


ALAN VINCELETTE

RECENT CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHY  
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY



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*by*

ALAN VINCELETTE



MARQUETTE  
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## INTRODUCTION

As has been noted, contemporary Catholics tend to be poor promoters of their Church. In philosophical matters this comes out in that many Catholic historians of philosophy either omit some important Catholic philosophers or fail to mention that a given philosopher was Catholic. Thus when in the Spring of 2000 I was hired to teach a course titled *Recent Catholic Philosophy*<sup>1</sup> at St. John's Seminary College in Camarillo, California (the seminary for the Archdiocese of Los Angeles), three things became abundantly clear: 1) the great diversity and multitude of Catholic philosophers writing during the past two centuries; 2) the lack of appreciation and awareness of these recent Catholic philosophers and movements; and 3) the absence of suitable English-language works covering the major contemporary Catholic philosophers.<sup>2</sup>

This work seeks to remedy this situation and so to make known the central figures in Nineteenth-Century Catholic philosophy (I hope to produce another volume covering the Twentieth-Century at a later date).

Catholic philosophy, of course, goes back to Jesus and St. Paul, and it was developed at great length by the Apologists and other Church Fathers (c. 150-750), as well as by thinkers of the Carolingian Renaissance (c. 800-900), the Middle Ages (1000-1350), and the Renaissance (1350-1600). But in many ways it was the rise of Protestantism in the early sixteenth century (c. 1520) that allowed Catholic philosophy to take stock of itself and become fully self-conscious.<sup>3</sup> Still, the Catholic philosophers of the Modern Period (1600-1800), apart from the School of Cartesianism, tended to embrace the philosophies at hand rather than develop their own creative systems of thought.<sup>4</sup> Hence it is really in the Nineteenth-Century that Catholic Philosophy comes into its own, and, through the genius of Catholic thinkers, several new philosophical movements come into being [Romanticism, Spiritualism, Integralism, etc.] (and hence the scope of this book).

What is not so easy to comprehend though is who counts as a Catholic Philosopher, in other words, who to include in this book. It seems clear that those philosophers who were raised Catholic but turned to

Protestantism, agnosticism or atheism before they had written any major works (indeed often at a young age) should not be included in a book on Catholic Philosophy: i.e. Arnold Geulincx (1624-1669), Charles Gildon (1665-1724), John Toland (1670-1722), Matthew Tindal (1657-1733), William Chillingworth (1602-1644), Jean Meslier (1678-1733), Antonio Genovesi (1712-1769), Gianmaria Ortes (1713-1790), Jean Martin de Prades (1720-1782), Karl Leonhard Reinhold (1757-1823); Melchiorre Gioja (1767-1829), Cristoforo Bonavino[Ausonio Franchi] (1821-1895), Roberto Ardigò (1828-1920), Carl Stumpf (1848-1936), George Santayana (1863-1952), Martin Heidegger (1889-1976), Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980), Simone de Beauvoir (1908-1986), Albert Camus (1913-1960), Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961), Louis Althusser (1918-1990), Gérard Granel (1930-2000), Anthony Kenny (1931-).

Nor does it seem justifiable to include those philosophers who converted (or were close to converting) to Catholicism at the end of their lives (even on their deathbed), and after all of their major philosophical works had been written: i.e. Baron Charles de Montesquieu (1689-1755), Voltaire [François-Marie Arouet] (1694-1778),<sup>5</sup> Jean Martin de Prades (1720-1782) once again, Émile Littré (1801-1881), Cristoforo Bonavino [Ausonio Franchi] (1821-1895) once again, Henri Bergson (1859-1941) [who wished to convert to Catholicism at the end of his life but put it off in solidarity with the Jews then being persecuted in Europe], Maurice Pradines (1874-1958) [who grew closer to Christianity], Jean Nabert (1881-1960) [who grew closer to Christianity], Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937), Frank Meyer (1909-1972), Mortimer Adler (1902-2001), and the convert from atheism Simone Weil (1909-1943) [which is not to say that the philosophical writings of some of these thinkers, such as Bergson and Adler were not compatible with Catholicism or even influenced by it].

However, it does seem warranted to include those Catholic philosophers who made major contributions to philosophy before they left the Catholic Church or were excommunicated (often becoming deistic): Franz Berg (1753-1821), Eulogius Schneider (1756-1794), Fr. Bernhard Bolzano (1781-1848), Fr. Hughes Félicité Robert de Lamennais (1782-1854), Fr. Friedrich Michelis (1815-1886), the convert biologist St. George Jackson Mivart (1827-1900), Fr. Hyacinthe Loyson [Charles Loyson] (1827-1912); Johann Nepomuk Huber (1830-1879), Fr. Franz Brentano (1838-1917), Anton

Marty (1847-1914), Fr. Marcel Hébert (1851-1916), George Tyrrell (1861-1909), Albert Houtin (1867-1926), William Sullivan (1872-1935), and Max Scheler (1874-1928).

Additionally, it seems reasonable that a book on Catholic Philosophy should focus on those areas of philosophy most directly relevant to Catholicism, such as epistemology, ethics, metaphysics, the philosophy of the mind, and the philosophy of religion. Hence, regrettably, those Catholic philosophers who have labored almost exclusively in areas such as logic, the philosophy of language, and the philosophy of science, cannot be included: i.e. Fr. Pierre Duhem (1861-1916), Jan Łukasiewicz (1878-1956), Alfred Tarski (1901-1983), Michael Dummett (1925- ), Nicholas Rescher (1928- ), and Bastiaan Van Fraassen (1941- ). Nor regrettably can those who labored in the area of political philosophy be included.<sup>6</sup>

Finally, due to considerations of space (in the book) and time (for research), I decided to narrow the focus to Catholic Philosophers writing in Western Europe (Ireland, England, Spain, Portugal, France, Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, and Italy) and North American (Canada, United States).

With the conviction that a philosopher is helpfully understood in his or her historical context, I have also written a lot about the histories of contemporary America, Belgium, England, France, Germany, and Italy. Much of this history of recent times reflects the weakening or outright elimination of the Catholic Church's political sway, and also the loss of much of its property (suffice it to say that some [though certainly not all] of the political and social upheavals chronicled in this book were arguably necessary or even beneficial to the Catholic Church).

In closing, it is my fond hope that this volume introduces the reader to the great diversity and profoundness of Catholic philosophy in the Nineteenth-Century.

## I

### ROMANTICISM

*1800-1850 in France, Germany, & Switzerland*

In his *Memoirs*, the great Catholic Romantic Chateaubriand professed that "... [as a] writer, I tried to restore religion on its ruins" (Preface, p. xxi). This was no literary embellishment on his part, as at the start of the nineteenth century the Catholic Church was indeed in a state of ruins in France. While the Church had regained its vigor with the Catholic revival that had occurred during the Counter-Reformation (1560-1648) and the Baroque Period (1600-1750), this revitalization was now over, and a fresh wave of opposition to Catholicism had arisen.

At the ideological level the Catholic Church's positions had been challenged by the rise of Jansenism (1640-1730), Quietism (1675-1700), Gallicanism (1680-1789), and the Enlightenment (1700-1789).<sup>7</sup> In particular the deistic philosophers of the Enlightenment such as Bernard le Bovier de Fontenelle (1657-1757), Baron Charles de Montesquieu (1689-1755) [a death-bed convert to Catholicism it seems], Voltaire [François-Marie Arouet] (1694-1778) [a death-bed convert it seems], Pierre-Louis Moreau de Maupertius (1698-1759), Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), Claude Adrien Helvétius (1715-1771), and the former priest Jean Martin de Prades (1720-1782),<sup>8</sup> as well as the materialistic atheists such as the former priest Jean Meslier (1678-1733), Julien Offray de La Mettrie (1709-1751), the later Denis Diderot (1713-1784), Jean le Rond d'Alembert (1717-1783), Baron Paul-Henri Thiry D'Holbach (1723-1789), and Pierre-Jean-Georges Cabanis (1757-1808), spared no ink in attacking the views and actions of the Catholic Church. They rejected any notion that truth could come from tradition, authority, or supernatural revelation and instead championed the use of reason alone in acquiring knowledge. While the former group, the deists, had no room for a Catholic Church that was the custodian of a supernatural revelation, and claimed that reason showed that God did not perform miracles but created a world that ran on its own through natural laws, the materi-

alistic atheists went one step further and claimed that reason showed that all that exists is a material world operating according to natural laws alone and that there is no Creator. All of this intellectual critique led to a decline in the Scholastic philosophy which had flourished during the period of the Baroque or Second Scholasticism (1525-1650) and opened the door for an influx of new movements into Catholic thought (initially these were attempts to combine various modern philosophies with Catholicism such as Humanism, Empiricism, Cartesianism, Wolffianism, Kantianism, and Idealism).

At the institutional level the power of the French Catholic Church had been severely curbed during the latter part of the eighteenth century. The Jesuits, who had been the most ardent supporters of the Counter-Reformation and who ran many of the European colleges, were outlawed in 1764 in France, and their order was suppressed altogether in 1773. Yet this disruption in the life of the Church, great as it was, was nothing in comparison with the events surrounding the French Revolution (1789-1799). In 1789, at the start of the French Revolution, the feudal privileges of the French Catholic Church, such as tithes, were abolished, and all of the Church property in France was nationalized with much of it being sold (measures which found strong support even among those Catholic clergy in the National Assembly). From 1790-1792 the male and female religious orders in France were dissolved, their property sold, and the famed Abbey of Cluny destroyed, and in 1791 a Civil Constitution of the Clergy was voted into effect whereby secular priests were elected by the laity and all priests had to swear an oath of fidelity to the state. This led to a great divide in the French Catholic Church when only seven out of the one-hundred and eighty bishops and just over half of the fifty-five thousand parish clergy took this oath, henceforth known as the juring clergy. Those who did not take the oath, or who later retracted the oath, the thirty or forth-thousand strong non-juring clergy, were forced to emigrate. Then in 1792 the registration of births, marriages, and deaths was turned over to the state. Disruptive as all of this was to the Church, the worst was yet to come.

The September Massacre (1792) and the Reign of Terror (1793-1794) ended with the murder of three bishops and around two-thousand to five-thousand priests and nuns, some of the priest's body-parts being marched through French cities on pikes. An additional thirty-five to forty-thousand French citizens also lost their lives, many of them

for their support of the Catholic Church. Eventually, a De-Christianization Campaign swept the country (1793-1794). Churches were vandalized and destroyed or forced to cease holding religious services; the relics of Saint Geneviève were destroyed; religious holidays were cancelled or replaced; a new secular Republican calendar was put into place; the seven-day week was replaced by a ten-day week; and a Cult of Reason was established throughout France. Soon throughout much of France secular ceremonies, festivals, and feasts to the goddesses of Reason, Liberty, or Nature replaced religious ones, children were named after revolutionary heroes or secular virtues instead of saints, and churches were converted into granaries, warehouses, prisons, barracks, stables, shrines for revolutionary heroes, or into Temples of Reason, Gratitude, Youth, and Victory, as with Notre-Dame Cathedral and the churches of Saint-Germain-l'Auxerrois, Saint-Gervais, and Saint-Sulpice in Paris. Indeed, some twenty thousand of the juring clergy who had taken the oath of support for the state were now forced to resign and another four thousand forced to renounce their vow of celibacy and marry (although many only married their house keepers *pro forma* and did not really take them as wives).<sup>9</sup> When in 1798 Pope Pius VI was captured by French troops in Rome and then died a year later as a prisoner of the French Army during a forced march into France, it seemed to many that the end of the Roman Catholic Church was near.

It was in this milieu that the first contemporary French Catholic philosophers operated and helped the Church to rebound. The initial response of several lay Catholic thinkers to this crisis was to develop a Romantic philosophy to counter the pervasive rationalistic influence then current in France. This philosophy of Romanticism attacked the prevailing rationalism by emphasizing the importance of feelings, imagination, inspiration, and mystical intuition, as opposed to reason, in acquiring truth. This was especially so for moral and religious truths. Accordingly, the Romantic Catholics engaged in an aesthetic apologetic and held that the ability of the Catholic Church to inspire beautiful artistic works was evidence of its truth, as was the beauty of its liturgy. Similarly, rather than relying upon the medieval cosmological proofs to demonstrate God's existence, they found evidence of God in the beauty of nature and the moral conscience within humans.<sup>10</sup>

The first French Catholic Romantic author was the layman Vicomte, **François Auguste René de Chateaubriand (1768-1848)**.<sup>11</sup>

His work defending Catholicism, *The Genius of Christianity* [*Le Génie du Christianisme*], was published in Paris in 1802 to great acclaim.<sup>12</sup> This work was over 600 pages in length – bulky and thick just like the cut of meat named after him. Chateaubriand was born in Saint-Malo, Ille-et-Vilaine, Brittany, France in 1768. He came from a noble Breton family, hence his title (Vicomte), his time spent growing up in the Castle of Combourg (1777-1786), and the expectation that he would follow in the footsteps of his exalted ancestors and embark upon a career befitting of a nobleman. Chateaubriand received the best of educations and studied at the Collège de Dol with the Eudist fathers from 1777-1781 and at the Collège de Rennes with the Jesuits from 1781-1783. After briefly flirting with two career paths worthy of a nobleman, that of a navy seaman and a priest (for which he attended the diocesan seminary Collège de Dinan and studied humanities from 1783 to 1785 with the Cordeliers fathers), Chateaubriand settled on a third option and joined the French army in 1786, becoming a member of the Knights of Malta in 1788. Chateaubriand was only in the army for a couple of years when the French Revolution broke out. As the French Revolution was not kind to the nobility (Chateaubriand's elder brother was hanged by the revolutionaries and his mother, wife, and sister imprisoned), Chateaubriand fled the country and went to the United States and toured the country in 1791. He returned to Europe in 1792 to marry and fight for the royalists but, injured and defeated in battle, he once again hasted off, this time to London, England in 1793.

Chateaubriand's prospects in France vastly improved after the Revolution had ended and Napoleon had assumed leadership. Hence he returned to France in 1800 and acquired some minor government posts in Rome and Paris before resigning in 1804 in protest over the execution of a French nobleman (Napoleon also had the journal he edited, the *Mercure*, suppressed after he repeated his protests there in 1807). After the Bourbon Restoration of 1814 Chateaubriand resurrected his political career and became Minister of State (1816-1820), Ambassador to Berlin (1821) and London (1822), and eventually minister of Foreign Affairs (1822-1824). Chateaubriand also served as Ambassador to Rome from 1828 to 1829, and he even adopted Pope Leo XII's cat after the Pope died in 1829. He additionally founded and wrote for the royalist journal *Conservateur* from 1818 until 1820 when it was shut down by the government. Chateaubriand was briefly

arrested in 1832 for his support of the royalists after the 1830 French Revolution. Chateaubriand died in 1848 in Paris, France, and is buried on Grand-Be Island, just off the coast of his birth-town, St. Malo, France. Chateaubriand was elected to the French Academy in 1811 and was named Peer of France in 1815; from 1820 to 1822 he helped to purchase new land for the *L'Infirmier Marie-Thérèse*, an asylum for aged clergy and the widows of the Revolution in Paris founded by his wife Célestè Buisson.<sup>13</sup>

Although Chateaubriand became a deistic opponent of Christianity in his youth, upon the death of his mother and sister in 1798 he was moved to re-embrace Catholicism. This set in gear his task of producing a Romantic or Aesthetic apologist for Catholicism, his *The Genius of Christianity*, subtitled *Beauties of the Christian Religion*, which appeared in 1802. *The Genius of Christianity* represented Chateaubriand's effort to respond to critics of Christianity such, as the aforementioned Voltaire (1694-1778), for whom the Catholic Church was "a cult born from the womb of barbarism, absurd in its dogmas, ridiculous in its ceremonies, enemy of the arts and sciences, of reason and beauty; a cult whose only result was to shed blood, to enslave humans, and to retard the happiness and the enlightenment of humankind" (*The Genius of Christianity*, Introduction, I, 1, p. 48 [13 (v. I)]), and for whom it was necessary to crush: crush the infamous thing as Voltaire put it (*Écrasez l'infâme!*).

In this work Chateaubriand argues that Enlightenment thinkers such as Voltaire fail to recognize that humans are composed of a dual nature: reason and feeling (head and heart). They instead uphold reason as the sole path to truth and progress and denigrate the sentiment. Yet, says Chateaubriand, the key to acquiring true knowledge and happiness is to harmonize our understanding with our feelings (*The Genius of Christianity*, Part One, I, 1, pp. 54, 60-61 [17, 23 (v. I)]; II, 3, pp. 115-116 [70-71 (v. I)]; VI, 5, pp. 201-202 [144 (v. I)]). In this way we return to our primitive state, before the Fall, where there was a perfect harmony of the feelings and the thought, of the imagination and the understanding (*The Genius of Christianity*, Part One, II, 3, p. 115-116 [70-71 (v. I)]; Part Two, III, 1, pp. 269-271 [201-203 (v. I)]; Part Three, II, 2, pp. 399-404 [310-314 (v. I)]).

Accordingly, Chateaubriand responds to the critics of Catholicism by engaging in an Aesthetic Apologetic for Christianity (a poetic of Christianity) and sets out to show, as he puts it, not that Christianity

is excellent because it comes from God, but that it comes from God because it is excellent (*The Genius of Christianity*, Part I, I, 1, p. 48 [12 (v. I)]). This excellence is shown in how beautiful the Christian religion is in its liturgy, songs, bells, festivals, and rituals, and in how favorable it has been to civilization, literature, and the arts. In particular Chateaubriand argues that the greatest literature, works of art, architecture, music, acts of charity (missions, hospitals, schools, laws, etc.) have been inspired by Christianity – showing its truth and establishing that Christianity is the one true revelation of God. As Chateaubriand asserts: “Christianity has created for the painter a dramatic department far superior to that of mythology. ... Traverse the gallery of the Louvre, and assert then, if you can, that the genius of Christianity is not very favorable to the fine arts” (*The Genius of Christianity*, Part Three, I, 4, pp. 379-380 [294 (v. I)]). Similarly he says “You could not enter a Gothic church without feeling a kind of awe and a vague sentiment of the Divinity” (*The Genius of Christianity*, Part Three, I, 8, p. 385 [299 (v. I)]). Thus Christianity is shown to be true because it has inspired the greatest works of civilization:

It was, therefore, necessary to attempt to prove that, on the contrary, the Christian religion, of all the religions that have ever existed, is the most poetic, the most humane, the most favorable to liberty, the arts, and the sciences; that the modern world owes everything to it, from agriculture to the abstract sciences, from the hospitals for the ill-fated to the temples built by Michelangelo and adorned by Raphael. It was necessary to attempt to prove that there is nothing more divine than its morality, nothing more lovely and grandiose than its dogmas, its doctrine, and its worship. It was necessary to declare that it promotes genius, refines the taste, develops the virtuous passions, imparts vigor to the thought, offers noble images to the writer, and perfect models to the artist ... In a word, it was necessary to summon all the charms of the imagination, and all the interests of the heart, to the assistance of that very religion. ...

Sublime in the antiquity of its recollections, which go back to the infancy of the world, ineffable in its mysteries, adorable in its sacraments, interesting in its history, celestial in its morality, rich and attractive in its pageantries; it calls for every kind of scene. Would you want to follow it in poetry? Tasso, Milton, Coreille, Racine, Voltaire, will recount its miracles. In the belles-lettres, eloquence, history, and philosophy? What have not Bossuet, Fénelon, Massillon, Bourdaloue, Bacon, Pascal, Euler, Newton, and Leibniz, produced through

its inspiration! In the arts? What master-pieces! If you examine it in its worship, what things do not its antique Gothic churches, its admirable prayers, and its superb ceremonies say to you! Among its clergy? Behold all the humans who have transmitted the language and the works of Rome and Greece; all those hermits of Thebes; all those asylums for the unfortunate; all those missionaries to China, to Canada, to Paraguay; without forgetting the military orders from where chivalry is going to be born. ... Sometimes, with the Maronite monk, we dwell on the summits of Carmel and Lebanon; at others times with the Daughter of Charity we keep watch at the bedside of the sick. ... Homer takes his place by Milton, and Virgil beside Tasso; the ruins of Memphis and Athens form contrasts with the ruins of Christian monuments, and the tombs of Ossian with our cemeteries of the countryside. ... In short, we endeavor to strike at the heart of the infidel in every possible way (*The Genius of Christianity*, Part One, I, 1, pp. 48-51 [13-15 (v. I)]; cf. Part Two, III, 8, pp. 291-296 [219-225 (v. I)]; Part Three, I, 3, pp. 375-377 [290-293 (v. I)]; VI, 12-13, pp. 664-668, 684-685 [213-216 (v. II), 230-231 (v. II)]).

Chateaubriand establishes then the truth of Christianity due to its sublime morality, the beauty of its worship, its immense benefits to society and the arts, and its accord with the sentiments of the heart. And while Chateaubriand does not completely reject the classical proofs of God's existence,<sup>14</sup> he prefers the view that God is known through the beauty of nature and our moral conscience, that is through our feelings (*The Genius of Christianity*, Part One, I, 1, p. 51 [15 (v. I)]; I, 5, 1-2, pp. 138-141 [90-93 (v. I)]; VI, 5, p. 201-202 [144 (v. I)]; Part Four, VI, 12, p. 665 [214 (v. II)]). For as Chateaubriand emphasizes, when it comes to forming a belief in God, an individual "must be extremely obstinate who would not embrace the cause where not only reason finds the greatest number of proofs, but where morals, happiness, hope, instinct itself, and the desires of the soul, naturally impel us; for if it were true, as it is false, that the spirit would have kept the balance even between God and atheism, still it is certain that it would tip much to the side of the first: besides half of one's reason, the human places the whole weight of one's heart onto the scale of God" (*The Genius of Christianity*, Part One, VI, 5, p. 201 [144 (v. I)]). Hence, Chateaubriand writes:

Always faithful to our plan, we shall banish abstract ideas from the proofs of the existence of God and the immortality of the soul, so

as to employ only poetic reasons and reasons of sentiment, that is to say the wonders of nature and moral evidence. ... There is a God. The plants of the valley and the cedars of the mountain bless Him; the insect buzzes His praises; the elephant salutes Him with the rise of the day; the bird sings to Him in the foliage; the lightning makes His power burst forth, and the ocean declares His immensity. ... It could be asserted that the human is the *thought of God manifested*, and that the universe is *His imagination rendered sensible*. ... the beauty of nature as proof of a superior intelligence. ... Combine, then, at the same moment, within your thought, the most beautiful incidents of nature; suppose that you see at the same time all the hours of the day and all the seasons, a spring morning and an autumnal morning, a night strewn with stars and a night overcast with clouds, meadows dotted with flowers, forests stripped by frosts, and fields gilded with crops; you will then have a just idea of the spectacle of the universe. ... the idea of the perpetual magnificence and omnipotence of God (*The Genius of Christianity*, Part One, V, 1-2, pp. 138-140 [90-92 (v. I)]; cf. V, 12, pp. 170-174 [118-121 (v. I)]).

Chateaubriand proceeds in a similar manner to establish the immortality of the soul based upon human feelings (our longing for complete and unending happiness) and the conscience.<sup>15</sup>

Let them tell us, in the first place, if the soul is extinguished in the tomb, whence comes to us this desire for happiness which torments us? Our passions here below may easily be gratified; love, ambition, anger, have an assured plenitude of enjoyment: the need for felicity is the only one that lacks satisfaction as its object, for we don't know what this felicity is that we desire. It must be admitted, that if every thing is *matter, nature* here is strangely mistaken: it has made a sentiment that applies to nothing.

It is certain that our soul eternally requires; barely has it obtained the object of its desire and it requires more: the whole universe cannot satisfy it. Infinity is the only field which suits it ... Filled but not gratified with what it has devoured, it plunges itself into the bosom of the Deity where the ideas of the infinity in perfection, time, and space come to meet. ...

Now the animals are not troubled by this hope which the human heart manifests; they immediately attain their supreme happiness; a little grass satisfies the lamb, a little blood gratifies the tiger. ... [The ox] may lie down on the greenery, raise his head toward the sky, and by his bellowing call the unknown Being who fills this immensity. But no: preferring the turf on which he treads; he does

not inquire about, at the height of the firmament, those suns which are the great evidence for the existence of God. He is insensible to the spectacle of nature, unaware that he himself is thrown under the tree where he reposes as a small proof of the divine Intelligence (*The Genius of Christianity*, Part One, VI, 1, pp. 184-185 [129-130 (v.I)]).

The conscience furnishes a second proof of the immortality of our soul. Each human has in the middle of one's heart a tribunal, where one commences to judge oneself while waiting for the Supreme Arbiter to confirm the sentence. If vice is but a physical consequence of our organization, whence comes this fright that troubles the days of a guilty prosperity? Why is remorse so terrible that people prefer to submit themselves to poverty and all the rigor of virtue rather than to acquire illegitimate goods? ... The tiger tears up its prey and sleeps; the human becomes a murderer and remains awake. ...

O conscience! Could you be a phantom of the imagination, or the fear of the punishments of humans? I interrogate myself, I make this question mine: 'If you could by a mere wish kill a human in China and inherit his fortune in Europe, with the supernatural conviction that people would never know anything about it, would you consent to form this wish?' However much I exaggerate my indigence, however much I attempt to extenuate this murder by supposing that through my desire the Chinese expires suddenly without pain, that he had no heir, that even at his death his goods will have been lost to the state, however much I imagine this stranger overwhelmed with maladies and sorrows, however much I tell myself that death is a good thing for him, that he himself calls for it, that he has no more than an instant to live: in spite of my vain subterfuges, I hear a voice in the depths of my heart that cries out so loudly against the mere thought of such a supposition, that I cannot for one instant doubt the reality of the conscience. ...

Having already spoken of the remorse which follows the crime, it would be unnecessary to speak of the satisfaction that accompanies virtue. The inward contentment that we experience while doing a good work is no more a combination of matter than the reproach of the conscience when we commit a bad action is fear of laws.

... sophists maintain that virtue is only a disguised self-love, and that pity is only a love of oneself ... Virtue and tears are for humans the source of hope and the basis of faith; how then would one believe in God who believes neither in the reality of virtue nor in the truth of tears?

We think that it would cause insult to our readers if we stopped to show how the immortality of the soul and the existence of God are proven by that interior voice called conscience. "There is in man," says Cicero [*To Atticus*, XII, 28], 'a power which inclines to good and deters from evil, which is not only prior to the origin of groups of people and cities, but as ancient as that God by whom heaven and earth subsist and are governed: for reason is an essential attribute of the divine Intelligence; and that reason which exists in God necessarily determines what is vice or virtue' (*The Genius of Christianity*, Part One, VI, 2, pp. 187-189 [132-134 (v. I)]; cf. VI, 3-4, pp. 190-196 [134-139 (v. I)]; Part Three, VI, 5, pp. 453-458 [32-37 (v. II)]).

Thus the desire for happiness and our conscience, which calls us to do good and avoid evil, show that the mind is different from matter and that though the mind is affected to a certain degree by the bonds it has with the body it is capable of eternal happiness with God. This is the great vision Christianity presents to the world says Chateaubriand. Atheism, on the contrary, views the human as "A fetus born from the impure body of a woman; inferior to the animals in instinct; dust like them, and returning as they do to dust; having no passions, but appetites; obeying not moral laws, but only physical influences; seeing before one as one's end the sepulcher and worms: such is that being who claimed to be animated by an immortal breath! Speak to us no more of the mysteries of the soul, of the secret charms of virtue: graces of infancy, loves of youth, noble friendship, elevation of thoughts, charms of the tombs and of the fatherland, your enchantments are destroyed!" (*The Genius of Christianity*, Part Three, IV, 5, p. 454 [33 (v. II)]). Worse still, as the human is nothing but matter for the atheist "there is in reality neither vice nor virtue, and consequently morality is no more. ... since it is certain that when humans lose touch of the idea of God, they rush into all manner of crimes in spite of laws and executioners" (*The Genius of Christianity*, Part One, VI, 3, p. 190 [134 (v. I)]).

Chateaubriand therefore wrote his extensive Romantic defense of Christianity, *The Genius of Christianity*, in order to respond to the Enlightenment deists and atheists in France and to show that the grand scenes of nature manifest God to the heart of humans and that the desire for eternal happiness and the moral voice within reveal that something more of the brave man survives than an empty name. In doing

so he helped to “restore religion from its ruins” in France and revitalize French Catholicism.

So it is that we find anti-Catholicism diminishing in France with the commencement of the Napoleonic Era (1799-1815). Hence in 1799 many imprisoned priests were freed, and in 1800 the religious Society of the Sacred Heart was formed. Most significantly, in 1801, Napoleon (1769-1821) signed a Concordat with Rome recognizing Catholicism as the religion of the majority of the French people and securing state funds for the support of Catholic priests (although Napoleon would also place Catholicism under tight state control by attaching seventy-seven organic articles to the Concordat and making the teaching of Gallicanism mandatory at the seminaries, limit religious priests and nuns in France, and in 1809 he would seize the papal states in Italy and force Pope Pius VII to live in France from 1809-1814). As a result, in 1802, just as Chateaubriand’s work *The Genius of Christianity* was beginning to garner fame, Notre-Dame Cathedral in Paris was reopened for Catholic services to much public fanfare. Finally, the secular Republican calendar was abolished in 1808, the Jesuits were reinstated by the Pope in 1814, in 1815 the Papal States were restored at the Congress of Vienna (1814-1815), and in 1816 the Marists, Marianists, and Brothers of Ploërmel originated. So by the start of the Bourbon Restoration (1815-1830) the French Catholic Church had regained much of its vigor, which would now increase even further. Indeed this revival of French Catholicism would survive the French Revolutions of 1830 and 1848 and only come to an end with the rise of the Third Republic (1870-1940).

Just as the Catholic Church in France needed a Chateaubriand to revive it, so too the Catholic Church in Austria and Germany needed someone to restore it from its ruins, or at least repair its damaged foundations. For though the Catholic Church was better off in Austria and Germany than it was in France at the start of the nineteenth century, still a grave intellectual and social crisis had greatly undermined it. During the past hundred or so years the German Enlightenment figures of Thomasius (1644-1728), Wolff (1679-1754), Reimarus (1694-1768), Baumgarten (1714-1762), Kant (1724-1804), Lessing (1729-1781), Mendelssohn (1729-1786), and Fichte (1762-1814) had challenged the reigning medieval Scholastic philosophy, and some of them had questioned the legitimacy of revealed religion as well. Indeed this Enlightenment in Austria and Germany had found powerful

allies in the new intellectual societies of the Freemasons (1717) and the Illuminati (1776).<sup>16</sup> And although institutionally the Austrian and German Catholic Churches did not encounter a radical attempt to overthrow them, as did the French Church, nonetheless it was also the case that these Churches were gradually losing their prestige and political privilege, and the Austrian and German states becoming more and more secularized. Hence Austria and Germany, even more than France, saw the spectacular architecture and painting of the Baroque period (1550-1750) come rapidly to a close. Moreover, the rise of Febronianism (1763-1799) in Germany and Josephinism (1767-1850) in Austria tried to pry Catholicism away from Rome and make it an insular state religion.<sup>17</sup> And the suppression of the Jesuits in 1773 did nothing to better the Catholic intellectual situation in Austria and Germany.

Yet the most harmful act to Catholicism in Germany ironically came at the hands of the individual who had resuscitated the Church in France, Napoleon Bonaparte. Napoleon had invaded the Rhineland in 1799, and proceeded to secularize Church property there in 1802-1803 (in cooperation with the Baden, Bavarian, and Prussian Governments), closing and selling off the monasteries (including the famed Benedictine monasteries of Amorbach, Andechs, Benedictbeuren, Corvey, Ellwangen, Ettal, Fulda, Kempten, Liesborn, Maria-Laach, Metten, Michelsberg, Oberalteich, Ottobeuren, Reichenau, Scheyern, St. Blasien, St. Emmeran, Tegernsee, Werden, Weingarten, and Wes-sobrönn), suppressing several German Catholic Universities (such as the Universities of Bamberg, Dillingen, and Fulda),<sup>18</sup> as well as removing the German Catholic prince-bishops. Additionally, in 1806 Napoleon helped end the strongly Catholic rule of Habsburg Austria over the Holy Roman Empire which included Austria, Germany, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, as well as other territories in the Low Countries, Italy and the Balkan states.

All was not lost, however, for, as in France, a German Catholic school of Romanticism arose to respond to this decline of the Church. The founder of German Romanticism was the layman **Karl Wilhelm Friedrich von Schlegel** (1772-1829).<sup>19</sup> Schlegel was born in 1772 at Hannover, Lower Saxony, Germany. He was initially content with a commercial career and served as a banker's apprentice in Leipzig in 1788; soon, however, he turned to studies in law, philology, art, and history at the Universities of Göttingen from 1790-1791 and Leipzig

from 1791-1794 with thoughts of becoming a lawyer. He soon abandoned this line of work as well and settled into a literary career. Schlegel then moved through the cities of Dresden (1794-1795, 1802), Jena (1796, 1799-1800), Berlin (1797), and Paris (1802) where he delivered lectures at the University of Jena (1800-1801) and privately to wealthy individuals on philosophy, history, and literature. Schlegel also edited the Romantic journals *Athenäum* (1798-1800) and *Europa* (1803-1805) as part of the circles of the Berlin and Jena Romantics.<sup>20</sup> In Berlin Schlegel joined the literary salons attended by other Romantics such as Tieck and Schleiermacher (indeed he became the roommate of Schleiermacher in Berlin) and he formed a friendship with Dorothea Veit, the daughter of the famous rationalistic Jewish philosopher Moses Mendelssohn (1729-1786). They were married and moved to Cologne in 1804 where they additionally converted to Catholicism in 1808, he from a youthful atheism and rationalism (Schlegel early favored the philosophies of Kant and Fichte and the French Revolution) and she from Judaism and then Protestantism [ironically Paris, the cradle of atheism and revolution in the eighteenth century, brought Schlegel closer to God and farther apart from the French revolutionaries].

Not surprisingly, Schlegel greatly admired the gothic cathedral in Cologne and pushed for its completion; he also collected many of the medieval art works that were being sold off after the secularization of the German monasteries. Schlegel supported himself in Cologne by lecturing on history at the University there, but he failed to land a coveted faculty position. Accordingly, Schlegel spent the later years of his life working as a court secretary for the Austrian government in Vienna (1809-1814, 1818-1828) and as the first secretary of the Austrian Legation to the Frankfurt Diet (1815-1818) – in his governmental position Schlegel opposed Napoleon's expansionist agenda. It was also during this time period that he edited the journals *Österreichischer Zeitung* (1809), *Österreichischer Beobachter* (1810), *Deutsches Museum* (1812-1813), and the Catholic review *Concordia* (1820-1823) with members of the Vienna Circle of Romantics such as Adam Müller (1779-1829). Schlegel died in 1829 in Dresden, Germany, after he had gone there to lecture on philosophy in 1828. Schlegel received the Order of Christ from the Catholic Church in 1815, and in 1820 was elected into the Bavarian Academy of Fine Arts.

Schlegel's Romantic Catholic philosophy is developed most fully in his trilogy *The Philosophy of Life* [*Philosophie des Lebens*] (1828), *The Philosophy of History* [*Philosophie der Geschichte*] (1829), and *The Philosophy of Language* [*Philosophie der Sprache*] (1830).<sup>21</sup> Schlegel, unfortunately, suffered a stroke (and later died) just as he was putting the finishing touches on this trilogy (which was to form part of his System of the Totality of Christian Philosophy).

In his Romantic trilogy, Schlegel (influenced by Schleiermacher) set out to develop a non-rationalistic apologetic for Catholic belief – a romantic philosophy of life founded on an exploration of the inner consciousness and lived experience of humans. Not that Schlegel completely rejected reason or the medieval Scholastic tradition – studying the writings of the Church Fathers and medieval Scholastics had played a large role in his conversion – rather, he wanted to recapture the unity of the human being and emphasize the role of the imagination with its attendant feelings (in addition to reason) in gaining religious knowledge. His deep conviction was that reason and imagination (i.e. the feelings) must work together to bring humans to the divine, rather than the Enlightenment reliance on reason alone (*The Philosophy of Life*, I, pp. 4, 17, II, p. 25, X, pp. 220-221; 224-32; *The Philosophy of Language*, VI, pp. 465-8, VIII, pp. 519-23; and *The Philosophy of History*, pp. 473-74).

Schlegel worked out his epistemology in a detailed scheme in which he tried to give proper weight to each of the human faculties. Schlegel held that humans were originally created in the image of God – although they also possessed a material body (*Der Körper*) lacking to God. Indeed he claims that, prior to the Fall, humans utterly resembled God in being an active spirit (*Der Geist*) and containing the faculties of understanding (*Der Verstand*) and will (*Der Wille*). The understanding was the faculty of immediate intuition which grasped the inner essences of things, and the will was the faculty that allowed humans to freely choose one act or another. Since their Fall, however, humans have additionally acquired a passive soul (*Die Seele*) with its extra faculties of reason (*Die Vernunft*) and imagination or fancy (*Die Phantasie*) [the reason is the regulative and discursive faculty of thought which distinguishes, combines, deduces, infers, and in general forms abstract ideas, and the imagination is the inventive faculty in humans which as we will see gives rise to our feelings]. Hence after the Fall humans had a four-fold consciousness, understanding, will,

reason, and imagination (*The Philosophy of Life*, I, pp. 18-22, II, p. 23-26; V, pp. 103-104; *The Philosophy of Language*, II, pp. 374, 379-383; compare 1 Thess 5:23).

Moreover, four subsidiary faculties are also found in fallen humans. These are the memory and conscience which arise from the reason; and the senses and inclinations which arise from the imagination. The memory arranges and stores the information acquired from the reason and understanding, the conscience is the moral intuition of right and wrong, the senses are the organs for perceiving sensible phenomena. Finally, and most significantly, are the inclinations – the instincts and feelings. These include the baneful passions such as pride, sensuality, and selfishness; the noble instincts for self-preservation and satisfaction of our natural wants; enthusiasm which is an admiration of an idea in the soul along with an untiring energy for realizing or preserving it; longing which is our desire for the infinite, eternal, and divine; and love which is the energy of life and our affection for other humans and God<sup>22</sup> (*The Philosophy of Life*, II, pp. 26-36, III, pp. 46-53; *The Philosophy of Language*, II, pp. 378-82, III, pp. 408-409, IV, p. 429, VI, pp. 465-7, VIII, pp. 517-519; *The Philosophy of History*, pp. 162-65).

According to Schlegel, prior to the Fall, humans (like God) had a direct and concrete intuitive comprehension of things. Yet in the fallen state human understanding is imperfect and all of the human faculties must work together in a harmonious manner in order to attain what knowledge is possible on earth. Schlegel thus writes “But now, if it be not reason, but rather understanding, that, with the co-operation of all the other faculties both of soul and spirit, is the proper organ for acquiring a knowledge of the divine” (*The Philosophy of Life*, III, p. 54; cf. III, p. 64). So then for Schlegel true knowledge occurs when humans combine reason with intuition (understanding) and imagination (feeling). For when the faculties of the human are united, thought can join with the feeling of love to grasp the richness and significance of life and the world as it is. As Schlegel notes: “Thought and feeling stand reciprocally in need of each other. As thought gains new life and animation from the rich feeling, with its facile, tender, and profound emotions, deriving thereof its vital nourishment and sustenance; even so the feelings are not infrequently first awakened, and very often strengthened and elevated, by the lofty flight of thought in its bold and searching investigations” (*The Philosophy of Language*, II, pp. 374-375; cf. *The Philosophy of Life*, V, pp. 94-97, 101). Accordingly the highest princi-

ple of knowledge for Schlegel is not logic but comprehension wherein thought and feeling are conjoined [indeed at times Schlegel even calls the will (rather than understanding) the sense for God, and the fancy (rather than reason) the distinguishing faculty of human beings] (*The Philosophy of Life*, V, pp. 106, 113).

On the other hand, Schlegel points out that, if our faculties work in isolation, only error and deception will occur. Thus reason, operating alone, and divorced from the other faculties, is frail and unproductive and only capable of generating dead abstractions and sterile concepts. And while the imagination can be fertile, left to itself it is blind. Again, the will devoid of understanding can do little good, and the understanding with a fickle or wicked will is also bad. Much the same, the passions when overpowered by the imagination and not moderated by reason can also become a source of error and evil (*The Philosophy of Life*, III, p. 49, V, p. 105-106; *The Philosophy of Language*, VI, pp. 465-467, VIII, pp. 520-523).

The general problem with Enlightenment thought is that it isolates a human's faculties from each other. Hence Schlegel rejects the rational approach of Kant (1724-1804), Lessing (1729-1781), Fichte (1762-1814), Hegel (1770-1831), and Schelling (1775-1854) [who incidentally had an affair with and later married Schlegel's brother's wife]. Their philosophical systems which are based exclusively on reason and deduction lead to cold abstractions and divorce themselves from life. Furthermore, the idealism of Fichte, Hegel, and Schelling which held that only mind and not matter is real, makes the opposite mistake of leaving the human being a lifeless, isolated, and eternally repetitive ego bereft of everything that relates it to the world. Idealistic systems are also too impersonal (God is mere absolute reason for them) and have no room for a personal God.

In a parallel manner, the empiricists such as Hume (1711-1776) reduced all knowledge to sensations, as if reason were a secondary and non-originate power and ultimately nothing but a sort of chemical precipitate and residuum from material sense impressions. Schlegel argues against the empiricists that the perceptual experience and inner coherence of these sensual impressions could not have come to the mind from without but instead is due to the unity of the perceiving consciousness. Moreover such an empirical philosophy denies the existence of what could not be reduced to material impressions such as the noble, beautiful, great, supersensible, and divine. It thus fails to

acknowledge the nobler faculties of humans such as the understanding and imagination and leads to the skeptical abyss of unbelief. The common flaw of all of these philosophies is that they fail to recognize that human beings gain knowledge through several faculties jointly; humans do not just use the reason or the senses, they also use the understanding and imagination (feelings and love) to know. Only with such a combination of resources do humans acquire an accurate philosophy that can capture actual living experience (*The Philosophy of Life*, III, pp. 49, 56-61; X, pp. 224-231).

This romantic approach also colors Schlegel's lectures on what he called "Christian Philosophy." If humans want to acquire knowledge of God, says Schlegel, they must use all four of their major faculties (Reason, Understanding, Will, and Imagination). Indeed when all of their faculties are working in conjunction on earth humans again form ourselves into a closer image of the triune God and manifest the theological virtues of faith, hope, and love (charity).

Schlegel accordingly argues that while belief in God cannot be proven by reason, it can be evinced or indicated by intellectual penetration into one's experience through the understanding cooperating with the other faculties of the human such as the memory, conscience, senses, and inclinations. In this way we can find the living presence of God in the world (*The Philosophy of Life*, III, p. 54, IX, pp. 192-5; *The Philosophy of Language*, VIII, pp. 516-19). He asserts:

And it is even herein that philosophy will most display its art, or rather its intellectual power over the minds of men. It is in this pre-eminently that its vocation lies. But if, on the contrary, it makes this mission to consist rather in demonstrating, in a strictly scientific form, the existence of a Deity, with its natural train of those eternal verities – the immortality of the soul, and the freedom of the will, then at the very first outset it will lose sight of its true aim and set up a false one. For were such a demonstration possible, still nothing essentially would be gained by its actual attainment. For, in such a case, the existence of God and God Himself would naturally become dependent, in thought at least, on that from and by means of which the proof was established, and would consequently appear to us no longer as the first cause of all, but rather a secondary and derivative being. In such the primal essence would be made to depend on our human knowledge and science of reasoning, so to speak, the latter must, in the plenitude of its power, first confer upon and guarantee to the former its existence. This would, indeed,

be a complete inversion of the true and natural order of things, such as, alas, has but too often occurred and manifested itself in actual experience.

These remarks, however, must be understood as applying to a strict demonstration of this great verity, or at least to all attempts of the kind. To point to this truth, to trace every indication of it, to elucidate it, to confirm it by analogy or other corroborative evidences, is quite a different matter. All this is perfectly allowable. But God does not allow His existence to be proven. By force of reasoning such a belief is not to be impressed on the mind of that man who is unwilling spontaneously to admit it. As life generally, so also this supreme life must be learned and concluded from every man's own experience; it must be adopted with the vividness of a feeling (*The Philosophy of Life*, IX, pp. 192-93).

Thus we come to a belief in God not by reason alone but by investigating our lived experience in the world with all of our faculties: understanding, will, reason (memory and conscience), and imagination (senses and inclinations, i.e. feelings) working together.

And when we investigate our lived experience we realize that belief in God has a fourfold basis: 1) original revelation as found in the Scriptures and tradition (known by the memory), 2) the voice of conscience which gives rise to a vague feeling that it arises from a higher source than ourselves, 3) nature which reveals the omnipotence of God (known by the senses), and 4) history [replaced with devotion in *The Philosophy of Language*] which reveals the working of providence (known by the imagination). So the first direct encounter with God (revelation being an indirect mode of knowledge) occurs through the human conscience, in its insistent negative prohibitions and positive requisitions. God is next encountered in nature, for the beauty and order of nature stimulates our imagination and reveals the glory of God (the world is the poem of God claims Schlegel). Finally by using the soul and inclinations to penetrate Scripture and History, and to worship and devote oneself to God, one can see the hand of God in all phases of human existence (*The Philosophy of Life*, III, pp. 50, 61-65, X, p. 235; *The Philosophy of Language*, VIII, pp. 516-19). Schlegel proclaims:

The philosophy which I have here undertaken to develop, setting out from the soul as the beginning and first subject of its speculations, contemplates the spirit as its highest and supreme object.

Accordingly, in its doctrine of the Deity, directly opposing every rationalistic tendency, it conceives of Him and represents Him as a living spirit, a personal God, and not merely as an absolute reason, or a rational order. ... our doctrine is not any such system of reason as the others pretend to be. It is an inward experimental science of a higher order. ... It is best indicated by a simple name, such as we have given it in calling it a philosophy of life.

Moreover, the revelation by which God makes Himself known to the human, does not admit of being limited exclusively to the written word. Nature itself is a book written on both sides, both within and without, in every line of which the finger of God is discernible. It is, as it were, a Holy Writ in visible form and bodily shape – a song of praise on the Creator's omnipotence composed in living imagery. But besides Scripture and nature – those two great witnesses to the greatness and majesty of God – there is in the voice of the conscience nothing less than a divine revelation within man. This is the first awakening call to the two other louder and fuller proclamations of revealed truth. And, lastly, in universal history we have set before us a real and manifold application and progressive development of revelation. Here the luminous threads of a divine and higher guidance glimmer through the remarkable events of history. For, not only in the career of whole ages and nations, but also in the individuals, the ruling and benignant hand of Providence is everywhere visible.

Fourfold, consequently, is the source of revelation, from which man derives his knowledge of the Deity, learns his will, and understands his operation and power – conscience, nature, Holy Writ, and universal history. ... Now, if we may venture to consider the fourfold revelation of God in conscience, in nature, in Holy Writ, and the world's history, as so many living springs or fertilizing streams of a higher truth, we must suppose the existence of a good soil to receive the water of life and the good seed of divine knowledge. For without an organ of susceptibility for good to receive the divine gift from above, no amount of revelation would benefit man. Now the soul, so susceptible of good on all sides, both from within and from without, is even this organ for the reception of revelation. And this function of the soul, together with its creation of language as the outer form of human knowledge, constitutes its contribution to science – and especially to internal science. And even with the understanding, as the sense which discerns the meaning and purport of revelation, the soul is co-operative – since nothing divine can be understood merely in the idea, and of and by itself alone,

but in every case a feeling for it must have preceded, or at least contributed towards its complete understanding. The soul, consequently, which is thus susceptible of the divine, is ever informing itself about, or cooperating in the acquisition of a knowledge of the Godlike. And this, the soul's love and pursuit of divine truth, when, unfolding itself in thought, it comes forth in an investiture of words, is even philosophy – not indeed the dead sophistic of the schools, but one which, as it is a philosophy of life, can be nothing less than living. And the soul, thus ardently yearning for the divine, and both receiving and faithfully maintaining the revealed Word, is the common center towards which all the four springs of life and stream of truth converge (*The Philosophy of Life*, III, pp. 61-65).

Schlegel thus develops a religious philosophy in which faith and reason (and intellect and feelings) are in harmony. By grasping God in our conscience, in nature, and in history, we acquire a love of Him which allows for a proper reception of God's revelation in Scripture and tradition. Schlegel even held that a seed of the eternal Word, an intimation of divine love, and a knowledge of the one true God run through all cultures (which was corrupted over time into polytheism – see *The Philosophy of Life*, III, pp. 58, 62-63; V, p. 111). Yet knowledge can only fruitfully develop if it is guided by faith. Thus faith is both the beginning and the consummation of knowledge. A faith, based on personal feelings and experience of life, yields an enduring charity, and a steadfast hope, and allows us to find God in nature, conscience, and history. Faith and love, cooperating with the imagination (enthusiasm and longing) allows God's presence in the world to shine forth. Moreover, the center and full harmony of religion is only found in Catholicism. The rituals, music, and architecture of the Catholic mass and tradition have an artistic glamour, charm, and beauty which excite our feelings and reveal its truth (*The Philosophy of Life*, V, pp. 111-113, IX, p. 194-197; *The Philosophy of Language*, IV, p. 429; VII, pp. 490-494; VIII, pp. 512-519, 523).<sup>23</sup>

The works of Schlegel and other German romantics eventually led to a great revival of Catholicism in Germany. This revival began in the Restoration Period (1815-1848) in Bavaria, after the congress of Vienna (1815), and after a Bavarian Concordat was signed with Rome in 1817 (Concordats were also made between Rome and Baden, Ermland, Hanover, Hesse, Nassau, Prussia, Saxony, and Württemberg in 1821, 1824, and 1827). And this revival encompassed Ermland,

the Rhineland, and Westphalia beginning in 1840 with the rule of Frederick William IV (1795-1861) in Prussia and the related ending that same year of the Cologne Mixed-Marriage Dispute which had led to the arrest of five Catholic bishops by the Prussian Government. Hence in the Rhineland construction on the gothic Cologne Cathedral was begun again in 1842 (it was previously built from 1248-1560 but left uncompleted; construction was completed in 1880) and there was a great pilgrimage to Trier in 1844. And throughout Bavaria, Ermland, the Rhineland, Westphalia, and Württemberg (the Catholic Church in Baden continued to have difficulties with the government) cathedrals were restored, monasteries and cloisters reopened, Catholic education returned with great force, and the governments returned much of the oversight of the Church to the bishops. Similarly, in Austria the revival of Catholicism occurred with the ascension of Metternich (1773-1859) to the foreign ministry in 1809 and the chancellery in 1821, the doing away with Josephinism in 1850, and the reaching of a Concordat with Rome in 1855. In 1848 Revolution put an end to the German Romantic movement (along with the Lola Montez Affair which resulted in the King of Bavaria purging the University of Munich of several Romantics in 1847 after they criticized the King's affair with Montez and his dismissal of the minister Abel), but it did not put an end to the revival of Catholicism in Germany which lasted up to 1871 when Prussia defeated Austria and instituted the *Kulturkampf*.<sup>24</sup>



## 2

### FIDEISM

*1820-1840 in France & Germany*

## &

### TRADITIONALISM

*1800-1865 in Belgium, France, Savoy, & Spain*

**T**he French Catholic philosopher Bautain, upon arriving in Rome in 1838 to defend his controversial views, was reproached by Pope Gregory XVI with the words “You have only sinned through an excess of faith” [*Peccasti tantum excessu fidei*]. The Pope was criticizing Bautain’s view, known as fideism (derived from the Latin word for faith – *fides*), which held that religious knowledge derives solely from faith and not from reason. The fideist then does not believe one can come up with rational arguments for fundamental religious truths such as God’s existence and the immortality of the soul. Instead, as the source of such religious truths, the fideist embraces a personal commitment to faith in God (sometimes based on a special divine illumination or encounter), or, in the traditionalist form we will later encounter, a historical revelation of God passed down through tradition.

Fideism has had a long history in the Catholic Church, having been present in Church Fathers such as Tertullian (c. 160-225); medieval nominalists such as William of Ockham (c. 1285-1347), Henry of Harclay (c. 1270-1317), Robert Holkot (c. 1290-1349), and Nicholas of Autrecourt (c. 1300-1350); modern Christian skeptics such as Fr. Gentian Hervet (1499-1584), Michel de Montaigne (1533-1592), Fr. Pierre Charron (1541-1603), Fr. François Véron, S.J. (1575-1625), Fr. Jean-Pierre Camus (1584-1654), Fr. Marin Mersenne (1588-1648), Fr. Piere Gassendi (1592-1655), and Fr. Pierre-Daniel Huet (1630-1721); and there are occasional hints of fideism in the famous Jansenist supporter Blaise Pascal (1623-1662) as well.

The first contemporary Roman Catholic fideist, however, was **Fr. Louis Eugène Marie Bautain (1796-1867)**.<sup>25</sup> Bautain was born in Paris, France in 1796. After studying at the École Normale Supérieure from 1814-1816 under the eclectic philosopher Victor Cousin, and attaining a doctorate in literature, he took a position teaching philosophy at the Collège Royale and the nearby University of Strasbourg, France in 1816. By this time Bautain had come to completely reject the Catholic faith in which he had been raised and instead he embraced a rationalistic idealism influenced by the thought of Cousin, Fichte, and Hegel. Immersing himself too greatly in his academic work, Bautain had a mental breakdown while teaching and went into a severe depression.

Weaned from his melancholy through the help of the staunch Catholic laywoman Louise Humann (the same woman who helped the Romantic philosopher Baader regain his faith), Bautain reconverted to Catholicism in 1820 (officially in 1822) after reading the books recommended by Humann: the Bible, Kant, Jacobi, and Baader. While this conversion helped him to regain his well-being (Bautain resumed teaching in 1820), the fideistic tendencies already evident in his thought caused Bautain to be suspended from his teaching assignment in 1822 when he began to proclaim that reason was powerless to know philosophical truth.

Bautain used his newfound free time to study medicine and theology at the University of Strasbourg and he lectured on philosophy privately at Humann's house (forming the so-called School of Strasbourg (1823-1828) which led to the conversion of many Jews to Catholicism and indeed to the priesthood). Bautain was allowed to return to the faculty of the University of Strasbourg in 1824 and at the same time was able to finish his doctorate in medicine in 1826 and in theology in 1828. He then made the decision to become a secular priest in 1828 and due to his education was ordained after only five months of private tutorials with the local bishop at the castle of Molsheim.

The July Revolution of 1830 in France led to a new wave of anti-Catholicism and to appease radical student demands the administrators of the University of Strasbourg suspended Bautain's courses. The bishop of Strasbourg subsequently appointed Bautain director of the minor seminary in Strasbourg. Yet soon thereafter Bautain's fideistic views began to trouble the Bishop of Strasbourg and Bautain's introduction of a new pedagogy at the minor seminary (courses were now

taught in French rather than Latin, the medieval practice of disputations was gotten rid of, and the new Philosophy of Lyons texts replaced the Scholastic manuals) did not go over very well. Hence Bautain was removed from his position in 1834 and deprived of the right to preach or hear confessions; additionally letters warning of Bautain's views were sent to the French clergy and bishops and Rome. On the advice of Lacordaire Bautain went to Rome to try and restore his standing in the Church (as was noted above).

In Rome Bautain met the Thomist Perrone and began to study Aquinas. Bautain became convinced of errors in his earlier views and signed statements in 1840 to that effect (as we will see he had earlier signed similar statements in 1834 and 1835). Hence Bautain's priestly functions were restored and Bautain returned as a lecturer to the minor seminary in Strasbourg in philosophy and psychology and was soon once again its director (in 1838 Bautain's position at the University of Strasbourg had also been restored – indeed he was appointed Dean of the Faculty of Letters – a position he held until 1849). In 1841, however, Bautain left for Paris to become superior of the College of Juilly. Now a dedicated Thomist, Bautain taught a Thomistic Conference at the Paris Catholic Circle from 1842 to 1846, and his newly won good standing and acclaim allowed him to found the Fathers and Sisters of St. Louis in 1842 (the Fathers were defunct by 1857 but the Sisters are still around to this day) and the House of St. Louis in Rome for French clergy in 1843, and resulted in his being named honorary Canon in 1846. Indeed in 1848 he ran for the constituent assembly at his bishop's behest, although he was defeated. Bautain went on to become vicar-general for the archdiocese of Paris in 1849, established the journal *La semaine religieuse* in 1850, and in 1853 was appointed professor of moral theology at the Sorbonne, a position he held until 1863. Bautain died in Viroflay, France in 1867 and is buried at the College of Juilly. There is a street named after him in Strasbourg.

Bautain's fideism is found in his key work *The Philosophy of Christianity*, 2 vols. [*La philosophie du christianisme: Correspondance religieuse de L. Bautain*] (1835) which represents an exchange of philosophical letters between Bautain (Le Maître) and his pupils.<sup>26</sup>

Bautain held that humans, with their dual nature of body and spirit, have four faculties of knowledge: sensation, imagination, reason (*la raison*), and intelligence (*l'intelligence*). Sensation delivers sense-experience to humans which imagination combines and forms into images.

Reason then produces concepts or notions from these images enabling it to classify and judge the validity of the sense-experiences.

Reason, however, is very limited for Bautain. It is complex, successive, and syllogistic and functions by dissecting, dividing, and decomposing; i.e. by deduction. Its purpose is to allow us to grasp the logical relations between abstracted concepts. As such, reason only gives us more or less probable knowledge and cannot give us invariable, uncontested, and certain knowledge. Moreover, as Kant and Jacobi have shown, reason is limited to the phenomenal realm; it cannot give us knowledge of things in themselves or grasp first principles, nor can it judge about what does not fall under the senses. When reason tries to go beyond the phenomenal realm contradictory metaphysical positions can and have been generated by different philosophers as Kant recognized. Hence reason is incapable of generating metaphysical or religious truths (*The Philosophy of Christianity*, I, 7, pp. 75-77; I, 9, p. 119; I, 13, pp. 171, 180-182; I, 14, pp. 187-189; cf. *Philosophy: Experimental Psychology*, I, pp. 208-214; II, p. 333).

Now this is not to depreciate human reason and its legitimate functions, says Bautain. Reason is the primary mode of humans on earth and lets us acquire knowledge of phenomenal objects which exist in space and time. Yet if reason is used improperly or thought to be the whole of the human being and capable of developing principles on its own, then it soon comes to lose itself in hypotheses, and ends in diversity, opposition, contradiction, and absurdity, and in fact yields death and destruction (*The Philosophy of Christianity*, I, 2, p. 13; I, 13, pp. 168-182; I, 17; pp. 213-218; II, 33, p. 244; see also *On the Teaching of Philosophy in France in the Nineteenth Century*, pp. 63-67, 88-91; *Philosophy: Experimental Psychology*, II, 333).

Especially significant for Catholicism, claims Bautain, is the fact that God's existence cannot be known by human reason. Bautain asserts:

People had conceded to individual reason a power that it never has had and that it never will have, that of elevating itself by itself and by the natural light to the certitude of the existence of the true God, of the one God. Nature, they said, proclaims the power and the wisdom of its Author. Very well! But what is important for humans to know is not only the Author of nature, the great Architect, the soul of the world, etc.: it is above all their own author, their God, the God of the human; and nature is silent on this point. It leaves humans confused with all purely natural products. Moreover, na-

ture is finite, limited, and one cannot conclude the infinity of the worker from a finite work. Reason, they say, can elevate itself by induction from effect to cause. So be it. But between finite effects and an infinite cause, between contingent and temporary existences and absolute and eternal Being, there is an abyss that reason will never cross. If it admits from the first a first cause, I ask from where it has taken the notion of this cause, and how it establishes its priority. It could not have found it in nature, since nature only shows us phenomena, effects, results, secondary causes, as they say. It could not have found it in itself, obtaining it through induction or deduction; for induction, no matter how far you push it, will never establish the absolute priority of a principle; and deduction presupposes the principle and does not prove it. Then, there remains the great question of the origin of evil, the stumbling-block on this path (*The Philosophy of Christianity*, I, 14, pp. 194-195).

Dialectic had insinuated itself as an evil genius in the Christian schools of the middle ages; and it had succeeded in causing an almost general belief that the human could, by the sole force of their mind, elevate themselves to the knowledge of the fundamental truths of metaphysics, such as the existence of God, the immortality of the soul, etc. The school did not suspect that by admitting this opinion, and by trying to prove God through reason, it laid the foundation of rationalism that was bound to one day rip the Church apart ... The school ... had applied itself for centuries to seek for apart from God and independently of God the proofs of the existence of God (*The Philosophy of Christianity*, I, 18, pp. 267-268).

Bautain then rejects the natural theology of the medieval Scholastics and holds that reason cannot establish God's existence for several reasons. First, he claims that, on account of the Fall, humans have become totally ignorant of and forgotten God their Creator. Indeed, as we have seen, due to the Fall human reason is inept and incapable of knowing anything beyond the world of the senses. This is why as Kant has shown for every rational proof of the existence of God an equally cogent disproof can be developed (*The Philosophy of Christianity*, I, 21, pp. 301-308; I, 25, p. 347). Secondly, God is infinite, eternal, and absolute and one cannot grasp God's being through the finite, temporal, and contingent world. Thus reason cannot bridge the abyss between finite beings and infinite cause, between contingent and temporary existences and absolute and eternal being (*The Philosophy of Christianity*, I, 14, pp. 194-198; II, 28, pp. 74-77). Thirdly, Bautain argues that any

God reason could know would be a gross image, a logical abstraction of the true God. Reason would substitute an idol of the mind for the living God of Israel and Moses. The God of reason would either be pantheistic and identical to nature or an amoral first cause that produced the world but not the creator, legislator, and conservator of the universe that we humans love and adore (*The Philosophy of Christianity*, I, 14, p. 194; I, 15, p. 209; I, 17, pp. 248-250; I, 18, pp. 260-261, 275; II, 28, pp. 78-82). Finally, Bautain maintains that if humans could arrive at knowledge of God by reason alone than revelation would not have been necessary. Accordingly the arguments for God have the limited role of helping someone who already has faith in God remove any obstacles to belief (*The Philosophy of Christianity*, I, 14, pp. 194-198; II, 28, p. 78; *On the Teaching of Philosophy in France in the Nineteenth Century*, pp. 36-43; *Philosophy: Experimental Psychology*, I, pp. xxxviii-xliv; OSSL (1926), pp. 158-162).

It is the intelligence not reason which furnishes us with certain knowledge about metaphysical and religious truths. Our intelligence (intuition or spiritual apprehension) allows us to instantaneously grasp first principles (intelligible truths) and hence receive innate ideas.<sup>27</sup> It does so when it opens itself to the direct revelation of God through faith in which case it is stimulated by the intellectual light of a higher order (*The Philosophy of Christianity*, I, 14, p. 190; I, 17, pp. 223-224; I, 24, pp. 339-341; see *On the Teaching of Philosophy in France in the Nineteenth Century*, pp. 59, 76; *Philosophy: Experimental Psychology*, I, p. lxxxi; I, pp. 208-214, II, p. 408).<sup>28</sup> Consequently, Bautain claims that God's existence is known not by natural reason, nor by persuasion of the heart (as with the Romantics), but by faith; God can only be known from the Word of God, not from the world of experience. Only faith can allow fallen humans to go beyond sensible appearance and can give them knowledge of first principles (eternal and absolute truths) and spiritual reality; only faith yields ideas grasped by the intelligence (versus the abstract concepts known with reason): for "nothing is more absurd, more contrary to the law of our mind, than the pretension to know, to judge, and to reason, prior to belief" (I, 21, p. 297). Humans can know God then when the intelligence is receptive to divine ideas through faith (the heart) and receives God's revelation (*The Philosophy of Christianity*, I, 7, pp. 94-103, 122, 142-143; I, 13, pp. 175, 182; I, 14, pp. 187-194; I, 17, pp. 219-228; I, 18, p. 275; II, 28, pp. 56-61, 68-73, 86-95; II, 31, p. 197; II, 38, pp. 350-352; see

*On the Teaching of Philosophy in France in the Nineteenth Century*, pp. 79-80; *Philosophy: Experimental Psychology*, I, p. lxxxvii, 79-80, II, pp. 349-352, 360-362, 382-385). Bautain puts this claim variously:

Finally it [reason] cannot legitimately judge what does not fall under the senses, what it cannot verify by observation or by experience. It is by the hearing, by the word and faith in the word that it [reason] apprehends the existence of a world superior to the sensible world, and that it receives some gifts or principles which cannot be proven by reasoning (*The Philosophy of Christianity*, I, 13, p. 171).

Science [the true knowledge of the true God] needs an objective principle, and I affirm to you with the deepest conviction that for the present human this principle is found in the books of divine revelation and nowhere else. The subjective principle of science is in your soul, in your intelligence, and not in your reason; and the authority that guarantees to you the truth of the principle and of the doctrine that flows from it is in the Church, where individual reason is Christianized, where common sense is universalized by faith (*The Philosophy of Christianity*, I, 14, pp. 188-189).

Certitude of the existence of God presupposes the idea of God, and this idea is not obtained by speculation, by abstraction, but only by faith in God, which is born from hearing and the word (*The Philosophy of Christianity*, I, 14, p. 197).

It is in you ... in your interior sentiment, in the most intimate depth of your being that you will find the true, necessary and active relation between the finite and the infinite, the created and the uncreated, between you and God. It is in vain that speculation seeks this relation outside; God immediately manifests Himself neither to the senses, nor the imagination, nor the reason; He speaks especially in the sanctuary of the soul (*The Philosophy of Christianity*, II, 33, p. 244).

