy, unsystematic way? Well, there's not much I can do about that. And probably more of us are guilty of these slips than we'd like to admit. Most of us, and not just tourists and journalists, use a phrase, a sentence, or a remark from time to time that implies national stereotypes, simplistic explanations, or sloppy, lazy thinking. I am myself guilty of sometimes taking these shortcuts, forgetting to use tendency statements, or omitting the proper qualifiers. But we all know that, since Almond and Verba, we need to be as systematic, as rigorous, as analytic, and as scientific as we possibly can. Actually, most of the profession does pretty well in these regards.

4. *A residual category*. Here's the criticism: it is often said that, when you cannot find any other cause for the behavior you observe, you call it, or blame it on, "political culture." Thus, if Italian or Latin American or Middle Eastern

behavior seems mysterious or even “exotic,”⁸ and you cannot think of any other explanation, political culture becomes the residual category into which you can dump it.

I find this charge inaccurate, old-fashioned, and downright insulting. Certainly, tourists and some journalists continue to think or write in this vein for a popular audience. But among serious scholars, no one has done this kind of sloppy and unsystematic work, at least since the 1950s. The charge tells me how far behind the critics are on the literature; they apparently have not read any of the serious political culture studies of the last 50 years. Once again, let me say that all of us who write on political culture want to improve the product and are always open to suggestions on how to do so. And I am sure we can all find instances where, as a result of lazy thinking, political culture is still employed as a kind of catch-all explanation: “Oh, those Italians; it must be their political culture.” Or maybe, “It is in their blood.” Or “in their genes.”

But few, maybe no, serious political culture scholars think or write this way anymore. Instead, we are careful or we try to be; we employ the best analysis we can; and we try to use the best methodologies available. So as with the “vagueness” charge, this seems to me a false charge, a red herring. It has little or maybe nothing to do with the way we study political culture today.

5. *Tautological.* There are several definitions of the word “tautology.” Most simply, it involves the repetition of the same idea in different words—a redundancy. For example, if you say, “It is a new innovation,” then the word “new” is tautological—a redundancy. Or if you say, “The organization expects joint cooperation from its members,” then the word “joint” is tautological—a redundancy. There are many such examples in everyday speech of redundant usage. However, such redundancy is permissible in everyday speech if we wish to give our expressions greater force or emphasis. Examples include such expressions as “close proximity,” “first priority,” “necessary requirement,” “very unique,” or to “reiterate again.”

In logic, following Wittgenstein, a tautology is a proposition or statement that in itself is logically true and/or cannot be either proven or disproven. It is a logical statement in which the conclusion merely confirms the premise, a sentence in which the verb part reinforces the subject part. Another way of putting this is to say that the propositional first parts of a sentence are confirmed, by definition, by the last parts. In logic, however, unlike some forms of everyday speech, there is no disapprobrium for the use of tautologies because tautologies are considered a key concept of propositional logic.

Now, how does any of this apply to political culture? It is a bit of a mystery to me; at the same time, it is rather like the other two criticisms, “vagueness” and “residual category,” already mentioned. That is, it is a criticism that seems most relevant when applied to the earlier and outdated national character literature,

8 Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1978).

but not really relevant to the analytic and much more careful and scientific *Civic Culture* and post-*Civic Culture* literature.

Here's how political culture could be considered tautological. If I say, "Political culture is important because scholars say it is important"; or if I say, "Political culture is important because everyone agrees it is important," these statements are self-evidently true. Another tautological statement would be "France is the way it is because of political culture." Or suppose we say, "Italian behavior can be explained because of political culture." Note that in these last two sentences—"the way it is because of *political culture*"; "*behavior ... culture*"—the predicate reconfirms, and is repetitious of, the subject. Hence, redundant; hence, tautological.

But let us be careful here. First, remember that tautological expressions are often used for *emphasis* and are thus, in the right circumstances, quite legitimate. Second, thinking logically, a tautology is a key concept in propositional reasoning; it need not necessarily be an expression meriting disapprobrium. Third, I am not entirely opposed to some of the statements above which we have labeled tautological. France *is* the way it is, in part, because of political culture; and Italian political behavior *can* be explained, in part, because of political culture. However, we cannot just leave it at that; we need to be specific about what aspects of French or Italian political culture help us arrive at the conclusion reached.

The key is to go on, be specific, and offer additional clarifying analysis and explanation. If I say, "Greece is the way it is, in part, because of its political culture," that is a tautological sentence. But then if I go on to explain that Greece's political culture includes such powerful motivating forces, among others, as clientelism, corruption, family favoritism, patron-client relations, and personalism, that explanation helps us further define Greek political culture. And in the process of offering clarifying explanation and specific data, the tautological aspects of the original sentence are removed. Definition, clarification, data, and analysis all seem to eliminate tautology.

And that gets us to the final point, which is that almost no one doing political culture these days uses the concept in a tautological way. First, political culture studies nowadays are mainly based on public opinion surveys and careful research, not tautological statements. Second, political culture studies are based on propositions or hypotheses that are testable and not just tautological. Third, these hypotheses are then tested empirically and scientifically. Fourth, using regression and correlation, data, analysis, explanation, and clarification all help to remove tautology. And fifth, the evidence for political culture, as in the work by David Landes, Ronald Inglehart, and others, is then weighed against other explanatory models, such as structuralism or institutionalism. In this evaluation, political culture comes out very often as the leading and strongest explanation. To say that, however, is not at all tautological.

So again, as with the charges of "vagueness" and "residual category," I find the "tautological" charge to be largely groundless. It is a charge that goes back to the early national-character studies but the problem identified is rarely present now. To be sure, one can still find tautological statements in the literature. But that kind

of charge is hardly limited to only political culture studies. Moreover, in the new, careful, analytic, empirical literature on political culture, tautological reasoning is seldom present. Instead, we use propositions, hypotheses, and testable concepts. And then the tests themselves, employing statistics, correlations, and regression as well as more traditional methodologies, are very sophisticated. I find scant evidence of tautological reasoning here.

Institutional and Structural Criticisms

Those who criticize political culture studies from an institutional or a structural point of view, it seems to me, are on firmer ground than are those who make, as above, very general criticisms. The “structuralists” and the “institutionalists” are at least half-way correct; that is, their criticisms are often quite valid. The problem comes subsequently when they try to elevate their own single-causal explanation into a position as the only or all-encompassing one, replacing political culture. Or when they try, by a kind of “definitional imperialism”—this is especially true of the institutionalists—to incorporate political culture within their own explanatory paradigm. When they do this, they are merely repeating the errors of the more overly enthusiastic supporters of political culture.

The Structuralists

By “structuralists” here we generally mean Marxists. Marxists insist that we look at *structure*, specifically *class structure*. And the mode of production, ownership, and distribution. Marxists, thinking here within comparative politics of such scholars as Ronald Chilcote, James Petras, and Immanuel Wallenstein,⁹ view political culture, including values, religion, ideas, and ideology, as part of the superstructure and of no substantive importance. It is part of Marx’s “epiphenomena”—fleeting, gone with the wind, not worth studying. In contrast, Marxist scholars would have us focus on the substantive: underlying class relations, the ownership of wealth, exploitation, and class conflict.

In studying developed or advanced industrial countries (Europe, North America, and Japan), comparative politics scholars rarely study class structure anymore. The assumption is that, at these high mass-consumption or “post-industrial” levels, class structure does not mean much anymore; the middle class has definitively triumphed; class conflict, therefore, has been mitigated; and certainly there will not be revolution. But most comparativists these days study developing nations rather than already developed ones. And in these nations,

9 Ronald Chilcote, *Theories of Comparative Politics* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1981); James Petras, *Empire with Imperialism* (New York: Zed/Palgrave, 2006); and Immanuel Wallenstein, *The Modern World System*, Vols. I and II (New York: Academic Press, 1974, 1980).

class structure, who owns what, elite machinations, and the power and influence that goes with land ownership and great wealth still count for a lot. The Marxian analysis and categories “fit” these countries better than they do developed ones. Therefore, those of us who study the Third World tend to be more sympathetic to a structuralist point of view. Class structure obviously counts for a lot.

The trouble comes when the advocates of structuralist interpretations try to elevate a useful but still partial explanation into a complete and all-encompassing one. Or try to say that the Marxist interpretation is the only one. That to most comparativists goes too far. Most of us agree that a structuralist or class-based interpretation is necessary and useful but we are not willing to give the structuralists a monopoly on truth. My own preference is for an explanatory paradigm that combines structuralism with explanations from political cultural, *and other* explanations. To give away for a moment one of the conclusions of this book, why not such a multi-causal explanation? One that combines the best and strongest explanatory powers from several approaches, one of which is the structural. That it seems to me and most of us in the field is the way to go.

The Institutionalists

The institutionalist critique of political culture approaches is very similar to the structuralist one. But with very interesting variations. Moreover, our response to the institutionalist criticism will be similar to our response to the structuralist or Marxist one. And again, with interesting variations.

Back in the 1950s and earlier, comparative politics was dominated by an institutional approach. Students in that sub-discipline mainly studied the laws, constitutions, and formal institutions of government on the assumption that they were the main things that counted. But then along came (1) the behavioral revolution in political science of the 1950s that ushered in the emphasis on informal processes, decision-making, and political behavior as distinct from formal institutions; (2) Roy Macridis’s tub-thumping, flag-waving critique of comparative politics as too Europe-centered, parochial, ethnocratic, too much centered on institutions, too formal-legalistic, and too static;¹⁰ and (3) the new emphasis in the late 1950s–1960s on developing countries where, unfortunately for the institutionalists, formal institutions do not count for very much but informal processes and institutions do. For example, Bolivia has had over 30 constitutions (institutions) in its near-200-year history proclaiming Bolivia to be a republic and a democracy, but that has not meant Bolivia is, in fact, a democracy. Hence, something else besides institutions must be at work here: my “candidates” for that something else include both political culture *and* a structuralist explanation.

During the 1960s and 1970s, these other and more informal aspects and explanations held sway in the literature, as comparative politics concentrated

10 Roy Macridis, *The Study of Comparative Government* (New York: Random House, 1955).

heavily on the developing areas. But in the 1980s institutional explanations began to make a comeback. Quite a number of political scientists, mainly concentrated on US or European studies, perhaps tiring of all the focus over the previous two decades on informal processes, arguments over political culture and dependency theory (structuralism), and the developing countries, began to assert that the study of institutions (Congress, the Presidency, etc.) *was* political science. That that is what we should all study. Exclusively!¹¹

Now, I have no trouble with studying institutions. It is important to get your institutions right. Institutions count! Just as political culture and structural factors count. Where I part company with the institutionalists, however, just as I part company with the structuralists, is their claim that institutions are the *only* thing that counts. As a student of developing countries, or of comparative politics more generally, I find that claim ludicrous.

But then the institutionalists went a step further. In the work of Frank Wilson, Nobel Prize winner, Douglas North, and others, they began to claim that all other areas of the discipline, including political behavior, political culture, and informal political process, were, in fact, “institutions.”¹² This is where the charge of “disciplinary imperialism” enters in. What the institutionalists did, contrary to all logic, common sense, and the history of the discipline, was to incorporate all these other subfields under the “institutionalist” label. Now *everything* was institutional! What chutzpah!

Most of us, when we think of institutions, think of Congress, the executive branch, political parties, the courts, etc. as institutions. Values, beliefs, political orientations, and behaviors are emphatically *not* institutions—except by some truly wild-eyed and dangerous stretching of concepts and definitions. Such concept-stretching defies all reality and good research sense. Political culture is one thing; structuralism, something else; and institutions, something else again. Let us not confuse things by combining them into one, single, all-encompassing, awkward, and unmanageable category. Instead, we need to treat political culture, structure, and institutions as three separate variables. And then proceed in our analyses from there.

Our final word on this subject: *of course*, institutions are important. Think of the famous 1954 Supreme Court decision on “Brown vs. Board of Education.” Surely we are, as a result of this Court decision and others subsequently, as well as the 1960s civil rights legislation, a different, a better, and a more tolerant society than we were before. Here, then, we have a case of institutions, the Supreme Court, the Congress, and its legislation, over time, actually changing political culture and political behavior and for the better. Meanwhile, it is also the case that the political culture, in profound ways, shapes the performance of our institutions. *Both* of

11 Scott Manwaring, *Democratic Governance in Latin America* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010).

12 Frank Wilson, “The Study of Political Institutions,” in Howard J. Wiarda (ed.), *New Directions in Comparative Politics*, 3rd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2001), 189–210.

these need to be considered as independent variables; neither should be elevated to the level of a single, all-encompassing, all-inclusive explanation. At the same time, it is both inaccurate and unconscionable for the institutionalists to claim, by definition, that the term “institution” includes all other factors. Such disciplinary imperialism or absorbing of whole areas of the discipline cannot be tolerated.

Closer to the Truth: Valid Criticisms

Most of the criticisms of political culture offered so far seem to me, to this point, to be off-target. They are either wrong or highly exaggerated or based on incomplete or a passé understanding of political culture studies from 60 years ago. Quite a number of the criticisms are even a legacy of the fears of 80 to a 100 years ago, growing out of some of the more outrageous claims of social Darwinism, the eugenics movement, racism, and the Nazi regime. I believe these fears of possible, ongoing racial or ethnic stereotyping are greatly exaggerated, but I can understand why we should continue to be on guard and to warn against the use of simplistic and potentially dangerous political-culture-analysis and categorization.

Two of the criticisms considered here so far seem to me to have validity, but then their advocates sometimes go too far to claim a monopoly for their own favored approach. The structuralists are correct to point to the importance of class analysis and underlying economic factors, but then the Marxists among them stretch the argument to claim that *only* class factors and the means of production and distribution should be considered while political culture is ignored. The institutionalists are correct to emphasize the importance of institutions but then, like the structuralists, some of them go too far by expanding the definition of institutions to include everything else in political science that is emphatically *not* an institution, including not just political culture but also political behavior, decision making, even class structure and analysis. In this way, *everything* becomes an institution.

While some of the criticisms listed above are weak, outdated, or off the mark, others have greater validity. Those are reviewed below. It is striking that many of these criticisms are the same as or similar to the criticisms leveled more generally against the political development literature of the 1960s. That is not entirely coincidental since both these bodies of literature, political culture and political development, emerged at about the same time and were formulated and written by many of the same authors. On the other hand, we should also recognize that quite a number of these earlier criticisms have now been addressed and more-or-less answered in the newer political culture literature.

1. *Ethnocentrism*. In much of the early development and political culture literature, including the influential 1963 *Civic Culture* study, the United States, or the United States and Great Britain, or the United States and Western Europe are held up as either models to emulate or the end point toward which all countries inevitably evolve. But that is too narrow and ethnocentric a vision: on the one hand, the United States has been severely chastised since the 1960s and is no

longer the beacon it once was. On the other, we now know that there are many routes to development, a lattice rather than a single path. No one model fits all; no cookie-cutter approach will do. The present author, in fact, was one of those who led the charge against the ethnocentrism of the then-dominant models.¹³

Having learned these lessons, the newer political culture approaches, such as those by David Landes, Ronald Inglehart, Robert Putnam, Francis Fukuyama, et al. are far more modest in their pretensions and far less ethnocentric. Instead, these studies tend to be neutral in their presentation of distinct models; they tend not to put the United States on a pedestal; and they acknowledge a pluralism and diversity of paths. One, of course, still needs to guard against the earlier ethnocentrism; and it is my impression that the newer literature, for the most part, does just that.

2. *Political development and political culture as an instrument of US foreign policy.* The charge has been made, mainly by the Left, that the political development and political culture literature of the 1950s and thereafter was sponsored by and put at the service of US foreign policy. And, therefore, that it is fatally biased and flawed.

This is a complicated issue and needs to be treated without politics, emotion, or ideology getting in the way. At the same time, it deserves longer and more detailed treatment than I can possibly give it here. Nevertheless, having known most of the people involved and been in on the project almost from the beginning, here is what I know: First, we know that the centers for international affairs at both Harvard and MIT, where most of the early development literature was formulated, were founded with considerable US government funding. And that funding, at the height of the Cold War, was explicitly to formulate a non-communist model of development appropriate for and attractive to the Third World.¹⁴ And second, we know that some of the founders of or scholars at these centers—for example, Max Milliken, Robert Bowie, Donald Blackmer, McGeorge Bundy, and especially W.W. Rostow—either had a long history of prior and ongoing work for the government or would go on to be among the chief architects of US policy during the 1960s.

On the other hand, having interacted and worked with most of them over the years, we know that: (1) most of the scholars in the political development school had a genuine and heartfelt interest not just in studying development but in engineering and *bringing* development to the developing nations. And (2) most of them, in the halcyon years of the early 1960s, with John F. Kennedy, the Peace Corps, the Alliance for Progress, and the optimistic, Camelot, anything-is-possible mood of the time, saw no incompatibility between their writings on development and their service to US foreign policy.¹⁵ Both were assumed, however naïve this

13 Howard J. Wiarda, *Ethnocentrism and Foreign Policy: Can We Understand the Third World?* [Answer, after 67 pages, No!] (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1985).

14 Donald L.M. Blackmer, *The MIT Center for International Studies: The Founding Years, 1951–1969* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Center for International Studies, 2002).

15 Wiarda, *New Directions*, Introduction.

position now seems, to serve the same liberal, progressive agenda. But we need to remember, this was before Vietnam, when we were all full of idealism, before we were chastised by the events of the later 1960s and 1970s, and before we were as cynical about our political leadership and our foreign policy as we are now.

We have recently had something parallel to, but different from, this earlier situation in Iraq, Afghanistan, and now other countries as well. Seeking to win the hearts and minds of the local populations as well as clan and tribal leaders, but lacking very many Arabic speakers or officers at home in Middle East culture, the Department of Defense began to recruit cultural anthropologists, historians, and other young social scientists to accompany the troops into the field. The Pentagon is still weighing the success of these efforts.

But to me this raises very dangerous issues, especially if the goal eventually becomes not just winning hearts and minds but the targeting for assassinations or drone strikes of guerrilla leaders. This goes way beyond what Ruth Benedict did for the war effort in her book about Japan, what the RAND studies of Soviet behavior did, or what the political development studies accomplished for our understanding of Third World areas. Background studies that increase understanding of other cultures are one thing, but actually accompanying platoons into battle is quite another. It raises all the issues that Franz Boas warned cultural anthropology against 100 years ago: the possible corruption of research, research at the service of the government or the war effort, research that leads to bad ends, the compromise of both the research and the war or foreign policy effort.¹⁶

3. *The stages are not sequential.* In the Western world, according to Rostow and most economists, the stages of national growth were as follows: first came economic development and industrialization. Industrialization drew people out of the countryside and into the cities, and stimulated social change: the emergence of a working class, a business-commercial class, and a larger middle class. Social change gave rise to greater pluralism and, hence, the need for democracy. This is the model, based on Rostow, followed by most US foreign aid programs since the 1960s.

Note that Almond and Verba's *Civic Culture* model of *political development* closely tracks the Rostow model, except that there are three stages rather than five. Both the economic and the political models of development start off with what they call "traditional" or "parochial" society: poor, backward, underdeveloped, illiterate, and non-modern. Then in the early stages of development, generally under authoritarian rule and in a "subject" political culture, the early-to-intermediary steps to modernization occur. Finally, societies reach the modern stage of high mass consumption (Rostow) and a participatory or "civic" political culture (Almond and Verba).

16 See David Prince, "Anthropologists as Spies," *The Nation*, 271 (November 20, 2000), 24–7; David Bowman, "Spying by American Archeologists in World War I," *Bulletin of the History of Archeology*, 21 (2011), 10–17.

The trouble is, except in a few developing or non-Western societies (South Korea and Taiwan), development does not work that way. People are drawn to the cities *prior* to industrialization so there are no jobs for them. The political culture may change before institutions do, producing the possibility of revolutionary upheaval. Revolutionary discontent often leads to chaos, bloodshed, and military coups. The armed forces may snuff out rising pluralism. Rather than the one replacing the other, capitalism and feudalism may continue to coexist side by side. Socialism may come before capitalism is firmly established—think of Russia, China, or Cuba. Authoritarianism may linger on for decades. Democracy is not inevitable.¹⁷

There, then, we have another criticism of the political development/early political culture literature that has considerable validity.

4. *The absence of international or globalization influences.* To my mind, one of the most powerful criticisms of the early political development/political culture literature is that it ignored the international forces set loose by globalization. Political development and the emergence of a civic culture are presented as if they were a purely domestic matter without outside influence; political culture is portrayed as purely a home-grown socialization process.

To be fair, in the early 1960s when most of these authors were writing, there was much less attention to international and globalization influences. And traditional comparative politics treated each country—the main ones covered were Great Britain, France, Germany, and the Soviet Union—as if they were completely autonomous entities.

But even at that early time, comparative politics knew, or should have known, better. *Of course*, countries are powerfully shaped not just by domestic influences but also by the forces of colonialism, imperialism, war, dependency relations, their position in the global economy, international media, trade, outside influence, etc. In my own doctoral dissertation on the Dominican Republic and written at the height (1965) of the political development/political culture literature, I devoted two full chapters in a thesis otherwise devoted to Dominican domestic politics to the role of international influences: the Vatican, the Organization of American States, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, and, of course, the United States Embassy. For in those days and continuing to this day, the US Embassy was constantly mucking around in internal Dominican politics: Writing speeches for the president, sitting in on cabinet meetings, sometimes administering and running whole government departments, and exercising *hegemonic* leverage in all areas of economic and political life. And then in 1965 militarily intervening, occupying the country, and changing the direction of Dominican politics and *not* toward greater pluralism and democracy.¹⁸

17 Howard J. Wiarda, *Political Development in Emerging Nations* (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/Thomson, 2004).

18 Howard J. Wiarda, *Dictatorship, Development, and Disintegration: Politics and Social Change in the Dominican Republic* (Ann Arbor, MI: The Center for Latin American

How could anyone even at that early time ignore the influence of these powerful international forces on internal domestic politics? The answer is, they could not and should not have. And now, with the powerful forces of globalization, social media, computers, the worldwide web, global television, etc., it is even less possible to ignore these international forces than before.

5. *Not one path but many.* The early development literature, as we have seen in Rostow as well as *The Civic Culture*, posited only a single path to development. That path was the US-Western European route, from feudalism to capitalism to social democracy, or from a parochial to a subject to a participatory, civic, and democratic editorial culture.

Even at that time, however, we knew better. As presented by Rostow and the political development school, the US-Western Europe route was set in opposition to the Soviet socialist one. In addition, we already at that time had the model of long-term, developmental authoritarianism—Franco’s Spain, Salazar’s Portugal, the Kuomintang in Taiwan, South Korea’s generals, Marco’s Philippines, Suharto in Indonesia, the South African apartheid regime, Mexico’s PRI, the Brazilian and Chilean generals, and many more. So that gives us three main models or routes to development—socialist, democratic, and authoritarian—as well as many combinations and local variations on these.

Then in 1979 came the Iranian Revolution and the demand for an authentic, homegrown, Islamic model of development. Concurrently or shortly thereafter, the cry went up in many parts of Africa, the Middle East, Latin America, and South, Southeast, and East Asia: let us do it our way. That is, given the oft-perceived failures of both the US and the Marxist models in so many of these countries, the issue often became: can we develop our own, homemade, indigenous model of development, independent from the foreign imports, that reflects our own history and culture?

The result is that now, in addition to the socialist, authoritarian-statist, and free-market routes to development, we have multiple options, or combinations of options, open. The image that should have been used is not a single path to development but a lattice or trellis, with numerous routes open on which the vines might grow, with numerous crossover members to accommodate reversals or changes of direction, and an open-ended process in which history and development would not “end” but would go on to new and innovative heights.

Nor should we believe that, with the so-called “Washington Consensus” of the 1990s—free trade, open markets, and democracy—these multiple options have ended. Whatever consensus on ends and means might have existed then is surely over now in the wake of the global depression that began in 2008. The image we should have, to echo Peter Berger, is that of “many globalizations” and multiple routes to development.¹⁹

Studies, University of Massachusetts, Xerox University Microfilms Monograph Series, 3 vols., 1975).

19 Peter Berger and Samuel P. Huntington (eds), *Many Globalizations: Cultural Diversity in the Contemporary World* (Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press, 2002); also

Conclusion

The older criticisms of political culture: that it is vague, impressionistic, unsystematic, imprecise, a residual category, tautological, unscientific, and even racist, seem to me to have little validity anymore. Of course, we must continue to guard against these characteristics and against any and all forms of racial or ethnic stereotyping. But I believe the main fears stemming from an earlier era of social Darwinism, eugenics, the Holocaust, and blatant racism are mainly over.

Most serious political culture studies these days rely not on stereotypes but on careful analysis, public opinion surveys, statistics, correlations, and tendency statements. Tourists and journalists will probably continue to say, "Oh, those Italians" or "Frenchmen are thus and so," but even these comments nowadays are said without malice for the most part and are mainly benign. We must certainly be careful of such oversimplifications and avoid them in serious scholarship, but I do not see them as the gross dangers that they were in the 1930s and 1940s.

The second category of criticisms from the Marxist perspective, on the one hand, and the institutionalists, on the other, seem to me both more important and more substantive. *Of course*, comparative politics and development studies need to look at class structure and the economic base of society; *of course*, we need also to consider institutional variables as well as cultural ones. I do not think anyone who's ever written seriously in the field would doubt that. The problem arises when these necessary but still incomplete explanations are elevated by some of their advocates into monopolistic or all-inclusive explanations, to the exclusion of all others. That, it seems to me, carries the argument way too far and obscures our understanding rather than enhancing it.