Much the same Bautain holds that the immateriality, freedom, and immortality of the soul cannot be established by reason: the view that they can is a "deplorable illusion" (*The Philosophy of Christianity*, II, 28, pp. 83-84). Nor does the human conscience reveal a natural law as it errs and is in perpetual contradiction with the consciences of others (*The Philosophy of Christianity*, II, 28, pp. 84-85). Bautain's main point, therefore, is that knowledge of the existence of God, the freedom and immortality of the soul, and moral principles does not come by way of reason, but by intelligence through faith. For the Catholic Church

possesses the treasure of divine revelation and with this treasure comes "the principles of all knowledge and morality, the source of all the virtues, finally all the means of civilization, of happiness, of prosperity and salvation" (*The Philosophy of Christianity*, I, 7, p. 91; cf. *The Philosophy of Christianity*, I, 9, p. 119; II, 27, p. 27; II, 29, p. 147; *On the Teaching of Philosophy in France in the Nineteenth Century*, pp. 63-67, 88-91; *Philosophy: Experimental Psychology*, I, pp. lxvii-lxix, lxxxiv-lxxxix; II, pp. 19-27, 156-163, 206-213, 315-316, 333, 408-413).<sup>29</sup> If we ground Christianity on faith, believes Bautain, then contrary to Voltaire's desire to crush Christianity, the infamous thing (*Écrasez l'infâme!*), we will find that Christianity has not been crushed.<sup>30</sup>

Of course once truths are revealed to us by our intelligence through faith (often with a dim belief) reason can then be used to develop and better understand them (*The Philosophy of Christianity*, I, 17, p. 225; I, 18, p. 242). For example, faith and Scripture show us God is triune but, possessing this truth known by our intelligence, an examination of nature and ourselves with reason shows us reflections of the Trinity: time is past, present, and future; sentences contain a subject, verb, and attribute; syllogisms contain major, minor, and middle terms; the world contains being, existence, and life; the human is body, soul, and spirit as well as heart, brain, and vital axis. Revelation thus supplies first principles that philosophy can incorporate, develop, organize, and find evidence for to some degree (*The Philosophy of Christianity*, I, 17, pp. 243-245, 248; I, 18, pp. 281-284; I, 21, p. 299; I, 22, pp. 321-322; II, 28, pp. 51-54; *Philosophy: Experimental Psychology*, I, p. lxxxviii-lxxxix; I, pp. 190-194; II, pp. 11-18, 349-352, 373-375; *On the Teaching of Philosophy in France in the Nineteenth Century*, pp. 81-83). Bautain, among contemporary Catholics, was really alone in holding his strict fideistic view, however, one variant of fideism was particularly attractive to French Catholic apologists at the beginning of the nineteenth century, that of traditionalism. Traditionalism is the view that knowledge of the fundamental moral, metaphysical, and religious truths comes only from tradition which is a transmission of divine revelation. For the traditionalists human reason is deeply flawed and unable to reach any knowledge of these truths. Such knowledge must be directly revealed by God in a primitive revelation which is then passed down from generation to generation. Hence according to traditionalism God taught the original humans the first principles or "common notions" of the faith and the only way one can come to know of

these truths today is to learn about them through sacred tradition (or by discovering the beliefs common to all humans). Thus knowledge of God must come from a faith-based acceptance of the authority of Revelations imparted through Tradition.

Traditionalism shows up very explicitly in the Catholic lay philosopher **Louis Gabriel Ambroise de Bonald (1754-1840)**.<sup>31</sup> De Bonald was born in a château in Le Monna (Millau), Auvergne, France in 1754. He was educated by the Oratorians at the College of Juilly in Paris in rhetoric and philosophy. De Bonald, as a traditionalist, stressed the importance of authority in both religion and politics (he was a royalist and supported the French monarchy), and his first career was serving in the military as part of the royal musketeers. Upon the suppression of the musketeers in 1776, de Bonald married Élisabeth de Guibal de Combescure [they were married in 1778 and their son Louis-Jacques-Maurice de Bonald (1787-1870) later became a priest and Cardinal], returned to Auvergne, and became a conservative politician, a natural line of work for someone descended from the French nobility. He did very well in his political endeavors and became the mayor of Millau in 1785 and a member of the Auvergne Assembly in 1790. De Bonald's political career came to a temporary halt during the Revolution when he refused to outlaw the non-juring priests and he had to go into exile to Heidelberg and Constance beginning in 1791 where he joined a rebel army. De Bonald secretly returned to France in 1797 and with the rise of Napoleon returned to politics; hence he served as part of the Council of the Imperial University in 1810 in Paris. De Bonald in particular achieved great prominence during the Restoration and joined the Royal Council of Instruction (c. 1815), and served in the *Chambre Introuvable* from 1815 to 1816 and the Chamber of Deputies (representing Auvergne) from 1815 to 1822 where he passed laws against the legalization of divorce and against the freedom of the press. In addition to his political life, de Bonald also joined Chateaubriand in writing for the *Mercure* in the early 1800s and the *Conservateur* from 1818-1820, and Lamennais in founding the *Défenseur* in 1820. After the second Revolution of 1830 de Bonald resigned his government post and retired to Le Monna. He died in Lyons in 1840. De Bonald was elected to the French Academy in 1816 and named Peer of France in 1832 and Vicomte in 1832.

Bonald's traditionalism is expressed primarily in his two works *Primitive Legislation* [*La législation primitive considérée dans les derniers*

*temps par les seules lumières de la raison*] (1802), and *Philosophical Studies on the Primary Objects of our Moral Sciences* [*Recherches philosophiques sur les premiers objets de nos connaissances morales*] (1818).<sup>32</sup>

In these works de Bonald argues that while particular truths, of which one has images, such as those of trees and animals, may be acquired through sensation and reason, general truths, of which one has ideas, such as those of geometry (i.e. lines and triangles) and morality (i.e. justice, wisdom, prudence, preference) and other abstract notions (i.e. reason, intelligence, power, force, order, truth), can only be acquired through divine revelation (*Primitive Legislation*, Preliminary Discourse and I, i, 1:1-15, BOC, I, pp. 1075-1076, 1155-1159, and footnote continuation on p. 1183; *Philosophical Studies*, 1, BOC, III, pp. 51-52, 59; cf. *On the Origin of Language*, BOC, III, p. 554).

General truths cannot be established by human reason because human reason in these matters is never without incertitude as it is subject to the influence of human passion and prejudices (*Philosophical Studies*, 1, BOC, III, p. 58; cf. *Theory of Political and Religious Power in Civil Society*, II, ii, 10, BOC, I, p. 707). Proof of this lies in the fact that there exist diverse and contradictory systems of philosophy, each of which claim to be founded on reason (*Philosophical Studies*, 2, BOC, III, pp. 40-41).

Moreover, reason can establish, in a sort of proof of God from language (i.e. from the operations of human intelligence), that these general ideas can only be known through language and that language cannot have been invented by humans, but must have been given to the first humans by a divine intellect, God. For general ideas such as those of triangles and justice are ideas of thought, and thought can only be known by its expression in speech [*la parole*], i.e. through language (*Primitive Legislation*, Preliminary Discourse and I, i, 1:1-15, BOC, I, pp. 1067-1068 and pp. 1155-1159). Or, as de Bonald puts it in a famous expression of his: "It is necessary that humans think their speech before speaking their thought" (*Primitive Legislation*, Preliminary Discourse, BOC, I, p. 1068; cf. *Philosophical Studies*, 2, BOC, III, p. 64). In other words, humans cannot think about these general truths, dealing with incorporeal objects that cannot be sensed and imagined, without having inside them the words which are the expression or representation of these thoughts; for "thought is only an interior speech, and speech a thought rendered exterior and sensible" (*Philosophical Studies*, 2, BOC, III, p. 71). Indeed not only is speech

or language necessary for the communicating of our general ideas to others, it is also required for one oneself to have any inner knowledge of these ideas (or of oneself), i.e. for conversing with oneself. For one needs to use words to express these objects in thought (*Primitive Legislation*, Preliminary Discourse and I, i, 1:19, BOC, I, pp. 1067-1068, 1160; *Philosophical Studies*, 2, BOC, III, pp. 64, 74, cf. *On the Origin of Language*, BOC, III, p. 554).

Consequently, the human being must know how to speak before thinking and could not have invented language; indeed the first human could not even have possessed the very idea of inventing speech apart from speech itself (*Primitive Legislation*, Preliminary Discourse, BOC, I, pp. 1068-1069; *Philosophical Studies*, 2, BOC, III, pp. 64, 71). As de Bonald asserts: "Thus to think, is to speak to oneself by an interior speech ... Thus we can regard as a general truth that *it is necessary* to have the expression of one's thought in order to express one's thought, or rather, as I have said it elsewhere, humans think their speech before speaking their thought: a certain proposition, and one which explains the mystery of intelligent being ... Thus intelligent beings *conceive* their word before *producing* their thought ... Therefore speech is not an invention of humans, since they cannot have here even the thought of inventing without a speech which expresses this thought" (*Primitive Legislation*, I, i, 1:19, 21, BOC, I, pp. 1161-1163). Furthermore, language cannot exist without being complete, and the very complexity of language, with its many combinations of verbs with their tenses and moods, names of number and appellation, substantives, and adjectives, even in people who lack the skill of making a fire, shows that language could not have been a human invention (*Primitive Legislation*, I, i, 2, n. 1, BOC, I, pp. 1163-1164; *Philosophical Studies*, 2, BOC, III, pp. 70, 73, 78; cf. *On the Origin of Language*, BOC, III, pp. 556-557).

All of this shows that language is a gift of God to the first human beings, and that speech can only come to humans by transmission or revelation (*Primitive Legislation*, Preliminary Discourse, I, i, 1, n. 1; I, i, 3:4; I, i, 4:1-2; I, ii, 1:2-5 BOC, I, pp. 1068-1069, 1072, 1161-1162, 1172, 1175-1176, 1213-1214; *Philosophical Studies*, 1-2, BOC, III, pp. 49-51, 52-54, 59, 62, 72). De Bonald summarizes his argument by stating: "Thus the proof of the existence of a being superior to humans, and of a law anterior to their reason ... [is that] it is impossible for the human to discover speech and to create a language from it ..." (*Primitive Legislation*, Preliminary Discourse, BOC, I, p. 1070), and

he concludes "This reason which enlightens the mind of the human is the reason of the one who has given one one's first expressions, and consequently the knowledge of one's first thoughts, and which is in one's consideration an authority. ... This necessary teaching of the truth is called revelation ... the knowledge of the primitive truths given by God Himself to the first humans; even today, one receives one's first facts of knowledge only by revelation, that is to say by the transmission that one's teachers make to oneself of the art of speech, the means of all knowledge of the truth ... Thus the first means of all knowledge is the speech received from faith and without examination, and the first means of instruction is authority" (*Primitive Legislation*, I, i, 3:5-6, BOC, I, pp. 1172-1173).

Now along with the gift of language, God also gave humans the general ideas of geometrical objects and morality. This is why all human societies today have a common stock of moral ideas, without which they could not communicate together nor understand each other (*Philosophical Studies*, 2, 10, BOC, III, pp. 92-94, 262, 267, 270). As de Bonald claims: "... it is certain, that is to say, in keeping with all the notions of reason, that this infinitely wise being, since He is infinitely powerful, was able to only place words of reason in the organs of humans, as He only placed ideas of truth in their intelligence. He has give them therefore maxims of belief and rules of conduct with speech, laws for their thoughts and laws for their actions" (*Primitive Legislation*, Preliminary Discourse, BOC, I, pp. 1069-1070; cf. *Primitive Legislation*, Preliminary Discourse, BOC, I, pp. 1066, 1074, 1116, 1120).<sup>33</sup>

Lastly, Bonald similarly claims that in addition to giving the first humans a knowledge of language and moral truths, God also implanted in them a knowledge (or sentiment)<sup>34</sup> of the existence of their Creator and the immortality of the soul (*Primitive Legislation*, Preliminary Discourse, BOC, I, pp. 1064, 1071; *Philosophical Studies*, 1, 9-10, BOC, III, pp. 56-57, 223-225, 238-242, 256-261, 263, 269; cf. *Philosophical Demonstration of the Constitutive Principle of Society*, XVI, BOC, I, pp. 89-91; *Theory of Political and Religious Power in Civil Society*, II, i, 1; II, i, 4, BOC, I, pp. 457-458, 470-473).

Now this original divine revelation given to the first humans has come down to humans today through its transmission in tradition: "Everything is explained, or can be explained, on the hypothesis of a first language given to a first human [by God], spoken within a first

family, and transmitted from generation to generation to all its descendants" (*Philosophical Studies*, 2, BOC, III, p. 89; cf. p. 91). So the acceptance of tradition through faith, and the embracing of this original divine revelation, is the means whereby humans today know the truths of the general ideas of geometry, morality, the immortality of the soul, and the existence of God (*Primitive Legislation*, I, i, 4:1-2; I, i, 8, BOC, I, pp. 1175-1176, 1192-1193; *Philosophical Studies* III, pp. 87-88). As de Bonald asks, "How can those who admit a Supreme Being, and even *the creation* of the human, suppose that this Being, essentially powerful and good, would have placed humans on the earth in order to live here in society, without recognizing at the same time that He had to give them or breathe into them, from the first moment of their existence, the necessary knowledge [*les connoissances*] for their individual and social, physical and moral life, knowledge which, transmitted naturally from father to children, and from generation to generation, has developed with society, and has deteriorated as society has?" (*Philosophical Studies*, 2, BOC, III, pp. 66-67; cf. *Primitive Legislation*, I, i, 3:7, BOC, I, p. 1178).<sup>35</sup> De Bonald, then, with his belief in traditionalism (and under the influence of Malebranche and Rousseau), argues that humans have a knowledge of morality, the immortality of the soul, and God through faith wherein they accept an original revelation of these ideas to the first humans and the transmission of these ideas down through human history by tradition. In other words all human knowledge of morals and God comes from tradition which is a preservation of the original revelation of God wherein God gave to humans both language and thought simultaneously.<sup>36</sup>

#### CONDEMNATIONS OF FIDEISM AND TRADITIONALISM

Fideism and traditionalism faced a lot of opposition from other Catholic thinkers beginning in the 1820s<sup>37</sup> and eventually came under suspicion of the Church hierarchy<sup>38</sup> and the Magisterium itself. Hence several papal statements came out in condemnation of fideism and traditionalism.<sup>39</sup>

Bautain initially felt the brunt of the attack and, as we have seen, was removed from his teaching post and had to sign his name to several propositions rejecting fideism in 1834, 1835, 1840, and 1844 (the latter two with the approval of Rome). Bautain thus had to sign his name to such propositions as the following (from 1840):

Reason can prove with certitude the existence of God and the infinity of His perfections. Faith, a gift of heaven, presupposes revelation; hence it cannot suitably be brought forward against an atheist in proof of the existence of God (DH, 2751).

Proof drawn from the miracles of Jesus Christ, sensible and striking for the eyewitnesses, has in no way lost its force and splendor as regards subsequent generations. We find this proof with all certitude in the authenticity of the New Testament, in the oral and written tradition of all Christians. By this double tradition we should demonstrate it (namely, revelation) to those who either reject it, or who, not having admitted it, are searching for it (DH, 2753).

In regard to these various questions, reason precedes faith and should lead us to it (DH, 2755).

Although reason was rendered weak and obscure by original sin, there remains in it sufficient clarity and power to lead us with certitude to the existence of God, to the revelation made to the Jews by Moses, and to Christians by our adorable Man-God (DH, 2756).

And these propositions from 1844:

We promise for today and for the future:

Never to teach that with the sole light of right reason, leaving aside divine revelation, one cannot give a true demonstration of the existence of God (DH, 2765).

... that with reason alone one cannot demonstrate the spirituality and immortality of the soul, or any other purely natural, rational, or moral truth (DH, 2766).

... that with reason alone one cannot have knowledge of principles or of metaphysics, as well as of the truths which depend on them, as a knowledge entirely distinct from the supernatural theology which is founded on divine revelation (DH, 2767).

... that reason cannot acquire a true and full certainty of the motives of credibility, that is to say, of those motives that render divine revelation clearly believable, such as are especially the miracles and the prophecies, and particularly the resurrection of Jesus Christ (DH, 2768).

And in 1846, in the encyclical *Qui pluribus* of Pope Pius IX, fideism and traditionalism were formally condemned:

... they boldly prate that it [faith] is repugnant to human reason. Certainly, nothing more insane, nothing more impious, nothing more repugnant to reason itself can be imagined or thought of than this. For, even if faith is above reason, nevertheless, no true dissension or disagreement can ever be found between them, since both have their origin from one and the same font of immutable, eternal truth, the excellent and great God, and they mutually help one another so much that right reason demonstrates the truth of faith, protects it, defends it; but faith frees reason from all errors and, by a knowledge of divine things, wonderfully elucidates it, confirms, and perfects it (DH, 2776; cf. Council of Rennes, 1849, decree lxiii).

But, how many, how wonderful, how splendid are the proofs at hand by which human reason ought to be entirely and most clearly convinced that the religion of Christ is divine, and that 'every principle of our dogmas has received its root from above, from the Lord of the heavens,' and that, therefore, nothing is more certain than our faith, nothing more secure, that there is nothing more holy and nothing which is supported on firmer principles (DH, 2779; cf. 2778).

And so, human reason, knowing clearly and openly from these most splendid and equally strong proofs that God is the author of the same faith, can proceed no further; but having completely cast aside and removed every difficulty and doubt, it should render all obedience to this faith, since it holds as certain that whatever faith itself proposes to man to be believed or done, has been transmitted by God (DH, 2780).

Accordingly, after 1850 the Magisterium was increasingly quick to condemn those thinkers whose writings contained traces of fideism or traditionalism. So it is that in 1855 the Sacred Congregation of the Index issues a decree against Augustine Bonnetty (see DH 2811-2814) and in 1864 the Holy Office condemned Casimir Ubaghs (he had earlier in 1843 been ordered by the Sacred Congregation of the Index to correct his writings – see RP (1966), p. 262), and he was removed from his teaching post at the University of Louvain for traditionalistic (and ontologistic) tendencies.

With Vatican I and its declaration on faith (*Dei Filius*, Session Three, 1870), fideism and traditionalism in their extreme forms were ruled out as philosophical systems for Catholics. This very important statement reads as follows:

The same Holy Mother Church holds and teaches that God, the beginning and end of all things, can be known with certitude by the natural light of human reason from created things; 'for the invisible things of Him, from the creation of the world, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made'; nevertheless, it has pleased His wisdom and goodness to reveal Himself and the eternal decrees of His will to the human race in another and supernatural way (DH, 3004).

However, in order that the 'obedience' of our faith should be 'consonant with reason,' God has willed that to the internal aids of the Holy Spirit there should be joined external proofs of His revelation, namely: divine facts, especially miracles and prophecies which, because they clearly show forth the omnipotence and infinite knowledge of God, are most certain signs of a divine revelation, and are suited to the intelligence of all (DH, 3009).

And not only can faith and reason never be at variance with one another, but they also bring mutual help to each other, since right reason demonstrates the basis of faith and, illumined by its light, perfects the knowledge of divine things, while faith frees and protects reason from errors and provides it with manifold knowledge (DH, 3019).

If anyone shall have said that the one true God, our Creator and our Lord, cannot be known with certitude by those things which have been made, by the natural light of human reason<sup>40</sup>; let him be anathema (DH, 3026; cf. Roman Catechism, 1564, Creed, article 1, 7-8).

If anyone shall have said that divine revelation cannot be made credible by external signs, and for this reason humans ought to be moved to faith by the internal experience alone of each one, or by private inspiration: let him be anathema (DH, 3033).

If anyone shall have said that miracles are not possible ... or, that miracles can never be known with certitude, and that the divine origin of the Christian religion cannot be correctly proven by them: let him be anathema (DH, 3034; cf. DH, 2121, 3425).<sup>41</sup>

## SEMI-RATIONALISM

*1820-1890 in Austria & Germany*

In 1837 two Catholic professors from the University of Bonn, Johann Wilhelm Joseph Braun and Peter Joseph Elvenich, journeyed to Rome bearing a treatise titled *Theologische Studien* [*Meletemata theologica*] defending the rationalistic position of their master, Georg Hermes; but the Roman curia refused even to open it, and they withdrew ignominiously back to Germany. A few years later, in 1853-1854, three more professors, Johann Baptist Baltzer of the University of Breslau, Theodor Gangauf of the University of Augsburg, and Peter Knoodt from the University of Bonn, arrived in Rome with the hope of defending the similarly rationalistic thought of the leader of their School Anton Günther. They too were unsuccessful, and with their retreat back to Germany, and the subsequent condemnation of the thought of Günther, rationalism ceased to be a real option for Catholic thinkers.

Rationalism (theological, not epistemological) is the view that all knowledge of God and God's commandments come from reason and not revelation. Revelation on this view is completely disregarded and said to be illegitimate or unimportant. Catholic thinkers recognized that such a negative view of revelation was incompatible with the beliefs of the Church and hence a strict rationalism was never in vogue among them.<sup>42</sup> However a more subtle form of rationalism, semi-rationalism, was a popular alternative. Semi-rationalism is the view that while the revelation of God is important and maybe even necessary for knowledge of religious truths (either initially or for the uneducated), human reason can independently demonstrate all or almost all of the truths known through revelation. Accordingly, on this view there are no or very few divine mysteries that cannot be independently proven through reason. Semi-rationalism was especially popular among German Catholic philosophers and theologians at the start of the nineteenth century, as a way to defend Catholicism in post Enlightenment times, although it goes back to such thinkers as St. Anselm (1033-

1109), Abelard (1079-1142), Hugh of St. Victor (1096-1141), Richard of St. Victor (d. 1173), Ramon Llull [Lull; Lully] (c. 1232-1315), Ramon Sibiuda [Sebond; Sabunde] (c. 1380-1436), and the Jesuit Benedikt Stattler (1752-1812), who all tried to use reason to prove that God was triune and other truths of revelation to some degree.<sup>43</sup>

Contemporary semi-rationalism really began though with **Fr. Georg Hermes (1775-1831)**.<sup>44</sup> Hermes was born in 1775 in Dreierwalde, Westphalia, Germany. He studied mathematics, philosophy, and theology at the University of Münster from 1792 to 1798. He was ordained a diocesan priest in 1799 and initially taught theology at the Paulinum Gymnasium in Münster. Eventually Hermes became quite successful in his field and served as a professor of Dogmatic Theology as well as Dean at the University of Münster from 1807 to 1820, and taught at the newly established University of Bonn from 1820 until his death in the city of Bonn in 1831.

The key semi-rationalist work of Hermes is his *Introduction to Christian-Catholic Theology*, 2 vols. [*Einleitung in die christkatholische Theologie*] (1819-1829; 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. 1831-1834).<sup>45</sup>

Hermes was greatly influenced by the German Enlightenment (he taught in German rather than Latin much to the displeasure of the diocesan officials), and especially the thought of Kant and Fichte (he was also influenced by Descartes). Hermes's studies of these Enlightenment thinkers caused severe doubts to his faith. He therefore decided to spend his life trying to show how the Catholic faith could be established on the basis of the pure reason favored by such Enlightenment thinkers.

Hermes, following Descartes, in his *Introduction to Christian-Catholic Theology*, held that theological investigations must begin by doubting all dogmas of faith and religious beliefs including the existence of God, for as he puts it, whatever can be doubted must be doubted. With this accomplished the human mind can go on to discover which of these beliefs can be re-established by reason on the ground of their universality and necessity (i.e. their certitude). Those beliefs which survive this method of doubt and which we find necessary to believe, as they are unavoidable, can be held as true and certain (*Introduction to Christian-Catholic Theology*, I, sec. 15). As Hermes proclaims: "I have been scrupulous in maintaining my resolution to doubt everything for as long as possible and to accept nothing as being determinately the case until I have been able to show the absolute rational necessity of

admitting such determination" (*Introduction to Christian-Catholic Theology*, I, Preface, x, translation from RAR (1985), p. 120; cf. I, sec. 1, p. 9). This method of doubt will hence ensure that all and only those truths which are rational and grounded in scientific knowledge (*Wissenschaft*) will be maintained. Ultimately Hermes held that human reason could re-establish not just the existence of God but even prove that there had been a divine revelation.

Hermes proceeds to rationally justify our knowledge claims by appealing to the philosophical distinctions of Kant. Like Kant, Hermes held that there are two kinds of reason, speculative (or theoretical) reason dealing with truths of the physical and metaphysical order and practical reason dealing with truths of the moral order. Yet Hermes went beyond Kant in arguing that speculative reason (in the form of *Vernunft* or intuitive intelligence and not *Verstand* or discursive reason), though it can't know the essences of things, can demonstrate the existence of the self, of God, and even some of the attributes of God such as God's immutability. For we grasp that we know things, and thus that there is a self or knower; moreover, the variations in the phenomena that appear to our mind necessitate our belief in a physical world, i.e. that something is there [here with speculative reason we are strictly necessitated to hold something as true (*Fürwahrhalten*) because our intellect sees the necessary link of the subject and the predicate in a judgment].

Next, from reflection on the nature of the world, Hermes, claims speculative reason can demonstrate the existence of God. For the world comes into being and is continually changing (i.e. it is contingent), and this shows that there must be a necessary being, God, who created the world.<sup>46</sup> On this same basis speculative reason can also prove that God is unchanging as God is the cause of all motion. Moreover, speculative reason can additionally show that a supernatural revelation from God is possible (indeed even probable) as it is within God's abilities and wishes to impart important truths to humans (*Philosophical Introduction*, I, sec. 73-74). Yet this is as far as speculative reason can go.

Besides speculative reason, however, as we have seen, humans also have practical reason, and this practical reason can be used to demonstrate further attributes of God, and what is more that God has supernaturally revealed truths to humans. For practical reason, says Hermes under the influence of Kant, is the reason which grasps moral

obligations and also accepts something as true if it is required to fulfill these moral obligations.

First then the practical reason of all humans recognizes a moral imperative to promote human dignity. In other words humans recognize the following categorical imperatives: 1) "Establish and preserve human dignity in yourself and others," and 2) "Use your intelligence and your experience. In general use all the experience which is absolutely necessary to fulfill a possible moral duty whether you already possess this experience yourself or must acquire it from others" [translations from NCS (1989), p. 62]. Second, practical reason asserts that we must accept something as true (*Fürwahrnehmen*) if it is required to enact these moral imperatives [here practical reason requires that we freely accept things as true with our free will even though our intellect cannot see the link between the subject and the predicate, if it is necessary for morality – thus judgments of practical reason have a less strict necessity than those of speculative reason]. So according to Hermes: "We are always ... obliged to accept as true a theoretically doubtful piece of knowledge on assent to which there depends the possibility of fulfilling a certain and unconditional general duty, knowledge, namely concerning the actual presence of an instance of duty" (*Introduction to Christian-Catholic Theology*, I, sec. 41, pp. 239-240, translation from RR (1989), n. 15, pp. 134-135).

Now since it is the case that through practical reason we must accept whatever is necessary in order to achieve our moral obligations, in the first place this requires us to accept that the world is governed by a being capable of promoting and ensuring that morality reigns; thus practical reason requires us to believe that God is just and infinite (*Introduction to Christian-Catholic Theology*, I, sec. 73-74) [as we have seen theoretical reason has already established that God exists and that God is unchanging].

In light of the second categorical imperative listed above, practical reason also requires that we peruse history to discover the moral experiences of previous humans so as to better live in accordance with the moral law. Hermes writes:

Practical reason demands that in general we call to our aid the knowledge and experience of our ancestors where our own insight, along with such insight of our contemporaries as is commended to us, might not, perhaps make a sure and perfect fulfillment of our duties possible. Practical reason consequently commands us to be-

lieve in history, for the knowledge and experience of our ancestors are the subject matter of history and knowable from it alone. In order, therefore, to assure ourselves all the more of the fulfillment of duty, and all the more certainly to exclude all omissions (arising from limited knowledge), and for no other reason, we ought to believe history (*Introduction to Christian-Catholic Theology*, I, sec. 85, translation from RR (1989), pp. 132-133; cf. RR (1989), p. 129, n. 7).

Most importantly, practical reason demands that humans believe in God's revelation in history and the truth of the Incarnation.<sup>47</sup> As Hermes states:

... theoretical reason cannot necessitate our acknowledgement that an alleged supernatural, divine revelation really is what it purports to be. Only practical reason can do that. Belief in the authenticity of such a revelation – which is what is under consideration here – can therefore be furnished a necessary ground, or firm support, not from some point of theoretical knowledge, but from duty. Hence the sole, all-inclusive condition for acknowledging the authenticity of a revelation alleged to have been supernaturally given by God, or rather, for belief in its authenticity, must consist of a thorough demonstration of the duty, or, what comes to the same, of the moral necessity, of accepting this revelation as supernaturally originating from God (*Introduction to Christian-Catholic Theology*, I, sec. 85; translation from RR (1989), p. 127).

Why does practical reason require us to believe in a divine revelation? It does so because in order to act in perfect accordance with the moral imperative, it is necessary to believe that God has revealed what exactly our moral duties are and how to best fulfill them in the Scriptures, and that God has come to earth as Christ in order to motivate us to live up to the demands of the moral imperative; in other words “the alleged revelation perfectly agrees in all its doctrines with moral reason, in such a way that it cooperates with the will and assists it to fulfill the demands of moral reason” (*Introduction to Christian-Catholic Theology*, I, sec. 85, translation from RR (1989), p. 128).<sup>48</sup> Hermes expands on this truth as follows:

Now if anyone before us, be he more or less distant from us, claimed himself to be supernaturally instructed by God as regards the most sure and perfect way in which men can fulfill their duty, and if this claim cannot be shown as false by reason of the intrinsic content of

the alleged instruction, then we have the duty when we hear this claim, and according to the above command to 'make use also of other's knowledge and experience from the past to make the fulfillment of duty surer and more perfect,' to investigate this knowledge and experience, and to that end, to believe history (*Introduction to Christian-Catholic Theology*, I, sec. 85, translation from RR (1989), p. 133; cf. RR (1989), p. 129, n. 7).

In conclusion then, for Hermes, it is necessary to ground religious faith in reason (speculative and practical), otherwise the existence of God and God's revelation will become questionable (*Introduction to Christian-Catholic Theology*, I, sec. 15, p. 265). Hence, according to Hermes, true humility in faith is not making a blind choice to believe but instead submitting to what reason demands. Faith is "abandonment of the self to the guidance of reason" (*Introduction to Christian-Catholic Theology*, I, Preface, p. xvi, translation in RAR (1985), p. 123). And once we abandon ourselves to theoretical and practical reason we can prove that God exists and that God has revealed Himself to humans.

Now on such a view of faith as rational conviction it seems that there is little room for human freedom, mysteries of the faith, and divine grace. However, in reply to these concerns Hermes notes that though in faith we embrace what reason determines must be believed, through practical reason at least (if not speculative reason) humans can still make a free assent; for as we have seen the beliefs stemming from practical reason (unlike speculative reason) are not completely necessitated, but rather involve our free assent to practical truths. It is for this reason that Hermes defines faith as "a state of certitude or conviction respecting the reality of something known, a state to which we are brought either by the necessary assent of the theoretical reason or from the voluntary consent of the practical reason" (*Introduction to Christian-Catholic Theology*, I, sec. 15, p. 258, translation from RAR (1985), p. 122). Furthermore, while practical reason demands that we believe in the fact of God's revelation to humans, it cannot tell us about the specific contents of that revelation; for this we need to turn to Scripture. Hence Hermes claims his view still allows for mysteries of the faith. In other words, while reason can demonstrate the truth of divine revelation (i.e. reason can recognize that a divine revelation has occurred, it is a knowing principle, an *erkennendes Prinzip*), it cannot independently demonstrate the contents of that revelation (i.e. reason is not a principle of revelatory knowledge itself, a knowledge principle,

an *Erkenntnisprinzip*). Reason then must turn to Scripture, tradition, and the Magisterium to determine what God's revelation contains. Finally, Hermes argues that while natural reason itself can give humans a rational faith (*Vernunftglaube*) by showing which religious beliefs can be established by practical reason, this only provides a passive faith of assent wherein one recognizes divine revelation has occurred. Yet in addition to this natural faith humans require a supernatural and active faith of the heart (*Herzenglaube*) wherein God's grace moves one to surrender oneself and devote one's life to that in which one believes. This faith of the heart is a living faith wherein one resolves to produce good works and not a merely natural dead faith of assent alone (see *Christian-Catholic Dogmatics*, III, pp. 285, 471).

The second major proponent of semi-rationalism was **Fr. Anton Günther (1783-1863)**.<sup>49</sup> Günther was born in 1783 in Lindenau, Bohemia. He attended the University of Prague in Bohemia beginning in 1803 where he studied law and philosophy. As he came from a poor family, he supported himself by tutoring the children of the local Prince. After graduating in 1809, Günther moved to Vienna, Austria where he once again supported himself by tutoring nobles's children. Here he went through a phase of religious doubt, but this was dispelled by reading the Scriptures and discussions with St. Clement Hofbauer. Hence it is that Günther decides to dedicate himself to God, and after theological studies in Raab, Hungary (1819-1821), he is ordained a diocesan priest in 1821 (Günther spent the years 1822 to 1824 in Starawiez, Galicia, Hungary, at the Jesuit novitiate, but he soon gave up the idea of becoming a member of the Society of Jesus and instead returned to the diocesan fold in Vienna). Besides serving as a priest, and tutoring children, Günther also worked as the government censor of philosophical books in Vienna until the revolution of 1848. He claimed that part of his motivation for being a censor was so that he would have access to texts that were scarce at the time. Shortly thereafter Günther edited the journal *Lydia* from 1849 to 1854. Though offered positions at several Universities (Munich, Bonn, Breslau, and Tübingen), Günther maintained his status as a private scholar throughout his life – it appears he was waiting for a position at the University of Vienna which never materialized. He died in Vienna in 1863.

Günther's major works espousing semi-rationalism were *Propaedeutic to the Speculative Theology of Positive Christianity* [*Vorschule zur*

*spekulativen Theologie des positiven Christenthums*], 2 vols. (1828-1829) and *Peregrine's Banquet* [*Peregrins Gastmahl*] (1830).<sup>50</sup>

Influenced by Hegel (both in content and stylistically), Günther held that instead of resting content with an espousal of the fundamental truths of Christianity on the basis of faith and revelation, it was necessary to demonstrate them through reason (more specifically through the intuitive intelligence or *Vernunft* and not the discursive understanding or *Verstand* which only knows phenomenal appearances).<sup>51</sup> For Günther argues that a Catholic must progress from an earlier phase of believing that one may understand (*credo ut intellegam*) to a more advanced phase in which one understands so that one may believe (*intellego ut credas*). Therefore once the mysteries of faith have been made known by the Scriptures, which Günther did think was a necessary first step, human reason (*Vernunft*) should be used to systematically demonstrate their truth; in this way a true and certain scientific knowledge (*Wissen*) of religion could be acquired wherein reason (*Vernunft*) intuitively grasps the intelligible ideas present in the Christian faith. Indeed Günther even went beyond Hermes here in that he asserted that reason could prove not just that a revelation of God had occurred, but that each of its individual contents could be proven through reason as well.

Günther begins the systematic process of proving the truths of revelation by reflection on human self-consciousness, following the examples of Descartes and Hegel (*Propaedeutic to the Speculative Theology of Positive Christianity*, I, Epistle 11, see RR (1989), p. 140). Through an intuitive inference (which Günther calls a metalogical use of intuitive understanding, *Vernunft*), we grasp our own existence (albeit indirectly or mediately through its acts);<sup>52</sup> I think therefore I am, as Descartes correctly stated (*Propaedeutic to the Speculative Theology of Positive Christianity*, I, Epistle 11, see RR (1989), pp. 140-141, 145-146; *Peregrine's Banquet*, pp. 140-145, 175-180, 311-313, 479-481). Moreover, we comprehend that the human self is a unity composed of both a soul (*Seele*) and a spirit (*Geist*) with their various faculties. The soul for its part engages in sensation, imagination, memory, and conceptual thought (*Verstand*); in so doing it structures the appearances of phenomena according to the *a priori* Kantian categorical concepts (*Begriff*) [as the soul makes use of abstract conceptual thought, it only grasps appearances and not the essence of being]. The spirit (or mind) on the other hand engages in understanding (passive receptivity) and willing

or loving (active or spontaneous response). The spirit with its intuitive intellection (*Vernunft*) grasps ideas (*Idee*) and in this way knows the essences of beings, i.e. the ground of appearances. It is this spirit that grasps the idea of its own being as a free and intellectual self.

The human self also recognizes that it possesses a body (*Leib*), and lives in a world of nature along with other spirits, although as spirit it is distinct from its body and the natural world [thus, according to Günther, the human can hence be conceived either as a “sphinx” or a dualistic synthesis of spirit (subject; ego; thesis) and nature [body and soul] (object; non-ego; antithesis), or as made in the image of a Trinity with body, animating soul, and spirit].<sup>53</sup> For as the unitary self is confronted by various and multiple phenomena that it cannot refer to itself as cause, it conceives the existence of beings external to it, and that it itself stands apart from this natural world of exterior beings (*Propaedeutic to the Speculative Theology of Positive Christianity*, I, Epistle 11, see RR (1989), pp. 145, 147). Hence, the spirit recognizes that it is not material but is immortal.

Moreover, the spirit additionally discerns that though it is immortal it is still limited and dependent (in fact, as we have seen, it can only know itself indirectly through interaction with non-egos). And reflection on the limited and dependent nature of the spirit gives rise to a knowledge that the human being is created by an infinite and unlimited being, God, who is an Absolute Spirit (*Peregrine's Banquet*, pp. 145-149).<sup>54</sup> As Günther proclaims:

... the conditionedness of the spirit itself ... is likewise an undeniable fact of consciousness. What does not simply be (or what is not *per se*) does not through itself come to self-revelation or to the externalization of its powers. Under this law of conditioned existence, then, stands the human spirit, which, as is so frequently repeated, is called into the light of self-consciousness only by a spirit that has already advanced to self-consciousness – in no way, therefore, through the mere operation of external nature, which does not understand its being. ... But if this limitation of spirit lies in the conditionedness of its nature, it must, however, fall away in an Unconditioned (*Propaedeutic to the Speculative Theology of Positive Christianity*, I, Epistle 11, translation from RR (1989), p. 141).

Now up to this point Günther has engaged in a Catholic apologetic very similar to the Scholasticism he rejects (albeit from an idealistic perspective), and so he claims to have proven the existence of an im-

mortal human spirit, and God. Yet Günther goes on to assert contra Scholasticism that reason (the intuitive intellect; *Vernunft*) can also prove that God is triune and had to incarnate Himself in human flesh; in other words, once God's existence is established, reason can go on to reflect on God's nature and rationally prove truths of Christianity that up to now were only known from faith in revelation (i.e. mysteries of the faith).

One such truth is that of creation, for, according to Günther, although God is free to create the world out of love or to not create it, once God chooses to create the world, God must create a world of nature and spirit. Just as the human mind (ego) must contemplate and affirm that which it is not (non-ego) to know itself, so too the divine mind (ego), if it creates, must create a world of nature (non-ego). Yet by creating a world of nature, God has created an opposition between nature and spirit and this must be resolved by creating humans who are a synthesis of both (*Propaedeutic to the Speculative Theology of Positive Christianity*, I, Epistle 11, see RR (1989), pp. 144-146).

More significantly, reason can show that God must be triune for Günther. For God, as the human, is a self-consciousness and thus eternally knows Himself in a process of subjectification of the object (*Objektivsubjektivierung*) [contra Hegel for whom God has to create the world in order to acquire self-knowledge as God only knows Himself through humans as they become aware of God] (see *Anti-Savarese*, p. 76). Now this very act of divine self-knowledge implies that God as subject (thesis) has emanated a known image as object (antithesis). Hence God the Father is the self-consciousness *knower* and God the Son is the *known* image of God. Yet there must also be a recognition in God that the Father and the Son are identical and this occurs when a subsequent *knowledge* (*knowing*) or the Holy Spirit (synthesis of subject-object) is emanated (see *Peregrine's Banquet*, pp. 193, 540).<sup>55</sup> Günther sets forth his difficult proof of the Trinity in the following manner:

But speculation also has a positive basis: its only true foundation is the facts of the life of the spirit. For this reason it is especially the moments of self-consciousness that, in their not absolute but modified transferal to the so-called concept of the Absolute, constitute the triune God ... consciousness is an essential form of being. The elements of this form, furthermore, are the two moments of the distinction of the representer [Father] and the represented [Son],

and of the representation [Holy Spirit] as the unity and likeness of the first two. Self-consciousness in this form is termed a higher level of consciousness, since in it spirit makes itself (not another, outside it) the object of inner representation. ... If God is, as being-through-itself, for that reason also knowledge-through-itself, that is absolute self-consciousness, so will the character of this absolute self-knowledge consist in precisely this: that it makes its absolute being as such immediately (without mediation from the outside) the object of its contemplation. ...

From these reflections follows the thought that God, when He [Father] comprehends Himself [Son] immediately in His substantiality (that is, becomes conscious of Himself), posits His own essence [Son] in opposition to Himself [Father], that is, posits Himself [Son] again. In other words, only in this way does it become thinkable for us that God makes Himself in His essentiality the object of immediate contemplation, namely, if He really opposes Himself in Himself as substance or duplicates Himself in Himself by emanation.

Now what is true of the object in the self-consciousness of God (which in its likeness to the divine subject is, just like it, absolute substance) is true also (according to the aforementioned received axioms about the nature of consciousness) of the second moment of self-objectification, which in addition to the subject and object posits a third element in the absolute self-consciousness [Holy Spirit]. It is, like the two previous moments, absolute substance, which proceeding from subject and object attests to the simultaneous positing of the two members in opposition, that is, of these in their perfection and completion ... In the divine self-consciousness the principle moves to itself as such in the opposition and thus has its conviction in a moment in which those two members again find themselves undivided and identical, because it has proceeded from both as third principle alongside both. ...

This process of conviction, or intensification (also called the self-objectification of the principle), is perfected in two moments with three factors. The first moment of the opposition already presupposes the principle [Father] as the first factor, which precisely through the relationship to it of that which is opposed [Son] attains subjecthood, as the exclusive causality of that which is opposed. Both factors, however, witness their mutual substantial likeness in a second moment of opposition, a twofold emanation that posits a third factor [Holy Spirit], in which the total identity of

being of both (their simultaneous positing in opposition) brings itself to objective, real contemplation. As this third factor is related to itself as the positing of both, so in a like manner it is related to both as its twofold cause. ... So much, then, for the triune or tripersonal God in and through the immediate consciousness of Himself, the consciousness of being through and from itself (*Propaedeutic to the Speculative Theology of Positive Christianity*, I, Epistle 11, translation from RR (1989), pp. 140, 142-143).

Lastly, Günther also claims that reason can prove that God has become incarnate in Jesus Christ. Now as we have seen the human being is a synthesis or harmony of spirit and nature. This harmony was at one time perfect in paradise when Adam's spirit and nature (i.e. his body with its various appetites and his soul) were in perfect concord (even though an initial revelation of God to Adam was necessary to bring him to full human consciousness). Unfortunately, Adam sinned (original sin), and this disrupted the original harmony of the human being and caused the spirit to lose its control over the natural appetites of the body [in Adam and his descendents] (*Peregrine's Banquet*, p. 321; cf. *The Last Symbolic Thinker*, p. 28). Hence, the Incarnation of God as Jesus Christ (the second Adam) was necessary as the Son had to come to earth to restore the lost harmony between human spirit and nature (i.e. to restore humans as the image of the Trinity). Jesus Christ, in whom the person of God is united to the human nexus of spirit and nature, is able to reestablish the shattered harmony between spirit and nature in humans, and reorder the natural appetites to God (i.e. the human spirit to the divine spirit), through his free and perfect compliance with the divine will (*Peregrine's Banquet*, pp. 395-398; cf. *Janusheads for Philosophy and Theology*, p. 96; *Thomas a Scrupulis*, p. 118).

Summing up then, according to Günther, even if revelation is initially needed, reason (intuitive intellect) can independently demonstrate all (or nearly all) of the truths of revelation such as the Trinity and Incarnation.<sup>56</sup> Of course this brought the charge that Günther had reduced faith to reason, in reply to which he claimed three things. First, Günther pointed out that people can believe religious truths through faith as well as through reason; so people are free to believe in the historical events of God's revelation to humans through faith and thereby accept Christ as the Son of God and receive his word and the transfusion of divine ideas. Second, following Hermes, he holds that

while reason can show that God is triune and became incarnate, for a total commitment of our lives to these truths we need faith which goes beyond a mere belief in religious truths. Third, Günther claims that though reason can comprehend the why of Christianity, only faith can reveal the how in regard to such things as the Trinity and Incarnation; in other words, though reason can show God is triune (why God's nature is the way it is), exactly what it means for God to be triune and how the procession of the Trinity occurs is still mysterious and known by faith alone (i.e. scripturally).<sup>57</sup>

#### CONDEMNATIONS OF SEMI-RATIONALISM:

The views of the semi-rationalists Hermes<sup>58</sup> and Günther<sup>59</sup> almost immediately came under vociferous attack by various philosophers and theologians, and soon the Catholic hierarchy took steps to condemn and stem the tide of the semi-rationalist movement. Hermes's thought was accordingly condemned in the brief *Dum Acerbissimas* issued in 1835 [this condemnation was renewed in 1847] and his two key works were placed on the Index of Forbidden Books (1835-1836). Moreover, the seminarians at Bonn and Cologne were specifically forbidden from studying the works of Hermes and in 1836 they had to subscribe to eighteen anti-Hermesian propositions. The brief *Dum Acerbissimas* (1835) by Gregory XVI, written against the thought of Georg Hermes, contains the following statements:

George Hermes ... is now building a darksome way to error of all kinds on positive doubt as a basis for all theological inquiry, and of the principle which states that reason is the chief norm and only medium whereby man can acquire knowledge of supernatural truths (DH, 2738; cf. DH, 2739).

Additionally Pope Pius IX, in his allocution *Singulari quadem* (1854), seems to have Hermes (as well as various other rationalists) in mind when he states:

There are, besides, Venerable Brothers, certain men pre-eminent in learning, who confess that religion is by far the most excellent gift given by God to men, who, nevertheless, hold human reason at so high a value, exalt it so much, that they very foolishly think that it is to be held equal to religion itself. ... Therefore, it is necessary to show to those men who exalt more than is just the strength of human reason that it (their attitude) is definitely contrary to those true words of the Doctor of the Gentiles: 'if any man think himself

to be something, whereas he is nothing, he deceiveth himself' [Gal. 6:3]. And so it is necessary to show them how great is their arrogance in examining the mysteries which God in His great goodness has deigned to reveal to us, and in pretending to understand and to comprehend them by the weakness and narrowness of the human mind, since those mysteries far exceed the power of our intellect which, in the words of the same Apostle, should be made captive unto the obedience of faith (Denz., 1642).

You should inculcate this salutary lesson in the souls of those who exaggerate the strength of human reason to such an extent that they venture by its help to scrutinize and explain even mysteries, although nothing is more inept, nothing more foolish. Strive to withdraw them from such perversity of mind by explaining indisputably that nothing more excellent has been given by the providence of God to man than the authority of divine faith; that this is for us, as it were, a torch in the darkness, a guide which we follow to life; that this is absolutely necessary for salvation ... (Denz., 1645).

Günther's thought was similarly condemned in the brief *Eximiam Tuam* (1857) issued by Pius IX and eight of his works were placed on the Index of Forbidden Books in the same year. The Brief *Eximiam Tuam* states:

Not without sorrow are we especially aware that in these books that erroneous and most dangerous system of rationalism, often condemned by this Apostolic See, is particularly dominant ... that extremely wicked and condemned doctrine which in Günther's books rashly attributes the rights of a master both to human reason and philosophy, whereas they should be wholly handmaids, not masters in religious matters; and therefore all those things are disturbed which should remain most stable, not only concerning the distinction between science and faith, but also concerning the eternal immutability of faith, which is always one and the same, while philosophy and human studies are not always consistent, and are not immune to a multiple variety of errors (DH, 2828-2829; cf. *Qui pluribus*, 1846, Pius IX, DH, 2780; Decree of the Holy Office against Rosmini-Serbati, 1887, DH, 3225).<sup>60</sup>

Finally, seven of the semi-rationalist Frohschammer's works were placed on the Index of Forbidden Books from 1857-1873 and in 1862 Frohschammer was suspended from his teaching position at the University of Munich and Pope Pius IX issued his epistle *Gravissimas Inter* against Frohschammer's thought [Frohschammer was excom-

municated in 1871 for refusing to recant his beliefs]. The epistle *Gravissimas Inter* (1862) rejects the semi-rationalism of Frohschammer by claiming that:

... the author attributes such powers to human reason which are not at all appropriate to reason itself ... For the author teaches especially that philosophy, if a right notion of it is held, cannot only perceive and understand those Christian dogmas which natural reason has in common with faith (as, for instance, a common object of perception), but also those which particularly and properly affect Christian religion and faith, namely, the supernatural end of man, and all that is related to it; and also, that the most holy mystery of the Incarnation of the Lord belongs to the province of human reasoning and philosophy; and that reason, when this object is presented to it, can by its own proper principles, arrive at those (dogmas) with understanding. ... Therefore, according to the teaching of the same author, it can and should be definitely concluded that, even of its free will, granted that the object of revelation be posited, reason can of itself, no longer on the principle of divine authority, but on its own natural principles and strength, reach understanding or certitude. How 'false' and 'erroneous' this teaching of the author is, there is no one, even though lightly imbued with the rudiments of Christine doctrine, who does not see immediately and clearly understand (DH, 2851; cf. DH, 2852).

... Indeed, true and sound philosophy has its own most noble position, since it is the characteristic of such philosophy to search diligently into truth, and to cultivate and illustrate rightly and carefully human reason, darkened as it is by the guilt of the first man, but by no means extinct; and to perceive, to understand well, to advance the object of its cognition and many truths; and to demonstrate, vindicate, and defend, by arguments sought from its own principles, many of those truths, such as the existence, nature, attributes of God which faith also proposes for our belief; and, in this way to build a road to those dogmas more correctly held by faith, and even to those more profound dogmas which can be perceived by faith alone at first, so that they may in some way be understood by reason (DH, 2853).

But, in truth, we can never tolerate that in so grave a matter as this surely is, that all things be rashly confused, and that reason should seize upon and disturb those things which pertain also to faith, since the limits beyond which reason in its own right has never advanced nor can advance, are fixed and well-known to all. To

dogmas of this sort pertain particularly and openly all those which treat of the supernatural elevation of man and his supernatural intercourse with God, and which are known to have been revealed for this purpose. And surely, since these dogmas are above nature, they cannot, therefore, be reached by natural reason and natural principles ... (DH, 2854).

For, from the divine Scriptures and from the tradition of the Holy Fathers, it is agreed indeed that the existence of God and many other truths were known by the natural light of reason, even by those who had not yet received the faith, but that God alone manifested those more hidden dogmas when He wished to make known 'the mystery, which had been hidden from ages and generations' (DH, 2855).

... the Holy Fathers, in transmitting the teaching of the Church, have constantly taken care to distinguish the knowledge of divine things which is common to all by the power of natural intelligence, from the knowledge of those things which is received on faith through the Holy Spirit; and they have continuously taught that through this (faith) those mysteries are revealed to us in Christ which transcend not only human philosophy but even the angelic natural intelligence, and which, although they are known through divine revelation and have been accepted by faith, nevertheless, remain still covered by the sacred veil of faith itself, and wrapped in an obscuring mist as long as we are absent from the Lord in this mortal life. From all this, it is clear that the proposition of Frohschammer is wholly foreign to the teaching of the Catholic Church, since he does not hesitate to assert that all the dogmas of the Christian religion without discrimination are the object of natural science or philosophy, and that human reason, cultivated so much throughout history, provided these dogmas have been proposed to reason itself as an object, can from its own natural powers and principle, arrive at the true understanding concerning all, even the more hidden dogmas (DH, 2856; cf. DH, 2857).

The Syllabus of Errors (1864) of Pius IX repeats these condemnations of rationalism and semi-rationalism. It censures the following claims:

Human reason, with absolutely no regard to God, is the only judge of the true and the false, the good and the evil; it is a law unto itself and is, by its own natural powers, sufficient to provide for the good of individuals and of peoples (DH, 2903).

All truths of religion flow from the natural power of human reason; hence, reason is the chief norm by which humans can and should come to a knowledge of all truths of whatever kind (DH, 2904).

The faith of Christ is opposed to human reason; and divine revelation is not only of no benefit to, but even harms the perfection of humans (DH, 2906).

All the dogmas of the Christian religion without distinction are the object of natural science or philosophy; and human reason, cultivated so much throughout history, can by its natural powers and principles arrive at the true knowledge of all, even the more hidden dogmas, provided these dogmas have been proposed to reason itself as its object (DH, 2909).

The method and principles according to which the ancient scholastic doctors treated theology are by no means suited to the necessities of our times and to the progress of the sciences (DH, 2913).

Philosophy is to be treated without any regard to supernatural revelation (DH, 2914).

Still most importantly and most clearly the First Vatican Council (1869-1870) argues against the view that reason can establish on its own every truth of religion (Session III, *Dei Filius*, 1870; cf. *Fides et Ratio*, John Paul II, 1998, 45-46, 52-55):

#### DOGMATIC CONSTITUTION:

Indeed, it must be attributed to this divine revelation that those things, which in divine things are impenetrable to human reason by itself, can, even in the present condition of the human race, be known readily by all with firm certitude and with no admixture of error. Nevertheless, it is not for this reason that revelation is said to be absolutely necessary, but because God in His infinite goodness has ordained man for a supernatural end, to participation, namely, in the divine goods which altogether surpass the understanding of the human mind (DH, 3005).

But the Catholic Church professes that this faith, which 'is the beginning of human salvation' is a supernatural virtue by which we, with the aid and inspiration of the grace of God, believe that the things revealed by Him are true, not because the intrinsic truth of the revealed things has been perceived by the natural light of reason, but because of the authority of God Himself who reveals them, who can neither deceive nor be deceived (DH, 3008).

By enduring agreement the Catholic Church has held and holds that there is a twofold order of knowledge, distinct not only in principle but also in object: (1) in principle, indeed, because we know in one way by natural reason, in another by divine faith; (2) in object, however, because, in addition to things to which natural reason can attain, mysteries hidden in God are proposed to us for belief, which, had they not been divinely revealed, could not become known (DH, 3015).

And, indeed, reason illustrated by faith, when it zealously, piously, and soberly seeks, attains with the help of God some understanding of the mysteries, and that a most profitable one, not only from the analogy of those things which it knows naturally, but also from the connection of the mysteries among themselves and with the last end of man; nevertheless, it is never capable of perceiving those mysteries in the way it does the truths which constitute its own proper object. For, divine mysteries by their nature exceed the created intellect so much that, even when handed down by revelation and accepted by faith, they nevertheless remain covered by the veil of faith itself, and wrapped in a certain mist, as it were, as long as in this moral life, 'we are absent from the Lord: for we walk by faith and not by sight' (DH, 3016).

#### CANONS:

If anyone shall have said that it is not possible nor expedient that through divine revelation man be taught about God and the worship to be given to Him: let him be anathema (DH, 3027).

If anyone shall have said that human reason is so independent that faith cannot be enjoined upon it by God: let him be anathema (DH, 3031).

If anyone shall have said, that divine faith is not distinguished from a natural knowledge of God and moral things, and that therefore it is not necessary to divine faith that revealed truth be believed because of the authority of the God who reveals it: let him be anathema (DH, 3032).

If anyone [i.e. Hermes] shall have said that the assent of the Christian faith is not free, but is necessarily produced by proofs from human reasoning; or, that the grace of God is necessary only for that living faith 'which worketh by charity': let him be anathema (DH, 3035).

If anyone [i.e. Hermes] shall have said that the condition of the faithful and of those who have not yet come to the true faith is

equal, so that Catholics can have a just cause of doubting the faith which they have accepted under the teaching power of the Church, by withholding assent until they have completed the scientific demonstration of the credibility and truth of their faith: let him be anathema (DH, 3036).

If anyone shall have said that no true mysteries properly so-called are contained in divine revelations, but that all the dogmas of faith can be understood and proven from natural principles, through reason properly cultivated: let him be anathema (DH, 3041).<sup>61</sup>

With the above condemnation of the First Vatican Council (and the beginning of the *Kulturkampf* in 1871), Semi-Rationalism as a Catholic movement was effectively brought an end. Hence by 1875 the followers of Hermes and Günther had either submitted to Rome and given up their views (such as Günther himself, Achterfeldt, Johann Wilhelm Joseph Braun, Gangauf, and Veith had done), had refused to submit and were excommunicated (as happened with Frohschammer), or had joined the Old Catholic Movement and left the Roman Catholic Church (such as Baltzer, Elvenich, Hilgers, Knoodt, Lutterbeck, Melzer, and Weber had done).



## SPIRITUALISM

*1820-1900 in France*

Spiritualism was conceived in France to combat the then dominant views of Materialism, Sensationism, and Positivism. Materialism – represented by Julien Offray De La Mettrie (1709-1751), the later Denis Diderot (1713-1784), Jean-le-Rond D'Alembert (1717-1783), Baron Paul-Henry Thiry D'Holbach (1723-1789), and Pierre Jean George Cabanis (1757-1808) – held that all of reality is reducible to matter. Thus there is no immaterial reality such as a human soul or a divine being. Sensationism [or Sensationalism] – as found in Claude Adrien Helvétius (1715-1771), Fr. Étienne Bonnot de Condillac (1715-1780), and the Swiss biologist Charles Bonnet (1720-1793) – held that all knowledge derives from physical sensation alone, i.e. from the operation of the five exterior senses (the intellect at most has the role of combining sensations). Positivism – as exemplified by Auguste Comte (1798-1857), Émile Littré (1801-1881) [who reconciled with the Catholic Church at the end of his life]; Ernest Renan (1823-1892), Pierre Laffitte (1823-1903), Hippolyte Taine (1828-1893), Théodule Ribot (1839-1916), and Eugène de Roberty (1843-1915) – held that science is the source of all knowledge. This implied that only what is sensible is real; there is no non-sensible reality. Accordingly, knowledge progresses from religious worldviews to philosophical ones, and finally advances to embracing scientific viewpoints wherein things are explained in terms of physical laws alone.

Spiritualism, to the contrary, asserted that there are forms of knowledge, especially introspective intuitions of our own thinking and willing, which cannot be reduced to sensations. Moreover, this introspection reveals that the human being is a spirit (*l'esprit*) which is not reducible to matter and which is especially characterized by its intellect and freedom. Finally, spiritualism held that the ultimate source of reality is an Absolute Spirit with intelligence and will (i.e. that nature is a product of God). Hence philosophical and religious worldviews need not give way with the advance of science.

One of the earliest spiritualists was **Jean Gaspard Félix Laché** [**Lacher**] **Ravaisson-Mollien (1813-1900)**<sup>62</sup> who was born at Namur, Sambre-et-Meuse, Belgium in 1813 (then part of France). His family was forced to flee the region during the war of 1814. A second tragedy soon followed when Ravaisson's father died and the young boy was thereafter raised by his mother and uncle, whose name Mollien he adopted. His uncle commented in a letter of 1821 that the young Ravaisson was a "complete mathematician, an antiquary, a historian, everything, in fact" and this was an accurate prediction of the expanse of Ravaisson's later diverse fields of expertise and inclination.

Ravaisson's first interests were theoretical and so he studied at the College Rollin in Paris from 1825-1832 where he received a prize in philosophy in 1832. He then attended the University of Munich where he heard the lectures of the Absolute Idealist Schelling and received a philosophy degree in 1836. After this Ravaisson studied with the eclectic Victor Cousin at the University of Paris and acquired his doctorate in philosophy in 1838. In 1838 Ravaisson began teaching philosophy at the University of Rennes, but difficulties with the aforementioned Victor Cousin, whose eclecticism he now critiqued and who had great sway in intellectual circles, prevented Ravaisson from a cherished post at the Sorbonne.

Ravaisson hence left Rennes in 1840 and took up a post in the French government as Inspector General of the Libraries. Then in 1859 he became Inspector General of Higher Education (a position he held until it was eliminated in 1888) and in 1863 he served as president of the board of examiners of the *agrégation* examination, the exam one needed to pass to teach in the French lycées. Ravaisson's thought at this time also became increasingly influential at the *École Normale Supérieure* though he never formally taught there (especially over Bergson, Boutroux, and Lachelier).

Ravaisson's interests then turned to art (indeed already in 1852 he had chaired a committee under the Ministry of Public Education concerning the best way to teach drawing in the schools). He thus became curator of classical antiquities at the Louvre in 1870 where he helped to restore the ancient statues of the *Venus de Milo* and the *Victory of Samothrace*. Ravaisson was also an accomplished painter and he exhibited his works at the Paris Salon under his middle name of Laché. He died in 1900 in Paris, France.

Ravaisson was elected a member of the Academy of Inscriptions and Fine Art in 1849 and the Academy of Moral and Political Sciences in 1880 (his membership seems to have been delayed by opposition from Victor Cousin). There is a portrait of Ravaisson by Kastor Robert.

Ravaisson's chief philosophical works were his *On Habit* [*De l'habitude*] (1839; reprinted in *Revue de métaphysique et de morale* 12 (1894), pp. 1-35; then reprinted in 1933; 1958; 1981; 1999) and his *Report on Philosophy in France in the Nineteenth-Century* [*Rapport sur la Philosophie en France au dix-neuvième siècle*] (1868; 1885; 1889; 1895; 1984) [written at the request of the French government in 1867].<sup>63</sup>

Ravaisson was a defender of spiritualism under the influence of Aristotle, Pascal, Leibniz, Maine de Biran, and Schelling. As such he opposed the materialism and positivism of the day.<sup>64</sup> The basic problem with these philosophies is that they explain the superior by the inferior (the mind by the body, the intellect by the senses, the form by the matter, the finished work by the rough sketch, the complete and the perfect by the incomplete). We must instead do exactly the opposite and explain the inferior by the superior (the sensible by the intelligible), the matter by the form (order, measure, and harmony), which is what truly makes something what it is. That is to say we must ultimately explain the human mind and nature in terms of the guidance of a spirit; spiritual facts must be recognized to be as true as scientific facts (*Report on Philosophy in France in the Nineteenth-Century*, I-II, pp. 53, 66-69, 72; XIII, p. 163; XXIV, p. 232; XXXVI, pp. 288-291, 295-297, 311-312, 320; cf. *Philosophical Testament*, pp. 4-5, 10).

Ravaisson holds that this spiritualist view is a continuation of the great tradition in French philosophy from Descartes to Malebranche, Pascal, and Maine de Biran: "If the genius of France has not changed, nothing is more natural than to see easily triumph here over the system which reduces everything to material elements and to a blind mechanism, the high doctrine which teaches that matter is only the last degree, and as it were the shadow, of existence; that true existence, of which all else is only an imperfect sketch, is that of the soul; that, in reality, to be is to live, and to live is to think and to will; that nothing happens in the last analysis except by persuasion; that the good, that the beautiful, alone explain the universe and its author itself; that the infinite and the absolute, of which nature presents only limitations to us, consists in spiritual liberty; that liberty is thus the last word of things, and that, under the disorders and antagonisms which disturb

this surface where the phenomena take place, at bottom, in the essential and eternal truth, all is grace, love, and harmony" (*Report on Philosophy in France in the Nineteenth-Century*, XXXVI, p. 320).<sup>65</sup> Hence according to Ravaisson, to be true to itself, philosophy must embrace a spiritual realism (or what he even terms a spiritual positivism) "having for its generative principle the consciousness that the spirit grasps in itself of an existence which it recognizes that every other existence derives from and depends on, and which is nothing else than its action" (*Report on Philosophy in France in the Nineteenth-Century*, XXXVI, p. 313; cf. *Skepticism in Antiquity*, IV, p. 356). Spiritualism in the end then explains matter by the immaterial, nature by mind.

Ravaisson also argued against the radical empiricism of Locke, Hume, Bain, and Condillac. Our goal must not be to show how all knowledge is derived from the external senses (or to make use of demonstration exclusively, which only applies to complex objects and not simple ones). For in doing this we are blind to all that is not sensible (to what is most truly real). Rather philosophy must recognize that it advances through a study of human consciousness and its interior activity, i.e. by introspection or intellectual intuition (*Report on Philosophy in France in the Nineteenth-Century*, II, pp. 78-79; XXXVI, pp. 298-299; cf. *Metaphysics and Morality*, pp. 21-23).

Now when we look within ourselves we find that we have an inner experience wherein we are spirits with self-consciousness, intelligence, and freedom (*Report on Philosophy in France in the Nineteenth-Century*, I, pp. 55, 67; XXXIV, p. 281; XXXVI, pp. 291, 308-309; *On Habit*, I, 4, p. 16-17; II, 1, pp. 21-22; II, 3, p. 48; cf. *Skepticism in Antiquity*, IV, p. 348; *Philosophical Testament*, pp. 10, 30 n. 26; *Metaphysics and Morality*, pp. 18-20). Indeed in some sense it is this latter item, the will, which is the most fundamental. For the very fact we have a free will (that we are free active causes) shows that humans are immaterial spiritual existences placed outside the course of nature; it shows that ultimate truth is found not in the determinism of the world, but in liberty (*On Habit*, I, 3, p. 13; *Report on Philosophy in France in the Nineteenth-Century*, XXXIV, p. 281; XXXVI, pp. 299, 305, 307-309).<sup>66</sup> Hence Ravaisson remarks, after Maine de Biran, that the fundamental certainty is not 'I think therefore I am' (Descartes) but 'I will therefore I am' (*Report on Philosophy in France in the Nineteenth-Century*, I, p. 67). In particular, again following Maine de Biran, Ravaisson argues that we are aware of our freedom through the resistance that we have

to overcome in performing our will acts (*On Habit*, II, 1, pp. 22-23; *Report on Philosophy in France in the Nineteenth-Century*, XXXVI, pp. 293-295): "It is in this mysterious middle term of effort that is found with reflection the most clear and most assured consciousness of the personality" (*On Habit*, II, 1, p. 25).

Ultimately, it is by turning within, and studying the activity of the will, that we can find the explanatory principle of all reality, habit. Habit is defined by Ravaisson in an extended sense as the "the general and permanent manner of being" (*On Habit*, I, p. 1). It is a state of permanency that results from the continuity or the repetition of change (*On Habit*, I, pp. 1-2).

Now habits do not occur with purely material bodies (one can hurl a rock a hundred times and for all that it will still not take on the habitual disposition to move in the direction in which it was thrown). Nonetheless, material bodies have an important role in that they allow for a stable and persistent reality wherein mechanical changes can occur (*On Habit*, I, 1, pp. 2-3, 6; II, 5, pp. 57-58). Habits do occur though in living beings, as they possess an interiority that can take on a new disposition through repeated action (*On Habit*, I, 1-4, pp. 3, 7-8, 12, 14, 17; II, 2, p. 34; II, 5, p. 58). For says Ravaisson "the more the living being has repeated or protracted a change which has its origin in itself, the more it still produces it and seems intent to reproduce it. ... the change which has come to it from itself becomes more and more its own. Receptivity decreases, spontaneity increases. Such is the general law of disposition, of habit, that the continuity or the repetition of change seems to engender in every living being" (*On Habit*, I, 2, p. 9). Habit then works by transforming repeated movements of the will (themselves based on an end of reason) into instinctive movements. Through a habit an end becomes a tendency and enters into our very being; it becomes a second nature (an acquired nature; a natured nature) (*On Habit*, II, 3, pp. 36-37, 39, 40-42, 49-50; II, 4, p. 54; *Report on Philosophy in France in the Nineteenth-Century*, XXV, pp. 234-235; *Philosophical Testament*, pp. 12-14). Ravaisson proclaims: "If then movement, in the measure that it is repeated, is changed more and more into an involuntary movement, it is not in the will, it is in the passive element of movement itself, that is developed little by little a secret activity. It is not action properly speaking which makes arise or strengthens the continuity or the repetition of locomotion; it is a tendency always more obscure and unreflective, which descends

further and further into the organism, and is concentrated more and more there" (*On Habit*, II, 2, pp. 33-34). Habit accordingly is a way of reducing the thought of an order or end, through continual will movements, to a state of active physical existence. Habit then links the will (mind) and nature; habit closes the gap between one's aim and the effort needed to realize it by coalescing the will into a natural necessity. In other words, with habit the voluntary submits to material conditionality, it forms itself into a mechanism, a deterministic series of movements (*On Habit*, II, 3, pp. 36-37; *Report on Philosophy in France in the Nineteenth-Century*, XXXVI, pp. 298-299).

Such habits are beneficial to living beings as they allow for action to occur in the future even after other initial movements have ceased. Moreover, habits allow for actions to become easier and stronger; they reduce the effort required to institute an action by producing a disposition, propensity, and tendency to action through repetition (*On Habit*, I, 2-3, pp. 8, 12; II, 2-3, pp. 29, 33-35, 41-42; II, 4-5, pp. 53, 57-58).<sup>67</sup> Ravaisson writes: "Habit transforms, little by little, the will of action into an involuntary propensity [*penchant*]. Virtue is initially an effort, a toil; it becomes by mere practice an attraction and a pleasure, a desire which is forgotten or which is ignored, and little by little it approaches the holiness of innocence. Its art is to draw the propensity to the good by action and to fix it there. Thus is formed a second nature" (*On Habit*, II, 4, p. 54).

Now an important thing to note about habits is that they operate in a very different manner than a mechanical fatalism (or even a reflective liberty) does. For a habit is not the mechanical effect of an exterior impulse, but rather the effect of a propensity [*penchant*] which succeeds willing. And ultimately, as we have seen, a habit refers back to an end proposed by intelligence to the will (*On Habit*, II, 2-3, pp. 35-36, 38; II, 5, p. 59). With a habit, an intelligent end becomes situated in a repetitive sequence.

Habit moreover is the analogous key which allows us to unlock the mystery of nature. For both a habit and nature have their origin in an act of intelligence. In habit and nature there is mysterious identification of real and ideal, being and thought, desire and intelligence (*On Habit*, II, 3, pp. 36-37, 39, 44, 46-47, 49; II, 4, p. 54; II, 5, pp. 61-62). Ravaisson explains: "There is an infinity of degrees which measure out the developments of one and the same power between the final depths of nature and the highest point of reflective liberty. ... This is, as it

were, a spiral whose principle resides in the depth of nature and which terminates in an expanding in awareness. It is this spiral that habitude drives back down, and of which it teaches us the generation and origin. ... and it has for its limit and final end the imperfect identity of the ideal and real, of being and thought, in the spontaneity of nature. The history of Habilidade represents the return of the Liberty to Nature, or rather the invasion of domain of liberty by natural spontaneity" (*On Habit*, II, 5, pp. 61-62). As a consequence, aware in our intimate consciousness that our repeated will acts (efforts) can produce a tendency in our body, we recognize that the ultimate cause of the world is also an intellect and will (*Report on Philosophy in France in the Nineteenth-Century*, XXXVI, pp. 293-295, 300-301, 304, 311). That is to say, from our awareness that habits occur in us where our will has become mechanism (consciousness to unconsciousness; intellect and desire to a necessity), we grasp that nature is also the degraded or fossilized residue of a supreme spirit (i.e. that a spiritual reality precedes the material one) (*On Habit*, II, 1-2, pp. 20, 28, 34; *Report on Philosophy in France in the Nineteenth-Century*, XXXVI, pp. 294-295, 300-302; *Essay on the Metaphysics of Aristotle*, I, p. vi): "Nature, one could say, is like a refraction or dispersion of the spirit" (*Report on Philosophy in France in the Nineteenth Century*, XXXVI, p. 309).

Methodologically then, for spiritualism, in contrast to materialism and sensationism, the ultimate nature of the universe is grasped by a synthetic intuition of the whole (the explanation of things is found most truly in the assemblage of elements, not the elements themselves, i.e. in the form and not the matter). For though analysis (logic) is necessary for comprehending the parts of things (diversity, quantity), true knowledge is found in synthesis, in a moral and aesthetic intuition wherein we grasp the order and harmony of the whole, i.e. the purpose of the whole. This is why comprehending the universe is analogous to comprehending a painting (both are produced by an artist and both often reveal more truth than abstract philosophical treatises). In both of these acts of comprehension we grasp the order and purpose of the ensemble; we explain efficient causes through final causes (*Report on Philosophy in France in the Nineteenth Century*, XXXVI, pp. 289-291, 293-295, 300-301, 304, 311). In the end then the activity of the spirit (as well as of nature) cannot be fully understood by reductive analysis by their (elements) but must instead be understood in terms of goals (order). We find that the soul, and especially the inner nature of the

soul, the will, is the principle of all things [that an Absolute Spirit, God, created the world] (*Report on Philosophy in France in the Nineteenth Century*, XXXIV, p. 281; XXXVI, pp. 308-309).

That the laws of nature are analogous to our habits – in that both are created by an intellect and will in reference to certain ends (God and humans, respectively) – is confirmed by our desires. For the movement of the will has its source in desire. And desire is based on a love of the good which has descended into our hearts. So through this desire, the soul becomes aware of its proper destiny, the end it is to accomplish, its perfection, its good. It sees that the will is driven by a quest for the good and beautiful (by an aspiration to perfection) (*On Habit*, II, 3, pp. 43-44; II, 4, pp. 52, 54-56; II, 5, pp. 59-60; *Report on Philosophy in France in the Nineteenth Century*, XXXVI, p. 309; *Philosophical Testament*, p. 27). All of this goes to show that nature lies wholly in desire, and desire lies wholly in the good that attracts it. Nature, in a sense, as Fénelon noted, is a prevenient grace working through desire (*On Habit*, II, 4, pp. 55-56; II, 5, p. 60). Ultimately the goodness we are attracted to by desire is God as found within the inmost depths of our being (*On Habit*, II, 4, pp. 55-56; II, 5, p. 59).

So too the existence of a supreme spirit is confirmed by love and beauty. The human heart is naturally called to let love rule in it, and, what is more, to open itself up to supernatural charity (*On Habit*, II, 4, p. 53; *Report on Philosophy in France in the Nineteenth Century*, I, p. 59; XXXIV, p. 281; XXXVI, pp. 306-308). The divine, which is not far from any of us, calls us to participate in its own life of love (*Report on Philosophy in France in the Nineteenth Century*, XXXIV, p. 281; XXXV, pp. 284-287; XXXVI, pp. 293, 299, 306, 320). That is to say, there is a call to engage in abnegation (immolation) and love others above ourselves (as God does). We must follow the spirit of heroism and chivalry and engage in generosity, gift and grace, liberality and magnanimity. For as Bossuet said, when God formed the entrails of humans, He first placed goodness there; thus the depth of our being is love (*Report on Philosophy in France in the Nineteenth Century*, XXXVI, p. 320; *Philosophical Testament*, pp. 17 n. 15, 18 n. 16, 26-27, 28, 30; *Metaphysics and Morality*, pp. 23-25). So too the soul is attracted by the beauty it sees in the world and stimulated to create its own works of beauty. This beauty radiates from the spirit and again expresses the inner being of the soul. We know God in our heart then by a free movement toward love (good) and the beautiful, as Pascal

said (*Skepticism in Antiquity*, IV, p. 357; *Philosophical Testament*, pp. 18, 31; *Metaphysics and Morality*, pp. 21-22).<sup>68</sup>

In this way God is found by introspection. We find that we are human beings who desire the good and the beautiful, and are called to love. By the same token, we see that beauty and goodness are the driving forces of the world (and manifestations of the Absolute Spirit); at bottom all is grace, harmony, and love. Far from chance causing things to be, nature is oriented to definite ends, as Aristotle noted. Nature expresses a tendency to perfection, goodness, and beauty. Here by a synthetic intuition we judge a whole (the world) against a model of perfection (against an absolute and unlimited perfection, God) (*Report on Philosophy in France in the Nineteenth Century*, XXXIV, p. 281; XXXVI, pp. 300, 305, 307-309, 312, 320; *Philosophical Testament*, pp. 21-22, 24; *Skepticism in Antiquity*, IV, p. 353).<sup>69</sup> Thus the last word of things is not just the will, but a will founded on grace. A spiritual intelligence and will creates the world and directs it on the basis of goodness and beauty (*Report on Philosophy in France in the Nineteenth Century*, XXXV, pp. 284-287; XXXVI, pp. 293, 306).

God then is known by analogy with the human spirit (the human soul is an image of God). Now the human will (ordered by goodness, beauty, and love) is a special generative principle; we can even say it is a particular god. Yet our will can produce nothing except through a superior power in which it particulates (an inspiration of the divinity), a universal God, who is perfect and infinite goodness (personality), beauty (wisdom), and love (*Report on Philosophy in France in the Nineteenth Century*, XXXVI, pp. 299-300; *Philosophical Testament*, p. 4 n. 2, p. 8 n. 4, pp. 13-14; *Metaphysics and Morality*, p. 25). Indeed, God is a complete and absolute existence. He is object and subject of thought, will, and love; indeed He is perfect thought, will, and love itself, a flame without material support that nourishes itself from itself (*Report on Philosophy in France in the Nineteenth Century*, XXXVI, pp. 314-315). God then is a Trinity of thought (goodness, personality), will (beauty, wisdom), and love.

Ravaisson goes on to develop a very interesting account of divine creation. God, he says, creates by reducing and quenching His infinite and all-powerful activity (*Report on Philosophy in France in the Nineteenth Century*, XXXVI, p. 317). Creation is thus a kind of cosmic fall wherein God deprives the world of some of His perfection (as we have seen, nature is a degradation or dispersion of the divine spirit). In cre-

ating the world God annuls (sacrifices) the fullness of His being. Yet this annulling is effected in order to draw from it an awakening and resurrection of what it hides (i.e. God deprives existence of perfection so that it can seek it and recover it, so that it can re-manifest goodness and beauty). The order of nature is a movement from the finite to the infinite, world to spirit, becoming to being, nature to God. God as love, gift, and liberality (and grace), also creates human creatures similar to His own being and divine like Himself, and He nourishes them from His own being. Hence God descends into the flesh to become the Son of God, Jesus Christ, where his love is manifested most directly (*Report on Philosophy in France in the Nineteenth Century*, XXXVI, pp. 309, 318-319; *Philosophical Testament*, pp. 14, 17, 21-22, 24; *Skepticism in Antiquity*, IV, p. 353; *Metaphysics and Morality*, p. 25).

Finally, aware of how we possess a ray of divine love, we also become cognizant that our consciousness is not born to perish after a short life. For the love in us seeks to always love. Moreover, only the infinite will suffice for the soul (which comes from the infinite). Thus the destiny of the soul is to return to the divinity and to unite to it in immortal life (*Philosophical Testament*, pp. 28, 30 and p. 30 n. 26, 31).

Another well-known spiritualist was **Joseph Louis Jules Lequier** [**Lequyer**] (1814-1862).<sup>70</sup> Lequier was born in Quintin, Côtes-d-Amor, Brittany in 1814. He spent his childhood in the town of Saint-Brieuc where his father was the physician. He then went to Paris where he studied at Stanislas College, the Institut Préparatoire Laville (c. 1832-1833), and math at the École Polytechnique (1834-1838) [where he met his friend Charles Renouvier]. In 1837 misfortune fell upon Lequier when his father died, and when he failed the army officer entrance exam the following year. Lequier subsequently returned to Plermont to live with his mother and her maid Marianne. He moved to Paris a few years later where he taught French to Egyptian princes of the family of Mohammed-Ali at the École Égyptienne in Besançon and Lons-le-Saunier from 1843-1848 (it was closed during the Revolution) and was professor of mathematics at the Collège Saint-François Xavier at Besançon from 1853-1855. He then retired into solitude in Brittany. Lequier was known to be very pious in these days (in 1846 he had had a five day religious experience where he intensely felt the sufferings of Christ and the Virgin Mary, his own sin, and God's forgiveness of sin; he knelt before a statue of Mary in his

garden each evening; and he went on a pilgrimage of devotion to the Virgin Mary in 1857).

Lequier ran, as a Catholic Republican, for a seat in the parliament of the Côtes-du-Nord, Brittany in 1848 but failed in his campaign (at which point it seems he was an active participant in the revolution that year). Often in financial difficulties, Lequier was now forced to sell the family home in Saint-Brieuc in 1850 (his Aunt gave him an inheritance but only enough to compensate for the debt that he owed to his cousin). These political and financial failures caused Lequier to have a mental breakdown in 1851 and he tried to cut off his arm with a hatchet (doctors attributed his breakdown to a lack of sleep and overwork, causing an incoherence of ideas and an excited state wherein they feared for the security of his own life and perhaps those of others). Due to an unwished for intervention of his friends Le Gal la Salle and Abbot Cocherl, Lequier spent one month in the lunatic asylum of Dinan (where he suffered hallucinations and attempted suicide on several occasions) and then under the care of a physician in Passy near Paris.

Only three months after his release, Lequier proposed to Anne-Françoise Espagniou "Nanine" Deszille (1818-1909), his childhood sweetheart. She turned him down saying her parents were opposed to the marriage (likely a pretext) and asked Lequier to burn the letters she had written to him (he complied but only after copying down his favorite portions of them). In 1853 Lequier found employment as a private tutor, and in 1854 he became professor of mathematics at the Collège Saint-François Xavier in Besançon and at Lons le Saunier (Lequier later sued his tutor, as well as the director of the Collège Saint-François Xavier and the Archbishop of Besançon, claiming to have been underpaid; Lequier could nonetheless afford to be quite generous and he was known for giving money to the poor, taking in wayward boys, and taking in an alcoholic Carmelite monk).

In 1858 Lequier moved in with his childhood maid Marianne and again worked as a tutor. Sadly, in 1860 he lost out on a potential position as an archivist for the Côtes-du-Nord due to a failure in the mail service (the letter from the Ministry of the Interior recommending Lequier got delayed for three days and by the time it arrived the position had already been filled). In 1861 Anne Deszille's father died and Lequier again proposed marriage to her and was again rebuffed. Lequier drowned off the coast of Plérin (Baie du Rosaire), Saint Brieuc, Côtes-

d-Amor, Brittany in 1862 (the official cause of his death was determined to be an accidental drowning of an individual with a "disturbed spirit", but there is a fair amount of evidence suggesting he committed suicide, or at least initially attempted this).<sup>71</sup>

A statue of Lequier (by Elmerich) can be found over his tomb in the cemetery of Plérin (Côtes-d'Armor) next to the l'Église St. Pierre (it was restored in 1922 by the French Philosophical Society and copied in a drawing by André Bluteau and Michelle Bakay; there is also a drawing of Lequier made by Le Gal La Salle). This tomb was erected by Charles Renouvier and Agathe Lando in honor of "the memory of an unhappy friend and a man of great genius." Finally, there is a street and hospital named after Lequier in Quintin and a Collège in Plérin. There is also a plaque on his birth-house in Quintin (erected in 1962).<sup>72</sup>

Lequier's key spiritualistic writing was his *The Search for a First Truth* [*La recherche d'une première vérité*] (1865; 1924; 1985; 1993).<sup>73</sup>

The stated goal of Lequier's aptly-named work, under the obvious influence of Descartes and Fichte, is the search for a first truth, a foundational truth that cannot be doubted (*The Problem of Knowledge*, I, pp. [20-21]). And again following Descartes, the method for attaining a first truth is to commence doubting in order to discover what cannot be doubted; this is, of course, a methodical doubt wherein one wants ultimately to know (*The Problem of Knowledge*, I, pp. [23-25]; II, pp. [28, 35, 39-40]). What ultimately will put a rest to our doubt will be the discovery of a first truth with real evidence supporting it (*The Problem of Knowledge*, II, pp. [28-31, 34]).

Now, according to Lequier, this first truth is that of human freedom (*The Problem of Knowledge*, V, pp. [66, 70]; *Liberty*, III, 2, p. [360]). Such a truth is more fundamental than the truth that I exist (contra Descartes) (*The Problem of Knowledge*, V, pp. [68-69]; cf. *Liberty*, IV, 3, p. [411]). Lequier writes: "At present I now possess, henceforth I keep under my custody, the most certain of truths and the first in order: I am free; I am beyond my dependence independent, and dependent beyond my independence. I am a dependent independence. I am a person responsible for me who am my own work, for God who created me creator of myself. Finally, I breath. I have found this first truth" (*The Problem of Knowledge*, V, p. [70]; cf. Letter to Renouvier of November 10, 1850, LOC, p. [538]).<sup>74</sup>

Our freedom consists in the fact that we can determine ourselves to do an act independently of our character, circumstances, and the inviolable laws of nature. That is to say, each choice of ours is not the inevitable consequence of factors outside of our control, of anterior events (*The Problem of Knowledge*, III, pp. [45-46, 48, 50]; *The Hornbeam Leaf*, pp. 47-48 [15-17]; *The Dialogue of Predestinate and the Reprobate*, III, p. 151 [224]; *Liberty*, III, 6, p. [389]). With respect to two different possible actions then “I choose one or the other, I realize one in preference to the another, at my wish [*gré*], as it pleases me; but my wish does not make my choice; it is my choice which makes my wish. It pleases me that it pleases me” (*The Problem of Knowledge*, III, p. [46]; cf. III, p. [46-47]; cf. *Reflections*, LOC, p. [474]; *Diverse Thoughts*, LOC, p. [480]). Hence for Lequier we must assert a real freedom to do otherwise (what we now call a libertarian view of freedom with its principle of alternate possibilities) (*The Problem of Knowledge*, V, p. [75]; *The Dialogue of Predestinate and the Reprobate*, II, pp. 100, 118, 122 [155, 180, 187]); II, p. 127 [192]; *Liberty*, I, p. [318]). As Lequier writes of the ability to touch a hornbeam leaf on a tree: “To do, or not to do! both so equally in my power” (*The Hornbeam Leaf*, p. 45 [14]).

Humans then possess the miraculous or divine power to will a first act of will, to initiate an act for which the laws of nature cannot furnish the explanation. The free will is the final determinant of a choice (the human is free to act on a motive or not); to act is to commence (*The Problem of Knowledge*, III, pp. [43, 47, 49]; V, pp. [67-68]; *The Hornbeam Leaf*, pp. 45, 48 [14, 16]; *Liberty*, I, pp. [315, 326]; III, 4-5, pp. [384, 400-401]; IV, 4, p. [419, 421]; IV, 5, pp. [428, 430]; *Diverse Thoughts*, p. [477]; *The Dialogue of the Predestinate and the Reprobate*, II, p. 127 [192]). This ability to truly act in a manner other than we did is what makes us free. As Lequier insists: “Liberty without the arbitrary is the thing without the word, or the word without the thing” (*The Problem of Knowledge*, III, p. [56]). We might as well say that we are free to go on a walk when imprisoned in a dungeon as long as we don’t budge (*The Problem of Knowledge*, pp. [50, 55-56]; *The Dialogue of the Predestinate and the Reprobate*, I, pp. 58, 85-86, 102-103 [90, 132-135, 158-160]; II, pp. 127-128 [192, 194-195]; III, p. 151 [224]).<sup>75</sup>

Just as amazing, by this power of choice one can introduce new and unseen effects into the course of nature. Freedom is the power to add a novel reality to the world that will always be a part of it; we

bring potentiality into being by our absolute initiative (*Liberty*, IV, 5, p. 429). Lequier famously tells how, upon touching a hornbeam leaf, a frightened dove took flight and was suddenly seized in midair by a sparrow-hawk (*The Hornbeam Leaf*, pp. 45-46 [14]).<sup>76</sup> Consequently, "Who knows what the first movement that I am going to make will decide in my future existence? It may be that from circumstance to circumstance my entire life will be different, and that later, in virtue of a secret connection, which, by a multitude of intermediaries, connects the most considerable events to the least things, I will become the rival of those humans whose names my father only pronounces with respect, in the evening, near the hearth, while one listens to him in silence" (*The Hornbeam Leaf*, p. 46 [14]). Indeed, by a free movement of a hand in Europe, a train of events can be initiated wherein this motion is somehow transmitted to Asia (*The Hornbeam Leaf*, p. 47 [15]; *The Dialogue of the Predestinate and the Reprobate*, II, pp. 138-139 [210]).<sup>77</sup> Thus "to will is always to will with audacity and ardor" (Letter to Le Gal la Salle of December 24, 1839, LOC, p. 501), for we are not in a position to know just what will result from our acts, nor what our future will be like on account of our acts (*The Hornbeam Leaf*, p. 46 [14]).

Now this first truth, i.e. human freedom, is not based on introspection for Lequier (contra Ravaisson). It is true that I have an interior sentiment that my will is exempt from constraint when choosing (or rather that I do not sense any constraint or necessity when I choose). Yet from the fact that I don't sense my will to be necessary, it doesn't follow that it isn't necessary. My freedom may be an illusion and there may be necessitating causes hidden from my view (*The Problem of Knowledge*, III, pp. [50-51, 53; *Liberty*, III, 5, p. [393]). In order to know that my acts are free from all constraints, from all interior and secret necessity, I would need to possess a knowledge of all the laws that rule over human nature, which is impossible (*Liberty*, II, 1, pp. [336-337]; III, 1, 6, pp. [349, 352-353, 393]). Thus the idea of liberty may be merely derived from the obscurity of the future and the lack of knowledge of the causes of one's acts. Just as it can seem to one ignorant of math that the interior angles of a triangle do not add up to two right angles, though they must necessarily do so, so too one may be ignorant of the causes of one's necessary acts (*The Problem of Knowledge*, III, pp. [54-55]; IV, pp. [60-61]).<sup>78</sup> In order to truly have an internal experience of the act of liberty, it would be necessary to

find oneself in perfectly identical (and not just similar) circumstances on two different occasions, and to have acted in two different manners. Yet identical circumstances never occur in one and the same life (*The Problem of Knowledge*, III, pp. [52, 54]; *Liberty*, III, 1, p. [353]). In the end then, our inner experience of being free from constraints when acting cannot give us evidence for (only a belief in) a freedom to do otherwise.

What lets us know that we are free is instead that freedom is an underlying presupposition of morality (*The Problem of Knowledge*, IV, p. [64]; *Liberty*, III, 4-5, pp. [380, 393]). Without freedom humans would be no more than machines and have no dignity, nor would there be any difference between good and evil (i.e. any moral responsibility) (*The Dialogue of the Predestinate and the Reprobate*, I, p. 59 [93]). Just as a rock which falls off a wall and hits someone on the head would not be responsible for the harm done, humans who could not choose other than they do would bear no responsibility, and moral chastisements would be foolish in regard to them (*Liberty*, III, 3, p. [367]).

Moreover, freedom is not just necessary for morality, freedom is also an underlying presupposition of knowledge (*The Problem of Knowledge*, IV, p. [64]; V, p. [70]; *Liberty*, III, 5, p. [393, 401]). Lequier states "Here then is an affirmation: I can [do] this or that" ... An affirmation eminently first, since it is at the beginning of all examination and at the root of all possible speculation" (*The Problem of Knowledge*, III, p. [49]).

Freedom underlies knowledge for two main reasons. First, when we seek for a first truth (or indeed any truth), we need to use our freedom to make sure our search for the truth is well-directed, honest, and sincere (i.e. that we abandon any prejudices or errors we may have) (*The Problem of Knowledge*, I, pp. [19, 21, 24-25]; II, pp. [29, 31-32, 38-39]; *Liberty*, III, 5, p. [398]). In order to know, we need to make sure we don't judge too quickly, and that we have scruples and pay attention; or, as Lequier puts it, we must search for the truth in "good faith" (*bonne foi*) (*The Problem of Knowledge*, II, p. [27]). He asks: "And how can I take a first step in this search, even only a groping one, except by means of this free movement of my thought? How can I form the project of seeking, to fix an end for myself, to deliberate, pause over the way to take, abandon the ancient ways, break (I said) from habit and prejudices, to try to place myself in conditions of independence and sincerity, to aspire to throwing off my errors, compare ideas, judge,

if all of my thoughts are prepared, produced, prolonged in a order of which I am not the master, in a manner where I can [do] nothing, each of them, at each prior instant, being precisely what they are, and not being able to be not such" (*The Problem of Knowledge*, III, p. [46]; cf. III, p. [50]). Knowledge then requires that we have confidence in the resources of the self, and in its ability to search for the truth, which is to say that it requires freedom.

More significantly, we need freedom to be able to distinguish true from false (apparently true) evidence; without freedom error and truth would be indiscernible (indeed we could not even know that truth and error exist). For if all were necessary, errors in reasoning would be just as necessary and inevitable as truths were; we would not be free to investigate what there is evidence for and which evidence is true (*The Problem of Knowledge*, IV, p. [63]). As Lequier puts it, "If there is liberty, the opposition of the free and the necessary gives a way of establishing primitive truths. But if there is no liberty, everything is necessary, and this opposition no longer existing, this way of establishing primitive truths no longer exists" (*The Problem of Knowledge*, IV, p. [64]). Lequier goes on to explain that in a deterministic world, any judgment we make could not be other than it is; thus we would be determined in what we believe (regardless of whether it is true or false). Yet if this were the case, there would be no basis on which to determine if these judgments were correct and in harmony with the truth (i.e. that the truth is what determines our judgments about what is true). For the necessity linking cause and effect (deterministic systems) is not the same as that linking inference and truth. In order to grasp the truth, we must be able to assent to the truth through a rational inference based on evidence. And this requires that the mind which assents to a belief be free (*The Problem of Knowledge*, IV, pp. [63-64]); *Liberty*, I, pp. [314, 324]; III, 4-6, pp. [374, 377, 379-380, 393, 400]].<sup>79</sup> Thus determinism yields absolute doubt; indeed if necessity were true one would not even have the right to affirm it to be true.

In the end then we must affirm our liberty as a postulate [*postulatum*] (by belief or faith): "the smallest expenditure of belief for the greatest result" (*The Problem of Knowledge*, IV, p. [64]). Just as the sciences posit necessity (the order of nature), which they use to make predictions (but which is limited to the natural realm and does not extend to the human soul), so too for philosophical reasons we must postulate freedom for the possibility of ethics and knowledge, the free-

dom to do the good and to know the truth. That is to say, freedom “is the necessary condition that renders possible the at once imperfect and admirable work of human knowledge and the work of Duty which proceeds from it, and this is perhaps enough to assure us that it is not a vain conception of our pride” (*The Problem of Knowledge*, IV, p. [64]; cf. *Liberty*, III, 5, p. 393).

Indeed according to Lequier we can even think of the postulation of freedom in terms of a dilemma [really a quadrilemma] (a wager similar to that of Pascal), for we must choose between liberty and necessity with liberty or necessity. Hence we can choose necessity from necessity, necessity with freedom, freedom with necessity, or freedom with freedom (*The Problem of Knowledge*, pp. [67, 70-71]; *The Hornbeam Leaf*, pp. 48-49 [17]; *Liberty*, I, pp. [319, 321]; III, 5, p. [398-400]). Now if necessity is true and I affirm necessity, I do so necessarily and without being in a state whereby I could guarantee its reality. If necessity is true and I affirm liberty, I necessarily affirm what is incorrect (though I establish in myself the foundations of knowledge and morality). If liberty is true and I affirm necessity, I freely affirm an error. But if freedom is true and I affirm it, I am in the truth and I acquire the merits and advantages of my free affirmation, i.e. that of being able to possess the truth and morality (*The Problem of Knowledge*, IV, pp. [64-65]; *Liberty*, III, 5, p. [398]). Hence the best option is to freely affirm my liberty; one must use one’s will to affirm that one is free and capable of finding a first truth (*The Problem of Knowledge*, III, pp. [43-44]; IV, p. [65]). As Lequier sees it then, it is “an act of freedom that affirms freedom” (*The Problem of Knowledge*, V, p. [67]; cf. *The Hornbeam Leaf*, pp. 48-49 [17]). Or in an expanded form: “Recovering faith in my freedom by my freedom itself, without reasoning, without hesitation, without any other assurance of the excellence of my nature than this inner testimony that my soul acknowledged itself created in the image of God, and capable of resisting him, since it was supposed to obey Him, I had just told myself, in the security of a superb solitude: This is not so, I am free” (*The Hornbeam Leaf*, pp. 48-49 [17]).

At bottom then the dogma of necessity is incorrect (*Liberty*, III, 5, p. 393; *The Hornbeam Leaf*, pp. 48-49 [17]): “This hideous dogma of necessity cannot be demonstrated; it is a chimera which contains absolute doubt in its bowels. It vanishes in the face of serious and attentive examination, as phantoms formed from a mixture of light and shadow, which only terrify when there is fear, and which the hand dissipates

by touching them" (*The Problem of Knowledge*, IV, p. [64]). For God created humans with the great gift of being creators of themselves (Lequier even says that God made us kings or gods created in God's image) (*The Problem of Knowledge*, V, pp. [70-71]; *The Dialogue of the Predestinate and the Reprobate*, p. 98 [152]; *Liberty*, II, 2, p. 334; III, 2, pp. 363-364; III, 5, p. [398]; IV, 3, p. [414]; Letter to Charles Renouvier of November 10, 1850, LOC, p. [538]; *Diverse Thoughts*, LOC, pp. [479, 484]; *Abel and Abel*, p. 65 [277]). The formula of science, says Lequier, is thus: "To make, not to become, but to make, and in making, make oneself" [FAIRE, non pas devenir, mais faire, et en faisant SE FAIRE] (*The Problem of Knowledge*, V, p. [71]).

Now as humans are free, God's grace does not predetermine what humans will do (*The Problem of Knowledge*, V, p. [70]; *The Dialogue of the Predestinate and the Reprobate*, p. 98 [152]; *Liberty*, II, 2, p. 334; III, 2, pp. 363-364; III, 5, p. [398]; IV, 3, p. [414]; Letter to Charles Renouvier of November 10, 1850, LOC, p. [538]; *Diverse Thoughts*, LOC, pp. [479, 484]). Such a predestinationism would wrongly imply that before one's birth (before any of one's acts), there was an eternal decree of one's fate (*The Dialogue of the Predestinate and the Reprobate*, I, pp. 58, 60, 72, 85-86, 102-103 [90, 94, 111, 132-135, 158-160; II, pp. 128 [194-195]; III, p. 151 [224]). For predestinationism, "Everything which I have done, everything which you have done, everything which I will do, everything which you will do, all of this was to be as it has been, as it will be" (*The Dialogue of the Predestinate and the Reprobate*, III, p. 148 [220]). Such a predestining God would not be a very desirable one. God would be like someone who says to us – choose among these books, but if you choose this particular book your hand will be cut off; indeed for the predestinationist, God uses even more efficacious and hidden means to ensure we do certain things (*The Dialogue of the Predestinate and the Reprobate*, III, p. 150 [222-223]). Worse still, if divine providence determined all that occurred, then by divine decree some will go to heaven and others to hell (for all eternity) with no power of resisting this fate and no power to merit one or the other (*The Dialogue of the Predestinate and the Reprobate*, I, pp. 52 [80]; II, p. 144 [215]; III, p. 148 [220]).<sup>80</sup> Yet this view makes a wreck of divine justice (nor is it helpful to say that divine justice is above human justice and we cannot comprehend it; we must know that God is incontestably just even when it seems He is unjust) (*The Dialogue of the Predestinate and the Reprobate*, I, pp. 52-53 [81-82]).<sup>81</sup>

God instead leaves humans to their own choices; God lets them determine their own lives. As Lequier asserts in a couple of quotes:

The All-Powerful, the divine poet, does not bring about the appearance on the world scene of characters who come to fill a role decided in advance – these imitations of life are the games of human genius. Who could make so frivolous and so base an idea of the work of God! God made the human free and capable himself of resisting Him. When he acts on us, he has said, it is with a great respect (*The Dialogue of the Predestinate and the Reprobate*, II, p. 140 [212]).

Without a doubt, nothing was difficult for God: God is power itself. But to create a being that was independent of Him in the strict sense, a being truly free, a person – what an undertaking! All His art is employed there, and one does not know what feat of strength achieves the masterpiece. Behold human beings: they think, they rule over their thoughts. God withdraws. God leaves humans to their solitary reflections. ... Human persons must decide themselves by themselves in their uncertainties. ... Human persons! Beings who can do something without God, who can, if it is pleasing, prefer themselves to God, who can will what God does not will, and not will what God wants, that is to say a new God who can offend the other! Horrible prodigy [*prodige*]. The human person deliberates and God waits. A homage truly worthy of God if humans are not rebellious, but what an injury if they are not submissive (*The Problem of Knowledge*, V, pp. [70-71]).

Lequier famously goes on to discern the implications of human freedom with respect to God's nature. First, as we see with the above quote, human freedom allows for humans to will against God's will. Humans can freely choose to do good in line with God's will, or to do evil and so offend God (*The Problem of Knowledge*, V, pp. [70-71]). Therefore God is not a "God All-Doing [*Dieu Tout-Faisant*]"; God limits his power to allow humans to initiate their own actions and to have independence (*The Dialogue of the Predestinate and the Reprobate*, I, p. 98 [152]; II, p. 113-114 [173-174]). God is even willing to allow for the possibility of evil (*Liberty*, I, p. [318-319, 323]). Indeed a glance at the actual world suggests that the first humans chose to misuse the great gift of freedom from which a catastrophe resulted and sin entered the world (original sin by which they transmitted to their descendents, not the flower of holiness and grace, but a nature violated in its most noble instincts and with a knowledge of evil – the corruption of the

flesh here also corrupted the spirit) (*The Problem of Knowledge*, V, p. [71]; *Liberty*, I, pp. [318-319, 323]).

Additionally, if humans have the power to do one thing or another, this means that the future is not determined. Rather the future depends on my power to create, it does not exist before a free preference of mine puts an end to a present irresolution, before I have commenced to be (*The Problem of Knowledge*, V, p. [75]). Thus there are ambiguous futures and real possibilities rather than infallible futures or fictive possibilities (for freedom is an ontological reality and not just a logical or epistemological possibility and merely due to our ignorance) (*The Problem of Knowledge*, pp. [53, 75]; *The Dialogue of the Predestinate and the Reprobate*, II, pp. 118, 122-123 [179-180, 187]). Lequier writes: "God knows that such a human is at present undecided between two choices, and that neither the one nor the other is absolutely future, but that each of the two is conditionally, imperfectly future" (*The Dialogue of the Predestinate and the Reprobate*, II, p. 135 [205]). Yet this implies that God cannot have a sure knowledge of what free creatures will do in the future (i.e. of what are called future contingents) (*The Dialogue of the Predestinate and the Reprobate*, II, pp. 135-136 [205, 207]).<sup>82</sup>

God then is not omniscient; God doesn't know the future acts of free humans before they happen (*Liberty*, IV, 4, p. [419]). God only knows what we will do in the future do after we have done it: the "human deliberates and God waits [*l'homme délibère et Dieu attend*]" (*The Problem of Knowledge*, V, p. [71]). In other words, God knows the future acts of humans in the way that we ourselves know them, by waiting for them to happen (*The Dialogue of the Predestinate and the Reprobate*, II, pp. 134-135 [204-205]). Lequier writes: "You are free to do an action. God does not know that you will do it since you can not do it, and God does not know that you will not do it since you can do it. God knows only that you are free, and just as in making the human free, He has himself freely restrained the exercise of His power in the government of the world, in the same way He restrained His knowledge in regard to our acts. If God wanted there would be no ambiguity in future events. All would proceed, so to speak, in a straight line, and nothing in the future would be hidden from this providence which in advance would have determined everything that would be. But God who is Power [*Force*] and for whom nothing is difficult, placed in our soul a power [*force*] by which it is in our capacity to act thus or to act

otherwise, to take this path or this other one" (*The Dialogue of the Predestinate and the Reprobate*, II, p. 112 [171]).

Now this denial of God's knowledge of the future acts of humans is not to limit God. For just as God in his omnipotence cannot make a logically impossible object such as a circle with the properties of a square, so too God in his omniscience cannot know the future acts of free beings (*The Dialogue of the Predestinate and the Reprobate*, II, pp. 112 [171-172]; *Eugene and Theophilus*, pp. 153, 155 [402, 404-405]); *Liberty*, IV, 1, p. [405]). God has chosen to restrain the exercise of His power over us and so His knowledge of our future acts. God, like us, is forced to predict the future behavior of humans from conjectures based on their characters and habits (*The Problem of Knowledge*, IV, p. [62]; *The Dialogue of the Predestinate and the Reprobate*, II, pp. 135-136, 138-139 [206-207, 210]; *Diverse Thoughts*, LOC, p. [487]).<sup>83</sup> Still, God can read human hearts much more perfectly than humans, whose knowledge is limited, obscure, and full of errors, can. God can see ways in which the present will affect the future that are hidden from humans (*The Dialogue of the Predestinate and the Reprobate*, I, p. 79 [123]; II, pp. 135, 137-140 [205, 209-211]; *Liberty*, IV, 4, p. [419]).

Lequier also argues that God's gift of freedom to humans, and its limitation on His omniscience, means that God is temporal. For God, in knowing human actions, knows the past as past, the present as present, and the future as future (*The Dialogue of the Predestinate and the Reprobate*, I, p. 79 [123]; II, p. 135 [205]). Yet this denotes that God is subject to some level of duration and succession (*Liberty*, IV, 4, pp. [420, 426]). Hence God is subject to time to some degree.

Finally, Lequier draws the further implication that human freedom means that God has a real relation to creatures, and indeed is affected by them in certain ways (*The Problem of Knowledge*, V, p. [73]). Lequier proclaims:

Things ... considered in regard to their being are really some after others. This succession of things conveys, it seems, its shadow even to God, in the sense that always the same in His nature and in the perfect knowledge that He has of these things, it is necessary nevertheless that He would see them successively coming successively into being, and now there is introduced into God some semblance of succession, that is to say succession, for there is no middle point between succession and permanence. A change in God! This is an

idea which disturbs, a phrase that one does not pronounce without terror. Nevertheless, it is necessary to recognize that either God in his relationship to the world incurs a new mode of existence which participates in the nature of the world, or that this world is before God as though it did not exist. Still, to say that this world is before God as though it did not exist is not to say enough: insofar as it is not a pure nothingness, the sovereign intelligence would not be able to confuse it with nothingness, and for so little that it is, it suffices to deprive God of the integrity of whole-being [*l'intégrité du tout-être*]. It causes a stain on the absolute that destroys the absolute. This universe compared to immensity is, I readily admit, but a grain of sand; but this grain of sand has its own form of existence, and as the changes which take place there do not have less reality than the things which undergo them, God, who sees these things change, changes also in beholding them (*The Problem of Knowledge*, V, p. [74]).

Hence God is not completely unchanging as Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas held (the position now often called that of classical theism), but rather God changes in certain ways (*Abel and Abel*, pp. 31-33 [243-245]). For as humans freely will various acts, we cause changes in the world, and God who sees these things change, changes also in regard to them. Yet as things change, there is a succession of events, and if God is to know them, then He too must be subject to succession (*The Problem of Knowledge*, V, p. [74]; *Liberty*, IV, 4, p. [420-421, 426]). Still, it would be wrong to think that for Lequier God changes in any fundamental way. God has an essential nature which doesn't change; it is only the concrete states of God's being that change with humans as they act. God then is neither wholly immutable nor wholly eternal. God has a temporal aspect whereby He knows free creatures and their acts as they happen, yet God also retains a substantial self. Lequier holds then that while God "does not change in Himself, in His substantial being, in His perfection, in His own personal life," yet He does change in that He sees things change (*The Dialogue of the Predestinate and the Reprobate*, I, pp. 77-78 [120-121]; *Liberty*, IV, 4, p. [420-421, 426]).

In regard to coming to know there is a God, Lequier argues that we cannot demonstrate that God exists by purely logical means (external evidences): "one can only show the truth; admit it who wants it; as far as proving it, it is an impossible enterprise" (*Liberty*, II, 2, p. [340]). Thus Lequier considers the classical arguments for God's existence

deficient (one can have a belief in God before any proof is validated). He is especially skeptical of the ontological argument for God, i.e. that God must exist as His existence is possible, or because we have the mere idea of the infinite. For one can always deny the objective reality of any idea, or doubt that the idea of infinity has an object that corresponds to it (*Liberty*, II, 2, p. [340]; *Reflections*, LOC, pp. [469, 485-486]). Indeed the Scholastics tend to give us a God of the philosophers (an idol) rather than a God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob who is Christ, as Pascal noted (see *Abel and Abel*, Introduction, p. 19 [232]).

Instead Lequier holds that we affirm God through a combination of reason (involving inward or personal experience) and faith. We assent to God through a free act of faith, based upon a recognition of our own limitations and what they imply. In other words, we come to believe in the existence of a God as we recognize that we are limited and dependent upon an absolute being. Thus God shows Himself to our hearts as our reason for existence (and Lequier notes that He speaks to us through a multitude of symbols in the visible world) (*Abel and Abel*, p. 29 [241]; *Liberty*, I, pp. [316-317, 324-325]). Lequier writes:

And nonetheless I am responsible insofar as I am free. I cannot give an account of the powers that are in me, and yet I know that I make use of them, and that, in this exercise of my activity, I am responsible for my determinations. Everything tells me that there is another person who has the reason of His being in Himself, and towards whom I am responsible (*Liberty*, I, p. [315]).

Moreover, in regard to knowing God's nature, I can transfer the perfections of my soul (my freedom) to God: "I only know myself; it is necessary for me then to transport to this infinite person the perfections that I find in my soul, but by having care to elevate them to the infinite power. I have encountered in myself a certain principle which acts, which can [do]; but this power which is in me does not have in itself its reason for existence, whereas what I will transport to the infinite person, will have to have in itself this reason for existence" (*Liberty*, I, p. [315]). Thus God has intellect, will (power), and love, as the human does. Indeed these form the three persons of God which exist in one being who is absolute and irresponsible (*Liberty*, I, pp. [315-316, 321]; V, 1, pp. [436-437]; *Discourse on the Divine Persons*, p. [318-322]). In this way our reason can show God is triune for Lequier.

God as love is also goodness and beauty. And God calls humans to participate in His very being by love of beauty and goodness. One must have a love which gives all that it has, which is insatiable in giving, whose life is to give, and so gives without ceasing. Such a love possesses a forgiveness which outlives any fault, consummate patience, the timidity of virgins, and the audacity of heroes (*Abel and Abel*, pp. 61-62 [273]; *Diverse Thoughts*, LOC, p. [489]).

Still, philosophy is ultimately insufficient and needs faith to complete it. Faith alone tells us about the mysteries of faith of the Creation, the Fall (Original Sin), the Incarnation, and the Redemption of God. For unlike the eternal truths knowable in the order of reason, revelation gives us contingent truths (such as those issuing from the Fall of Adam and Evil) that are known through Scripture alone (*Liberty*, I, pp. [324-325]; see Papers of Lequier, ms 255 f. 18, 25, 38-46).<sup>84</sup> Ultimately the Catholic religion is a union of reason with the Catholic Creed (with faith) [though Lequier does limit reason's role more than others such as the Thomists would]. Philosophy can shed light on revealed truths (i.e. logic is useful in putting our inward experience into abstract terms), but philosophy draws its confirmation and consummation from revelation (see Papers of Lequier, ms 255 f. 18, 25, 101). Moreover, the Catholic Church is the great guardian of the aforementioned first truth of human freedom. Catholicism is a religion of liberty, its dogmas and ethics rest upon the presupposition that a free God made free humans (see Papers of Lequier, ms 252 f. 20; ms 255 f. 1-18).<sup>85</sup>

## ONTOLOGISM

*1830-1900 in Belgium, England, France,  
Italy, Switzerland, & the United States*

In his 1998 encyclical *Fides et Ratio*, Pope John Paul II surprised many by including the name of the Italian philosopher Rosmini on his list of great Christian thinkers (section 74). For the thought of Rosmini and his fellow ontologists had been earlier condemned by the Magisterium (1861 and 1887), and two of Rosmini's works had been placed on the Index of Forbidden Books (1849).

The Index of Forbidden Books, for its part, had been started at a time of renewed vigor for the Catholic Church (1557), and closely followed upon the establishment of the Roman Inquisition in 1542 (when Rome had sufficiently recovered from its sacking and the imprisonment of the Pope by Imperial troops in 1527), and the Council of Trent (1545-1563). However, by the time Rosmini was born the Catholic Church in Italy had increasingly come under attack and repression.

This decline began in the eighteenth century due to the spread into Italy of Gallicanism, Josephinism, and Enlightenment thought through continuing French influence and outright Austrian control with the signing of the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713. Hence, many Italian thinkers began to defend anti-clerical, deistic, and atheistic philosophies, such as Pietro Giannone (1676-1748), the former secular priest Antonio Genovesi (1712-1769), the Camaldolese monk Gianmaria Ortes (1713-1790), Pietro Verri (1728-1797), Cesare Bonesano, Marchese di Beccaria (1738-1794), Francesco Soave (1743-1806), Melchiorre Delfico (1744-1835), Mario Pagano (1748-1799), Gaetano Filangieri (1752-1788), the scientist Gian Domenico Romagnosi (1761-1835), Filippo Buonarroti (1761-1837), the former secular priest Melchiorre Gioja (1767-1829), Carlo Cattaneo (1801-1869), Giuseppe Mazzini (1805-1872), Giuseppe Ferrari (1812-1876), the former secular priest Cristoforo Bonavino [Ausonio Franchi] (1821-1895), the former secular priest Roberto Ardigò (1828-1920), and Andrea Angiulli

(1837-1890).<sup>86</sup> Influenced by these enlightenment ideas, several secret societies arose in Italy dedicated to the overthrow of the Catholic Church and traditional social structures such as the Adelfi Society, founded in 1805 by Buonarroti and renamed the Society of the Perfect Sublime Masters in 1818; the Carbonari, founded in 1808; and the Society of Young Italy [*La Giovine Italia*], founded in 1831 by Mazzini. Through the penetration of these ideas institutional changes began to take place.

Hence in 1741-1777 the law professor Bernardo Tanucci (1698-1783), who was the Councillor of State in the Bourbon Kingdom of Naples, enacted Gallican reforms in Naples. Tanucci required governmental approval for dissemination of papal bulls, for episcopal communication with Rome, and for admittance of new clergy and the filling of bishoprics (not unexpectedly, many sees were left vacant and their revenues confiscated by the state). Furthermore, the granting of marriage licenses became the prerogative of the state rather than the Church, tithes for churches and taxes going to the Roman Curia were abolished, thirty-eight convents were suppressed, and the Jesuits were expelled in 1767.

Following suit, the Austrian regions of Italy such as Lombardy (1757-1790) and Tuscany (1765-1792) under the rule of Grand Duke Peter Leopold enacted Josephinist reforms (the 1786 Synod of Pistoia also promulgated Josephinism). Thus in Lombardy and Tuscany the state closely supervised the operation of seminaries, schools, and universities, suppressed several monasteries and sold off church lands, and regulated the establishment and decor of churches and the institution of processions and pilgrimages.

Worse still, as we have seen, Italy was invaded by the French in 1796 who seized the papal states in 1797 (the very year Rosmini was born) and the Pope himself in 1798.<sup>87</sup> The subsequent Napoleonic policy abolished the remaining feudal privileges, suppressed the remaining monasteries and convents (such as those in Naples from 1806-1813 and in Rome in 1810), and confiscated and sold various Church properties. Napoleon even had the temerity to have another Pope, Pope Pius VII, arrested and confined to France from 1809-1814.

The Congress of Vienna in 1815 did reestablish Austrian control of Italy and restored many monasteries and convents, as well as the Papal States (additionally the Jesuits had been reestablished in 1814). Thus the Catholic Church regained much of its power. Yet this resurgence

of the Church was to be short-lived as Italy entered into the turbulent process of its own Risorgimento [Resurgence] (1815-1871) involving the unification of the Italian states and rule. First an early series of revolts – 1821 in Naples, Piedmont, Palermo, Sicily, and Turin, and 1831 in Bologna, Modena, Parma, and the Papal States – shook the prestige of the Church. Then the revolt of 1848 in Milan, Naples, Palermo, Piedmont, Tuscany, and Venice led to the assassination of the minister of the papal states, Pellegrino Rossi (1787-1848), and the flight from Rome of a disguised Pope Pius IX as revolutionary forces occupied the city (this time the French restored the Pope to Rome shortly thereafter).

Moreover, Piedmont now imitated the example of the earlier states and embarked upon its own enlightenment path with the expulsion of the Jesuits in 1848, the imprisonment of the Archbishops of Turin and Sassari in 1849, and the state assumption of control of all legal jurisdiction (the Siccardi Laws of 1850), theological education (1851) and civil marriages (1852). Subsequently, owing to the influence of Massimo D'Azeglio (1798-1866), Count Camillo Benso di Cavour (1810-1861), and Urbano Rattazzi (1808-1873), in 1855-1867, over three-hundred monasteries and convents (except those involved in teaching, preaching, and helping the poor) were closed and their lands sold.

Italy was finally unified in 1861 which led to the eventual loss of the Papal States in 1861 and 1871 (with the resulting secularization of more church land and the implementation of taxes on ecclesiastical properties), and the suppression of theological faculties in the universities (1873). This caused Pope Pius IX to issue his *Non expedit* denouncing the Italian state and urging Catholics not to participate in political elections (which in turn led to several decades of tense church-state relations in Italy). Indeed in 1887 religious instruction was prohibited in primary schools and in 1889 a statue of Giordano Bruno (1548-1600), a philosopher killed by the Roman Inquisition, was erected in the Campo de' Fiori (thanks to Francesco Crispi (1819-1901) who was prime minister).

Ontologism was the movement spawned in Italy, the center of Catholicism, under the influence of Augustine and Kant, in response to the aforementioned political and philosophical crises facing Italy and Catholicism during the nineteenth century.<sup>88</sup> Ontologism is the view that all humans can acquire a direct vision of God (or a component of

God) in this life. Indeed not only can all humans acquire this direct vision or immediate intuition of God while on earth, assert the ontologists, but to some degree all humans have a direction vision of God, as without it knowledge of any kind is impossible. This is because the first idea present to the human mind, upon which all other knowledge depends, is an intuition of pure being (considered by ontologists to be either God Himself or a component or appendage of God present to our minds). And this knowledge of pure being is not derived from sense-perception but is instead directly implanted in human souls by God at the moment of their creation. Accordingly the ontologists were fond of developing *a priori* proofs for God's existence based on their assertion that all humans have an innate knowledge of God (or an appendage of God) which they only have to acknowledge in order to see that God exists.

The founder of ontologism was **Fr. Antonio Rosmini-Serbati (1797-1855)**.<sup>89</sup> Rosmini was born in 1797 in Rovereto, Trentino, Italy (then ruled by Austria) to a family of wealthy nobles. Accordingly Rosmini received a private education in philosophy through a local priest from 1814 to 1816, at which point he went off to the University of Padua where he completed his studies in 1819 (he also inherited a large sum of money in 1820 which he used to help fund various charities and his future religious institution). Deciding to become a priest, Rosmini was ordained in 1821 and received his doctorates in theology and canon law from Padua in 1822. Among the early endeavors of this ambitious young priest was the formation of a clerical group dedicated to studying the thought of Thomas Aquinas (1823 to 1825) and a failed attempt to edit an encyclopedia countering the one produced by the French enlightenment thinkers. Rosmini then moved to Milan in 1826 where he served as a canon at the Milan cathedral and began to write his philosophical works. In 1828 Rosmini took up residence at the abandoned monastery of Mount Calvary (Monte Calvario) in Domodossola, Piedmont, Italy where he founded the religious congregation Institute of Charity (formally approved in 1839) and also helped to establish the Sisters of Providence in 1833. He was offered chairs of ethics at Pisa in 1840 and Padua in 1848 but refused them, choosing instead to lead his religious congregation.

With the 1848 revolution, Rosmini was swept up into Italian politics and he moved to Rome where he served as an envoy for the Piedmont government and a Consulter of the Holy Office and Index.

Rosmini, as a supporter of Neo-Guelphism, tried to create a united confederation of Italian states under the rule of the Pope (and free of the yoke of Austria). When the revolution turned violent in 1848 Rosmini (and Pope Pius IX in disguise) fled Rome to Gaeta and then to Naples, finally settling in Stresa, Piedmont, Italy where he died in 1855.<sup>90</sup> Rosmini's body reposes at the Church of the Santissimo Crocifisso in Stresa where there is an International Centre of Rosminian Studies (there is also a Collegio Mellerio Rosmini in Domodossola).

In 1829 Pope Pius VIII suggested to Rosmini that God's purpose for him was the renewal of Catholic philosophy, a task to which Rosmini dedicated his life, publishing his key work *New Essay on the Origin of Ideas* [*Nuovo saggio sull'origine delle idee*], 4 vols. (1830) wherein, under the influence of Plato, Augustine, Bonaventure, Ficino, Malebranche, Gerdil, and Kant, he defends ontologism.<sup>91</sup>

Rosmini, in his book *New Essay on the Origin of Ideas* (especially Volume 2) asks the question of where our ideas originate (*New Essay on the Origin of Ideas*, I, Preface, 7-8; II, v, 385). He argues that our ideas cannot originate wholly from our senses, nor from our own mind (*New Essay on the Origin of Ideas*, I, Preface, 3; I, iii:1, 52-54; I, iv:4, 366-384; II, v, 385). Rather, our ideas must in some manner be innate and implanted in us by God. As Rosmini states "If we do not admit that the human spirit possesses of itself some innate natural intellectual element ... our spirit would never begin to think and therefore never form ideas" (*New Essay on the Origin of Ideas*, II, v, 389, p. 4). In the end, Rosmini claims that all of our innate ideas are reducible to a single idea which lies at the root of all knowledge, the innate idea of being [*l'idea di essere*] (*New Essay on the Origin of Ideas*, I, iv:4, 368-384; II, v, 395; III, ii:1, 1065; III, v:2, 1374; III, vii:4, 1438-1445; III, vii:6, 1454-1455). This is the conception of being in its most universal state, i.e. as possible undetermined being (*New Essay on the Origin of Ideas*, II, v:1:2, 409; II, v:1:3, 416-417) [Rosmini often calls this the ideal being (*l'essere ideale*) present to our minds, as opposed to the real being existing in reality]. As Rosmini puts it: "In its primal, original state, the formal part of knowledge consists in a single, natural, and, in us, permanent intuition of possible being" (*New Essay on the Origin of Ideas*, II, v, 396, p. 7; cf. I, iv:4, 379).

Rosmini's claim then is that all thought relies upon the presence of an innate idea of being in the human soul. For if we take any object of thought and abstract away its qualities, the last one remaining is its ex-

istence; and if we abstract away its existence then we have no thought at all. Accordingly, all knowledge depends upon the human possession of the innate idea of being (*New Essay on the Origin of Ideas*, I, Preface, 8, 13; II:v:1:3, 467; II, v:2:5, 552-553, 556; II, vi:2, 1033; III, iv:1, 1245-1246). Rosmini explains:

The most universal idea of all, therefore, which is also the last abstraction, is possible being; we can call it simply idea of being. ... We cannot think of anything without the idea of being. Indeed we can have no knowledge or thought separate from the idea of being. Existence is the most common, universal quality of all. ... Take any object you wish. First, abstract its particular qualities, then its less common qualities, then its more common qualities and so on. In the end, the last quality will be existence, by means of which you can still think something, an *ens*, but without its mode of existence; the object of your thought is a perfectly undetermined something, unknown as regards its qualities, an *x*. But it is something because existence, although undetermined, remains; it is not nothing, because nothing has no existence, not even possible existence. Either you are thinking that an *ens* [being] exists, or can exist, with all the qualities necessary for its existence, although these remain unknown to you, or you are not thinking of them. Nevertheless what you are thinking is indeed an idea, although totally undetermined. If you finally take away being, the most universal of all qualities, nothing is left in your mind; all thought has disappeared and along with it any idea of the *ens* [being]. ... The idea of being, therefore, is the most universal idea, and remains after the last possible abstraction; without it, all thinking ceases and all other ideas are impossible (*New Essay on the Origin of Ideas*, II, v:1:2, 409-411, pp. 16-17).

Now what are the characteristics of this innate idea of being? According to Rosmini being has nine qualities: 1) objectivity (being is thought of as it is in itself, as existing, and not in relation to other things); 2) possibility or ideality (in conceiving being we have an intuition of the possibility of things); 3) simplicity (being as an idea does not possess an extension); 4) unity or identity (being is one); 5) universality or infinity (being can apply to an unlimited number of real things); 6) necessity (being as possible cannot be thought not to be); 7) immutability (being cannot be thought of by our mind in any other way than it is); 8) eternity (our mind cannot think of a time in which possible being would not be what it is); 9) undetermination (being can apply

to any species or genus) (*New Essay on the Origin of Ideas*, II, v:1:3, 415-437).

Given these properties of being, it is clear, says Rosmini, that our ideas of things (and especially our idea of being) cannot come wholly from the senses or from ourselves. For the qualities of objects discovered by the senses, as well as our own being, are the exact opposite of this idea of being. Such objects are relative (related to humans and so subjective); subsistent or real; extended and material; multiple; particular; contingent (they may not be); changing; passing; and determined (*New Essay on the Origin of Ideas*, II, v:1:3, 415-437, 464, 466). Hence the idea of being (the precondition of all knowledge) is given to us directly by God; it is an innate idea, the light of reason, God implants in us.

Rosmini, under the influence of Kant, accordingly claims that knowledge of the world arises from two sources: the senses (matter) which provide felt sensations, and the intellect (form) through which we grasp ideas implanted in our intellect by God (*New Essay on the Origin of Ideas*, II, v, 393-394; III, vii:5, 1450; cf. *Philosophical System*, 163-168). Rosmini calls this process intellectual perception (*percezione intellettuale*) wherein we use reason to take what we feel with our senses and combine this with the idea of indeterminate being (*l'essere indeterminato*) that we intuit with our intellect. In so doing we form the judgment that a being with its particular determinations subsists, that is we judge that a being with its particular determinations is acting upon us to cause the particular sensations that we feel. In intellectual perception then the idea of being (form) intuited by our intellect becomes clothed with the various determinations felt by our sensation (matter) and we judge that this being is real or subsistent.<sup>92</sup> For example we have the idea of a possibly existing thing which we determine by means of weight, shape, size, color and arrive at the judgment that a soccer ball exists (*New Essay on the Origin of Ideas*, II, v:1:2, 406; v:1:3, 419-420, 454-459, II, v:2:1, 475-476; II, v:2:2, 480-482; II, v:2:3, 491, 495; II, v:2:4, 530, 535-536; II, v:2, 690; III, v:6, 1225-1228; III, viii:3, 1468-1472; cf. *Principles of Moral Science*, I, 7).

... intellectual perception is composed of three parts: 1. sensation, in which particular sensible qualities ... are terms of our sensory capacities ... 2. the idea of existence in all its universality ... 3. judgment, the relationship between sensation and the idea of existence, in which existence, known in the idea (predicate), is attributed to the

force acting in the sensations and drawing them together in an *ens* [being]. ... First, the idea of being must be present; this is followed by sensation; finally, judgment, by joining the idea of being and sensation, generates the perception of the existence of bodies. Such perception is simply the application of existence (a quasi-predicate) to bodily agents which, in the self-same application, become objects. ... Moreover, careful observation of these terms of judgment will show that the idea of being must precede sensation. Most obviously of all, we see on reflection that the idea of being must be present in all our ideas, and therefore in all our judgments (*New Essay on the Origin of Ideas*, II, v:1:3, 454-455, pp. 40-41).

We receive the matter of our cognitions from sensations. This matter is not itself knowledge, but becomes such when form, being, is added to it. This means that our spirit, simultaneously sensitive and intellective, considers what it feels with its sense in relationship to being, which it sees with its intellect and then discovers in what it feels something (an *ens* [being]) that acts upon it. We have defined intellect as the faculty of seeing undetermined being, and reason as the faculty of reasoning and hence primarily of applying being to sensations. Reason sees *ens* [being] determined to a mode offered by the sensations, and unites form to the matter of cognitions (*New Essay on the Origin of Ideas*, II, v:2:2, 480-481, p. 57).

As Rosmini has it, knowledge of the world occurs in humans through a process of intellective perception which is a vision of the relationship between the idea of being, grasped by the intellect, and what is perceived by the senses (I, iv:3, 363). Moreover, as our knowledge comes from both the senses and the intellect, much of our knowledge is purely *a priori* as it is based on universal principles implicit in our idea of being. Indeed from reflection upon our idea of being alone, says Rosmini, humans can derive several significant first principles (i.e. other general ideas). These are the principles of knowledge (the object of thought is being), contradiction (that which is cannot not be; i.e. being cannot be thought of, at the same time, as non-being), substance (accidents cannot be thought of without a substance), and cause (a new entity cannot be thought of without a cause; i.e. every happening has a cause that produces it, for what does not exist cannot act) [as well as the additional principles of justice and beauty] (*New Essay on the Origin of Ideas*, II, iii:1-2, 558-574; II, iv:2, 583-607, 615-622, 629; III, ii, 3, 1136).<sup>93</sup>

So too we can come to know the existence of God through reflection on the idea of being.<sup>94</sup> Hence for Rosmini philosophy is a preparation for theology as it prepares the way for faith (*New Essay on the Origin of Ideas*, I, Preface, 13). Somewhat surprisingly, Rosmini does accept some of the traditional *a posteriori* arguments for God's existence, such as the argument from contingency. His argument proceeds along the lines that the natural objects found in the universe have being but they are not being themselves; rather their being is received or added to them. This has the implication that they must receive their being from whatever (whoever) is being and this is God (*New Essay on the Origin of Ideas*, III, iii:5, 1212). Yet Rosmini expends most of his energy in developing an *a priori* proof for Gods' existence based upon reflection on our idea of being.<sup>95</sup>

Rosmini begins his *a priori* proof for God by reasserting that humans have an idea of being wherein being is absolutely unchangeable, eternal, and necessary (being also is forcefully present to our minds). Once this is recognized, it becomes obvious that the idea of being cannot have been produced by us or indeed by any finite cause. Instead the idea of being must originate from an infinite and eternal intelligence who implants it in our minds (*New Essay on the Origin of Ideas*, III, vii:7, 1457-1460). Here is his proof produced at greater length:

But I would go further and say that with the idea of being as our sole datum, we can elaborate a rigorous and extremely solid demonstration of the existence of God, which would therefore be an *a priori* demonstration in the sense in which we have defined it. ...

Being in all its universality, thought naturally by the human mind, is of such a nature, we said, that on the one hand, it shows no subsistence outside the mind and can therefore be called logical being. On the other hand, it cannot be a modification of our spirit. In fact, its authority is such that our spirit is entirely subject to it. We are conscious to ourselves that we can do nothing against being, and cannot change it in any way whatsoever. Moreover, it is absolutely unchangeable; it is the knowable act of all things, the fount of all cognitions. It has nothing contingent, and in this sense it is not like us. It is a light that we perceive naturally, but which rules, conquers and ennobles us by submitting us entirely to itself.

Again, although we can, if we wish, think that we might not be, it would be impossible to think that being in all its universality,

that is, possibility, truth, might not be. Prior to me, what is true was true, nor is it possible for there to be a time when it could be otherwise. Yet truth is certainly not nothing. Nothing does not bind me; it does not oblige me to pronounce anything. But the nature of truth which shines within me, obliges me to say: 'This is', and even if I did not wish to make this statement, I would know that the thing would be in spite of me.

Truth, being, possibility presents itself to me as an eternal, necessary nature, and such that against it no power whatsoever can prevail. We cannot even conceive a power that can abolish truth. Nevertheless, we do not see how this truth subsists in itself, although we do feel its unconquerable force and the energy that it demonstrates within us as it subjects our own and all other minds to its gentle dominion, a fact without possibility of opposition.

This fact of truth, which stands before me and constitutes my intellectual light, tells me: 1. that there is an effect in me that cannot be produced either by myself or by a finite cause; 2. that this effect is the intuition of an object present to me as intrinsically necessary, immutable, and independent of my own mind and of every finite mind.

These two elements lead me by two ways to the knowledge of the existence of God. If I apply to the first element the principle of cause, I must conclude: 'A cause exists that manifests an infinite power; this cause must, therefore, be infinite.' Considering the second, I see that if the cause which manifests an infinite power were to reveal itself, it would still be that same object of my mind which now presents itself as having existence in my mind alone. And so I conclude: 'The nature of this infinite cause is to subsist in a mind, that is, to be essentially intelligible. But if it must subsist in a mind, this mind must be eternally intelligent.'