Finally, there is a set of criticisms that I consider valid or at least partially so. These include the charges of ethnocentrism, of the use of these research findings for US foreign policy purposes, of the fact that development in today's non-Western countries is different from what it was earlier and in the West, of the lack of attention to outside or globalization forces and influences, and of the fact of multiple routes to development rather than just one or two. Interestingly, these criticisms of the political culture literature are remarkably similar to the criticisms of the early theories of political development more generally. That should not be surprising since these two bodies of literature developed at the same time, in parallel fashion, and with many of the same scholars.

Much of the new literature on political culture seeks to avoid these earlier mistakes. Not always successfully, but certainly the new literature, the "renaissance" of political culture, tries to eliminate these methodological and research biases and traps. In the next chapter we explore this renaissance and what it means for political culture studies.

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Chapter 7

The Renaissance of Political Culture

During the 1970s, political culture studies and political culture as an explanatory variable fell into decline. From its high point in the 1960s, when the pioneering *The Civic Culture* and other path-breaking books came out and “everyone” was doing political culture, political culture went into a nearly two-decade fall-from-favor from the late 1960s to the mid-1980s.

The reasons for this decline are several. Part of it had to do with fad and fashion: by the end of the 1960s, both political culture and political development, of which it was a part, had, intellectually, largely run their course. Part of it had to do with the methodological and other critiques of *The Civic Culture*, which damaged political culture studies, in general. A large part of the decline of political culture studies had to do with the times: Vietnam, assassinations, Nixon, and Watergate. When all American institutions are under attack, we should not expect the dominant paradigms in comparative politics to be an exception. Finally, as we saw in the previous chapter, political culture came in for intense criticisms, some of which were valid.

By the 1970s, other and newer approaches had become popular, while political culture studies went into remission. Political culture studies were still carried out—see Chapter 5—but they no longer had the appeal and caché of the earlier studies. Most of the newer approaches tended politically to be on the left, in keeping with that era’s attacks on all established institutions and ways of doing things. These included dependency theory, Marxism, political economy, and the world-systems approach.¹ Other innovative comparative politics approaches of that time, such as corporatism, state-society relations, and then transitions-to-democracy carried fewer ideological overtones, but they also sought to supplant political culture as an explanatory paradigm.²

But then in the late 1980s to early 1990s, political culture began to make a comeback. I would date this comeback, which was quite dramatic, to the enormously influential essays and papers during this period by a number of presidents of the American Political Science Association and by several leading lights in the field:

1 The most prominent literature includes Ronald Chilcote, *Theories of Comparative Politics* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1981); F.H. Cardoso and Enzo Fuleto, *Dependency and Development in Latin America* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1979); and Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World Systems I and II* (New York: Academic Press, 1974, 1980).

2 For an overview of these trends, see Howard J. Wiarda, *Introduction to Comparative Politics: Concepts and Processes*, 2nd ed. (Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt Publishers, 2000).

Harry Eckstein, Francis Fukuyama, Samuel Huntington, Ronald Inglehart, Robert Putnam, and Aaron Wildavsky. Their essays attracted a lot of attention, were widely read, and strongly made the case for political-culture studies. All these leading figures followed up their initial articles with popular, attention-grabbing books: think of Fukuyama's *The End of History* or Huntington's *The Clash of Civilizations*. Within political science, if a specific date had to be assigned to this comeback, it would be Inglehart's 1988 *American Political Science Review* article which also provides the title for this chapter, "The Renaissance of Political Culture."³ Comparable to the path-breaking *Civic Culture* of the 1950s, Inglehart's pioneering studies include several books on the subject as well as his World Values Surveys, available for the asking, which now includes data on over 130 countries. It is a treasure trove of political culture data.

Since then, during the 1990s and continuing to the present, political culture studies have gone in newer, innovative, and more exciting directions. David Landes's magisterial *The Wealth and Poverty of Nations* show that it was *culture* that enabled the West to forge ahead while other potential global competitors, China or India, lagged behind. Geert Hofstede has elevated culture to *the* most important variable in his studies of all institutions. The Peace Corps, and maybe now even the World Bank, asserts that "They Know How," referring to the fact that the Third World and non-Western recipients of foreign aid know more about what works in their cultures than do the aid donors. Meanwhile, the Frank Sinatra-like call has gone out, elaborated in Chapter 8, from many Third World areas: "Let us do it our way"—i.e., let us develop our own Asian, Islamic, African model of development" in accord with our own culture, history, and traditions. An especially useful, edited book putting forth the case for political culture studies is that by Lawrence Harrison and Samuel Huntington, *Culture Matters*. Meanwhile, Fukuyama, Putnam, and many other writers and scholars have advanced political-culture studies into new terrains. It is, genuinely, a "Renaissance."

The Precursors

In 1988–89, after nearly two decades of nearly constant criticism of political culture by institutionalists, structuralists, and dissidents of various sorts, the political culturalists struck back. In that two-year period, five or six truly path-breaking articles and book chapters by leading figures in political science, including several who were presidents of the American Political Science Association—Aaron Wildavsky, Harry Eckstein, Samuel P. Huntington, Francis Fukuyama, and Ronald Inglehart—were published in leading journals. I also weighed in with an article supporting the political-culture approach in 1989, but I am the first to admit my piece did not have the depth or power these others did. Then in the next few years, some blockbuster books from

3 Inglehart, "The Renaissance of Political Culture," *American Political Science Review*, 82 (December 1988), 1203–30.

a political-culture perspective by Fukuyama, Robert Putnam, Inglehart, Landes, and Huntington again, also appeared. Political culture approaches had made a dramatic comeback.

I have found no evidence that there was any connivance, let alone conspiracy, among these authors that explains so many powerful articles and good books on political culture coming out at roughly the same time and with remarkably similar themes. Certainly, in my case there was not: I wrote my 1989 article on political culture with no knowledge whatever that others were writing on parallel themes. No, all the evidence I have is that these were all independent efforts. The fact these articles all quite literally *exploded* onto the political science/comparative politics agenda at the same time was not planned but coincidental. If there was any connection between them, it was that all the authors mentioned had reached the common conclusion that culture remained an important variable and that institutional and structural causes, by themselves, were insufficient. And that, reflecting a long tradition in political science recounted in Chapter 2, the culture variable had to be brought back in. Just as a decade earlier political scientists had rediscovered the state,⁴ now they rediscovered political culture.

Aaron Wildavsky

Aaron Wildavsky, professor of political science at the University of California/Berkeley, was also president of the American Political Science Association. He chose his presidential address to the Association to deliver a powerful statement in favor of cultural explanations.⁵

Wildavsky was one of the country's leading public policy scholars. He was especially known for his budget analysis. He urged political scientists to listen not so much to political rhetoric but to study how funds were allocated in the policy process. That is the true measure of policy priorities, he said. Follow the money trail!

In this article Wildavsky begins by rejecting a social science that begins and ends with interests and/or institutions. Instead, he wishes to make what people want—their desires, preferences, values, and ideals—the central subject of inquiry. And that, of course, means political culture.

Wildavsky defines culture as “the shared values legitimating social relations as the generators of diverse preferences.” Culture thus functions as a “social filter” to generate various policy preferences.

Wildavsky believes we should use cultural concepts rather than a left-right ideological divide to explain behavior. At the same time, he believes cultural preferences tend to develop out of institutional structures: schools, families, peers,

4 Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

5 Aaron Wildavsky, “Choosing Preferences by Constructing Institutions: A Cultural Theory of Preference Formation,” *American Political Science Review*, 81 (March 1987).

and political socialization. These institutional arrangements, in turn, help explain the emergence of policy preferences.

Wildavsky advances a model of culture that leads to four preferences or ways of life. In his model there are two areas: one measures the strength of group boundaries; the other, the variety of policy prescriptions. Four types of preferences derive from the culture. Viewed graphically, the model looks like this:

Variety of Policy Prescriptions	Strength of Group Boundaries	
	Weak	Strong
Numerous and Varied	Apathy (Fatalism)	Hierarchy (Collectivism)
Few and Similar	Competition (Individualism)	Equality (Egalitarianism)

Hence, in the Wildavsky schema, persons who are strongly individualistic (nonprescriptive and anti-collectivist) tend to prefer minimal economic and social regulation. Egalitarians (combining nonprescription with collective decision) prefer strong economic but weak social regulation. Whereas adherents of hierarchy (joining hard group boundaries to heavy prescription) desire both strong social and economic regulation.

Wildavsky goes on to talk about culture and risk. He says the perception of risk or danger is a function of political culture. Risk acceptance is a function of a more individualistic and hierarchical culture. In contrast, risk aversion comes with an egalitarian political culture which also argues that individualism and hierarchy are coercive and domineering. The more trust in the culture, the more risk acceptance. The less trust, the more risk rejection.

I do not necessarily accept the Wildavsky schema, which I find to be too simple, with two few categories and not enough gray areas and gradations. Nevertheless, I find it interesting that this leading scholar of institutions and policy preferences comes back to culture in his presidential address as his key variable. As Wildavsky puts it, culture permits preferences to be formed from the slimmest clues. And that the varying degrees of adherence to a culture are measurable.

Harry Eckstein

Harry Eckstein was professor of politics at Princeton University. He was also president of the American Political Science Association. Eckstein was for many decades one of the country's leading scholars of comparative politics. I used his textbook—a mistake, too conceptual and theoretical for undergraduates—in the first course (1965) I ever taught in comparative politics.

Eckstein's article, "A Culturalist Theory of Political Change," was published in the *American Political Science Review*⁶ in 1988, a year after Waldavsky's article came out. It was part of the great outpouring of research and writing on political culture that emerged in the late 1980s and continues to today.

Eckstein's theme is: how to explain political change when the nature of culture suggests continuity. He begins with the postulates of culturalist theories which make researchers expect continuity. But, he argues, genuine political change can simultaneously be derived from culturalist promises.

Culture theories, he says, regard continuity as the "normal" state of political affairs. In this light, he examines the main postulates of culturalism. These are "oriented action," "orientational variability," and "cultural socialization." Under oriented action there are cognitive elements (meanings), affective elements (feelings), and evaluative elements (goals). All of these imply continuity.

Under what he calls "cumulative learning," Eckstein sees two fundamental needs of actions in societies. These are: the need for economy of action and the need for predictability in interaction. These needs similarly lead to the expectation of continuity.

How then, within these expectations of cultural continuity, to explain change. Eckstein sees two types of change: situational, meaning "natural" change, and political, meaning deliberate change. Situational or "natural" change comes about because of changes in disposition in response to contextual alteration, in response to general societal modernization, and in response to social discontinuities. In the latter case, social discontinuity may produce a retreat into existing parochial structures or it may result in ritualistic conformity.

With regard to political transformation, Eckstein says that revolution cannot accomplish cultural transformation (see the discussions on Cuba and Russia above) in the short run. Such transformation may be attempted by a despotic regime, either left or right, but that top-down approach is unlikely to be immediately successful. And in the long run, he argues, attempts at revolutionary transformation will tend to be regressive or produce unintended consequences. Eckstein concludes that genuine and lasting cultural change is likely to come only from the vast social transformations stemming from modernization.

As with Wildavsky, I do not necessarily accept Eckstein's schema or his conclusion. Nevertheless, it is interesting that this classic comparative politics scholar, trained his entire career in the formal-legal tradition of "old world" European politics, an institutionalist by background as well as education, should now come around to an emphasis on culture as *the* key variable. And that it was his work on developing areas, no longer on the more better-institutionalized countries of Western Europe, that led Eckstein as well as Parsons, Almond, and the entire earlier "developmentalist" school to that conclusion, that culture was the key variable.

6 Harry Eckstein, "A Culturalist Theory of Political Change," *American Political Science Review*, 82 (September 1988), 789–804.

I see two conclusions beginning to emerge here. First, the rediscovery of the importance of political culture. And second, that it was the study of developing countries, not so much developed ones where institutions really do count, that brought political culture variables to the fore.

Ronald Inglehart

Barely three months after Eckstein's thoughtful piece, Ronald Inglehart's breakthrough article on "The Renaissance of Political Culture" appeared, also in the leading journal of the profession, the *American Political Science Review*.⁷ Inglehart is professor of political science at the University of Michigan, which has the top-ranked political science department in the country (and my alma mater!). Inglehart's article was a prelude to the important book he published the next year, 1989, entitled *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society* and reviewed in the next section of this chapter, and to a series of more recent books on political culture.⁸

The article and the book are about the emergence of post-materialist and "collectivist" values in societies formerly dominated by individualistic and capitalistic behavior. But the argument is much bigger and stronger than that: it is really a renewed and powerful statement, backed by empirical data, about the importance of political culture, an argument not heard or put forth so strongly since the 1960s and *The Civic Culture*.

Inglehart's focus is on the impact of life satisfaction on cultural, social, and political outlooks. He argues that the cultural traits of a nation have a major impact on economic and institutional development. In an oft-quoted passage (page 29), Inglehart says, "Culture is not just a consequence of economics but can shape the basic nature of economic and political life." In Inglehart's empirical work, he demonstrates that culture is not just an independent variable but it may often be *the most important variable*.

Inglehart's analysis begins with the argument that cultural factors have been deemphasized and devalued to an unrealistic level. His data support strongly that different societies are characterized, to varying degrees, by specific syndromes of political-cultural attitudes. These cultural attitudes are relatively enduring but are not immutable.

Cultural patterns, he finds, once established, possess considerable autonomy and can powerfully impact subsequent political and economic development. Among other consequences, and echoing the findings of Almond and Verba, political culture is closely linked to the possibilities for, and the viability and durability of, democratic institutions. Hence, his overarching conclusion that culture is not just determined by economic or social structure but has an independent life of its own and can itself shape the basic structures of economic and political life.

⁷ Inglehart, "Renaissance."

⁸ Inglehart, *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980).

Inglehart found, using interview data, statistical correlation, and regression analysis—the most sophisticated techniques available—that political culture was a crucial link in explaining the relations between economic development and democracy. Further, that the underlying disparities between developed and developing countries could be found in their underlying values, or political culture. Another finding: that the emergence of mass-based democracy is related to economic development and that democratic outcomes are contingent on specific cultural changes. Put another way, while modern democracy is almost impossible without economic development, economic development by itself does not produce democracy. Instead, democracy, if it is to be more than superficial, depends on vast culture change.

Political culture, in Inglehart's sophisticated and empirically based argument, is the missing link in our analyses. Unless specific changes occur in culture and social structure, he warns, the result may not be democracy but a variety of outcomes ranging from authoritarianism and totalitarianism to chaos, civil war, and failed states. Second, he says, while enduring cultural differences are often due to a country's level of economic development, they are relatively independent of short-term economic changes. And third, Inglehart argues, cultural factors have an important bearing on the long-term durability of democracy, which seems to result from the complex interplay of economic, cultural, and institutional factors. His overall conclusion: when empirically tested against other variables, political culture stands up very well as a powerful tool of understanding and explanation.

Inglehart makes a strong argument. Not only is political culture an important variable, it may be the *most important* explanatory variable. What gives his argument so much weight is that he combines a sophisticated theoretical and conceptual discussion of political culture with empirical evidence. Moreover, going way beyond the earlier pioneering work of Almond and Verba, Inglehart employed data from 40 countries and in his later books, from some 130. His is the most sophisticated presentation of political culture, covering more countries, that we have seen so far.

“Political Culture and National Development” (Wiarda)

My own contribution to “the Renaissance” is quite a bit more modest than is the breakthrough Inglehart's article summarized above. Nevertheless, published as it was in 1989, this article became part and parcel of the revival of political culture studies of those years. Mine was the lead article in a special issue of the *Fletcher Forum* on “Culture in Development,”⁹ and was later republished in a number of anthologies.

The purpose of this article was to issue a caution, a yellow light, against what I saw as the excessive enthusiasm then current, at both scholarly and policy levels, for the then *au-courant* transitions-to-democracy paradigm. Not only had scholars

9 Wiarda, “Political Culture and National Development,” *Fletcher Forum of International Affairs*, 13 (Summer 1989), 193–204.

enthusiastically embraced this intellectual construct—which to my mind was less a serious academic approach than simply a reaction to and effort at understanding what was going on in the world—but policy-makers had also embraced democracy promotion as a way out of having to choose between authoritarianism and a Marxist or guerrilla takeover. While I was similarly supportive of the democratic openings then occurring, my research led me to see at least as much continuity as change in such countries as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Indonesia, Mexico, the Philippines, Portugal, Greece, and others. Hence, the cautionary warning to not let wishful political science trump hard-headed realism.

The article begins with an argument for the importance of political culture as a key, independent variable. It also stresses the flexibility and accommodating features of many traditional institutions—tribes, castes, clans, and patronage networks—many of which were converting themselves into modernizing interest associations and political parties.

The article then issues several warnings, already rehearsed in this book, with regard to political culture: the dangers of racism, oversimplification, and national stereotyping. It goes on to argue that political culture is only one variable among others, including class, structural, economic, and institutional factors. Methodologically, it urges a multi-causal approach in which these factors are all interrelated in complex and ever-changing ways.

The article goes on substantively to examine the state, state-society relations, and the changing face of corporatism in Latin American politics and development—all issues that I had written about extensively before. My argument was that, in our enthusiasm for democracy, we should not ignore the continuing role of the state in Latin American labor relations, its continuing efforts to coopt rising social groups (business, labor, peasants, and women), the state's desire to continue controlling and harnessing the development process, the continuance of many aspects of corporatism in this new democratic era, and, hence, the limits on democratic openings. A decade-and-a-half later, I published a long book on this subject—*Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America—Revisited*¹⁰—which contained both theoretical discussion and detailed country-by-country analysis.

The conclusion was that Latin America was still corporatist in many areas of labor relations, social welfare legislation, and interest group and state-society relations, many areas of public policy, and in the new public-private partnerships that had sprung up all around the region. Hence, I argued, we need to examine the many social, cultural, and institutional continuities in Latin America, as well as the changes ushered in with the region's democratic openings.

10 Wiarda, *Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America—Revisited* (Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press, 2004).

The Goals of Development (Samuel P. Huntington)

One other article in “the Renaissance” deserves our attention. It is by the late and great political scientist, Samuel P. Huntington. It was part of his political culture metamorphosis.¹¹

Huntington had always stood apart from the political development/political culture school of the 1960s. He had not been a member of the famed Committee on Comparative Politics/ Social Science Research Council (CCP/SSRC) that pioneered political development studies in that decade. His articles in *World Politics* during the 1960s were strongly critical of the political development literature, and his 1968 book, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, was a devastating critique of that approach, one of the main reasons it subsequently went into decline. In the faculty seminar on comparative politics that I chaired at Harvard in the early 1980s, I learned quickly that Huntington was not much loved by the CCP/SSRC members present—Gabriel Almond, Lucian Pye, Myron Weiner, et al.¹² Huntington, then, was an “institutionalist,” definitely not a “culturalist.”

But over the course of the mid-to-late 1980s, that orientation began to change. Huntington came to accept the basic tenets of the culturalist argument: that culture was one of or *the* key variable. I know that personally because during this period Huntington offered me a position at Harvard heading up a new research institute on political culture. However, I already had tenure and a full professorship at the University of Massachusetts; the Harvard position was a research and administrative rather than a regular faculty position and did not carry tenure, which I could not give up. When I turned it down, I believe Larry Harrison, whose positions on political culture were so extreme, verging on racism and culturalism, that I was strongly critical of them,¹³ accepted the position.

Huntington was already working then on his well-known book on democratization (*The Third Wave*), which carried a strong orientation toward focusing on culture *as well as* institutions in understanding non-Western countries. As early as 1984, as part of “the Renaissance,” he had published an article entitled “Will More Countries Become Democratic?” that contained, in Huntington’s usually powerful prose, a strong argument for the importance of cultural factors.¹⁴

But now in 1987 he came full circle, elevating culture to a position as *the* determining variable.

11 Samuel P. Huntington, “The Goals of Development” in Myron Weiner and Samuel P. Huntington (eds), *Understanding Political Development* (Boston, MA: Little Brown, 1987).

12 Howard J. Wiarda (ed.), *New Directions in Comparative Politics* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984).

13 See the footnotes in Wiarda, *Political Culture*.

14 Huntington, “Will More Countries Become Democratic?” *Political Science Quarterly*, 92 (1984), 193–218.

Huntington is appropriately careful. He warns against the usual dangers: stereotypes, reductionism, and culture as a residual category. Nevertheless, he's now made the transition: it is culture that counts and may even be determinative. There are no numerical models of development, he argues; every culture area is different. Hence, the need for specific knowledge and regional or culture-area understanding. Here we find the first statement of the "civilizational" (culture) area groupings that will go into his famous "Clash of Civilizations" article and then book. Here, too, we find an analysis of the cultures (plural) of development. In the developing world at least, Huntington no longer focuses on institutions; it is culture that counts now.

Huntington concludes:

If the study of development leads back to a focus on culture and the differences among major cultural traditions and country cultures, then the time is perhaps appropriate for closer links between the comparative politics scholars (developmentalist subbranch) and area specialists. If the differences in the present and future development and goal achievement of East Asia, Latin America, and sub-Saharan Africa are to be found in the different values and beliefs of East Asians, Latin Americans, and Africans, then surely a primary place has to be accorded the comparative analysis of culture, how and why it develops, how it is transmitted, what patterns it forms, how its various dimensions can be defined and measured, and how and under what circumstances it changes. For those who wish to explain the extent to which different countries have made differing progress toward achieving the goals of development, such an approach becomes almost indispensable. Culture and its impact on development cry out for systematic and empirical, comparative and longitudinal study by the scholars of political development.

Full Flowering

After the initial spate of political-culture "Renaissance" articles came out in the late 1980s, significantly all written independently but all with essentially the same message—culture counts!—we were treated to a flurry of new books on the subject. Some of these volumes grew out of the earlier articles; others were developed independently, such as those by Robert Putnam, Francis Fukuyama, Huntington, David Landes, Peter Berger, and Geert Hofstede—to name only a few. These were all wonderful books—well written, provocative, well organized, and methodologically sound. Indeed, I would be prepared to argue that, during the last two decades, the best books in political science—certainly the best *collection* of books—were all written from a political-culture perspective.

Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society (Inglehart, 1989)¹⁵

Less than a year after Inglehart's famous "Renaissance" article on political culture came out, he published a whole book on the subject. The book echoes the main themes of the article; indeed, in this instance the article forms a main part of the introduction to the book.

Inglehart starts off with his objective: to study the impact of economic and sociopolitical change on culture in "post-materialist" Western Europe. By the same token, he aims to study the impact of culture on economics, society, and politics. In other words, the study is open-ended; Inglehart has not foreordained his conclusions.

The units of analysis in the study are two: nations and individuals. The study overall moves from the system level to the individual level and then back again to the system or national level.

The methodology of the study is quantitative analysis. The sources of his data are three: surveys carried out by the European Community (predecessor of the EU) Euro-Barometer from 1970 to 1988, his own World Values Surveys housed at the University of Michigan, and in-depth interviews and fieldwork carried out in 1981 and 1990. This initial work covered 37 countries; in more recent surveys reported in subsequent books, Inglehart has expanded the coverage to over 130 countries.

Inglehart's purpose is to analyze and measure culture change and its impact. He is interested in the shift in Europe from an essentially materialist to a post-materialist—social welfare, environmental issues, and soft power—value priorities. Post-materialism implies new political issues, provides the impetus for new political movements and has split the older political parties. It has also given rise to new political parties (for example, the Greens in Germany and elsewhere); moreover, it changes the criteria by which people evaluate their subjective sense of wellbeing. Indeed, these broad culture changes from industrialist to post-industrialist ways of thinking have reshaped and recast the religious orientation, gender mores, several mores, and cultural norms of *all* of Western society.

We need not go through all of Inglehart's sophisticated methodology and analyses. What he finds is that the unprecedented prosperity and security of postwar Europe has led to a fundamental shift in the culture, which is, in turn, transforming society, politics, and the economy. From the 1960s (materialist) to today (post-materialist), Europe has gone through revolutionary changes in its culture—less religious, less socially rigid, greater freedom, etc. Moreover, using six key indicators—happiness, interpersonal trust, political satisfaction, economic transformation, support for the existing social order, and overall life satisfaction—Inglehart and his team are able to measure enduring cross-national differences as well as change over time. His findings are fascinating: a gradual decline in materialist values and a corresponding increase in post-materialist ones.

15 Inglehart, *Culture Change*.

Yet, Inglehart is careful not to overstate his case. Culture is important but not determinative. Other variables—modernization, greater prosperity, and better education—also enter in. Moreover, all these variables are closely interwoven. Nevertheless, his overall conclusion is an important one: that culture is an essential causal element that helps shape society and politics.

Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (*Robert Putnam, 1992*)¹⁶

In 1992 Harvard's Robert Putnam published another path-breaking work that is widely cited in both academic and policy circles. The book should be included as part of the general renaissance of political culture studies of the late 1980s, early 1990s.

Putnam is a serious and sophisticated scholar. His book combines several important, interlocking approaches: political culture, institutional analysis, and rational choice.

Putnam's Introduction sets forth an ambitious agenda: the origins of effective government. The puzzle he poses is: "What are the conditions for creating strong, responsive, effective representative institutions?" To answer this question, he studies the effectiveness of regional government institutions in Italy, his country of specialization, designed to bring government closer to the people. He asks: Did these new institutions actually affect the character of leadership and the way politicians act? Did they affect the distribution of power and influence? Did the citizens perceive any changes in governance? And did these institutional changes affect behavior in any way?

Putnam finds that some of these institutional changes were effective and others less so. He then asks *why* some of the changes were more effective than others. And this gets Putnam to the themes for which he is well known: the importance of civil society, culture, and social capital.

Both of these explanations—culture and civil society—Putnam finds to be crucial in explaining the differences between the Northern, Central, and Southern regions of Italy. In the North and Central, civil society is active, well-established, and with vibrant social and political networks. The norms of civic engagement are strong. In contrast, in the South, politics is more vertically structured; there is a social life of fragmentation and isolation; and civil society is weak. The prevailing political culture is one of distrust, corruption, and lack of civic responsibility. In short, Putnam confirms both the political-culture study of Edward Banfield of the 1950s and the chapter on Italy in the Almond and Verba *Civic Culture* study of the 1960s.