When I compare this infinite cause with the definition of 'accident', I find that it cannot be just an accident, or generally speaking, a simple appurtenance of a substance, as it would appear if it were a purely mental object, and I conclude: 'An eternal mind exists which has the property of being *per se* intelligible, and of communicating intelligibility to other subjects, and as such is the cause of the infinite power manifested to minds and of all our cognitions'" (*New Essay on the Origin of Ideas*, III, vii:7, 1457-1459, pp. 305-307).

Rosmini thus proclaims that God's existence can be known by all humans if they but reflect upon the idea of eternal, necessary, and unchanging being present in their minds. Still, Rosmini clearly asserts that the idea of being present in our minds is not God Himself. For the idea of being is ideal (possible) and undetermined whereas God is a real and determined infinite being (*New Essay on the Origin of Ideas*, II, vi:2, 1033; cf. Preamble to the Ideological Works, Appendix 35 in *A New Essay concerning the Origin of Ideas*, I, 13-19, pp. 416-421; *Theodicy*, I, 55-60, 75-79, 86; cf. *Psychology*, I, ii:11, 235-246). Rosmini consequently calls the idea of being an appurtenance or appendage of God as we have seen in the quote above. That is to say, God is "an absolute subsistence of which initial being is a mental appurtenance" (*New Essay on the Origin of Ideas*, III, vii:7, 1460, p. 308); so our idea of being is an accidental property of God's substance given to our minds (*New Essay on the Origin of Ideas*, III, vii:7, 1459).<sup>96</sup>

While humans can know God through the idea of being, says Rosmini, our knowledge of God is still very imperfect on earth, and at best we can have a distant analogy of God as being an intelligent spirit like humans (though God is unlike humans in being infinite and intelligible through Himself), as cause of the universe, and as the supreme good (i.e. good, just, and perfect). In the end, the essence of God remains unknowable to humans on earth: we can know that God exists but not what God is like. For God contains all perfections in a simple unity and nothing like this can be found in nature (*New Essay on the Origin of Ideas*, III, iii:5, 1237-1241; cf. *Philosophical System*, 176-182). Consequently, philosophy points out the need for revelation and motivates us to seek it out in order to perfect our limited knowledge of God. For a supernatural revelation of God, embraced through faith, can render human reflection certain and remove its errors (*New Essay on the Origin of Ideas*, III, v:2, 1376; cf. III, Appendix, 9, 1238). In fact revelation teaches us that God, in God's positive reality, is one substance with three persons (the triad of ideal being, subsistent being, and moral being giving us an image of the Trinity). Revelation thus goes beyond philosophy in showing us that God is a personal being, and is our ultimate end and happiness.

While the degree of anti-Catholicism that arose in the 1700s in France, "the eldest daughter of the Church," and Italy, "the home of the Pope," was quite surprising, this could not be said to be the case in the United States of America. From the very beginning the United States

was a Protestant country,<sup>97</sup> and in the Colonial Period (c. 1600-1775) several colonies passed laws that discriminated against Catholics.

Thus we find that the colonies of Connecticut (1639-1818), Georgia (1777-1789), Maryland (1692-1776), Massachusetts (1780-1821), New Hampshire (1696-1877), New Jersey (1776-1844), New York (1776-1806), North Carolina (1776-1836), Pennsylvania (1693-1775), Rhode Island (1719-1783), and Vermont (1777-1786) prohibited Catholics from holding civil office (typically by proscribing a Test Oath whereby a candidate for government had to swear he did not serve any foreign power, i.e. the Pope, or to deny the doctrine of transubstantiation), and often also from serving as lawyers or teachers. Some colonies went further such as Georgia (1732-1777), Maryland (1654-1660, 1692-1776),<sup>98</sup> Massachusetts (1631-1780), New Jersey (1698-1776), North Carolina (1669-1776), South Carolina (1697-1776), and Virginia (1642-1776), and prohibited Catholics, i.e. "Papists," from practicing their religion (the colony of Maryland manifested the interesting procedure of allowing Catholics to worship but taxing them double from 1756-1776). Indeed although with the Declaration of Independence (1776) and the Constitution (1787) freedom of religion was finally recognized, it was only in the 1820s that the last of these anti-Catholic laws were finally phased out [1789 in Georgia, 1818 in Connecticut; 1820 in Maine, 1831 in Delaware]. Indeed only in 1775 did George Washington suppress the anti-Catholic holiday of Pope Day (Guy Fawkes Day) where an effigy of the Pope was burned and anti-Catholic songs were sung in Massachusetts and elsewhere.<sup>99</sup>

This persecution gradually dissipated after the revolution of 1776 but returned again from 1830-1860 with the rise in Catholic immigration from Ireland, Italy, Germany, and elsewhere. Thus in 1830-1845 the Native American Association flourished whose stated goal was to keep America safe from the foreign influence of Catholicism.<sup>100</sup> The Nativists were supported by such journals as the *American Protestant Vindicator* (1834-1842) and such authors as Samuel Morse [the inventor of the Morse code] in his *Foreign Conspiracy against the Liberties of the United States* (1834), Rebecca Reed in her *Six Months in a Convent* (1836), and Maria Monk in her *The Awful Disclosures of Maria Monk* (1836).<sup>101</sup> Indeed, with the Irish Famine (1845-1852) over a million Catholic Irish came to the United States causing great fear and resentment and anti-Irish hostility (as one Catholic Newspaper

had it, the Declaration of Independence established the rights to "Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Irishmen." This led to the rise of the American and Foreign Christian Union (1848) and the Know-Nothing Party (c. 1850-1860) who wanted to limit the influence of Catholicism in America by voting exclusively for native-born Protestant government officials. In fact, members of the Know-Nothing Party took control of the governorships of Connecticut (1855), New Hampshire (1855), and Rhode Island (1855), and the mayorships of Pittsburgh (1850), Boston (1854), and Baltimore (1854). Along with the Know-Nothings, Catholics were additionally criticized and mocked in the 1850s by such authors as Josephine Bunkley in her *The Testimony of an Escaped Novice* (1855), James Chapman in his *Americanism versus Romanism* (1856), and the cartoonist Thomas Nast (1840-1902) in *Harper's Weekly* (1859-1886).

Moreover, during this period there were several ugly anti-Catholic riots in the United States. Protestant rioters destroyed Irish houses in Massachusetts in 1825; in 1834 Lyman Beecher (1775-1865) gave anti-Catholic speeches in Boston and shortly thereafter the Ursuline Convent of Charlestown, Massachusetts was burned down; and in 1837 there were Broad Street Riots between the Yankees and Irish in Boston. With the arrival of the aforementioned Know-Nothing Party things grew even worse and in 1844 there were anti-Catholic Riots in New York and in Kensington, Philadelphia (in which two Catholic churches and two convents were set on fire, Catholic instructors were fired, and 13-40 people were killed and 50-100 injured); in 1844 Catholic churches were set ablaze in Pittsburgh; in 1854 Catholic churches were destroyed in Dorchester, Massachusetts and Bath, Maine, the Jesuit John Bapst (1815-1887) was tarred and feathered at Ellsworth, Maine, and an Orangemen parade in Newark, New Jersey resulted in a riot that destroyed a Catholic church as well as a factory utilized by Irish and German workers, and led to the death of two Irishmen; in 1855 the Know-Nothings held an inspection of a convent in Providence, Rhode Island, tried to burn down a church in Williamsburg, Brooklyn, destroyed 12 Irish houses in New York, and also took control of the polls in Louisville, Kentucky and prevented Irish and German Catholics from voting (leading to a riot in which 22 people were killed); finally in 1856 the Catholic Church in Ellsworth, Maine was burned down and there were Know-Nothing riots in Baltimore, and one year later in 1857 in Washington, D.C.<sup>102</sup>

After Catholics showed themselves to be true patriots during the Civil War (1861-1865), anti-Catholicism died down in the United States. Although it resurfaced briefly in 1870-1897 with the Peace Policy of Ulysses Grant (1870-1884) that turned many Catholic missions over to Protestants; with the failed attempt in 1871 to amend the first article of the Constitution to prevent the establishment of any foreign hierarchical powers in the United States; with the establishment of the American Protective Association (1887-1897) whose members pledged not to vote for a Catholic; with the formation of the National League for the Protection of American Institutions (1889) which tried to deny government funds to Catholic schools and charities; and with the rise of the Anti-Saloon League (1893-1933) who wanted to limit the use of alcohol in the United States including at Catholic masses.

It was in the midst of this anti-Catholicism that, to the great surprise of many, ontologism came to be accepted by the convert and first great American Catholic philosopher, **Orestes Augustus Brownson (1803-1876)**.<sup>103</sup> Brownson was born in Stockbridge, Vermont in 1803. His father died when he was a child and Brownson lived with guardians in Royalton, Vermont for a number of years. In 1817 Brownson rejoined his mother in Ballston Spa, New York where he attended a local academy and studied Greek and Latin (he later taught himself French, German, Italian, and Spanish) and worked as a printer's apprentice. Brownson's early religious views were very transient (he was nicknamed the "weathercock" as his views were "changing with every moon")<sup>104</sup> and he went from being a Congregationalist as a youth [influenced by his guardians] to a Presbyterian in 1822 [whereupon he taught in Stillwater, New York in 1823 and in Springwells, Michigan near Detroit in 1824], to a Universalist in 1825. Brownson finally achieved some stability and was ordained a Universalist minister in 1826, married Sally Healy in 1827, and preached at various congregations in Litchfield, Connecticut; Auburn, Elbridge, Geneva, and Ithaca, New York; and parts of New Hampshire and Vermont. It was at this time that Brownson began his career as an editor for the *Gospel Advocate* from 1827 to 1829. As a Universalist Brownson argued in his preaching and writing that the key to serving God is to be honest, kind, provide for oneself and one's family, and cultivate one's mental powers.

Brownson abandoned Christianity in 1829 (through the influence of David Hume) and became an agnostic socialist and a Freemason [as a socialist Brownson joined the Workingmen's Party movement of Robert Dale Owen and Fanny Wright in New York City and became an associate editor of their journals the *Free Enquirer* and *The Daily Sentinel* from 1830-1832 – he also edited his own journal, *The Philanthropist*, from 1831-1832].

Brownson though, weathercock that he was, again switched religion, and returned to Christianity becoming a Unitarian in 1832 (soon thereafter, in 1833, he embraced the eclectic philosophy of Victor Cousin – the same Cousin who later tried to acquire a position for Brownson at Harvard in 1838 but was ultimately unsuccessful). Brownson began preaching as a Unitarian first in Walpole, New Hampshire, then in 1834 at Canton, Massachusetts, and finally he moved to Chelsea, Massachusetts near Boston in 1836. Brownson soon found sympathetic minds in the Transcendentalists (i.e. Ralph Waldo Emerson, Bronson Alcott, George Ripley, etc.) whom he joined in Boston and at Brook Farm (post 1841 where he sent his son to live for a while), taught at the Boston Lyceum and various Freemason Lodges, and also began his own religious organization, The Society for Christian Union and Progress. Brownson achieved much success in Boston and served as Steward of the United States Marine Hospital in Chelsea from 1837-1841 and in 1838 founded *The Boston Quarterly Review* (this review was merged with *The U.S. Magazine and Democratic Review of New York* in 1842). It was also during these years that Brownson came to embrace ontologism (c. 1842; becoming a follower of Gioberti in 1849).

Finally, in 1844, Brownson converted to Catholicism and founded *Brownson's Quarterly Review* [BQR] (which he edited from 1844-1864 and 1873-1875). In 1853 Brownson was even invited by John Henry Newman to teach at the new Catholic University at Dublin but his name was eventually withdrawn due to opposition to his thought. In 1855 Brownson moved to New York and then in 1857 to Elizabeth, New Jersey, both moves were apparently made to escape the supervision of the local Catholic bishops (Brownson's works were referred to the Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith in 1858 and examined by the Thomist Johann Baptist Franzelin (1816-1886) who exonerated him of heresy in 1861). Still, Brownson was attacked by Bishop John Hughes of New York following commencement ad-

dresses he gave at Fordham University in 1856 and 1861 (Bishop Hughes promised to never attack Brownson again after Brownson wrote a piece correcting the views of the bishop on slavery; Brownson was also criticized by Bishop Michael O'Connor of Pittsburgh, Bishop John Purcell of Cincinnati, and Bishop James Woods of Philadelphia). Brownson ran for Congress in 1862 as a Republican of New Jersey but was not elected. By this point Brownson's influence began to wane and hence, due to lack of subscribers, Brownson temporarily ceased publishing his *Review* and became a lecturer at Seton Hall University in South Orange, New Jersey in 1864-1866. He died in 1876 in Detroit, Michigan. Brownson's remains reside at the Sacred Heart Church (Brownson Memorial Chapel) at the University of Notre Dame. A statue was erected in Brownson's honor in 1910 in Riverside Park [Sherman Park Square] in the city of New York. Sadly, after the bust of Brownson had been knocked over by vandals in 1937, no one in the city knew of whom the figure on the statue was.<sup>105</sup> Fortunately, Brownson's name is well-known today as the greatest of the American Catholic philosophers and indeed an Orestes Brownson Society was founded in 2002.

Orestes Brownson's ontologist philosophy was set forth in numerous essays he wrote for various journals, including *Catholic World* and his own *Brownson's Quarterly Review*;<sup>106</sup> however, Brownson did write one extended work of philosophy *An Essay in Refutation of Atheism* (1873-1874).<sup>107</sup> Brownson's stated goal in this work is to refute the many living atheists and so answer the key question 'God or no God?' in the positive (see *An Essay in Refutation of Atheism*, pp. 1, 3-4, 32). Brownson accomplishes this task by setting forth an ontologist epistemology, under the influence of Plato, Augustine, Malebranche, Kant, Cousin, and Gioberti, and establishing that humans can intuit God while on earth.

A properly philosophical account of the foundations of knowledge, says Brownson, must begin with an examination of consciousness, i.e. thought. Now when we analyze thought we find that all thought contains a subject, an object, and their relation (*An Essay in Refutation of Atheism*, pp. 19, 41-42; cf. BW I, p. 58; BW II, pp. 310, 495). All three are necessary for knowledge to occur: "Remove the subject, and there is no thought, for there evidently can be no thought where there is no thinker; remove the object, and there is equally no thought, for to think nothing is simply not to think; and finally, deny the relation

of the subject and object, and you also deny all thought, for certainly the soul cannot apprehend an object or an object be presented to the soul with no relation between them" (*An Essay in Refutation of Atheism*, p. 42).

Moreover, the analysis of thought reveals that Kant was correct in asserting that knowledge involves both an *a posteriori* or empirical element (given by the senses) as well as an *a priori* or ideal element (intuited by the mind); for without *a priori* cognition there can be no *a posteriori* cognition (see *An Essay in Refutation of Atheism*, pp. vi, 25-26, 47-50, 62; cf. "Kant's Critique of Pure Reason," 1844, BW I, pp. 186-188, 210-213; "The Giobertian Philosophy," 1864, BW II, pp. 233-235, 248; see also BW I, pp. 67-71, 120-129, 288-290, 312-313, 372-373, 388-389, 508-510; BW II, pp. 454-457). Brownson observes: "Obviously then the principles of philosophy and of reality are *a priori*, and precede both the science and the reality that depends on them, or of which they are principles. They must, then, be given, and neither created nor obtained by the mind's own activity, for without them the mind can neither operate nor even exist. The great error of the dominant philosophy of our times is in the assumption that the mind starts without principles, and finds them or obtains them by its own activity or its own painful exertions. Hence it places method before principles, which is no less absurd than to suppose that the mind, the soul, generates or creates itself. Principles are given, not found by the mind operating without principles. They are given in the fact which we call thought, and we ascertain what they are only by a diligent and careful analysis of thought" (*An Essay in Refutation of Atheism*, p. 41).

Kant also correctly noted that the *a priori* principles occurring in thought are closely interconnected with *a posteriori* experiences: "The ideal is really given in intuition, but not by itself alone; it is given in the empirical fact as its *a priori* condition, and is distinctly held only as separated from it, by reflection" (*An Essay in Refutation of Atheism*, pp. 52-53; cf. 54-55, 74).

Yet Kant was wrong to think that the *a priori* principles of thought are created by the subject; in so doing he gave us a science of empty forms and not of things (*An Essay in Refutation of Atheism*, pp. 20, 46). Consequently Brownson exhorts against Kant that the mental categories are objective: "The question to be settled is, Is the ideal, without which no fact of experience is possible, on the side of the object, or on the side of the subject? Kant places it on the side of the subject,

and subjects the object to the laws of the soul; we place it on the side of the object, and hold that it is that without which the object is not intelligible, and therefore no object at all. Hence we maintain that the object of thought is not a simple unit, but consists of three inseparable elements, the ideal, the empirical, and their relation" (*An Essay in Refutation of Atheism*, pp. 51-52, cf. pp. 53, 75). Moreover, the object given in intuition is the active cause of our cognition and hence the objects of our thought must be real as what is not real cannot act (*An Essay in Refutation of Atheism*, pp. 19, 23, 43-44, 47): "It is the fact that the object actively concurs in the production of thought that establishes its reality, since what is not, or has no real existence, cannot act, cannot present or affirm itself" (*An Essay in Refutation of Atheism*, p. 44; cf. "An A Priori Autobiography," 1850, BW I, p. 250; "Ontologism and Psychologism," 1874, BW II, p. 483; see also BW I, p. 376; BW II, pp. 258, 302, 391, 450, 454-455, 458, 510-511; BW V, p. 153). In other words, the soul cannot act (or know itself for that matter) without an object being placed in relationship with it; hence the object is presented to the soul and not created by it (*An Essay in Refutation of Atheism*, pp. 44-45, 47, 65).

Brownson opines then that once we have properly analyzed the nature of thought and shown that all thought involves a subject, object, and their relation, we can at the same time establish the objectivity of knowledge. He puts it thusly: "The analysis of thought, as we have just seen, discloses a non-psychical or an ontological element, and shows that in every thought there is an object distinct from and independent of the subject, and that in every intuitive thought the object affirms or presents itself by its own activity. This at one stroke establishes the reality of the object and the validity of our science or knowledge" (*An Essay in Refutation of Atheism*, p. 46; cf. pp. 47, 59-60, 62-63, 65, 75). So while for Brownson knowledge requires the intuition of a *a priori* principles in addition to a *posteriori* experiences given through the senses, both of these sources of knowledge reveal objective realities (*An Essay in Refutation of Atheism*, p. 48; cf. "An Old Quarrel," 1867, BW II, pp. 295-296, 299-303; "Kant's Critique of Pure Reason," 1844, BW I, pp. 167-176, 186-190, 200-203, 206-213; see BW I, pp. 311-312; BW II, pp. 402, 474-475, 523; BW V, p. 136).

Brownson further claims that when we analyze our thought – consisting of the subject, object, and their relation, or, as we have seen, the *a priori* ideal, the *a posteriori* empirical, and their relation – we find

that the ideal *a priori* element of knowledge, which we intuit, can itself be broken down into the triad of the necessary (being), the contingent (existences), and their relation (*An Essay in Refutation of Atheism*, pp. 51-52, 56, 61). Once again, says Brownson, knowledge requires all three elements of the intuited ideal: necessity, contingency, and their relation. Our knowledge of contingent existences is impossible without a cognition of necessary being [which Brownson also calls real being]. For as Brownson sees it, contingent beings “are not cognizable without intuition of the real and necessary or independent being which creates them. Contingency or dependence expresses a relation, but relations are cognizable only in the related, and only when both terms of the relation are given. Neither term can be inferred from the other, for neither can be thought without the other. Hence there is no intuition of the contingent without intuition of necessary, or empirical intuition without ideal intuition” (*An Essay in Refutation of Atheism*, p. 50).<sup>108</sup>

Now this is merely to say in different words that humans have an intellectual intuition of God in every act of knowledge (*An Essay in Refutation of Atheism*, p. 99; cf. “An *A Priori* Autobiography,” 1850, BW I, pp. 247-251; “The Existence of God,” 1852, BW I, pp. 257, 262, 267-270, 274-275; see also BW I, pp. 296-297, 304, 320, 336-337, 346-351, 370, 442, 454, 477; BW II, pp. 149, 437-438, 527; BW III, pp. 26-29, 130, 533-534, 583; BW V, pp. 129, 137-138; BW XIV, pp. 355-358). Indeed, God is “immanent as first cause in all creatures and in every act of every creature” (*The American Republic*, 1866, p. 67; cf. BW I, p. 269; BW II, pp. 260-261). Among several possible choices, let us reproduce the following statements of Brownson to this effect:

We find that in every act of intelligence there is apprehension of real being, and it is only in virtue of such apprehension that there is any actual intelligence at all. But this apprehension is immediate, intuitive, not discursive, by virtue of a prior act of intelligence, or a previous apprehension, because without it there is no apprehension, and no intellectual act at all. As certain, then, as it is that there is intelligence at all, so certain is it that in the first, as in the last, act of intelligence there is intuition of being, and of real being. It is equally certain that this real being is necessary and eternal being, and therefore God (“The Existence of God,” 1852, BW I, p. 268).<sup>109</sup>

... we deny that we can have immediate intuition of existences as existences without immediate intuition of God. What is not is not intelligible, and what is not intelligible cannot be known. Exis-

tences, therefore, cannot be immediately revealed to us in intuition without God, for without Him they are unintelligible, and unintelligible because without Him they are not existences, that is, do not exist. To suppose a thing intelligible without that by which it exists, is only supposing that it can be intelligible without being. Then, as existences in the order of being are not without God, it follows that they cannot be without Him in the order of knowledge. Then they cannot be more evident to us than God ("An A Priori Autobiography," 1850, BW I, p. 246).

All thought therefore presupposes the combined intuition of the necessary (what must be; i.e. self-sufficient and independent being), the contingent (what can be or not be; i.e. contingent existences), and the relation between the two (necessary being as the creator of contingent existences: for contingent existences stand outside of their cause, *ex-stare* – that is, they stand, i.e. exist, by virtue of an external cause) (*An Essay in Refutation of Atheism*, pp. 51, 56-61, 73, 76; cf. "The Existence of God," 1852, BW I, p. 269; "The Giobertian Philosophy," 1864, BW II, pp. 262, 265; "Ontologism and Psychologism," 1874, BW II, pp. 477-479).<sup>110</sup> Brownson notes: "*Ens creat existentias* [Being creates existences] ... the judgment in its three terms is Divine and apodictic, the necessary and apodictic ground of every human or empirical judgment, without intuition of which the human mind can neither judge nor exist. ... There is no judgment – and every thought is a judgment – without the creative act of being creating the mind and furnishing it the light by which it sees and knows" (*An Essay in Refutation of Atheism*, p. 66).

Building on this view, Brownson develops an *a priori* argument for God's existence. All that is required to show that God exists is to analyze the ideal element of knowledge that we intuit. For analysis of this ideal element gives us an awareness of an eternal and self-existent Being (necessary), contingent existences, and the creative act of Being (their relation), i.e. that existences are produced from nothing by the creative act of necessary Being (*An Essay in Refutation of Atheism*, pp. 61, 63-64, 67, 76, 85; cf. "The Existence of God," 1852, BW I, pp. 262, 269, 274-275; and BW II, pp. 260-261, 303-304). That is to say, in intuition we grasp (following Gioberti) the ideal formula that Being creates existences [*Ens creat existentias*]<sup>111</sup> (*An Essay in Refutation of Atheism*, pp. 59, 61, 66, 73, 75; cf. "Vincenzo Gioberti," 1850, BW II, p. 126; "The Giobertian Philosophy," 1864, BW II, pp. 255-256, 260-

263, 270; see also BW I, pp. 291-292, 297-298, 301-303, 365-366, 377-378, 407, 427-437; BW II, pp. 149, 177-179, 185-186, 279-281, 304-305, 314-316, 344-345, 349, 393-397, 454-455, 523-528; BW III, p. 191). In other words we grasp that contingent being, the world, is derived from and depends on necessary being, God (*An Essay in Refutation of Atheism*, pp. 60, 65). Two quotes of Brownson bring out this view:

Intuition ... furnishes the principles of the demonstration or proof of the existence of God, with absolute certainty; but ideal intuition, which gives the principle of cognition, is not itself cognition, and though implicitly contained in every thought as its condition, it becomes explicit or express only as sensibly re-presented in language, and the long and tedious analytical process performed by the reflective reason. ... It is only by this long and difficult process that one is able to assert as the intuitive synthesis, *Ens creat existentias*, or the essential principles of theistic philosophy. It is so because ideal intuition, is ... the objective or divine judgment affirmed to the soul implicitly, that is, indistinctly in every thought or empirical judgment (*An Essay in Refutation of Atheism*, pp. 96-97).

But will the objector tell us how we can prove the existence of God by any argument from premises that contain no intuition of the necessary, and therefore, since the necessary, save as concentered in being, is a nullity, of real and necessary being? We may have been mistaught, but our logic-master taught us that nothing can be in the conclusion, not contained, in principle at least, in the premises. If we had not ideal intuition of real and necessary being, there is no possible demonstration of the existence of God. St. Thomas finds the principle of his demonstration of the existence of God, precisely as we have done, in the relation of cause and effect, or as we say, in the relation of being and existences; but whence does the mind come into possession of that relation, or of the ideas expressed by the terms cause and effect? St. Thomas does not tell us; he simply takes it for granted that we have them. What have we done but prove, which he does not do, by analyzing, first, thought, then the object, then the ideal, and finally the relation, that we have them, and at the same time prove that being is a free, not a necessary cause, and thus escape pantheism, which we should not do, if we made cause as ultimate as being, *Ens creans* [Being creating], not simply *ens in se* [being in itself], that is: *Ens* [Being] acting is the cause, and existences or creatures are the effect (*An Essay in Refutation of Atheism*, pp. 72-73).<sup>112</sup>

We can prove then that necessary Being or God is creator of the world, as in all knowledge we intuit Being as real, necessary, independent, self-existing and self-sufficing, and existences as contingent, and Being as creating existences. Moreover, as God is independent and self-existing, God is subject to no extrinsic or intrinsic necessity and does not create necessarily but voluntarily. Thus being possesses will and so also intelligence without which there can be no will: God is thus personal (*An Essay in Refutation of Atheism*, pp. 72, 80, 83).

Interestingly, in spite of the fact that Brownson claimed that humans have an intuition of a necessary, self-existent being or God, Brownson denied that he was an ontologist (at least after the period 1842-1844). He denied being an ontologist because he claimed humans cannot directly know God through intuition but only indirectly: "while I maintain that the principles of all the real and the knowable are intuitively given I deny that we know that being or God is by intuition" (*An Essay in Refutation of Atheism*, Preface, p. vi; cf. p. 33). As he explains at greater length:

The analysis of the ideal element of the object in thought, we have seen, shows that it is resolvable into being, existences, and their relation, and the analysis of the relation, real only in the related, brings us, so to speak, face to face with the Divine creative act. ... The being given in ideal intuition is real and necessary being, self-existent, self-sufficient, complete in itself, wanting nothing, and incapable of receiving any thing in addition to what it is, and is eternally ... Yet, though being is sufficient in all respects for itself, it is cognizable by us only *mediante* [by means of] its own act creating us and affirming itself as the first term or being in the ideal element of the object in thought, and therefore only in its relation to the second term, or existences. This relation under which both being and existences, the necessary and the contingent, are given, is the creative act of being, as we have seen, and therefore, as that *mediante* [by means of] which both being and existences are given, is necessarily itself given in ideal intuition (*An Essay in Refutation of Atheism*, p. 71).

That is to say, we only know God indirectly through God's creative act, and in the intuition of real and necessary being, and thus have no immediate cognition of God (*An Essay in Refutation of Atheism*, pp. 52, 72, 74, 77, 97). Or said differently, in this life we only grasp God indistinctly and indirectly as Being and we need analysis to show that the Being we grasp in intuition is God; it is only in heaven that we

intuit God directly in the beatific vision. As Brownson proclaims “We know by intuition that which is God, but not that it is God” (“An Old Quarrel,” 1867, BW II, 304; cf. *An Essay in Refutation of Atheism*, p. 52; “Ontologism and Psychologism,” 1874, BW II, pp. 472-473, 478-479; see also BW I, pp. 291, 302, 336, 370, 427, 506; BW II, pp. 260-261, 422, 436-438, 520-521; see also Brownson’s Letter to Henry Mc-Murdie in BO, pp. 376-381).<sup>113</sup> In spite of his denials, however, it still seems proper to call Brownson an ontologist in the sense that he holds that humans in this life have an indirect intuition of God as necessary and self-existent being.

As humans can know God at least indirectly in this life by intuition (“natural intuition”), Brownson of course willingly concedes that humans can use reason to know there is a God (*An Essay in Refutation of Atheism*, pp. 70, 76-77, 95). Nevertheless, a rational proof of God is difficult to grasp, and according to Brownson most humans come to know God through faith and the supernatural instructions of the Creator handed down through tradition (*An Essay in Refutation of Atheism*, pp. 95, 97-99).<sup>114</sup> Moreover the knowledge that reason gives us about God is itself limited, and for a full knowledge of God, and in order to accomplish God’s commandments and achieve salvation, humans need divine revelation and supernatural grace (*An Essay in Refutation of Atheism*, pp. 40, 87-88; cf. BW I, p. 280; BW II, pp. 235-236). Brownson writes: “Revelation is not the basis of philosophy, but no philosophy of any value can be constructed without it” (*An Essay in Refutation of Atheism*, p. 100). Accordingly, Brownson developed a view wherein humans ought to use both reason and revelation to come to know God. Reason provides a foundation for the faith by showing humans that God exists and that God’s revelation is trustworthy and faith can provide supernatural instruction and assistance to fill in the deficiencies of reason (*An Essay in Refutation of Atheism*, p. 98; cf. “What Human Reason Can Do,” 1855, BW I, pp. 306-307; “Philosophy of the Supernatural,” 1876, BW II, pp. 272-273, 275-278; “Natural and Supernatural,” 1847, BW III, pp. 4-5, 14-16; “Harmony of Faith and Reason,” 1861, BW III, pp. 262-263; “Nature and Grace,” 1868, BW III, pp. 353-356; “What Is the Need of Revelation?” 1873, BW III, pp. 509-512; see also BW I, pp. 22-23, 258-259, 326-329, 357-361, 467-475, 494, 502, 519; BW II, pp. 151, 158-161, 207-209, 237-241; BW III, pp. 32-33, 82-83, 136-138, 146, 190-191, 197-201, 250-254, 575-578; BW VIII, pp. 324, 335-339).<sup>115</sup>

Ontologism came under attack from many sides beginning in the 1840s.<sup>116</sup> As a consequence, in 1842 the thought of Rosmini was investigated by a Vatican Commission. This Commission and Pope Gregory XVI cleared Rosmini and enjoined silence on Rosmini and his Jesuit adversaries. Yet by 1849 two of Rosmini's works, *The Five Wounds of the Holy Church* and *The Constitution of Social Justice* had been placed on the Index of Forbidden Books,<sup>117</sup> as was the *Il Gesuita moderna* of the ontologist Gioberti (in 1852 the rest of Gioberti's writings were also placed on the Index).<sup>118</sup> The works of Rosmini were again examined in light of their ontologism from 1851-1854 and once again not found worthy of censure (*Nil censura dignum*), so the censure was dismissed (*dimittantur*). But the tide of anti-ontologism kept on rising and eventually the Magisterium did condemn ontologism.

So it came to pass that in 1861 seven propositions of the ontologists were condemned by the Magisterium, in 1862 fifteen propositions culled from the ontologistic thought of Louis Branchereau (1819-1913) were condemned, in 1864 the thought of the ontologist Casimir Ubaghs (1800-1887) was condemned by the Roman Congregation and Ubaghs was removed from his teaching position,<sup>119</sup> and in 1866 Flavien-Abel-Antoine Hugonin (1823-1898) had to retract his ontologism to become the Bishop of Bayeux. Finally in 1887, forty propositions taken from the works of Rosmini (mostly posthumous) were condemned.<sup>120</sup>

Among the ontologistic propositions condemned in 1861 by a Decree of the Sacred Office we find:<sup>121</sup>

- 1) Immediate knowledge of God, habitual at least, is essential to the human intellect, so much so that without it the intellect can know nothing, since indeed it is itself intellectual light (DH 2841).
- 2) That being which is in all things and without which we understand nothing, is the divine being (DH 2842).
- 3) Congenital knowledge of God as being simply involves in an eminent way all other cognition, so that by it we hold as known implicitly all being, under whatever aspect it is knowable (DH 2844).
- 4) All other ideas do not exist except as modifications of the idea by which God is understood as Being simply (DH 2845).<sup>122</sup>

And here are some of propositions of Branchereau condemned in 1862:

- 1) Among the intelligible truths which we apprehend ideally, God is placed first, the intellection of Whom, although essentially different from the intuition of the blessed, does not terminate in a representative image but in God Himself.
- 2) We apprehend the metaphysical essences of things which are known by us in the divine intellect; yet their concretion [*actuabilitas*] is made known to us through the concept of the creative power befitting God.
- 3) We apprehend ideally created things neither in God nor in themselves. Yet knowledge of them is obtained in this way: 1. We know our soul through an inner sense, or through consciousness. 2. Yet we know created things, which are distinct from the soul, through an invincible judgment founded on the divine veracity in which we affirm that a certain essence has been concreated [*actuatam*] through creation.

Lastly, the 1887 Decree of the Holy Office, *Post Obitum*, condemned the following errors of Rosmini:

- 1) In the order of created things there is immediately manifested to the human intellect something of the divine in its very self, namely, such as pertains to divine nature (DH 3201).
- 2) Indeterminate being, which without doubt is known to all intelligences, is that divine thing which is manifest to man in nature (DH 3204).
- 3) Being, which man observes, must be something of the necessary and eternal being, the creating cause, the determining and final cause of all contingent beings; and this is God (DH 3205).
- 4) The first light rendering the soul intelligent is ideal being; the other first light is also being, not merely ideal, but subsisting and living; that concealing its personality shows only its objectivity; but he who sees the other (which is the Word), even through a reflection or in enigma, sees God (DH 3237).
- 5) The traces of wisdom and goodness which shine out in creatures are necessary for possessors (of God); for they are collected in the eternal exemplar as that part of Him which can be seen by them

(creatures), and they furnish material for the praises which the Blessed sing forever to God (DH 3239).<sup>123</sup>

Of course, as we noted at the outset of this chapter, Pope John Paul II, asked the Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith in 1991 to reexamine the condemned propositions of Rosmini. In 1994 this Congregation opened the way for the beatification process of Rosmini by the Congregation for the Causes of Saints. This led to the praise lavished on Rosmini in 1998 John Paul II's encyclical *Fides et Ratio*. And the rehabilitation of Rosmini was complete when in 2001 the Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith issued a *Note on the Force of the Doctrinal Decrees concerning the Thought and Work of Fr. Antonio Rosmini Serbati*. This Note states that though the thought of Rosmini was condemned, this applied principally to his posthumous works where it was hard to determine the precise meanings of the expressions and concepts used, and which were often used in an ambiguous and equivocal manner. Moreover, this Note states that the condemnation was enacted in order to ensure that Rosmini's thought was not erroneously interpreted or erroneous conclusions drawn from it. The Note goes on to say that subsequent study of the thought of Rosmini has shown that Rosmini himself did not understand his thought in a manner contrary to Catholic doctrine (i.e. in the manner understood by the condemnation), and so his own views are no longer considered contrary to Church teaching (as the Note puts it, the reasons for the condemnation have been superseded). We also read that though not every aspect of Rosmini's thought may be correct (the plausibility of his system of thought being entrusted to theoretical debate), Rosmini is an example of a thinker who achieved a fruitful exchange between philosophy and revelation. Accordingly, Rosmini's orthodoxy has been upheld and indeed he has recently been declared Venerable (2006) and Beatified (2007).<sup>124</sup>

## THOMISM

*1840-1970 in Belgium, France, Germany,  
Italy, Spain, & the United States*

As we have seen, there was a great flourishing of German Catholicism during the years 1815-1870. This flourishing came to an end in 1871 with the Kulturkampf (1871-1890), which was stimulated by the Austro-Prussian War (1866), the Syllabus of Errors (1867), formation of the German Catholic Center Party (1870) and the Association of German Catholics (1872), the end of the First Vatican Council (1869-1870), and the end of the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871) with the subsequent rise of the Prussian-controlled German Empire (1870). The Kulturkampf was a political policy instituted by the Prussian emperor Otto von Bismark<sup>125</sup> and the Prussian minister of education Adalbert Falk that attempted to destroy the power of the German Catholics [who were especially powerful in the German States of Alsace (formerly a part of France), Baden, Bavaria, Dürdinghausen, Ermland, Jülich, Lorraine (formerly a part of France), Posen (formerly part of Poland), the Rhineland Palatinate, Saarland, Schlesien [Silesia] (formerly part of Poland), Westphalia, and Württemberg] who often sided with Catholic Austria, France, or Poland over Protestant Prussia. As its name suggests, its goal was to create a unified Protestant culture [*Kultur*] in Germany.

The Kulturkampf began in 1871 when Bismark abolished the Catholic bureau of the Prussian ministry of education and public worship and mandated state-control of education in Alsace-Lorraine which was previously under the care of the Catholic clergy (Pulpit-Laws of the same year outlawed any criticism of the state by priests or bishops). All Prussian schools were then subject to state inspection in 1872. These actions were merely the initial forays of Prussian anti-Catholicism.

Affairs grew much worse when in 1872-1873 the Jesuits, Holy Ghost Fathers, Lazarists, Redemptorists, Religious Women of the Sacred Heart, and Vincentians were expelled from Prussia and diplomatic re-

lations with the Vatican were suspended. Subsequently, the May Laws were passed in 1873-1874 which stipulated government control over seminaries and required all seminarians to study at a German University for three years and pass state examinations in history, literature, and philosophy. Additionally the state asserted its power to veto clerical appointments and disciplinary actions of Catholic bishops. Those who resisted were arrested and then expelled including the bishops of Cologne, Poznań, and Trier. Ultimately nine of the twelve Prussian bishoprics became vacant including the aforementioned posts and the bishoprics of Fulda (1873-1881), Mainz (1877-1886), Münster (1875-1884), Osnabrück (1878-1882), and Paderborn (1879-1882); additionally over 1000 priests (about a quarter of the total clergy) were imprisoned or expelled from the German Empire.<sup>126</sup> Then in 1874-1875 all marriages had to be registered with the Prussian state. Later in 1875-1876 all religious orders, excepting those engaged in hospital work, were expelled (thus nearly three-hundred monasteries closed throughout Germany and had their land appropriated by the state), and the ownership of church property was transferred to lay trustees of the Church (further laws to the same effect were passed in 1876 and 1878 and ecclesiastical salaries ultimately totaling over three million dollars were withheld from parishes that resisted), and religious instructors in primary schools had to be appointed by the State.<sup>127</sup>

The Kulturkampf gradually came to an end at the close of the nineteenth-century. In 1879 Falk was replaced as minister of education, in 1880-1883 the May Laws were modified allowing the vacant sees to be filled, in 1882 relations with the Vatican were restored, in 1886 the May Laws were modified allowing for bishops to discipline the clergy and to control seminary education, and the bulk of the remainder of the anti-Catholic legislation was repealed in 1890-1891 allowing for Church control over priestly nominations and the expelled priests to return, and reestablishing Church control over education. In 1894 the religious orders (excluding the Jesuits) were allowed to return to Germany. Finally in 1904 the Jesuits were allowed to return to Germany (though the last anti-Jesuitical legislation was not repealed until 1917). This led to Concordats with Bavaria (1924), Prussia (1929), and Baden (1932) [though only in 1953 were the Pulpit Laws repealed].

As has been noted, subsequent to and in the midst of this Kulturkampf, the Catholic Magisterium was asserting its authority with the Syllabus of Errors (1864) and the First Vatican Council (1869-1870). Pope Leo XII also released an encyclical encouraging the revival of the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, *Aeterni Patris* (1879). While these actions fueled the anti-Catholicism of the day (and the Kulturkampf) and even led to anti-Catholic riots in Mannheim and Berlin, nonetheless they also helped the Catholic Church recover the Thomistic tradition that had been nearly forgotten since 1650.

Thomas Aquinas (c. 1225-1274), the founder of Thomism, is famous for his claim that grace perfects nature (rather than destroying it) [*gratia non tollat naturam, sed perficiat*] (see *Summa Theologiae* I q. 1 a. 8 ad 2; I q. 2 a. 2 ad 1). This meant for Aquinas that human reason, though imperfect, can acquire a knowledge of God (natural theology) and the moral law of God (natural law) as well as practice the cardinal virtues of wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice. Hence Aquinas develops his famous five ways (*quinque viae*) to God's existence as well as his account of the primary precepts of the natural law (see *Summa Theologiae* I q. 2 a. 2-3; I-II q. 94 a. 2). God, according to Aquinas, is known by way of analogy as the cause of creation. God is neither identical (univocal) with the universe, nor is He completely different (equivocal), rather God's nature is analogical with (similar to) the nature of the world. Yet supernatural revelation (coming by grace) can help us to remove the flaws in our thought and give us a fuller account of God and the moral law (*Summa Theologiae* I q. 1 a. 1). Moreover, there are certain truths that go beyond reason and are knowable only by supernatural revelation (the Scriptures), such as that God is a Trinity.

Aquinas is also well-known for his view that though knowledge begins with the senses (from which we form a mental image or phantasm), we must use the intellect to abstract out an intelligible species, i.e. a universal form, in order to have knowledge properly speaking (*Summa Theologiae* I q. 85 a. 1-2). Hence as the famous slogan goes: "There is nothing in the intellect which is not first in the senses" [*Nil est in intellectu quod prius non fuerit in sensu*] (*Disputed Questions On Truth*, q. 2 a. 3; *Summa Theologiae*, I q. 84 a. 7). Nevertheless intellectual abstraction also delivers universal concepts which resemble the nature of the mind (they are universal and immaterial) more than the nature of the world (still the intelligible species in our mind reflect the

forms in the material world): "whatever is received is received according to the mode of the receiver [*Quicquid recipitur per modum recipientis recipitur*] (*Summa Theologiae*, I q. 75 a 5; I 79 a. 6). On account of this cognitive process, the mind grasps the nature of reality and so truth is defined by Aquinas as the conformity of thought and thing [*adaequatio intellectus et rei*] (*Summa Theologiae*, I q. 16 a. 2).

Finally Aquinas develops a metaphysics based on the principles of Aristotle wherein things are composed of both matter and form (the hylomorphic theory), possess substance (the essence of the object) and accidents (properties that can change without the object losing its identity or essence) and potency and act, and he adds to them his distinction between essence (what a thing is) and existence (that a thing is). For as Aquinas notes we can conceive of an essence (such as the legendary Phoenix) without knowing if it exists (*On Being and Essence*, c. 4). Thus all material objects (and angels) have an essence that does not exist by its own nature (only God is a self-subsistent being, *ipsum esse subsistens*, whose existence is necessary).<sup>128</sup>

A great name in nineteenth-century Thomism is that of **Josef Wilhelm Karl Kleutgen (1811-1883)**.<sup>129</sup> Kleutgen was born in Dortmund, Westphalia, Germany in 1811. He thought about becoming a priest early on but the Enlightenment atmosphere of his schooling (where he imbibed Lessing and Herder) caused him to cool in his fervor. Part of this irreligious atmosphere was found at the University of Munich which he attended from 1830 to 1831. At the University of Munich, Kleutgen studied philosophy and joined the political organization Germania which took part in an 1830 protest on the streets of Munich. This protest led to the arrest of several members of Germania, and Kleutgen, who denied any active role, nonetheless withdrew from the University.

In 1832 Kleutgen, who had moved in with his uncle priest in Wiesdorf near Cologne, had a religious awakening which brought him out of a state of depression. Hence, in 1832 he enrolled in the theological academy of Münster and in 1833 attended the seminary at Paderborn. He joined the Jesuits at Brig, Switzerland in 1834 and was ordained a priest in 1837 (Kleutgen had to use the pseudonyms Joseph Peters and J.W. Karl from 1834-1846 as well as become a Swiss citizen in order to avoid complications with the Prussian government which wanted him to come to Berlin and explain his role in the Germania riot).

Kleutgen studied philosophy and theology in Fribourg from 1836-1840. Early on he was a follower of Günter (under the influence of Franz Rothenflue) and so a semi-rationalist but he later abandoned that position and became a Thomist. He taught as a professor of natural law and rhetoric at the Kollegium Sankt Michael, the Jesuit Scholasticate, in Fribourg, Switzerland from 1836-1840, rhetoric at the University of Brigue from 1841-1843, and then from 1843-1880 rhetoric at the German College, Rome where he also served as perfect of studies [he briefly went into hiding outside of Rome in 1848 when protestors made Pius IX ask the Jesuits to leave the Papal States]. While in Rome Kleutgen also served as substitute secretary for the General Superior of the Jesuits (1843-1856), secretary for the General Superior (1856-1862), as a consultor to the Congregation of the Index of Forbidden Books (1851-1859, 1872-c. 1880) where he helped to condemn the works of Günther.

Kleutgen was also a confessor to the Benedictine Sisters of San Ambrogio in Rome. Unfortunately, Kleutgen happened to be the confessor (and apparent lover) of the infamous novice master Mother Vicaria, who was venerated in that convent, as well as the confessor of another religious sister, the Hohenlohe princess Katherine of Hohenzollern. Katherine had told Kleutgen in confession that she was upset that Mother Vicaria was continuing to write to a former lover. Kleutgen broke the seal of the confession and told Mother Vicaria of this who then allegedly tried to poison Katherine. Katherine's cousin was the archbishop of Edessa and a friend of Günther and reported Kleutgen to the Roman Inquisition in 1859<sup>130</sup> (the charges against Kleutgen were that he allowed the community to honor Vicaria as a saint before her canonization and established an altar for her, and that he violated the sacredness of the confession; the Old Catholics in 1879 falsely reported that Kleutgen was sentenced for involvement in the poisoning of the princess). Hence Kleutgen was forbidden from saying mass, and was suspended as a confessor and from the Index. Kleutgen also had initially been sentenced to five years in the Inquisitorial prison but eventually it was agreed that he could serve out his sentence living in the Jesuit house near the shrine of Our Lady in Galloro (1859-1864) where he composed philosophical and theological works [the prioress of the convent of San Ambrogio was sentenced to life in prison and Katherine of Hohenzollern went on to help found Beuron Abbey in Baden-Württemberg, Germany]. Upon the opening of the First Vati-

can Council (1869-1870), the ecclesiastical censures against Kleutgen were removed and he returned to Rome and was put in charge of drafting the document "De Fide" for the First Vatican Council, and editing the document "De Ecclesia Christiana" and the encyclical *Aeterni Patris* (1879) which helped to launch Thomism. Kleutgen retired to Tyrol at the end of the First Vatican Council but again returned to Rome for brief stints as prefect of studies and professor of dogmatic theology at the Gregorian (1878-1879) and the German College (1880) and professor of rhetoric at the German College (1880). Kleutgen died in 1883 in St. Anton (Kaltern), Tyrol, Austria [he had suffered from paralysis to portions of his body].

The key works of Kleutgen defending Thomism are his *Theology of the Former Times* [*Theologie der Vorzeit*], 3 vols. (1853-1860; 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. 5 vols. 1867-1874; 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. 1878) and *Philosophy of the Former Times* [*Philosophie der Vorzeit*], 2 vols. (1860-1863; 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. 1868).<sup>131</sup>

It was not by chance that Kleutgen was nick-named *Thomas redivivus* (Thomas reborn) by Matthias Joseph Scheeben and *princeps philosophorum* [prince of the philosophers] by Pope Leo XIII himself. For Kleutgen spent his whole life defending Thomism (the pre-Cartesian philosophy of the former times, *Vorzeit*) against the newer systems of Enlightenment Thought, Romanticism, Traditionalism, Semi-Rationalism, and Ontologism (the post-Cartesian philosophy of the modern times, *Neuzeit*). These newer systems of thought are literally new creatures (*nova creatura*), and in order for philosophy to recapture its glory it must return to the balanced relationships of faith and reason, nature and grace, act and potency, and sense and intellect found in Aquinas (*Theology of the Former Times*, v. V, 626-660, pp. 446-490). Indeed the newer Enlightenment systems of thought led to the French revolution with its execution of nobles and priests, suppression of religious orders, and theft of church property (*Philosophy of the Former Times*, v. I, Introduction, 3, 9, 12-13, pp. 5, 12, 17-18 [3-4, 13, 19-20][we can note the execution or imprisonment of the Catholic scientists Lavoisier, Haüy, Desault, and Latreille]).

All of these newer schools of thought lacked the vision to recognize that Scholasticism was thoroughly scientific and could solve the philosophical problems of the day. Thus they were unable to resist the greatest prejudice of the modern age: "it would only be granted to it [modern times] to reveal the truth hidden all these centuries" (*Philosophy of the Former Times*, v. I, Introduction, 9, p. 12 [13]; cf. *On the*

*Old and the New School*, I, 5, pp. 96-105; Letters of October 13, 1836 and July 30, 1838 to Christoph Bernhard Schlüter in Deufel, 1976, pp. 222 and 227).<sup>132</sup> Yet Kleutgen argued conversely that it was not the case that “in order to bring the philosophical sciences to perfection one must renounce the principles of the former times and abandon the path it has laid down” (*Philosophy of the Former Times*, v. I, IV, iii, 332, p. 523 [110 (v. II)]). Hence Kleutgen argues that we must resurrect the ancient philosophical systems, meaning the philosophy taught in the Catholic schools from the beginning of Christianity up to the time of Descartes, i.e. up to the Seventeenth-Century (*Philosophy of the Former Times*, Introduction, 1, 17, pp. 3-4, 22 [1-2, 26-27]).

Kleutgen was of course aware that not all of the philosophical questions had been resolved by the ancients, nor did he believe that the modern schools of thought had nothing to contribute in their clarification (*Philosophy of the Former Times*, v. I, Introduction, 17, p. 22 [26]; IV, iii, 332, p. 523 [110 (v. II)]). Hence Kleutgen wanted to not only defend the traditional Scholastic doctrine, but also develop and perfect it (and incorporate into it any legitimate insights of the moderns) (*Philosophy of the Former Times*, v. I, Introduction, 10, p. 14 [16]).

Regarding the relation of faith and reason, Kleutgen argued that the fideists (Bautain) and traditionalists (Lamennais) wrongly asserted that reason could not show that God exists (*Philosophy of the Former Times*, Introduction, 9, 12-15, pp. 12, 16-20 [13, 18-23]). In point of fact religious belief does require reason to judge whether or not belief is irrational. Hence it is not true to say that religion is based on faith alone (*Theology of the Former Times*, v. II, I, ii, 15-39, pp. 20-62; v. IV, III, 100-109, 171-174, pp. 208-227, 332-337). On the other hand the semirationalists (Hermes and Günther) failed to recognize that there are truths of faith (mysteries) not provable by reason (*Theology of the Former Times*, v. I, Introduction, 4-13, pp. 8-25; I, ii-v, 98-102, 106-108, 120-122, 140-149, 208-227, 278-295, 428-432, pp. 156-165, 171-175, 194-198, 221-236; 330-363, 435-462, 642-650; v. II, 123-132, 181-192, 423-429, 479-484, pp. 193-207, 279-295, 616-624, 691-698; v. III, 48-57, 104-116, pp. 60-71, 136-152; v. IV, III, 100-109, pp. 208-227; v. V, I, iv-II, ii-iii, 408-421, 464-477, 581-584, 626-644, 656-660, pp. 169-188, 239-254, 392-395, 446-470, 482-490). They wrongly tried to develop a philosophy of revelation wherein reason can deliver a perfect comprehension of the divine essence and demonstrate all (or nearly all) of the truths found

in the Bible. Such a position destroys both the freedom and the mysteries of our faith. While philosophy can provide for an indirect and analogous knowledge of God, and can help theology to understand the mysteries of the faith better by analogy with experience, it cannot prove them. We can only know the mysteries of Scripture by an act of faith (*Theology of the Former Times*, v. V, I, 4, 422-436, 455-463, pp. 188-205, 229-238).

We hence need to turn to Thomas Aquinas who long ago recognized that humans know about religious matters through both reason and faith, i.e. philosophy and theology, and set their proper boundaries. He showed that philosophy proceeds on the basis of first principles evident to the natural light of reason, whereas theology proceeds on the basis of first principles known by the supernatural light of faith (*Theology of the Former Times*, v. V, I, i, 286-295, pp. 3-22). Theology can accordingly be defined as "the science of what is believed, indeed insofar as it is believed" [*die Wissenschaft von dem, was geglaubt wird ... aber insofern es geglaubt ... wird*] (*Theology of the Former Times*, v. V, I, i, 286, p. 4).<sup>133</sup> In theology our knowledge is founded on the authority of the revealing God as there is a lack of intrinsic evidence graspable by our natural reason.<sup>134</sup> Put slightly differently, theology's intellectual source is the free assent to Christian faith by a mind elevated by grace (and based on God's testimony) (*Theology of the Former Times*, v. V, I, i, 286-295, pp. 3-22). Kleutgen brings out this contrast between faith and reason by stating: "Natural knowledge is the knowledge that we obtain through the power of knowing that is particular to our spirit and through the revelation of God in creation, and supernatural knowledge is that which we obtain through the inner light of grace and through positive revelation, the expressed Word of God" (*Theology of the Former Times*, v. I, I, 1, p. 64; translation from Inglis, 1998, p. 79). Philosophy then by using natural reason to study the world and human nature can show us that there is a God and that the human soul is immortal. And theology, by giving us access to revealed truths otherwise unknowable, can tell us that our end is the beatific vision of the Triune God, and reveal the supernatural virtues of faith, hope, and charity (*Theology of the Former Times*, v. V, I, i, 286-295, pp. 3-22). Hence faith, or the adhesion to the revelation of God based on trust in God as a revealer, is necessary for a fully adequate knowledge of God and the moral order (*Philosophy of the Former Times*, v. I, III, iii-iv, 266-267, 279-282, pp. 409-413, 433-438 [517-521, 548-555]).

Philosophy in fact is best engaged in by a mind elevated by grace and faith as this can strengthen natural reason and help eliminate its errors (*Philosophy of Former Times*, v. I, III, iv, 282, pp. 437-438 [553-555]; cf. *Theology of the Former Times*, v. I, Introduction, 14-20, pp. 25-36). For reason in actual practice is faced with obstacles that hinder its arrival at the truth (*Philosophy of the Former Times*, v. I, III, iii-iv, 266-267, 279-282, pp. 409-413, 433-438 [517-521, 548-555]). Theology for its part can make use of the truths known to philosophy to further grasp the nature of the revealed truths of Scripture (*Theology of the Former Times*, V, p. 563). Here Kleutgen follows the Renaissance Thomist De Lugo in asserting that theology is a science which derives its doctrines "from faith through thought" [*aus dem Glauben durch das Denken*] (*Theology of the Former Times*, v. V, I, 1, p. 21). Thus while theology primarily utilizes the habit of faith to generate revealed principles (theological dogmas), it also makes use of minor principles of philosophical reason to derive conclusions. Moreover, the foundation of theology is based on apologetical arguments for its credibility that are themselves partly philosophical (i.e. that God exists, that God wants to reveal Himself to us, and that there are signs and miracles that testify to God's revelation) (*Theology of the Former Times*, v. IV, IV, 232-234, pp. 440-443). Hence philosophical reason can demonstrate that the assent of faith is rational (even if the assent to faith is itself free and supernatural).<sup>135</sup>

In terms of the relationship of the senses and the intellect, Kleutgen takes the Thomistic party line that knowledge begins with sensation. Or as he puts it, the first Thomistic principle of knowledge is the following: knowledge results when an image of the known object is produced in the knower by the concurrence of the knower and the known] [*Die Erkenntniß entsteht dadurch, daß vom Erkennenden und Erkannten in dem Erkennenden ein Bild des Erkannten gezeugt wird*] (*Philosophy of the Former Times*, v. I, I, i, 18, p. 23 [30]). Here we form a mental image of the object (a sense-image or phantasm) based on our sense-experience (*Philosophy of the Former Times*, v. I, I, i, 18-22, pp. 23-27, 29-30 [30-34, 37-39]). As knowledge begins in the sense-realm, there are no innate ideas, whether conceived in Platonic terms as transcendental forms that we can directly grasp, or along the line of the traditionalists where God implants ideas in addition to language in our minds (*Philosophy of the Former Times*, v. I, I, iii, 49-61, pp. 72-94 [89-118]; III, iv, 270-276, pp. 418-429 [528-543]). For we cannot

have ideas of that of which we lack the sensation (a deaf person cannot hear sounds), and we find that we can trace back all of our ideas to what we have sensed at some level (*Philosophy of the Former Times*, v. I, III, iii, 62-63, pp. 94-97 [118-122]).

A second principle of Thomistic epistemology is that the object known is in the knower according to the mode of the knower [*Das Erkannte ist in dem Erkennenden nach Weise des Erkennenden*] (*Philosophy of the Former Times*, v. I, I, i, 23, p. 32 [39]). Thus though knowledge begins with particular sensations (and the formation of the phantasm from them), knowledge proper requires the use of the intellect by which we form universal concepts in our minds (i.e. intelligible species) (*Philosophy of the Former Times*, v. I, I, i, 23, pp. 32-33 [40-42]).

Now the formation of these universal ideas comes by way of abstraction from sense-images. In abstraction reason grasps the essence of an object of perception, such as a rock or a tree, i.e. what is common to all rocks and trees, the type or model (*Philosophy of the Former Times*, v. I, Introduction, 20, p. 26 [33]; I, iv-v, 67, 85-94, pp. 103-104, 137-152 [129-131, 173-191]). In other words, utilizing the data of the senses, which perceive the variable accidents of things, the intellect can cast aside what is non-essential, penetrate into the nature of the object, and acquire knowledge of its substantial form or essence (*Philosophy of the Former Times*, v. I, I, i, v, 33, 89, pp. 51, 144-146 [63, 181-183]). In this way the essence abstracted from sensible singulars occurs in human beings as a mental idea of universal application (an impressed intelligible species or an intentional object) (*Philosophy of the Former Times*, v. I, Introduction, 18-19, pp. 23-26 [30-32]). So though the essence we know is in fact found in material bodies, we do not grasp it in the way in which it exists in them – where it is a particular – but instead as a universal concept (*Philosophy of the Former Times*, v. I, I, iii, 67, pp. 103-104 [129-131]). Kleutgen explains: “Now to discern [*erkennen*] something that exists as an individual thing in the material [body], but not in the manner in which it exists in it, is called abstracting” (*Philosophy of the Former Times*, v. I, I, iii, 67, p. 103 [129]).

A third precept of epistemology for Kleutgen is that knowledge is all the more perfect as the knowing principle is more removed in its being from materiality [*Die Erkenntniß ist um so vollkommener, je weiter das erkennende Prinzip in seinem Sein von der Materialität entfernt ist*] (*Philosophy of the Former Times*, v. I, I, i, 27, p. 38 [48]). Hence animals have the least perfect knowledge as they rely purely on physical

sensation to grasp their environment, humans have a somewhat better knowledge as they are at least immaterial beings united to a body, angels have an even more perfect knowledge as they know essences of things as pure spirits, but knowing is perfect in God who is an immaterial pure act (*Philosophy of the Former Times*, v. I, I, i, v, 27-29, 106, pp. 38-44, 175-176 [48-55, 221-222]; I, vii, 122-123, pp. 199-203 [250-254]; I, viii, 133-136, 145-146, pp. 216-220, 232-236 [272-277, 292-298]).

Based on these principles, Kleutgen defends a realistic epistemology wherein humans can truly grasp the nature of objects in the world. Our concepts can agree with reality as the concept is formed in light of the sense-image which is itself formed in light of the known object. As we have seen the agent intellect grasps what is general, necessary, and essential in an object by abstraction from a sense image (*Philosophy of the Former Times*, v. I, I, iv, 79, pp. 128-129 [158-161]; II, iii, 162-164, pp. 258-263 [326-333]; v. I, IV, iv, 337-341, pp. 531-540 [122-134 (v. II)]).

The intellect can also achieve certitude of this knowledge, or the adhesion to the truth without any fear of being mistaken. We can be certain that we know the essences of natural objects, that our thought agrees with reality, as the human both knows its acts of knowing (we grasp an evident truth and our grasping of this evident truth) and knows its own nature (i.e. that the human nature is to know things just as they are). And there is additional certainty that natural objects exist as we are aware that the conviction regarding the reality of things is born in us through a necessitating force that penetrates the innermost depths of our mind; i.e. there is a spontaneous belief in the reality of the exterior world that is imperiously imposed on the mind (necessitated) and it is not something we freely choose (*Philosophy of the Former Times*, v. I, I, vi, 105, 107, pp. 173-174, 177-178 [219-220, 224-225]; III, i-iv, 229-231, 259-262, 266, 276, pp. 350-353, 397-404, 410-411, 429-430 [444-447, 501-509, 518, 543]; IV, ii-iii, 297, 328, 331, p. 463-464, 514, 519-522 [33, 99, 107-111 (v. II)]).

Hence we can have knowledge of reality and need not begin with a theory of real doubt as Descartes or Hermes has it, which is moreover quite immoral and arrogant (*Philosophy of the Former Times*, v. I, III, i, 224-227, 229-232, pp. 344-348, 350-354 [432-437, 444-448]). Yet we can engage in a methodical or fictitious doubt in order to examine philosophically how we can justify our spontaneous acts of assent (*Philosophy of the Former Times*, v. I, III, ii, 244, 246-258, pp. 374, 376-396 [473, 475-500]).

One fundamental form of knowledge that humans have is that of metaphysics, or the study of abstract being (*Sein; ens*) (*Philosophy of the Former Times*, v. II, VI, i, 572, pp. 57-58 [71-74] (v. III))). Now according to Kleutgen, following the thought of Suárez and De Lugo, metaphysics deals with the study of possible being. That is to say, metaphysics is the study of the ideal or possible essences of things and not existence (actual being). Kleutgen writes:

The particular task of a science then must be determined by its proper object. What is, then, the specific object of metaphysics? The great scholastics unanimously said the real (*ens reale* [real being]) and knew distinctly that such an object could neither be understood from thought alone (*ens rationis* [a being of reason]) nor be reduced to God or God and pure spirit. It belongs then to metaphysics to study the real in its entire extension rather than, as other empirical sciences do, merely as a specific kind of essence (*Wesen*) – as physics deals only with bodies. Metaphysics must both investigate the concept of being (*Sein*), the attributes common to all being, and the causes of all being. ... But now in order to better appreciate the explications of the scholastics and obtain from them the response to the question that occupies us we must see how they understood *ens reale* [real being]. If one uses the word *ens* [being] not as the participle of the word *esse* [to be], but rather as a noun derived from it, it signifies something an *essentia* [essence] has, thus essence. It is thus a question of what is to be understood under essence and what under real essence. The essence [*Wesenheit*] is the innermost root and the first principle of all the activity and all the properties [*Eigenschaften*] of the thing. That is why one regards it as what is first designated of the thing known and interrogated – not because it is that from which we begin the acquisition of knowledge but because it is the source through which all that we know of the object contains its ground and perfection. If we call *essentia* [*Wesenheit*] or essence [*Wesen*] real, we exclude not only that which is inconceivable and absurd, on pain of an intrinsic contradiction, but also all that is thought or imagined arbitrarily as such – that is to say, not only what is absolutely impossible, but what cannot be regarded as possible to express according to the order of things that we know. We also exclude from essence what cannot be expressed as positive being, but only a privation of being or a merely thought relation, and thus also what can be known not through itself but rather only through a relation upon an other. An essence is therefore real due to the fact that from itself (according to itself) it is suitable for existing

and being known. ... In the Scholastics the subject of the concept is not what is universal in phenomena, but rather the innermost ground of existence of phenomena and effects. ... For the scholastics, as previously noted, the real is not, as the actual is, opposed to the possible; rather the real can be possible as well as actual. Thus the scholastics, when they denoted the real as the object of metaphysics, made the task of metaphysics in no way, as Hermes did, the seeking and finding of the actual. Suárez explicitly states this. When we conceive a being as real, we do not think of it as purely possible, by excluding existence; however, we no longer think of it as existing either, but we make an abstraction from existence. This is how finite and created things, for which existence is not essential, can become the object of science (*Philosophy of the Former Times*, v. I, IV, iii, 323-324, pp. 506-509 [88-92 (v. II)], translation modified from that of James Swindal in ACP (2005), pp. 271-272).

These possible essences represent the divine ideas that are found in God even prior to creation of the world. Metaphysics seeks to grasp these eternal ideas in God's mind whether they exist or not (*Philosophy of the Former Times*, v. I, IV, iii, 321-327, pp. 502-514 [84-98]; v. II, VI, i-ii, 564-572, 581, pp. 46-58, 74-75 [58-74, 94-95 (v. III)]). For instance metaphysics (beginning with the study of actual mobile things we sense) can aim at understanding the nature of mobile things in general and in this way acquire concepts that universal and eternally true. Thus it is that our laws of motion are valid for bodies whether they exist or not; for we can grasp the relations that things would have with other things were they to exist, and the laws according to which they would operate (*Philosophy of the Former Times*, v. I, IV, ii, 303-309, pp. 476-485 [49-61 (v. II)]). Indeed, as suggested by the previous quote, actual existing things (the items of this world) are temporal, contingent, and changeable and so their existence cannot become an object of science. Or rather, their existence can only become an object of science if metaphysics can uncover a necessity underlying the contingent, and a permanent law underlying the temporal and changing (*Philosophy of the Former Times*, v. I, IV, iii, 324, pp. 508-510; v. II, VI, ii, 575, p. 65 [82-83 (v. III)]).

Putting metaphysics into practice and studying the possible essences found in nature lets us develop the metaphysical categories of substance and accident, essence and existence, the transcendental

properties of being, and the principles of identity, contradiction, and causality.

A substance is a being which exists through itself whereas an accident is something which exists through the existence of something else (i.e. through a substance) (*Philosophy of the Former Times*, v. II, VI, iii, 592-594, pp. 92-98 [118-125 (v. III)]; v. II, VI, iv, 617-619, pp. 136-142 [172-174, 177-181 (v. III)]; v. II, VII, ii, 673-679, pp. 233-243 [296-309 (v. III)]). The essence is the complex of everything by which a thing is (i.e. what a thing is), whereas existence is everything which not only occurs as a cause or possibility but in itself and actually (i.e. that a thing is) (*Philosophy of the Former Times*, v. II, VI, ii, 573, 576-578, pp. 59-61, 66-70 [75-78, 83-89 (v. III)]; VI, iii, 595, pp. 98-100 [126-128 (v. III)]).<sup>136</sup> The transcendental properties of things are being, truth, unity, and goodness (these are properties found in all things whatsoever). And the first principles of metaphysics, abstracted from experience, are the principle of identity (a thing is what it is), the principle of contradiction (a thing cannot be one thing and another thing at the same time in the same way), and the principle of causality ("Nothing can exist without a sufficient reason") (*Philosophy of the Former Times*, v. I, IV, ii, 291-295, pp. 457-462 [24-30 (v. II)]).

God as we have seen is known not just by faith for Kleutgen but also by reason (contra the fideists) (*Philosophy of the Former Times*, v. I, III, iv, 281, pp. 436-437 [551-552]). Specifically, following Aquinas, God is known through creation, that is to say, through reasoning which begins with premises derived from metaphysical observations regarding the nature of the world.<sup>137</sup> Kleutgen argues "By no means are we claiming that humans, if they had been created with the faculties that they possess at present, could acquire the knowledge of God and of His law without the guiding and supporting influence of God ... the knowledge of the divine that is named natural is quite independent of revelation and of grace understood in the strict sense of the word, but not though of the divine providence which governs all things in us and apart from us" (*Philosophy of the Former Times*, v. II, IX, i, 909, p. 670 [271-272 (v. IV)]). Hence God is known in an *a posteriori* manner – through argumentation based on sense-experience (not by way of an immediate intuition as the ontologists hold). God is analogously known as cause of this world (*Philosophy of the Former Times*, v. I, V, ii, 378-380, 412-421, pp. 601-607, 656-671 [213-221, 281-302 (v. II)]; v. II, IX, i, 909, pp. 668-670 [269-271 (v. IV)]).<sup>138</sup>

Kleutgen himself helps to initiate the Thomistic pattern of laying stress on the third way of Aquinas. In other words, he advances the following argument for God's existence: Everything has a sufficient reason for being. Now things which have been made (that have begun to exist) have their sufficient reason in another being (in the being that has made them). Moreover, we find that things in this world are contingent, they have been made and are not able to begin to exist by themselves. Hence in order to account for their existence we need to posit a being which exists through itself and is the sufficient reason of its own existence, i.e. the uncreated God (*Philosophy of the Former Times*, v. I, IV, ii, 302, p. 475 [48 (v. II)]; V, iv, 500-521, pp. 804-841 [476-518 (v. II)]; v. II, VI, i, 568-571, pp. 50-56 [64-71 (v. III)]). To quote Kleutgen, God's existence is known by the fact that "things do not suffice for themselves ... in order to exist, act, and develop, they presuppose God as their author and their conservator. ... Now this change, this activity, this arising and passing of things in the world can have its final reason only in a being that produces change without being itself subject to change, [a being] that is cause without having been caused, having the ground of its existence in itself; this being is God" (*Philosophy of the Former Times*, v. II, IX, i, 912, p. 674 [276 (v. IV)]); cf. *Philosophy of the Former Times*, v. II, IX, i, 913-914, 917-923, pp. 674-677, 681-693 [277-281, 285-301 (v. IV)]).

In terms of His nature, God is an absolute being (or the highest essence) that is fully self-sufficient and is pure act, simple, immutable, infinite, and one, with an intellect possessing perfect knowledge, and a free will (*Philosophy of the Former Times*, v. I, IV, iii, 324, pp. 509-510 [92-93 (v. II)]; v. II, IX, ii, 944-945, 947-954, 958, 963, 966, 970, 974-976, pp. 734-737, 739-749, 756-758, 765-768, 772-774, 779-781, 788-793 [357-359, 362-374, 384-386, 396-398, 405-406, 413-416, 425-431 (v. IV)]). That is to say, God is a perfect spiritual living being. In fact, as God's being is known analogically, we must repeat with Dionysius that God is in a sense super-substantial, super-spiritual, and super-living as God exceeds the nature of the world (*Philosophy of the Former Times*, v. II, IX, iii, 1043-1047, pp. 911-920 [583-594 (v. IV)]).

Reason can also prove that the soul is immortal according to Kleutgen. For the human soul is simple (it knows itself and knows universal concepts), and is thus incorruptible and immortal. Moreover the soul does not show signs of diminishment through use and age, and it has

free will, showing it is superior to the material world and the forces of nature. Additionally the human being has a desire for immortality and supreme happiness which a good God would not disregard. Finally the soul recognizes it can merit or demit by its moral acts. Now as it is necessary that one be recompensed for one's good works (or punished for one's bad works), and as this does not take place in the present life, the soul will be recompensed (or punished) in the next life for its actions on earth (*Philosophy of the Former Times*, v. II, VIII, i, iii, 799-801, 846, 849, 852, pp. 466-474, 565-567, 570-573, 575-577 [19-28, 139-143, 147-149, 152-155 (v. IV)]).

In the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries Belgium came under the control of various foreign powers and so was subject to any anti-Catholic persecutions of its subjugators. Austria was the first and took over control of Belgium in 1713. As this was the age of Austrian Josephinism (1781-1789) with its state control of the church, in 1782 the contemplative orders of Belgium were suppressed and their property confiscated, and liturgical matters had to be approved by the government (prior to this in 1781 toleration had been granted to the region's Protestant minorities). Then in 1786 the seminaries were closed and seminarians had to study at the University of Louvain which was staffed with Enlightenment-minded thinkers. The Brabançonne Revolution of 1789, with support of the clergy, resisted Austrian rule but it was re-established again in 1790.

The French came next and conquered Belgium in 1794. Hence Belgium suffered through the anti-Catholicism of the French Revolution (1796-1802). In 1796-1797 public Catholic worship and religious symbols were outlawed in Belgium. Over 850 of the 8500 recalcitrant priests were arrested (many of them being imported to the penal colony of Guiana in South America) as they did not pledge to subscribe to the laws of the Republic or refused to stop wearing their ecclesiastical garb, and the churches of these non-juring clergy were closed and their property sold. As in France the day of rest became the tenth day and not Sunday. Next the University of Louvain with its seminary was closed and all the religious orders and congregations were suppressed (initially with the exception of those devoted to teaching and care of the sick). Napoleon did end the Catholic persecution with the Concordat of 1801 (hence Catholic worship and bishoprics were re-established in 1802), but he later imposed the Imperial Catechism (1806) which impelled clergy to be faithful to the policies of the Emperor [when the

bishops of Ghent, Tournai, and Troyes had the temerity to complain, several priests and the seminarians of Ghent were forcibly drafted into the army and dispatched to Wesel, Rhineland, Germany where almost fifty of them succumbed to disease, and the re-established seminaries of Ghent and Tournai were closed], and additionally arrested Pope Pius VII (1809-1814).<sup>139</sup>

In 1815 Belgium came under the control of Calvinistic Netherlands (1815-1830). The Fundamental Law of Holland passed the previous year was rejected by the Belgium bishops in 1815 (the Bishop of Ghent was exiled for his opposition) as it suppressed the privileges of clergy, granted freedom of religion, and requiring governmental approval for the publication of papal decrees. The Dutch king also kept in effect the banishment of the Jesuits and Christian brothers (except for a few communities such as at Dinant). Moreover, in 1821 the government stipulated that all schools must be government-approved, and in 1825 the government mandated (becoming voluntary in 1829) that all seminarians must attend the newly established Philosophical College at the State University of Louvain (which the Dutch had opened in 1817 along with universities at Ghent and Liège; the Catholic University of Louvain was not re-established until 1834, and the American Seminary at Louvain was established in 1857).

Belgium finally gained its independence in 1830. The new pro-Catholic constitution of 1831 allowed for the autonomy of the clergy and for their communication with Rome. It also allowed for freedom of worship and education. Hereupon many religious orders such as the Jesuits returned to Belgium. Indeed in 1842 religious teaching was made obligatory in state schools (Catholics once again felt free to choose between public and private schools). Moreover, the state agreed to provide funding for the clergy.

The rise of the liberal party (1847-1871, 1879-1884) [and in particular Hubert Joseph Walthère Frère-Orban], however, meant that anti-Catholic measures would continue. Hence in 1850, an anti-Catholic law of secondary education was passed that made it difficult for clergy to serve as teachers. In 1846 (1857, 1859, and 1869) a law stipulated that federal money could only go to charitable foundations that were under the control of the government. In 1862 (1870, and 1879) the cemeteries were secularized. And in 1868 the government suspended the annual fee to the Bollandists who edited and published the *Acta Sanctorum*. Finally laws of 1879 (called the Loi de Malheur, the Law

of Misfortune, by Catholics) mandated religion could only be taught in state schools outside of normal class time and that graduates of the religious's schools could not teach there in any case (this resulted in much resistance by Catholics and the expansion of private Catholic schools once more). Matters reached a head in 1880 when Belgium severed diplomatic relations with the Vatican and appointed state inspectors to tour the country and ensure compliance with the secular educational laws.

Of course political movements come and go and in 1884 a Catholic government came into power and restored educational freedom and public religious education (each commune could now decide whether or not to give religious instruction), state subsidizing of schools, stipends for the clergy and the upkeep of religious buildings, a Sunday day of rest, and diplomatic relations with the Vatican. These actions led to a great riot later that year wherein the liberal party disrupted the procession of nearly 80,000 Catholics in Brussels and forced the resignation of the pro-Catholic legislators Victor Jacobs, Jules Malou, and Charles Woeste. And though the Catholic Church regained its strength in the twentieth century (Fr. Adolf Daens founded the *De Christene Volkspartij* in 1893-1894, in 1895 the Catholic political parties were once again ascendant, and in 1925 Joseph Cardijn created the *Jeunesse ouvrière chrétienne*), Belgium suffered greatly during the First (1914-1918) and Second World Wars (1937-1945).

One of the first Belgian Thomists during these trying times was Mercier whose epitaph read "Added to his titles of illustrious thinker and Bishop, that of a great citizen." As is indicated here, Mercier was equally well known for his work in philosophy, as a Cardinal, and a defender of Belgian rights during the Second World War.

**Désiré Félicien François Joseph Mercier (1851-1926)**<sup>140</sup> was born in Braine-l'Alleud (near Waterloo), Brabant, Belgium, in 1851 where his grandfather had previously been mayor. He decided quite early to become a priest and attended the minor seminary of Malines in 1868 where he was a Mamelouk, i.e. an Xavérien associate, who, in order to reach out to the working class, ministered to workers in bars while drinking beer, playing cards, and gambling. Mercier then attended the major seminary of Malines in 1870 where he encountered and embraced the thought of Aquinas (through reading the works of Toni-giorgi and later Kleutgen). He then went to the University of Louvain beginning in 1873 and was ordained in 1874 (he was also a tertiary

of the Franciscans). In 1877 Mercier earned his licentiate in theology and became director of philosophical studies at the minor seminary of Malines, as well as supervisor of lay students at the University of Louvain. And in 1882 Mercier received doctorates in philosophy and theology from Louvain.

Always ambitious, Mercier dedicated himself to bringing Thomism and modern science together and so in 1882 he studied biology and psychology with Jean-Martin Charcot in Paris, France and Wilhelm Wundt in Leipzig, Germany (he later also studied neurology with Arthur Van Gehuchten, biology with Pierre-Joseph Van Benedey, chemistry with Louis Henry, and mathematics with Augustin Mansion). His hard work did not go unnoticed and in 1882 Mercier was made Canon of Malines, and was appointed to the chair of Thomistic Studies at Louvain (only after their first choice of the bishops of Belgium declined and the pope was going to appoint a foreign-born Dominican; Mercier had turned down a position at the Catholic University of America). Then in 1886 he became a member of the Roman Academy of St. Thomas Aquinas and in 1887 Leo XIII conferred a Roman prelacy upon him and he became a Monsignor.

Mercier soon found himself thrust into the role of advancing the Higher Institute of Philosophy [Institut Supérieur de Philosophie] at the University of Louvain, a Thomistic center that was founded in 1889 (officially given its name in 1894). As its first director Mercier brought on board many qualified instructors of philosophy and also established one of the first centers of experimental psychology there in 1892 [chaired by Albert-Édouard Michotte (1881-1965) and Fr. Armand Thiéry (1858-1955)], as well as later centers of chemistry and physics. Mercier also soon found out about the politics of the University of Louvain and had to deal with opposition to his educational policies. Hence in 1886 opponents of Mercier's Higher Institute (namely Collinet, a professor of comparative literature at Louvain, and Fr. Jean Baptiste Abbeloos, the rector of the University of Louvain) sent complaints to Rome to the effect that too many courses were taught on the natural sciences (as opposed to philosophy) and that much of the teaching was in French and not Latin. Mercier quickly went to Rome to defend his methodology, and though he initially received a letter of rebuke from Cardinal Camillo Mazella, ultimately Mercier received a 1898 letter of support from Cardinal Francesco Satolli and permission to use the French language (still for a number of years the Institute's

right to confer degrees was revoked). Always busy, in 1888 Mercier founded the Philosophical Society of Louvain, in 1892 the seminary Leo XIII [le séminaire Léon XIII] in Louvain, and in 1894 the journal *Revue néo-scholastique* [this journal became the *Revue philosophique de Louvain* in 1946].<sup>141</sup> Then in 1902 Mercier became a member of the Royal Academy of Belgium (he later received the prize for philosophy from this same Academy in 1907 and became its president in 1913).

Mercier's academic career was however cut short when he was made Archbishop of Malines in 1906 and elevated to the rank of a Cardinal (with the associated church of St. Peter's in Chains) in 1907. Mercier was just as active and ambitious as a Cardinal as he had been as an academic. Hence he held a Belgian Catholic congress in 1909, only two years after his elevation, where he tried to dissipate the often tense relations between Flemish-speaking and French-speaking Belgians (indeed the Conseil des Flandres, a group advocating greater usage of the Flemish language, was quite hostile to Mercier, who favored utilizing French in academic circles, and unsuccessfully petitioned the Pope for his dismissal). He also entered into a polemic with the physicist Lucien Anspach in regard to the Spanish radical Francesc Ferrer i Guàrdia (1889-1909) in 1910.

During World War I (1914-1918) Mercier became a national hero of Belgium for his resistance to the German invasion. For during the German occupation, Mercier gave sermons and wrote pastoral letters criticizing the German actions (the Germans had bombed the University of Louvain (destroying its library) and put several priests to death in 1914; then in need of labor in 1916, the Germans exported 90,000 Belgium youth to Germany; finally they instituted a program of teacher certification that was highly anti-Catholic). Mercier even set up an underground printing press in order to publish works (*La libre Belgique*, *Bulletin de la Propagande Patriotique*) criticizing the abuses and misinformation of the Germany forces. Accordingly, Mercier and his publisher, Charles Dessain, were arrested by the Germans (Mercier was placed under house arrest and faced several tense visits from General Moritz von Bissing – the Berlin paper *Kladderadatsch* and the Belgian paper *La libre Belgique* both published cartoons in which Mercier and von Bissing squared-off). Mercier, never one to back down, retorted that he would never stop asserting the rights of the Belgians including their right to resist the German occupation. When the war ended in 1919 Mercier came to the United States to raise money for

reconstruction of the Louvain library and he received honorary degrees from the Catholic University of America, Duquesne, Harvard, Loyola University in Chicago, Princeton, St. Louis University, Yale, and several other universities (he was also awarded the Croix de guerre by the French Army).

With the war over in 1918 Mercier could return to his ambitious pastoral plans. Hence in 1920 he founded the International Union of Social Studies [Union Internationale d'études sociales] in Mechlin (which issued its "Social Code" in 1925) and he held a provincial council of Malines. Then in 1921 Mercier founded *La revue catholique des idées et des faits*. Furthermore, he and the Anglican Lord Halifax organized ecumenical conversations between Anglicans and Catholics, the famous Malines Conversations of 1921-1925 (Mercier additionally founded the Institute of the Monks of Union at Chevetogne, Belgium, and the Benedictine foundation at Amay, to try and reconcile with the Orthodox Church). Finally he built the Collège Cardinal Mercier outside of Braine l'Alleud for the education of young boys, and supported the *Association de la Jeunesse catholique* (founded in 1886) and *Jeunesse catholique ouvrière* (founded in 1924). When Mercier died in Brussels, Belgium in 1926 he was known throughout the world and had been awarded the Order of Leopold, the Legion of Honor, and inducted into the Institut de France (1919). He is buried in St. Rombold's Cathedral.

Mercier has been memorialized by a painting of Josef Janssens and by the establishment of a lecture series given by the holder of the Chaire Cardinal Mercier (1915- ) at the Catholic University of Louvain and a Prix Cardinal Mercier (1975- ) awarded every two years at the Catholic University of Louvain. There is also a Place Mercier in Braine l'Alleud.

Mercier authored the famous manual of Thomistic philosophy *Course of Philosophy* [*Cours de philosophie*], 6 vols. (1892-1897) – consisting of volumes on Logic [Logique] (v. I) (1894), General Metaphysics [Métaphysique générale ou ontologie] (v. II) (1894), Psychology [Psychologie] (v. III), 2 vols. (1892), and General Criteriology [Critériologie générale ou Théorie générale de la certitude] (v. IV) (1899); with other volumes written on the Histoire de la philosophie médiévale (3rd ed. 1909) by Maurice De Wulf and Cosmologie by Désiré Nys; and with projected but unwritten volumes on Critériologie spéciale, Théodicée, and Morale. This Course of Philosophy has

been abridged as the *Elementary Treatise of Philosophy* [*Traité élémentaire de philosophie*], 2 vols. (1905).<sup>142</sup>

Certainly when one thinks of those Thomists who dedicated their lives to upholding the goal of Leo XIII's encyclical *Aeterni Patris* (1879), namely of restoring the philosophy of Aquinas,<sup>143</sup> the name of Mercier comes to mind. For Mercier's professed goal in his writings, and his work on behalf of the Higher Institute of Philosophy, was just that of helping Catholics better understand the teachings of Aquinas and putting into place the encomium of Leo XIII to restore the wisdom of the Angelic Doctor (*Course of Philosophy*, Logic, Introduction, 14, pp. 52-62; "Leo XIII and the Restoration of Philosophical Studies," in CMPE, pp. 55-56, 107-108, 118; "A Commentary about the Revival of the Teaching of Saint Thomas Aquinas," in CMPE, pp. 210-214, 220-226; "The Encyclical and Philosophy," in CMPE, p. 547; "Neo-Scholastic Philosophy," in CMM, pp. 360-363, 366-367 [5-7, 17-18]). As Mercier asks: "Should Scholasticism be disdained because it is five centuries old? Since when is novelty synonymous with truth? If conservation is right and innovation is wrong, isn't it better to be a conservator than an innovator? Why does the traveler feel himself moved to the depths of his soul when he contemplates in the museums of Rome or Naples, of Milan or Florence, the ancient statues of the Greek masters or when he silently goes through the Coliseum? It is because the majesty of the centuries hovers over these treasures and this majesty commands respect. It is above all that these glorious monuments are like classical forms of art that rose to a pinnacle and in whose perfection still stimulates, after so many centuries, our inspired souls with this omnipotent energy which is the distinctive sign of genius shows. Conceivably, modern thought does not bow down before the scientific heritage of the past solely because it goes back to the Middle Ages. ... what I do not understand is that one repudiates *a priori*, a doctrine because it has deep roots in the past" ("Leo XIII and the Restoration of Philosophical Studies," translation in CMPE, pp. 115-116). Mercier then felt that Thomism had much to contribute to philosophy: "Among the unceasing downfall of the systems that we witness these last three centuries, the philosophy of Saint Thomas alone has been able to conserve the stability of its principal foundations" (*Elementary Treatise of Philosophy*, v. I, Introduction, 14, p. 30 [36]).<sup>144</sup>

Mercier of course recognized that Thomism can and should progress; it must not be blind to the advances of science and modern

thought (in this Mercier was merely following Aquinas who tried to incorporate the best insights of his day into his system).<sup>145</sup> As he noted: “we consider, however, the Thomistic philosophy neither as an ideal which it is forbidden to surpass, nor as a barrier setting limits to activity of the mind; but we believe, after due consideration, that there is wisdom as well as modesty in at least taking it for a starting-point and foundation. This must be said in response to those, among our adversaries or our friends, who sometimes deem it worthwhile to ask if we intend to lead the human mind back to the Middle Ages or to identify *the* philosophy with the thought of *a* philosophy. Manifestly not ... recommending the discoveries and speculations of modern humans as congenial to everyone” (*Elementary Treatise of Philosophy*, v. I, Introduction, 14, pp. 30-31 n. 32 [36 n. 1]; cf. *Course of Philosophy*, Logic, Introduction, 14, p. 53 n. 1; “Neo-Scholastic Philosophy,” in CMM, p. 366). Or as a famous turn of phrase of Mercier’s goes: “Let us have the persuasion that we are not alone in the possession of the truth and that the truth that we possess is not the entire truth” (“The Philosophical Assessment of the Nineteenth-Century,” in CMM, p. 323 [328]; see *Christianity in the Modern Life*, p. 71). Thomism then can continue to develop and grow and remain relevant by embracing the insights of contemporary philosophy and natural science.

Still, it was Thomism that Mercier wanted to restore because it had the best integration of reason and faith, observation and speculation, analysis and synthesis (*Course of Philosophy*, Logic, Introduction, 14, pp. 52-62; “Leo XIII and the Restoration of Philosophical Studies,” in CMPE, pp. 59-60; “Opening Discourse for the Course on St. Thomas’s Philosophy,” in CMM, pp. 297, 301).

Thomism had the best blend of reason and faith as it recognized that reason can be used to know the world and God, but that reason must also be completed by faith. Indeed, according to Mercier philosophy must be pursued for its own sake (rather than for apologetical purposes) and so in a manner completely independent of theology. Philosophy is a scientific enterprise that investigates reality by the light of unaided reason and hence separates itself from all external authority. Philosophy is thus autonomous in that its motive of certitude is the intrinsic evidence of its object of study; to be true to itself, philosophy must stick to its own resources (i.e. natural reason) and reach conclusions solely on this basis.<sup>146</sup> Indeed as Mercier points out, philosophical endeavors existed before the foundation of Christian-

ity and so the Christian faith does not come to destroy the natural endowments of the human but to enrich them (*Elementary Treatise of Philosophy*, v. I, Introduction, 12, pp. 21-22 [25-26]; *Course of Philosophy*, Logic, Introduction, 12, pp. 36-40; *Report on the Higher Studies of Philosophy*, in CMM, p. 345).

This is not to say that theology, which is based upon revelation, is not useful to philosophy, only that its role is often misunderstood. Theology does not positively contribute doctrines to philosophy (contra Étienne Gilson and Jacques Maritain [somewhat]), instead it leaves philosophers to their own reflections and research for this. Yet theology cannot stand idly by and allow what is detrimental to the divine dogma to be taught. So revelation must step in and denounce any philosophical theory which is in error and contradicts the deposit of revealed truths. Theology thus has the negative function of helping to correct the errors of philosophy. It is in this way that theology is the helpmate (*l'auxiliaire*) of reason, and that a philosophy completely separated from theology is not beneficial (*A Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy*, v. I, Introduction, 12, pp. 22-23 [26-27]; "Opening Discourse for the Course on St. Thomas's Philosophy," in CMM, pp. 297-298; *Course of Philosophy*, Logic, Introduction, 12, pp. 36-40).<sup>147</sup> Mercier explains his view in the following manner: "Revealed doctrine is not a motive of assent, a direct source of knowledge, for the philosopher and scholar, but rather a safeguard, a *negative norm*. From the moment when they undertake their investigations, Christian philosophers can at that point examine nature or their consciousness with full freedom and follow the direction of reason. But if it should happen that they find their conclusions at variance with the Revelation that legitimate authorities propose to them for belief, they must, in the interest of both faith and scientific truth, redo [*reprendre*] their investigations until their difficulties are resolved in accordance with the teachings with which at first sight they seemed to conflict. The Word of God cannot be erroneous. A proposition which would be in manifest contradiction with a manifestly revealed doctrine, can only be an error: to repudiate error is to perform an act of reason" (*A Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy*, v. I, Introduction, pp. 23-24 [27-28]).

Moreover, we must recognize that reason cannot furnish explanations for the whole of reality. Hence revelation can provide for a positive knowledge of God which goes beyond reason's capabilities; for instance revelation can tell us that God is three persons in one nature,

i.e. a Trinity (*A Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy*, v. I, Psychology, Part Three, III, 173, pp. 327-328 [199-200]; v. II, Natural Theology, Part Three, III, 77, p. 113 [116 (sec. 71)]). Here theology, starting from Scriptural principles undiscoverable by human reason on its own, delivers supernatural truths that surpass the power of created nature [here theology does not contribute a doctrine to philosophy, but shows that there are theological doctrines going beyond reason] (*A Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy*, v. II, Natural Theology, Introduction, 1, p. 3 [113]; Part III, III, 89, pp. 131-132 [136-137 (sec. 83)]; “Leo XIII and the Restoration of Philosophical Studies,” in CMPE, pp. 107-113; “The Last Idol,” and “Discussions: The Proofs of the Existence of God and Monism,” in CMPE, pp. 473-475, 480-484, 505-508; *Course of Philosophy*, Psychology, v. II, III, 3, 292, pp. 376-377).<sup>148</sup>

Thomism also had the best blend of observation and speculation (senses and reason for Mercier). Now for the Thomist, philosophy begins when reason reflects on experience and grasps an essence or order underlying the sensible world. Thus contrary to the position of idealists such as Descartes and Hegel, or ontologists such as Rosmini, there are no innate ideas (*A Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy*, v. I, Psychology, Part Three, I, 100, pp. 255-256 [111-112]; *Course of Philosophy*, Psychology, v. II, III, 1, 178-181, pp. 54-72). Rather the intelligible forms are apprehended through examination of the world presented to senses. Or as Aquinas noted, there is nothing in the intellect that is not first present to the senses. All positive knowledge then is based on an experience of sensible things (even our positive concepts of supersensible beings, says Mercier, are based on those attributes that they have in common with material beings, i.e. being, unity, activity, knowledge, etc., or are negations of them, i.e. simplicity, immensity, etc.).<sup>149</sup> Knowledge must begin with the perception of material things (*a hoc aliquid* – this thing) determined by particularizing notes (*A Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy*, v. I, Psychology, Part Three, I, 89, 94, 106, pp. 240-244, 249-250, 261 [94-96, 104-106, 117-118]; cf. *Course of Philosophy*, Psychology, v. I, II, 1, 57-58, 68, 103, pp. 135-139, 156-162, 251-253; v. II, III, 1, 165-167, pp. 11-22).

Yet against the radical empiricists – such as David Hume, Étienne Bonnot de Condillac, Herbert Spencer, Hippolyte Taine, Théodule Ribot, John Stuart Mill, and Alexander Bain – Mercier asserts that knowledge occurs through the use of an abstractive intellect, and is not

just a mechanical process of sensation (*A Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy*, v. I, Psychology, Part II, I, 55-57, pp. 211-213 [57-61]; "Leo XIII and the Restoration of Philosophical Studies," in CMPE, pp. 85-88, 93; *Course of Philosophy*, Psychology, v. I, II, 1, 111-115, pp. 260-272; v. II, III, 1, 174, 229, pp. 43-48, 197-201). For knowledge cannot get off the ground without abstraction (see *Course of Philosophy*, Psychology, v. I, II, 1, 59, pp. 140-143; v. II, III, 1, 168-173, 191, pp. 22-42, 92-93; *Course of Philosophy*, General Criteriology, Part One, IV, 136, 140, pp. 356-364, 386-398).

Now to abstract is to engage in a separate consideration (*separatim considerare*) of the manifold aspects of a thing. For instance the mind can abstract out the individual characteristics or properties of the mineral chalcantite (copper sulphate) such as hard, blue, prism shape, three dimensions, etc., and focus on each separately (*A Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy*, v. I, Introduction, 2-3, 17, p. 4, 6-7, 39 [4-6, 8, 47]; v. II, Logic, I, 10-11, pp. 141-143 [8-9 (v. I)]); "Leo XIII and the Restoration of Philosophical Studies," in CMPE, p. 94). Subsequently, the mind can go on to combine the separate characteristics into one whole intelligible object and so unite the properties as properties of one object (an extended thing of prism shape and bluish color) (*A Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy*, v. I, Introduction, 2, 17, pp. 4-5, 39 [4-5, 47]).

This process of abstraction has the result that what the mind knows is abstract and universal; it is applicable to an indefinite number of individual objects. We perceive this quiddity or abstract reason of a thing with the intellect. Thus, for instance, from the many oak trees in the forest, each of a different color and shape, we can grasp what is common to oak leaves and distinguishes them from willow leaves. Again we can grasp the concept of a triangle by abstracting it from a particular wooden three-strip object lying in our palm. Here we abstract out the particularizing notes such as wood and focus on triangularity (*A Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy*, v. I, Psychology, Part Three, I, 89, 91-92, 106, pp. 240-241, 244-249, 261 [94-95, 99-102, 117-118]; *Course of Philosophy*, Psychology, v. I, II, 1, 87, pp. 219-222; v. II, III, 1, 182, 223, pp. 72-75, 185-190). Consequently, truth, while it begins in experience, ultimately issues from an act of intellectual reflection (a view Mercier called illationism).

Mercier additionally holds that the mind can grasp reality (contra Kant and others). For truth, following Aquinas, is the conformity be-

tween thoughts (ideal or mental types) and objects (things) (*A Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy*, v. I, Criteriology, Part One, I, 5-6, pp. 347-348 [4-5 (sec. 4-5)]; see "The Notion of Truth," in CMPE, pp. 359-365; *Course of Philosophy*, Psychology, v. II, III, 1, 185, pp. 79-80; *Course of Philosophy*, General Metaphysics, II, 95-99, pp. 200-211; *Course of Philosophy*, General Criteriology, Part One, I, i, 1, 11, 13, 15-16, pp. 17-18, 20-33). Indeed, Mercier is famous for his extended investigation of the criteria by which we distinguish truth (especially certitude) and falsehood, an investigation he termed a criteriology.

Now Mercier held that through reflection on our acts of knowledge we can attain a criterion of truth that is immediate, intrinsic, and objective, i.e. certitude. Certitude is the state of the mind when it grasps that it knows the truth, the repose of the soul in the conscious possession of truth. In other words certitude is based on the internal observation that an act of knowledge has occurred (*A Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy*, v. I, Criteriology, Part One, III, 33, 35, p. 369, 371 [31, 33 (sec 34, 36)]; *Course of Philosophy*, General Criteriology, Part One, I, ii-iii, 23, 55, pp. 40, 114-115).

This certitude comes from the intellectual perception that the two terms of a judgment (subject and predicate) are united by a relation or bond (objective evidence) in some way (*A Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy*, v. I, Criteriology, Part One, I, 8, pp. 346, 349 [4, 8]; Part One, III, 31-32, pp. 368-369 [29-30 (sec. 32-33)]; *Course of Philosophy*, General Criteriology, Part One, I, i-ii, 17-19, 25, pp. 33-35, 46-52; III, i, 101-102, 111-114, pp. 234, 259-271; IV, 152-153, pp. 419-423; "Leo XIII and the Restoration of Philosophical Studies," in CMPE, pp. 83-85). Certitude is thus "the firm and reflective adherence of the mind to a truth, an adhesion determined by the intuition of a relation of identity or of conformity between two terms" (*A Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy*, v. I, Criteriology, Part One, I, 8, p. 349 [8]; cf. *A Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy*, v. I, General Metaphysics, Part Two, 61, p. 460 [64-65 (sec. 62)]; *Course of Philosophy*, General Criteriology, Part One, I, i, 6, 9, pp. 8, 16; IV, 152, p. 420).

Certitude may take the form of an immediate judgment of truth (self-evidence) about the identity of subject and predicate as in the assertions that 'a whole is equal to the sum of its parts' or ' $2+2=4$ ,' or that 'something cannot both be and not be in the same way in the same place and time,' i.e. the principle of non-contradiction. Here we merely analyze the terms of a proposition and see the relation between

predicate and subject (*A Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy*, v. I, Criteriology, Part One, III, 33, 36, pp. 369, 371 [30-33 (sec. 34, 36)]; Part Two, I, 54, pp. 387-388 [49-50 (sec. 52)]; "Theory of the Three Primary Truths," and "Discussion of the Theory of the Three Primary Truths" and "Positivism and the Necessary Truths of Mathematical Sciences," in CMPE, pp. 273-275, 304-306, 308-309, 335, 340; *Course of Philosophy*, General Metaphysics, II, 132-135, pp. 257-266; *Course of Philosophy*, General Criteriology, Part One, II, ii, 52, 108-111). Certitude may also take the form of judgments wherein the subject and predicate are united due to experience such as "The cause of tuberculosis is a microbe.' Here we must verify that the subject and predicate relate by their actual existence as a concrete reality (*A Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy*, v. I, Criteriology, Part One, III, 36, pp. 371-372 [33-34 (sec. 37)]).<sup>150</sup> Certitude is attainable in both of these ways.

Mercier then, in a manner similar to that of Kleutgen, argues philosophy must commence neither with the assumption that the mind cannot know the truth (i.e. Cartesian methodical doubt), nor that the mind is capable of knowing the truth. Rather we must hold in abeyance whether or not the mind can know the truth until by an analysis of its act of knowing we learn that it knows and the cause of its knowledge (i.e. until a criteriology can be established). Mercier calls this view a mitigated or rational dogmatism (*A Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy*, v. I, Criteriology, Part One, II, 12, 17, 20, pp. 353, 356-357, 359-361 [12, 15-16, 19-20 (sec. 12, 16, 20)]; "Why Methodical Doubt Cannot be Universal," in CMPE, pp. 316-324; *Course of Philosophy*, General Criteriology, Part One, II, i, iii, 32-34, 39-43, 55, 58, pp. 68-76, 83-91, 114-115, 119-123; IV, 148, 151, pp. 413-416, 418-419; Appendix, pp. 428-431).

Mercier also follows Kleutgen in his metaphysics where he argues that humans can grasp both an ideal and a real order of reality. The ideal order consists of the essences or quiddities of things abstracted from their individuating circumstances and acts of existence. We can study these abstract essences to determine their logical natures and the relations between various ideal essences in a judgment of the imagination. We can also link these abstract essences to actual things and engage in judgments of experience relating to actual essences. Here we affirm that an essence is individualized by a thisness (*haecceity*) which we sense. All knowledge therefore involves the grasping of an essence (intelligible form) which is actually existing or capable of so existing

(*A Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy*, v. I, Criteriology, Part One, III, 43, p. 379 [41]; Part Two, II, 65, pp. 397-398 [63-64 (sec. 64)]); "Agnosticism," in CMPE, pp. 295-298; *Course of Philosophy*, General Metaphysics, I, 15-28, pp. 26-52; IV, 150, pp. 416-418).

Mercier goes on in his metaphysics to describe the nature of finite beings as possessing substance (what can exist in/through itself) with accidents (what exists only in a substance), matter and form, and a distinct essence and existence (*A Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy*, v. I, General Metaphysics, Part One, 31-33, pp. 434-439 [33-39 (sec. 32-34)]); "The Distinction between Essence and Existence," and "Discussions: Objections against the Theory of the Real Distinction between Essence and Existence," in CMPE, pp. 448-455, 494-498; *Course of Philosophy*, General Metaphysics, I, 14, 45, 50-54, pp. 25-26, 89-91, 103-130; III, 1-2, 137-138, 141, 145, 155-161, 186, pp. 268-271, 274-278, 287-299, 319-337, 389-392). All things also have the transcendental properties of being, unity, truth, and goodness (but not beauty for Mercier) (*A Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy*, v. I, General Metaphysics, Part Two, 41, 60, 63, 73-77, pp. 446-447, 459-463, 468-472 [44-46, 63-64, 67, 75-77 (sec. 39, 61, 65, 74-75)]); *Course of Philosophy*, General Metaphysics, II, 59, 62-64, 94, 101-102, 121, 129-131, pp. 140-141, 146-149, 198-200, 212-215, 236-240, 254-257; IV, 4, 280, pp. 592-594).

Mercier's metaphysics leads us back to the Thomistic position that God is knowable by reason and not just faith. Mercier claimed against the romantics, fideists, traditionalists, integralists, and positivists that discursive reason can show that God exists (*A Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy*, v. II, Natural Theology, Introduction, 1-2, pp. 3-5 [1-3]; Part One, II, 10, pp. 17-18 [14-15 (sec. 9)]; II, 12, pp. 23-24 [19-21 (sec. 11)]; II, 15, p. 28; see v. I, Criteriology, Part One, III, 24, pp. 363-365; *Course of Philosophy*, General Criteriology, Part One, III, i, 69-71, 83, 85, 90, pp. 151-163, 194-195, 197, 211-214; III, iii, 129, pp. 331-334; "The Philosophical Assessment of the Nineteenth Century," in CMM, pp. 324, 327). As Mercier notes, only a belief in God founded on reason can successfully admit the existence and worship of God. For reason alone gives us a criterion by which to judge the truth or falsity of a religious teaching, and the security to accept what is built on its foundations (*A Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy*, v. II, Natural Theology, Part One, II, 15, p. 28).

Mercier, of course, as a Thomist, rejects the ontological arguments of Anselm, Descartes, Leibniz, and Bossuet. For our idea of God's being comes from analogy, and we cannot draw the note of existence from an analysis of the idea of infinity. All we can say is that if an infinite Being exists, existence necessarily belongs to it (i.e. we can grant only a hypothetical necessity to the claim) (*A Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy*, v. II, Natural Theology, Part One, II, 17-18, pp. 29-32 [25-28 (sec. 14-15)]; v. I, General Metaphysics, Part Three, IV, 126, pp. 520-522 [136-138 (sec. 127)]; *Course of Philosophy*, General Criteriology, Part One, III, i, 96, pp. 226-228).<sup>151</sup>

God's existence is instead known through reflection on the metaphysical nature of the world around us, i.e. in an *a posteriori* manner (*A Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy*, v. II, Natural Theology, Introduction, 2, p. 4 [2]; *Course of Philosophy*, Psychology, v. II, III, 1, 195, pp. 95-96). Mercier in particular defends the five ways of Aquinas. First, we find that things in the world pass from potentiality to actuality, i.e. they undergo metaphysical movement (change). Now a being in a state of potentiality cannot be the principle (source) of the perfection that being acquires in becoming actual. Nor can we find the principle of actuality by positing an infinite series of beings in potentiality. For none of these moved beings would have in themselves the reason of the perfections they receive (nothing can give itself what it does not already possess but must receive it from some being that already does possess it). Thus we must posit the existence of a First Being (a being that does not receive its perfections from any other being and is Pure Actuality) to explain the passing from potentiality to actuality that we observe in beings. God, an Unmoved Being, is thus the ultimate source of all worldly movement (*A Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy*, v. II, Natural Theology, Part One, II, 21-22, pp. 35-40 [30-34 (sec. 19-20)]). Mercier summarizes this first way as follows: "There are moved beings. The reason of the formal determinations that they acquire is not found in themselves; it is extrinsic. Now, to explain the acquisition of these perfections it is necessary to admit, outside the series of movers that are moved, a mover free from all external action. For, if there existed only moved beings, the total series that they constitute would not give the explanatory reason (*raison d'être*) of the movement which we observe there. We must then admit the existence of a moving Cause, free from movement, and which is in itself the principle of its formal determinations" (*A Manual of Modern*

*Scholastic Philosophy*, v. II, Natural Theology, Part One, II, 21, pp. 37-38 [32 (sec. 19)]).

The second way is the argument from efficient causality. Now we observe efficient subordinated causality in the beings around us (i.e. some beings depend on other beings for their being and activity). Yet none of these causes contain within themselves the principle of their own causal activity. Nor can we trace causality back to an infinite series of dependent causes, as each new imagined cause merely renews the previous difficulty. As Mercier famously remarks: "A problem is not solved by the act of proposing it an endless number of times" (*A Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy*, v. II, Natural Theology, Part One, II, 23, p. 42). We must therefore posit a Cause independent of all extrinsic causes, i.e. God (*A Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy*, v. II, Natural Theology, Part One, II, 23, pp. 40-43 [34-36 (sec. 21)]).<sup>152</sup> Mercier sums up this argument as follows: "There are dependent efficient causes. They cannot find in themselves their explanatory reason (*raison d'être*). Consequently it is necessary to posit, outside the series of causes, even if it be infinite, an uncaused Cause which gives the adequate explanation of their action" (*A Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy*, v. II, Natural Theology, Part One, II, 23, p. 43 [35-36 (sec. 21)]).

The third argument is the argument from the contingency of beings. Now we observe beings that begin to exist and so pass from non-being to being. Yet a being which begins to exist does not possess in itself the reason of its own existence. Nor can we posit an infinite series of contingent beings to arrive at an explanation for this. For if none of the beings in the series has a reason for its existence in itself there cannot be any existence at all. We must accordingly posit a Being that is independent of all other beings and is itself the reason of its own existence (*A Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy*, v. II, Natural Theology, Part One, II, 24, pp. 43-45 [36-37 (sec. 22)]; v. I, General Metaphysics, Part Three, III, 122-123, pp. 517-518 [132-133 (sec. 123-124)]); "Leo XIII and the Restoration of Philosophical Studies," in CMPE, pp. 101; *Course of Philosophy*, General Metaphysics, III, 3, 196-198, pp. 413-415). Mercier explains the argument in this way: "There are beings which become. These contingent beings can only be explained by an external being. One cannot go back without end in the series of beings which do not have their explanatory reason in themselves: their dependent existence cannot be explained in this manner. We must

therefore arrive at a Being which would be in itself the reason for its existence, a necessary Being" (*A Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy*, v. II, Natural Theology, Part One, II, 24, p. 45 [37 (sec. 22)]).

The fourth way is that from the grades of perfection manifested in beings, which Mercier reinterprets in a non-traditional manner. His version is as follows. Now we find various degrees of perfections – virtue, goodness, and nobleness – in earthly beings. Moreover, a perfection that is possessed to a limited degree cannot belong to a being by virtue of its own essence (in virtue of the being in itself) but must be communicated to it by another causal agent. For a perfection possessed in virtue of an essence must be wholly present. But there cannot be an infinitely long series of perfections and so we must posit a being which is the reason of its own perfections, i.e. God (*A Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy*, v. II, Natural Theology, Part One, II, 27, pp. 47-48 [39-41 (sec. 25)]).

Lastly is the argument from the order of the universe (which Mercier notes is not an argument from analogy as in William Paley but is rather an argument from requisite explanation). Now we find an order in the universe – the many elements and activities are arranged to make one harmonious and enduring whole (and to secure the good of the species). This marvelous harmony of the universe, taken as a whole, is like an immense drama wherein the general success of the innumerable scenes that succeed one another is secured by the harmonious setting and the development of all the parts. For living organisms display a wonderful order in the nice adjustment of their various parts (eyes are designed for the reception of light; plants give off  $O_2$  which is used by animals who in return give off the  $CO_2$  utilized by plants). Now this order demands an intelligent and free cause. For if the order of the world resulted from pure chance then inorganic and organic substances would not combine according to strictly fixed proportions and render vital activity possible. Thus to explain the order of the universe, wherein a multitude of elements achieve a felicitous and purposeful union, we need to posit an intelligent ruling and controlling cause (*A Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy*, v. II, Natural Theology, Part One, II, 28-29, pp. 49-54 [41-46 (sec. 26-27)]; v. I, General Metaphysics, Part Four, IV, 170-171, pp. 558-561 [182-186 (sec. 171-172)]; *Course of Philosophy*, General Metaphysics, IV, 4, 259-263, 288-290, pp. 540-552, 614-618).

In these five ways then God is known through nature. Consequently, in opposition to the view of the ontologists and intuitions such as Bergson and Le Roy, we know of God's nature by analogy, by acquiring concepts from the material world and then eliminating all the imperfections characteristic of this finite and contingent realm before applying them to God (*A Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy*, v. II, Natural Theology, Introduction, 2, p. 5 [3]; Part One, I, 5, p. 10 [6-7 (sec. 4)]; Part One, II, 13-14, pp. 26-28 [21-23 (sec. 12)]; v. I, Psychology, Part One, I, 108, pp. 262-263 [119-120]; *Course of Philosophy*, General Metaphysics, III, 4, 291, pp. 421-422). So we know God by "borrowing the various simple perfections in created beings, and by means of a work of purification, we recombine them in the unique concept of the divine being" (*A Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy*, v. II, Natural Theology, Part One, II, 18, p. 30 [26 (sec. 15)]). Specifically, the knowledge of God results from a threefold process of 1) attribution (taking up all the simple perfections, i.e. perfections found in the world whose definition neither implies nor excludes imperfection), 2) elimination (excluding all ideas of imperfection from them), and 3) transcendence (affirming the purified perfections of God in a way different from and superior to that in which they are found in contingent beings) (*A Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy*, v. II, Natural Theology, Part One, I, 6, pp. 11-12 [8 (sec. 5)]). Mercier explains his view thusly: "On account of this infirmity of our understanding, we can only grasp the nature of God in the relations that His nature entails with nature. From the order of finality established and maintained in the Cosmos, we ascend to the divine *intelligence*, to the divine *wisdom*; from the contingency of the beings that surround us we ascend to the *power* of God the creator" (*A Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy*, v. II, Natural Theology, Part One, I, 7, p. 14 [10-11 (sec. 6)]).

In this way we know that God is a self-subsistent being (an actual absolute existence, with no composition of essence and existence), simple (lacking extended parts and matter), perfect, infinite, immense (omnipresent or ubiquitous), immutable, eternal, and who is a living being with thought and knowledge (omniscience), will (omnipotence), and goodness (omnibenevolence) (*A Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy*, v. II, Natural Theology, Part Two, I, 36-38, 41, 44-46, 48, 51-55, pp. 61-72, 79-88 [51-65, 75-88 (sec. 31-33, 35, 39-41, 43, 45-49)]); Part Three, I-II, 57-61, 70, 75-76, pp. 91-96, 109,

112 [91-96, 111, 114-115 (sec. 51-55, 64, 69-70)]; "Leo XIII and the Restoration of Philosophical Studies," in CMPE, p. 102).

Now an obvious question is if God is good (and all-knowing and all-powerful) why is there evil? Mercier replies to this concern by arguing that physical evil occurs as the particular ends of creatures are sacrificed to the requirements of the general order of nature. Suffering and grief, moreover, detaches the human heart from the sensible-life and leaves it free to pursue moral aspirations and build a moral character. Finally, moral evil is due to humans as humans have free will and can do good or evil. Yet all of this, he admits, is but a glimpse or guess at God's design in creation (*A Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy*, v. II, Natural Theology, Part Three, III, 89, pp. 128-132 [133-137 (sec. 83)]; *Course of Philosophy*, General Metaphysics, II, 122-123, pp. 241-250).

Regarding the human soul, Mercier certainly was aware of the soul's intimate connection with the physically real, i.e. with the body. His works continually point out how the soul is intimately tied to and affected by the operations of the nervous system (*A Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy*, v. I, Psychology, Part Three, I, 90, 142, 148, 160, pp. 242, 244, 295, 300-302, 314-315 [96-99, 157, 164-166, 182-183]; *Course of Philosophy*, Psychology, v. II, III, 1, 227, 263-266, 274, pp. 195-196, 287-304, 327-330). Still the soul is not reducible to the brain, but is rather an immaterial spirit. As such the soul is capable of existing and acting without the body; the soul, unlike other material substances, is a subsisting form. As Mercier puts it, the soul does not depend upon the human body in an intrinsic manner for its operation, only in an extrinsic manner.

Mercier gives several arguments for this immateriality of the soul. The immateriality of the soul is demonstrated by the fact that the soul 1) knows abstract universals which are disengaged from the particular characteristics of material things; 2) can engage in self-reflection; 3) is not affected by wear and tear or over-stimulation – indeed it can immediately think of what is simple and familiar after contemplating the most extensive truths of reason; 4) can engage in free choices in a manner undetermined by the fixed laws affecting material objects; and 5) is simple and not composed of parts (*A Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy*, v. I, Psychology, Part Three, I, 143-147, pp. 295-300 [157-164]; v. II, Ethics, Part One, III, 51, p. 244 [91 (sec. 101)];

*Course of Philosophy*, Psychology, v. II, III, 1, 3, 251-258, 282-283, pp. 249-277, 347-349).<sup>153</sup>

The human soul is therefore also immortal, for an immaterial and simple entity is incapable of being corrupted (*A Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy*, v. I, Psychology, Part Three, III, 167, pp. 321-322 [191-192]; "Leo XIII and the Restoration of Philosophical Studies," in CMPE, pp. 98-99). The soul's immortality can also be established by the (nearly) universal belief in the afterlife found throughout the human race. Finally there is the important matter that God, who is wise, holy, just, and good, will reward the just and punish the wicked according to their deserts and provide for human happiness. Now as neither of these occurs fully in this life, there must be a future life wherein humans will find justice and happiness (*A Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy*, v. I, Psychology, Part Three, III, 168-169, pp. 322-324 [192-195]; v. II, Ethics, Part One, III, 51-52, pp. 244-245 [91-92 (sec. 101-102)]; *Course of Philosophy*, Psychology, v. II, III, 3, 284-285, pp. 350-360). Moreover, as we need a resurrected body for complete happiness, the soul will be combined with a body in the afterlife. For the soul's natural activity is most perfectly exercised when united to a body. Thus reason can not only establish the resurrection of the soul for Mercier, it can establish that of the body as well (*A Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy*, v. I, Psychology, Part Three, III, 172, pp. 326-327 [198-199]; *Course of Philosophy*, Psychology, v. II, III, 3, 290-291, pp. 371-376).<sup>154</sup>

Through the work of Kleutgen and Mercier Thomism became the dominant philosophy of the Catholic Church. Hence its major prominence in the encyclical *Aeternis Patris* (1879) and at the First Vatican Council (1869-1870). This Thomistic revival was to last until the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965).



## AUGUSTINIANISM

*1840-2000 in Argentina, Canada, France, Germany,  
Italy, Poland, & the United States*

We have explored the rise of the Catholic philosophies of Romanticism, Traditionalism, Semi-Rationalism, and Ontologism, in previous chapters. And we have just seen the predominance of Thomism. Somewhat surprisingly, however, the classical philosophy and theology of Augustinianism, so dominant in the Patristic era,<sup>155</sup> so influential in the medieval period,<sup>156</sup> had comparatively few adherents in the Modern and Contemporary philosophical periods.<sup>157</sup>

Augustinianism, in its philosophical views, consisted of four key ideas. First, Augustinians held that God is known by turning within [*intus*], by reflecting on the human soul and its operations, rather than by reflecting on the external world. As a well-known remark of Augustine proclaims: “Do not go outside, return into yourself, truth dwells in the interior of human” [*Noli foras ire, in te ipsum redi, in interiore hominis habitat veritas*] (*On True Religion*, XXXIX, 72; cf. *Confessions*, III, 6; X, 27).

This idea of the truth being within humans led Augustine to embrace a theory of illumination. This is the view that humans are able to know eternal truths (such as those of mathematics and morality) due to the fact that their minds are illuminated by God. In other words, God imparts eternal divine ideas (or at least a divine light) into the souls of humans giving them a knowledge of unchanging truths. As Augustine writes: “we immediately see things in that inner light of truth (*interiore luce veritatis*) by which one oneself who is called the inner human is illuminated and brought joy” (*On the Teacher*, XII, 39; cf. 38-40); and “the nature of the intellectual mind is so fashioned as to see things ... in a sort of incorporeal light (*luce incorporea*) of its own kind” (*On the Trinity*, XII, 24; cf. XII, 2, 15, XV, 12; cf. *On Free Choice of the Will*, II, 8-9, 12, 15; III, 1; *Soliloquies*, I, 1, 5, 12-13; *On Diverse Questions*, q. 9 and 46).

The third tenet of Augustinians contends that humans have a natural desire for happiness, and that such a desire can only be satisfied by the possession of an eternal being. Thus, in what may be called the proof of God by desire, God's existence is indicated by the very desire humans have to love and know God (for Augustinians, God is known primarily through the will). This approach is reflected in two famous quotes from Augustine regarding God: "Our hearts are restless until they rest in You" [*inquietum est cor nostrum donec requiescat in te*] (*Confessions*, I, 1) and "I have tasted You and I hunger and thirst for You. You have touched me, and I am kindled in Your peace" (*Confessions*, X, 27; cf. X, 22-23; XI, 29-30; XIII, 8; cf. *The Happy Life*, IV, 33-35; *On Free Choice of the Will*, II, 13-15; *On the Trinity*, IX, 12; XIII, 8; *City of God*, XIII, 8).

Finally, there is Augustine's influential idea that first we must believe by faith but then we can try to understand more about our religion through reason (*On Free Choice of the Will*, II, 2; *Tractates on the Gospel of John*, XXIX, 6; *On Diverse Questions*, q. 48; *On Order*, II, 9; *On the Trinity*, XV, 2; Epistle 120; Sermons 43 and 126).<sup>158</sup>

Augustinianism was revived in the nineteenth-century by the French philosopher **Auguste Joseph Alphonse Gratry (1805-1872)**.<sup>159</sup> Gratry was born in 1805 in Lille, Nord, France. In 1820, at the age of fifteen, he set out for the Collège Henri IV in Paris where he discovered Voltaire and gave up his religious beliefs. In 1822, however, an awareness of his need for the spiritual (and reflection on how most humans go through life like sheep – unaware of their purpose) convinced him that there was a supreme being to whom he henceforth dedicated his life. Gratry thus rejoined the Catholic Church and studied at the École Polytechnique in Paris from 1825 to 1827. Deciding to become a priest, he left the École Polytechnique and joined the community of Bautain at the school of Strasbourg in 1828 where he taught secondary school and where he was ordained to the priesthood in 1832. After his ordination, Gratry became a professor at the Petit Séminaire in Strasbourg, and then rector of the Collège Stanislas in Paris from 1840-1846. Gratry moved to the École Normale Supérieure in 1846 where he held the position of chaplain. Here he came into literary conflict with the Hegelian Étienne Vacherot, both of whom were dismissed ("resigned") in 1851 due to the embarrassment this incident caused the school. After his dismissal Gratry served as Vicar-General for the diocese of Orléans and helped to found the Oratorians of the

Immaculate Conception in 1852. Gratry left the Oratorian community in 1861 as it did not suit his contemplative and academic life-style (indeed he was forced out of the Oratory itself in 1869 after he had founded the International League for Peace [*La Ligue de la paix*] with Hyacinthe Loyson two years earlier) and he acquired a position at the Sorbonne beginning in 1862. Gratry died in Montreaux, Vaud, Switzerland in 1872. He achieved much renown in his life and became a member of the French Academy in 1867, his bust was erected at the College de Juilly in 1896, and a pacifistic Société Gratry was established from 1907-1909.

Gratry's great work on philosophy of religion was his *The Knowledge of God* [*La Connaissance de Dieu*], 2 vols. (1853).<sup>160</sup> In this work Gratry, under the influence of Plato, Augustine, Bonaventure, Pascal, Malebranche, Fénelon, and others, presented an Augustinian defense of the human knowledge of God (see *The Knowledge of God*, Introduction, 5, p. [47 (v. I)]).<sup>161</sup>

Although Gratry was a student of the fideist Bautain, he held a quite different view about the significance of reason to philosophy. Gratry argued that the abasement of reason is a grave danger to Christianity; for if one managed to overthrow reason one would end up overthrowing religion with it. In fact, says Gratry, "the crime against nature which attacks reason is worse than the sacrilege which attacks faith. To ruin reason is to prevent the religious edifice from holding by undermining its ground" (*The Knowledge of God*, Introduction, 4, pp. [33-34 (v. I)]).<sup>162</sup> Hence philosophy must reestablish its respect for reason by incorporating reason as part of its method (*The Knowledge of God*, Introduction, 5, pp. [40-42 (v. I)]; cf. *The Knowledge of God*, Introduction, 1, pp. [1-2 (v. I)]; 2, p. [17 (v. I)]; 3, pp. [18-19 (v. I)]; 4, pp. [32-33, 44 (v. I)]).<sup>163</sup>

Yet in order to resurrect reason properly, it is necessary to recognize that human beings know reality not through reason in isolation, but rather through the conjunction of reason and will (and the senses as well). This need for both reason and the will in knowledge makes itself clear once we recognize that philosophy is the search for the whole of wisdom, both theoretical and practical (intellectual and moral): philosophy is "the human seeking through the intellect and the will goodness and truth" (*The Knowledge of God*, I, 1, pp. 13 [54 (v. I)]; cf. I, 1, pp. 17-18, 21-23 [61, 67-70 (v. I)]; I, 2, p. 30 [80-81 (v. I)]; I, 7, pp. 263-264 [28-30 (v. II)]). Humans must thus seek the whole truth

not just with the reason, but also with the heart (as Gratry says, intelligence and will are the two wings of the soul which elevate it to the good and the true) (*The Knowledge of God*, Introduction, 5, p. [43 (v. I)]; I, 7, pp. 193-194 [369-370 (v. I)]; II, 1, p. 359 [189 (v. II)]; II, 3, p. 403 [266 (v. II)]; cf. *The Knowledge of the Soul*, section 1).

Now on account of this dual nature of humans, intellectual and volitional, there are two corresponding processes of human reasoning: 1) syllogism or deduction and 2) dialectic or induction (*The Knowledge of God*, I, 1, pp. 18-19 [62-63 (v. I)]; I, 9, p. 333 [147 (v. II)]; *Logic*, v. I, Introduction, pp. lxiii, lxvii, lxxxix [54, 57, 73]; v. I, I, 1, p. 7 [116]; v. I, II, 1, pp. 110-111 [175]).

Syllogistic reasoning, which occurs through reason alone, proceeds from the universal to the particular through the principles of identity (what is is) and contradiction (the same thing cannot be and not be at the same time in the same way). It draws conclusions that are latent in the premises of an argument (like to like; known to known). Syllogistic reasoning is particularly useful in mathematics, but can be abstractive and sterile if misapplied to other domains (*Logic*, v. I, I, 6, p. 94 [164]).

Dialectic on the other hand, which occurs through the joint operation of reason and the will (love), proceeds from the particular to the universal through the principle of transcendence. It discovers additional knowledge not present in the premises (like to unlike; known to unknown) (cf. *Logic*, v. I, Introduction, pp. lii-liii, lxvii, xci-xcii, cx-cxi [47, 57, 74, 88]; v. I, I, 4, pp. 69-70 [151]).

In particular, through dialectic one can traverse from the finite to the infinite (limited to unlimited) and achieve a knowledge of God. That is to say, dialectic, in the main, is the process whereby from finite and limited perfections one comes to affirm the existence of a divine being with the correlative infinite and unlimited perfections (*The Knowledge of God*, I, 1, pp. 19, 21, 24 [63, 66-67, 71 (v. I)]; cf. I, 7, p. 290 [74 (v. II)]; I, 9, pp. 328, 332-335, 344 [138, 144-150, 164 (v. II)]; II, 4, pp. 421-423, 426 [296-299, 305 (v. II)]; II, 6, pp. 448-449 [344-346 (v. II)]; cf. *Logic*, v. I, Introduction, pp. lxix-lxx [59]). Gratry speaks of dialectic in the following way: "It consists, with any degree of being, beauty, or perfection being given (which is always given as soon as we are, see, or think), in instantly eliminating, by thought, the limits of finite being and the imperfect qualities which we possess or see, in order to affirm, without any other intermediary, the infinite existence

of Being and its perfections which correspond to those we see" (*The Knowledge of God*, I, 1, p. 19 [64 (v. I)]); cf. *The Knowledge of God*, I, 1, p. 23 [71 (v. I)]); or in more detail, "I speak of that fundamental operation of the rational life, that act of sovereign reason, which from every finite given soars to the infinite as the actual source and eternal mode of the finite given that is perceived ... which says, in sensing being, life, and its limits: remove these limitations, there is an infinite being, actually and infinitely living, which says, I know something, therefore an infinite intelligence exists; I love, therefore an infinite love exists; I see limited space, transitory time, therefore an infinite magnitude and eternity exists; there are traces of beauty, therefore there is a supreme beauty; there are traces of happiness, therefore there is a complete happiness and a felicity without limits" (*The Knowledge of God*, I, 9, p. 334 [148-149 (v. II)]). So in dialectic, by negating the limits of the finite positive traits of being, beauty, and goodness that things present to us, we are able to affirm that there is an infinite and eternal exemplar of their reality, i.e. God (*The Knowledge of God*, I, 2, pp. 28-29 [78-79 (v. I)]); I, 9, pp. 343-344 [162-163 (v. II)]; *The Philosophy of Belief*, I, 2, p. 12; *Logic*, v. I, Introduction, pp. lxxxi, xcvi [67, 79]; v. I, II, 1, pp. 121-131 [183-190]; v. I, II, 2, p. 181 [214]; v. II, IV, 1, pp. 1-2 [351]; v. II, V, 3, pp. 509-510 [283-284]).

This knowledge of God, which is based on a dialectical act of the whole human being (i.e. intellect and will), Gratre does not hesitate to label a form of prayer. He writes: "If there are true proofs of the existence of God, these proofs should be with the reach of all humans. ... Therefore, in order to find useful proofs of the existence of God, it is necessary to seek their origin and reality in some ordinary and everyday operation of the human soul, mind, and heart, intelligence and will, which is nothing else than the universal fact of prayer. And I understand by prayer in philosophy, what Descartes specifies when he says: 'I feel that I am a finite being who unceasingly strives and aspires to something better and greater than I am' ... Prayer is the movement of the soul soaring from the finite to the infinite" (*The Knowledge of God*, I, 1, p. 16 [58-59 (v. I)]); cf. *The Knowledge of God*, Introduction, 3, p. [22 (v. I)], 5, p. [50 (v. I)]; I, 7, p. 191 [365 (v. I)]; I, 9, p. 345 [164-165 (v. II)]; II, 5, p. 439 [329 (v. II)]; cf. *Logic*, Preface to the Second Edition, p. [18]; v. I, Introduction, p. cxxxvii [106]; v. I, I, 6-II, 1, pp. 103-142 [170-198]; v. II, IV, 2, p. 42 [373]; v. II, IV, 5, p. 119 [417]; *The Knowledge of the Soul*, I, pp. 223-227).

Gratry recognizes that this dialectic transition from the finite to the infinite seems to bridge a great gap. Humans can achieve this transition, he argues, through the operation of a vital impulse (*élan*), that is to say through the desires of the heart (combined with reason), or what Gratry calls the divine sense (*The Knowledge of God*, Introduction, 5, pp. [43-44 (v. I)]; I, 1, pp. 14, 17-18, 21 [55, 60-61, 67 (v. I)]; cf. *The Philosophy of Belief*, VII, 1-2, pp. 250-266; *Logic*, v. I, Introduction, pp. xcvi-xcix, cxxvi, cxxxviii-cxli [78-79, 98, 107-109]; v. I, I, 1, p. 15 [120]; v. I, I, 5, p. 81 [157]; v. I, II, 3, pp. 231-232 [242]; v. I, III, 4, pp. 395-399 [338-340]; v. II, VI, p. 303 [524]). Gratry speaks of the divine sense allowing humans access to God as follows: "The first moral condition of the existence of these dialectical judgments which proceed from every finite to the infinite, is what should be called the sense of infinite, this divine sense which is always given, which is the universal attraction to the Sovereign Good or the infinite within every soul" (*The Knowledge of God*, I, 1, p. 22 [69 (v. I)]; cf. I, 1, p. 23 [70 (v. I)]; II, 2, p. 368 n. 1 [203 n. 2 (v. II)]; II, 6, p. 449 [345-346 (v. II)]). He similarly explains that the process of dialectic: "... reaches God by a simultaneous act of intellect and will, reason and liberty. Its moving force (*ressort*) in the mind is the divine sense, the sense of the infinite, or, if you will, the inevitable attraction to the Sovereign Good in every soul" (*The Knowledge of God*, I, 1, p. 24 [71-72 (v. I)]; cf. *The Knowledge of God*, I, 2, pp. 30-31 [81-82 (v. I)]). Hence according to Gratry humans find a proof of the infinite in the finite through the operation of a divine sense, or in other words, through the natural attraction of the sovereign good, the attraction of the desirable and intelligible (*The Knowledge of God*, Introduction, 5, pp. [44-45 (v. I)]; *Logic*, v. I, I, 6, pp. 98-99 [167]; cf. *Logic*, v. II, IV, 7, p. 191 [458]). This is how humans can rise beyond finite beings to assert the existence of a God who is pure being, necessary, simple, infinite, immense, eternal, immutable, omnipotent, omniscient (intelligent), good, free, and loving (*The Knowledge of God*, I, 1, p. 15 [57 (v. I)]; I, 8, pp. 307-312, 316, 318 [104-112, 118, 122 (v. II)]; I, 9, p. 344 [164 (v. II)]).

Gratry expands his own dialectical proof of God through the mouth-piece of Anselm: "Here is what occurs in the soul which arrives at the idea of God, this main principle of all philosophy. First, every soul always experiences the attraction of the sovereign Good. Moreover, it sees all things, in a certain manner, in the light of God. Every desire for any finite good whatsoever implies a desire for the sovereign Good.

The vision of any finite being implies a certain vision of infinite Being. The attraction of the desirable and the intelligible, the divine sense, this is always the beginning. But this sense and this vision of God which is given to us, or at least which is offered to us by every desired or known thing, is implicit" (*The Knowledge of God*, I, 5, p. 146 [282 (v. I)]; cf. *The Knowledge of God*, I, 2, p. 35 [90 (v. I)]; I, 4, pp. 101-102, 108, 116-118, 120, 128-129 [204-205, 216, 232-235, 239, 252-253 (v. I)]; I, 5, pp. 146-148, 153 (v. I)]; I, 6, pp. 168-169 [322-323 (v. I)]; I, 7, pp. 193-194, 201-203, 211-212 [369-370, 382-385, 398-399 (v. I)]; I, 7, pp. 274-275, 288 [49-50, 71 (v. II)]; I, 8, p. 304 [99 (v. II)]; I, 9, p. 335 [149-150 (v. II)]; II, 3, pp. 393-396, 403 [249-255, 266 (v. II)]; cf. *The Philosophy of Belief*, I, 2, p. 13; cf. *Logic*, v. I, Introduction, p. xci [74]; v. I, I, 6, p. 94 [164], v. I, II, 2, p. 178 [212]).