Putnam next goes into Italian history to explain the historical origins of this fundamental, North-South cultural divergence. And why these differences have proved so stable; why these diverging political-cultural orientations have been so

16 Robert Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992).

persistent. To answer these questions, Putnam explores several research avenues: collective action or rational choice, his own concept of social capital, and “historic path dependency,” meaning previous experience with democracy, again a political-cultural variable.

His conclusions:

- It is easier for a person to adapt to existing rules of the game than to change them.
- Once development is set on a particular course, cultural habits and existing mental models tend to keep it on that trajectory.
- Informal norms and political culture not only change more slowly than do formal rules and institutions, but culture also tends to re-mold those rules.
- Context (culture) and history have a profound effect on institutions.
- But institutions can also, over time, affect behavior; however, this is generally a long process.
- Both cultural and institutional history move slowly.

The End of History and the Last Man (*Fukuyama, 1989, 1992*)¹⁷

Fukuyama first expanded his theory on “The End of History” in a 1989 journal article which received little attention. But between that date and 1992, when the full-length book came out, the world had been transformed: the fall of the Berlin Wall, the liberation of Eastern Europe, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the end of the Cold War. Hence, the book received far greater and more serious, even worldwide, attention than did the earlier article. Between the two dates, 1989 and 1992, we have the rough bookends of the renaissance of political culture.

For Fukuyama’s book is decidedly a political-culture book. It is a study in political theory, the history of ideas. Fukuyama’s other books, on *Trust*, *Human Nature*, *Latin America*, and *America at the Crossroads*, are also studies of values, belief systems, and ideas. He is a political-culture guy.

Fukuyama was writing just as the old Iron Curtain separating East from West was being rolled up. The Berlin Wall was also coming down, the “Evil Empire, the Soviet Union, was collapsing, and the 45 year-long Cold War was drawing to an end. In addition, on the other side of the political spectrum, right-wing authoritarian regimes were also collapsing—Marcos in the Philippines, Suharto in Indonesia, Pinochet in Chile, and many others—and giving rise to a variety of “Third Wave” (see below) transitions to democracy. It was a tremendously optimistic time and Fukuyama was undoubtedly caught up in what would later be seen as an excess of democracy optimism.

The End of History and the Last Man argued that, with the collapse of both communism and authoritarianism, democracy would emerge as the inevitable

17 Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History,” *The National Interest*, 1989; *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 1992).

outcome, the “only game in town,” as it was famously stated. Fukuyama argued further that the advent of Western liberal democracy would point toward the end of humanity’s social and cultural history, the termination of sociocultural evolution. As Fukuyama himself put it,

What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.

It is important to be clear about what Fukuyama meant by “the end of history.” Fukuyama is a very smart man; he did not mean stupidly or literally that history would “end.” Obviously, events of historical significance would continue to happen. But, in the Hegelian tradition of the large unfolding of ideas throughout history, democracy was the only one that had survived. Not fascism, not communism, not authoritarianism, nor Marxism. Only democracy was left standing. Moreover, in Fukuyama’s view, democracy was now poised to spread throughout the world. And as it did so, history would “end” because, in the Hegelian tradition, that was the only big idea left. All the other alternatives had been destroyed or discredited.

Fukuyama’s book is clearly a product of its times, of the excessive optimism that accompanied the Soviet collapse and the end of the Cold War. And it is, of course, heartening that democracy during this period was ascendant while totalitarianism and authoritarianism were in decline. Among those agencies in Washington engaged in democracy promotion—USAID, the National Endowment for Democracy, and others—Fukuyama’s announcement that the whole world was moving toward democracy and inevitably so turned his book into a “Bible” of holy writ for the true believers.

We are all, including the present author, encouraged by the fall of communism and the spread of democracy over the last 25 years. But we should not be so naïve and unrealistic that we fail to see that Fukuyama grossly overstated his case. Democracy is neither inevitable nor global. There are still more authoritarian regimes in the world than democratic ones. The pace of democratization has slowed; other regimes—Belarus and Russia—that once seemed headed for democracy have regressed. Giant China, four-fifths of Africa, and most of the Arab Middle East show few signs of democratizing. Caught up in the hopeful spirit of the early 1990s, Fukuyama, as we say in political science, went way beyond his data. He made the cardinal mistake of letting his wishes for the world outrun his analysis, and thus produced a book of gigantically wishful sociology.

Nevertheless, it is nice to see a leading contemporary political scientist return to the world of ideas. To intellectual history. This is not a book of empirical political science. There are no data sets here. Instead, it is a book of history, of political analysis, and of culture change in the best sense. It is a political-culture book, one of the best. For that, we applaud Fukuyama’s work and his enthusiasms even while lamenting that he overreached and overstated his case.

The Clash of Civilizations (Samuel P. Huntington, 1993, 1996)¹⁸

Samuel P. Huntington's *The Clash of Civilizations* is the great counterpoint to Fukuyama's *End of History*. Whereas Fukuyama is perhaps excessively optimistic, Huntington is, perhaps, excessively pessimistic. Whereas Fukuyama predicts a happy ending culminating in democracy, Huntington's analysis foresees war, clash, and conflict. Nevertheless, it is striking that these two great books of the last two decades, indeed I would argue *the two greatest* books, which reach diametrically opposed conclusions, are both political-culture books. That should tell us something, maybe a lot.

Before analyzing Huntington's *Clash*, we need to step back a little and look at his previous book, *The Third Wave*.¹⁹ *Wave*, which deals with the spread of democracy in the world and is thus parallel to Fukuyama's *End of History*, was first presented in article form in 1987 and then as a book in 1991—but, unlike Fukuyama, before the fall of the Soviet Union. *Wave* thus precedes *End* by a year, but what a year that was: the collapse of the Soviet Union, the liberation of Eastern Europe, and the end of the Cold War! Huntington was writing and finishing his *Wave* book, just as all this was happening. With all the attention devoted to *Clash*, *Wave* has been largely forgotten.

The Third Wave, which refers to the various openings to democracy in Asia, Latin America, and Southern Europe beginning in the mid-1970s, is mainly institutional analysis. It is in keeping with Huntington's earliest work going back to the 1950s and 1960s. Some readers will recall his articles of the 1960s, strongly critical of the political socialization/political development school, and his powerful 1968 book, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, in which he emphasized the importance of *institutions* in the process of change, not mass mobilization, social change, or changing political culture.

But during the mid-to-late 1980s, as we have said, Huntington went through a sea-change in his thinking. He went from being an "institutionalist" to being a "political culturalist." More and more, in his writings, teaching, and informal comments, he emphasized the importance of political-cultural variables. Essentially, and that is the point of this digression, *The Third Wave* was written when Huntington was still mainly in his institutionalist mode, but by the time *The Clash of Civilizations* was published, he had become a political-culturalist.

For our purposes, it is essential to emphasize that what Huntington meant by *Clash of Civilizations* was a *Clash of Cultures*. And by *Cultures* Huntington meant the Western or Euro-American one, the Russian or Orthodox one, the Sinic or East Asian one, the Indian or Hindu one, the Islamic Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America. As usual with these global or universal studies, Huntington

18 Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).

19 Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).

was not quite sure what to do with Latin America: he *hoped* it would be part of the Western civilization but he recognized its non-Western aspects.

It was Huntington's thesis that, with the end of the Cold War, future global conflicts would be between cultures or "civilizations" and not necessarily any longer between nation-states. Cultures and identity clash had replaced the struggle for power among nations as the driving force in history, or so Huntington said. Of course, that was overstating the case: witness the struggle for power and status of, for example, China, a rejuvenated Russia, India, Brazil, and others. At the same time, other countries put forth the notion of closer ties among countries and cultures instead of clash: I recall a conference that I attended sponsored by the Turkish government on the theme of "Alliance of Civilizations" as distinct from "Clash."

Nevertheless, Huntington had a point, which most scholars recognized, and that seemed particularly relevant in the time period in which he wrote. Thus in the 1990s as East Asia became more prosperous, more assertive, and surpassed the United States in some measures, the long-term prospects for a clash of these two civilizations, the Western and the Sinic, over power, resources, and other matters, seemed inevitably to grow. But the biggest confirmation of Huntington's thesis came on September 11, 2001, in the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Here was a real clash of civilizations between the West and the Islamic world; recall also that it was not a nation-state seeking power that attacked us on 9/11 but a culture, a "civilization": radical, fundamentalist Islam. Similar and subsequent bombings or killings in Great Britain, Spain, France, and the Netherlands, to say nothing of radical-Islamic attacks on Christians in Egypt, Iraq, Sudan, Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Mali, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Nigeria, Kenya, Ethiopia, the United States, and other countries, seemed to confirm a *worldwide* clash between Islam and Western culture in all its manifestations. In 2001 and thereafter, Huntington looked particularly prescient.

So who is right, Fukuyama or Huntington? Or could it be that both are correct to some degree? Fukuyama was clearly naïve, unrealistic, and too optimistic; on the other hand, while the march of democracy has slowed, it is still as Fukuyama predicted going forward in quite a few areas of the world. As for Huntington, he may have been too pessimistic; for not only, we have figured out, are not all Muslims terrorists, but some Muslim countries—Indonesia, Turkey, Malaysia, maybe Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Iraq, Syria—are becoming democratic. Huntington has the advantage, however, in that, if we weigh the possibilities for a "clash of civilizations," that event may be so far in the indefinite future that we cannot ever rule it out.

There we have, in Fukuyama and Huntington, two of the country's leading public intellectuals, our two visions for the future. The one is peaceful, hopeful, and democratic; the other, cloudy, pessimistic, and violent. Take your pick! Or try to reconcile the two. But, while weighing your choices, keep in mind the extraordinary occurrence: that the two best, most interesting, most provocative books of the last two decades have been political-culture books. And then, if we add in Putnam and now David Landes, we have even more titles that we can add to our "best books" roster.

The Wealth and Poverty of Nations (*Landes, 1998*)²⁰

I consider David Landes's 1998 book (the 1999 paperback version adds an epilogue) to be part of "the renaissance." It is a wonderful book: thoroughly researched, well-written, careful, balanced, provocative, and a pleasure to read. Of all the books of "grand theory" or "grand systems" published in the last several decades, purporting to explain the *world* (no less!)—Ferdinand Braudel, Immanuel Wallenstein, Jared Diamond, Felipe Agüero, and Fareed Zakaria—Landes is the best!

David Landes, now retired, was the Coolidge Professor of History at Harvard. He had a distinguished career even before publishing this *opus magnus*. In the book, Landes seeks to explore why, in the sixteenth century and the succeeding 500 years, Europe and North America forged ahead while the rest of the world lagged behind. Why did Europe and America develop modernize, and become the world's wealthiest, most powerful, and most progressive nations"? And why not Asia and particularly China, which in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries was as developed as Europe and might have claimed the mantle of world leadership? Landes's fine book is an exploration in comparative global history.

In searching for explanations of these regional differences, Landes explores several alternative theories. He examines the role of technology but concludes that is not enough. Geography, resources, climate, environment, and temperature—à la Jared Diamond—are explored but then dismissed by Landes. Karl Wittfogel's thesis of "Oriental Despotism" is similarly examined and then rejected by Landes. He also explores economic determinant approaches, from Marxism to dependency theory to Wallenstein's "world systems." Landes finds a certain validity in several of these explanations but none of them is complete or sufficient by itself.

Landes's book is especially well-researched and balanced. That is why his conclusions are both plausible and convincing. In the end, Landes comes down on the side of culture as the most powerful explanation. In doing so, he revisits the thesis of Max Weber in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* examined earlier in this book. Landes is not a slavish disciple of Weber and is critical of his work in places, but he also recognizes Weber's great contribution: that it is culture, including religion, values, and beliefs, that counts and not just classes, institutions, or material forces.

Why, then, was it Europe that first developed, then North America, but not Asia, at least initially, and not the Middle East, Africa, or Latin America? Landes finds the answer in Europe's greater knowledge buildup. He points to and analyzes in depth three contributing factors in Europe's and North America's greater storehouse of practical, enriching knowledge. The first is the growing autonomy and independence (from kings, churches, landowners, and whomever) of intellectual inquiry and experimentation. The second has to do with the development of modern research methods, which call for active experimentation rather than fatalism or the act of just standing by and observing. And the third is

20 David Landes, *The Wealth and Poverty of Nations* (New York: Norton, 1998).

the routinization of scholarly research through academic journals and professional associations that established standards. Through these methods, Landes argues, Europe and then America built up a knowledge base whose methods and findings, over time, were incorporated in the overall culture and which enabled these areas to modernize while other culture areas showed more limited progress.

The two countries that led the way in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were Great Britain, which during this period forged a global empire and led the way on all indices of modernization, and, on only a slightly smaller scale, the Netherlands, which “fought” and innovated way above its weight. Both these countries *led the world* in science, philosophy, exploration, invention, and experimentation. They were followed, in all these areas, during the nineteenth century, by Germany, France, and the United States. Meanwhile, Eastern Europe, Southern Europe, Latin America, Asia, and the Middle East not only lagged behind but, in fact, lagged farther and farther behind. It was only in the late twentieth century that these peripheral areas of Europe, as well as Asia and other enclaves in the non-Western world, adopted the policies, altered their cultures, and built the institutions that would enable them to begin to catch up.

It is obvious that I really like the Landes book. My preference for Landes is only partially shaped by the fact that his work supports a number of the arguments presented here. It is also well-written, thoroughly researched, a work of serious scholarship, and enjoyable to read. My own preference is to read both Landes’s narrative account (or those of Fukuyama, Huntington, or Putnam) *and* the empirically based studies of Almond and Verba or Inglehart. Between the two, between the careful empiricists, on the one hand, and the reasoned interpretive accounts, on the other, I think we get a pretty accurate and scholarly picture.

*Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind (Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov, 1997)*²¹

This is mainly a European study in political sociology and is not yet well known in the United States. However, it is an important book: first, because the authors set forth a theory and model of culture that applies to *all organizations*—businesses, churches, foundations, and political parties—and not just nation-states, which has been our focus so far. And second, because in setting forth their model, the authors respond to some of the early criticisms of political culture, that it is unsystematic, impressionistic, unverifiable, and, therefore, unscientific. But in this book we have some real scientific breakthroughs: clear definitions, a systematic methodology, testable and verifiable hypotheses, empirical data, and scientifically derived conclusions. I could see *hundreds* of books and dissertations written on political culture based on the ideas and propositions of this book alone. Hofstede et al. provide the theoretical and conceptual bases on which numerous future political-culture studies could be grounded.

21 Geert Hofstede et al., *Culture and Organizations* (New York: Hill, 1997).

We cannot possibly provide here a complete summary of all the rich materials contained in the book. But let us provide at least a flavor. The Hofstede and Minkov start off with two basic research questions. First, are there systematic (latent variable) explanations for cultural differences between countries? Second and even more intriguing, could these observed cultural differences be but different manifestations of a continuous cultural dimension?

The authors started with lots of data, mainly from the early 1980s IBM surveys. They then used factor analysis to find the relationships between sets of questions/responses. They labeled these relationships “cultural dimensions.” The next step was to correlate these cultural dimensions with other social traits—for example, levels of development, levels of modernization, social change, public policy preferences, and the like. As they continued to gather data—new IBM surveys, the Euro-Barometer surveys, the Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior Survey (GLOBE), the Chinese Value Survey, Inglehart’s World Values Surveys—the data *and* the analysis became more sophisticated.

They started with a single dimension, what they call the Power Distance dimension. PD is defined as the extent to which the less-powerful members of a nation or an organization expect and accept that power is distributed unequally. Large PD is associated with greater hierarchy, obedience, authority, and inequality—for example, Russia, Guatemala, and much of the Arab world. Smaller PD is associated with greater independence, individualism, democracy, and decentralization—for example, Costa Rica, Israel, and the US.

Over the course of their research and publications history, the Hofstede team added four more “dimensions.” This proliferation of dimensions reminds me of Talcott Parsons’s 1950s-era “pattern variables.” The other four dimensions are: collectivism (societies with strong protective groups)—individualism (looks after self); femininity (gender roles overlap)—masculinity (clear gender roles); low uncertainty avoidance (leniency)—high uncertainty avoidance (strict rules); indulgence (greater freedom)—constraint (curbing of gratification).

To provide some further understanding of these dimensions as they apply to political culture, we can say that the United States, Great Britain, Israel, and some few other countries tend to be low on Power Distance, are more individualistic, demonstrate mixed masculinity-femininity, are tolerant of high uncertainty, and are indulgent of others’ mistakes. In contrast, continental Europe, especially Latin or Catholic Europe, Latin America, Asia, the Middle East, and Africa tend to be high PD, collectivist, masculine/macho, low uncertainty avoidance, and constraining. Especially interesting is the fact that the Hofstede team started off by using these dimensions to study the political cultures of business organizations; only later, once they had the Euro-Barometer, World Values Surveys, GLOBE et al. did they extend their theory and model to the study of nation-states.

By now, the team has a model that they claim applies to *all* organizations: business firms, labor unions, religious groups, militaries, and national governments. And to both individual and collective (group or nation-state) behavior. In this claim, they again seem to run parallel to Parsons who asserted that his pattern

variables applied to everything from individual behavior and psychology to group behavior and countries. Moreover, the Hofstede team is now extending its analysis into such areas as global cultural and behavioral evolution, public policy, and even world cultural convergence. In these regards they start to sound like our hopeful, wishful friend, Fukuyama. Or perhaps, in their claims to all-encompassing and universal explanatory power, like the institutionalists criticized earlier in this book for becoming “imperialists” by incorporating *everything* in their paradigm.

I find the Hofstede efforts enormously stimulating, worthwhile, and provocative. Their five dimensions, like Parsons’s pattern variables, *do* explain a lot. Their model, theory, and methodology are logically consistent and attractive. But they do perhaps overreach, making claims that their data may not support. They have elevated culture into a single, all-encompassing, all-explaining factor that is similar to the grandiose claims of the Marxists, some institutionalists, or rational-choice advocates.

In this book we have been generally positive toward political-culture explanations, but we have never elevated it to the level of being the *only* or all-encompassing explanation, and we do not think political culture is quite up to that level. Especially when the Hofstede team starts talking about evolutionary psychological development and global cultural convergence, they leave me behind. Hence, our earlier admonition: a tremendously stimulating book, which gives political culture a body of formal theory and testable hypotheses comparable to other leading approaches, but which still needs to be approached skeptically and with the appropriate scholarly reservations, a set of hypotheses rather than a final conclusion.

Culture Matters (*Harrison and Huntington, 2000*)²²

Culture Matters is an edited volume. It comes out of the political-culture research shop at Harvard established by Samuel P. Huntington and for which Huntington once offered me the directorship. After all that, it cannot be a bad book, right?

Culture Matters is not an innovative book; it does not make nor does it claim to make any great theoretical breakthroughs. It does not cover new ground. It does, however, rehearse and well state all the arguments in favor of political culture as an important variable outlined here. Perhaps even more important for students, it contains short versions of all the great political-culture scholars and their books that we have discussed here—Pye, Lipset, Landes, Inglehart, Huntington, Fukuyama, Berger, and many more. It is an excellent collection in brief form of all the main writers in this area of the discipline and their ideas. Of course, as scholars we also want you to go back to the originals, to get the full flavor and the full arguments, but *Culture Matters* is not a bad place to begin.

It is also a good place to end this chapter!

22 Lawrence E. Harrison and Samuel P. Huntington (eds), *Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress* (New York: Basic Books, 2000).

Chapter 8

Non-Western Theories of Development

with Leah L. Carmichael

In the late 1970s, early 1980s, I published a series of articles,¹ later published as a short book,² that set off a firestorm of debate within the discipline. Over the preceding 20 years, based on my field work, research, and writing on the Third World, I had become convinced that neither of the two great alternative paradigms of that time, the Marxian and the developmentalist (Rostow, Lipset, et al.) was particularly useful in studying developing areas. Both of these great systems had their advantages, of course, but neither, based as they were on the Western (European and North American) process of development, accurately captured the dynamics of today's Third World countries. Among other things, neither of these two paradigms paid any attention to culture and culture-area differences; both assumed mistakenly that there was but a single route to development—although the two routes were very far apart and at odds politically and ideologically. Both paradigms were part of the Cold War struggle of that time, with developmentalism as part of US foreign policy and Marxism identified with the Soviet Union.

My research and interviews in the Third World revealed widespread disappointment and disillusionment with both these paradigms. In the context of those times, the 1960s and 1970s, with the military in power in numerous countries of Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East, with widespread human rights abuses, and with economic development not yielding sufficient results, the Third World response was strong criticism and anger at these two paradigms' failure to deliver. Both of these paradigms or models came to be viewed in the Third World as inadequate, imported models that did not fit local conditions, irrelevant to their needs and demands.

Hence, the call began to go out during the 1970s for an indigenous, home-grown model of development. One that reflected authentic *local* needs and realities, not imported from the outside. One that was culture-specific and drew from the grassroots rather than being imposed from above. In some irreverent quarters this was referred to as the "Frank Sinatra model," after one of his great songs,

1 Howard J. Wiarda, "Ethnocentrism and Third World Development," *Society* (Fall 1987); also published in *Estudios Públicos*, 19 (August 1985); and in Jeffrey M. Elliott (ed.), *The Third World* (Guilford, CT: Dushkin, 1989).

2 Howard J. Wiarda, *The Ethnocentrism of Foreign Policy: Can We Understand the Third World?* (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1985).

“Let us do it *our way*.” This model would have to reflect the local or regional culture; hence, there would have to be a distinct African, Asian, Latin American, and Islamic-Arab-Middle East model of development. The argument presaged the later work by Samuel Huntington and others that future issues in the world would be in terms of distinct culture areas or as “civilizations.” No one universal model of development would fit all, no cookie-cutter approach would do.

By this time, a number of development and aid agencies were reaching many of the same conclusions. In 1977 the Peace Corps, the *preeminent* US grassroots development agency, published a significant volume based on their volunteers’ experiences over the previous fifteen years entitled *They Know How*,³ which argued that foreign aid had to be in accord with local needs and ways of doing things, and not imposed by know-it-all “experts” from the outside. About the same time, Leon Clark⁴ and his colleagues at the Center for International Training and Education, a program of the Council on International and Public Affairs, began publishing through their World Cultures programs, a series of books entitled *Through African (Indian, Chinese, Japanese, Middle Eastern) Eyes* with the same theme: that for development and democratization to be successful, they had to be understood through local eyes and adjusted to local conditions. Similarly, at the World Bank and other big development agencies: whereas heretofore these agencies had followed a top-down Rostowian global or universal cookie-cutter model of development (“*We Know Best*”), now belatedly *they* began to hire anthropologists, sociologists, and political scientists who could show the economists manning these agencies how to adapt their development policies to local conditions.⁵

Then, concretely, on the ground, along came the Iranian Revolution of 1979. I have to confess that the Iranian regime is not among my favorites; I had little use for those who at that time captured, tortured, and imprisoned the American diplomats living in their country; I have little sympathy for regimes that oppress women and minorities; and I would not want to live under the Iranian system of rule. Nevertheless, we underestimate at our peril the impact the Iranian Revolution had in galvanizing the Third World. For here was a regime, one of the first, that rejected both the Marxist- and the US-favored development models, that sought

3 IAF, *They Know How: An Experiment in Development Assistance* (Rosslyn, VA: The Inter-American Foundation, 1977).

4 Leon E. Clark, *Through African Eyes: Cultures in Change* (New York: Praeger, 1969); Leon E. Clark and Jack Strauss, *Through Chinese Eyes* (New York: Center for International Training and Education, 1981); Leon E. Clark, *Through Japanese Eyes* (New York: Center for International Training and Education, 1995); Leon E. Clark et al., *Through Indian Eyes* (New York: Center for International Training and Education, 1995); Robert P. Pearson and Leon E. Clark, *Through Eastern Eyes* (New York: Center for International Training and Education, 2002).

5 Maria Donoso Clark, *Social Assessment for Effective Results in HNPO Operations* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2013). This publication is a wonderful manual for those interested in the impact of socio-cultural factors on development.

to create its own indigenous (Islamic) path to development, and has sought ever since that time to fashion an Islamic model of change applicable to the entire Middle East. This model, for all its faults, survives; more than that, it continues to serve as an inspiration for quite a number of developing countries seeking to do it “our way.”

All of this preliminary commentary is prelude to the basic argument of this chapter that development, if it is to be successful, must adapt to local cultures and ways of doing things. There is no one, simple, development model appropriate for all countries. Instead, all countries are different; and they tend to be differentiated along culture-area or civilizational lines: Latin America, East Asia, Russia, Sub-Saharan Africa, the Islamic Middle East, South Asia, etc. For this reason, the following discussion of non-Western theories of development belongs in this book. What distinguishes all these areas is *culture*. Culture is a key (maybe *the key*) element in development. Unless we understand and work through the local culture, no development policy or strategy will work. Once again, culture or “civilizational” factors need to be built back into our political science considerations.

One additional point needs to be made. And that involves the distinction between developed and developing areas, corresponding to the “war” between the “institutionalists” and what we’ll now call the “culturalists.” In already-developed countries, institutions really do count and make a difference. That is why most institutionalists are located in Western Europe or the US and focus their research, with good reason, on institutional analysis. Whereas those of us who study developing areas know that culture and socio-cultural factors still make a big difference, while institutions tend to be weak or even irrelevant. Perhaps this sociology-of-knowledge analysis offers us an “out” from the ongoing debate between the institutionalists and culturalists camps, with institutional analysis being appropriate in some countries and contexts, and cultural analysis in other countries and contexts. My own view is that both approaches are valid, or perhaps both combined, depending obviously on what it is exactly that we wish to examine or research and the time frame and level of development involved.