What Gratry believes to occur in dialectic ascent to God is consequently this: in grasping any finite being one also finds traces of the infinite in it. Furthermore, due to the desire of the soul for the infinite good, one recognizes the imperfection of the finite world causing the soul to reach out and affirm an infinite and perfect good, God, existing beyond the world (*Logic*, v. I, Introduction, pp. xcii-xcvi [75-77]; v. I, III, 4, pp. 407-408 [345]; v. II, IV, 2, pp. 56-57 [381]; v. II, IV, 3, pp. 76, 84-86 [392, 396-398]; v. II, IV, 7, pp. 185, 195-197 [455, 460-461]). For the soul recognizes that finite beings cannot satisfy its desire to know and love and hence is impelled to look beyond the finite (*Logic*, v. I, Introduction, pp. xcv-xcvi [77]). Gratry describes this process of ascending to a knowledge of God in the following manner:

The soul of the human ... conceives and desires without limits all of the beauties and goods of which it perceives any trace. All boundaries, limits, and imperfections are eliminated. Being is conceived in all its plenitude: one conceives of eternal love, happiness without tribulations, truth without shadows, the will stronger than any obstacle, strength playing with space and time, marvels, sudden creations realized by a word, a gesture, a wish. ... All these premonitions of the heart of the human ... all these intoxications of ideal nectar, imply a true and rigorously scientific method. Analyzed by reason, this poetry and this faith contain the rigorous demonstration of the existence of God and His attributes. ... The spectacle of the world, the awareness of life, the sight of finite beings and created beauties, when the heart and the imagination take hold of them to enlarge and impel them to the infinite, by eliminating evil, boundaries and limits, this impulse

[*élan*] of our soul towards the infinite from the finite, is what gives humans the idea of God, the natural knowledge and love of God (*The Knowledge of God*, I, 1, p. 17 [59-60 (v. I)]; cf. *The Knowledge of God*, I, 1, p. 17 [59 (v. I)]; I, 7, p. 188 [361 (v. I)]).

Hence, as we saw at the outset, Gratry argues that God's existence can be proven through reason, but a reason which operates through the need of the heart, i.e. through a natural desire for goodness, happiness, and truth (*The Knowledge of God*, I, 1, p. 16 [58 (v. I)]; I, 5, p. 147 [282-283 (v. I)]; I, 9, pp. 336-340 [151-159 (v. II)]; II, 2, pp. 374-376, 381-383 [214-218, 229-232 (v. II)]; II, 6, p. 453 [351-352 (v. II)]; Compendium, p. [385 (v. II)]; Note A, pp. [423-431 (v. II)]; cf. *The Philosophy of Belief*, I, 4, p. 22; cf. *Logic*, v. I, Introduction, pp. cxxxvi-cxxxvii [106]; v. II, V, 1, p. 201 [466]; v. II, V, 2, pp. 232, 238-239 [483, 486-487]; v. II, V, 3, pp. 280-281 [508]).<sup>164</sup>

This has the consequence that one's knowledge of God is affected by one's moral character. Due to human finitude, excessive sensuality, and vices, knowledge of God is often limited; conversely one who engages in moral acts, especially acts of sacrifice, can more easily discover the presence of God. For though the mind may see reasons to believe in God, unless the heart is moved it will not yield to them. Here again reason must function in cooperation with the will and heart (*The Knowledge of God*, I, 5, p. 147 [282-283 (v. I)]; I, 9, pp. 336-340 [151-159 (v. II)]; II, 1, pp. 353, 357-360 [179, 186-191 (v. II)]; II, 2, pp. 388-392 [241-247 (v. II)]; II, 3, pp. 405-406 [270-273 (v. II)]; II, 4, p. 411 [280-281 (v. II)]; II, 5, p. 440 [330 (v. II)]; *Logic*, v. I, I, 1, pp. 10-11 [118]); *On the Knowledge of the Soul*, II, p. 371; IV, 1-2, VI, 2; *Morality and the Law of History*, I, pp. 49, 281).<sup>165</sup>

Still reason is limited and incomplete without revelation according to Gratry. Though we can know certain natural truths, i.e. God and the moral law, we cannot know these truths with a comprehensive knowledge (nor without error). Neither can humans find their full happiness in nature or in a natural knowledge of God. Supreme felicity requires seeing God in God's essence which in turn requires faith and divine grace. Gratry explains: "human reason is ... an imperfect, incomplete, and dependent thing, which ceaselessly tends and aspires toward something better and greater than itself" (*The Knowledge of God*, II, 4, p. 412 [282 (v. II)]; cf. II, 4, p. 413 [284 (v. II)]). Humans then have a need for a supernatural revelation of God and supernatural grace (*The Knowledge of God*, I, 4, pp. 136-138, 141 [266-269, 274

(v. I)]; I, 6, pp. 180-182 [346-351 (v. I)]; II, 4, pp. 419-420, 423-427 [294-296, 299-306 (v. II)]; II, 5, pp. 445-447 [338-343 (v. II)]; II, 6, p. 460 [362-363 (v. II)]; *Logic*, v. II, V, 1, pp. 200-201 [465-466]; v. II, VI, p. 406 [585]; *The Knowledge of the Soul*, section 4).

The natural desire for happiness, truth, and goodness then, just as it leads humans to a natural knowledge of God through the world, also leads humans to recognize the need for embracing a supernatural faith and a revelation of God. Reason seeks faith,<sup>166</sup> a higher supernatural light, which ultimately gives humans a vision of God's essence in the afterlife and complete felicity (*The Knowledge of God*, Introduction, pp. [18, 45-46 (v. I)]; II, 4, pp. 412-417, 428-430 [282-291, 310-315 (v. II)]; II, 6, p. 459 [361 (v. II)]; Note A, pp. [432-434 (v. II)]). Grattray writes:

This insufficiency of reason, even in the natural order, that is to say in the first degree of the divine intelligible, can be and is known by reason, and this demonstrates the necessity of divine revelation, even in this order of truths. Reason can, moreover, ... recognize that it is itself not its own absolute and first principle, that its natural light is only the image of this principle and as it were the shadow of its light; that this image corresponds to an object which is not in the image, which it does not see, and which it must be possible to see directly; it grasps that it is necessary to see the source of the light, the essence of this divine object, and that this sight is necessary to its supreme happiness and its final perfection (*The Knowledge of God*, II, 6, p. 453 [352 (v. II)]; cf. *Logic*, v. II, V, 1, pp. 213-217 [472-475]; v. II, VI, 1, p. 421 [594]).

There are thus two ways of coming to know God, reason (philosophy) and revelation (faith) (*The Knowledge of God*, I, 10, pp. 350-351 [176-177 (v. II)]; II, 2, pp. 364, 366 [196-197, 200 (v. II)]; cf. *Logic*, v. I, Introduction, p. cxxxi [102]; v. II, V, 3, p. 253 [492]). Reason (with the assistance of desire) is a natural and indirect knowledge of God by reflection (through image of God in world or humans). Revelation on the other hand supplies a supernatural and direct knowledge of God, either obscurely by faith or in a clear manner in the beatific vision (*The Knowledge of God*, II, 2, pp. 368-369, 372, 381-386 [203-206, 210-211, 228-237 (v. II)]; II, 3, pp. 397, 407 [255-256, 273-274 (v. II)]; II, 4, p. 413 [283 (v. II)]; II, 5, pp. 433-437, 443 footnote continuation, 446 [317-327, 335 n. 1, 341 (v. II)]; II, 6, pp. 448-449, 455-458,

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462 [344-346, 354-359, 366 (v. II)]; *The Philosophy of Belief*, I, 2, p. 16).

Gratry's life coincided with a great flourishing of French Catholicism (1800-1875). For, as we have seen, the Church that had been nearly destroyed during the French Revolution (1789-1799), rose again from the ashes when Napoleon signed a Concordat with Rome in 1801. The religious orders, Benedictines, Carmelites, Dominicans, Jesuits (re-established in 1814), Oratorians, Trappists, Vincentians, as well as many others, though not always officially sanctioned, were allowed to return to France. Napoleon also allowed seminaries to reopen and established a state-controlled educational system of lycées (i.e. high-schools): these lycées were overseen by a Minister of National Education (1802) and later additionally by an Imperial University (1808) dedicated to the precepts of the Catholic religion. Moreover, during the Bourbon Restoration (1815-1830) pro-religious laws were passed such as the Press Laws of 1822 forbidding newspapers to attack religion, and the Anti-Sacrilege Law of 1825 which mandated the death penalty for anyone caught stealing consecrated hosts.

The Catholic educational system further expanded during the July Monarchy (1830-1848), the Second Republic (1848-1852), and the Second Empire (1852-1870). Thus in 1833 the Guizot Law allowed for Catholic primary schools to open (the same year in which the Society of St. Vincent de Paul was also founded by the philosopher and associate of Gratry, Antoine Frédéric Ozanam (1813-1853); in 1850 the Falloux Law allowed for Catholic secondary schools and Catholic representation on the Council of the University (the same year in which the Assumptionists were founded); and in 1875 Catholic faculties at the Universities of Aix, Bordeaux, Lyons, Paris, and Rouen, and the Catholic Universities of Angers, Lille, Lyons, Paris, and Toulouse were established. Indeed from 1849-1870 French troops were in Italy assisting Pope Pius IX in his struggle against the Italian revolutionaries. This period of Catholic revival peaked with the First Vatican Council (1869-1870).<sup>167</sup>

However, shortly after Gratry's death in 1872 a new round of anti-Catholicism broke out in France during the Third Republic (1870-1914), especially after the Republicans took the election of 1876. The initial phase occurred under Minister of Education Jules Ferry who was a positivist and whose administrators were the liberal Protestant deists Ferdinand Buisson, Félix Pécaut, and Jules Steeg.<sup>168</sup>

Their stated goal was to reorganize society “without God or king” [*établir l’humanité sans Dieu et sans roi*], which they quickly set about doing. Hence, in 1789 the French senate passed legislation excluding priests from the administrations of hospitals and charities as well as from the Council of the University, and Catholic Universities could no longer confer degrees or call themselves Universities (they became Instituts Catholiques instead); in 1880 Bastille Day was made the national holiday (in celebration of the French Revolution), work was allowed on Sundays, parliamentary sessions no longer opened with prayers, priests and religious serving as army and hospital chaplains were replaced by laity, and the Jesuits were again outlawed; in 1884 divorce was legalized; finally, in 1882 and 1886 education was secularized, made obligatory and free (*l’obligation, la gratuité, la laïcité*) and mandated to be given exclusively in the French language. With the passage of the latter educational decrees, religious priests and nuns were forbidden to teach in state schools (indeed over 5000 of them had to be expelled by force after they refused to obey the law), religion could no longer be taught in the state schools, textbooks had to remove the words God, Providence, and Creator,<sup>169</sup> and religious symbols such as crucifixes were not allowed in newly-opened schools.

After these laws Catholicism was left alone until the unfortunate Dreyfus Affair (1894-1899) in which the Jewish army officer Alfred Dreyfus was accused of selling military secrets to the Germans and imprisoned in 1894 (in 1995 the French Army admitted framing him). A group of left-wing intellectuals (one thinks of Zola’s famous *J’accuse!*) claimed Dreyfus was framed and defended him but various Catholic groups such as the Assumptionists in their paper *La Croix* supported the army.

The backlash against the Catholic Church was great, with the Assumptionists being dissolved in 1900, and the 1901 passage of the René Waldeck-Rousseau law whereby religious congregations of men and women had to be authorized by the state to operate (most of those that applied for authorization were denied). Hence around 16,200 “unauthorized” religious congregations including nearly 14,000 associated schools were dissolved, leaving only around 3200 authorized congregations (including the Brothers of the Christian Schools, Lazarists, and Sulpicians); once again major religious orders such as the Benedictines, Capuchins, Carmelites, Dominicans, Oratorians, and Salesians ceased to exist in France. And following the standard pat-

tern, the properties of these religious congregations were appropriated by the state (1901 and 1903) and sold. Subsequently, in 1903-1904 naval and military hospitals were laicized, soldiers were forbidden from frequenting Catholic social clubs, and crucifixes were removed from the courts of law; in 1904 Émile Combes (a former seminarian) had the Falloux Law repealed and religious priests were forbidden to teach even at private schools and so the remaining 3000 schools operated by authorized congregations were closed (not surprisingly France and the Vatican ended diplomatic relations); and lastly in 1905 a law was passed that officially separated the Church and State in France. With this 1905 law the Concordat of 1801 was revoked and Catholicism was no longer recognized as the religion of the majority of the French populace; the state no longer paid for the upkeep of Catholic priests (the state pay had originally been invoked to compensate the Church for the property taken from it during the French Revolution); all church buildings became state property overseen by Catholic lay associations (*associations culturelles*); presbyteries and seminaries were allowed to be used rent-free for only five years and bishop houses for only two years (in 1908 the government seized these buildings altogether); the Catholic theological faculties of Aix, Bordeaux, Lyons, Paris, and Rouen, were suppressed, and explicitly Catholic professors were not always welcome in the state university system; additionally, all crucifixes were removed from the state schools, religious symbols were not allowed in public spaces (including cemeteries), the mass to start the term at naval academy was eliminated, and a battleship was named the Ernest Renan after the French deist. These were also the years in which Modernism (c. 1902-1907), the view that church dogmas and structures needed to be changed in light of modern interests and science, was a major concern for the Church.

It was in this milieu that perhaps the most famous Augustinian of the nineteenth-century, **Maurice Blondel (1861-1949)**,<sup>170</sup> was born in 1861 in Dijon, Côte-D'Or, France. Blondel came from a very wealthy family (his father was a lawyer and owned three houses) and thus was never lacking for money. He studied at the University of Dijon from 1879-1880 and the École Normale Supérieure in Paris from 1881 to 1886 (where he had the Catholics Émile Boutroux and Léon Ollé-Lapruné as instructors). Blondel then began a teaching career at the lycées of Chaumont (1885), Montauban (1886-1889), Aix-en-Provence (1889), and at Saint Stanislas College in Paris (1891-1892).

In 1893 Blondel received his doctorate in philosophy from the Sorbonne, not without considerable consternation on the part of his dissertation committee due to the Christian nature of his thought (hence Blondel's defense lasted over five hours). On account of anti-Catholic prejudice (of the Director of Higher Education) Blondel initially was not able to attain a philosophy post at a University (he was only offered a chair of history which he refused); however, due to the help of former professors and friends (and after a new Director of Higher Education came on board) Blondel was able to attain a teaching post at the University of Lille from 1895 to 1896 and at the University of Aix-en-Provence from 1896-1927 (he became a professor there in 1899). In 1894 Blondel had also abandoned the idea of becoming a priest and married Rose Royer (who died in 1919).

With his considerable inheritance Blondel jumped at the chance of purchasing the journal *Annales de Philosophie Chrétienne* in 1904 which was edited by Lucien Laberthonnière and operated until 1913 when, due to the modernist crisis, Blondel deemed it wise to cease publication. In 1926-1927 Blondel was stricken blind and spent the rest of his long life in retirement dictating his voluminous future works (especially to Nathalie Panis and to his daughter). He died in 1949 in Aix-en-Provence, France. He was perhaps the favorite philosopher of the recent popes and was praised by Popes Leo XIII, Pius X, Pius XI, Pius XII, Paul VI, and John Paul II. Blondel was elected to the Academy of Moral and Political Sciences in 1914, and an Association des Amis de Maurice Blondel was founded in 1950.

Blondel's key work was his *Action: Attempt at a Critique of Life and a Science of Practice* [*L'Action, essai d'une critique de la vie, et d'une science de la pratique*] (1893; second edition 1950).<sup>171</sup>

Blondel begins his great work *Action* by tracing the human condition. Humans are born into the world without any choice, and they have to make decisions and act without knowing what ultimately will satisfy them (*Action*, III, ii, 1, p. 113 [108]; III, iii, 2, pp. 163-167, 173-174 [166-170, 177-178]; III, iv, 3, pp. 225-227 [236-238]; III, v, 3, p. 296 [317-318]; Conclusion, 427, 430, 432-433 [469, 474, 476-477]). Moreover, each act cuts off a multitude of other possible acts. Yet to cease acting is itself an act, and one which invariably allows something else to act for us (*Action*, Introduction, pp. 4, 6 [ix, xi]). Nor can reason help us out here. A complete analysis of the human situation is impossible; moreover, we often are forced to make choices

without the luxury of having time to reflect fully on them (*Action*, Introduction, pp. 4, 6, 7 [ix, xii, xiv]). Blondel, in setting out this human condition, commences *Action* with these memorable words:

Yes or no, does human life have a meaning, and does the human being have a destiny?<sup>172</sup> I act, but without even knowing what action is, without having wished to live, without knowing exactly who I am or even if I am. This appearance of being which flutters about within me, these light and fleeting actions of a shadow, bear in them, I am told, an eternally weighty responsibility, and that, even at the price of blood, I cannot buy nothingness because for me it is no more: I would thus be condemned to life, condemned to death, condemned to eternity! Why and by what right, if I did not know it nor will it?

I shall get to the bottom of it. If there is something to see, I need to see it. Perhaps I will learn whether or not this phantom that I am to myself, with this universe that I bear in my gaze, with science and its magic, with the strange dream of consciousness, has any solidity. I shall no doubt discover what is hidden in my acts, at the greatest depth where, without myself, in spite of myself, I am subjected to being and become attached to it. I will know whether I have sufficient knowledge and will concerning the present and future so as to never sense any tyranny in them, whatever they may be.

The problem is inevitable; the human being resolves it inevitably; and this solution, true or false, but voluntary at the same time as necessary, each one bears it in one's actions. That is why we must study *action*: the very meaning of the word and the richness of its content will unfold little by little. It is good to propose to humans all the Requirements of life, all the hidden fullness of their works, to strengthen within them, along with the force to affirm and to believe, the courage to act. ... We do not go forward, we do not learn, we do not enrich ourselves except by closing off for ourselves all roads but one, and by impoverishing ourselves of all that we might have been able to know or gain otherwise. Is there a more subtle regret than that of adolescents obliged, in order to enter life, to limit their curiosity as if with blinders? Each determination cuts off an infinity of possible acts. No one escapes from this natural mortification.

Will I at least have the power to stop? No, I must go forward. To suspend my decision in order to renounce nothing? No, I must commit myself under pain of losing everything; I must compromise myself. I have no right to wait or I no longer have the power to choose. If I do not act out of my own movement, there is something in me or outside of me that acts without me; and what acts with-

out me ordinarily acts against me. Peace is a defeat; action admits no more room for delay than death. Head, heart and arms, I must therefore give them over willingly or they are taken from me. ... Impossibility of abstaining and of holding myself in reserve, inability to satisfy myself, to be self-sufficient and to emancipate myself, that is what a first look at my condition reveals to me. That there is constraint and so to speak oppression in my life is not then an illusion, nor a dialectical game, it is a brute fact of daily experience. At the origin of my acts, in the use and after the exercise of what I call my freedom, I seem to feel all the weight of necessity. Nothing in me escapes from it. If I try to evade decisive initiatives, I am enslaved for not having acted. If I forge ahead, I am subjugated to what I have done. In practice, no one eludes the problem of practice; and not only does each one raise it, but each, in one's own way, inevitably resolves it (*Action*, Introduction, pp. 3-5 [vii-x]).

Now as indicated by the title of his great work, Blondel's philosophy was a Philosophy of Action (also variously called Integral Realism, Vitalism, or Voluntarism). The key to human existence for Blondel was not found in abstract and dispassionate thought, but rather in reflection on concrete and lived human action: "It is a question of the whole human; it is not then in thought alone that we must look for the human. We must transport the center of philosophy to action, for there we also find the center of life" (*Action*, Introduction, p. 13 [xxiii]; cf. *Action*, Introduction, pp. 5, 9 [x-xi]; III, i, 3, p. 105 [99-100]; Conclusion, p. 443 [488]; *Carnets intimes*, v. I, p. 23; *L'Itinéraire philosophique*, pp. 66-67; *Lettres philosophiques*, p. 10; *Action*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., v. I, Introduction, pp. 12-15). Action is the human answer to the problem of life (*Action*, Introduction, pp. 3, 5 [viii, x]).

Philosophy thus advances through analyzing human action, as intimated by the above quote, and this is so for three main reasons. First, action, unlike isolated human faculties, involves the whole of the human being. That is to say, in action one brings to bear all of oneself: head, heart, and hands (*Action*, Introduction, p. 6 [xii]); action involves an intersection (*vinculum*) of knowing, willing (acting, doing, loving), and being (*Action*, Introduction, p. 14 [xxiii]; II, 1, p. 40 [28]; III, iii, p. 146 [145]; IV, i, 3, p. 323 [349]; Conclusion, 425, 436, 444 [467, 480, 490]; cf. "La Semaine sociale de Bordeaux et le monophorisme," pp. 26-27, 32, 42; *Thought*, v. II, VII, p. 409; "Croyance," in Lalande, *Vocabulaire philosophique*; *Action*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., vol. I, Appendix, 15, pp. 360-

364). Thus if one is going to understand the nature of reality and make sure nothing of it escapes, it is to action that one must turn in order to study the human in all of its manifestations, thinking, aspiring, and existing. For as Blondel puts it in a famous turn of phrase, truth is not the adequation of intellect and thing (*adequatio speculativa rei et intellectus*) as Aquinas claimed (as understood by Blondel), but instead the adequation of mind and life (*adequatio realis mentis et vitae*) (*Carnets intimes*, v. I, p. 86; "The Starting Point of Philosophical Research," in *The Idealist and Other Essays*, p. 135 [MBOC, v. II, p. 556]).

Second, Blondel's philosophical approach appeals to a method of immanence (or implication) wherein what is true must affect and make a difference to the human. Or said differently, truth must impact human life and acting. As Blondel states: "Nothing can enter into a human that does not come [*sorte*] from the human, and does not correspond in some manner to a need for expansion" ("Letter on the Requirements of Contemporary Thought," II, 1, p. 152 [PEMB, p. 34]; cf. "Letter on the Requirements of Contemporary Thought," I, 3, pp. 135-136 [PEMB, pp. 14-15]; "Immanence," *Bulletin de la société française de philosophie* 8 (1908), p. 326; "Sens, Possibilité et Necessité de Notre Méthode," p. 7; *Action*, Introduction, p. 6 [xii]; III, ii, 1, p. 111 [105-106]; V, 3, p. 424 [465]; "Le point de départ de la recherche philosophique," p. 237; *Thought*, v. II, VII, 1, pp. 321-325; *Philosophical Requirements of Christianity*, I, 3, pp. 54-75 and Appendix, p. 288; *The Problem of Catholic Philosophy*, I, 1, pp. 16-17). In other words – following Augustine, Bernard of Clairvaux (who shared the same hometown as Blondel), Pascal, Chateaubriand, Maine de Biran, Lèon Ollé-Laprune, Émile Boutroux, and Victor Delbos – truth comes from within. The study of action is what allows us to determine this inner truth.

Third, action reveals the aspirations of the human will. Blondel explains: "The true science of the subject is the one which, considering the act of consciousness as an act from the beginning, discovers through a continuous progress its inevitable expansion. It seeks the equation of action, that is to say that, intending to develop all of its content, its plan is to determine what is its necessary end according to the very force of the initial movement from which the act proceeds and which is shown at each effort of its development. Hence it is in the very work of the will that the law and the end of willing (*la fin du vouloir*) will have to be revealed ... (the) hidden desire (*vœu*)" (*Action*,

III, i, 3, p. 106 [100]; cf. *Action*, Introduction, p. 14 [xxiv]; II, 2, pp. 52-53 [41-42]; III, ii, 3, p. 139 [137]; III, iii, 3, p. 192 [198]; III, v, 2-3, pp. 274, 292 [293, 314]; IV, i, 3, pp. 317-319 [343-345]; cf. *Being and Beings*, II, 2, p. 167 and Appendix, pp. 448-452; *Action*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., v. I, II, 1, p. 131; v. II, Introduction, pp. 11, 14 and Appendix, 12-13, pp. 457-461; *Philosophy and the Christian Spirit*, v. I, 1, pp. 1-2, 31, and Appendix, pp. 211-212; *Carnets intimes*, v. I, p. 526 and v. II, pp. 178, 180, 207; *Études blondeliennes*, I, p. 81; *Lettres philosophiques*, pp. 34-36; "The Starting Point of Philosophical Research," in *The Idealist and Other Essays*, p. 136 [MBOC, pp. 557-558]).

Thus by studying action, we can determine what the ultimate desire of the human heart is, which we can do by examining the degree to which various activities fulfill or leave unsatisfied the aspiration of the will. That is to say, as Blondel puts it in his own technical terms, we must find the extent to which the willing will (*volonté voulante*) harmonizes with the willed will (*volonté voulue*), the extent to which what we appear to will, as judged by our actions, harmonizes with what we really will in our heart ("Letter on the Requirements of Contemporary Thought," II, 2, pp. 156-157 [PEMB, pp. 38-39]; III, 1-2, pp. 181, 183, 198 [PEMB, pp. 65, 67-68, 85]; cf. *Action*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., vol. II, IV, pp. 127-131, and V, p. 295; *The Problem of Catholic Philosophy*, III, 3, p. 173). Here then for Blondel the willed will denotes the various choices and activities humans engage in throughout life (i.e. particular instances of willing), while the willing will denotes the fundamental aspiration (drive, search) of the will for self-satisfaction.

Unfortunately often what humans truly want (the willing will; the primordial will; the profound will; the secret will) and what they actually do (the willed will; the reflective will; the positive will) are not in accord (*Action*, III, i, 3, p. 106 [100]; III, ii, 3, p. 135 [133]; III, v, 1, p. 261 [277]). As Blondel writes: "we feel a disproportion between the willing will, *quod procedit ex voluntate* (what proceeds from the will), and the willed will, *quod voluntatis objectum fit* (what is made an object of the will). ... The whole art of life, the whole effort of sincerity, will be to bring about as perfect a conformity as possible between the initial will and the positive will ... Henceforth, the enunciation of the problem is quite clear: what do we will, when we will truly all that we will? And how do we uncover an end adequate to the integrity of the primitive movement?" (*Action*, III, ii, 3, pp. 134-135 [132-133]; cf. *Philosophical Requirements of Christianity*, I, 6, pp. 105-108 [see trans-

lation "Philosophy Fulfilled in Christianity," p. 31]). Or put differently, we seek to obtain "as perfect an agreement as possible between the impulse [*élan*] and the result of our effort, equality between the amplitude of the voluntary aspirations and the magnitude of the willed ends" (*Action*, III, ii, 3, p. 141 [140]; cf. *Action*, V, 2, p. 374 [406]).

So by studying action we are better able to determine what the true aspiration of the human being is, by seeing what actions (what willed will) satisfy the impulse of the will (the willing will) (*Action*, Introduction, pp. 14 [xxiv]; I, 2, pp. 32-33 [19]; II, 2, pp. 52-53 [41-42]; III, ii, 3, pp. 135, 139 [133, 137]; III, iii, 1, pp. 147-148, 153 [147, 154]; III, iv, 1, pp. 204 [211]; III, v, 1, pp. 261, 283, 287 [277, 303, 307]; IV, i, 2, pp. 309-310, 313 [333-334, 337-338]; V, 2-3, pp. 374, 391-392 [406, 427]; Conclusion, p. 444 [490]; cf. *Philosophical Requirements of Christianity*, Appendix, p. 298). For the movement [*mouvement*] or impulse [*élan*] of the will reveals the truth (about reality) that dwells in the secret recesses of all humans, a truth from which humans never are free (*Action*, Introduction, pp. 8, 12-13, 15 [xv, xx-xxiii, xxv]; III, ii, 3, p. 139 [137]; III, iii, 2, p. 163 [165]; III, v, 2, pp. 237, 264 [249, 280-281]). This truth, revealed by our primitive will, is our human destiny, what will be, what ought to be, what is (*Action*, Conclusion, pp. 426-428, 430, 434-436, 443-444 [468-471, 473-474, 478-480, 488-490]; *Thought*, v, I, I, p. 16). Indeed in the end we will find that only the attainment of God can satisfy the dynamism of the will.

Our task is now clear for Blondel. We must investigate the various objects that humans will (the willed will), from the lowest to highest, and find to what extent they equal the impulse of the fundamental will (the willing will), the secret cravings of the human heart (*Action*, II, 2, pp. 52 [41]; III, ii, 2, p. 130 [127]; III, v, 1, pp. 240, 253 [252, 267]).

Blondel first looks at the approach to life of the person he calls the dilettante, aesthete, or sampler of everything (*essayiste*) [seemingly based on positions advocated by Ernest Renan (1823-1892) and Maurice Barrès (1862-1923)]. The dilettante or aesthete is someone who rejects any large purpose to life (as well as moral obligations) and merely looks to undergo a variety of pleasurable experiences (a succession of different enjoyments). In Blondel's words, the dilettante seek to "unburden consciences and to give life back its grace, its buoyancy and cheerfulness" (*Action*, I, 1, p. 16 [1]). The dilettante does this by treating life as a vain and amusing farce (as a game), and is occupied with acquiring all ideas and sensations (*Action*, I, 1-2, pp. 16-17, 20-21,

23-25, 27 [1-2, 5-6, 9-11, 13]; II, 1, p. 36 [23]). What the dilettante wants is:

Through history, to belong to all times and races; through science, to be in all of space and to equal the universe; through philosophy, to become the theater for the interminable battle of systems, to bear in oneself idealism and positivism, criticism and evolutionism, and to indulge oneself on the carnage of ideas; through art, to be initiated into the divine grace of serious frivolities, into the fetishism of advanced civilizations; what a pleasant business to give oneself to everything without giving anything, to hold in reserve this inexhaustible power of spirit alternately sympathetic and destructive, to weave and to unknit without respite, like a cloth of Penelope, the living garment of the God who will never be! One kneels before all altars, and one gets up smiling to run off to new loves; for an instant one sticks to the letter in order to penetrate into the sanctuary of the spirit. ... Some take pleasure in mixing the extremes and in combining in a single state of consciousness eroticism and mystical asceticism; some, by means of sealed compartments, develop along parallel lines a double role of alcoholic and idealist. One after the other, or at one and the same time, one tastes, one loves, one practices different religions and one savors all the conceptions of heaven through the dilettantism of the future life (*Action*, I, 1, pp. 18-19 [3-4]; cf. I, 1, p. 23 [9]; III, iii, 2, p. 169 [172]).

Thus the dilettante wants to sample the spice of life, to try everything, including religion and immorality: "Not that we should ruin the superstition of decency or even of piety. The damage would be great because pleasure and the love of evil are perfect only thanks to the prickle of internal contradiction and to the savor of the forbidden fruit, as for those young courtesans who have the spice of a *prie-dieu*. ... the mystical libertine, 'a Christian poet with the legs of a faun,' will discover how purifying adultery can be, or will fathom all the voluptuousness of corrupting a virgin soul" (*Action*, I, 1, p. 21 [6-7]). By embracing dilettantism then one can be a "voluptuous ascetic"; one can "penetrate oneself with the Exercises of Saint Ignatius while jumping into the fray of political intrigues" (*Action*, I, 1, pp. 22-23 [8-9]).

Yet in the end the life of the dilettante cannot be willed, as the dilettante wills contradictory things. First, the dilettante wants to embrace all ideas and pleasures and treat life as a form of play. Yet in so doing, the dilettante rejects an idea, the idea of an absolute, exclusive, full, and serious truth, a truth that requires commitment and abnegation

(*Action*, I, 1-2, pp. 24, 28-29, 31, 33 [9, 14-15, 18, 20]). Thus the dilettante wills to experience all ideas and not to experience all ideas: dilettantes "love themselves enough to sacrifice everything to their egoism, (but) they love themselves poorly enough to disperse themselves, to sacrifice themselves and to lose themselves in all the rest" (*Action*, I, 2, p. 33 [20]; cf. *Action*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., v. II, Appendix, 3, pp. 419-423). Secondly, the dilettante at bottom chooses to act by the basic aspiration of egoism, self-love: "Nothing before me, nothing after me, nothing apart from me" (*Action*, I, 2, p. 29 [16]; cf. *Action*, I, 2, pp. 28-29, 30, 32-33 [15, 17, 19-20]). Yet the dilettante also wills to exist, to enjoy life and being, to find peace and happiness (*Action*, I, 1-2, pp. 23, 25-26, 29-30, 34 [9, 11-12, 16, 21]). The dilettante hence also wills non-self or being in addition to self: "In the depths of my being, there is a willing and a love for being, or else there is nothing" (*Action*, Introduction, p. 13 [xxiii]; cf. *Action*, Introduction, p. 3 [vii]; cf. *Itinéraire philosophique*, p. 24). Thus the willed will of the dilettante perverts the primitive willing of the willing will.<sup>173</sup>

For according to Blondel, all humans must will being, they must will something (*Action*, II, 3, pp. 51 [40]; III, p. 54 [43]). More than this:

What we will, then, is that there be something, and that this something be self-sufficient; we want the phenomenon to be; we want the sensible life, science; we want all this immensity of the universe known and yet to be known which fills our sight and our heart to be, and to be all for us. And behind this screen of the phenomenon, we hope that life will be lucid, complete, and satisfying, and we want action to unfold and come to a conclusion in it. ... There is something in our sensations and our pleasures, in our knowledge, and in our acts. ... In my acts, in the world, inside of me, outside of me, I know not where or what, there is something (*Action*, II, 3, pp. 51-52 [40-41]).

Another common answer to the problem of life is to embrace a positivism or scientism [with Auguste Comte (1798-1857), Émile Littré (1801-1881 [later a Catholic]), and Hippolyte Taine (1828-1893)], and hold that science alone (which begins with sensation) provides knowledge and solves the dilemmas of life (*Action*, II, 2-3, pp. 50, 52-54 [39, 41-43]; III, i, 1, p. 60 [50]). Yet Blondel argues that sensation and science are not self-sufficient and can only be posited in virtue of something else (*Action*, II, 2, p. 53 [42]; Conclusion, p. 438 [483]). For science operates on two fronts. First it gathers concrete,

unique, discontinuous, heterogeneous facts from sense-data (nature). Second, it tries to find a cause, order, law, continuity, or homogeneity in this data (math) (*Action*, III, i, 2, pp. 64-65, 70, 72-73, 77-78, 86 [54-55, 60-61, 63-64, 68-69, 78]). Thus science goes beyond mere sensation as the intelligible order (whole) imposed on the sense-data is not reducible to its component parts (*Action*, III, i, 2-3, pp. 79-81, 84, 87, 95-96 [70-73, 76-77, 79, 89]; cf. "Letter on the Requirements of Contemporary Thought," I, 2, pp. 131-132 [PEMB, pp. 10-11]; III, 2, pp. 202-203 [PEMB, pp. 89-90]; cf. *Action*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., v. II, III, pp. 106-111). Indeed, as Blondel notes: "Now this is the concurrence for which experimental science offers no account; it subsists only by admitting the joining of two orders which, from its viewpoint, are incoherent. The relation between calculus and intuition, between the intelligible determinism of facts and the sensible discontinuity of the data of observation, escapes it at the beginning, in the course, and at the ideal end of its development; and yet it lives by this very relation" (*Action*, III, i, 2, pp. 85-86 [78]; cf. III, i, 2-3, pp. 88-89, 92, 94 [81-82, 85, 87]).

Thus science is possible only on the basis of a mediating principle (a *vinculum* or bond) which exceeds science, and this mediating principle is the activity of the mind, the subject or self (*Action*, III, i, 2-3, pp. 62-63, 70, 96-97, 102, 104, 107-108 [51-53, 60, 89, 91, 96, 98, 101-102]; III, ii, p. 109 [103]; cf. *Action*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., vol. II, III, pp. 119-123). For, argues Blondel, the subject is an internal principle of unity that merges sensation and mathematical theories and as such goes beyond science (*Action*, III, i, 3, pp. 94 [87]: the subject is "precisely that which cannot be known either in function of calculation [*calcul*] or in function of sensible observation, because it is that which constitutes their bond and introduces unity in the midst of multiplicity" (*Action*, III, i, 3, pp. 104-105 [97])). So beyond science there is a subjective self.

Moreover, the human self is a conscious agent that acts by a freedom escaping from worldly conditions (either in terms of passions or analysis), and so again is not reducible to science. As Blondel asserts: "Freedom adopts all of its antecedent conditions. But it does not find in them its reason for being. It becomes necessary to find the true reason for action in an end transcending nature or science" (*Action*, III, ii, 2, p. 128 [124]). Furthermore to explain human action it is necessary to go beyond science as the human being acts according to ends to be

realized; in Blondelian terms, what moves (mobiles) humans are ends (motives), and ultimately reasons (*Action*, III, ii, 1-2, pp. 112, 117-118, 121-124, 126-127, 129-130 [106-107, 112, 116, 118-123, 126]; III, v, p. 237 [249]; V, 3, p. 405 [443]; cf. *Action*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., vol I, I, pp. 67-76, III, pp. 224-227, and Appendix, 12, 23, 38, pp. 350-355, 392, 441-444).<sup>174</sup> Indeed in the end freedom itself is "the true reason for the final resolution [of action] by choosing, so to speak, that one among the determinism to which it will prefer to give itself over" (*Action*, III, ii, 3, p. 133 [130]); "To what is insufficient to determine it, (freedom) adds its own sufficiency to determine itself" (*Action*, III, ii, 3, p. 133 [130]).

Science then cannot provide life with meaning and self-sufficiency; it relies on the self. Moreover, in order to find happiness and realize itself the self must transcend the frontiers of its own subjectivity; the self must engage in action in the world (*Action*, III, iii, p. 145 [144]). For if human beings are to realize their ends, they cannot remain isolated but must instead act and use the medium of the world with its other humans (*Action*, III, iii, 3, pp. 192-193 [198-200]; III, iv, 1-2, pp. 195, 197, 201, 203-205, 209, 214 [201, 203, 208, 211, 213, 216, 223]).

Initially, as it happens, when we act to realize our ends we attempt to use the world as well as the people in it for our own interests (*Action*, III, iv, 1, p. 203 [210]). That is to say, we try to co-opt the environment and other people for ourselves, make them an extension of our own will, servers of our own ends (*Action*, III, iv, 1, pp. 209, 211 [216, 218]; III, iv, 2, pp. 214, 223 [222, 233]; III, v, 1, p. 255 [269]). Thus in the beginning we act for ourselves in the first place (even if at times we act for others so that they may exist for us and to find ourselves more) (*Action*, III, iv, 3, pp. 219-222 [228, 230-231]; III, iv, pp. 234-235 [245-247]).

Still, ultimately we recognize that what we really crave is a true affection for another person and a detachment from ourselves (*Action*, III, iv, 3, pp. 237, 240, 242-243 [248, 252, 254-255]). We cannot truly be ourselves without placing ourselves in another being (*Action*, III, iv, 3, p. 237 [249]; cf. *Action*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., v. II, V, p. 179). Blondel proclaims this truth in some moving lines:

Since individuals cannot close themselves up, nor can they will to keep themselves alone and wholly within themselves, they aspire to be revived [*revivre*] in another. They transport, so to speak, their

center of action, no longer into their external work, nor even into this cooperation which allows them to extend their power and their influence, but into the intimate unions [*l'union*] that they establish [*contracte*] with other selves (*Action*, III, v, p. 234 [245]).

And what we want now of the subjects are the subjects themselves, – not what they manifest and produce, but their intimacy, what they possess, so to speak, of the infinite and incommunicable. Until now we had taken them only as means; we only wanted an assistance [*un concours*] from them, in view of a work that seemed the principle end and for which they were only an instrument. At present we are treating them as ‘ends in themselves’; we solicit and desire them for themselves; we expect of them less what they do than what they are; and what we want, it seems, in preference to the work, are the workers themselves, in order to ally ourselves to them, no longer as end to means or as whole to part, but as principal to principal and as part to part, within a whole to which the individuality of each is devoted in a truly singular [*unique*] life and in a real communion (*Action*, III, v, pp. 235-236 [247]).

To love oneself by loving another sincerely, to give oneself and to redouble [*se redoubler*] oneself by this gift, to see another in oneself and to see oneself in other, not to be solitary at all and be alone, to unite with and embrace each other while remaining distinguished, to have everything in common without confusing anything, and to remain two in order to ceaselessly merge as it were into a unique whole and into a single more perfect and more fruitful being ... is the natural cry of the heart (*Action*, III, v, 1, pp. 241-242 [254]; cf. *Action*, pp. III, iii, 3, 191-192 [198]; III, iv, 3, pp. 229, 231-232 [240, 243-244]; III, v, 1, pp. 236-239, 241, 244-245 [247-250, 253, 257]).

The aspiration of the will though does not stop at an individual love; it continues on to seek its completion in the family, society, and humanity as a whole [as with Auguste Comte]. Here is how Blondel describes the expansion of the will through each of these stages:

And yet when by a mysterious exchange two beings form but a single more perfect being, does this mutual presence and common action close the circle of the will? Does the impulse of desire stop at this full possession or end? No. Two beings are only one and it is when they are one that they become three. ... This perpetuity that love required, this indissoluble and surviving unity, is accordingly now in the child ... A third appears, as though to make up for the unfruitful attempt at unity. ... So the end of love is not love, but

the family ... It is in generation then that humans find a way of expressing themselves, giving themselves over, of completely outliving himself, where they meet the perfection of their act and the first finished response for which they hope. Their first living work is the child, a marvelous synthesis: two and one and three (*Action*, III, v, 1, pp. 245-246 [257-259]; cf. *Action*, III, v, 1, p. 247 [260]; cf. *Action*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., vol. II, V, pp. 253-263).

It is a decisive moment in the history of children's thoughts and hearts when they clearly notice that they, which is to say, their family, is not alone on the earth, that there are others like them there, that all the interests of the world do not gravitate around this unique center, that there are other people [*gens*] who capable also of having their own affections, their distinct horizon, their separate life [i.e. the country] (*Action*, III, v, 1, p. 248 [261]; cf. III, v, 1, pp. 240, 242, 249-250, 252, 254-256 [252, 254, 263-264, 266, 269-271]; cf. *Action*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., vol. II, V, pp. 263-278).

The will of the human and human action do not stop at the borders of the country. In spilling outward, the city is the symbol of the interior life of the will that spreads out without any enclosure to limit its expansion. ... It is no longer enough to bear within oneself, as it were, a whole nation and to form one soul with it; the human aspires, so to speak, to espouse humanity itself and to form only one single will with it (*Action*, III, v, 1, p. 259 [274]; cf. *Action*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., vol. II, V, pp. 287-288).

... whereas egoism sees only the individual, whereas the individual knows only its family, thinking of it as incomparable and unique, whereas the family limits its horizon to the political life of the city, moral ideas have advanced little by little. ... we have had to learn to be more than a citizen in order to appreciate [*goûter*] and love in others, not the relative, friend, compatriot, guest, stranger, or ally, but the human who has no other qualifications [*titres*] than being human; someone unknown, an enemy perhaps, but a human. It is a great act and an admirable step of reason to have felt that there is in the slave, in the savage, in the poor, in the diseased or disabled, humanity itself (*Action*, III, v, 1, p. 260 [276]; cf. *Action*, III, v, 1, pp. 240, 253, 259, 261-262 [252, 267, 275, 277]).

Thus, issued at first from the wholly personal intention of the agent, action has little by little incorporated the family and the city to take flight into humanity in its entirety. In requiring the total solidarity of all humans, it becomes what it wills to be; it wills to be, by free choice, what it is already by the impetus of its first impulse [*élan*] ... this is only a translation, not only of what should be for the

deliberate and willed will, but of what is already for the willing and operative will (*Action*, III, v, 1, p. 261 [277]).

Hence, according to Blondel, the impulse of the will progresses from the love of self to the love of another person, to the love of family, and to the love of all humanity. In other words, from self-interest the will comes to embrace self-sacrifice (although it does find its happiness in said sacrifice); the will embraces the moral life (something which goes beyond science) (*Action*, Introduction, pp. 7, 9, 11 [xiii-xiv, xvi, xix]; I, 1-2, pp. 24, 27 [10, 13-14]; III, v, 2, pp. 264-265, 268, 270 [280-281, 285, 287-288]; Conclusion, 430, 435 [473, 479]). In the end only abnegation (disinterest and detachment from self) can satisfy the striving of the will (*Action*, III, v, 2, pp. 265-266, 268-269, 271 [281-283, 285-287, 289]; cf. *Action*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., v, II, V, pp. 295-296, 313-318; *Philosophical Requirements of Christianity*, I, 9, pp. 137-138). Or to render it more technically, moral autonomy (freedom) demands heteronomy (subjugation to a moral command) (*Action*, pp. III, ii, 1 and 3, pp. 110, 131, 136-137, 139, 143-144 [104, 128, 134-135, 137, 143]; III, v, 1-2, pp. 270, 282, 298-299 [288, 302, 321]; IV, i, 1, p. 327 [354]; cf. "Letter on the Requirements of Contemporary Thought," II, 2, pp. 158-159 [PEMB, pp. 40-41]; *The Problem of Catholic Philosophy*, III, 2-3, pp. 136, 142-143, 168).<sup>175</sup>

Indeed, most significantly, Blondel claims that the aspiration of the will cannot be satisfied with anything natural. The human must go beyond the natural order which is insufficient to satisfy human needs (*Action*, III, v, 1 and 3, pp. 262, 297, 299 [278, 319, 322]; IV, i, 1-3, pp. 304, 308, 310-313, 316 [327-328, 333-334, 336-338, 342]; "Letter on the Requirements of Contemporary Thought," III, 1, p. 181 [PEMB, p. 65]). Blondel asserts:

In the very name of determinism, there is only one inevitable conclusion, and here it is in its severity, without addition or subtraction: through their voluntary actions humans surpass phenomena; they cannot equal their own requirements; they have within themselves more than they can use in isolation; they do not succeed, through their powers alone, in placing in their willed action all that lies at the principle of their voluntary activity. ... All attempts at the completion of human action fail; and it is impossible for human action not to seek to complete itself and to be self-sufficient. It has to, it cannot (*Action*, III, v, 3, p. 299 [321]).

In vain do we try to restrict voluntary action to what depends on the will itself. The immense order of phenomena where human life expands seems to have been exhausted and human willing is not. ... Humans claimed to get along by themselves and to find in the natural order their self-sufficiency and their all. They do not succeed at this; nor do they succeed in stopping or in going beyond. ... In every human consciousness, inevitably there arises the feeling that the will is not its own principle, nor its rule, nor its own end (*Action*, IV, i, pp. 300-301 [323-324]; cf. *Action*, IV, i, 1, pp. 302-303 [325-327]).

No matter what we will, whether it is a life of pleasure, science, love, family, social action, morality, we do not in the end satisfy our will if our willing remains in the natural domain. For explains Blondel:

Since in voluntary action, such as it is given in fact, there subsists an element whose mysterious fecundity is exhausted by none of the forms of personal, social or moral life, since, after having brought into this abyss of the human will all the grandeurs of science, of consciousness, of affections, of ideas, of duties, there remains a void, since, no matter how stretched the enveloping lines may be, still the circle cannot be closed; it is therefore necessary to push on further (*Action*, III, v, 3, p. 285 [305]).

Some are inclined to seek for truth itself and real being in sense data. But thought has to be on guard against this false mysticism; it must take these sense data not as a reality exclusive of every other, but such that they appear as a system of symbols to be deciphered. ... Some are inclined to look for the one [*unique*] secret of reality in the positive sciences, and to turn the conclusions they establish against everything that surpasses their range ... – But let us not forget. The positive sciences are only a coherent symbolism ... They do not permit us to exclude or to deny anything whatsoever, either outside ourselves or inside ourselves. ... Some are inclined to look for the very expression of real life in the determinism of consciousness, and to believe that this internal dynamism excludes everything that is not automatism and necessity. ... Freedom cannot be denied in the name of the interior or exterior determinism of science, because, reciprocally, science is determined in the name of the freedom which is the soul of intellectual life and of scientific knowledge. ... Some are inclined to attribute an absolute value to practice founded on the sole witness of conscience, illuminated by the sole light of reason, supported by the sole effort of good will; as if, by themselves, moral phenomena, cutting themselves off from all the others

had a divine sufficiency, touched on the depths of things, worked out salvation, and rendered every ulterior investigation [*recherche*] superfluous. But this pretension is only one more superstition: the truth is that, without stopping at what we do not know, we must act according to the duty we do know; the error is to judge that this forward march cannot and should not lead to any new light, and that reason is exclusive of a higher order, whereas it is in solidarity with it (*Action*, Conclusion, pp. 438-441 [483-486]; cf. *Action*, IV, i, 3, p. 317 [343]; IV, ii, 1-2, pp. 336, 354 [364, 384-385]; Conclusion, pp. 431-432 [475]).

Indeed, only the infinite can satisfy us (*Action*, III, v, 2-3, pp. 266, 271, 285-286, 297, 299, 373, 443-444 [282, 289, 305-306, 319-321]; V, 2, pp. 373 [405-406]; Conclusion 443-444 [489]). Only God, which Blondel calls "the one thing necessary" [*l'unique nécessaire; unicum (unum) necessarium*] can satisfy us; only the supreme being enables the will to will itself as it wishes (*Action*, IV, i, 2, p. 313 [338]; cf. "Letter on the Requirements of Contemporary Thought," III, 2, p. 188 [PEMB, p. 73]; *Philosophy and the Christian Spirit*, v. I, 1, pp. 1-2, 17-18; *Action*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., v. II, V, pp. 340-349, 366; "What is Faith?," pp. 184-185, 187, 191; *The Problem of Catholic Philosophy*, III, 3, pp. 162, 177; cf. Lk 10:42).<sup>176</sup> Blondel writes:

Let us see all in one glance the way we have traveled under the constraint of an inflexible determinism. It is impossible not to posit the problem of action; impossible to give it a negative solution; impossible to find either in ourselves or in others what we will to be; in short, impossible to stop, to go back or to go forward in isolation. In my action there is something I have not yet been able to understand and to equal, something which keeps it from falling back into nothingness and which is something only in being nothing of what I have willed up to now. What I have voluntarily posited, therefore, can neither surpass nor maintain itself. It is this conflict that explains the forced presence of a new affirmation in consciousness; and it is the reality of this necessary presence that makes possible in us the consciousness of this very conflict. There is a "one thing necessary." The whole movement of determinism brings us to this term. ... But let us make no mistake about it; in spite of a dialectical appearance, there is nothing in this argumentation, absolutely nothing, that is a deduction. What constitutes the strength of the proof is that it simply manifests the real expansion of the will (*Action*, IV, i, 3, p. 314 [339]).

Here the central Augustinianism of Blondel comes to the fore. God is not known through abstract thought, but through need (through action and the movement of the will); we find God with the heart not with the head (*Action*, IV, i, 3, pp. 317-319, 323-325 [343-345, 350-352]; IV, ii, 1-2, pp. 330, 334, 337-338, 342, 345, 357 [357, 361-362, 365, 367, 371, 375, 388]; V, 1, pp. 358, 363-366 [390, 394-398]; V, 3, pp. 418, 421 [458, 461]; Conclusion, p. 442 [487]; cf. "History and Dogma," II, p. 246 [PEMB, p. 179]; *Philosophical Requirements of Christianity*, I, 2, p. 43 [see translation "The Intellectual Aspect and the Permanent Unity of the Christian Spirit," p. 567]; *Action*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., v. I, I, pp. 114-117, II, 1, pp. 155-159).<sup>177</sup> A God of reason alone is a phantom and an idol, a God that does not move us (*Action*, pp. III, v, 3, pp. 296-297 [318-319]; IV, i, 3, pp. 314-315, 317, 319, 323-325 [340-342, 344, 350, 352]; V, iii, pp. 390-391 [426]; cf. *Being and Beings*, II, 2, p. 164; *Thought*, v. I, III, 3, pp. 167-168, v. II, IV, 3, pp. 89-109, and v. II, VI, 3, pp. 287-293; *Philosophy and the Christian Spirit*, v. I, 1, pp. 6-8 and Appendix, p. 213; "The Third Testis Article," p. 863). Blondel here asserts the importance of immanence, this time in relation to God: "One does not find the divine anywhere when one does not bear it in oneself" (*Action*, III, v, 3, p. 294 [316]; cf. *Action*, IV, i, 3, pp. 318, 322 [343, 349]). God then is encountered as "... the universal good [that] has secretly solicited the will ... the conviction, perhaps vague, but certain and imperious, of a destiny and an ulterior end to be attained ... An uneasiness [*inquiétude*], a natural aspiration toward the better, the feeling of a role to fulfill, the search [*recherche*] for the meaning of life" (*Action*, IV, i, 3, p. 326 [353]; cf. *Action*, IV, ii, 1, pp. 332, 334, 342 [359, 361-362, 370]; V, 2, p. 373 [405]; "Letter on the Requirements of Contemporary Thought," II, 2, p. 157 [PEMB, p. 39]; *The Problem of Catholic Philosophy*, II, 5, p. 122; III, 3, pp. 160, 172-173).

Not that Blondel rejects intellectual approaches to God.<sup>178</sup> Yet he himself reformulates the proofs for God's existence by interiorizing them (i.e. making them more immanent) and rooting them in the movement of life and the drive of the will, that is to say, in the need for God (*Action*, IV, i, 3, pp. 315 [341]; cf. "The Third Testis Article," pp. 860-862; *Thought*, v. I, III, 3, pp. 164-168, 170-173, 179-180 and Appendix, pp. 328-332, and v. II, VI, 3, pp. 280-281; *Philosophical Requirements of Christianity*, I, 2, pp. 45-52 [see translation "The Intellectual Aspect and the Permanent Unity of the Christian Spirit," pp. 568-572]; "Le problème de Dieu en la philosophie," pp. 47-48; *Action*,

2<sup>nd</sup> ed., v. II, Appendix, 31, p. 506). Thus Blondel bases the cosmological argument not on abstract metaphysics, but on the human experience of insufficiency, inconsistency, and non-satiation. In the vanity of sensation, knowledge, passion, and delight, humans encounter both indigence and fullness. They find that in the contingent world (i.e. the insufficient realm of phenomena) there is more than they know, that their will seeks beyond it, that there is a necessity immanent at the very center of things (*Action*, IV, i, 3, pp. 317-318 [343-344]; cf. *Being and Beings*, I, 2, pp. 135-137 and Appendix IV, p. 370). Similarly, the teleological argument begins for Blondel with the harmony of the universe, of the sciences, of the mechanism of consciousness. In the midst of this admirable harmony – a harmony which is also imperfect and feeble (as there is a disproportion and non-identity of efficient and final cause, real and ideal, power and wisdom, being and perfection) – one discovers a pure and identical act of perfect thought and power (*Action*, IV, i, 3, pp. 319-321 [345-347]). Blondel writes: “There is in me a disproportion between the efficient cause and the final cause; and yet neither the one nor the other can be in me what they already are without the permanent mediation of a perfect thought and a perfect action. All that there is of beauty and of life in things, all that there is of light and of power in the human, contains, in its very imperfection and weakness, a sovereign perfection. ... Thus, the order, the harmony, the wisdom that I discover in myself and in things, is not simply an effect starting from which a reasoning process would force me to ascend to a cause absent from its work; I cannot consider this harmony and this beauty as constituted and subsisting in itself; I do not make the premises of a deduction from them; I do not invoke any principles of causality; rather, I find in this imperfect wisdom of things and of my thought the presence and the necessary action of a perfect thought and power” (*Action*, IV, i, 3, pp. 320-321 [346-347]). And finally the ontological argument is reformulated on the basis of the life of action wherein from the real perfection we find in ourselves, and from the recognition that we do not equal ourselves because we do not equal it, we come to discover ideal perfection (a unity of being, knowing, and acting); said differently, we find the idea (of perfection) in being (*Action*, IV, i, 2-3, pp. 310, 316, 321-323, 326 [334, 341, 348-349, 354]; IV, ii, 1, p. 333 [360]; Conclusion, p. 425 [467]; cf. *Thought*, v. I, III, 3, pp. 174-176; “Le clef de voûte de système cartésien,” in *Dialogues avec les philosophes*, V, pp. 131-137).

Thus according to Blondel, God, the one thing necessary, is found through the movement of the will and its search for satisfaction. As Blondel writes: "The need of humans is to equal themselves, such that nothing of what they are would remain alien or contrary to their willing, and nothing of what they will would remain inaccessible or denied to their being. To act is to seek this agreement of knowing, willing and being ... which reintegrates the final cause into the efficient cause" (*Action*, Conclusion, p. 425 [467]).

Furthermore, it turns out that what the will seeks is not just to know God, but to give itself to God, to submit itself to God (*Action*, IV, i, 3, pp. 327 [355]; IV, ii, 1-2, pp. 330, 345-348, 353 [357, 374, 376-377, 384]; V, 1-3, pp. 361, 366-367, 388, 400, 404, 422 [393, 398, 422-423, 437, 441, 462-463]; Conclusion, pp. 434, 437 [478, 481]; cf. *L'Itinéraire philosophique*, p. 261; *Action*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., v. II, V, pp. 357-358). For we only live truly and find ourselves (and satisfy the imperious demand of our conscience) by opening ourselves up to a will other than our own, by immolating and mortify ourselves (*Action*, Introduction, pp. 7 [xiv]; IV, i, 3, pp. 328-329 [356]; IV, ii, 2, pp. 349-350, 352-353, 357 [379-380, 383-384, 387]; V, 1 and 3, pp. 367, 404-405, 417, 423 [398, 442-443, 457, 464]; Conclusion, pp. 425-426, 430, 434, 440, 443-444 [468, 473, 478, 484, 489-490]; "Letter on the Requirements of Contemporary Thought," II, 3, p. 162 [PEMB, p. 44]; III, 1-2, pp. 183-184, 195, 197 [67-68, 81-83]; *Thought*, v. I, I, 3, pp. 74-80 and II, 2, pp. 95-96; *Action*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., v. I, II, 2, p. 191, v. II, V, pp. 356-362; *Philosophical Requirements of Christianity*, I, 7-9, pp. 112, 121-129, 138, and Appendix, p. 303; *Philosophy and the Christian Spirit*, v. II, 4, pp. 179-185; "What is Faith?" p. 186; Letter of November 16, 1905). Blondel presents this key idea of mortification in the following ways: "Human beings do not equal the fullness of their spontaneous aspiration through their deliberate intention except on the condition of annihilating their own will by installing in themselves a contrary and mortifying will" (*Action*, IV, ii, 2, p. 353 [383]); "The true will of the human is the divine willing. To admit their fundamental passivity is, for humans, the perfection of activity. ... Not to appropriate anything is the only method of acquiring the infinite. It is wherever one is no longer one's own [*Il est partout où l'on n'est plus à soi*]" (*Action*, IV, ii, 2, p. 356 [387]; cf. *Action*, V, 3, pp. 404-405 [442]; "Letter on the Requirements of Contemporary Thought," I, 4, p. 138 [PEMB, p. 18]; II, 1, p. 153 [PEMB, p. 35]; "The Elementary Principle of a Logic of the

Moral Life," in *The Idealist Illusion and Other Essays*, p. 108 [PEMB, p. 145]).

Blondel's argument is therefore that the satisfaction of the human will (i.e. the will equaling itself) can only occur if human action is directed towards a transcendent God, and if it mortifies itself in the will of God (for the will seeks to become God). Yet ultimately, this imbalance between the willing will and the willed will (resolvable by self-mortification) can only be overcome by the initiative of God, i.e. by the gift of divine grace (*Action*, IV, i, 2-3, pp. 313, 327 [338, 354]; IV, ii, 2, pp. 354, 356-357 [385, 387-388]; V, 1-2, pp. 358, 366-367, 378, 384 [389, 398-399, 411, 418]; Conclusion, p. 425 [467]; cf. "Letter on the Requirements of Contemporary Thought," II, 3, p. 162 [PEMB, pp. 43-44]; *Thought*, v. I, II, 1, p. 176, v. II, VI, 3, pp. 302-303, and v. II, VII, 3, p. 370; *Action*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, v. I, II, 2, pp. 190-191, v. II, VI, pp. 376-386; "What is Faith?," pp. 176-177, 187; *Philosophy and the Christian Spirit*, I, V, 1, pp. 111-112; *Philosophical Requirements of Christianity*, I, 8, p. 123 and II, p. 231; *The Problem of Catholic Philosophy*, I, 1, p. 12; III, 1 and 3, pp. 134-135, 160, 165-166, 174; cf. "Le surnaturel" in André Lalande, *Vocabulaire de la philosophie*). Blondel makes then the significant claim: "Hence there is nothing absolutely good and willed, except what we do not will of ourselves, what God wills in us and of us" (*Action*, IV, ii, 2, p. 349 [379]). And this leads to the profound dilemma (supreme alternative) of human existence: "either exclude from ourselves any will other than our own, or give ourselves over to the being that we are not as to the one thing salutary [*l'unique salutaire*]. The human aspires to become a god [*faire le dieu*]: to be god without God and against God, to be god through God and with God, that is the dilemma" (*Action*, IV, i, 3, p. 328 [356]; cf. *Action*, III, v, 3, pp. 294, 297 [316, 319]; IV, i, 3, pp. 326-328 [354-355]; IV, ii, 1, pp. 330, 333, 340 [357, 360, 368]; V, 3, p. 390 [426]; *Philosophy and the Christian Spirit*, v. I, 3, p. 75-76; *Philosophical Requirements of Christianity*, I, 6, pp. 103-106 [see translation "Philosophy Fulfilled in Christianity," p. 30]). Or, to put it in other words: "Here then is the state of the difficulty. To bring nature to consummation and to close off human aspiration, human and nature do not suffice. Yet it is impossible for the complete deployment of voluntary action not to bring us before this gaping hole [*trou béant*] that separates us from what we will to be. It is impossible for us to fill the abyss, impossible for us not to want it

to be filled, impossible for us not to conceive the necessity of a divine assistance" (*Action*, V, 1, p. 369 [401]).<sup>179</sup>

Thus in the end philosophy cannot show that human existence ultimately has a meaning. Reason leaves unanswered the question of humanity's supernatural destiny. Yet reason does show us that if human existence is to have any overarching meaning it must come from outside the phenomenal world and be offered by God. For reason tells us that nature is insufficient to satisfy our will and that in order for the will to be satisfied humans must transcend themselves and the world and reach out to a supra-phenomenal reality or God.<sup>180</sup> Blondel asserts:

It is necessary, if one can say this, to de-center the human being and philosophy, so that this vital point may be placed where it really is, not in the objects attained by the senses, not in the ends to which desire is inclined, not in intellectual speculations, not in moral prescriptions, but in action: for it is through action that the questions of the relations between human and God are in fact inevitably decided. ... In order to find the equation of action, the critique of life is called upon to embrace and surpass the whole natural order. Without introducing any constraint or any postulate from the outside, and by the sole energy of the force [*ressort*] internal to the human will, the critique of life forces humans to open themselves to the gift of a higher life, or, if they close themselves up within themselves, to condemn themselves (*Action*, Conclusion, p. 442 [487]).

Philosophy hence presents us with what Blondel calls "the religious option" [*l'option religieuse*] (*Action*, IV, i, 3, pp. 324, 328 [351, 355]; V, 2-3, pp. 374-375, 393, 422 [406-407, 429, 462]; Conclusion, p. 442 [487]; *Philosophical Requirements of Christianity*, I, 9, p. 138 and II, pp. 269-272; *The Problem of Catholic Philosophy*, III, 3, p. 170). Philosophy demonstrates the incompleteness of nature and opens up our minds to the need for and possibility of a divine revelation (containing commandments and dogmas); it tells us only the supernatural can satisfy the dynamism of the human will (*Action*, V, 1-2, pp. 358-359, 361-362, 374-375, 382, 384 [389-391, 393, 406-407, 416, 418]; see "Letter on the Requirements of Contemporary Thought," p. 198 [PEMB, p. 85]). Blondel remarks: "It is to render Philosophy the best of services to place it in contact with this higher order, where it cannot penetrate, but which it cannot ignore nor exclude except by mutilating itself: if it does not reach the point of indicating its necessity, all the

other questions that it treats lose their sense and their linkage" (*Action*, Conclusion, p. 442 [488]; cf. V, 2, p. 375 [407]).