Prologue

Non-Western approaches to development have been studied and analyzed by social scientists now for some four decades. Their main appeal has been to serve as alternatives to the several, often ill-fitting Western theories of development. Cultural approaches have often failed to blossom, however, into complete theoretical frameworks, providing more guideposts than a complete path or model to development for non-Western states to follow. The rest of this chapter (1) examines the historical factors that motivated non-Western and other scholars to seek alternative, indigenous approaches to development, (2) considers the current

state of these approaches, and (3) discusses the issues that must be resolved so that these approaches may have greater future applicability.

Before continuing, it is important to discuss the terms used in this chapter. *Western* refers to the geographical areas of Western Europe, North America, and a handful of other countries that are fragments (Louis Hartz's term) of the West such as Australia, Canada, or New Zealand. The term *non-Western* refers to all areas and concepts originating outside this Western geographical-cultural-civilizational region. The concept of *development*, first fashionable during the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, suggests the process of change or progress by an individual or state. Knowledge, study, merit, hard work, industry, rationality, and education—all cultural values—were usually seen by Westerners as the keys to improving the individual's lot. By similar diligent effort, presumably, other, non-Western societies and nations could also show progress, developing economically, industrially, and even morally.

During the latter part of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, economists, including Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, and David Ricardo, measured the progress or development of a state in terms of its economic prosperity.⁶ This bias toward the more economic measurements of development continued, for example, in the work of W.W. Rostow, with few exceptions through the mid-twentieth century. We next discuss the historical attention given to economic prosperity *or* per capita income as a key measurement of development while taking into account other measurements used as well (for example, political capacity, improved access to education, social mobilization, etc.).

Western Approaches to Non-Western Development

Early theories of non-Western development originated in the Western world. In the 1950s and 1960s, Western scholars and policy makers increased their focus on non-Western states for several reasons. First, in the 1940s, '50s, and '60s, a large number of new nations emerged on the world stage as former colonies won their independence. Thus, for social scientists, the number of states and societies that could be studied increased rapidly. Moreover, for scholars interested in studying developing areas, these new nations presumably had little understanding of self-governance and a limited capacity to provide their own citizenry with economic growth or basic services. Thus, these scholars were able to examine the difficulties facing new nation-states and prescribe a formula for them; we Westerners would provide the formula. Hence, the early development literature addressed questions such as: how do states develop governmental institutions and encourage political parties? How can economic growth be encouraged? What aspects are essential

6 Adam Smith, *Wealth of Nations* (New York: Classic House, 2009); David Ricardo, *The Principles of Political Economy & Taxation* (London: J.M. Dent & Sons, 1911); T.R. Malthus, *An Essay on the Principle of Population* (London: J.M. Dent & Sons, 1973).

to a functioning constitution? How do states settle border disputes caused by colonially-drawn artificial boundaries?

Second, policy makers became increasingly interested in non-Western states because of the Cold War. There was the Soviet threat, the Chinese revolution, the Korean civil war, revolution in Southeast Asia, and fears of revolution in such important countries as Indonesia, the Philippines, India, and Brazil. The Soviet Union increased its influence by sending missiles to Cuba and assisting revolutionary guerilla movements in Latin America, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. Fearing that the Soviet Union might gain an advantage were other states to become Marxist-Leninist, the US increased the resources and its overall influence in these non-Western regions. It also sought to find a model of development that could compete with Marxism. Developmentalism provided the answer.

Third, multinational corporations in the United States and Europe were very interested in the non-Western states that offered vast natural resources and/or potential markets for manufactured goods. United States policy-makers saw the increase in economic investment in these states as complementary to their goals of containing communism. From their perspective, if these areas experienced an increase in economic investment from the United States or Europe, they would benefit from overall economic growth and an increase in size of the middle class. Consequently, these states would be more politically stable and more resistant to communism. Promoting US business interests in the non-Western states served to complement US policymakers' foreign policy objectives of containing communism.

Finally, there is the matter of logistics. Scholars once fortunate enough to travel abroad just three or four times in a lifetime now had access to modern jet travel and greatly increased funding from the US government. Generous university and private- and government-sponsored fellowships became available to study non-Western countries. As a result, the appeal of studying non-Western states and regions grew. By the end of the 1960s, the study of development in non-Western states was one of the major foci of the social sciences.

Economics as Driving Forces in Development

As the non-Western states and regions became a focus of Western scholars in the 1950s and 1960s, the study of development concentrated mainly on economic growth, and the earliest books on non-Western development were written almost exclusively by economists. Fundamentally, the early developmentalist economists shared four underlying assumptions.

First, economic growth was *the* driving force in development, more so than culture, geography, history, sociology, and politics. Second, social change and political development (i.e., democratization) were the results of economic growth. Third, these economists argued that the European/American model of development, rather than being a particular model based on Europe's or America's unique history

and culture, was *the universal* model of development to be replicated everywhere. Finally, these economists argued that once the economy was primed, the influx of investment would encourage automatic, self-sustained growth. Positive social and political changes (democratization) would inevitably follow.

Notable developmentalist economists from the West in these early years included W.W. Rostow, Everett von Hagen, Bruce Morris, and Robert Heilbroner.⁷ While differing on particulars, they shared the main assumption set forth above. In addition, there were also non-Western scholars, such as Raul Prebisch and the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECCA), that acknowledged locally distinct conditions, but nevertheless echoed the argument that economic development was key and that Western states provided the model that non-Western states should emulate.

The most influential among this group of scholars and, later, among policymakers was Rostow. In his book titled *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto*, Rostow presents five stages of economic growth: (1) traditional society (i.e., backward, underdeveloped), (2) establishment of the preconditions for takeoff (i.e., political stability and national unity), (3) the takeoff (i.e., rapid economic growth but limited in extent and area), (4) the drive to maturity, and (5) the age of high mass consumption. See Figure 8.1.⁸



Figure 8.1 Rostow's Five Stages of Development

Rostow's five stages were built on the underlying assumptions shared by most developmentalist economists that all societies had to go through each of these stages: that the driving force to move a society through these stages was economic growth, that progression from one stage to the next was inevitable and automatic, and that US- or European-style democracy would be the inevitable end product. Rostow and the early economists of development paid no or scant attention to cultural differences.

7 Everett von Hagen, *On the Theory of Social Change: How Economic Growth Begins* (Homewood, IL: Dorsey Press, 1962); Bruce Morris, *Economic Growth and Development* (New York: Pitman, 1967); Robert Heilbroner, *The Great Ascent: The Struggle for Economic Development in Our Time* (New York: Harper and Row, 1963); W.W. Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto* (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1960).

8 Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto* (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1960).

Expansion into Other Fields

Though originating within the field of economics, the theories of development advanced by these early writers soon expanded into other fields within the social sciences.

Cultural Anthropology

Developmental anthropology originated during the 1950s. In response to the early individual case-study approach pioneered by Franz Boas, Margaret Mead, Ruth Benedict, and others, the newer developmental anthropologists tended to search for *patterns* of development shared among distinct societies and cultures. Though not as well-known as the economists and without much impact on policy, anthropologist Francis X. Sutton's "Social Theory and Comparative Politics" (1954) was enormously influential in the early academic studies and literature of development, providing an essential link between the theories of the economists, on the one hand, and the sociologists and political scientists, on the other.⁹

Sutton assumed that distinct cultures move from traditionalism to modernity through similar processes in measurable and comparable ways. He suggested that all societies could be placed along a continuum and their progress from traditionalism to modernism could be charted. Though sensitive to the particular uniqueness of each society being examined, the dichotomy presented by Sutton mirrored the argument posited by Rostow and the economists that all societies were inevitably moving along, by stages, on a linear path toward modernity. Sutton's formulation from the point of culture studies and social theory had a major impact on such developmentalists as Gabriel A. Almond and the important Social Science Research Council Committee on Comparative Politics (SSRC/CCP), which in the 1960s and 1970s strongly shaped our understanding of developing countries.

Sociology

Unlike the economists who, naturally enough, indicated economic growth as *the* driving force in development, sociologists tended to argue that social change and mobilization needed to accompany economic growth so as to bring about political change. The renowned German sociologist Max Weber had argued that societies evolved in three stages, from choosing traditional types of authority (for example, chiefs and clan heads) in their earliest stages, charismatic or colorful personalities

9 Francis X. Sutton, "Social Theory and Comparative Politics." Paper presented for the Committee on Comparative Politics, Social Science Research Council, Princeton University, 1954.

(*caudillos* or men-on-horseback) in their transitional stages, to regularized, merit-based bureaucratic, or rational authority at their fully developed stage.¹⁰

Talcott Parsons, Weber's translator and major American disciple, developed what he called *pattern variables* to distinguish between traditional and modern societies. See Figure 8.2.¹¹

Traditional Society		Modern Society
Ascription	➡	Merit
Particularism	➡	Universalism
Functionally diffuse	➡	Functionally specific

Figure 8.2 Parsons's Pattern Variables

Though these variables added a new layer of complexity to the method of classifying societies, in reality most societies may not identify with either the "traditional" or "modern" patterns but may instead resemble something in between or else complex, ever-changing mixtures of both sets of features. As an example, a developing country in Africa or Latin America might show both patterns of ascription (prizing *who* you know over *what* you know) and merit (prizing *what* you know over *who* you know) at the same time. Thus, it would be necessary to understand how each variable is measured and their complex overlap to determine into which category a society falls. Further though Parsons does argue that societies are moving from traditionalism to modernity, he does not explain how and why this change occurs. What is the motor force: is it culture change, economic development, or social modernization (greater literacy, urbanization, etc.)?

Political Science

While the scholars mentioned above were examining economic and social reasons for development in non-Western societies, Gabriel Almond's pioneering work, *The Politics of Developing Areas*, focused on the main political factors driving development.¹² Almond, building on Sutton and Parsons, was particularly

10 Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," in *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, eds. Max Weber, Hans Heinrich Gerth, and C. Wright Mills (New York: Galaxy Books, 1958).

11 Talcott Parsons, *The Social System* (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1951).

12 Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman (eds), *The Politics of Developing Areas* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1960).

interested in political socialization and political culture. He argued that all states shared a similar set of political functions that must be performed. While most of these functions were institutional (law-making, etc.), culture changes, according to Almond, were also required. Without addressing his entire argument here, Almond's work used Parsons's pattern variables and systems analysis (i.e., input-decision-making-output) to explain the political systems present in each state (see Figure 8.3), dividing the world into "developed" and "developing" countries.

Almond's Functional Model of Political Activity




Figure 8.3 Almond's Functional Model of Political Activity

Source: Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman (eds), *The Politics of Developing Areas* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1960).

Though Almond's work was extremely popular at the time and provided many scholars and graduate students with the desired framework to explain development in non-Western states, some saw his ideal modern political system as merely a representation of the American liberal, democratic model. Thus, his work seemed yet again, as did Rostow's and others, to echo the ethnocentric assumption that the Western model was the ideal for which all developing states should strive.

Developmentalism's Influence on US Foreign Policy

During the 1960s, the developmentalist approach gained increasing appeal in academia and was seen as the guiding framework for US foreign policy. Academically, the developmentalist approach dominated the fields of anthropology, economics, sociology, political science, comparative politics, and

Third World studies. Though its initial appeal in these areas was that it purported to explain the process of development in newly independent non-Western states, developmentalism also served as a means for justifying and reinforcing the historical development choices made by Western states. That is, since democracy is presumably the end product of this process, and since we are democratic, we must have been making the right choices all along.

Politically, developmentalism became *the* approach underlying US assistance programs and policies toward emerging nations. There are many reasons why developmentalism was the cornerstone of US, assistance programs and policies during this period. First, quite a number of the same scholars that the U.S. government funded during the 1950s and 1960s to present a more specialized understanding of non-Western states and societies later went to work for the government where they could put their ideas into practice. The prime example is W.W. Rostow who left his academic position at MIT to work as head of the Policy Planning Staff at the State Department. Later he was the chief architect of John Kennedy's Alliance for Progress in Latin America, of the I.U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the National Security Adviser to President Lyndon Johnson. During the 1960s period of the New Frontier and the Great Society, numerous academic economists, political scientists, sociologists, and cultural anthropologists went into the US government to work on development policy, including, in many cases, on the ill-fated Vietnam policy.

A second reason that developmentalism was so popular is that it presented a single solution for a large number of states. It was universal! It was not necessary to understand the specific culture, history, politics, religions, or ethnicities of the people of a given country or region in order to provide economic assistance. Instead, based on developmentalism's underlying assumption that economic growth and investment would be *the* driving focus for development and democratization in all countries, the United States poured money into non-Western states in the form of foreign aid and development assistance on the assumption that this model would work for all.

Such an influx of resources, however, did not always result in stimulating the economy or producing democracy but, more often than not, was used by corrupt officials to line their own pockets or as patronage to buy favors from friends and supporters. Corrupt rulers in the 1960s, 1970s, and even into the 1980s, such as Marcos in the Philippines, Suharto in Indonesia, the Shah of Iran, the Somoza family in Nicaragua, and numerous dictators in Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East benefitted from the assistance provided by the United States, but without providing either development or democracy. Critics began to argue that Rostow and the developmentalist economists may have gotten the stages of development backwards. That is, a state must first have an honest, democratic regime, they argued, that would be more accountable to its citizens before meaningful economic progress could occur.

Similar flaws appeared within the sociology literature. Most sociologists interested in development argued that social mobilization would need to precede democratization. The logic is that, as the peasantry and working class grow in

influence, newly formed democratic governments would necessarily become more inclusive, *pluralistic*, and democratic. In reality, however, the elites in Third World countries were mainly concerned that the social mobilization of these groups would inevitably lead to either their own removal from power peacefully through the electoral process or violently through a Marxian revolution.¹³

Thus, during the 1960s and early 1970s, the elites mainly in Africa, Asia, and Latin America organized a wave of right-wing military takeovers that overthrew fledgling democracies, suppressed the working class and the peasantry, and restored oligarchic and authoritarian regimes for the ensuing decade and more. Rather than social mobilization producing democratization, it often resulted in oppression and authoritarianism.

Developmentalism in the 1950s and 1960s had appealed to both Western and some non-Western scholars because it offered a clear explanation and “model” for how, presumably, all non-Western states could develop: economic investment would inevitably and automatically lead to greater social mobilization and, ultimately, to political development (i.e., democratization). Further, this theoretical framework appealed to US policymakers because it offered clear strategies for combating communism in non-Western states when Cold War tensions were highest. As the United States continued to pour money into non-Western states and encourage social mobilization of the peasant and working classes, however, it became clear that economic investment and social mobilization did not always or necessarily result in development or democratization. Instead, many of the authoritarian regimes and their supporting elites in non-Western states became wealthier and more powerful as a result.

By the late 1970s and early 1980s, many Western and non-Western intellectuals and political leaders had become disillusioned by the inherent ethnocentrism, the authoritarianism, and the delayed, often skewed, results of developmentalism. Further, they were disillusioned by the effects of failed US foreign policy objectives based upon developmentalism, such as in Vietnam. Marxism also seemed to have failed in those poverty-ridden states (Angola, Cuba, North Vietnam, North Korea, and others) that had opted for that formula. In response, many non-Western intellectuals in the late 1970s and early 1980s began calling for new, non-Western approaches to development that would be indigenous to their own countries and regions. The next section highlights the growing popularity of non-Western or indigenous approaches to development

Non-Western Approaches to Development

Throughout the late 1970s to mid-1980s, a growing non-Western critique of the Western theories and models of development was coupled with a growing search

13 Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968).

for indigenous alternatives based on local traditions rather than those imported from the West. Though some critiques of Western developmentalism had been growing earlier, by the mid-1970s these criticisms were far more pervasive, more pointedly articulated, and more widely accepted by non-Western leaders and societies as a whole.

First, non-Western scholars and critics emphasized that the main theories of developmentalism were rooted in a specific European and Western philosophical, cultural, and political tradition and were modeled in a unique historical and social context. Thus, these theories had little applicability in the non-Western world. For example, Western political sociology assumes that bureaucratization and urbanization accompanied and were products of industrialization, but Latin American scholars countered that urbanization and bureaucratization were preindustrial phenomena in their region and thus require a different kind of analysis.¹⁴

Second, not only is the sequencing or stages in the development process of non-Western states going to be different from the Western model (and from each other), but also the international context in which these states are developing is notably different. In the nineteenth century, when Great Britain, Germany, Japan, and the United States were developing, these countries were able to do so relatively autonomously. However, the non-Western states, developing during the last half of the twentieth century, were doing so in a Cold War and increasingly globalized context. Thus, politically they were often used as pawns in the struggles for influence between the United States and the Soviet Union. Countries had also become much more economically interdependent following World War II, while smaller states were increasingly more dependent on outside capital, technology, and markets for their products.¹⁵

Third, the theory of developmentalism has, both intentionally and unintentionally, been used as a tool for keeping the non-West within the Western orbit. For example, developmentalism focused on the importance of distinctly *Western* institutions to aid in development (e.g., trade unions and political parties). Doing so, it oftentimes failed to fully examine existing institutions (e.g., tribes, castes, religious institutions, clan groups, patronage networks, extended family ties, etc.) that may have served important functions in the local or indigenous development process. In many cases, US policy served to erode or eliminate these existing groups and institutions prior to the establishment of new, presumably “modern” ones. Thus, the development agendas of the West may have served to undermine the institutions that could have assisted in the transition to real modernity of the non-West.

Though most non-Western intellectuals focused on critiquing the ill-fitting Western model of development during this time period, a few began to assert non-

14 Claudio Veliz, *The Centralist Tradition in Latin America* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980).

15 Douglas A. Chalmers, *Changing Latin America* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972).

Western alternatives to development. Most shared the common goal of taking into account local conditions in order to provide a better analysis of what is needed for a country to develop. Before providing descriptions for the various non-Western approaches to development, three caveats must be noted.

First, these are *approaches* and not necessarily full-fledged *theories* of development. Some approaches provide the beginnings of a theory (e.g., some isolate mechanisms that will bring about change or development). Most, however, serve as a cluster of ideas or observations as to what is distinct or unique about the development process as it occurs in each region.

Second, these approaches are organized by region and cultural area. When organizing non-Western approaches by regions, we are in danger of oversimplifying the subject-matter at hand, for there is great diversity of thought and practice *within* each region as well as *among* them. Think of China versus Japan, Brazil versus Argentina, Shia versus Sunni Islam, or Iran versus Turkey as models for the Islamic world. Simultaneously, by stressing the differences *among* each region's approach to development, one is also in danger of failing to see the parallels that may exist among these regions and their developmental processes.

Finally, we should keep in mind that here we provide only a brief historical account of the major social and intellectual dimensions of the several non-Western approaches to development. Though this section provides the foundational aspects for each region's approach to development, it is by no means a comprehensive list of all approaches or their variations.

Indian Approaches to Development

The Western model of development assumes that economic growth will lead to social mobilization of the masses and finally end in greater political development, or democratization. The Indian experience has been quite different. Democracy in India was not a product of economic growth or social mobilization, but was introduced by India's intellectuals within the independence movement *before* much economic growth or social change had taken place.¹⁶ The leaders of the independence movement in India attempted to graft the liberal democratic institutions inherited from Britain onto an existing culture filled with ethnic, cultural, regional, and religious diversity. Democratization thus, contrary to Rostow, *preceded* industrialization.

Lloyd and Susanne Rudolph, furthermore, suggest that initially the caste system of India, usually viewed in the development literature as a "traditional institution" bound to disappear under the impact of modernization, in fact *aided* in the political participation of people previously disenfranchised because it aligned people of

16 A.H. Somjee, "Non-Western Theories of Development: Critiques and Explorations" in *New Directions in Comparative Politics* (3rd edition), ed. Howard J. Wiarda (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2002), 119–40.

common social and political interests—"identity politics"; see the next chapter)—with one another.¹⁷ Subsequently, A.H. Somjee argued that the caste system had transformed itself from below and within as people, now familiar with the political process, began to vote outside their caste associations.¹⁸ Thus, in India one could argue that traditional cultural and social institutions such as caste, at least initially (and maybe still today), aided political development by bringing more people into the political system and converting the caste associations into modern interest groups. Irrespective of the contrasting claims, a vast literature now exists in India suggesting that its democracy should be built on an indigenous basis, including the caste associations, and not just on imported British institutions.¹⁹

Following independence, Prime Minister Nehru's focus on economic growth was seen as operating in tandem with the goal of increased political participation.¹⁹ As a result, he chose a more socialistic and statist form of economic growth based on the European model that focused on investment in public rather than private entities. By the 1990s, however, it was clear that vast government resources were being inefficiently squandered on a corrupt, self-serving bureaucracy and political class.

In response to this self-realization and the phenomenal economic successes of many of its Asian neighbors, India eventually developed an economic model that mirrored the Asian Tigers' systems more closely than the Western European varieties of free-market capitalism. Correspondingly, in his work, *Beyond Marxism: Towards an Alternative Perspective*, Vrajendra Raj Mehta argues that perspectives of Indian development must be viewed multidimensionally.²⁰ That is, development of a whole society does not occur in one area at a time (e.g., the economy first, then society, and finally the government) but rather each area develops simultaneously.

This sentiment is echoed in Somjee's work when he states, "in the Asian development scene, where tigers and dragons occupy the center stage, the Indians decided to make their country a development tortoise so as to avoid the future nemesis of neglecting the participatory aspects of their overall development."²¹ Thus, an Indian approach to development may focus on both imported models of development combined with local, indigenous institutions and ways of doing things.

17 Lloyd and Susanne Rudolph, *The Modernity of Tradition: Political Development in India* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1967).

18 A.H. Somjee, "Caste and the Decline of Political Homogeneity," *The American Political Science Review*, 67 No.3 (1973), 799–816.

19 A.H. Somjee, "India: A Challenge to Western Theories of Development" in *Non-Western Theories of Development*, ed. Howard J. Wiarda (Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 1999), 44–63.

20 Vrajendra Raj Mehta, *Beyond Marxism: Towards an Alternative Perspective* (New Delhi, India: Manohar Publications, 1985).

21 A.H. Somjee, "India: A Challenge to Western Theories of Development."

Middle Eastern Approaches to Development

The attraction of indigenous theories of development has arguably affected the Islamic world more than anywhere else. There are several reasons for this. First, in the Koran and the Shariah, Islam has a coherent set of beliefs, a legal system, and civil guidelines that could serve as components of indigenous political, social, and cultural models. Second, imported models from the West, where they have been tried, have generally failed to produce either development or democracy in this region. Third, there is an overall popular frustration at the lack of domestic and international economic success in these states. Fourth, as indicated, the Iranian Revolution (1979) provided an early “Islamic model” for others to emulate.

Deep divisions, however, both within this region and even within individual states as to the practicable interpretations of Islam, make it difficult to ascertain if Islam can provide a model of development or not. The laws of Islam may address models for organizing social and political life, creating an “Islamic” system of banking, and providing laws for governing. It is unclear, however, what Islam could consider ideal political institutions (i.e., that may provide the basic needs for its people). Different interpretations could argue for an authoritarian, despotic, or democratic form of government. Moreover, the current “civil war” between the Shia and Sunni forms of Islam, or whether theocratic Iran or democratic Turkey should be the model to follow, does not auger well for a unified “Islamic theory” of governance and development.

Islamic political theory has been generally thought to support authoritarianism, but democracy is not condemned, and the so-called “Arab Spring” may offer some greater hope for democracy. At the same time, while the *Koran* urges social justice and consultation, it is very vague on the institutional mechanisms for achieving these, giving rise to much abuse. Moreover, some Islamic leaders and the ulema (clerics) may be willing to use specific interpretations of Islam for their own political purposes, while the Iranian revolution has proven less attractive to other Arab leaders. With such varied political motivations guiding present interpretations of Islam, few assessments or conclusions as to the viability of an Islamic model of development have been put forth.

Sub-Saharan African Approaches to Development

During the 1960s, following independence from colonial rule, initial optimism and euphoria were replaced in many African states by economic and political collapse and disintegration. Both Western developmentalism and the Marxist-Leninist models encouraged African states to move away from tribalism and ethnicity-based groups in order to modernize.²² These groups, however, had provided some

22 Lana Wylie, “Sub-Saharan Africa: Western Influence and Indigenous Realities” in *Non-Western Theories of Development*, ed. Howard J. Wiarda.

basic social services (e.g., police protection, education, and health care). Ill-fitting Western institutions, including constitutions, parliaments, and political parties, were alien to a majority of the people and often collapsed within months or years, to be replaced by authoritarian or strong-man governments.

New leaders of African states were often educated in Western countries and returned to Africa with the intention of fashioning Western-style governments and, most often, socialist economies. These experiments, too, proved unsuccessful and, after a brief flirtation with democracy, many of these new states collapsed into authoritarianism and single-party systems. Over the decades since independence, some homegrown institutions have replaced ill-fitting Western ones, often using tribe or ethnicity as the basis of political organization. Political systems designed as decentralized, consociational, or federal-type regimes using local ethnic organizations are present in many African states and may offer some hope for greater stability in the future. Presently, the dominant assessment is that indigenous models of development have proved no more successful in Africa than imported ones.

Latin American Approaches to Development

Latin America offers a unique blend of Western institutions from the republican period, semi-feudal traditions adopted from Portugal and Spain during the Middle Ages, and indigenous institutions and practices inherited from the area's native people. During the 1960s, 1970s, and even 1980s, some Latin American intellectuals claimed either dependency theory or corporatism (or both!) as *their own* indigenous institutions and, therefore, provided no choice but to adopt, however weak and unstable, Western, mainly North American ways and institutions.

Whether or not that is the case, for the last three decades the region has been democratizing and becoming increasingly integrated into the globalized international economy. Thus, the call for a distinct Latin American model of development has been quieted by a growing interest by Latin American populations and policymakers in following the Western system of democracy, human rights, and a mixed, public-private economic model. In Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, Paraguay, Venezuela, Guatemala, and even Mexico, however, there are interesting experiments underway with indigenous or mixed (Western, indigenous) models. It is too soon to fully assess these experiments but so far they appear to have not been particularly effective.

Russian and Eastern European Approaches to Development

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Eastern European countries and those countries that were formerly a part of the Soviet space, were able to assert nationalistic and ethnic traditions and identities that they could not before. Within Central and Eastern Europe, some states have connected more with the Western model

of development (e.g., Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, the Baltic states, and Slovenia), while others have not or have done so only partially (e.g., Belarus, the Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia, Albania, and Moldova).

Dale Herspring divides the latter group into two categories, those that have not experienced much economic growth (e.g., Belarus, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, and Moldova) and those with little economic growth *and* severe existing ethnic/cultural tensions (e.g., Serbia, the Ukraine, Croatia, Kosovo, and Bosnia).²³ They are divided between their pro-Western aspirations and their often ethnic and cultural orientation toward Russia. Though Croatia and perhaps Serbia arguably are moving toward the more Western model of development (both are currently candidates for accession to NATO and the European Union), powerful ethnic and identity tensions still remain below the surface. Ultimately, the states in these two groups seem to be following one of two paths: either the Western approach to democracy and development or economic stagnation. But there is no real, *indigenous* model for them to follow other than nationalism and the desire that the West not look too closely at their internal politics.

The debate continues within Russia as to whether it belongs as a member of the Western and European culture and society or something else (e.g., Slavic, Eastern, Asian, etc.). Belarus, the Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia show similar divisions. Their proximity to Western Europe and the requirements for entry into the European Union and NATO, to say nothing of history and culture, have generally kept these countries within reach of the Western tradition or at least partially so. With the exception of such ingredients as nationalism, statism, religion, strains of authoritarianism, and pride in its Slavic distinctiveness, there is yet no serious effort to construct a full-fledged and uniquely *Russian* theory of development, although under President Putin some efforts have been made in this direction. His talk of a unique "Russian Civilization" (à la Huntington), built on Orthodoxy and an authoritarian state, has both alarmed Russia's near neighbors who fear they may again be sucked into the Russian orbit, and democratic and ethnic minority elements within Russia who fear they may be excluded from this renewed nationalistic and jingoistic agenda.

East Asian Approaches to Development

There are strong non-Western traditions (e.g., Confucianism, Shintoism, and Taoism) present within East Asia which could provide the basics of a framework for a unique, Asian and non-Western approach to development. East Asian states tend to be strong states, corporately organized, generally autonomous from social and economic interest groups, but with close links between business and the state. Thus, the purpose of modernization within most Asian countries has not been

23 Dale Herspring, "Eastern Europe and the Search for a Democratic Political Culture" in *Non-Western Theories of Development*, ed. Howard J. Wiarda.

necessarily to benefit certain pluralist interest groups or a strong civil society; rather, modernization has been state-led and its purpose is the re-strengthening of the state, often through corporatist-like controls of civil society. As a result, Asian states have been able to carry out phenomenally successful economic policies while maintaining stability and order in society.

There is no doubt that the East Asian Tigers (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong; now China, Malaysia, Vietnam, Thailand, Macao, and perhaps others) have experienced great economic success through this state-led model of economic growth. The lasting question, however, is whether the emphasis on the order, discipline, top-down political rule, and social order inherent in Confucianism are sufficient foundations for a complete East Asian theory of development. There are, of course, distinct "Asian values," but do these constitute a unique and distinctive developmental model?

One difficulty in beginning to discern whether an East Asian model is possible is the extreme diversity within the region. For example, though Confucianism is a common element in all the East Asian states, it is overlain with different cultural and religious influences (e.g., Taoism, Shintoism, etc.) that shape different outcomes. Japan, China, and South and North Korea, although sharing a common Confucian tradition, are very different countries. Thus, it is unclear what commonalities exist because of the legacy of Confucianism within these states, and which features of them are products of other factors entirely. Or, alternatively, has East Asia now entered an era of post-Confucianism that is simply pragmatic and realistic?²⁴ Finally, it should seem obvious that there is a vast difference between Japan's democratic, more open, but still state-led growth, and China's model of a continued quasi-Leninist, top-down, economy and political system.

General Criticisms of the Non-Western Approaches to Development

It is striking how many of these non-Western theories have *culture* and *cultural differences* at their base. Whether we are talking of India and its identity politics, the Middle East and Islam, sub-Saharan Africa with its ethnic and tribal divisions, corporatism and organic-statism in Latin America, or Confucianism in East Asia, it is *culture* or Huntington-like *civilizational differences* that are most at dispute. And yet, it is equally striking in our all-too-brief analyses of these distinct regions or culture areas that *nowhere* do we find a complete or fully successful *indigenous* model of development.

The non-Western approaches surveyed here must be subjected to the same kind of analysis and criticism used on the Western theory of development. Though each may receive its own specific criticisms as well, there are three general problems associated with non-Western approaches to development. First, non-Western

24 Peter Moody, *Tradition and Modernization in China and Japan* (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Press, 1995).

approaches to development are oftentimes perpetuated by groups or elites within a state that wish to preserve their own parochial positions of power rather than to benefit society as a whole. Thus, simply because a model is non-Western does not mean it is representative of the majority of the population in any given state.

Second, the sheer diversity of ideas and paradigms within a given region or culture area oftentimes is the greatest impediment to formulating a clear, applicable, area-wide approach to development. Thin, for example, of the differences between Indonesia, Yemen, and Dubai within the Islamic world, or between China and Japan in Asia, or Uruguay and Paraguay in Latin America.

Third, though all these indigenous approaches offer important perspectives on development within their own societies, none of these approaches could be considered a full-fledged theory, let alone a *model*. Instead, they are pre-theories or partial theories, and they often mix and overlap imported Western models with home-grown and often very traditional ways of doing things.

The next section will examine the current state of the debate on non-Western theories of development and the main issues that must be resolved so that these approaches might be more applicable in the future.

Changes to the World Order

At a time when criticisms of the non-Western approaches to development were emerging, several changes in the international system changed the world balance and shifted the perspective and arguments over non-Western development again. Among the changes were the fall of the Berlin Wall, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, and the collapse of the Soviet Union. These changes, combined with advances in global communication technology, and travel, resulted in the globalization of Western culture. Non-Western states were unsure as to whether they could maintain their indigenous values in the face of the growing Western and global influence. At the same time, the free market system of the West seemed to have triumphed over both socialism and statism. In a strong sense, globalization means Westernization, the internet, the worldwide web, the English language, global business, democracy, etc. And in the 1990s, that model seemed to have emerged as “the only game in town.”

Within the field of development studies, scholars debated the new relationships forming between the West and non-West and the implications these relationships had on non-Western development. The main research questions during this time included: How did the emergence of the United States as the clear victor in the Cold War affect the development of non-Western states? Has Westernism now triumphed? With the spread of Western culture throughout the world, what is the current and future balance between West and non-West cultures? Has Western globalization rendered moot the earlier arguments about a plurality of approaches to development? Why have some non-Western states openly defended their culture from the onslaught of Western influence, while other states have readily adopted Western culture?

Development scholars approached these questions in different ways, from Francis Fukuyama's view that all paths of development are leading to the same goal of democratization ("the end of history"), to Samuel P. Huntington's assertion that future conflicts between the West and non-West will be along cultural, or civilizational lines, not between nation-states.

In Fukuyama's book, *The End of History and the Last Man*, he argues that, though development has not been linear—with instability, uncertain commitments to liberal values, and even lapses back into authoritarian rule prevalent throughout the world—all nation-states will eventually adopt a more-or-less liberal-democratic model.²⁵ Fukuyama acknowledges that modern liberal democracy has its roots in the West; he argues, however, that just because the liberal democratic model originates in the West does not mean it lacks universal applicability. Further, he states that the prevalence of liberal democracies worldwide has less to do with the influence of a single dominant hegemon (the US) and more to do with the social evolution of humankind, which leads to the adoption of more and more democratic principles. This is essentially the Rostow-Lipset-Almond argument of the 1950s to 1960s restated in new form.²⁶

In direct response to Fukuyama, his former teacher, Samuel Huntington, wrote an article in *Foreign Affairs* in 1993, "The Clash of Civilizations," which was later expanded into his book, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order*.²⁷ Huntington's main thesis is that, with the end of the Cold War, conflicts will occur more often along cultural, rather than theological or political lines. He argues that Western universalism is not so much going forward but rather global politics is becoming multipolar and multicivilizational. He further suggests that the West may even be declining in relative influence as Asian civilizations and perhaps others are increasing in influence, and that an alliance between Islam and Asian civilizations against the West may be likely. Huntington argued that the survival of the West depends both on Americans reaffirming their Western identity and their accepting Western civilization as unique, not universal.

Though Huntington's work is provocative, there is little support for his view that full-scale conflict between civilizations is or will be occurring anytime soon. Furthermore, conflicts that do occur more often than not are found *within* cultural areas or societies (e.g., Iraq and Afghanistan) rather than between them. Instead, in the different regions around the world, aspects of Western and non-Western culture appear to be intermeshed, overlain, or blended. Japan provides a good

25 Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 1992).

26 Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," *American Political Science Review*, 53 No. 2 (1959), 69–105.

27 Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs*, 72 No. 3 (1993), 22–49; Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).

example. Borrowing, copying, or synthesizing the technology and organizational models of the West, Japan has adapted these to historic and preferred Japanese forms and structures of doing things.²⁸

Another provocative work is Peter Berger and Samuel Huntington's co-edited volume, *Many Globalizations: Cultural Diversity in the Contemporary World*.²⁹ The contributors to this work suggest that globalization is not simply the spread of American culture around the globe but a highly complex interaction of cultures in which the results of the interaction are varied. In this volume Berger argues that there are "many globalizations"—i.e., a diversity and plurality of modernizations—occurring simultaneously around the world, not any one, single process or endpoint.

Movement toward Non-Western Theories of Development

Until recently, scholars studying development seemed to be placing the non-Western and the Western models of development at endpoints on a spectrum. At one end, Fukuyama and the developmentalists believed that, with time, the non-West would be subsumed by Western values and institutions. At the other end, Huntington and Berger argue that cultures would maintain their distinct validity and clashes between cultures would ensue. Many scholars believe that most non-Western states will fall somewhere in the middle of these extremes, choosing to adopt some Western components while maintaining traditional and indigenous ones as well.

Ultimately, however, this chapter charts the progress, or possibilities, of non-Western states in terms of their ability to adopt or withstand the onslaught of Western values. For non-Western *theories* of development to be created, scholars must move beyond viewing the developing world as what it is not (i.e., *non-West*) and begin to examine what it is.

As noted earlier, this is not easily done since most writings on these regions provide a cluster of ideas or approaches to development. Few, however, offer clear mechanisms for how change is mobilized within a given society, state, or culture area, let alone a full-fledged *theory*. In his chapter, "Non-Western Theories of Development: Critiques and Explorations,"³⁰ A.H. Somjee offers some strategies for beginning to reconstruct some viable non-Western theories of development.

First, he suggests we recognize that different regions may have common as well as specific features. He argues it is acceptable to identify the common problems—e.g., poverty and inequality—but one must be careful not to focus only on what

28 T.O. Wilkinson, "Family Structure and Industrialization in Japan," *American Sociological Review*, 27 (1962), 678–82.

29 Peter L. Berger and Samuel Huntington, *Many Globalizations: Cultural Diversity in the Contemporary World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).

30 A.H. Somjee, "Non-Western Theories of Development: Critiques and Explorations" in *New Directions in Comparative Politics*, 3rd edition, ed. Howard J. Wiarda (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2002), 119–40.

these distinct regions have in common. Instead, he suggests that we also articulate the features that are unique to a given region. By examining both the common and the specific features in each situation, Somjee suggests we may avoid assuming commonalities or universal trend lines that are not there, or labeling a given region as “exceptional” when it indeed shares some common features with other regions.

Additionally, with the global spread of Western culture, many regions and countries, Japan most successfully, now Abu Dhabi, Dubai, and others as well, have blended traditional and Western components into something wholly new and different. Thus, when looking at distinct features in a given region, it may be worthwhile to distinguish between specific causative factors that have existed prior to globalization and more recent features developed in response to globalization. Different countries will arrive at different cultural, social, and political features and combinations.

Second, all theories need to explain the causes of change. This does not mean that all processes of development begin with the same factors. Further, the endpoints of development for each society may be different. To construct a theory of development, however, one must explain how certain factors operate to bring about change. Is it culture, sociology, institutions, economics, politics, or, most likely, some combination of all of these? The answer may vary from country to country.

Third, Somjee recommends that scholars become less bound by their own academic specializations (for example, political science, sociology, and economics). Doing so, he suggests, will allow more leeway when looking at which factors play an important role in the development process. For example, if one is a political scientist, it may be hard to focus on sociological or cultural factors; economists have a hard time understanding political as well as cultural factors, and so on. By keeping an open mind and suspending one’s own biases, one may be able to empirically isolate the most important factors in development and thereby construct newer and better theory.

Fourth, Western scholars would benefit from studying the culture, the institutions, and the practices that are important to the society they are examining rather than viewing it through their own rose-colored glasses. A good dose of empathy and understanding is necessary.

Finally, rather than assuming that the processes of development are linear, scholars should accept that development may be the result of a complex interaction of factors. Though initially scholars may not be able to comprehend all the factors at play in a given process of development, theoretical construction is an ongoing effort that periodically needs strengthening in specific areas, pruning in others, and radically altering that which leads us nowhere.³¹

31 Ibid.

Chapter 9

Political Culture in Other Fields: Identity Politics and Constructivism

“Identity politics” is the most recent version, or the latest incarnation, of political culture. Identity politics first came into popular usage, after bubbling around previously in the academic literature for some 20 years, during the 1990s winning election campaigns of Bill and Hillary Clinton. At the time, no one but a few academic and political specialists understood what the term meant, but it quickly proved to be a powerful political tool both in those campaigns and in the election victories of Barack Obama in 2008 and 2012. Playing “identity politics” enabled both the Clintons and Obama to put together the political coalitions that carried them to impressive election victories. In the last decade or so, to bring this analysis up-to-date, it seems like almost everyone is “doing,” researching, and writing about identity politics.

Something similar is happening in the subfield of international relations. What we are saying here is that, while political culture studies in the broader field of political science have waxed and waned—and then waxed again, in the form of the “renaissance” of political culture—they have also been re-thought, re-conceptualized, and re-formulated and re-constituted in new forms, including now as identity politics. Specifically, in the IR field, after a long (and ongoing) debate between realists, liberal internationalists, and now neoclassical realists, a fourth school of thought, called “constructivism,” has emerged. Constructivism, in its essence, much like “identity politics” in political science and comparative politics more generally, is a way to build political culture—a country’s values, beliefs, ideology, and culture, and not just anarchic power politics as the realists argue—back into international relations. In short, that a country’s internal or domestic situation, including its values, beliefs, and overall political culture, also affects its stance and position in the world.

In the first part of this chapter we deal with the large issue of identity politics and its usefulness in political science and comparative politics. In a later section we treat of the constructivism theme and its role in international relations.

Identity Politics Defined

“Identity politics” may sound complicated but it is really a very simple concept. Identity politics is a broad and inclusive term for many of the topics in comparative politics and political culture already covered in this book. Students of political

science, comparative politics, and political culture need not be afraid of the concept of identity politics since it complements nicely the discussion offered so far. Simply put, identity politics is the quest to belong.

Identity politics may be more formally defined as political attitudes or positions that focus on the concerns of sub-groups in the society.¹ Identity politics refers to the activism or status-seeking that is based around categories like gender, class, ethnicity, tribe, clan, sexuality, cultural orientation, race, caste (as in India), or political identification. Identity politics, thus, are political arguments emanating from the self-interested perspectives of self-identified societal interest groups (in the US, women, blacks, gays, etc.) in ways that people's politics are shaped by these narrower (non-national) aspects of their identity. The *practice* of identity politics is, thus, not new, but the specific term "identity politics: is a product of only the last 30 years or so.

Whereas political culture studies as treated in this book usually focus on *national* values, beliefs, and ideology, identity politics focuses at a lower level, on the values and political orientations of various *sub-national groups* in society. The big difference from political culture studies is that, while political culture seeks to identify value differences *between* nations, identity politics mainly looks at the differing values of groups *within* society. Strictly speaking, however, political culture studies have *always* been concerned with measuring both the dominant and the minority voices within a society. Similarly, there is no reason why identity politics cannot be used to study not a subgroup but an entire *national* identity (e.g., Chinese or Brazilian nationalism) or the self-identity of groups that reach across borders, for example, women, gays, or immigrants—diasporas (e.g., Russians in the lands of the former Soviet space, the "overseas Chinese" in Southeast Asia, Hispanics in the US)—that go abroad but often remain loyal to their own country.

Politicians now routinely try to play upon or manipulate identity politics to their own advantage. At the same time, if you are a politician or a political leader and you seek to ignore identity politics, you do so at great peril. For example, and using only the United States for the moment, Republican candidates must appeal to such identity groups as the middle class, businessmen, Tea Party voters, WASPS, the country-club crowd, conservatives, religious elements, and those who are upwardly mobile. In contrast, Democrat politicians must appeal to African-Americans and other racial minorities, the working class, single women, unions, gays, and lesbians, the Hollywood and other cultural elites, teachers, and young people. Politics in America (and in other countries, as we shall see) now consists

1 *Free Encyclopedia*, also *Wikipedia*. Scholarly treatments may be found in Kristin Renwick Monroe et al., "The Psychological Foundations of Identity Politics," *American Review of Political Science*, 3 (2000), 419–47; David Laitin, *Identity in Formation: The Russian-Speaking Populations of the Near Abroad* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998); and Marc Howard Ross, *Cultural Contestation in Ethnic Conflict* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

in large part of getting out these “base” voters and putting together a coalition of enough of these identity groups to win the next election.

Identity politics is now with us to stay, but one can also see why it can be such a controversial concept. For in focusing on the various sub-groups in society, identity politics may detract from loyalty to the country or nation as a whole. Identity politics may open up such deep divisions or rifts in society that it diminishes adherence to a common core of values. As we see in a moment, identity politics, if carried too far, has the potential to tear a country apart and produce chaos, disintegration, and civil war. Think, for example, of the former Yugoslavia, the former Soviet Union, or even the United States in the 1860s. Several decades ago, the foremost expert on American interest group politics, David Truman, warned that interest or “identity” group politics had the potential to produce such extreme divisions and polarization that it leads to breakdown or “morbific” (deadly) politics.²

So there are grave dangers in identity politics as well as opportunities. Historian Arthur Schlesinger in an earlier book entitled *The Disuniting of America* warned against external identity politics and multiculturalism.³ He argued that a well-functioning democracy requires a *common basis* of core beliefs and values (what Almond and Verba called a “civic culture”) and not just multiple identities. You need unity in society, he insisted, and not just diversity. According to Schlesinger, one of the nation’s foremost historians, basing politics solely or even primarily on group solidarity, marginality (grievances), and identity, fractures the polity, perpetuates division, and thereby *reduces* the opportunities for ending marginalization. Schlesinger, as a liberal, much prefers to lift up and assimilate marginalized groups into mainstream society rather than perpetuating outsidership through the celebration of differentness.

Samuel P. Huntington, whom we’ve encountered previously in this book as part of the renaissance of political culture and author of the seminal “The Clash of Civilizations,” echoes Schlesinger in his fear of too much multiculturalism. In his more recent book, *Who Are We?*,⁴ Huntington addresses the question of whether we have become so diverse as a nation, so multicultural, and so much dominated by narrow identity politics that we have lost all sense of what it means to be *American*. Huntington’s solution, that we emphasize and re-identity with what he calls America’s “Anglo-Protestant” history and values, may be too narrow in the pluralist nation that the United States has become; nevertheless, he presents a powerful argument in favor of America’s traditional values and against multiculturalism run amok.

2 David Truman, *The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion* (Berkeley, CA: University of California, Institute of Government, 1993).

3 Arthur Schlesinger, *The Disuniting of America* (New York: Norton, 1992).

4 Samuel P. Huntington, *Who Are We? The Challenge to America’s National Identity* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004).

History of Identity Politics

There are disputes regarding the origins of the term “identity politics.” Black groups, women’s groups, and gay and lesbian groups all claim original authorship. Almost all authors, even while disagreeing over who was the first to use the term, agree that its original usage goes back to the 1970s and even 1960s. The term identity politics originally emerged out of the more radicalized political atmosphere of those times. And it emerged originally as a way of consciousness-raising among marginalized groups and as a means to empower those groups who felt oppressed by the society around them.

Identity politics aimed to raise the self-awareness of these groups and also provide them with political power as a force to be reckoned with in the political arena. It was only in the 1990s and thereafter that the term was used to apply to a broader array of interest groups and that it entered mainstream political discourse. By now it is one of the most widely used terms in the field.

The 1960s and 1970s in America and Europe saw the emergence of new and large-scale political movements onto the stage. These included black power movements, radicalized students, Greens, feminists, gays, Marxists, Indians and other indigenous movements, and progressives of various kinds. A few years later, in Latin America and other parts of the Third World, what were called “new social movements”—of women, peasants, workers, indigenous peoples, the oppressed, and even revolutionary guerrilla movements—also began to come together under these same labels. The term “identity politics” emerged out of this milieu—of groups who claimed injustice and who wanted to increase their own power so as to reduce their marginalization. Each group *identified* with its own individual cause (hence, “identity politics”) although there were some linkages across national boundaries as well as among the groups themselves in terms of a common radical agenda.

Initially, all these groups and even the term “identity politics” itself were identified with left-wing or radical causes. Identity Politics from the beginning was linked to the underlying idea that some groups in society—women, blacks, gays, Indians, etc.—are uniquely oppressed. That one’s *identity* as a woman, a minority, an environmentalist, a homosexual, a young person, or any marginalized person made one particularly susceptible to violence, ostracism, and oppression. And that such marginalization of these groups was not just national but cut across the boundaries of nation-states. Hence, the emphasis in identity politics, not so much on the nation and on national loyalties, but on sub-national solidarities of particularly oppressed groups which may cross national frontiers.

Identity politics was a main theme of political discourse on the Left in the ‘80s and ‘90s; conservatives and mainstream politicians were slow to grasp its implications. Liberals like Schlesinger and those who believed in the *American* (national) dream of liberty, equality, freedom, and pluralism opposed the concept; so did conservatives like Huntington who wanted a return to traditional and historic values. But, interestingly, Marxist historians such as Eric Hobsbaum and Todd Gitlin also vehemently criticized the new identity politics movements as

detracting from such more fundamental issues of society as class conflict and capitalist oppression. Classical Marxists saw these subgroup or identity politics movements as expressions of narrow, bourgeois values and undermining class solidarity, while other Marxist writers and those on the Left saw the potential in these movements for a new kind of progressive politics.

Currently, the range of political movements that fall under the identity politics label is wide. It is no longer limited just to radical groups. In addition to women, blacks, gays, etc., almost every ethnicity in America is now being mobilized and organized in one form or another. People are being organized and urged to act and vote not just as Americans but as Irish-Americans, and so on.

If these sub-groups or ethnicities are not already organized for political purposes, they are now being mobilized both by domestic politicians and, albeit largely unknown so far, by the embassies of the countries from which they came originally. For example, the Polish, Czech, Slovakia, and other Eastern European embassies in Washington reached out to mobilize their ethnics in Akron, Pittsburgh, Cleveland, and Chicago on behalf of the Eastern European countries' accession to the EU and NATO; the Greek embassy recruits Greek-Americans to bolster its conflicts with Turkey; the Israeli embassy, on behalf of Israel's Middle East politics, etc. Sometimes below the radar screen, it seems that all ethnic groups are becoming more aware of common interests and are being mobilized to support those interests. Identity politics is all around us; it is no longer just limited to progressives.

While in some quarters the term identity politics has become something of a political punching-bag, it has also gone mainstream. Politicians and campaign managers of all stripes use the techniques of identity politics to rally their supporters and seek out new voters. Moreover, the concept of *identity*, in terms of race, gender, politics, ethnicity, and other forms, has become so ubiquitous in our discussions that everyone now uses the term. Identity politics is now a part of contemporary political discourse, used in the media and at the popular level as well as by political operatives and academic specialists. At least for now, identity politics as a concept is here to stay.

Identity Politics in Comparative Political Analysis

So far we have analyzed identity politics generally and in terms of its emergence in American politics. But we need to broaden that focus because identity politics affects other countries and cultures as well, and in many different ways.

The cultures of different countries are very much a part of their identity politics.⁵ Culture, following anthropologist Clifford Geertz, is a shared system of meaning that people use to make sense of the world. Culture, therefore, is not just a surface phenomenon; it is a deeply rooted set of values, beliefs, and ways of behaving. Culture provides a group or a country with its identity. Culture offers

5 The analysis here follows that of Ross, *Cultural Contestation*.

meaning to people's lives; it helps them define the issues; and it helps them order their priorities.

Culture provides the lenses through which we view the world and by which we achieve our identity. Identity and culture affect our perceptions, help us identify threats to our group or nation, and give us a sense of group identity. Culture frames how we see our interests, structures the demands we place on the political system, and shapes our common viewpoints. Our identity, as persons or as members of a group or nation, is often defined through our culture. Among the issues in a culture that are often at dispute, particularly one that is deeply divided, are language, education, territory, holidays, and government jobs.