Philosophy consequently shows humans the need for faith, it anticipates faith as it were (for Christianity is "divinely human" [*divinement humain*]). Philosophy opens up the human mind and forces it to acknowledge that only a faith in God can satisfy human need. Still, while philosophy leads the mind to this need for faith, it cannot lead it any further ("Letter on the Requirements of Contemporary Thought," I, 3-4, pp. 133-134, 136, 141 [PEMB, pp. 12-15, 21]; II, 1-3, pp. 152-155, 161-162 [PEMB, pp. 34-38]; III, 2, pp. 190, 198-199 [PEMB, pp. 75-76, 85-86]; cf. *Being and Beings*, Appendix, pp. 453-461; *Action*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., v. II, VI, p. 388, and Conclusion, pp. 400-403; *Philosophy and the Christian Spirit*, v. I, 1-3, pp. 14, 17-18, 30-31, 61-63, and Appendix, pp. 212, 225-233; Letter of September 9, 1893). Only God can freely offer Himself to us; our role is to accept God's revelation when it is offered to us through faith. As has been noted in regard to Blondel's viewpoint, philosophy leads us to the door of the chapel (perhaps even gives us peek inside) but only faith can open the door. Philosophy shows the incompleteness and insufficiency of the human being without faith, but it cannot itself generate that faith which is a gift of God (a prevenient grace) and an assimilation of our whole being to the principle of a higher life (*Action*, V, 1-3, pp. 358, 360-361, 369, 371, 375, 377-380, 384, 386-387, 423 [390-392, 402, 403, 408, 410-413, 418, 420-421, 464]; cf. *Action*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., v. I, III, pp. 261-262-268, v. II, V, p. 367, and Conclusion, p. 399; *Philosophy and the Christian Spirit*, v. I, 1-2, pp. 22-24, 67-70, 75; v. II, Appendix, pp. 257-266, 278-286, 368-375; *Philosophical Requirements of Christianity*, I, 6, pp. 97-105 [see translation "Philosophy Fulfilled in Christianity," pp. 27, 29]).<sup>181</sup> For Blondel then we do not have so much a faith seeking understanding (as with Augustine and Anselm; *fides quaerens intellectum*), as we have an understanding seeking faith (*intellectus quaerens fidem*) ("Letter on the Requirements of Contemporary Thought," III, 2, p. 193 [PEMB, p. 79]). Philosophy calls the human to wait in humble expectancy for God's self-revelation (God's gift of faith).<sup>182</sup>

Blondel ends his work in a way similar to how it began, with these moving lines:

The entire mystery of life comes from this superficial disagreement between apparent desires and the sincere aspiration of the primitive willing. ... And for this beginning [*ébauche*] to find completion, it is necessary that the human will receive perfection from a more than human hand. Humans can gain their being only by renouncing it, in some fashion, in order to relate it to its principle and to its true end. To renounce what they have of their own, and to annihilate this nothingness that they are, is to receive that full life to which they aspire, but whose source they do not have within themselves. In order to acquire and save themselves, it is necessary to surpass themselves. Their manner of contributing to their self-creation is to consent to the invasion of all that is previous life and superior will compared to their own. To will all that we will, in full sincerity of heart, is to place the being and action of God within ourselves. ... Even after we have posited, by way of a necessary hypothesis, the supernatural order as a scientific postulate, we must be on guard against believing that we could prove its real truth through the development of its consequences or through its internal appropriatenesses. To affirm that it is, is a confession that never comes from us alone. It is enough, therefore, to discard everything that makes it wrongly appear impossible, to show everything that rightly makes it necessary, to prove that it can neither be established nor excluded by philosophy, and yet that the human could not dispense with it without fault or without loss. ... It is for philosophy to show the necessity of posing the alternative: 'Is it or is it not?' It is for philosophy to make known that only this unique and universal question which embraces the entire destiny of the human imposes itself on all with this absolute rigor: 'Is it or is it not?' ... But philosophy cannot go any further, nor can it say, in its own name alone, whether it is or not. But if it is permitted to add one word, only one, which surpasses the domain of human science and the competence of philosophy, the only [*l'unique*] word able, in the face of Christianity, to express that part of certitude, the best part, which cannot be communicated because it arises only from the intimacy of wholly personal action, one word which would itself be an action, it must be said: 'It is' (*C'est*) (*Action*, Conclusion, pp. 444-446 [490-492]; cf. "Letter on the Requirements of Contemporary Thought," III, 2, p. 201 [PEMB, pp. 88-89]).<sup>183</sup>

It was World War I (1914-1918) that brought an end to the persecution of the Catholic Church during the French Third Republic. During the First World War the French government sought the diplo-

matic aid of the Catholic Church and many priests and monks served in the army (such as the famous Jesuit theologian Pierre Rousselot (1878-1915) who died on the battlefield of Éparges as a Sergeant leading the French troops and whose fellow Sergeant the next trench over was a Benedictine monk). Indeed around 30,000 French priests served in the military (many as soldiers) and over 1450 of them died (including Assumptionists, Benedictines, Brothers of the Christian Schools, Capuchins, Dominicans, Fathers of the Holy Ghost, Jesuits, Lazarists, Little Brothers of Mary, Redemptorists, Society of Foreign Missions, and Trappists) during World War I.

Thus it was that in 1914 the French governmental measures against religious congregations were suspended, in 1919 the Concordat was restored in Alsace-Lorraine, in 1920 diplomatic relations were re-established between the French government and the Vatican. Indeed the Astier Law of 1919, the Marie and Barangé Laws of 1951, and the Debré law of 1959 subsidized the cost of education at Catholic schools (in 1941 religious congregations were officially allowed to return to France and teach in primary schools). This was also a time in which various Catholic organizations flourished such as the Association Catholique de la Jeunesse Française (founded by Albert de Mun in 1886), Le Sillon (founded in 1894 at Stanislas Collège by Marc Sangnier, a follower of Gratry, and condemned by the Vatican in 1910), Action Française (founded in 1898 and condemned by the Vatican in 1926), the Young Christian Workers (founded in 1912 in Belgium by Cardinal Joseph Cardijn), Pax Romana (founded in Fribourg, Switzerland in 1921), and the Worker Priest Movement (founded in 1944 in Paris, France).<sup>184</sup>



## INTEGRALISM

*1870-1970 in Belgium, England, France,  
Germany, Poland, & the United States*

**B**efore he abandoned Catholicism and instituted the Anglican religion into England, Henry VIII (1491-1547) was known as the *Fidei Defensor* (Defender of the Faith) for safeguarding the Catholic religion against the incursions of the Lutherans. Indeed in 1521 he wrote his *Assertio Septem Sacramentorum* upholding the Catholic view of the sacraments. Yet once Henry VIII broke with the Catholic Church and launched the English Reformation (1533-1534) and the Irish Reformation (1536) [later followed by the Calvinistic Scottish Reformation (1560)] he quickly abandoned any attempt to defend the Catholic faith and instead became its assailant.

Henry VIII and other British Reformers quickly undertook the dissolution of the Catholic monasteries in England (1536), Ireland (1540), and Scotland (1561, 1587) in order to raise money (ostensibly to end monastic corruption). These acts closed over 1000 monasteries of the Augustinian, Benedictine, Carmelite, Carthusian, Cistercian, Franciscan, Gilbertine, Premonstratensian, and other monastic orders, including the famed Abbeys of Fountains, Glastonbury, Jarrow, Lindisfarne, Rievaulx, St Albans, Tintern, Westminster, and Worcester and led to the loss of much learning, literature (thousands of volumes of books were corrupted), and charity work. They also provoked revolts in 1536 in Lincolnshire, Norfolk, and Yorkshire named the Pilgrimage of Grace in response.

The English and Irish Parliaments also passed several laws which curtailed the civil and political rights of Catholics such as the Acts of Uniformity (1549, 1559, 1604; 1662), the Test Acts (1563, 1673, 1678), the English Bill of Rights (1689), and the Irish Penal Laws (1695). These laws outlawed the practice of the Catholic religion (indeed they mandated attendance at Anglican religious services) and forbade Catholics from attending the medieval Catholic universities of Oxford and Cambridge (c. 1209).<sup>185</sup> They additionally prohibited

Catholics from inheriting property, voting (the Irish Catholics were allowed to vote but they were not allowed to purchase land and any land they owned had to be divided up equally among their offspring upon their death), serving as a doctor, lawyer, schoolmaster, or government official, or succeeding to the throne (a law still in effect). These laws, moreover, prescribed severe penalties for any Catholic priest who lived in England. Indeed over the next two-hundred years (1535-1713) over three-hundred and fifty British Catholic martyrs were put to death (or died due to imprisonment) on account of their being "papists" and "recusants"; these martyrs included some of the best educated Augustinians, Benedictines, Carmelites, Carthusians, Dominicans, Franciscans, Jesuits, and Seculars such as Thomas More (executed in 1535) whose head hung over London Bridge. Finally the Jesuits were suppressed in England in 1773 and many Catholic houses and churches were destroyed in London during the Gordon Riots of 1780.<sup>186</sup>

It was in the midst of this English anti-Catholicism that one individual's conversion to Catholicism forever changed the face of the English Catholic Church, the integralist John Henry Newman.

Integralism (sometimes called Integral Realism) holds that belief in God as well as other fundamental human beliefs (such as belief in the moral law) do not derive purely from reason and logical argumentation, but instead involve the whole human being. Such acts of belief arise from a combination of reason, will, and feeling, and perhaps other special faculties (such as the illative sense for Newman). Belief in God for the integralists then integrates all the faculties of the human being and cannot be reduced to a purely rational affair.

The Integralist **Fr. John Henry Newman (1801-1890)**<sup>187</sup> was born in London in 1801 to an English banker and a French Huguenot mother. He was raised in the Anglican confession, but due to the influence of his mother and the instructor Walter Mayers at the private school of Ealing (1808-1816), Newman practiced a form of Calvinism as a youth (Newman was so anti-Catholic at the time, he tells us, that he substituted vile epithets for such titles of the pope as *Christi Vicarius* in his music textbooks). In 1816, at the age of fifteen, Newman was stricken with both physical illness and mental doubt (due to the failure of his father's banking business, and through reading the philosophical works of David Hume, Thomas Paine and a French author writing against immortality who was possibly Voltaire). In the midst of this corporal and spiritual crisis, Newman underwent a religious

experience during which a profound belief in God as well as a belief that he was to serve God as a celibate came to the fore. Subsequently Newman entered Trinity College, Oxford in 1816 where he studied classics and mathematics and also edited *The Undergraduate* (1819) [with John William Bowden]. Though Newman graduated with only third-class honors in 1820, he was elected a fellow of Oriel College, Oxford in 1822 where he came under the influence of the many Anglican intellectuals stationed there.

In 1825 Newman was ordained an Anglican priest and became curate of St. Clement's Parish, Oxford (1825-1826), vice-principal and tutor of St. Alban's Hall (1825), and a tutor at Oriel College, Oxford (1826) (unfortunately due to overwork, illness, and bereavement, Newman had a nervous collapse in 1827). In 1828 Newman took on the important post of vicar of St. Mary's the Virgin, the Church of Oxford University (not surprisingly, Newman was dismissed from his post as secretary of the more evangelical-oriented Church Missionary Society in 1830). Deciding to take some time off in 1833, Newman traveled through Mediterranean by sea where he wrote his famous hymn "Lead, Kindly Light."

From 1833 to 1841 Newman helped institute the Tractarian or Oxford Movement (along with Frederick William Faber [convert to Catholicism], Richard Hurrell Froude, the poet Gerard Manley Hopkins [a friend of Newman's and convert to Catholicism], John Keble, Henry Manning [convert to Catholicism], William Palmer, Edward Pusey, William George Ward [convert to Catholicism], Robert Wilberforce, and Isaac Williams). The Oxford Movement sought to show how Anglicanism was a middle path (*via media*) avoiding the doctrinal heresies of liberal Protestantism and the devotion excesses of conservative Catholicism. It was at this time that Newman edited and contributed many of the *Tracts for the Times* (1833-1841) and also began editing the *British Critic* (1838), both of which were dedicated to recapturing the Catholic aspects of Anglican theology. When Newman wrote Tract 90 in 1841, in which he argued that the Thirty-Nine Articles of the Anglican Church were not really opposed to Catholic doctrine, Newman came to be censured by the administration of Oxford University and twenty-four Anglican bishops, and a halt was placed on the Tracts themselves. Newman then decided to resign as editor of the *British Critic* (1841) and retire to the town of Littlemore where he established a religious community [he later resigned from

his post at Saint Mary's (1843), and gave up his Oriel College Fellowship (1845)].

At Littlemore Newman began a thorough study of early Church history and the Church Fathers. Influenced by his reading and Augustine's phrase *Securus judicat orbis terrarum* [The whole world judges securely] (*Answer to the Epistle of Parmenian*, III, 24), Newman became convinced of the truth of Catholicism (he thus wrote an anonymous article to the *Oxford Conservative Journal* (1843) in which he withdrew all of his anti-Catholic remarks, and he wrote a number of apologetical letters to newspapers under the pen name Catholicus). Newman ultimately converted to Catholicism in 1845 to the shock of the Anglican community, and was ordained a Catholic priest in 1847 after studying with Cardinal Nicholas Wiseman at Oscott College (1846) and at the College of the Propaganda Fide in Rome (1847) from which Newman received a doctorate of divinity. Newman then received permission to establish an Oratorian community in Maryvale, England (near Birmingham) in 1848 (which moved to Edgbaston in 1850).

Newman had a terrible string of bad luck from 1850 onwards beginning with a lawsuit charging Newman with libel leveled by the former Dominican priest Giovanni Giancinto Achilli in 1852 (Achilli had openly attacked the Catholic Church and in response Newman had published details of Achilli's past sexual misconduct as a priest). Achilli initially won the suit and Newman was ordered to pay a fine of 100 pounds; Newman, however, eventually had his name cleared and the fine reduced. Then from 1854-1857 Newman took on the post of rector at the newly-established Catholic University in Ireland but had to resign after the University fell on hard times due to lack of support from the bishops, as well as lack of students, funding, and a royal charter necessary to grant recognized degrees (the University was re-established as University College, Dublin in 1880). In 1857 Newman turned his energies to producing a new translation of the Bible into English but the translation team had to cease work when an American publication house producing a similar translation brought their pressure to bear. No more successful was Newman's editorship of the *Rambler* which began in 1859, and which Newman was forced to resign in 1860 after he published the article "On Consulting the Laity in Matters of Doctrine" (for which Newman was reported to Rome but never censored). He also tried to found an Oxford Catholic Center in 1858 but this too met with failure as the bishops were afraid

it would discourage Catholics from attending Catholic schools (of course today there are Countless Newman Centers around the world named in Newman's honor, including the Oxford University Newman Society founded in 1888 and the Newman Center at the University of Pennsylvania founded in 1893).

Newman did, however, achieve great success later on in his life. He started the Birmingham Oratory School for boys in 1859, was invited to be a theological expert at the Vatican Council in 1868<sup>188</sup> (which he declined due to age and in order to work on his philosophical book), became an honorary fellow of Trinity College, Oxford in 1878, and was made a Cardinal in 1879. Newman died in Edgbaston, Birmingham in 1890. There are busts of Newman at Oxford and the London Oratory, and his memorial stone at Rednall reads: *Ex umbris et imaginibus in veritatem* [Out of shadows and images into the truth]. In 1991 Newman was declared Venerable by John Paul II. Newman's fame has of course only grown over the years and there is a German journal *Newman-Studien* (1948- ), an American *Newman Studies Journal* (2004- ), and Newman is quoted four times in the *Catechism of the Catholic Church* (1992) [sections 157, 1723, 1778, 2144]. Newman was beatified in 2008.

Newman's key philosophical work is his *An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent* (1870).<sup>189</sup> Newman wrote this work in order to investigate the actual ways in which people's minds assent to truths and in particular the truth of God's existence (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part One, I, 1, pp. 28-29; Part One, IV, 1-2, pp. 69, 81; Part Two, VI, 1-2, pp. 139, 141, 157; Part Two, VII, 1, p. 177; Part Two, IX, 1, pp. 273-274).<sup>190</sup> He was influenced by Aristotle (384-322 B.C.), Francis Bacon (1561-1626), and the Anglican Bishop Joseph Butler (1692-1752) in his endeavor.

Newman's device as a Cardinal was *Cor ad cor loquitur* [Heart speaks to heart]. This expression forms a nice synopsis of his philosophy. Newman held that while abstract reason can be of great service to humans, there are many forms of thought which escape systematic logical formalization (such as those utilized by jurists, historians, and religious believers). These latter forms of thought involve more instinctive versions of reasoning, and at their highest level they speak not just to our minds but also to our hearts (see "Love the Safeguard of Faith against Superstition," *Oxford University Sermons*, XII, 6-7, 35, pp. 226, 248; Letters to Charles Newman of March 3, 1825 and

March 24, 1825, *Letters and Diaries*, v. I, pp. 214, 219; "Moral Effects of Communion with God," *Parochial and Plain Sermons*, IV, 15, p. 872; "Revelation in Its Relation to Faith," *Theological Papers on Faith and Certainty*, VIII, pp. 141-142, 151-155). As Newman professes, it is wrong to hold "that belief belongs to the mere intellect, not to the heart also" (*An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine*, VIII, p. 358). For "A mutilated and defective evidence suffices for persuasion where the heart is alive; but dead evidences, however perfect, can but create a dead faith" ("Faith and Reason, Contrasted as Habits of Mind," *Oxford University Sermons*, X, 44, p. 200). So Newman observes "the whole man moves; paper logic is but the record of it" (*Apologia pro vita sua*, VI, p. 264).

Thus Newman reacts against the logical and rational theism of John Locke (1632-1704), the Anglican theologian William Paley (1743-1805), and the Oriel Noetic Movement (1826-1833) composed of Richard Whately (1787-1863) [to whose work *Elements of Logic* (1826) Newman contributed], Renn Dickson Hampden (1793-1868), and Thomas Arnold (1795-1842) – hence Newman's comment that "the Oriel Common Room stank of Logic," (*Apologia pro vita sua*, VI, p. 264). For, explains Newman, life is too short for sustained operations of reflection on all aspects of existence and instead demands action, assumption, and faith; moreover, the human is not so much a reasoning animal as a seeing, feeling, contemplating, and acting animal (*A Grammar of Assent*, I, 4, pp. 90-92).

In expounding his account of human knowing, Newman makes several key distinctions. First he distinguishes inference and assent. Newman utilizes the name of inference to refer to abstract forms of reasoning (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part One, I, 1, p. 26). An inference is a logical process of reasoning wherein humans grasp the logical consequences of premises (here one considers a proposition in relation to other propositions). Consequently, as Newman is careful to point out, inference is always conditional. This is because, on the one hand, the premises on which the conclusion of an inference is based are assumed to be true, and because, on the other hand, logical demonstration is impossible in inferences involving concrete matters (inferences about the concrete are rather cases of probability and vary in strength with the evidence) (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part One, I, 1, pp. 25, 28; Part One, II, p. 32; Part One, III, p. 47; Part One, IV, 1, pp. 50-51, 65; Part

Two, VI, 1-2, pp. 135-136, 145, 147-148, 157; Part Two, VIII, 1, pp. 209, 215-216, 222).

Inference, then, involves forming a conclusion based on conditional grounds (either on the credit of the premises, or on probabilistic grounds) (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part One, I, 1-2, pp. 25-26, 31; Part One, IV, pp. 51-52). As Newman writes: "Inference, being conditional, ... views its own proper proposition in the medium of prior propositions, and measures it by them. It does not hold a proposition for its own sake, but as dependent upon others, and those others it entertains for the sake of the conclusion" (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, VIII, 1, pp. 212-213). Again Newman states: "Inference requires no apprehension of the things inferred; that in consequence, Inference is necessarily concerned with surfaces and aspects; that it begins with itself, and ends with itself; that it does not reach as far as facts; that it is employed upon formulas; that, as far as it takes real objects of whatever kind into account, such as motives and actions, character and conduct, art, science, taste, morals, religion, it deals with them, not as they are, but simply in its own line, as materials of argument nothing more than major and minor premisses and conclusions" (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part One, IV, 3, p. 87). Inferences then insofar as they are capable of rigorous demonstration (given the conditional assumption of some premises) involve mental abstractions or general notions (what Newman calls notional apprehension<sup>191</sup>); once inferences begin to treat the concrete they become "mere determinations of the probable" (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, VIII, 1, pp. 213, 215-216, 222, 226-227).

Inferences of logical demonstration (which are ultimately conditional as the demonstration depends upon the truth of the assumed premises, but which may become notional assents, as we will discuss later, if made unconditionally) deal with the abstract matters of pure logic and mathematics: i.e. 3 times 2 equals 6 (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, VIII, 1, pp. 212-214). Among the probabilistic concrete forms of inference are induction and analogy, such as the arguments "Europe has no security for peace, till its large standing armies in its separate states are reduced; for a large standing army is in its very idea provocative of war" and "This place will have the cholera, unless it is drained; for there are a number of well-ascertained cases which point to this conclusion" (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, VIII, 1, pp. 226-227).

Inference, i.e. logic, is quite useful in classifying, cataloguing, and organizing bodies of knowledge (in generalizing and discriminating),

in exhibiting the logical relations of ideas (in formulating consistent theories), in weighing evidence, and in correcting mistakes. Thus as Newman puts it, abstract forms of reasoning (inference, and notional assent as described below) give breath to knowledge and provide the principle of advancement (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part One, III, pp. 44-47; Part Two, VI, 2, p. 171; Part Two, VIII, 1, pp. 220, 228; Part Two, IX, 3, p. 283). Yet actual objects in the world are individual and concrete and cannot be reduced to abstract concepts or logical formulas (accordingly an abstract generalization has no existence or counterpart outside the mind). So though we can compare the similarities of individual objects and make generalizations and probable inferences, in the end, inference (abstraction) comes up short when dealing with concrete things: abstraction impoverishes things and strips them of their unique individuality (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part One, I, 2, p. 29; Part Two, VIII, 1, pp. 215, 222-223, 225-227; Part Two, IX, 1, p. 272).<sup>192</sup> Hence we must look for another way forward. This is found in assent.

Assent (belief), in contrast with inference, is a real and intelligent apprehension of a proposition in an unconditional manner, i.e. without reservation or doubt. It is the unhesitating adhesion to a truth, says Newman (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part One, I, 1-2, pp. 25-26, 28, 31; Part One, III, p. 47; Part One, IV, pp. 50-51, 54-55; Part Two, VI, 1-2, pp. 135-136, 145, 147-148, 157; Part Two, VIII, 2, p. 208; Part Two, IX, 1, p. 274; cf. "Assent and Intuition," *Theological Papers on Faith and Certainty*, IV, pp. 64-65). As assent is the absolute acceptance of a proposition without any condition, it considers a proposition in itself and for its own sake (its object is the thesis itself) (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part One, I, 1, pp. 25, 28; I, 2, p. 32; Part One, IV, pp. 51-52). Assent can thus be classified as "the mental assertion of an intelligible proposition, as an act of the intellect direct, absolute, complete in itself, unconditional, arbitrary, yet not incompatible with an appeal to argument, and at least in many cases exercised unconsciously" (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, VI, 2, p. 157).

Now most significantly, assents provide for certitude, "an active recognition of propositions as true," the natural and normal state of the human mind (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, VI, 2, p. 172; Part Two, VII, 2, p. 181; Part Two, IX, pp. 270-271).<sup>193</sup> Because assents are certain they are unconditional beliefs which are free from all doubt: "No man is certain of a truth who can endure the thought of the fact

of its contradictory existing or occurring" (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, VI, 2, p. 164). Accordingly, when we assent and find certitude we acquire a special state wherein we attain a surety of a truth and a sense of security and repose (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, VI, 2, p. 169; Part Two, VII, 2, p. 186). Certitude is "the termination of all doubt and fear about its [a matter's] truth, and an unconditional conscious adherence to it," (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, VII, 2, p. 181). Moreover, in certitude one acquires invincible knowledge; one has an inward assurance, strong though implicit, that one's belief shall never fail or be overturned (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, VII, 1, pp. 174, 181). Certitude is "a feeling of satisfaction and self-gratulation, of intellectual security, arising out of a sense of success, attainment, possession, finality, as regards the matter which has been in question" (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, VI, 2, p. 168; cf. *A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, VII, 2, p. 186; Part Two, IX, p. 270). Hence, Newman, summarizing the three conditions of certitude, holds "that it [certitude] follows on investigation and proof, that it is accompanied by a specific sense of intellectual satisfaction and repose, and that it is irreversible" (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, VII, 2, p. 207; cf. *A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, VII, 2, p. 191).

According to Newman we assent to, and thus have certitude of, the following truths (none of which can be logically demonstrated): 1) we exist; 2) the external world exists; 3) humans have lived before us and so various events have happened in the past (i.e. Julius Caesar invaded England and was later assassinated, the South American tribe of the Abipones existed, England had colonies; we did certain things yesterday); 4) the plays of Terence, Virgil's *Aeneid*, Horace's *Odes*, and the Livy's *Histories* are not medieval forgeries (we also can reconstruct the authorship of some anonymous texts); 5) the universe operates according to natural laws (namely, the laws of motion, optics, chemistry, and electricity; as well as other generalizations of science such as a moving body left to itself will never stop or that the earth rotates about its axis); 6) the earth is a globe; 7) there are cities on the earth named Florence, London, Madrid, and Paris, and a country named India; 8) Great Britain is an Island (and is not an exact circle or square); 9) Great Britain is ruled by a certain individual (Queen Victoria in Newman's day); 10) we have parents who gave birth to us; 9) we cannot live without food; 11) we are allergic to some foods; 12) we shall one day die; 13) we have intimate friends who are not false

to us; 14) some people are hostile to us (and some people are guilty of certain crimes); 15) two and two make four, three times two (or two plus four) makes six; 16) the angle in a semi-circle is a right angle, and a straight line is not the longest possible distance between two points; 17) there are moral truths (i.e. treachery, cruelty, and ingratitude are not as praiseworthy as honesty and temperance); 18) there is a God;<sup>194</sup> 19) the soul is immortal and there will be future rewards for good acts and future retribution for evil acts; 20) Christianity is true (the Lord Jesus Christ is divine) (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part One, IV, 1, p. 67; Part Two, VI, 1-2, pp. 135, 148-151, 155, 158, 164-165; Part Two, VII, 1-2, pp. 174-175, 183-185, 192, 194; Part Two, VIII, 1-2, pp. 213, 229, 234, 235-239, 244, 247-248, 251-251, 255-256, 259; Part Two, IX, 1, p. 272, 3, pp. 282, 298-299; Part Two, IX, 2, pp. 319, 333; cf. "Experience, Mind, and Reasoning," Manuscript of 1859 in PR, XIV, pp. 193-196; Letter to William Froude of April 29, 1879 in PR, X, pp. 154-155; *Apologia pro vita sua*, III, pp. 127, 129, 146; VII, p. 319; "Papers on the Certainty of Faith," *Theological Papers on Faith and Certainty*, I, p. 5, 20-21; "Papers on the Evidence for Revelation," *Theological Papers on Faith and Certainty*, V, pp. 82, 88-90; "Papers in Preparation for *A Grammar of Assent*," *Theological Papers on Faith and Certainty*, VII, pp. 129-130; *The Philosophical Notebook*, v. II, pp. 30-31, 33).

Here Newman is criticizing the radical empiricism of English philosophers such as John Locke (1632-1704), David Hume (1711-1776), John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), James Froude (1818-1894), Thomas Huxley (1825-1895), and William Clifford (1845-1879). These thinkers held that all propositions relating to the external world are merely probable for as Locke said "... there is one unerring mark of it, viz., the not entertaining any proposition with greater assurance than the proofs it is built upon will warrant" (*An Essay concerning Human Understanding*, IV, 19) and as Clifford was to soon say (perhaps in response to Newman): "It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence" (*The Ethics of Belief*, 1879, p. 77).

The view of these thinkers that we cannot entertain any proposition with greater assurance than the proofs upon which it is built will warrant (with its corollary that truths about the world are merely probable) is wrong and cannot be held in practice, claims Newman. For there are many truths to which all people unconditionally assent (even

when there is nothing more than probable reasons for them which fall short of demonstration and intuition) (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, VI, 1, pp. 136-139, 148, 150-152; Part Two, IX, 2, p. 320; cf. Letters to Henry Wilberforce of July 27, 1868 and August 8, 1868, *Letters and Diaries*, v. XXIV, pp. 104-107, 118-119). People often believe with certainty what they cannot definitively prove by logic.<sup>195</sup> Newman writes: "None of us can think or act without the acceptance of truths, not intuitive, not demonstrated, yet sovereign. If our nature has any constitution, any laws, one of them is this absolute reception of propositions as true, which lie outside the narrow range of conclusions to which logic, formal or virtual, is tethered; nor has any philosophical theory the power to force on us a rule which will not work for a day" (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part One, VI, 1, p. 150).

Hence for Newman humans can assent with certitude to many things which cannot be demonstrated (such as the belief in human mortality); these beliefs go beyond the evidence and are not self-evident. Following Locke, Newman says that humans form sure beliefs in which there is a "surplusage" of belief over proof (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, VII, 2, p. 185; Part Two, VIII, 1-2, pp. 212, 237-238, 250-251). In other words we have sure beliefs which are rational but which go beyond the ability of logic and argumentation to establish (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, VIII, 2, p. 236, 241, 246; Part Two, IX, p. 271, 2, p. 280). Newman claims: "... certitude is the result of arguments which, taken in the letter, and not in their full implicit sense, are but probabilities" (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, VIII, 2, p. 234).

Now how is it that we humans can form a belief that is certain but yet goes beyond the evidence? Newman argues that this occurs through the special human cognitive faculty of ratiocination or what he terms the illative sense [or a personal form of thought]. Newman writes: "Anyhow, there is a considerable 'surplusage,' as Locke calls it, of belief over proof, when I determine that I individually must die. But what logic cannot do, my own living personal reasoning, my good sense, which is the healthy condition of such personal reasoning, but which cannot adequately express itself in words, does for me, and I am possessed with the most precise, absolute, masterful certitude of my dying some day or other" (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, VIII, 2, p. 239; cf. *A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, VIII, 2, pp. 250-251).

In further clarifying the nature of ratiocination or the illative sense, Newman describes it as a human cognitive faculty that is instinctive

(*A Grammar of Assent*, Part One, IV, 1, p. 67; Part Two, VIII, 1, p. 229). Ratiocination proceeds by a form of instinctive perception or spontaneous impulse from premiss to conclusion, without explicit recognition of the connection between the two (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, VIII, 1-3, pp. 209-210, 245, 266): "we grasp the full tale of premisses and the conclusion ... by a sort of instinctive perception of the legitimate conclusion in and through the premisses" (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, VIII, 2, p. 239). Moreover, as Newman remarks, our most natural mode of reasoning is not from propositions to propositions, but from things to things, from concrete to concrete, from wholes to wholes (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, VIII, 2-3, pp. 232-233, 245, 260-261). It is the illative sense (ratiocination) which functions in these concrete matters (in what will be called real assents) (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, VIII, 2-3, pp. 233, 260, 269; Part Two, IX, 1-3, pp. 271, 276, 281-282). As such, this form of reasoning is quite "subtle" and occurs through a process that cannot be systematically analyzed as it is much too spontaneous (instinctive), implicit (lacking full advertence of mind), impalpable, and delicate (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, VIII, 1-3, pp. 217, 227, 232-233, 240, 246, 250-251, 259-261, 263, 266; Part Two, IX, 2-3, pp. 281-283, 285, 296, 299; Part Two, IX, 2, p. 379; cf. Letter to William Froude of April 29, 1879 in PR, X, pp. 156-158, 163). Hence Newman holds that "... many of our most obstinate and most reasonable certitudes depend on proofs which are informal and personal, which baffle powers of analysis, and cannot be brought under logical rule" (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, VIII, 2, p. 239). For instance, we are able to distinguish two brothers without being able to express exactly how it is we can distinguish them; and an artist's eye is able to implicitly determine what lines or shades make a countenance look young or old, amiable, thoughtful, angry, or conceited (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, VIII, 2, p. 233).

Most importantly, Newman argues that the certainty garnered by ratiocination or the illative sense is based on an accumulation of probabilities. Humans here rely upon an accumulation of probabilities which are combined by the illative sense in order to acquire certitude. By an accumulation of separate threads of evidence we form a solid rod of certainty (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, VIII, 1-2, pp. 220, 233, 250, 252-253, 260; Part Two, X, 2, pp. 320, 332-333; Appendix, II, p. 383; cf. "Papers on the Certainty of Faith," *Theological Papers*

on *Faith and Certainty*, I, p. 19; "Love the Safeguard of Faith against Superstitions," *Oxford University Sermons*, XII, 3, pp. 223-224; Letter to Canon John Walker of July 6, 1964, *Letters and Diaries*, v. XXI, p. 146, and Letter to Henry Bleckley of c. January 10, 1871, *Letters and Diaries*, v. XXV, p. 266; *The Philosophical Notebook*, v. II, p. 133). The illative sense functions then as "a number of independent probable arguments, [are] sufficient, when united, for a reasonable conclusion" (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, VIII, 2, p. 232); there is "(a) mass of probabilities ... acting upon each other in correction and confirmation" (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, VIII, 2, p. 233; cf. *A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, IX, 3, p. 299). Thus "It is by the strength, variety, or multiplicity of premisses, which are only probable, not by invincible syllogisms ... that the practiced and experienced mind is able to make a sure divination that a conclusion is inevitable, of which his lines of reasoning do not actually put him in possession" (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, VIII, 2, p. 254). These varying lines of evidence help to clear up objections and difficulties, provide unlooked-for correlations, and throw light on a multitude of collateral facts, account for them, and unite them in one whole (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, VIII, 2, pp. 254-256). Newman summarizes: "My argument is in outline as follows: that that absolute certitude which we were able to possess, whether as to the truths of natural theology, or as to the fact of a revelation, was the result of an assemblage of concurring and converging probabilities, and that, both according to the constitution of the human mind and the will of its Maker; that certitude was a habit of mind, that certainty was a quality of propositions; that probabilities which did not reach to logical certainty, might create a mental certitude; that the certitude thus created might equal in measure and strength the certitude which was created by the strictest scientific demonstration; and that to have such certitude might in given cases and to given individuals be a plain duty, though not to others in other circumstances" (*Apologia pro vita sua*, III, p. 140).

Very felicitously, Newman speaks of how a mass of probabilities can converge upon a truth and allow the mind to form a rational certitude (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, VIII, 2, pp. 253, 258; cf. *Apologia pro vita sua*, VI, pp. 286-287): "a proof is the limit of converging probabilities" (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, VIII, 2, p. 254). Here we have distinct and numerous lines of evidence all converging on the same point, a situation similar to two lines converging and meeting at

a distance (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, VIII, 2, p. 259; Part Two, IX, 3, p. 282; cf. Letter to John Walker of July 6, 1864 in PR, XI, p. 164; Letter to Richard Holt Hutton of March 1, 1872, *Letters and Diaries*, v. XXVI, p. 41), or similar to how a regular polygon inscribed inside a circle, with its sides being continually diminished, tends to become that circle as its limit (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, VIII, 2, pp. 253-254, 257-258; Part Two, IX, 2, p. 281).

Newman thus writes of the Illative Sense: "It is the cumulation of probabilities, independent of each other, arising out of the nature and circumstances of the particular case which is under review; probabilities too fine to avail separately, too subtle and circuitous to be convertible into syllogisms, too numerous and various for such conversion, even were they convertible" (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, VIII, 2, p. 230; cf. *A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, IX, 3, p. 298); when utilizing the illative sense "one's mind does not proceed step by step, but he feels all at once and together the force of various combined phenomena, though he is not conscious of them" (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, VIII, 3, p. 261). Thus the illative sense can supplement (and even go beyond) the laws of logic to reach true certitude about matters not knowable through abstract reasoning alone.

As we have seen, Newman holds that this illative sense functions with respect to several of our most basic beliefs which are unconditional and certain but which fall short of logical demonstration. Such a form of instinctive ratiocination occurs when humans grasp their own existence, believe in the existence of the external world (we instinctively believe there is an external world from which the phenomena of senses proceed), acquire knowledge of the past, and believe that they will die (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part One, IV, 1, p. 67; Part One, V, 1, pp. 96-97; Part Two, VIII, 1, p. 229; Part Two, IX, 3, pp. 298-299; *The Philosophical Notebook*, v. II, pp. 201-204). It is the illative sense which is utilized in determining the veracity of the pre-historic legends of Greece and Rome and it is what operates in scholarly debates about the authentic wording in Shakespeare's works. For logic, syllogism, and inference cannot in the end resolve the matter as we are dealing with first principles and pre-existing beliefs (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, VIII, 1, pp. 218-222; Part Two, IX, 3, pp. 284-290). So too we use the illative sense to determine that the plays of Terence, Virgil's *Aeneid*, Horace's *Odes*, and the *Histories* of Livy are not medieval forgeries. For we have an instinctive sense that the medievals could

not write the classics, and also a faith in testimonial tradition and its lack of dissenting voices (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, VIII, 2, pp. 235-237, 244).

And the illative sense is invoked by a weather-wise peasant who cannot assign reasons why he thinks it will be fine tomorrow and in the physician of natural acuteness and varied experience who can make an accurate diagnosis of a medical complaint (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, VIII, 3, p. 261). The zoologist who builds up an intricate organism from examination of a small bone makes use of it, as does the archeologist who recreates a past culture from an inscription (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, VIII, 1, p. 210). The illative sense is also operative in detectives who investigate the mysterious with great sagacity and who often have an intuitive perception of human character, as well as by those who have an ear for music or a detailed knowledge of a landscape, those who can discern friends and enemies, and lawyers and judges (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, VIII, 2-3, pp. 249, 262-263, 265-266; Part Two, IX, 2-3, pp. 280, 291). Lastly the illative sense was used by such geniuses as Newton in his perception of mathematical and physical truths, Napoleon in his ability to survey and judge a battlefield, and Columbus who braved the terrors of a mysterious ocean out of faith in the existence of a Western world (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, VIII, 1, pp. 210, 3, pp. 262-263; cf. "The Nature of Faith in Relation to Reason," *Oxford University Sermons*, XI, 24, pp. 217-218).

And most famously, Newman discusses our use of the illative sense to assent with certainty to the belief that England is an Island: "We are all absolutely certain, beyond the possibility of doubt, that Great Britain is an island. We give to that proposition our deliberate and unconditional adhesion. There is no security on which we should be better content to stake our interests, our property, our welfare, than on the fact that we are living on an island. We have no fear of any geographical discovery which may reverse our belief. ... yet are there arguments producible for it (to use the common expression) in black and white commensurate with this overpowering certitude about it? Our reasons for believing that we are circumnavigable are such as these: -first, we have been so taught in our childhood, and it is so in all the maps; next, we have never heard it contradicted or questioned; on the contrary, every one whom we have heard speak on the subject of Great Britain, every book we have read, invariably took it for granted; our

whole natural history, the routine transactions and current events of the country, our social and commercial system, our political relations with foreigners, imply it in one way or another. ... I am not at all insinuating that we are not rational in our certitude; I only mean that we cannot analyze a proof satisfactorily, the result of which good sense actually guarantees to us" (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, VIII, 2, pp. 234-235).

Thus the illative sense is a special natural faculty of reasoning in humans which proceeds from the concrete to the concrete, based on an accumulation of converging probabilities, and allows for real assent to beliefs, i.e. certitude. The illative sense in this way provides for unconditional forms of assent.<sup>196</sup>

Now while all assents are unconditional (verses inferences which are conditional), still there are two different kinds of assent one can make, notional and real assent.

Notional assent is given to propositions that deal with abstract notions and possible existences; notional assent is an unconditional assent to ideas in our minds (mental constructions) that don't exist in the concrete world of things as such [inference also deals with such abstract notions but conditionally which is why Newman asserts that both are forms of notional apprehension] (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part One, I, 2, pp. 29, 31; Part One, III, pp. 36-38, 44-47; Part One, IV, 1, pp. 49-52, 66, 69, 76; Part Two, VI, 1, pp. 146, 154-155).

Newman provides a list of five different forms of notional assents: 1) profession (here one forms an assent out of habit and without reflection; one adopts the fashion of the day): for example, I am a Tory or a Liberal; 2) credence (here one takes for granted and assents to what comes to us from the senses, other people, newspapers, books, etc.); such knowledge forms the broad and diverse foundation of our thought: i.e. England is an island; 3) opinion (here through reflection (measurement, estimation) we assent to a proposition as probably true; as an assent this is independent of the premises unlike inference): i.e. one is of the opinion that one will have a fine hay-harvest this year; 4) presumption (here we assent to the first principles of logic, mathematics, science, aesthetics, and ethics: for instance, causation occurs in nature, there is an external world, there is a true and false, just and unjust, beautiful and deformed); 5) speculation (here by contemplation of our mental operations we form a firm awareness of propositions as true and assent to all general propositions and forms of reasoning: i.e.

we assent to propositions of science, math, proverbs, aphorisms, sayings, rules of conduct (such as a Stoic to the maxim *Justum et tenacem* [(Be) just and steadfast]), legal judgments, constitutional maxims, and theological statements [a God of certain attributes has done various works and given a Revelation to humans]); and 6) mysteries of the faith (for these truths cannot be experienced or conceived) (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part One, IV, 1, pp. 50-76, 3, p. 89; Part One, V, 2, pp. 115-117; Part Two, VI, 1-2, pp. 141, 147, 162, 169; Part Two, VII, 1-2, pp. 175, 190, 197; Part Two, IX, 3, pp. 282, 290).

Real assent (real apprehension) on the other hand involves assent to concrete things (either to an individual thing in the world or to a mental image) ultimately known through experience (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part One, I, 2, pp. 29, 31; Part One, III, pp. 36-39, 44, 46-47; Part One, IV, 1-2, pp. 49-52, 66, 69, 76, 80; Part One, V, 2, pp. 113-114). Whereas notional assents apprehend what the words of a proposition mean, real assents apprehend the object denoted by the words. Notional assent, in other words, is rendered to the truth of a proposition but real assent is rendered to the reality spoken of by the proposition [whereas inference is given to the proposition(s) inferred] (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part One, V, 1, p.108; cf. *A Grammar of Assent*, I, 4, pp. 54-55). Real assent provides for depth of knowledge and is thus the conservative principle of knowledge (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part One, III, p. 47).

Now as real assent deals with real concrete things or images (and as it is an act of the whole human seeking the truth), it is more vivid and forceful than notional assents or inferences. Hence a real assent is more practical, invokes the imagination, and has the potential to excite and stimulate the affections and passions (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part One, I, 2, pp. 29, 31; Part One, III, pp. 36-38, 47; Part One, IV, pp. 49-50, 3, pp. 86-87; Part One, VI, 1, pp. 154-155; Part Two, X, 2, p. 379).<sup>197</sup> This is because real assent deals with concrete things that can invoke our imagination (honor, glory, duty, self-aggrandizement, gain, divine goodness, future reward, eternal life) and stimulate our hopes, fears, likes, dislikes, appetites, passions, affections, selfishness, and of love (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part One, IV, 2, pp. 81-82).

As Newman explains in a couple of quotes: "(Real assent) being concerned with things concrete, not abstract, which variously excite the mind from their moral and imaginative properties, has for its objects, not only directly what is true, but inclusively what is beautiful, useful,

admirable, heroic; objects which kindle devotion, rouse the passions, and attach the affections; and thus it leads the way to actions of every kind, to the establishment of principles, and the formation of character, and is thus again intimately connected with what is individual and personal" (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part One, IV, 3, p. 87; cf. Letter to William Froude of January 2, 1860, *Letters and Diaries*, v. XIX, p. 273) and "This is why science has so little of a religious tendency; deductions have no power of persuasion. The heart is commonly reached, not through the reason, but through the imagination, by means of direct impressions, by the testimony of facts and events, by history, by description. Persons influence us, voices melt us, looks subdue us, deeds inflame us. Many a man will live and die upon a dogma: no man will be a martyr for a conclusion. ... No one, I say, will die for his own calculations: he dies for realities" (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part One, IV, 3, p. 89; cf. "The Tamworth Reading Room: Secular Knowledge not a Principle of Action," *Discussions and Arguments on Various Subjects*, IV, 6, p. 293). Or as Newman puts it so eloquently elsewhere: One would lay down one's life for one's mother's veracity but not for 'Lucern is food for cattle' (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part One, II, p. 35).

Real assents also may (indirectly) issue forth in action in the world (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part One, I, 2, p. 31; Part One, IV, 3, pp. 86-87; Part Two, VII, 1, pp. 176-177; Part Two, VIII, 2, 240). As Newman asserts: "Till we have them [Real Assents], in spite of a full apprehension and assent in the field of notions, we have no intellectual moorings. ... They create, as the case may be, heroes and saints, great leaders, statesmen, preachers, and reformers, the pioneers of discovery in science, visionaries, fanatics, knight-errants, demagogues, and adventurers. They have given to the world men of one idea, of immense energy, of adamant will, of revolutionary power. They kindle sympathies between man and man, and knit together the innumerable units which constitute a race and a nation. They become the principle of its political existence; they impart to it homogeneity of thought and fellowship of purpose. They have given form to medieval theocracy and to the Mahometan superstition; they are now the life both of 'Holy Russia,' and of that freedom of speech and action which is the special boast of Englishmen" (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part One, IV, 2, pp. 85-86; cf. *A Grammar of Assent*, Part One, IV, 2, p. 77).

A real assent is thus an energetic adhesion to a truth that arrests us, wherein (often) the imagination is kindled, the heart inflamed, devo-

tion commenced, and conduct affected (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part One, V, 2, pp. 112-113, 115-116, 122-123). For a real assent is an assent to the particular and concrete, and as such appeals to the imagination, affection, and conduct, whereas notional assent is an assent to the general, and appeals to the intellect [a real assent is also unique to each individual while a notional assent is common to all and can be made at will] (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part One, IV, 2, pp. 82-85; Part One, V, 2, pp. 122-123). Newman distinguishes inference from notional and real assent by claiming: "(Notional assent) is always an unconditional acceptance of a proposition, (inference) is an acceptance on the condition of an acceptance of its premises. In its notional assents as well as in its inferences, the mind contemplates its own creations instead of things; in real (assent), it is directed toward things, represented by the impressions which they have left on the imagination. These images, when assented-to, have an influence both on the individual and on society, which mere notions cannot exert" (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part One, IV, 2, p. 76).

An example of a real assent would be the assent of a Christian to the historical reality of the Lord Christ's Passion (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part One, IV, pp. 50-51). Indeed according to Newman while theology is abstract and deals with notional assents (theological truths and intellectual exercises),<sup>198</sup> one's personal religion is constructed from real assents. For religion deals with imagination, devotion, and the reality of God and Christ (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part One, IV, 1, p. 62; Part One, V, 1, p. 93, 108; Part One, V, 2, p. 122; cf. *The Philosophical Notebook*, v. II, pp. 129, 169). Newman concludes:

Here we have the solution of the common mistake of supposing that there is a contrariety and antagonism between a dogmatic creed and vital religion. People urge that salvation consists, not in believing the proposition that there is a God, that there is a Saviour, that our Lord is God, that there is a Trinity, but in believing in God, in a Savior, in a Sanctifier; and they object that such propositions are but a formal and human medium destroying all true reception of the Gospel, and making religion a matter of words or of logic, instead of its having its seat in the heart. They are right so far as this, that men can and sometimes do rest in propositions themselves as expressing intellectual notions; they are wrong, when they maintain that men need do so or always do so. The propositions may and must be used, and can easily be used, as the expression of facts,

not notions, and they are necessary to the mind in the same way that language is ever necessary for denoting facts, both for ourselves as individuals, and for our intercourse with others. Again, they are useful in their dogmatic aspect as ascertaining and making clear for us the truths on which the religious imagination has to rest. Knowledge must ever precede the exercise of the affections. ... We must know concerning God, before we can feel love, fear, hope, or trust towards Him. Devotion must have its objects; those objects, as being supernatural, when not represented to our senses by material symbols, must be set before the mind in propositions ... in religion the imagination and affections should always be under the control of reason. ... Sentiment, whether imaginative or emotional, falls back upon the intellect for its stay, when sense cannot be called into exercise; and it is in this way that devotion falls back upon dogma (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part One, V, 1, pp. 108-109; cf. *A Grammar of Assent*, Part One, V, 2, p. 116).

Newman makes a special effort to apply this doctrine of the illative sense to our knowledge of God's existence. Now in regard to God, Newman certainly held (in spite of what some have argued) that we know of God's existence through reason (understood in a broad sense). He argues:

In religion inquiry each of us can speak only for himself, and for himself he has a right to speak. His own experiences are enough for himself, but he cannot speak for others. ... (Yet) if, as he believes and is sure, it is true, it will approve itself to others also, for there is but one truth. And doubtless he does find in fact, that, allowing for the difference of minds and modes of speech, what convinces him, does convince others also. There will be very many exceptions, but these will admit of explanation ... But, however that may be, he brings together his reasons, and relies on them, because they are his own, and this is his primary evidence; and he has a second ground of evidence, in the testimony of those who agree with him. But his best evidence is the former, which is derived from his own thoughts; and it is that which the world has a right to demand of him; and therefore his true sobriety and modesty consists, not in claiming for his conclusions an acceptance or a scientific approval which is not to be found anywhere, but in stating what are personally his own grounds for his belief in Natural and Revealed Religion, – grounds which he holds to be so sufficient, that he thinks that others do hold them implicitly or in substance, or would hold them, if they inquired fairly, or will hold if they listened to him, or do not hold from

impediments, invincible or not as it may be, into which he has no call to inquire. However, his own business is to speak for himself" (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, X, pp. 300-301; cf. *A Grammar of Assent*, Appendix, II, pp. 382-384; *Apologia pro vita sua*, IV, p. 177; VI, p. 279).

Hence Newman quite happily argued (following the Catholic and Anglican traditions) that there is a natural religion by which humans believe that God exists and is one (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part One, V, 1 pp. 94, 107; Appendix, II, p. 387; *Apologia pro vita sua*, VII, p. 321; *The Philosophical Notebook*, v. II, pp. 203-204). For he says there are three channels by which God furnishes humans knowledge of Himself: 1) the course of the world (including human life and affairs); 2) tradition (the voice of humankind including religious rites that have prevailed in all parts of world); 3) our own minds (the moral conscience) (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, X, 1-2, pp. 303, 317, 324-325; *Apologia pro vita sua*, III, p. 147; "Nature and Grace," *Discourses Addressed to Mixed Congregations*, VIII, p. 152).

Firstly then, the universe which came to be must have an eternal uncreated cause, as the cosmological argument shows ("Mysteries of Nature and Grace," *Discourses Addressed to Mixed Congregations*, XIII, pp. 264-265; "The Mystery of Divine Condescension," *Discourses Addressed to Mixed Congregations*, XIV, pp. 285-286; "Revelation in Its Relation to Faith," *Theological Papers on Faith and Certainty*, VIII, p. 157). Secondly, the order of the universe (as evidenced by causation and the laws of nature), speaks of God's nature and will in its broad outlines, as the argument from design indicates (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, IX, 1, p. 275; Part Two, X, 1, p. 309; Appendix, II, p. 383). Newman states: "And here I am led to observe that, as a cause implies a will, so order implies a purpose. Did we see flint cells, in their various receptacles all over Europe, scored always with certain special and characteristic marks, even though those marks had no assignable meaning or final cause whatsoever, we should take that very repetition, which indeed is the principle of order, to be a proof of intelligence. The agency then which has kept up and keeps up the general laws of nature, energizing at once in Sirius and on the earth, and on the earth in its primary period as well as in the nineteenth century, must be the Mind, and nothing else, and Mind at least as wide and enduring in its living action, as the immeasurable ages and spaces of the universe on which that agency has left its traces" (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part One,

IV, 1, p. 75; cf. *A Grammar of Assent*, Part One, IV, 3, p. 89; "Revelation in Its Relation to Faith," *Theological Papers on Faith and Certainty*, VIII, p. 157).

Yet in the end the cosmological and teleological arguments (i.e. the argument from design) [as well as other traditional arguments for God, such as that from causality advanced by Samuel Clarke (1675-1729) and the watchmaker analogy argument of William Paley (1743-1805)], merely teach us about the power and goodness of God (they only sanction belief in the existence of an uncreated wise designer, a supramundane agent). So while they give us a faint and fragmentary view of the divine being, they tell us nothing of God's sanctity, mercy, love, and future judgment (i.e. of God's personal attributes which are the core of religion) (*The Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, X, 1, p. 309; *Apologia pro vita sua*, VII, p. 319; *The Idea of a University*, VII, 10, pp. 340-342; "The Influence of Natural and Revealed Religion Respectively," *Oxford University Sermons*, II, 14-15, pp. 22-23; Letter to William Brownlow of April 13, 1870, in PR, XIII, p. 189). That is to say, the traditional arguments for God only allow for a notional assent to God (moreover they are not very effective in the conversion of non-believers) (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, VII, 2, p. 194; II, 10, p. 319).<sup>199</sup> Thus Newman writes: "I do not want to be converted by a smart syllogism; if I am asked to convert others by it, I say plainly I do not care to overcome their reason without touching their hearts" (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, X, 2, p. 330; cf. *A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, VIII, 2, p. 242; *Apologia pro vita sua*, VII, p. 319).

So the traditional arguments for God's existence can help us grasp some of the attributes of God (and exhibit the relations of ideas about God). Yet for true faith and religion a real assent is required in which we assent to the existence of God as a personal being who appeals to our passions and will and to whom we can dedicate our lives. And for a belief in a personal God we need to use our illative sense and not the Aristotelian logic of mood and figure. Only the utilization of the illative sense allows for an imaginative apprehension of God, a real assent, which has power over our affections and actions (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part One, V, 1-3, pp. 95-97, 108, 111-113, 119-123, 125; Part Two, VII, 2, p. 190; Part Two, VIII, 2, p. 242; *Apologia pro vita sua*, VII, p. 319). Newman proclaims: "Logic makes but a sorry rhetoric with the multitude; first shoot round corners, and you may not de-

spair of converting by a syllogism. ... After all, man is not a reasoning animal: he is a seeing, feeling, contemplating, acting animal. ... Life is not long enough for a religion of inferences; we shall never have done beginning, if we determine to begin with proof. We shall ever be laying our foundations; we shall turn theology into evidences, and divines into textuaries. ... If we insist on proofs for everything, we shall never come to action; to act you must assume, and that assumption is faith. ... But if we commence with scientific knowledge and argumentative proof, or lay any great stress upon it as the basis of personal Christianity, or attempt to make man moral and religious by Libraries and Museums, let us in consistency take chemists for our cooks, and mineralogists for our masons" ("The Tamworth Reading Room: Secular Knowledge Not a Principle of Action," *Discussions and Arguments on Various Subjects*, IV, 6, pp. 294-296).

Specifically our personal access to God is through the moral conscience for Newman (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, VII, 2, pp. 194, 199; Part Two, X, 1-2, pp. 310-311, 318, 324-325; *Letter to the Duke of Norfolk*, section 5; *Apologia pro vita sua*, VI, pp. 286-287; VII, p. 319; Letters of July 25, 1869 and August 17, 1869 to Charles Meynell, in PR, XV, pp. 197-198, 199-200; "Religious Faith Rational," *Parochial and Plain Sermons*, I, 15, p. 127; "Faith without Sight," *Parochial and Plain Sermons*, II, 2, p. 237; "Mysteries of Nature and of Grace," *Discourses Addressed to Mixed Congregations*, XIII, pp. 260-263; "Dispositions for Faith," *Sermons Preached on Various Occasions*, V, pp. 65-66; Letter of June 25, 1869 in PR, XVII, p. 207; "From Conscience to God," Manuscript of 1859 in PR, XVIII, pp. 209-212; *The Philosophical Notebook*, v, II, pp. 25, 32, 59-61, 65; *The Arians of the Fourth Century*, I, 3, p. 76). As Newman writes: "To gain religious starting points, we must in a parallel way, interrogate our hearts ... interrogate our own consciences, interrogate, I will say, the God who dwells there" (Letter to Louisa Simeon of June 25, 1869, *Letters and Diaries*, v, XXIV, p. 276, reprinted in PR, XVII, p. 208).

Now Humans have an inner voice of conscience in which they experience a command to do certain acts and not do others (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part One, IV, 1, pp. 69-70; Part One, V, 1, pp. 96-97; Part Two, X, 1, p. 311; see *Callista*, pp. 314-315; *The Philosophical Notebook*, v, II, pp. 47, 59). In other words, humans experience moral obligations. They experience conscience as a "solemn Monitor, it is personal, pe-remptory, unargumentative, irreparable, minatory, definitive. This I

consider relieves me of the necessity of arguing with those who would resolve our sense of right and wrong into a sense of the Expedient or the Beautiful, or would refer its authoritative suggestions to the effect of teaching or of association" (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part One, V, 2, p. 110).<sup>200</sup>

Furthermore, according to Newman, such an experience of conscience (through the illative sense) reveals the existence of a transcendent lawgiver and judge, a good God who imparts a moral law to humans. Thus conscience "vaguely reaches forward to something beyond self, and dimly discerns a sanction higher than self for its decisions, as evidence in that keen sense of obligation and responsibility which informs them" (*A Grammar of Assent*, I, 5, p. 99); conscience "carries on our minds to a Being exterior to ourselves, else, whence did it come? and to a Being superior to ourselves, else, whence its strange, troublesome peremptoriness? ... Its very existence throws us out of ourselves and beyond ourselves, to go and seek for Him in the height & depth whose Voice it is" (*The Philosophical Notebook*, v. II, p. 53). Indeed, just as we induce from sense experience that there is a material world, so we induce from particular experiences of conscience the Ubiquitous Presence of One Supreme Master (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part One, IV, 1, p. 68). Newman's words are here worth repeating at length:

When it is said that we cannot see God, this is undeniable; but in what sense have we a discernment of His creatures, of the individual beings which surround us? The evidence which we have of their presence lies in the phenomena which address our senses, and our warrant for taking these for evidence is our instinctive certitude that they are evidence. By the law of our nature we associate those sensible phenomena or impressions with certain units, 'individuals, substances, whatever they are to be called, which are outside and out of the reach of sense, and we picture them to ourselves in those phenomena. ... And so of those intellectual objects which are brought home to us through our senses: that they exist, we know by instinct; that they are such and such, we apprehend from the impressions which they leave upon our minds. ...

Now certainly the thought of God, as Theists entertain it, is not gained by an instinctive association of His presence with any sensible phenomena; but the office which the senses directly fulfill as regards the external world, that devolves indirectly on certain of our mental phenomena as regards its Maker. Those phenomena are found in the sense of moral obligation. As from a multitude of

instinctive perceptions, acting in particular instances, of something beyond the senses we generalize the notion of an external world, and then picture that world in and according to those particular phenomena from which we started, so from the perceptive power which identifies the intimations of conscience with the reverberations or echoes (so to say) of an external admonition, we proceed on to the notion of a Supreme Ruler and judge, and then again we image Him and His attributes in those recurring intimations, out of which, as mental phenomena, our recognition of His existence was originally gained. And, if the impressions which His creatures make on us through our senses oblige us to regard those creatures as *sui generis* respectively, it is not wonderful that the notices which He indirectly gives us of His own nature are such as to make us understand that He is like Himself and like nothing else.

I have already said I am not proposing here to prove the Being of a God; yet I have found it impossible to avoid saying where I look for the proof of it. For I would begin to prove it by the same means by which I would commence a proof of His attributes and character; by the same means by which I show how we apprehend Him, not merely as a notion, but as a reality (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part One, V, 1, pp. 96-97).

I assume, then, that Conscience has a legitimate place among our mental acts; as really so, as the action of memory, of reasoning, of imagination, or as the sense of the beautiful; that, as there are objects which, when presented to the mind, cause it to feel grief, regret, joy, or desire, so there are things which excite in us approbation or blame, and which we in consequence call right or wrong; and which, experienced in ourselves, kindle in us that specific sense of pleasure or pain, which goes by the name of a good or bad conscience. This being taken for granted, I shall attempt to show that in this special feeling, which follows on the commission of what we call right and wrong, lie the materials for the real apprehension of a Divine Sovereign and judge.

The feeling of conscience being, I repeat, a certain keen sensibility, pleasant or painful-self-approval and hope, or compunction and fear attendant on certain of our actions, which in consequence we call right or wrong, is twofold: it is a moral sense, and a sense of duty; a judgment of the reason and a magisterial dictate. ... Here I have to speak of conscience in the latter point of view, not as supplying us, by means of its various acts, with the elements of morals, which may be developed by the intellect into an ethical code, but simply as the dictate of an authoritative monitor bearing upon the

details of conduct as they come before us, and complete in its several acts, one by one. ...

Conscience is ever forcing on us by threats and by promises that we must follow the right and avoid the wrong; so far it is one and the same in the mind of every one, whatever be its particular errors in particular minds as to the acts which it orders to be done or to be avoided; and in this respect it corresponds to our perception of the beautiful and deformed. As we have naturally a sense of the beautiful and graceful in nature and art, though tastes proverbially differ, so we have a sense of duty and obligation, whether we all associate it with the same particular actions or not. Here, however, Taste and Conscience part company: for the sense of beautifulness, as indeed the Moral Sense, has no special relations to persons, but contemplates objects in themselves; conscience, on the other hand, is concerned with persons primarily, and with actions mainly as viewed in their doers, or rather with self alone and one's own actions, and with others only indirectly and as if in association with self. And further, taste is its own evidence, appealing to nothing beyond its own sense of the beautiful or the ugly, and enjoying the specimens of the beautiful simply for their own sake; but conscience does not repose on itself, but vaguely reaches forward to something beyond self, and dimly discerns a sanction higher than self for its decisions, as evidenced in that keen sense of obligation and responsibility which informs them. And hence it is that we are accustomed to speak of conscience as a voice, a term which we should never think of applying to the sense of the beautiful; and moreover a voice, or the echo of a voice, imperative and constraining, like no other dictate in the whole of our experience.

And again, in consequence of this prerogative of dictating and commanding, which is of its essence, Conscience has an intimate bearing, on our affections and emotions, leading us to reverence and awe, hope and fear, especially fear, a feeling which is foreign for the most part, not only to Taste, but even to the Moral Sense, except in consequence of accidental associations. No fear is felt by any one who recognizes that his conduct has not been beautiful, though he may be mortified at himself, if perhaps he has thereby forfeited some advantage; but, if he has been betrayed into any kind of immorality, he has a lively sense of responsibility and guilt, though the act be no offence against society – of distress and apprehension, even though it may be of present service to him, of compunction and regret, though in itself it be most pleasurable, of confusion of face, though it may have no witnesses. These various perturbations

of mind which are characteristic of a bad conscience, and may be very considerable-self-reproach, poignant shame, haunting remorse, chill dismay at the prospect of the future and their contraries, when the conscience is good, as real though less forcible, self-approval, inward peace, lightness of heart, and the like these emotions constitute a generic difference between conscience and our other intellectual senses-common sense, good sense, sense of expedience, taste, sense of honour, and the like-as indeed they would also create between conscience and the moral sense, supposing these two were not aspects of one and the same feeling, exercised upon one and the same subject-matter.

So much for the characteristic phenomena, which conscience presents, nor is it difficult to determine what they imply. I refer once more to our sense of the beautiful. This sense is attended by an intellectual enjoyment, and is free from whatever is of the nature of emotion, except in one case, viz. when it is excited by personal objects; then it is that the tranquil feeling of admiration is exchanged for the excitement of affection and passion. Conscience too, considered as a moral sense, an intellectual sentiment, is a sense of admiration and disgust, of approbation and blame: but it is something more than a moral sense; it is always, what the sense of the beautiful is only in certain cases; it is always emotional. No wonder then that it always implies what that sense only sometimes implies; that it always 'involves the recognition of a living object, towards which it is directed.' Inanimate things cannot stir our affections; these are correlative with persons. If, as is the case, we feel responsibility, are ashamed, are frightened, at transgressing, the voice of conscience, this implies that there is One to whom we are responsible, before whom we are ashamed, whose claims upon us we fear. If, on doing wrong, we feel the same tearful, broken-hearted sorrow which overwhelms us on hurting a mother; if, on doing right, we enjoy the same sunny serenity of mind, the same soothing, satisfactory delight which follows on our receiving praise from a father, we certainly have within us the image of some person, to whom our love and veneration look, 'in whose smile we find our happiness, for whom we yearn, towards whom we direct our pleadings, in whose anger we are troubled and waste away. These feelings in us are such as require for their exciting cause an intelligent being: we are not affectionate towards a stone, nor do we feel shame before a horse or a dog; we have no remorse or compunction on breaking mere human law: yet, so it is, conscience excites all these painful emotions, confusion, foreboding, self-condemnation; and on the other hand it

sheds upon us a deep peace, a sense of security, a resignation, and a hope, which there is no sensible, no earthly object to elicit. "The wicked flees, when no one pursueth"; then why does he flee? whence his terror? Who is it that he sees in solitude, in darkness, in the hidden chambers of his heart? If the cause of these emotions does not belong to this visible world, the Object to which his perception is directed must be Supernatural and Divine; and thus the phenomena of Conscience, as a dictate, avail to impress the imagination with the picture of a Supreme Governor, a judge, holy, just, powerful, all-seeing, retributive, and is the creative principle of religion, as the Moral Sense is the principle of ethics.

And let me here refer again to the fact, to which I have already drawn attention, that this instinct of the mind recognizing an external Master in the dictate of conscience, and imaging the thought of Him in the definite impressions which conscience creates, is parallel to that other law of, not only human, but of brute nature, by which the presence of unseen individual beings is discerned under the shifting shapes and colours of the visible world (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part One, V, 1, pp. 98-102; cf. *A Grammar of Assent*, Part One, V, 1, pp. 102-103, 107).

So for Newman the straightest natural path to God is through conscience. Moreover, not only does conscience reveal God's existence, but conscience goes beyond logic and stimulates our affections by revealing a personal God who claims our habitual obedience and who is also a holy lawgiver and angry and retributive Judge (a God who will reward or punish us according to our faith and works) (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, VIII, 2, pp. 248-250; II, 10, 1-2, pp. 305, 307, 326-327; "The Influence of Natural and Revealed Religion Respectively," *Oxford University Sermons*, II, 7-8, pp. 18-19). Hence Newman remarks "I have a certain feeling on my mind, which I call conscience. When I analyze this, I feel it involves the idea of a Father & Judge – of one who sees my heart" (*The Philosophical Notebook*, v. II, p. 31). Again Newman states: "Our great internal teacher of religion is ... Conscience ... [It is] adapted for use of all classes and conditions of men, for high and low, young and old, men and women, independently of books, of educated reasoning, of physical knowledge, or of philosophy. Conscience, too, teaches us, not only that God is, but what He is; it provides for the mind a real image of Him, as a medium of worship; it gives us a rule of right and wrong, as being His rule, and a code of moral duties" (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, X, 1, p. 304).

Now such an approach to God, in which we know a good God exists through our moral experience (and the experience of beauty), gives us a frame of reference with which to wrestle with the problem of evil. We recognize with joy that God is good but that evil and suffering exist in the world as well and that these two truths are somehow reconcilable (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part One, V, 1, p. 106; Part Two, X, 1, pp. 305, 312). Our moral conscience lets us see the Hand of an unseen power (divine providence) directing the physical and moral system in goodness, mercy, and judgment (as do the recurring blessings of life, domestic affection and social intercourse). We see that God returns good to good and evil to evil – that punishment is sure, though slow, that murder will out, that treason never prospers, that pride will have a fall, that honesty will be rewarded (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, X, 1, pp. 312-313). Moreover, the conscience reveals that humans are in a degraded and servile condition (that there is a chronic alienation of humans from God) and that they require expiation and reconciliation. Hence the conscience in the end reveals that human suffering in its last resolution is the punishment of sin (i.e. that humans have fallen away from God and have been punished). In this way the notions of sin, guilt, and atonement become part of the doctrine of natural religion (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, X, 1-2, pp. 305, 307, 310-311, 316, 324; *Apologia pro vita sua*, VII, pp. 320-321).