Each country, we have already seen, may have its own dominant culture and identity or there may be disagreement over the culture and, hence, over the future direction of the country. Cultures and identities are hard to change but they are not monolithic and do change over time. Cultures involve *shared* identification, yet these are often ambiguous and evolving. Cultures and identities may also be manipulated by leaders, by elites, and by governments. Some elements of culture and identity may grow naturally, organically, out of a shared history and experience; in other cases, culture and identity, including in some cases nationalism itself, are invented, artificially created, or manufactured with some clear goal in mind. Think of Indonesia, an archipelago of 13,000 islands and almost as many tribes, clans, and languages, and the enormous difficulty of creating a true nation-state and a national culture out of such disparate elements.

In addition to group and national loyalty and identity, entire global areas may have a cultural identity. We call these "culture areas"; in our universities the study of such culture areas is often called "area studies." That is because the countries of these areas, while different in many respects, also share a certain history, sociology, and culture. Europe is a culture area, albeit with its peripheral (Southern Europe and Eastern Europe) parts; Latin America is definitely a culture area, although it, too, has sub-areas (the Guianas and the English-speaking Caribbean) that do not fit very well. East Asia (Japan, Korea, China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore) is a culture area, so is the Arab Middle East. Central Asia, Southeast Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and the South Pacific are exceedingly diverse but within each of these regions there are shared experiences, cultural features, and identities. In addition to group and national cultures and identities, therefore, entire regions of the world may share certain common cultural and historical experiences and identities.

Now the going gets tricky because within these regions or culture areas, there are also sub-regions and, therefore, sub-cultures and sub-identities. Think within Europe of the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), on the one hand, and the Balkans (Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, and the former Yugoslavia), on the other. In Latin America we have the Andean countries (Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia), Central America, the Southern Cone (Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay), and the Caribbean. In Asia we have East Asia, Southeast Asia, and South Asia (India, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh). Africa is often further subdivided into East Africa, West Africa, South Africa, and Central Africa.

Cultures, identities, and, hence, loyalties may thus be split between a larger region and its smaller or “sub” parts or between patriotic allegiance to a nation and equally strong allegiance to one’s “group” (gender, race, ethnicity, or sexual orientation) identity.

Here we focus on the many varieties of identity politics in the modern world, and the kinds of issues and conflicts to which these give rise.

Identity Politics and Issues within Nations

Let us start with the case we perhaps know best: the United States. Over the last four decades the United States has become a deeply divided nation: divided over race, over class and inequality issues, over politics (Republican versus Democrat, Conservative vs. Liberal or Progressive, and Red vs. Blue) and over the future direction of the country. One could almost say that the United States at this stage is really two countries, two cultures, and two identities. The gaps and differences are so wide that they are unlikely to be bridged anytime soon.

Not only is the US deeply divided with little hope of rapid reconciliation but we are also deeply divided over what future path the country should take. Should we become like a European welfare state with high taxes, clean parks, and generous social benefits, or do we prefer low taxes, limited government, and greater private disposable income? “Should we remain, as Schlesinger and Huntington advocated, a nation with a single culture and identity (“American”) goals (freedom, equality, and liberty), to which all persons can aspire, or do we want to go the route of unfettered pluralism, diversity, and multiculturalism? Polling data and recent elections show that the United States is evenly split about 46–46 percent between these extremes, with another 8 percent (independents or swing voters) going either way depending on the candidates and circumstances and often able to determine electoral outcomes.

Another country that is similarly evenly divided currently is Russia. There is a split in the Russian “soul,” its psyche, its culture, and, hence, its identity. This split has existed for some 800 years so it is not going to go away soon. The basic split in Russia is between those who are Western- and Europe-oriented and want all the things that Europeans enjoy: wealth, high culture, science, the Enlightenment, the EU, and democracy *and* those who want to keep Russia distinctive: Eastern Orthodox, Slavic, a part of the great Eurasian land mass. Moscow and especially St. Petersburg tend to be Western-oriented and, if one only visits those two cities, one would get the impression that Russia is a quasi-Western country. But the great interior of Russia—remember, Russia covers seven time zones versus only three for the US—is poor, almost Third World, and mixed or non-Western.

President Vladimir Putin has cleverly sought to play on these divided Russian sentiments. On the one hand, he wants Western investment, Western trade, and greater affluence. On the other, he has resurrected many of the institutions associated with traditional Russia: the Army, the Orthodox Church, the secret

police, authoritarian government, historic Russian nationalism, and the themes of “Greater Russia,” which sounds threatening to Russia’s newly liberated neighbors in Eastern Europe.

The Ukraine is similarly divided over cultural identity with Kiev, its capital, right in the middle. Take a look at a map: the Dnieper River divides the Ukraine, a big and important country of 80 million persons, almost exactly in two. To the east of the river, the country is oriented toward Russia, trades with Russia, speaks Russian as its second (or even first!) language, votes for pro-Russia parties, and often thinks of itself as part of “Greater Russia.” But to the west of the river, and especially as one gets close to the border with Europe, the society is oriented toward the West, often speaks English, travels to the West, and wants to join the EU and NATO. Its politics is also more liberal and democratic, as opposed to the eastern part which, as in Russia, prefers strong, authoritative if not authoritarian government. These divisions over Ukrainian culture, identity, and the fundamental direction of the nation are so deep and so fundamental that one wonders if they can ever be healed.

In poorer, Third World countries, these crises over culture, politics, and identity can be even more severe and even bloodier than the three countries discussed here.

Identity as a Political Instrument for Minorities

A second category of countries is those where culture and identity are not evenly divided as above, but where minorities employ the politics of identity as a political instrument to advance their agendas.

The United States is again a good example. And that also means the United States faces a double whammy: not only is it about evenly divided politically between Red and Blue but it also has a considerable number of minorities who *practice* identity politics to put forward their causes. These mobilized and organized minorities now include African-Americans, Hispanics, women, gays and lesbians, American Indians, and various ethnic communities. These groups, through demonstrations, pressure group politics, and voting, have been clever and skillful in advancing their agenda. In turn, the Democratic Party in the United States was the first to recognize the potential political power of these groups and to incorporate them into the party as part of its broad coalition, even to *win* elections on the basis of collecting all these disparate minority voices under its umbrella. The Republican Party was slow to catch onto this theme of identity politics and building a coalition on that basis, but it may now be catching up.

Other countries do not practice interest group parties or have as many interest groups (tens of thousands) as the US does. Also, in parliamentary regimes, where the parliament and government must necessarily be from the same party or parties, there tends to be less room, and less opportunity, for interest group politics. However, under divided government, as in the US, where the Congress or one house thereof is controlled by one party and the White House or executive branch is under the control of the other, there is ample room for interest group

bargaining—including for minorities—in the interstices of the system. However, in Europe and in other parliamentary systems, if you want to influence politics outside of the elected arena, you are best off concentrating on the bureaucracy, the government, all those agencies that are part of the European state.

For Europe also has its issues of identity politics, mainly triggered in modern times by large-scale immigration from chiefly Islamic countries: Turks in Germany, Moroccans in the Netherlands, Pakistanis and Indians in Great Britain, and Algerians and black Africans in France. The goal in these countries, as in the US historically, has been gradually to integrate the immigrants into national life. With some immigrants that strategy has worked; but with others, it has not worked, and several of the European countries are now faced with a combustible tinderbox within their own borders, of not well-educated, unskilled, unemployed, embittered young men (young women tend to integrate better) who may turn to violence and even terrorism.

What to do? Two models have been tried. Neither has been successful. The first model, mainly employed in France, is to so thoroughly assimilate the immigrants that they turn into full-fledged Frenchmen. They leave their former nationalities and loyalties behind, learn French, go to French schools, absorb French values, and become French citizens. Those goals were behind the effort, for example, to ban young Muslim girls from wearing headscarves to school. But increasingly we see in France and other countries that follow the same model that the immigrants do not want to assimilate, often prefer their own culture, and do not want to become “little Frenchmen.” Besides, they are unskilled, cannot find jobs, are isolated in ghetto communities (*banlieux*), and are the victims of racial prejudice. They are often angry, bitter, and prone to lash out. Assimilation has not worked.

But the other model, multiculturalism, has not worked very well either. That has been the preferred model in Great Britain and the Netherlands. Multiculturalism means that the immigrants have their own schools, keep their own language, and even have whole neighborhoods and towns to themselves. Instead of the immigrants learning the national language and culture, integrating, assimilating, and *identifying* with British or Dutch ways, they are encouraged to maintain their own language and customs. It is the natives who are expected to learn the immigrants’ ways and language and pay for Arabic (and other) language schools and community activities. Again, while some immigrants do eventually assimilate in this way, others remain separated from, unintegrated into, and hostile toward their adopted societies. In both the UK and the Netherlands recently, there have been protests, riots, acts of terrorism, and some bloody, ritualistic murders committed by unassimilated immigrants against their hosts.

But if neither the assimilation-immigration nor the pluralism-multiculturalism model has worked, what else is there? No one seems to know. And it is the very lack of a workable solution that has accelerated the rise recently in Europe of far-right, anti-immigrant political parties in France, Germany, the Netherlands, and even Switzerland.

Identity Politics Leading to National Breakups

In some countries ethnic, cultural, and identity conflict become so extreme that it leads to national breakup, even war.

In South Asia following World War II, British colonialism was coming to an end. As they withdrew, Great Britain established two new states: India for the Hindus and Pakistan for the Muslims. The division was based almost entirely on cultural, religious, and identity considerations. Mass transfers of people, some ethnic cleansing, and even genocide were involved.

The British were so eager to leave, and so bankrupted by the war, that they left a lot of problems in their wake. First, India and Pakistan have been in a virtually constant state of hostility, and often war, ever since. Second, there are still 300,000 Muslims in India, one-fourth of the population, a continuing source of tension, ethnic conflict, and often violence. Third, there is Kashmir: Indian-controlled, but a Muslim majority, and disputed by both countries. Fourth, as the British pulled out, Pakistan consisted of two enclaves, East and West, separated by 1,000 miles of India. But that division could not work as a nation-state, East Pakistan was not just poorer but also felt discriminated against in the larger Pakistan, and eventually declared independence and went its separate way as the country of Bangladesh. All of this is identity politics run amok, producing not peaceful coexistence but conflict, war, and terrorism.

In southeast Europe following the collapse of the Soviet Union, what had been called “Yugoslavia” also split apart. Yugoslavia had always been an artificial creation, held together by tanks, long-time strongman Jozev Tito, and Soviet oppression. But once these shackles were removed, Yugoslavia quickly fell apart into violence, war, and ethnic cleansing.

The cultural, religious, ethnic, and identity divisions in the Balkans had always been severe; now they burst out into the open: Christian versus Muslim, North Slavs vs. South Slavs, Catholic vs. Orthodox, the Roman alphabet vs. the Cyrillic, all kinds of ethnic, land, and territorial disputes. In the early-to-mid-1990s these disputes produced bloody conflict, war, ethnic cleansing, and even genocide—so much so that the US and our European NATO allies were forced to intervene militarily, bomb Serbia, and the so-called “Dayton Accords” to restore peace to the area. But even now tensions remain high; the level of violence is similarly high; and ethnic cleansing is still going on.

Another fatality from the collapse of the Soviet Union was the former country of Czechoslovakia. Like Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia was an artificial creation, held together by guns and Soviet oppression, and not much else. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Czechoslovakia went its separate way, but the two parts of the country were never really united. The Czech part was richer, better educated, more sophisticated, and closer to the advanced economies of Germany and Western Europe. Slovakia was not only poorer and less well-educated, it was also in its language and trade more oriented, like the Ukraine, toward Russia.

Moreover, in terms of public works, government jobs, and other opportunities, the Slovaks always felt prejudiced against and that they got the short end of the deal.

Hence, in 1993, in what was called the “Velvet (because it was so smooth) Revolution,” the two separated, became independent countries, and went their separate ways. The Czech Republic quickly became democratic and prosperous and joined the EU and NATO; poorer Slovakia had a hard time of it at first, was governed by a hard-line, pro-Russia regime, and was excluded from NATO and the EU. But over the course of the next decade, Slovakia made significant reforms, became more democratic, and joined the EU and NATO. It is still poorer than the Czech Republic and sometimes feels slighted by its richer, more progressive neighbor; but, overall, we can say the Czech-Slovak separation provides a case of a peaceful, successful divorce.

Another, as yet not consummated case is that of Belgium. Here we have a small country artificially created after the Napoleonic wars as a buffer state between France, the Netherlands, and Great Britain to keep its larger neighbors from dominating that territory. But like many of the African states today, its borders made little sense geographically and there was little unity internally. The north of Belgium (Flanders) was rich, a trading nation, had a particularly vibrant cultural history going back to medieval times, spoke Flemish (close to Dutch), and was integrated into the wealthier economies of Great Britain and the Netherlands. The south of Belgium, called Waloonia, in contrast, is poorer, less progressive, speaks French, and is oriented southward toward France. The capital of Belgium, Brussels, straddles the line between the two halves of the country and seeks, not very successfully, to mediate between them.

In many towns and provinces of Belgium the relations between the two parts or cultures are poisonous. The issues are both economic (lack of jobs and poverty in the south) and identity-based: what language is to be used in official documents and court hearings, what kind of history is to be taught in the schools, where one shops or drinks, and even who one’s friends and neighbors are. The more prosperous north also resents that its tax moneys continuously are drained away to support the poorer south. The relations are so sour that north and south could split apart, with the south gravitating toward France and the north, toward the Netherlands. Belgium would then cease to exist as a distinct country.

One can think of many other cases like this where the potential for national division and even a split on cultural and identity grounds may be in the offing. For example, Scotland may separate from the United Kingdom and become an independent country; Catalonia (Barcelona) could separate from Spain; North and South (the *Risorgimento*) of Italy are going their separate ways; West (Bohemia) and East (Moravia) of the Czech Republic could split, or Northern Ireland could have renewed civil strife between its Protestant and Catholic “identities.”

Or how about the North (Blue States) and the South (solidly Red) in the US? This is a divide that 150 years after the Civil War is still bitter and intense, largely on cultural, political, and identity grounds. No one believes a renewed civil

war is in the offing but in the South at least sentiment for some form of autonomy or independence is still very much alive.

Identity Politics in Post-Colonial Regimes

When we move to consideration of the Third World, the possibilities for rupture of existing states is even stronger. That is because the existing governments and institutions, including police and army in these countries are weak and unable to legitimately extend their authority throughout the countryside, *and* because separatist and indigenous movements, centered around identity, religions, and wealth issues, are strong.

When the colonial powers following World War II left the Middle East, South and Southeast Asia, and Africa, they left behind borders and nation-states that often made no sense geographically, culturally, and in terms of how these former colonies were governed. We have already seen the post-Colonial divisions (Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh) that emerged in South Asia; even now, it is a major miracle that incredibly diverse India, with its deep geographic, religious, economic, racial, cultural, caste, and other differences, has not fallen apart.

Indonesia, with its 13,000 islands and hundreds-if-not-thousands of clans, tribes, and languages, is an especially interesting case. How to create national identity and a true nation-state, where none had existed before, out of such incredible diversity? The answer, Benedict Anderson tells us, is an “imagined community.”⁶ That is, a national culture and identity “imagined” and even *invented* by the country’s early leaders. This was not an easy task; it sometimes had to be enforced at the point of a gun (the Suharto regime) against separatist movements and, even today, some 60 years after independence is still not a completed process, with ongoing separatist or “national liberation” movements in Aceh, the Moluccan Islands, Borneo, and Timor.

Moving to the Southeast Asia mainland, we see similar breakaway pressures on the part of almost-forgotten ethnic and identity groups. Think of Cambodia, Thailand, Malaysia, and now Myanmar which all have tribal-ethnic elements not yet integrated into the national life. Under military rule, using force if necessary, the lid was usually kept on these separatist movements; but as soon as democracy emerged, the different ethnicities saw an opportunity to break away. In addition to their efforts to achieve social and economic development, now quite a number of these countries are facing serious internal uprisings.

Or take the Middle Eastern and North African countries of Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Libya, and perhaps large and important Egypt. We talk of these as if they were real countries but, in fact, they were created out of very disparate peoples and territories and their borders were drawn by the departing colonial powers (France and Great Britain). Some 60 and more years later, we

6 Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism* (London, UK: Verso, 1991).

are realizing that these may be artificial nations with artificial borders. They are, in reality, made up of diverse tribes, clans, and ethnicities whose interests and loyalties may be incompatible.

For a long time under military-authoritarian, royal, or sheikdom rule, these separatist tendencies could be glossed over, disguised, or suppressed. But as soon as the strong man (Saddam Hussam in Iraq, Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, or Muammar Qaddafi in Libya) is removed, these tribal and separatist movements begin to reassert themselves. And as we have seen in Benghazi, Tripoli, Beirut, Kabul, and Damascus, these movements are especially dangerous because each one has its own militia which is armed to the teeth. It is no longer “mere” identity politics; it is armed rebellion and civil war.

The most extreme cases, because colonialism was so oppressive and the “new nations” (50 years of independence) involved so weak and with so many unsettled boundaries, are in sub-Saharan Africa. All the main colonial powers—Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, France, Great Britain, Germany, and Belgium—were involved. They conquered territories, divided them up, subjugated the people, exploited the land, minerals, and people—and then left, without leaving any established institutions, such as universities, bureaucracies, governments, or national armies, in place. Moreover, the borders they established often divided Africa’s existing tribes and ethnicities, broke up clans and families, or else combined distinct ethnic groups in a single territory or “nation” that was unviable. It is no wonder that Africa, over the last half-century, has experienced so many upheavals, revolutions, civil wars, separatist movements, and genocides.

Only a few of many examples can be provided here. In South Africa the white *apartheid* regime set up various black “homelands,” rather like US Indian reservations, organized on a tribal or ethnic basis, a number of which have still not been integrated into the post-apartheid South African nation. On a line just north of the equator and passing through Ethiopia, Kenya, the Sudan, Chad, Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Mauritania, ethnic and religious conflicts between Muslims in the north and (mainly) Christians in the south have torn these countries apart. In Uganda the conflict between Hutus and Tutsis has produced ongoing conflict, genocide, and the deaths of 100,000s of people.

In the Sudan, breakaway provinces in the south, who are also Christian and of a different ethnicity, have separated from the majority-Muslim population in the north to form the world’s newest country, South Sudan. Earlier breakaway provinces in the Congo, Angola, Mozambique, and other countries that may have started their rebellions over tribal, territorial, ethnic, and identity issues were often subsumed under larger Cold War issues where the US supported one side, usually the established governments, in the conflict while the Soviet Union supported the other. Not all these conflicts were over identity, however; they were also over oil, land, diamonds (see the movie “Blood Diamonds”), and other issues.

Ethnic, identity, and these other issues do not just divide societies; particularly in new nations they may tear them apart, produce bloodshed and genocide,

generate religious wars (almost always the most violent kind), and in a few cases (South Sudan) even produce a hopeful outcome.

State Response to Identity Issues

So far we have been focusing on the mobilization of groups and persons who organize themselves around identity issues. These include persons mobilized on the basis of race, gender, ethnicity, culture, caste, sexual orientation, or politics, often organized under the heading of “new social movements.” Political scientists often refer to this as the “input” side of the political systems: groups and organizations whose views and interests go “into” the political system. But now we need to look systematically at government decision-making and the policies and programs that come “out” of the government, the “output” side of the political system. In other words, how do governments respond to all these pressures that come from the various identity groups?

Essentially, there are three different responses that governments can make to the rise of new groups, including protest groups. These are: (1) acceptance and integration of new groups into a pluralist and democratic political order; (2) cooptation of these groups and their incorporation under state or government control—what we often referred to as corporatism; and (3) authoritarian or even totalitarian suppression of these groups. Of course, there will be variations on these three quite different responses; in addition, a country may move from one response to another, for example, from authoritarian repression to a democratic opening. Or, back the other way, from democracy and pluralism to repression and authoritarianism, with corporatism as a kind of middle way. A fourth possibility already discussed is the breakdown of the system into chaos, national disintegration, and perhaps civil war. Let us look at each of these possibilities in turn.

The democratic-pluralist option is the one that we prefer, both because of our own values and because it serves our foreign policy goals. Most of us want to be inclusive; we want to be open and liberal; and we want to bring forgotten or oppressed minorities into the political system. If our values are those of democracy and pluralism, then we will want to be inclusionary and bring new groups into the process, even those groups who may leave us vaguely uncomfortable. The essence of democracy is inclusion: *everyone* belongs; one person, one vote. Since this is an evolutionary process, it means that the effective, participatory nation is constantly expanding; new groups—women, minorities, and the like—are always in the process of being brought in. That is what a commitment to democracy and pluralism is all about.

A second option, taking them slightly out of order, is repression. That is what often occurs in the Third World where democratic institutions are often still new and weak. What happens is that new groups get mobilized—the working class, peasants, women, students, Islam’s fundamentalists, and unemployed persons at

the street level—faster and on a scale larger than the government or the political system can handle it. Think of Egypt recently or perhaps Libya or Tunisia.

When you get massive demonstrations of these new groups and movements in the streets, particularly if and when they get out of control, it frightens the traditional wielders of power: the elites, the armed forces, the business community, perhaps high religious authorities. They may demand a crackdown. Or they may organize to stage a military coup d'état. They may take over the government or demand that an existing government remove the demonstrators. That is when the suppression begins. The police and military may just crack down on the most visible demonstrators or they may move against whole groups or sectors of the population. Obviously, there can be a range of responses, from just a temporary and limited crackdown to wholesale, mass suppression of entire social groups. It can be, and often is, bloody.

We are used to thinking of this in dichotomous terms: *either* democracy *or* authoritarianism and repression, but there is a third option, one that is increasingly popular in the Third World. And that is called corporatism, a response that presents a middle way between democracy and authoritarianism. Under corporatism, the state or government allows new groups and new social movements to organize and present their point-of-view. But it *structures* their participation as much as possible under state control.

Instead of allowing unfettered mobilization and pluralism, the state creates *official*, approved trade unions, women's groups, peasant associations, etc., which it can control. These groups, rather than operating in a liberal, pluralist, free, and open framework, must seek recognition from the state (which also means the ability *not* to recognize them), must reveal their membership lists, and must tell where their funding comes from. Recent examples of these kinds of official or government-approved groups include the Russia of Vladimir Putin or Egypt after the generals re-took power from the Islamic-fundamentalist government of Muhammed Morsi.

One can see why this corporatist or middle-way option would be especially popular in the Third World. It allows some, limited pluralism and access for new groups but not so much pluralism and democracy that it gets out of-hand, provokes demonstrations and riots in the streets, and threatens either the local elites or foreign investors. At the same time, it gives an often weak state the ability to control, regulate, and limit the group life that swirls around it. It is at least semi-democratic, semi-pluralist, and semi-participatory but without allowing the process to get out of control. Rather than more transitions to a pure or Western model of democracy in the Third World, we may expect to see more of these intermediary, half-way-house, corporatist forms.

Constructivism and International Relations

The research field of international relations is witnessing what we may call a "constructivist moment." Constructivism is to the international relations field what

identity politics is to comparative politics and political science more generally. That is, it is a way to build values, beliefs, and political culture back into our thinking about and our studies of international relations. Specifically, with regard to IR, constructivism brings domestic politics back into foreign policy from which it has been excluded for too long.⁷

For the last 40 years the international relations field has been conflicted between the realist school (or neo-realists or neo-classical realists) and the liberal internationalism school. The realist school consists of such writers/diplomats as Hans Morganthau, Henry Kissinger, George Kennan, and, more recently, Kenneth Waltz. The liberal-internationalist school emerged during the presidency of Jimmy Carter and out of the Vietnam War protest movements. Among its more prominent voices are Joseph Nye, Robert Keohane, and, more recently, Anne Marie Slaughter.

The realists argued, especially during the Cold War, that another country's domestic politics should be of no concern to us. We should pay attention only to how they behave in their foreign policy. Are they allied with us or not? As American Secretary of State (under President Dwight Eisenhower) once rather baldly put it, "We have no friends, only interests." The realists would thus pursue either American/Western dominance or, where that was not possible, a balance of power strategy.

While neo-realist Kenneth Waltz went so far as to exclude all domestic politics from his model of international relations, more sensible writers like Morgenthau, Kissinger, and Kennan acknowledged that a country's domestic situation, its resources, and its values had to be taken into account in any foreign policy decision. And Kissinger, late in his career, recognized that democracy-promotion and human rights, at least in the United States of America, had to be incorporated into a successful "realist" position.

Liberal internationalists similarly denigrated domestic political considerations, although not to the same extent the realists did. They wanted the United States to stand for certain moral positions, a "beacon to the world": democracy, human rights, disarmament, peace-keeping, arms control, the environment, the UN, the peaceful resolution of conflicts, the anti-land mines campaign—an entire cornucopia of liberal values. We, the United States, or at least the liberal-internationalist school, knew what was best for the rest of the world. But by excluding, for the most part, domestic politics and particularly political culture from consideration, both the realists and the liberal internationalists left out a great deal.

Constructivism, basically stated, seeks to build these factors of domestic politics, values, and political culture back into the international relations field.

7 Useful analyses include Jeffrey T. Checkel, "The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory," *World Politics*, 50 (January 1998), 324–68; Alexander Wendt, "Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization* (Spring 1992), 325–91; Ted Hopf, "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory," *International Security*, 23 (Summer 1998), 171–200; and Birgit Locher and Elizabeth Pruge, "Feminism and Constructivism," *International Studies Quarterly*, 45 (2001), 111–29.

Constructivism returns domestic politics and political culture to IR. It does so by offering an account of the politics of identity. It proposes, says Ted Hopf, “a way of understanding how nationalism, ethnicity, race, religion, and sexuality, and other intersubjectively understood communities, are each involved in an account of global politics.” Hopf goes on, “Understanding how identities are constructed, what norms and practices accompany their reproduction, and how they ‘construct’ each other is a major part of the constructivist research program.”

Here, then, we have the connection between identity politics, culture, and constructivism in IR. *Of course*, IR and foreign policy are products, in part, of domestic politics. And domestic politics consists of interests which are, in turn, undergirded by values, beliefs, and ideology—i.e., political culture. Identities are often the bases of interests.

Values and identities put limits on interests; they are also the filters through which interests are defined and put forward. Therefore, states as well as persons and groups may have identities that are shaped by underlying socio-cultural and political-cultural factors. Majority-Arab states shaped by Islam may see or interpret their interests differently than do Western states. So may the East Asians. Are we back, by a roundabout way, in constructivism, to Huntington’s “clash of civilizations”—that is, of regional identities and cultures? It would appear so.

State actions, Hopf and other constructivists tell us convincingly, are both constrained and empowered in the foreign policy realm by prevailing social practices at home and abroad. Note that it is not just culture or political culture, though that is important; it is also level of socioeconomic development, degree of institutionalization, geography, resources, civil society, international place in the world, etc. But surely culture, or identity, is one of the factors. Again we return to the theme of multicausality.

Culture, identity, and cultural practices may either limit or advance state policy including foreign policy. Identity politics can be used to identify both within-state differences and the identities of whole-state actors. From this point-of-view there are no subfield divides between international relations and comparative politics. Instead, both of them can reincorporate political culture, by way respectively of either identity politics or constructivism, back to mainstream political analysis. However, it needs to be said that, while ethnicity, nationalism, and national identity are being reintegrated back into IR thinking, issues of gender, race, sexual orientation, and religion have received far less attention.

Winding Up

There are still some people who are reluctant to use political-cultural explanations. The reasons for this are obscure; probably it has something to do with the dangers recounted earlier of national stereotyping. Despite the best efforts of scholars to use public opinion survey results, qualification, and tendency statements rather

than broad generalizations, political culture still, for some people, leaves a bad taste in the mouth or maybe a bad hangover.

Yet *everyone* recognizes that culture, specifically for our purposes political culture, remains an important variable. You cannot ignore value, belief, religious, and ideological or cultural factors. As a result, scholars have sought for ways to study culture but without calling it that. In comparative politics, quite a number of newer studies have focused on “identity politics”; in international relations, the new focus is called “constructivism.”

Identity politics has concentrated mainly on the subunits of society: gender, race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, class, caste, etc. This concentration has supplied us with valuable information about informal groups in society. But there is no reason that loyalty to a “nation” cannot also be an identity, indeed in many persons (recall President Lyndon Johnson, “I am an American first, a Democrat second.”) it may be the dominant identity. In that case, we are back, are we not, to political culture: looking at society in terms of its national values.

Much the same has gone on in international relations theory: both a sense, among realists as well as liberal internationalists, that domestic politics, including political culture, does not count for very much *and* a certain discomfort with the study of political culture itself. But because they recognize that values, beliefs, and ideologies still matter in foreign affairs, IR scholars have, therefore, invented the term “constructivism” to cover that gap in their knowledge. In my reading of the IR literature, constructivism seems to cover more than just beliefs and values, relating to a broader range of domestic politics factors. But to the extent constructivism includes religion, identity, values, ideology, belief systems, and behavioral orientation, we are back again to political culture.

Could it be that “identity politics” and “constructivism” are really just new names for an old phenomenon dressed up in new form: political culture? Are these terms really just new wine in some very old political-culture bottles?

Chapter 10

Conclusion

Culture can be an elusive concept. Most of us, when we think of culture, think of what has been called “high culture”: classical music, painting, ballet, opera, and theater. And when we study or go to college or university, we do so, at least in part, in hopes of becoming “cultured.” That is what a liberal arts education is, or is supposed to be. To my mind, that means a coming to grips with the ideas and institutions of ancient Greece, the ethical profundities of the Old and New Testament, Roman law and civilization, the history of the middle ages, the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, the scientific revolution and the revolution of democratization, the industrial revolution and its social effects, Freud and the unconscious, and the modern state and Third World modernization. Absorbing all this thought and knowledge, or just the effort to do so, helps one to transition, in my old fraternity formulation, from “uncouth” to “couth,” from uncultured to cultured.¹

But neither high culture *nor* the process of becoming cultured are our main concerns in this book—although both of these may play a part in our subject matter. Our subject is “the culture.” And that topic may include everything from classical music and theater to pop music and rock’n’roll. “Culture” in this sense may mean everything from how we shave in the morning, how we drive to work, to how we behave and what we do in the evening. Instead of carrying high hopes for man’s perfectability—the old meaning of culture—nowadays culture has come to mean almost any collection of habits and behavior among a given group of people. There can be, presumably, a global culture, a regional culture (as in the European Union), a national culture, and any number of subgroup cultures, or “identities,” within a given country.

In other words, the value preference implied in the term “high culture” has been greatly reduced or taken away. Instead, “culture,” as used here and in the literature we have surveyed, is a neutral concept. It is neither good nor bad; it just *is*. This is the anthropological sense of culture. It is value-free. It is relativistic. There is no “high” or “low” culture; there is just culture viewed scientifically and empirically. We make no value judgments about it (well, obviously we do, but not supposedly in our scientific efforts); we just study it. In this relativistic conception, culture becomes just about any old collection of beliefs, behaviors, and ideas present in the society.

Our particular concern in this book has been what is called *political culture*. We are not here concerned so much with the “culture” of Hollywood, or the

1 Harry Eyres writes regularly on cultural issues; see his column in *Financial Times* (February 26, 2011), 18.

cultures, respectively, of shaving, driving, or dating. No, our interests are in the *political* values, beliefs, orientations, and behaviors undergirding a society. That, in fact, is the accepted and commonly used definition of political culture: the *political* values, beliefs (including religious beliefs), orientations, and behaviors of a society. Political culture may thus encompass elements of “high” or “low” culture, as well as all those subnational behaviors and practices mentioned earlier, so long as they pertain to politics. We may be interested in those other things and behaviors, too, but our focus here is *political behavior* and the *political culture*.

A word ought to be said here about that other main theme of recent discourse, multiculturalism. Because this is also related to our theme of studying political culture. I am all in favor of multiculturalism. But I have some caveats that need to be entered into the discussion. First, I believe it is necessary to understand myself, my culture, where I came from, the culture that I was born into, which means the Western, Christian, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant culture of Northwest Europe (actually Dutch, if you are interested in what kind of a funny name Wiarda is). It is probably not always necessary to do this, but I believe that understanding your own culture well and thoroughly is a prerequisite for understanding other cultures, particularly if your interests are, as mine are, in *comparison*. I am a professor of comparative politics, after all, and my research and writing interests lie in comparison among and between different political cultures around the world.

And that gets me to my second caveat. Believing in multiculturalism should not be some wishy-washy, PC thing in which you believe all cultures, all countries, all *civilizations* (again, that troublesome Huntington term), and all peoples everywhere are “just wonderful.” That is being intellectually and morally lazy. No, for me, being multicultural is hard work. It means learning and speaking at least one foreign language tolerably well because it is through language that we gain new perspectives and really learn another culture. It means long *years* of traveling, studying, living, and working abroad until you really master another society and culture and what makes them tick. Only then, I believe, can we use our multiculturalism to go beyond the wishy-washy level, truly understand other countries and cultures, and be in a position to make the moral, ethical, and political judgments that are still necessary in the modern world.

The Book: A Review and Summary

We began this book by asking some provocative questions. What makes other countries tick? Why do they do as they do? What undergirds their behavior? What is the role of political culture, as distinct from other factors, in explaining these differences? More provocatively, are there some political cultures that are more conducive to national development and modernization than other political cultures? Put another way, why are some political cultures seemingly holding back growth (Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East) while others (Europe, Asia, and North America) are stimulating it? And given all this and the obvious

importance of political culture, why are some scholars and others so opposed to political cultural explanations?

The Preface and the Introduction set forth the main ideas of this book. We suggested here that political culture was an important, even essential, ingredient in studying other countries and societies. Political culture was as important to our understanding—and in some analyses, more important, but we left that open for further discussion—as structure, by which is usually meant class structure, institutions, or other factors or variables. Through the presentation of some dramatic headlines, we showed that political culture, and particularly an understanding of foreign cultures, was essential to business, diplomacy, or foreign policy. Unless you understand the culture, we argued, in contrast to those who would either shy away from it for fear of being branded as “racist” or “insensitive” or are ideologically committed to other, often Marxist, explanations, you do not understand anything at all.

In Chapter 2 we provided the historical background, tracing the evolution of political culture from ancient to modern times. Plato, Aristotle, and the ancient Greeks understood the importance of values and beliefs as well as social structures in undergirding and helping explain social and political institutions. So did the ancient Romans, for whom such political-cultural understandings of conquered peoples were essential to maintaining their far-flung (in those days “global”) empire. During the Middle Ages the entire then-known world (the West) was based on a political-culture concept: the belief in a single, universal Church (Catholic) and religion (Christianity).

As we move into the modern era, a more secular view comes to prevail. Machiavelli, the founder of modern political science, radically separated religion and political culture from politics precisely because he understood the importance of religion and beliefs for political purposes. Similarly, in Thomas Hobbes: he presents a purely secular view of the state in which the king or ruler manipulates the religious life and conflict of ideas that swirls around him. In John Locke, the key theorist of both the British (1689) and American (1776, 1789) revolutions, although the arguments are carefully couched in religious terms to appeal to a wider audience, it is plain that the logic used is a secular one in favor of republican, representative, democratic government.

The analysis of political culture’s ongoing importance continues through the Enlightenment and especially Montesquieu. Montesquieu is known to Americans mainly for his argument for the separation of powers, on which our own Constitution is based; but he may be even better known for his analysis of the influence of cultural and environmental factors on politics. In the nineteenth century we analyzed the contrasting visions of Karl Marx with English utilitarians, and French philosopher, Auguste Comte. Comte, while almost completely unknown in the United States, is very well-known in Europe and Latin America. Comte was not only the founder of sociology but, important for our purposes, based his entire system of knowledge on political-cultural variables—i.e., the role and march of religion in history.

Our analysis of the historical role of political culture in politics and political theory leaves off in the late nineteenth century, precisely when the new field of cultural anthropology begins. That is treated in Chapter 3. Although we traced the history and evolution of cultural anthropology from its founder, Franz Boas, through such leading figures as Ruth Benedict and Margaret Mead, to our contemporary Clifford Geertz, I was particularly fascinated in my researches with Boas. First, he founded an entire field of study, cultural anthropology, an accomplishment similar in importance to Freud and psychoanalysis. Second, even though he was writing 100 years ago during a period of widespread racism, social Darwinism, and the eugenics movement, Boas was very concerned to warn against racism and to separate culture from race.

Third, even though Boas was trained as a scientist and had a Ph.D. in physics, he recognized that cultural anthropology (and political science?) was a “soft science” that required a different methodology than that used by the natural or “hard” sciences. So for anthropology he pioneered the techniques of ethnography or field work, participant observation, and interviewing, to be supplemented by as much library and archival research as possible. It is significant that it was a *scientist*, a *physicist*, who perfected these techniques of qualitative research. The field of comparative politics, my field within political science, also used these or similar techniques in its early decades. While I am not at all opposed to quantitative techniques and what they can reveal through statistics, correlation, and regression analysis. I sometimes wish that today’s political scientists, who unlike Boas were not trained as scientists, had retained these qualitative techniques in studying other societies to go along with their newer, more empirical methodologies.

It was but a short step, and sometimes occurring concurrently, from cultural anthropology to what we have here termed the “national character studies” discussed in Chapter 4. There are both evil and benign versions of these studies. The evil versions began mainly in the nineteenth century—even earlier in some cases—concurrent with the rise of cultural anthropology, social Darwinism, and the eugenics movement. They used Darwin’s theories of the “survival of the fittest,” combined with anthropology’s discovery of new lost tribes, to construct an evolutionary scale or continuum going from “primitive” or “uncivilized” to “civilized.” Darker-skinned and usually African peoples were often found at the bottom of this scale and white Europeans, at the top. The frameworks used were blatantly racist and were often used not just to demean but sometimes to sterilize, institutionalize, and even eliminate darker and feebler peoples. The culmination of these perversions was, of course, during the Holocaust when whole categories of peoples—Jews, gypsies, and homosexuals—were considered inferior and marked for elimination.

The benign versions of these national character studies were reviewed in this book, starting with Salvador de Madariaga, Luigi Barzini, and Edward Banfield, although Banfield’s book, by a professional political scientist, represented serious scholarship and is still considered one of the best books ever written about Italy. These books sometimes fall into the trap of national stereotyping but, for the

most part, they are serious studies, make good reading, and are quite harmless. Indeed, often these studies are quite insightful about the nations or regions that are their focus.

Lucian Pye on China, Hedrick Smith on Russia, Alan Riding on Mexico, Edwin Reischauer on Japan, and Elaine Sciolino or Philip Wylie on France provide other examples of this kind of single-country studies, combining good writing with rich insights. Bernard Lewis on the Arab world, Crawford Young on cultural pluralism in Africa, or, being generous, my own books on Latin America also fall into this category, but focused on a whole region rather than a single country. A worrisome variation in this genre are the books produced by scholars to promote US war efforts, such as Ruth Benedict's World War II-era study of Japan or the RAND Corporation's Cold War-era study of Soviet Bolshevik behavior. These studies are worrisome precisely because serious scholarship may be sacrificed or even just modified to serve the interests of the study's sponsor, a government entity.

A breakthrough, as detailed in Chapter 5, occurred in 1963 with the publication of Almond and Verba's *The Civic Culture*. This was a large-scale study of five countries; it employed a sophisticated methodology; and, rather than just focusing on one country, it was genuinely comparative. Most important methodologically, *The Civic Culture* relied not on the researchers' impressions or their perceptions of "the national character" but on scientific public opinion surveys. Such surveys enabled the authors to make empirically based, statistically derived *tendency statements*, rather than using misleading and dangerous national stereotypes. Thus, they could say that, while 60 percent or so of Mexicans favored democracy and a civic political culture, 40 percent favored a top-down or authoritarian regime, a percentage that increased as democracy proved less than successful. This is much more sophisticated and discriminating than saying "Mexico is an authoritarian country," and it avoids national stereotyping. Henceforth, all political-culture studies, even if they continued to employ impressionist or qualitative data, would have to make at least some bow in the direction of using statistics, interview data, correlations, and qualified tendency statements.

We then take a break in Chapter 6 from our chronological account to deal with the criticisms of political culture. We try to do this fairly and honestly. But quite frankly, I am not impressed with most of these criticisms. Many of them seem to be based on earlier, often ideological quarrels with cultural explanations, rather than on the newer, post-Almond-and-Verba, and most particularly the post-Inglehart literature. These criticisms are often more damaging to the critics than to the political-culture approach because they often reveal the critics to be not up on the literature in their own fields. We do, however, treat these criticisms, of vagueness, tautology, imprecision, and impressionism, seriously even while trying to refute them.

We treat the alternative explanations stemming from the rival structuralist and institutionalist schools at greater length. Both the structuralist and the institutionalist approaches tend to be dismissive of culturalist explanations, either because they do not view them as important or because they do not fit into their ideological or

methodological paradigms. The “new institutionalism” goes so far as to redefine political culture as a so-called “institution”—an incredible leaps of annexation and of logic—so that now everything falls under the institutionalist rubric.

Some of the other criticisms of political culture studies I find to be quite valid and have written about them myself. For example, political culture studies often ignore outside, international, and globalizing forces and their impact on the local culture. They tend not to pay much attention to class and social structure, or to how cultures change, or to how outside actors (the US Embassy and other actors) seek to *force* changes in the political culture—toward democracy, for example. Another criticism is that political-culture studies, not unlike other studies carried out in the Third World, are terribly ethnocentric, favoring a US-like model of development and paying little attention to local needs and wants.

Chapter 7 chronicles what has been called the “Renaissance of Political Culture.” In the late 1980s and early 1990s, a wave of especially forceful articles and books—by Samuel Huntington, Aaron Wildovsky, Francis Fukuyama, Harry Eckstein, Robert Putnam, Ronald Inglehart, David Landes, Geert Hofstede, Lucian Pye, Peter Berger, Orlando Patterson, and many others—remade the case for political culture studies. They argued that culture was an important independent variable, that it could not be ignored, even in some of these writers that it was *the most important* factor. Interestingly, these authors had absorbed the earlier criticisms; this “new-wave literature” was almost uniformly carefully stated, thoroughly researched, with hypotheses and variables and their relations clearly stated, and tested using empirical methods as much as possible. The new literature, in short, was much more methodologically self-conscious than had been the earlier political-culture and national character literature and much better for it. We concluded that these new political-culture studies were producing—look again at that roster of authors above—some of the best, most interesting, most provocative books in the entire political science field.

During this same period, and in some cases even before, studies of political culture and preoccupation with underlying cultural issues had spread to the Third World. By the early-to-mid-1970s, many intellectuals and political leaders in the Third World had become thoroughly disillusioned with both the Marxist- and the U.S.-favored developmentalist models. Neither of these other alternatives had delivered much in the way of either economic development or democracy.

Hence, Third World leaders began to search around in their own cultures to see if there might be an indigenous or home-grown model on which they might build. This helped produce such varied outcomes as the Iranian Revolution of 1979, East Asia’s assertion of an alternative state-led model of growth, a preoccupation with “authenticity” in Tanzania, the focus on both corporatism and dependency theory in Latin America, and the Middle East’s search for an Islamic model of development. We are not here saying that these quite varied efforts were always successful, but they do illustrate both the failures of the other outside or imported models *and* the sometimes almost desperate search for home-grown alternatives. Frank Sinatra’s song, “I’ll Do It *My Way*,” became the rallying song of these

disparate movements which, taken together, demonstrate the resurgence of local culture factors in the Third World as well as the First.

Chapter 9 focused on the latest iterations of political culture studies, identity politics, and constructivism. Something curious happened during the last decade or so: while some scholars continued to utilize political culture variables and to write about political culture, others preferred to use the newer approaches of identity politics (usually with reference to subnational groups such as women and minorities) and constructivism (in international relations studies). Identity politics is particularly useful in studying the internal divisions within society (for example, the former Yugoslavia or present-day Belgium) and may also be useful in studying differences between countries or even entire regions—e.g., between the West and Asia or between those two and the Islamic Middle East. Constructivism in our view offered a needed corrective to the focus in realist IR on sheer power politics, to the exclusion of values, ideology, and domestic political considerations.

The question remains: what is the difference between political culture and identity politics? Or between political culture studies and constructivism? Quite frankly, our analysis shows there are few differences. Political culture usually refers to the values and beliefs of a whole society while identity politics focuses on subgroups; but there is no reason why one could not also study the political culture of subgroups, or use identity politics to study whole nations or even regions. Similarly with constructivism: in its emphasis on values, beliefs, and ideology, it sounds like political culture to me; if it refers to a country's entire domestic politics as distinct from its foreign policy, then there are some degrees of difference between the two. But overall, we conclude that identity politics and constructivism, certainly valuable as approaches, are really new ways of describing political culture, new wine in old bottles.

The Argument—Reiterated

Culture matters! Culture counts! It is not just class structure, the level of modernization, or institutions that count; it is culture. Despite our similarities of origins, the United States has a very different political culture from that of Canada, for example; or from other former British colonies, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, or India; or for that matter, from Great Britain itself. None of these countries understands the others very well, although the fact they seem familiar and also speak English helps explain why American tourists prefer Great Britain to the Continent and why the other English-speaking countries soar to the top ("warm feelings") of the Council on Foreign Relations Thermometer Readings of US attitudes toward other countries.

When you land in Continental Europe, the differences are far more pronounced. Despite the homogenizing effects of the European Union over the decades and the efforts to create the new European Man (Person!) and a European consciousness, when you land in France you know immediately that you are in a new and different

world. The sights, smells, sounds, and, yes, culture are all very different. No one would ever mistake Germany for Greece or Italy, or Spain and Portugal for Scandinavia. When you get to the nether reaches of Eastern Europe, it is another world; when you cross that cultural and civilizational divide into Russia, Belarus, the Ukraine, or Moldova, it is another world entirely—Great Russian, Orthodox, Eurasian, often raw, brutal, and, historically at least, “uncivilized.”

When you get to the non- or semi-Western worlds, the differences are even more stark and dramatic, not only between them and “the West” (whatever that is) but also among and between all these regions and countries. The differences are so pronounced that there are few bases for comparison among them. It is like comparing apples, potatoes, oranges, and kumquats. There are valid comparisons you can make among the Latin American countries because they share a parallel history and culture, or among the Middle East countries because they share a heritage of Islam, or among the East Asian countries founded on a Confucian tradition. But try comparing more than superficially Latin America with the Middle East or Africa with East or Southeast Asia, and you soon run into trouble. Or *any* of these distinct culture areas with the West. You immediately run into the almost insurmountable obstacle of comparing regions that have *nothing* or about nothing in common. Their cultures are entirely different. That is why the term “Third World” is objectionable because it implies a unity among the poor nations of these diverse culture areas that does not exist. As you travel there, you may go into what we call “culture shock”—such unfamiliar surroundings that you have nothing familiar to identify with or to fasten onto.

Every nation, region, or culture area has a history, an identity, a culture of its own. The United States is not Great Britain; Britain is not France or Germany; Denmark is not Ireland or Portugal; and none of these is Tunisia, let alone Bangladesh. Nor, as we see in a minute, do their peoples necessarily want to become like someone else. They may envy our wealth but not necessarily our culture or political institutions. They do not want to be occupied by our armies, overrun by proselytizers of a new and strange religion, or advised and governed by a people of a different race, ethnicity, or culture. They may desire democracy but not necessarily our form of it, and they certainly do not want to be lectured to by us on how to govern themselves or run their lives. Many of them find our culture unacceptable, even repulsive and blasphemous, and from their point of view not worth a tiny increase in their GNP. No amount of hectoring from us will change fundamental cultural attitudes.²

At the same time, because of the historic movements of peoples, one sometimes finds affinities between culture areas that are quite unexpected. Southern or Mediterranean Europe (Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal) is very similar ethnically and culturally to the Southern Cone countries (Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay) of Latin America. The Philippines is more understandable as a country

2 David Brooks in the *New York Times* writes regularly on these themes; see among others his columns of January 15, 2009; March 26, 2010; and November 16, 2010.

if we remember that it, like Latin America, had 400 years of Spanish colonialism followed by another 100 years of US imperialism. It is fascinating to study what happens to Hispanics and their culture after they migrate to the US; similarly, the “Overseas Chinese” in places like Indonesia, Singapore, Vietnam, Malaysia, Taiwan, and the Philippines make an interesting subject for study, as well as in comparison with the Chinese back in China. Culture is a complicated issue but it is often continuous across continents among similar ethnic groups.

Listen on this theme, of the pervasiveness of culture reaching across continents, to the American writer and humorist, A.J. Liebling, in his book on the politically powerful Long family of Louisiana.

You are right on that. We are Mediterranean. I have never been to Greece or Italy but I am sure I'd be at home there as soon as I landed ... New Orleans resembles Genoa or Marseilles more that it does New York. Like [pre-Revolutionary] Havana and Port-au-Prince, New Orleans is within the orbit of the Hellenistic world that never touched the North Atlantic. The Mediterranean, Caribbean, and Gulf of Mexico form a homogeneous, though interrupted, sea.

In the literature surveyed in this book, and in the literature on national development, it is becoming clear that culture is one of the main keys to success. Not *the* key necessarily, although some of our authors do argue that, but an essential key. Along, I would say, with geography, resources, the environment, social structure, and institutions as the other keys. If we ask, for example, why Europe and then North America forged ahead in early modern times, the answer is, mainly, culture: the revolution of science, printing, the rule of law, economic and political freedom, individualism and entrepreneurship, and pluralist, representative government. If we ask why, in the last half of the twentieth century, East Asia forged ahead of other developing areas (Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East), the answer again is, in large part, culture: the ethic of hard work, family honor, education, and getting ahead that are part of the Confucian culture of Chinese society now spread elsewhere in Asia. Similarly, if we ask why some countries and areas—Haiti, Sub-Saharan Africa, the Arab Middle East, and Southeast Asia—have fallen behind, the answer again is culture: the absence of a culture supportive of development.

Culture and values are at the heart of development. Of course, it is also necessary to get your institutions right but, at least in the initial stages of development, it is essential to have a supportive culture, one that is propitious for development as in Asia, Europe, and North America. Such values as personal responsibility, trust (Putnam and Fukuyama), the dignity of work, government under law, and the priority of the individual make a *huge* difference in development. So, of course, do natural resources, geography (for example, the American and European internal river transportation system), and having a permeable class system that allows for upward mobility. All these factors—the right institutions, resources, geography, and an upwardly mobile social system—are important, but ultimately culture also

plays a large role, maybe the largest. Culture is the key that unlocks the door of civilizational success.

Let us recall that famous quote from the always-perceptive, late Democratic Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan. He said, “The central conservative truth is that it is culture, not politics, that determines the success of a society. The central liberal truth is that politics can change a culture and save it from itself.” If we reflect on this statement for a moment, we see that Moynihan is saying that culture matters more than politics, particularly as a country is at the beginning stages of development. If the culture is not conducive to development or democracy, for that matter, no amount of “politics” or social engineering will make much difference.

However, recall also the second part of Moynihan’s statement: over the long haul, politics makes a difference and can even change the culture. Witness our own famous, 1954 Supreme Court desegregation case, *Brown versus Board of Education*: surely, we are a more integrated, less prejudiced, more racially tolerant society because of this and other Court decisions (“politics”) than we were 60 years ago. Similarly, in Asia and Latin America: both these areas, even though their respective cultures held them up for many long centuries, are more developed and more democratic (politics again) now than they were 60 years ago. Culture is key but in the long run politics, social change, and modernization can also make a difference.

Some cultures, some value systems, some beliefs, and some religions are more conducive to promoting development and democracy than others. We may not be very comfortable with that fact, and it is certainly not very politically correct to say so, but it is a fact. I began my career as a scholar of Latin America, wrestling with the issue of why Latin America was less developed than the United States.³ After a decade of studying Latin America, I shifted my research focus to Southern Europe and the issue of why Orthodox Greece and Catholic Italy, Spain, and Portugal were less developed than the Northern Protestant countries of Germany, the Netherlands, and Scandinavia. Next, I branched out to study the phenomenal success of Asia as compared with the considerably less than stellar performance of Africa and the Middle East. I need not recount all that personal history here,⁴ except to say that I have now done research on these issues in over 90 countries, roughly half of the world’s total.

The answer to my quest to find the root causes of development, democracy, and successful countries lies, in large part, with culture. It turns out, following the pioneering work of Max Weber, that the Protestant (Calvinist and Evangelical Lutheran) countries of Northern Europe were better at promoting the values that led to growth—trust, individual responsibility, rule of law, the value of education,

3 Howard J. Wiarda, *Politics and Social Change in Latin America* (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 1964); subsequent editions by Westview Press and Praeger/Greenwood.

4 See Howard J. Wiarda, *Adventures in Research* (Lincoln, NE: iUniverse, 2006–07), four volumes.

and risk-taking—than were the Catholic countries of the Mediterranean, although by now such Catholic countries as Austria, Belgium, and France have caught up.

Similarly, in the Americas: the modern, progressive, middle-class, self-reliant societies that the British and Dutch implanted in North America were much more supportive of democracy than were the quasi-feudal, two-class, and still medieval and pre-modern societies that Spain and Portugal implanted in Latin America. And now in Asia: the Confucian societies of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and recently Macao and China, with their emphasis on education, honor of parents, and individual achievement, have done phenomenally well, with miracle growth rates that have even outstripped the United States and Western Europe. However, the cultures of Africa, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East, areas that are also encumbered by rigid belief systems, weak institutions and civil society, and social structures not conducive to either growth or development, have not been so successful.

Culture, however, should not be seen as deterministic. Your culture may initially inhibit development and growth but it need not always be that way. Cultures can change, albeit slowly, undoubtedly too slowly for many of us who want to get things done and see progress. Your culture is not necessarily your final destiny. Cultures can be supplanted, or some of their pernicious aspects put aside, or modified, or reinterpreted. Cultures can and do change under the impact of modernization, economic development, social change, and globalization. Remembering again the second half of Moynihan's injunction, good politics in the way of literary campaigns, educational reform, economic growth, good social policies, civil society development, and democratization can ultimately, over time, also change the culture.

Researchers are still arguing about what is the ultimate origin of global or civilizational cultural differences. Does it lie in history, the environment, or perhaps even our genes? Some scholars trace the origins of Western, individualistic culture back to the ancient Greeks and to Hellenistic society's emphasis on heroic individual action. They contrast that with more collectivist or communalist societies which never developed the core values of individualism and entrepreneurship.⁵ Other scholars have hypothesized that it all goes back to microbes, which may vary from one geographic area to another. Still others are now arguing that culture is hot-wired, that it somehow originates in our genes. Or that, as they put it, "culture is a second great system of inheritance that stands alongside our genes." In this view, culture and genes evolved hand-in-hand, with culture serving as a second way of transmitting knowledge down through the generations, thus shortcutting the normal genetic paths of inheritance.

I am not a biologist. I do not have an answer to these issues. Obviously, if culture is more than learned, if it is somehow genetic and/or inherited, then that has huge implications. So rather than a knee-jerk reaction to these new findings,

5 Lawrence F. Harrison writes regularly on the importance of culture; see especially his edited book with Samuel P. Huntington, *Culture Matters* (New York: Basic Books, 2000).

or a response driven by ideology more than science, let us for now keep our minds open. In the future we'll know more. But whatever the outcome of this specific research issue, it does not in my way diminish the importance of the culture variable; indeed, it may make culture even more important than before.

Policy Implications

Culture, specifically political culture, has an enormous impact on politics and policy. Its impact may be felt both at the levels of domestic and foreign policy. According to the canons of political correctness, however, we are all supposed to respect the cultures of others, keep silent about them, and certainly not make moral judgments about them. But that stance has not only prevented us from examining closely the role of culture in politics; it has led to some enormous failures in American policy.

Let us go back again to Daniel Patrick Moynihan and his dictum: "the central conservative truth is that it is culture, not politics, that determines the success of a society." We start off with this assertion. But soon we will return to Moynihan's second dictum: "the central liberal truth is that politics can change a culture and save it from itself."

We begin with a few comments relating to domestic policy issues. It is said, for example, that America has a "gun culture," that we are a country shaped historically by our "frontier" or "wild West" mentality. Well, that is probably true to a certain extent: our "gun culture," if we can call it that, is certainly different from Europe's or Asia's view of firearms, in both of which death at the hands of guns is far lower than our own. Because it is part of our culture, that means it will be difficult to change and will likely require a long time. On the other hand, President Obama, a disciple of the second half of the Moynihan quote above, certainly believes that legislation—"politics," in Moynihan's sense—has the power over time to change that culture.

Or let us take health care. We have been, historically, a country with a system of private-sector health care. Our medical "culture" includes private doctors, private hospitals, private insurance companies, privately arranged visits to doctors' offices, and a medical methodology that incorporates numerous tests for those who can afford them. It is an individualistic, as distinct from collectivist, health care system, in a society and culture that is historically individualistic. Clearly, President Obama, with his Affordable Health Care Act, popularly known as "Obamacare," is seeking to change all that. He is betting, once again à la Moynihan, that legislation or "politics" can not only change the American system of health care but can also change the health care culture. In this case, however, he is dealing with 16.9 percent of the total national economy, so the stakes are very high and the risks and costs of political failure are extraordinarily high.

Or, let us take racial attitudes. It is said that, because of America's history of slavery and then 100 more years of racial segregation that we are a "racist

country,” even that we have a “racist culture.” And we already know that once such attitudes are embedded in the culture, they are very hard to change. On the other hand, “politics” in the Moynihan sense—through Supreme Court decisions outlawing segregation or the Civil Rights Legislation of the 1960s—can, over time, change these attitudes. Surely, we are today a more integrated and tolerant society than we were in the 1950s. Once again, while culture is powerful, it is not immutable; and over a long period of time, basic cultural attitudes on guns, health care, or race can be changed.

Now, let us turn to foreign policy, where the issues are even more complex. First, Afghanistan. Afghanistan is a very traditional society. It is at extremely low socioeconomic levels, has *never* had democracy, and is a tribal- and clan-dominated society. Most Afghans prefer Sharia law, do not believe in the classic Western freedoms (press, religion, speech, etc.), and are not free-market oriented. They prefer women to be subordinated and uneducated, alcohol to be prohibited, and unbelievers killed or driven out. They seem to prefer local, tribal warlords, even perhaps the Taliban, above any elected national government. So what chance of success does democracy or American/NATO policy have in this context?

Almost none, I would say; and I have been saying so from the start, even before the beginning of our intervention there. Naïve or wishful American political and military leaders insist that we are “winning” and they have the matrixes to “prove” it. They cannot admit that their mission, which would be to change the entirety of Afghan culture, is impossible. Similarly, civilians rush in to build “democracy” and “civil society,” “liberate” Afghan women, and teach the Afghans to respect human rights. But none of this is working. *We* cannot change deep-rooted Afghan political culture. Real change can come only from within—and that will require three or four *generations*, not three or four years, as the Americans seem to believe. In Afghanistan or in other “hopeless” cases like Haiti or the Central African Republic, we are in denial of reality. Meanwhile, we have wasted upwards of a *trillion* dollars and thousands of lives.

Similarly in Iraq. “Similarly” but not “the same.” For Iraq is a considerably more-developed country than Afghanistan. It has a middle class, a level of literacy, and a diversified economy that Afghanistan cannot come close to matching. So the odds of success in Iraq are better than in Afghanistan. But even here, we are dealing with a country that favors Sharia law, that is dominated by warlords and violence, that has *no history* of democracy and human rights, and that is divided by partisan, tribal, and sectarian strife.

The Americans are betting that “politics” (Moynihan again)—a new constitution, elections, a new government—will prove more important in Iraq than the historic culture outlined above. In this case, it was the George W. Bush foreign policy team and its neo-conservative advisers who argued that culture did not count in Iraq and that just the *idea* of democracy and human rights would be the Iraqis together to forget past history and build a new society. The question, posed by the *New York Times*’ Thomas Friedman, is whether Iraq’s new American-inspired politics will triumph over its cultural divides, or will its historic political

culture doom to failure its fledgling democracy?⁶ Although we do not know the final answer to that question, I am betting on the culture—once again, failure of the policy at the cost of another trillion dollars and more blood, death, and maiming.

Now let us look, thirdly, at the so-called “Arab Spring.” This includes the countries of Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and Yemen—all of which deposed authoritarian leaders in 2010—and possibly Bahrain and Syria, which launched violent protest demonstrations against ruling regimes. The questions are (1) can these countries succeed in building democracy and a modern society, and (2) should the United States and its allies assist them in getting rid of older dictators and restructuring their societies?

I would say “No” to both questions. First, we need to distinguish between countries: Egypt is the most developed of the six countries listed and, therefore, the one where the odds of success are greatest. Second, we need to weigh the circumstances of each: Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and Yemen all had aging leaders so change would soon be coming to these countries anyway. But third, none of these countries has the civil society, the institutional base, the large middle class, the socioeconomic level, *or* the political culture to be supportive of democracy and rapid modernization. So the odds of succeeding in any of them are not stellar. Note here that it is not just political culture that is determinative but that factor along with the others listed.

Now let us look at big and important Russia, our fourth case, or perhaps China, for that matter. Twenty years ago, in the hopeful and proto-democratic years just after the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia was open to advice from the West on building a strong democracy and a modern, free-market system. But now, under Vladimir Putin, Russia has regressed to its traditional political culture including authoritarianism, statism, nationalism, and traditional institutions—church, army, and secret police. It does not want advice from the West on democracy or anything else. It may be we can still do some limited things—help with educational reform or civil society assistance—but we, as outsiders, cannot reform or rebuild Russia if the Russians themselves do not want to do so. It is folly to try to force freedom on those—and not just in Russia—who do not want it or whose political culture and socioeconomic level are not supportive of it.

Freedom and democracy, it turns out, are neither inevitable, instinctive, nor universally desired. It may be that all peoples everywhere want to be free of the shackles that imprison them; they also want a say in who governs them, they want to feed their families, and they’d obviously rather not be terrorized or tortured. But that does not mean necessarily that they want democracy, especially given our own problems, US- or European-style democracy. Most societies in the world do not have a word for freedom nor does their language have agreed-upon terms for such concepts as “pluralism,” “individual rights,” “public interest,” or “representative democracy.” How can we transplant these concepts, let alone the

6 Friedman, “Iraq’s Known Unknowns Still Unknown,” *New York Times* (February 24, 210), A21.

institutions that go with them, to other countries and cultures if we lack even a language for doing so?

Freedom, democracy, and pluralism are, in fact, products of a distinctive *Western* civilization. They were forged through *centuries*, even thousands of years, of religious history, political history, and societal change, to say nothing of almost constant struggle. Western democracy is thus unique, a product not just of a distinct culture but of thousands, nay, millions of struggles, contingencies, and compromises. Of course, this history and the unique culture to which it gave rise cannot be transferred *en toto* to other lands and cultures. However noble it is to try to do so, we must also recognize the realities which are that these other lands and cultures, even with globalization, do not see things the same way we do or with the same priorities. You cannot just pick up our history, culture, and institutions, plunk them down in some other society, and expect them to work in the same way. In the non-West, democracy is difficult, but it is not impossible.

While this is most obviously true in the efforts to export democracy and human rights to other, benighted lands, we are also discovering that the injunctions indicated above similarly apply to economic growth and development. Economists and the denizens of the big development banks (IMF and World Bank) tend to believe even more than do political scientists that their models, and the prescriptions that flow from them, are universal. Of course, you do need to get your economy and your policy right. But there are many ways to do this: witness the way that East Asia, and now especially China, has employed a statist model of growth as distinct from the American and America-favored *laissez faire* one. Not only has the Asian model been phenomenally successful, but it is the one, more than the American one, to which other Third World developing nations are increasingly looking for inspiration.

The issue is still, among economists, open to dispute. It is the same Moynihan-like debate that we saw earlier. On the one side are economists and development specialists who argue that all a country has to do to stimulate growth is adopt the right policies. On the other side is the growing chorus that emphasizes cultural restraints. If the culture is not supportive of growth and investment, they say, then no amount of technological quick-fix or institutional tinkering is likely to be successful. If their values and social structures are hostile to development, then their economic policies are unlikely to be successful. Culture here is the key, predisposing some societies to growth and others to either permanent poverty or only modest growth. Echoing Max Weber's arguments of 100 years ago, all the correct economic policies cannot overcome a culture whose bedrock values are resistant to change.

Economists and development specialists have dealt with these new cultural realities in a variety of ways.⁷ Some are in denial that their supposed universal models are actually somewhat less than that. Nobel prize winner, Douglas North, while acknowledging the importance of culture, treats it as just another

7 See David Brooks in *New York Times* (January 15, 2009).

“institution” (how curious to treat culture as an institution) to be either reformed or done away with. Some extreme culturalists would similarly have development-retarded countries repudiate their historic cultures, as if India, Haiti, Sub-Saharan Africa, and the Arab Middle East could ignore and abolish thousands of years of history and cultural practices overnight and simply adopt somebody else’s culture (presumably the American one) lock, stock, and barrel. More realistically and constructively, the World Bank, after long resisting such steps, is now hiring anthropologists because it has belatedly figured out that its policies have an effect on indigenous cultures, and a handful of political scientists because it has discovered they can instruct the Bank on governance, human rights, and corruption issues.

Culture explains a lot, but not everything. It helps explain why Western Europe forged ahead in the sixteenth century while other global regions lagged behind. But it also explains, because of the Confucian work ethic, why East Asia took off in the last half of the twentieth century. Conversely, it was the culture along with the social structure that explains why Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America fell behind and are still struggling to catch up. Culture helps explain why the Dominican Republic (Hispanic) is modernizing while next-door Haiti (pre-modern) is still mired in poverty and disorganization. The clientelistic, family-driven, patronage-dominated cultures of Southern Europe help explain why that area is in deep trouble but Northern Europe is doing much better.

It should be obvious that one economic model, one political model, one business model, or one leadership model cannot fit or be appropriate for all countries. Foreign aid and advice, if they are to be useful at all, must equip developing countries with projects and models that fit *their* country and culture, rather than the over-simple, presumably universal, and idealized Western models that they currently offer. You cannot just impose your ways of doing things on other countries with their often long histories and proud cultures. Rather, you need to adjust your advice and your aid to the realities of the countries/cultures with which you are dealing.

Culture is important but it is not deterministic. That is the opposite trap—that culture explains everything—into which we are in danger of falling. Take, for example, the late Samuel Huntington’s famous book on *The Clash of Civilizations*. Close readers will know that I am a Huntington mentee; I also admire this book, even while thinking that it goes too far. For societies and cultures are not quite as locked in place as he says. Instead, societies and cultures change, modernize, and undergo transformation. Globalization, except perhaps for North Korea, affects all countries over time. Men and women change; they adjust to new realities; they find themselves in new circumstances. Or else, following Crawford Young’s analysis, the balance of power in society and politics changes, forcing a new

cultural awareness and configuration.⁸ Political culture is more permeable, more adjustable, more open to change than the cultural determinists can admit.

The issue comes home to us in our politics, almost every facet of it. Democrats, followers of Moynihan's second dictum, but ignoring his first, seem to believe that politics and policy can change everything. They would have us rush indiscriminately into such global hot-spots as Libya, Haiti, Egypt, East Timor, or Syria on the apparent assumption that a good democracy promotion and human rights policy can change the world. They ignore the local culture and realistic possibilities in favor of a supposedly "universal" model that somehow always seems to bear a striking resemblance to an idealized version—democratic, pluralistic, and socially just—of the United States. History does not count; everything is in the here-and-now. Plus, for them, it is politically incorrect to suggest that some cultures are resistant to either American blandishments or American ways of doing things.

Republicans have reached the opposite conclusions. They champion Moynihan's first proposition while ignoring the second. On foreign policy in the Middle East, for example, they have gravitated to a Huntingtonian-like position where culture is everything and policy can accomplish nothing. They apparently believe that Arab culture and public opinion are so unyielding and hostile that we can accomplish nothing by way of human rights and democracy promotion there. Better to have little contact with the area than to get involved only to be disappointed—or be attacked for our good intentions. They now doubt President George W. Bush's words that "Islam is a religion of peace"; they also doubt the ability of the State or Defense Department to deal effectively with the Arab world. Hence, their advice is to withdraw, have as little contact as possible, and give up on our futile efforts to change Arab behavior in our direction.

Both these positions are wrong. The Democrats are wrong to ignore culture, to treat every nation as a *tabula rasa* on which we can write a new script, and to rush in indiscriminately in pursuit of such lofty goals that they have no possibility of success. You cannot ignore the local culture or its level of socioeconomic development, literacy, institutional structure, and level of civil society—what have historically been referred to as the "prerequisites" of democracy. But the Republicans' position is equally wrong and too fatalistic. Culture counts for a lot but it is not everything. The Republican position is a bastardization of Huntington, whom I doubt they have ever read completely or seriously. Cultures, societies, politics *do* change and become reconfigured under the impact of many-faceted modernization, or even revolution as in the Arab Spring, both of which open up new possibilities. Culture is neither as pliable as Democrats believe nor as deterministic as Republicans think.

What then are we to do? The first and foremost admonition is to be realistic. We cannot rush pell-mell into every hopeless situation (Haiti, Somalia, Yemen, Afghanistan, Libya, and Syria) on the assumption that we can save them from

8 Young, *The Politics of Cultural Pluralism* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1976).

themselves and construct democracy in places where there is no cultural, socioeconomic, or institutional basis for doing so. On the other hand, we need not always stand by hopelessly and fatalistically either. We need to pick and choose and single out those cases where we have a good chance of success of building democracy and a stable foreign policy relationship. That may mean, for example, concentrating our efforts on Egypt but not Yemen, Tunisia but not Libya, the Dominican Republic but not Haiti, Malaysia or Indonesia but not Myanmar. To those countries not yet ready, by the criteria above, for full-scale democracy promotion, we may want to support lower-level efforts: a literacy campaign, basic economic development, and/or civil society promotion. Occasionally, to follow the advice of colleague, Philippines expert, and former Swarthmore President, Theodore Friend, we may even wish to exercise some “timely daring” in promoting democracy even where it seems unlikely.⁹

Research Implications

For the most part, people from different cultures have only a minimum of trouble understanding each other. They can laugh and do business and talk about their jobs, families, children, and other matters, and there are no problems. Going beyond these minimums, there may even be some universal or near-universal desires for liberty, dignity, and a government that is responsive. But there is another obstinate, stubborn, 10 percent of cultural values and beliefs in the words of *Financial Times* columnist, Harry Eyres, “that do not overlap, which you always have to be careful about, which can be the most fertile ground for misunderstanding.”¹⁰

It is that “other 10 percent” that has been our main focus here. Actually, I believe it is often more than 10 percent. That cultures often differ in profound, basic, and systemic ways. In thinking about these issues I am close to the world-renowned anthropologist, Claude Lévi-Strauss, who passed away recently. For Lévi-Strauss, each culture is different, each culture is organized systemically in different ways, each culture has different values and beliefs, and each culture must be studied on its own terms, not through the often-biased, rose-tinted glasses of the observer. As scholars, observers, exchange students, or just tourists, we much pay serious attention, as a matter of respect if nothing else, to peoples and cultures that think differently from what we do. Hence, in Lévi-Strauss’s terms, we must embrace the idea of a variety, a “colloquia” of civilizations—i.e., real multiculturalism. Moreover, this variety needs to be appreciated on its own terms and not just how it relates to the West or through Western-inspired democratization or modernization theory.

9 Friend; see his and other valuable comments in the series of volumes published by the Foreign Policy Research Institute, *Friendly Tyrants* (New York: St. Martin’s, 1991).

10 Eyres, “The Delights and Dangers of Diversity,” *Financial Times* (June 11, 2011), 18.

I have been thinking about this matter of culture, really political culture, for some time. Here are my conclusions—so far!

1. Culture is one of the three great explanations in the social sciences, the others being structuralism (by which is usually meant class analysis) and institutionalism in its several forms.
2. Some analysts (Weber and Landes interpretively; Inglehart empirically) see culture as *the* most important explanatory factor. That may yet prove to be correct, though it is still not proven.
3. Social structure and class analysis are especially important in the Middle East or Latin America; structuralism, in its broader sense, meaning trade preferences and favored access to US markets, was especially important in explaining Japan's, Taiwan's, and South Korea's economic take-offs in the last half of the twentieth century.
4. I see culture, along with geography and resources, as a key variable *initially* in explaining why some countries and areas forged ahead (Northwest Europe, North America, and eventually East Asia) while others (Latin America, Southeast Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and the Middle East) lagged behind.
5. At this early stage, institutions are less important. Remember Bolivia: beautiful laws and constitutions but very little democracy. As countries develop, getting their institutions and policies right becomes more important.
6. But even as institutions acquire greater importance, culture remains an important variable. Witness the ongoing differences between Southern Europe (clientelistic, patronage dominated, and high corruption) and more efficient, rationalized Northern Europe.
7. Political-cultural explanations often have a number of weaknesses: vagueness, imprecision, stereotyping, and lack of clear definition or methodology. They also tend to ignore both class/structural factors and outside, international, or globalization factors.
8. But political culture also has its strengths. It gets you at first causes, the essence of things, the basics.¹¹ And in Almond and Verba's or Inglehart's work, it gets you closer to an empirical, scientific explanation.
9. Studying political culture is both hard work *and* fun to do. It enables you to travel, go abroad, and learn about other countries and cultures.
10. While political culture is important, it is not, in my view, the only explanation. Other factors, as above, are also important. So political culture should not be reified or elevated into an exclusive or single-causal explanation. Political culture explains a lot but not everything. My own preference is for a more complex, multi-causal explanation. Culture should thus be used *in combination with* other explanations: geography,

11 On this issue, see "Human Culture, An Evolutionary Force," *New York Times* (March 2, 2010), D1.

social structure, resources, and institutions. These factors can now best be weighed and evaluated through correlations and multi-variate analysis. Such analysis can give us the explanatory weight of each factor or variable.

11. At the same time, we must recognize that cultures do change. They are not deterministic or fixed for all time. They adjust, adapt, get altered, even undergo at times revolutionary transformations. Societies change; modernization and globalization go forward; and culture change both drives and is a product of these other changes. After all, culture is mainly a human and a societal construct; it has not yet been proven that it is genetic, inherited, and organic.¹² As cultures change, so also will societies and political systems.
12. These are my views on political culture from a macro level. That is, from the point of view of the overall importance of political culture as an independent variable and its relations to other variables.

Now in conclusion, let me offer some “micro” or practical advice to young (or old!) political-culture researchers as they go out into the field:

1. Learn the language; you have got to be able to function and do your research.
2. Steep yourself in the culture, for the same reason.
3. Try to work it out so that you can live there for a year, six months at a minimum, three if you are an experienced researcher with prior experience in that area.
4. Have a list of names, contacts before you go. Get these from family, friends, professors, and your own preliminary research. Contact them upon arrival, set up interviews, collect more names from them or people to see. Use in-depth interview techniques before going on to more structured interviews.
5. Practice participant observation. That means, go there, sit on a park bench and watch the world go by, talk to the prostitutes and shoeshine boys, and soak up the sights, sounds, and smells.
6. Get out of your hotel, rent a room or apartment, get a driver’s license or a work permit. That way you begin to learn how real, local people function and the joys and frustrations of real life.
7. Empathize! Be sympathetic. Try to understand your country/culture area/issue on their terms, not just yours. Remember the book series, *Through African [Chinese, Asian, Indian, Middle Eastern] Eyes*. Or the Peace Corps perspective, “*They Know How!*”
8. Practice a healthy dose of cultural relativism. Do not judge, do not criticize. It may be the “dysfunction” you see is because of lack of understanding on your own part, not the fault of the local society. Of course, you do not

12 A wonderful manual written for World Bank leaders on the importance of socio-cultural factors is Maria Donoso Clark, *Social Assessment for Effective Results in HNP Operations* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2013).

accept everything you see or experience but a little restraint before you criticize goes a long way.

9. Ask the people! How do they do things? Be prepared to accept their practical solutions before you try to impose your own outside views, which not only may not work but may also be destructive of indigenous institutions.
10. Work through local institutions. They may be more functional and modernizing than you think. These may include ethnic groups, clan groups, tribes, patronage or family networks.
11. When possible, try to develop a more structured interview schedule and questionnaire. Go beyond your earlier in-depth interviews. If at all possible, hire and train a research team to do interviews for you. Decide on a sample. Or get hold of prior public opinion surveys for your country—e.g., the Inglehart/University of Michigan World Values Surveys.
12. Supplement your interviews and participant observation with library and archival research. In my case, I like to do extensive library research first to establish a baseline of knowledge, then use the interviews to supplement and probe beneath the surface of the published information.
13. Be flexible. No one research methodology fits all research issues or situations. Be prepared to adjust and adapt depending on circumstances. Use *any methodology* to get at the issues you want to research. Do not let some methodological hang-up or design flaw get in the way of your completing the research by other means. It is the substance you are after, not the methodology; do not allow the research methodology tail to wag the substantive dog.
14. Remember, just as there are many routes to development and many globalizations, so there are many routes and methods by which to complete your research. Be eclectic. Use multiple means to accomplish your ends, which are to complete your study, paper, thesis, or book.
15. As you become adjusted to the local environment, use more sophisticated techniques: statistics, correlations, multivariate analysis, and computers. Which of your variables and which methodologies explain more?
16. Good luck! And be careful out there!

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