Finally, the illative sense shows us that the soul is immortal since there must be more than this life if the sufferings of those such as the poor factory girl are to make sense (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, VIII, 2, pp. 247-248; *Apologia pro vita sua*, VII, p. 321; “The Immortality of the Soul,” *Parochial and Plain Sermons*, I, 2, pp. 16-17; “The Mysteriousness of Our Present Being,” *Parochial and Plain Sermons*, IV, 19, pp. 907-908). And this hope of a future life sweetens all of our suffering while on earth (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, X, 1, p. 312).

Of course, for Newman, as for other Catholic thinkers, reason only takes us so far in our quest for knowledge of God and happiness (and it is subject to error to boot). So in addition to reason we need the assistance of a power greater than the human, a supernatural faith, for full certitude and complete knowledge of God and God’s moral law (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part One, V, 1, p. 107; Part One, VI, 1, pp. 155-156; Part Two, VII, 2, p. 201; Part Two, VIII, pp. 2, 244-246; Part Two, IX, 3, pp. 293, 299; “The Usurpation of Reason,” *Oxford Uni-*

versity Sermons, IV, 2, p. 55; "Faith and Reason, Contrasted as Habits of Mind," *Oxford University Sermons*, X, 5-10, 16, pp. 179-181, 184; "Intellect, the Instrument of Religious Training," *Sermons Preached on Various Occasions*, I, p. 6; "The Religion of the Pharisees, the Religion of Mankind," *Sermons Preached on Various Occasions*, II, pp. 25-27; "Papers in Preparation for A Grammar of Assent," *Theological Papers on Faith and Certainty*, VII, p. 132; "Rise and Progress of Universities" *Essays and Sketches*, II, pp. 316-317; reprinted in PR, XIX, p. 212). Newman proclaims: "... if religion is to be devotion, and not a mere matter of sentiment, if it is to be made the ruling principle of our lives, if our actions, one by one, and our daily conduct, are to be consistently directed towards an Invisible Being, we need something higher than a mere balance of arguments to fix and to control our minds. Sacrifice of wealth, name, or position, faith and hope, self-conquest, communion with the spiritual world, presuppose a real hold and habitual intuition of the objects of Revelation, which is certitude under another name" (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, VII, 2, p. 193; cf. *A Grammar of Assent*, Part II, VII, 1, p. 180).

Hence it is in faith where our profound knowledge of God and security is found. This is a faith which goes beyond mere abstract reasoning, and in which we believe in revelation not as "probably true, or partially true, but as absolutely certain knowledge, certain in a sense in which nothing else can be certain, because it comes from Him who neither can deceive nor be deceived" (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, X, p. 302; see the similar statement in Vatican Council I, Session III, *Dei Filius*, 1870, DH 3008; cf. *A Grammar of Assent*, Part II, X, 1, pp. 313-314; *The Philosophical Notebook*, v. II, pp. 101, 103, 197).<sup>201</sup> Accordingly Newman rejects the view "that in all things we must go by reason, in nothing by faith, that things are known and are to be received so far as they can be proved" ("The Infidelity of the Future," *Faith and Prejudice and Other Sermons*, IX, 6, p. 123; cf. "On the Introduction of Rationalistic Principles into Revealed Religion [originally published as Tract 73]," *Essays Critical and Historical*, II, 1, 5, pp. 31-32, 45-46; "Faith without Demonstration," *Parochial and Plain Sermons*, VI, 23, pp. 1382-1385; "The Infidelity of the Future," *Faith and Prejudice and Other Unpublished Sermons*, IX, 6, pp. 123-124; "The Nature of Faith in Relation to Reason," *Oxford University Sermons*, XI, 18, p. 213; "Faith and Doubt," *Discourses Addressed to Mixed Congregations*, XI, pp. 224, 235; "The Usurpations of Reason," *Oxford University Sermons*,

IV, 17-23, pp. 69-72).<sup>202</sup> Indeed, some truths such as that of God as a Trinity and the Incarnation are mysteries that can't be established by reason but are known only by faith in the Scriptures and tradition ("The Christian Mysteries," *Parochial and Plain Sermons*, I, 16, pp. 130, 133-134; "Mysteries in Religion," *Parochial and Plain Sermons*, II, 18, p. 357; "Faith without Demonstration," *Parochial and Plain Sermons*, VI, 23, p. 1380; "Mysteries of Nature and Grace," *Discourses Addressed to Mixed Congregations*, XIII, pp. 265-266, 274; "Lecture on Logic," *Theological Papers on Faith and Certainty*, III, pp. 60-62; *The Philosophical Notebook*, v. II, p. 105).

This is not to say that faith is irrational (though it utilizes the illative sense and so non-discursive modes of thought): "Faith, then, though in all cases a reasonable process, is not necessarily founded on investigation, argument, and proof; these processes being but the explicit form which the reasoning takes in the case of particular minds" ("Implicit and Explicit Reason," *Oxford University Sermons*, XIII, 15, p. 262; cf. "Implicit and Explicit Reason," *Oxford University Sermons*, XIII, 4, pp. 253-254; "The Usurpation of Reason," *Oxford University Sermons*, IV, 11-14, 25, pp. 63-67, 73; "Faith and Reason, Contrasted as Habits of Mind," *Oxford University Sermons*, X, 12-16, pp. 182-184; "The Nature of Faith in Relation to Reason," *Oxford University Sermons*, XI, 8-17, 25, pp. 207-213, 218; *A Grammar of Assent*, Part II, X, 1, p. 312; "On the Introduction of Rationalistic Principles into Revealed Religion," *Essays Critical and Historical*, II, 1, p. 32; "Religious Faith Rational," *Parochial and Plain Sermons*, I, 15, pp. 122-123; "Faith and Doubt," *Discourses Addressed to Mixed Congregations*, XI, pp. 224, 233; "Papers on the Certainty of Faith," *Theological Papers on Faith and Certainty*, I, pp. 37-38; "Papers on the Evidence for Revelation," *Theological Papers on Faith and Certainty*, V, pp. 82, 81-87; Letter to William Froude of April 29, 1879 in PR, X, pp. 161-162). Reason is a part of faith if not the whole of it (*A Grammar of Assent*, Appendix, II, pp. 383, 385). Reason indeed can provide a motive for the assent to faith: "The Catholic religion is true, because its objects, as present to my mind, control and influence my conduct as nothing else does ... it has about it an odour of truth and sanctity *sui generis*, as perceptible to my moral nature as flowers to my sense, such as can only come from heaven ... it has never been to me any thing but peace, joy, and consolation, and strength all throughout my troubled life" (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, VII, 1, p. 174). Newman even is willing to appeal to the more

traditional preambles of the Christian faith for its justification, such as prophecies, miracles, the moral example of Christ who also claimed to be the Messiah, the notes of the Church and the purity of its moral teaching and its inspiring martyrdom, and the universality of Christian belief (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, X, 2, pp. 334-335, 340-342, 347-348, 354-358, 360-361, 370-375, 377-378; Appendix, II, p. 383; see Letter to Lord Emly of April 17, 1883 in *Letters and Diaries*, v. XXX, pp. 206-207; *The Philosophical Notebook*, v. II, pp. 157, 194). Newman writes: Christianity "has raised the tone of morality wherever it has come, has abolished great social anomalies and miseries, has elevated the female sex to its proper dignity, has protected the poorer classes, has destroyed slavery, encouraged literature and philosophy, and has a principle part in that civilization of human kind, which, with some evils, has still on the whole been productive of far greater good" (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, X, 2, p. 345). Indeed Christianity aims to conquer the world not "by force of arms or by other means of this world, but by the novel expedient of sanctity and suffering. If some aspiring party of this way, the great Orleans family [of France], or a branch of the Hohenzollern [of Austria], wishing to found a kingdom, were to profess, as their only weapon, the practice of virtue, they would not startle us more than it startled a Jew eighteen hundred years ago, to be told that his glorious Messiah was not to fight, like Joshua or David, but simply to preach" (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, X, 2, p. 353).

Reason can also point the way to revelation by showing humans their need for it (natural religion gives us an anticipation that a supernatural revelation will be given). For we believe in infinite goodness (divine mercy) as well as our own misery, concupiscence, sin, and guilt; all of this suggests an antecedent probability of a divine revelation to humans (Christ) wherein our need and desire for God's teaching, grace, and healing will be met (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part One, X, 1, p. 315; Part Two, X, 2, pp. 321, 328-330, 333, 341, 359, 375-376, 379; "Faith without Sight," *Parochial and Plain Sermons*, II, 2, p. 238; "The Testimony of Conscience," *Parochial and Plain Sermons*, V, 17, pp. 1102-1103; "Religion a Weariness to the Natural Man," *Parochial and Plain Sermons*, VII, 2, p. 237; "The Thought of God, The Stay of the Soul," *Parochial and Plain Sermons*, V, 22, pp. 1149-1152; "Nature and Grace," *Discourses Addressed to Mixed Congregations*, VIII, pp. 149-151, 159; "Illuminating Grace," *Discourses Addressed to Mixed*

*Congregations*, IX, p. 176; "Mysteries of Nature and Grace," *Discourses Addressed to Mixed Congregations*, XIII, pp. 276-279; "Faith and the World," *Sermons Bearing on Subjects of the Day*, VII, 4, pp. 87-88; *The Philosophical Notebook*, v. II, p. 163). Hence the Christian revelation fulfills the aspirations and needs arising out of our natural faith (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, X, 2, pp. 333-334).

Newman's approach to faith thus resembles his earlier middle path approach to religion. While faith and belief in God cannot be reduced to a mere deduction from the evidence, it is also wrong to hold that it should be completely divorced from evidence. Christianity builds upon nature (evidence) even as it adds to it (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part II, X, 1-2, pp. 302-303, 308, 379): "Nothing would be more theoretical and unreal than to suppose that true Faith cannot exist except when moulded upon a Creed, and based upon Evidence; yet nothing would indicate a more shallow philosophy than to say that it ought carefully to be disjoined from dogmatic and argumentative statements. To assert the latter is to discard the science of theology from the service of Religion; to assert the former, is to maintain that every child, every peasant, must be a theologian. Faith cannot exist without grounds or without an object; but it does not follow that all who have faith should recognize, and be able to state what they believe, and why" ("Implicit and Explicit Reason," *Oxford University Sermons*, XIII, 4, pp. 253-254).

Newman in the end then wants to develop a theory of belief that could encompass both the faith of a simple believer as well as the faith of an Oxford don. For while faith is in accord with reason and the evidence upon which it is based will satisfy a university professor, still children, the poor, and the busy can have a true faith yet not be able to weigh evidence. As Newman famously stated: "If children, if the poor, if the busy, can have true faith, yet cannot weigh evidence, evidence is not the simple foundation on which faith is built" ("Love the Safeguard of Faith against Superstition," *Oxford University Sermons*, XII, 12, p. 231; cf. "Papers on the Evidence for Revelation," *Theological Papers on Faith and Certainty*, V, p. 81). In other words, not every child or peasant is a theologian nor do they have to be ("Implicit and Explicit Reason," *Oxford University Sermons*, XIII, 4, p. 254; Letter to Charles Meynell of January 23, 1860, *Letters and Diaries*, v. XIX, p. 294). Thus Newman retorts to those who base faith on explicit reason as follows: "It does not seem to have struck him [Locke] that such a

philosophy as his cuts off from the possibility and the privilege of faith all but the educated few, all but the learned, the clear-headed, the men of practised intellects and balanced minds, men who had leisure, who had opportunities of consulting others, and kind and wise friends to whom they deferred" (*An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine*, VII, p. 328). This is why analysis and attempts to make the basis of our faith explicit often inadequately represent the mental act of the believer according to Newman.

Newman's efforts, and those of others, helped Catholic philosophy regained its vigor in Britain in the Nineteenth-Century (often called the Second Spring of English Catholicism). Quite unexpectedly, the same French Revolution (1789-1799) which did so much harm to the French Catholic Church, helped to re-establish English Catholicism by the forced return to Britain of many Catholic thinkers, priests, religious orders [such as the Benedictines at Downside Abbey (1795; 1814), Ampleforth Abbey (1802), and Glenstal Abbey, Ireland (1927); the Carmelites; the Cistercians; the Colombans; the Dominicans; the Franciscans; and the Jesuits], and schools. Additionally, fortuitous laws had gone into effect that restored the civil rights of British Catholics and allowed for Catholic educational institutions and religious practice, including the Irish (1771, 1774, 1778, 1782), English (1778, 1791), and Scottish Relief Acts (1793), the Irish Education Acts (1793-95), the Catholic Emancipation Act (1829), and the removal of the anti-Catholic quote from the Monument to the Fire of London (1831). This led to a great flourishing of British Catholic thought during the Victorian Era (1837-1901).

During this time period British institutions of Catholic learning opened such as St. Edmund's College, Ware [Hertfordshire] (1793), Stonyhurst College, Lancashire (1794), Ushaw College, Durham (1794; 1808), Oscott College, Birmingham (1794), St. Patrick's College, Maynooth, Ireland (1795), St. Mary's Hall, Lancashire (1828) [established by the Jesuits who had returned to England in 1801-1803; 1829], Blairs College, Aberdeen, Scotland (1829), All Hallows College, Dublin, Ireland (1842), Beda College, Rome (1852), the short-lived Catholic University of Dublin (1854-1880 – re-established as University College, Dublin in 1880 by the Jesuits), the even shorter-lived Catholic University of Kensington (1875-1882), St. Peter's College, Glasgow, Scotland (1874), Upholland Seminary, Liverpool (1883), Milltown Institute, Dublin (1889) [established by the Jesuits],

Wonersh Seminary, Southwark (1889), Hawkesyard, Staffordshire, England (1894) [established by the Dominicans], Campion Hall, Oxford (1895) [founded by the Jesuits], Fisher House, Cambridge (1895), St. Edmund's House, Cambridge (1896; became a College in 1996), Benet's Hall, Oxford (1897) [founded by the Benedictines], Greyfriars, Oxford (1910) [established by the Franciscans], Blackfriars, Oxford (1921, 1937) [established by the Dominicans], Plater College [Catholic Worker's College], Oxfordshire (1921-2005), and Heythrop Hall, Oxfordshire (1926) [becoming part of the University of London in 1970].

Finally, in 1850 the Catholic Hierarchy returned to England (though the first Catholic bishop, Nicholas Wiseman, had his effigy burnt and carriage pelted with dung in the streets of Southwark upon his foray into England), in 1869 Anglicanism was no longer mandated as the state religion, and the University Test Acts of England (1871) and Ireland (1873) permitted Catholics to attend the state schools of Oxford and Cambridge, as well as other universities (although only in 1895 did Catholics receive permission from the Catholic Bishops to attend); and the Irish Universities Act (1908) and the Catholic Relief Act (1926) granted further rights to British Catholics. Additionally the Catholic Truth Society for the intellectual defense of Catholicism was founded in 1868 (re-established in 1884), and the peace society PAX in 1936-1971.

Along with the re-establishment of English Catholicism, the late 1800s also saw the increasing prominence of lay Catholic philosophers (prior to this time most of philosophy was done by secular and religious priests). One of the greatest of the French lay Catholic philosophers was **Léon Ollé-Laprune (1839-1898)** who was born in Paris in 1839. He was educated at the École Normale Supérieure in Paris from 1858 to 1861 where he studied Letters (receiving his *agrégation* in philosophy in 1864). Upon his graduation he taught philosophy at lycées in Nice (1861-1864), Douai (1864-1868), Versailles (1868-1871), and Henry IV in Paris (1871-1875). He then became a professor at the school of his youth, the École Normale Supérieure, from 1875-1898. Ollé-Laprune married Marie-Adèle Saint-René Taillandier (1847-1921) [daughter of Saint-René-Gaspard-Ernest Taillandier (1817-1879), the secretary general of the French Ministry of Education and member of the French Academy] in 1872 and received a doctorate from the Sorbonne in 1880. Although Ollé-Laprune taught

during the anti-Catholic Third Republic he was subject to little interference, although he was suspended from his position by Jules Ferry from 1881-1882 after he complained about the dismissal of religious instructors from French schools (Ollé-Laprune received the surprising support of the socialist Jean Jaurès in this matter). Ollé-Laprune died in Paris in 1898 of appendicitis. From 1893-1897 he had presided at the annual prize of Stanislas College and he was awarded the Légion d'Honneur in 1894; and though there was opposition due to the explicit Catholic nature of his thought, he was elected to the French Academy of Moral and Political Sciences in 1897.<sup>203</sup> His daughter-in-law Alice Ollé-Laprune [Gavoty] mentions that he was much admired by Pope Leo XIII in her *Journal* of 1914.

Ollé-Laprune's key work was his *On Moral Certitude* [*De la Certitude morale*] (1880; 5<sup>th</sup> ed. 1905).<sup>204</sup> He was influenced by the Catholic thinkers Blaise Pascal (1623-1662), John Henry Newman (1801-1890), Alphonse Gratry (1805-1872), Antoine-Frédéric Ozanam (1813-1853), Jean Gaspard Felix Ravaisson-Mollien (1813-1900), and Elme-Marie Caro (1826-1887) [a non-practicing Catholic], as well as by the non-Catholic thinker Charles-Bernard Renouvier (1815-1903).

In his *On Moral Certitude* (1880; 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. 1892), Ollé-Laprune criticized the rationalist epistemology of the Cartesians, who held that metaphysical knowledge occurs only through the intellect, as well as the empirical epistemology of the Positivists, who held that knowledge occurs solely through the senses. Ollé-Laprune argued that both viewpoints failed to appreciate the role of the will (heart) in knowing; for one thinks with every aspect of one's being (sensation, reason, appetite, and will): "One must approach the truth with the entire soul" [*C'est avec l'âme entière qu'il faut aller à la vérité*] (*On Moral Certitude*, Preface to the First Edition, p. xi). So in his estimation: "Complete certitude is *personal*: it is the total act of the soul itself embracing by a free choice, no less than by a firm judgment, the truth which is present to it, light and law, object of contemplation and love, of respect and obedience" (*On Moral Certitude*, II, p. 79).

Thus Ollé-Laprune wants to establish against these schools of thought that humans don't acquire knowledge through the operation of any one faculty in isolation, whether it be the operation of a mechanism of sensing alone (empiricism) or the operation of reasoning alone (rationalism). Rather both sensation and reasoning are involved

in gaining knowledge. Moreover, and more significantly, in order to attain knowledge (especially in the moral order), moral dispositions and voluntary will acts are necessary prerequisites (*On Moral Certitude*, Introduction, pp. 2, 16-17, 21-22; II, pp. 74-75; cf. *Philosophy of the Current Age*, XII, p. 264; *Reason and Rationalism*, X, p. 95; *The Value of Life*, Preface, pp. x-xi).<sup>205</sup>

Now according to Ollé-Laprune, the will has an essential role to play in all acts of intellection. This occurs at a basic level in that in order to know something one must attend to the facts. Ollé-Laprune notes that even the grasping of mathematical truths, which are considered the most self-evident of all, requires a preceding act of the will wherein we give our attention to the mathematical concepts involved. For the recognition and comprehension of mathematical truths involves an act of “preference and choice” in which the soul turns away from every other object in order to fix itself on that object alone (*On Moral Certitude*, II, pp. 45-47; cf. *Reason and Rationalism*, VIII, p. 80; XXI, p. 242; *Philosophy and the Present Age*, XII, p. 257). Secondly, knowledge requires us to develop a habit of inquiry (such as a habit for mathematics), a habit born from antecedent will acts – that is to say knowledge demands an initial set of exercises of the soul whereby it places itself in a position to use its resources [such as in learning to read and use mathematical and logical symbols] (*On Moral Certitude*, II, pp. 46, 62-63). Hence the will prepares the soul to see and to judge, and it supports and maintains its attention (*On Moral Certitude*, II, pp. 69, 73).

Thirdly (and especially with truths of the moral order, i.e. metaphysics, ethics, religion, and history), knowing needs to be sustained by a will that is enamored with and resolved to investigate its objects of knowledge; otherwise one will be indifferent and become discouraged when faced with obstacles (*On Moral Certitude*, II, pp. 46-48). As Ollé-Laprune notes: “A created spirit ... can fail to think about this or that, it can think with less vigor about this or that, and so even if it embraces the truth it could choose the false” (*On Moral Certitude*, II, p. 59). Finally (and again with special reference to truths of the moral order), one must will to seek the truth (otherwise one will fail to reflect properly or fall prey to one’s biases). Indeed the act of attention itself is based on a love of the truth, a fidelity to the good (*On Moral Certitude*, II, pp. 46-47, 59, 66-67, 69, 79; cf. *Philosophy and the Present Age*, XII, pp. 258, 261, 264-265; XIV, pp. 325-327; XVI, pp. 343-344).

All knowledge then, even knowledge of the self-evident truths of mathematics or of the scientific order, involves the utilization of the will along with the intellect (*On Moral Certitude*, II, p. 53). For as we have seen it pertains to the will to give its attention or not to a particular matter (to use or not use reason in a given case), to develop a habit of investigation, and an interest in the subject matter and the truth: "An intelligence like that of the human, subject to the law of its functioning (*la loi du travail*) and to the necessity of only attaining its object through a more or less lengthy and difficult series of discursive operations, cannot judge properly without the intervention of the will which sustains the attention and appears to become part of the assent itself" (*On Moral Certitude*, II, p. 73). Or as Ollé-Laprune explains in more detail: "To think, for every being, is an act; but certainly for humans it is a labor. The will is everywhere present and acting in the whole series of these laborious and fecund operations. ... Thus it is the will which places or fixes the soul on the terrain where it must operate. It is it which accomplishes the preparation indispensable for this operation. It is it which at first directs, with a passionate ardor, or with a cold resolution, all the intellectual forces on the object which it is a matter of knowing" (*On Moral Certitude*, II, pp. 47-48).

Yet knowledge depends even more fundamentally on the will when it is a matter of truths of the moral order (i.e. in metaphysics, ethics, religion, and history). For here reason can hesitate before pronouncing judgment (for the act of judgment is not completely determined by the intellectual representation alone). Thus the final decision to subscribe to a moral truth or not lies within one's own power (one can suspend one's concurrence), and judgment involves a mixture of will and intelligence.

When it comes to moral truths, the will even intervenes in the adhesion to the truth (*On Moral Certitude*, II, pp. 48-50, 59, 62-63, 66-67, 69). This is because, unlike the angel intellect where judgment infallibly follows vision (simple apprehension) and so does not depend on the will, human reason is discursive. Hence there is a fundamental role for the will in reasoning concerning the moral order, since, notes Ollé-Laprune, there is an interval between apprehension and assent (*On Moral Certitude*, II, pp. 48-50, 52, 73).

Indeed, with this role of the will in cognition in mind, and under the influence of Newman, Ollé-Laprune distinguishes between assent (*assentiment*) and consent (*consentement*).<sup>206</sup> Assent (primarily a func-

tion of the intellect) is the involuntary affirmation or denial of a truth as one sees that one must affirm or deny it. In regard to assent, one does not declare a thing true because one wants to do so (the will has no part in the decision by which one pronounces on the true and the false; assent is not chosen). Rather one's assent is determined by the light of truth (i.e. evidence) (*On Moral Certitude*, II, pp. 64-65). Ollé-Laprune states: "One affirms or denies legitimately, because one sees that one must affirm or deny, and one is not free to see or not to see. One is only free to regard, which is a different matter. Now, if one sees in spite of oneself and if judgment follows upon the sight, judgment, considered in its own essence, is not free; it has its motive, origin, foundation, its principle in knowledge which does not depend on the will" (*On Moral Certitude*, II, pp. 64-65). Assent occurs with knowledge of first principles (or primary intuitions), with truths that are self-evident such as the immediate data of the senses or in mathematics (*On Moral Certitude*, II, pp. 50-52).<sup>207</sup>

Consent (heart; will), on the other hand, is the voluntary acceptance of the truth wherein the truth is received, welcomed, and loved. Hence consent is not the act of accepting or denying the truth (as is assent) but rather "the soul's response to that higher voice" (*On Moral Certitude*, II, p. 65; cf. II, p. 66). Consent is especially pertinent to truths of the moral order (metaphysics, ethics, and religion) where the addition of the will (and personal dispositions) is needed for reception of the truth (*On Moral Certitude*, Introduction, pp. 12-14, 16-18; I, p. 22): "in the order of moral truths, the adhesion of the will is required as a condition of the complete and definitive assent of the mind. ... They (humans) only see them (moral truths) well when their will welcomes them" (*On Moral Certitude*, II, p. 79; cf. *On Moral Certitude*, III, p. 97). For with the moral order in particular "in the adhesion to the truth we introduce an element of liberty ... since this liberty is subject to the law of duty: it is a duty to place oneself in a state to recognize the truth, it is a duty to prepare oneself to see the light, it is a duty to attach oneself with a courageous fidelity to the first rays which hit the mind in order to merit more abundant clarifications, it is a duty to render the mind apt to grasp moral things by a good and serious will ... it is a duty finally to embrace the truth when it appears, to yield to it, to consent to it, to give oneself to it entirely" (*On Moral Certitude*, Introduction, pp. 16-17).

Consequently, as suggested by the above quote, in order to adhere to truths of the moral order it is necessary that one first practice the good (which requires habits built up out of one's past will-acts). That is to say, one must live a virtuous life in order to see and judge properly (*On Moral Certitude*, II, pp. 69, 71, 79; *Philosophy and the Present Age*, XII, p. 258, XVI, pp. 343-344). Every voluntary preference given over to evil, all culpable neglect, reduces our perception of moral truths or their delicacy or force. Moral truths no longer touch us in the same way; they no longer appear so lively (*On Moral Certitude*, II, p. 71). As Ollé-Laprune comments "Moral truth is not given as a display; it is not a pure object of contemplation. Essentially practical, it requires of us a practical assent, and if we fall into the habit of refusing this, the liveliness of the first impressions diminishes. To the degree that our responses to the interior call become rarer and less satisfactory, the call itself becomes less powerful" (*On Moral Certitude*, II, p. 71).

Now all of this is merely to say that in order to know fully it is necessary to believe. Belief or faith (here natural) is at the foundation of thought (*On Moral Certitude*, Introduction, p. 18; IV, p. 128; *Philosophy and the Present Age*, XIII, p. 290). So to the assent produced by evidence, the human joins the consent of the heart (natural faith) (*On Moral Certitude*, II, pp. 73; *Reason and Rationalism*, XXI, p. 242).

Ollé-Laprune makes use of his distinction between assent and consent to show against the fideists that truth is independent of our will, and that we have to recognize it, not create it (*On Moral Certitude*, Preface to the Second Edition, pp. vii, ix; Introduction, p. 17). In other words "One must will that the truth is in order to affirm that it is, but if one must will that it is, this is because it is" (*On Moral Certitude*, Preface to the Second Edition, pp. viii-ix). For our assent or adhesion to the truth is ultimately due to an involuntary grasping of objective reality and is not a creation of the will even if the will can prepare the way for belief and can add its consent to it. Knowledge is a conformity to being; it is an assent to a reality independent of us, one whose truth is recognized by reason (*On Moral Certitude*, Introduction, p. 15; II, pp. 64-65; *Reason and Rationalism*, II, pp. 33-34; V, p. 54): "And we will establish that if the will prepares belief, it does not fashion it, and if it disposes the mind to receive light, it does not give birth to it" (*On Moral Certitude*, Introduction, p. 15). So the will does not create the truth (which is independent of our will), rather the will places us in a state capable of grasping and receiving the truth (*On Moral Certitude*,

II, p. 45; cf. *Reason and Rationalism*, II, pp. 19, 22-23, 31; V, p. 57, 63-64; X, p. 96, 104; XI, p. 111; *Philosophy and the Present Age*, XIII, p. 289). As Ollé-Laprune remarks: "Let us insist: to know is in no way to make something be ... my knowledge makes something be for me because it is precisely without me ... knowledge presupposes its object and does not make it" (*Reason and Rationalism*, V, p. 56). Hence "Moral certitude does not dispense with rational certitude: it supposes it and adds to it. Moral certitude, at once rational and moral, is born of conviction and persuasion. From this it follows that the proofs which serve to sustain and transmit it have a twofold end: they should *make us see* the truth and *make us want* the truth to exist. Consequently, it is easy to explain why these proofs do not make the same impression on all minds, nor on the same mind at different times, why they do not immediately produce their effect, why they do not overcome all resistances" (*On Moral Certitude*, VII, p. 378).<sup>208</sup>

Now it is in the ethical and religious spheres where the will is most involved in the act of knowing. For in regard to ethical and religious matters, the known object is in part obscure and the reasons that illuminate the soul do not determine assent. Accordingly in order to assent to truths in these domains the will must add itself to the assent. It is when the will enters the assent that assent happens here. That is to say, moral truths, as they are full of obscurities, make faith possible and necessary (*On Moral Certitude*, II, pp. 73-74; *Philosophy and the Present Age*, XIII, pp. 272, 275-276). Moreover, with respect to these spheres the will must also aid the intellect in overcoming hesitations to believe. An effort of the will is specifically required to overcome aver-sions to painful truths such as self-critiques, or to accept a moral obligation which entails painful consequences to oneself (*On Moral Certitude*, III, p. 98). Finally, in these matters we must go beyond merely assenting to a truth to embracing it with love and acting upon it as well (*On Moral Certitude*, II-III, pp. 66-67, 96).

Let us now see how Ollé-Laprune applies his theory of knowing in the moral order when it comes to knowledge of the moral law, freedom, God, and the immortality of the soul. All of these truths are first of all grasped in experience: "I know the law of duty because I feel myself obliged to do this or not do that, and because my will submits to or resists this sovereign authority. I know at the same time my freedom, because I experience it, having a choice to make. I know God because of the moral emotions which I feel coming from him and because they

reveal Him to me just as the voice of humans coming to my ear or their hand placing itself on my hand advertises their presence to me. I know the moral necessity of a future life because the justice and goodness which must rule in this other world begin to exercise themselves in my very conscience. The practical facts, where what I call here the moral and divine invisible is continually found, are the true and firm starting point of all thought concerning moral and religious things" (*On Moral Certitude*, I, p. 34). Yet, every one of them also goes beyond mere experience and involves an act of the will (they are truths of the moral order). Ollé-Laprune in particular holds that the affirmation of the moral law, liberty, the existence of God, and the future life, are matters of both faith and reason (they involve an act of the will [consent] along with an act of the intellect [assent]).

For instance, according to Ollé-Laprune, we apprehend the moral law in the fact of obligation, which is an object of experience. Hence belief in the moral law is an assertion of rational belief (*On Moral Certitude*, III, pp. 99, 120; *The Value of Life*, X, pp. 106-107; XI, p. 112, 121-122, 124). Still, we do not have a wholly intuitive knowledge of the moral law and the good, and so if we are not attentive enough or faithful enough to what we know, the veil can thicken and expand, and the distinction between good and evil become obscure. Thus at the origin of every moral notion, in addition to the evidence in the form of a voluntary acceptance, there is a consent (choice), an act of the will, which receives and embraces the truth. Hence, if we rebel against the moral law, or are indifferent to it, certain moral notions are obscured and almost disappear. Nor can we know the moral law if we have vile passions or engage in vulgar undertakings (*occupations grossières*) (*On Moral Certitude*, III, pp. 120-121). Ollé-Laprune warns: "Relationships of perfection are invisible to someone who does not want to see them. ... Every effort that they (humans) make in order to rise above is in a certain manner an act of faith. ... One believes in the duty which imposes on oneself an inconvenience and sacrifices. ... One believes in what is grand and noble; one believes without seeing, without comprehending. One admires, loves, reveres, and practices what vulgar reason in others and often even in oneself calls lunacy. Yes, truly, the fundamental truth of morality is in a certain manner an object of faith; for the superiority of the spirit is visible neither to the senses nor to the reason subject to the senses; and it is not a reasoning which can establish it" (*On Moral Certitude*, III, p. 122). Or as he puts it: "For, in

a word, nature has given to every human access to this superior order, to this domain of the good and perfection; this is precisely what makes a human a human, otherwise one would only be an animal. Therefore each has, by nature, access to this superior world, but each can freely refuse to proceed to it, each can leave it, each, on the contrary, can penetrate it and make progress toward it. And this gives a moral character to the acceptance from the first of all moral truths. The will has something to do from the start. It does not depend upon us that the truth exists: but in a certain manner it only exists for us if we will it. And as the shadows which are intermingled with the light where it appears, render possible hesitation, doubt, and resistance, to recognize and greet it in spite of these shadows is to go forward with confidence. And as confidence is faith, our adhesion to the moral law, and to the fundamental and essential distinction of good and evil, is an act of faith. An intimate persuasion, which comes from nature and which is also our work, belongs to all of our thoughts, the persuasion that good, that perfection exists, and that perfection is worthy of respect and love. ... in the most intimate part of ourselves confidence and evidence meet up" (*On Moral Certitude*, III, pp. 124-125).

We also sense and experience our freedom. For our freedom is what resists pleasure in order to remain faithful to duty. Indeed the moral law presupposes the concept of liberty as a condition of itself (*On Moral Certitude*, III, pp. 98-100, 117; *The Value of Life*, XX, p. 253). For the honor of the human being is to obey the moral law with a sincere and firm will; hence morality requires a moral agent that is free or capable of determining itself to follow the law (*On Moral Certitude*, Introduction, pp. 2, 5-6). The moral law then presupposes freedom, it presupposes "a principle of action not only exempt from all exterior constraint, but even exempt from all interior necessity, a principle of action which, solicited by passion, can resist it, and enlightened by reason, follows this light by a personal choice and not by the impulsion of nature" (*On Moral Certitude*, Introduction, p. 5). These then are the grounds on which we have a right to believe in our freedom of the will. Still, our will in its profound intimacies is a very mysterious thing. For our liberty is not encountered at all in the sensible order; in fact if we reflect on the universe reason seems to offer and even impose upon us the idea of a universal liaison of antecedents and consequents as the only way of explaining everything. Hence, we can be tempted to regard liberty as a chimera. This is where faith comes in. In order to overcome

the oppositions, difficulties, obscurities, and shadows that envelop the idea of freedom of the will, it is necessary to believe as well as to reason. By faith we can pass from the sphere of the visible to the sphere of the invisible spirit and assert the existence of liberty. For though one can know the existence of liberty by clear and well-established testimonies, these testimonies do not carry us to the point of vividly forcing our assent; and so we also need to reply upon faith in order to accept liberty (*On Moral Certitude*, III, pp. 117-119; cf. *Reason and Rationalism*, XIX, pp. 207-211; XX, p. 211).

God is also known experientially, says Ollé-Laprune. Ultimately though knowledge of God requires that we go beyond a crude empiricism, an empiricism that holds that only the phenomena that we sense are real and that one must not seek for ultimate causes lying outside the physical domain.

Now in one way God is known by analogy, by the relation of cause and effect, i.e. through the world which is God's creation. Here we have a true, but incomplete and limited, knowledge of God. For the disproportion between God as cause and world as effect is very great (indeed our positive idea of God is that God is infinitely above all things, and better than what we can know or conceive). In the end, then, we cannot comprehend what God is, but rather what God is not, in a certain sense; God is known in the midst of shadows (*On Moral Certitude*, III, pp. 105, 109-112, 117; *Reason and Rationalism*, XXI, pp. 236, 246; XXII, p. 262).

Additionally, according to Ollé-Laprune, God's existence is known to all who recognize duty (*On Moral Certitude*, Introduction, p. 9; cf. *On Moral Certitude*, IV, p. 208; *The Value of Life*, XVI, p. 197; XX, pp. 256-257). A duty is acknowledged when a human at the moment of acting recognizes, or at least feels, that such conduct is that which has to be followed, although one can indeed follow another path (*On Moral Certitude*, Introduction, pp. 4-5). Duty is hence a commandment, an expression of a reasonable and good law that is inviolable and immutable. It involves a moral law that is imposed on our mind with the power of an eternal truth and on our will with the authority of an obligatory rule (*On Moral Certitude*, Introduction, p. 6). Now such a moral law cannot have a human origin: "Reasonable, it presupposes Reason in itself; excellent, it presupposes the Good in itself; powerful, it presupposes the perfectly wise and good will of the Being who is the principle of all Truth and of all Good. This being is God" (*On*

*Moral Certitude*, Introduction, p. 6). Thus the moral conscience, which at each moment gives us pressing orders, causes us to affirm that God, a sovereign legislator, an absolutely good and perfect being, exists (*On Moral Certitude*, I, pp. 35-37).<sup>209</sup>

Yet though we can know God by analogy and through our conscience, there are also obscurities and challenges when it comes to knowing God. Thus there is need of the will and faith as well as reason. As Ollé-Laprune proclaims: "I know that God is: the reasoning destined to prove the existence of God is conclusive. ... I cede to the evidence. Is this enough? No. If I only have my knowledge which is limited in so many places, I risk forgetting that it is solid and allowing it to be carried away by sophisms of which my surprised reason does not see the weakness. It is necessary that I receive and that I keep with all my soul a truth which is addressed to my whole soul. I say then that I believe in God, and this shows the energy, the profundity, the vivacity of my adhesion; this declares its moral character. Reason is not in the least way diminished by this; it is in no way placed in suspension. It belongs to it to know and to judge, and no other power can take its place" (*On Moral Certitude*, III, pp. 110-111). This is not cause for regret for "It is a fitting thing that God should only be known in the midst of shadows. From these shadows there emerges enough clarity in order to give us confidence, but these shadows themselves leave, in the act by which we recognize God, a place for the will, for moral liberty, consequently, for merit" (*On Moral Certitude*, III, p. 110). Moreover, to know God fully, God cannot be the object of the intellect alone. For if I merely know that God is, such a belief is cold and has no moral value to it, it would be similar to believing that two and three are five (*On Moral Certitude*, III, pp. 105, 109-112, 117). So a robust belief in God involves not just the intellect but a total engagement of oneself, it involves intellectual judgment and a free act of the will. While one can have a purely intellectual assent to God, such an assent only truly becomes valuable when transformed into consent (living faith) by a personal commitment of one's whole being (including one's will) to God.

Thus for Ollé-Laprune there is indeed evidence for God's existence (fideism is incorrect and we must not substitute sentiment, or the secret inspirations of the heart for the intellectual light); still we must combine faith (belief) with knowledge to know God fully (rationalism is incorrect) (*On Moral Certitude*, III, pp. 110, 117; IV, pp. 226-

227; *Reason and Rationalism*, XX, pp. 221-223; XXI, pp. 228-230). In this need for faith in addition to reason, Ollé-Laprune compares our knowledge of God to the knowledge we acquire of a friend's soul. For on the surface we merely sense the external signs of our friend's interior life (analogous to the signs by which we express our own interior life). Yet somehow by induction and analogy we penetrate into the soul of a friend, and attribute to this friend more than we see. Thus our knowledge of a friend's soul is by way of both reason (often tacit and imperceptible) and belief, and this is what allows us to attain an intimate commerce between one soul and another in some unknown manner. For instance we know that our friends respect and love us (and that we love and respect them). Yet if we stopped ourselves at appearances alone, the depths of our friends' affection for us would remain closed-off. Instead we pass from the sphere of the visible to the invisible by faith, by confidence in the affection of our friend; what we experience of our friend's being (what we see in our friend's face and eyes and feel when grasping our friend's hands) testifies to what does not appear to our senses, that our friend loves us (*On Moral Certitude*, III, pp. 112-115).

Now parallel to this we know of God's existence by the signs that manifest Him to us. God's visible works (and the conscience) are the language with which he addresses us, they are God's testimony to us. Yet in order to grasp God we cannot content ourselves merely with God's signs, we must pass from the visible sphere, and from the obscurities and difficulties that can assail reason, to the invisible sphere. It is thus necessary to combine faith with reason. And just as one trusts in the loyalty, justice, and tenderness of other humans, in spite of behavior inconsistent with this on occasion [perhaps one's friend has acted out of character or other people have mischaracterized his behavior], so too the finite, mixed, imperfect, and incomplete goodness found in the world suggests the idea of a pure goodness (*On Moral Certitude*, III, pp. 115-117, 125). In the words of Ollé-Laprune: "Faith fills in the lacunas of knowledge. I believe in God; I believe in His real existence and in His infinite perfection, just as I believe in the real existence and in the moral goodness of this friend of whom my senses only apprehend the exterior, of whom my reason cannot perhaps always comprehend the behavior" (*On Moral Certitude*, III, p. 117).

Lastly, Ollé-Laprune, influenced by Kant, argues that the basis for belief in the existence of a future life is that the requirements of eternal

justice are not satisfied in the present life. That is to say, on earth evil people often prosper while good people suffer. Yet in spite of this we know that the last word should belong to the moral law and that the good should definitively triumph. This is the firm reasoning on which belief in the future life is established (*On Moral Certitude*, III, pp. 105-106). Yet though there is a philosophical basis for the existence of the future life, there are also contrary appearances which reason can present to us. For the only life we know through experience is a life in the body and one accessible to the senses. Furthermore, contemplation of the ordinary course of nature gives us no example of personal immortality. For all we know the future life may be one wherein there is an ongoing series of changes as in this life, or it may be a state without memory or awareness (*On Moral Certitude*, III, pp. 107-108). Thus belief in the existence of a future life requires not just reason but also faith.

Once again natural faith can give our soul the strength to surmount the obstacles and appearances that run contrary to a belief in the after-life. Just as from our confidence in a person we can trust his or her testimony, so too from our confidence in God, and in God's nature as the principle of morality and the Good par excellence, we can rightfully expect the triumph of justice and the moral law, and that this triumph will be ours in another life (*On Moral Certitude*, III, pp. 107-109). As Ollé-Laprune asserts: "Thus it is necessary to affirm what the senses cannot attain, and even what reason cannot comprehend. ... it is necessary to elevate oneself above nature, to enter into a superior sphere, into an order of new things, and once there, leaning upon the moral law, to confess that, since the last word should belong to it, there is another life for the human" (*On Moral Certitude*, III, pp. 107-108).

Ollé-Laprune then certainly allows that humans can acquire a natural knowledge of morality, God, and the afterlife (this knowledge does of course require our will along with our intellect and so it requires what Ollé-Laprune calls a natural faith). Yet besides this natural knowledge or faith we can and should come to a supernatural faith in God; natural religion must be illuminated by revealed religion. This is so because humans cannot fulfill their vocation (and abide by the moral law in a perfect manner) without the supernatural assistance of God. Indeed what humans can achieve and what God requires are separated by a large gap as the fallen human nature suffers from inordinate desires (concupiscence), and the reason is obscured, and

the free will weakened and attenuated. So while humans can display a natural virtue, the pursuit of the whole and radical good requires the supernatural and God's grace to be added to the fallen human. Again though by nature some knowledge of God is to be had, we can integrate most fully with the divine center by Christ, through faith. Such faith is an act of the whole personality, it is a total assimilation of the integral principle of reality manifested by Christ. In these ways revealed Christianity conforms to the deepest aspirations of the human being (*On Moral Certitude*, VII, pp. 409-411; *Reason and Rationalism*, XXI, pp. 235-238, 243, 247; *The Value of Life*, XXVI, p. 337, 341-342; XXVII, pp. 347, 350-353, 381-382; *Philosophy and the Present Age*, XIII, p. 280).

Now the justification of this supernatural faith that humans so desperately need for perfection is based on testimony according to Ollé-Laprune: "The evidence of the authority of the testimony, such is the motive, such is the reason of faith" (*On Moral Certitude*, III, p. 94). In this way supernatural faith resembles natural faith which is an assent given to a person's testimony based on a confidence in that person. This confidence in the person who speaks is in turn based on an awareness of the speaker's wisdom, prudence, and rightness of soul and heart (*On Moral Certitude*, III, pp. 89-90, 93-94). Hence Ollé-Laprune says elsewhere: "to believe is to affirm, not on account of the evidence of the object, but on account of the authority and veracity of the one who speaks" (*Reason and Rationalism*, XXI, p. 231; cf. XXI, p. 239; cf. *Philosophy and the Present Age*, XIII, pp. 269, 271). Indeed "What one does not see one affirms by faith as if one saw it; not that the object becomes in fact visible, but, in spite of the obscurities that envelop it, the existence of it is so assured that the sight of it itself would add nothing to the certitude" (*On Moral Certitude*, III, p. 92). Like natural faith, supernatural faith is also a matter of consent and pertains to an act of the will. For while there are motives which render the consent of faith reasonable, there is an essential obscurity and lack of irresistible clarity to faith (*On Moral Certitude*, III, pp. 97-98). Moreover, the confidence I have in another person [here God] is based on an attraction of love which dominates the will but does not force it to act, hence faith is ultimately voluntary (*On Moral Certitude*, III, pp. 96-97).

Supernatural faith goes beyond natural faith, however, as it is based on the authority of God who reveals. Still even though supernatural faith delivers objects that surpass reason (the mysteries of the faith),

the assent to this faith is itself reasonable and based on motives of credibility (as well as on the will and divine grace) (*On Moral Certitude*, Introduction, pp. 15, 18; cf. *Reason and Rationalism*, XXI, pp. 238, 240). As Ollé-Laprune remarks: "For to affirm more than one sees without sufficient reason would be reckless credulity. To affirm more than one sees with good reasons of belief is wisdom" (*On Moral Certitude*, III, p. 97). We can even say then that it is the intelligence which knows that there is a place for belief (even that it is necessary to believe, that it is a duty to believe); for it is the intelligence which knows the reasons for belief (*On Moral Certitude*, IV, p. 226).

In conclusion, for Ollé-Laprune in all cognitive acts the human must exclude neither evidence (reason) nor faith (will). Instead the human must join the intellectual element (knowledge, understanding) to the moral element (will, belief, faith). It is the whole human that knows (*On Moral Certitude*, IV, pp. 224-226).<sup>210</sup> As Ollé-Laprune memorably puts it: "Such is the role of the will in every order of knowledge ... to place oneself on the terrain suitable for seeing and judging is to live the moral life. Among the requisite conditions for the complete and legitimate exercise of reason, the moral conditions are at the first rank" (*On Moral Certitude*, II, p. 69).<sup>211</sup>

## ABBREVIATIONS

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| AAA – See Blau (1946)                  | CEP – See Bocheński (1961)               |
| AC – See Swidler (1978)                | CGC – See Dru (1963)                     |
| ACP – See Swindal (2005)               | CHAD – See Jacquemet (1948 – 2000)       |
| ADB – See Von Liliencron (1875 – 1912) | CHP – See Copleston (1953 – 1977)        |
| AF – See At (1898)                     | CILA – See Reher (1989)                  |
| AMRT – See Carey (1987)                | CM – See Gottfried (1979)                |
| ANB – See Garraty (1999)               | CMM – See Boileau (1996), p. 315 n. 142  |
| AR – See Goyau (1905 – 1909)           | CMPE – See Boileau (2002), p. 316 n. 142 |
| ATH – See Dulles (1994)                | CP – See Coreth (1987 – 1990)            |
| ATA – See Fitzgerald (1999)            | CPH – See Sertillanges (1941)            |
| BBKL – See Bautz (1990 – 2005)         | CRHP – See Mascia (1957)                 |
| BCJ – See Sommervögel (1890 – 1960)    | CTE – See Nichols (1998)                 |
| BDTC – See Brown (1996)                | CTF – See Benrubi (1926)                 |
| BHP – See Bréhier (1967 – 1969)        | CWZ – See Schwaiger (1987)               |
| BI – See Bunnell (1990)                | DAF – See D'Ales (1924 – 1931)           |
| BO – See McAvoy (1943), p. 289 n. 103  | DCT – See Vacant (1903 – 1950)           |
| BOC – See Migne (1859), p. 261 n. 32   | DENZ – See Denzinger (2002)              |
| BRI – See Beiser (2004)                | DH – See Denzinger (1999)                |
| BW – See Brownson (1882 – 1887)        | DNBP – See Mander (2002)                 |
| CAHP – See Baldwin (2003)              | DP – See Huizman (1993)                  |
| CB – See Giraud (1938)                 | DPR – See Reese (1996)                   |
| CCI – See Allitt (1997)                | DSHP – See Delfgaauw (1968)              |
| CCP – See Critchey (1998)              | DTCB – See Brown (2005)                  |
| CCR – See Viatte (1922)                | EACH – See Glazier (1997)                |
| CE – See Herbermann (1907 – 1950)      | EF – See Melchiorre (2006)               |
|  | EGR – See Silz (1929)                    |

- EMFT – See Murray (2004)  
 EP – See Borchert (2005)  
 EP:1 – See Edwards (1967)  
 ER – See Jones (2004)  
 ERE – See Hastings (1908 – 1927)  
 ERR – See Beiser (1992)  
 FCP – See Sparrow–Simpson (1918)  
 FGR – See Frank (2003)  
 FKCT – See McEnhill (2004)  
 FPR – See Boas (1964)  
 FPTC – See Gutting (2001)  
 FRR – See Law (1966)  
 FU – See Batscha (1979)  
 FUP – See McCool (1989 entry 1)  
 GAR – See Graßl (1968)  
 GCT – See O’Meara (1991)  
 GDR – See De Murillo (1986)  
 GFC – See Bertrin (1895)  
 GP – See Pinkard (2002)  
 GR – See Walzel (1932)  
 GRA – See Ayrault (1961 – 1976)  
 GTK – See Werner (1889)  
 HA – See Dulles (1971)  
 HAB – See Herringshaw (1909 – 1914)  
 HAP – See Schneider (1963)  
 HAT – See Mayer (1951)  
 HBP – See Sorley (1965)  
 HCEC – See McBrien (1995)  
 HHP – See Hirschberger (1958 – 1959)  
 HMPF – See Lévy–Bruhl (1899)  
 HPF – See Ferraz (1880)  
 HPS – See Ferm (1950)  
 HT – See Hocedez (1947 – 1952)  
 HWP – See Caponigri (1963 – 1971)  
 HYBP – See Metz (1950)  
 HYP – See Passmore (1966)  
 IDR – See Kluckhohn (1941)  
 IEC – See Pizzardo (1948 – 1954)  
 KKT – See Heizmann (1976)  
 KPR – See Kircher (1906)  
 KTD – See Fries (1975)  
 KTS – See Geiselman (1964)  
 LHP – See Miller (1927)  
 LOC – See Lequier (1952), p. 277 n. 73  
 LT – See Reardon (1975)  
 LTK – See Kasper (1993 – 2001)  
 MAP – See Shook (2005)  
 MBOC – See Troisfontaines (1995) on p. 339 n. 171  
 MCT – See Livingston (2000)  
 MER – See Schenk (1966)  
 MFP – See Gunn (1922)  
 MHP – See Mar’as (1967)  
 MS – See Benz (1983)  
 MTCJ – See Bird (1967)  
 NCE – See Marthaler (2003)  
 NCE:1 – See MacDonald (1967 – 2001)  
 NCRT – See Smart (1985)  
 NCS – See McCool (1989 entry 2)  
 NT – See McCool (1994)

- OI – See Himes (1997)  
 OLTK – See Höfer (1957 – 1968)  
 OSSL – See Regny (1926), p. 258 n. 25  
 PAF – See Aubert (1958)  
 PC – See Monod (1916)  
 PCF – See Foucher (1955)  
 PCHP – See Popkin (1999)  
 PEMB – See *Les pr. écrits* (1956), p. 339 n. 171  
 PF – See Delbos (1919)  
 PFPM – See Theau (1977)  
 PGD – See Lavelle (1942)  
 PHP – See Torre (1988)  
 PR – See Collins (1961), p. 357 n. 189  
 PRNE – See Adshead (2000)  
 PRP – See Perry (1926)  
 PSR – See Gurr (1959)  
 PTCW – See Sciacca (1964)  
 PTNS – See Wilson (1967)  
 PTRD – See Schaub (1928)  
 RAR – See Reardon (1985)  
 RCM – See Reardon (1970)  
 REE – See Gower (1990)  
 REP – See Craig (1998)  
 RF – See Lasserre (1907)  
 RI – See O'Meara (1982)  
 RNT – See Baisnee (1965)  
 RP – See Gilson (1966)  
 RPF – See Guitton (1968)  
 RPFN – See Ravaisson (1984)  
 RR – See Fitzner (1989)  
 RRR – See Hellerich (1995)  
 RSP – See Perrier (1909)  
 RTN – See Reardon (1966)  
 SCT – See Schoof (1970)  
 SHP – See Thonnard (1955)  
 SHT – See Cessario (2005)  
 SOR – See Viatte (1965)  
 SPC – See Souilhé (1934)  
 SPI – See Inglis (1998)  
 TC – See Bellamy (1904)  
 TCP – See Delfgaauw (1969)  
 TCPF – See Schrift (2006)  
 TCRT – See Macquarrie (1988)  
 TCT – See Ryan (1965)  
 TE – See Riet (1963 – 1965)  
 THP – See Turner (1903)  
 TNJ – See Neuner (2002)  
 TRAN – See Miller (1950)  
 TRC – See Weiss (1977)  
 TRME – See Hartley (1971)  
 TS – See John (1966)  
 TT – See Shanley (2002)  
 TYT – See Berkhof (1989)  
 VAR – See Funk (1925)  
 WHP – See Weber (1896)  
 WPR – See Long (2002)  
 WT – See Fries (1969 – 1976)

## NOTES

- 1 This course had been taught at St. John's Seminary College since 1991, when, in order to simplify the philosophy course offerings, the separate courses on such Catholic thinkers as John Henry Newman, Maurice Blondel, Max Scheler, Gabriel Marcel, Etienne Gilson, Jacques Maritain, Karl Rahner, Bernard Lonergan, and Karol Wojtyła (Pope John Paul II) were combined together into one course.
  
- 2 Notable exceptions are Giraud, Victor, *De Chateaubriand à Brunetière: essai sur le mouvement catholique en France au XIXe siècle* [CB] (Paris: éditions Spes, 1938); Foucher, Louis, *La philosophie catholique en France au XIXe siècle avant la renaissance thomiste et dans son rapport avec elle (1800-1880)* [PCF] (Paris: Vrin, 1955); Reardon, Bernhard, *Liberalism and Tradition: Aspects of Catholic Thought in Nineteenth-Century France* [LT] (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975); O'Meara, Thomas, *Romantic Idealism and Roman Catholicism: Schelling and the Theologians* [RI] (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1982); Coreth, Emerich, Walter Neidl, and George Pfligersdorffer, eds., *Christliche Philosophie im katholischen Denken des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts* [CP], vols. 1-3 (Graz: Styria, 1987-1990); Fitzner, Joseph, ed., *Romance and the Rock: Nineteenth-Century Catholics on Faith and Reason* [RR] (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1989); O'Meara, Thomas, *Church and Culture: German Catholic Theology, 1860-1914* [GCT] (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1991); Nichols, Aidan, *Catholic Thought since the Enlightenment: A Survey* [CTE] (Leominster: Gracewing, 1998); Swindal, James, and Harry Gensler, *The Sheed and Ward Anthology of Catholic Philosophy* [ACP] (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005). There are also several accounts of Catholic Neo-Scholastic Thought. As can be seen, these works are either in a non-English language or limited in scope.
  
- 3 The Catholic Church saw its supremacy over Europe come to an end in the Sixteenth Century with the inroads made by Islam, Orthodoxy, and Protestantism. In 1453 the Islamic Turks conquered Constantinople and as a result much of Eastern Europe became either Islamic or reverted to Orthodoxy. In 1517 Martin Luther (1483-1546) questioned the practices and theology of the Catholic Church and along with Philipp Melancthon (1497-1560) and Martin Bucer (1491-1555) founded Lutheranism. Other Reformers such as Ulrich Zwingli (1484-1531), John Calvin (1509-1564), John Knox (c. 1513-1572), and Jonathan Edwards (1703-1758) established Calvinism; Conrad Grebel (1498-1526), Menno Simons

(1496-1561), and Thomas Münzer (1490-1525) established Anabaptism; Thomas Cramner (1489-1566), Henry VIII (1491-1547), Matthew Parker (1504-1575), and Richard Hooker (1554-1600) established Anglicanism; Thomas Helwys (1550-1616) and John Smyth (1554-1612) established Baptism; and John Wesley (1703-1791) established Methodism. This rise of Protestantism issued in a series of religious wars throughout Europe. In France the Calvinistic Huguenots fought the Catholics in the French Wars of Religion (1562-1594) that were settled by the Edict of Nantes (1598). In Germany various religiously-motivated wars such as the Knights' War (1522-1523), the Peasants' War (1524-1526), the Münster War (1534), the Gelderland War (1543), the Schmalkaldic War (1546-1547), and the Princes' War (1552-1553) were temporarily settled by the Peace of Augsburg in Germany (1555). However, tensions flared again with the War of Cologne (1583-1588), the Donauwörth War (1607), the War of the Jülich-Cleves Succession (1609-1614), and the Thirty Years War (1618-1648) which were finally concluded with the Peace of Westphalia (1648). This latter treaty established the European religious boundaries that are still in place today: Austria, Belgium, Croatia, the Czech Republic, France, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain remained predominantly Catholic countries; Germany, Hungary, Netherlands, and Switzerland were split between Catholicism and Protestantism; Denmark, England (Anglicanism), Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Scotland (Calvinism), Norway, Sweden, and Wales were predominantly Protestant countries.

In Germany Catholicism was predominant in Bavaria, Eichsfeld, Ermeland, the Rhineland, Saarland, Westphalia, and had an influence in Baden, Cleves, Düdinghausen, Hohenzollern, Jülich, and Württemberg.

The Netherlands (Dutchland; Holland) retained a Catholic predominance in the southern regions of Noord-Brabant, Limburg, and Zeeland. Switzerland retained a Catholic predominance in the cantons of Fribourg, Jura, Lucerne, Schwyz, Solothurn, Ticino, Unterwalden, Uri, Valais, Zug; and a partial Catholic influence in the cantons of Aargau, Appenzell, Glarus, Graubünden, and St. Gall.

The Catholic Counter-Reformation (1560-1648), which was in part a response to the Protestant Reformation, saw the implementation of the Council of Trent (1545-1563), the establishment of Catholic seminaries, and the rise and increasing influence of new religious orders such as the Oratory of Divine Love (1497), Theatines (1524), Capuchins (1528), Somaschi (1532), Barnabites (1530), Ursulines (1535), Jesuits (1540), the Italian Oratorians (1564), and the Discalced Carmelites (1593).

Subsequently, during the Baroque Period (1600-1750), a great revival of Catholic architecture, music, painting, and sculpture took place in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain. The Baroque Period also saw the establishment of the French School of Spirituality (1600-1720) with such notable members as St. Francis de Sales (1567-1622), St. Jane Frances de Chantal (1572-1641), Pierre de Bérulle (1575-1629), Louis Lallemant, S.J. (1587-1635), Charles de Condren (1588-1641), St. John Eudes (1601-1680), Jean-Jacques Olier (1608-1657), St. Vincent de Paul (1580-1660), Jean Baptiste de la Salle (1651-1719), and St. Louis Marie Grignon de Montfort (1673-1716). Many of these figures were instrumental in establishing the vibrant religious orders of the French Oratorians (1611), Vincentians (1625), Sulpicians (1641), Eudists (1643), Trappists (1664), and the Brothers of the Christian Schools (1680); Italy also saw the founding of the Passionists (1720) and Redemptorists (1732). This revival of Catholicism also included such controversial institutions as the Spanish Inquisition (1479), Roman Inquisition (1542), and the Index of Forbidden Books (1557).

4 The key movements in Modern Catholic Philosophy (1600-1800) include:

Christian Skepticism [Pious Skepticism; Christian Pyrrhonism]: Fr. Gen-tian Hervet (1499-1584); Juan de Maldonado [Maldonat], S.J. (1533-1583); Michel de Montaigne (1533-1592); Fr. Pierre Charron (1541-1603); Cardinal Jacques-Davy du Perron (1556-1618); Fr. François Véron, S.J. (1575-1625); Nicolas Caussin, S.J. (1583-1651); Bishop Jean-Pierre Camus (1584-1654); Fr. Marin Mersenne (1588-1648); François de la Mothe-le-Vayer (1588-1672); Fr. Piere Gassendi (1592-1655); Samuel Sorbière (1615-1670); Blaise Pascal (1623-1662) [somewhat]; Fr. Pierre-Daniel Huet (1630-1721); Fr. Simon Foucher (1644-1696); Fr. Hubert Hayer (1708-1780).

Aristotelianism [Blackloism]: Charles Malapert, S.J. (1581-1630); Thomas White (1593-1676); Kenelm Digby (1603-1665); Honoré, Fabri (1607-1688); John Sergeant (1623-1704); Michael Moore (1640-1726); Anton Mayr, S.J. (1673-1749).

Cartesianism [followers of Descartes]: the Minin Marin Mersenne (1588-1648); René Descartes (1596-1650); Géraud Du Cordemoy (c. 1605-1684); the Mimin Emmanuel Maignan (1607-1676); Robert Desgabets, O.S.B. (1610-1678); Fr. Antoine Arnaud (1612-1694); Claude Clerselier (1614-1684); Jacques Rohault (1618-1672); Fr. André Martin (1621-1695); Jean-Baptiste Duhamel (1624-1706); Andrea Pissini (fl. 1665); Pierre Nicole (1625-1695); Antoine Le Grand, O.F.M. (1629-1699); the canon of Sainte-Geneviève René Le Bossu (1631-1680); Pierre Sylvain

Régis (1632-1707); Fr. Nicholas-Joseph Poisson (1637-1710); Adrien Baillet (1649-1706); Michelangelo Fardella, O.F.M. (1650-1718), Claude Buffier, S.J. (1661-1737); Jean Cochet, S.J. (d. 1771); Antoine de Montazet (1713-1788) and Joseph Valla (d. 1790), authors of the *Philosophy of Lyon Manual*; Michael Kalus (d. 1792); Claude Mey, S.J. (1712-1796); Cardinal Hyacinthe-Sigismond Gerdil (1717-1802); Antoine Guénard, S.J. (1726-1806); Antoine Migeot (1730-1794); Andrea de Guevara y Basoazabal, S.J. (1748-1801); Pierre Denis Boyer (1766-1842); Pasquale Galluppi (1770-1846).

Occasionalism: Louis Thomassin (1619-1695); Louis de la Forge (1632-1666); Fr. Nicolas de Malebranche (1638-1715); François Lamy, O.S.B. (1636-1711); Bernard Lamy (1645-1715); Michel-Angelo Fardella, O.F.M. (1650-1718); Yves Marie André, S.J. (1675-1764).

Wolfianism: Eusebius Amort (1692-1775); Frobenius Forster, O.S.B. (1709-1791); Philip Steinmeyer, S.J. (1710-1797); Joseph Redlhamer, S.J. (1713-1761); Berthold Hauser, S.J. (1713-1762); Mansuetus a S. Felice (d. 1775); Joseph Stepling, S.J. (1716-1778); Karl Scherffer, S.J. (1716-1783); Joseph Mangold, S.J. (1716-1787); Herman Osterrieder, O.F.M. (1719-1783); Paul Makó von Kerek-Gede, S.J. (1724-1793); Rudolf Graser, O.S.B. (1728-1787); Benedict Stattler, S.J. (1728-1797); Sigismund von Storchenau, S.J. (1731-1797); Cardinal Lorenzo Altieri, O.F.M. (1730-1796); Leopold Biwald, S.J. (1731-1805); Sigmund von Storchenau, S.J. (1751-1797); Manuel Mar'a del Mármol (1776-1840); Michael Joseph Fesl (1786-1865), at Leitmeritz Seminary, whose works were placed on the Index of Forbidden Books; Joseph-Aloysius Dmowski, S.J. (1799-1879), at the Roman College.

Sensationism [Sensationism; Empiricism]: Antonio Genovesi (1712-1769); Lu's António Verney (1713-1792); Fr. Etienne Bonnot de Condillac (1715-1780); the Celestine Appiano Buonafede (1716-1793); Fr. Para du Phanjas, S.J. (1724-1797); Ignace Monteiro, S.J. (1724-1812); Antonio Eximeno y Pujader (1729-1808); Jacob Anton Zallinger zum Thurn, S.J. (1735-1813); Juan Andrés, S.J. (1740-1817); Fr. Francesco Soave (1743-1806).

Kantianism [followers of Kant]: Beda Mayr, O.S.B. (1742-1794) [a work placed on Index of Forbidden Books]; Augustinus Schelle, O.S.B. (1742-1805); Jakob Danzer (1743-1796); Peter Miotti (1743-1804); Johann Lorenz Isenbiehl (1744-1818); Matthäus Fingerlos (1748-1817); Fr. Sebastian Mutschelle (1749-1800); Georg Eduard Daum (fl. 1780); Maurus von Schenkl, O.S.B. (1749-1816); Maternus Reuss, O.S.B. (1751-1798); Ulrich Peutingen, O.S.B. (1751-1815); Aloys Sandbichler (1751-1821); Bishop Johann Michael Sailer (1751-1832); Ildefons Schwarz, O.S.B.

(1752-1794); the early Patriz Benedikt Zimmer (1752-1820); Placidus Muth, O.S.B. (1753-1821); Franz Berg (1753-1821) [left Church]; Felix Anton Blau (1754-1798); Josef Socher (1755-1834); Eulogius Schneider (1756-1794) [left church]; the early Georg Leonhard Reiner, O. Praem. (1756-1807); Coelestin Königsdorfer, O.S.B. (1756-1840); Bernhard Ströger, O.S.B. (1757-1817); Anton Joseph Dorsch (1758-1819); Fr. Gregor Zirkel (1762-1817); Fr. Kajetan von Weiller (1762-1826); Jacob Salat (1766-1851) [also followed Jacobi]; Johannes Neeb (1767-1843) [also followed Jacobi]; Johann Joseph Batz (1775-1813); Friedrich Köppen (1775-1858) [also followed Jacobi]; Fr. Alphonso Testa (1784-1860); Anton Reyberger, O.S.B. (1787-1810); Matías Nieto Serrano (1813-1902); José Rey y Heredia (1818-1861); the Sulpician Marcel Hébert (1851-1916) [left Church]; Karl Gebert (1860-1910).

Idealism [followers of Schelling]: the later Fr. Patriz Benedikt Zimmer (1752-1820); Marian Dobmayer, O.S.B. (1753-1805); Johann Kaspar Götz (fl. 1897), later Fr. Joseph Weber (1753-1831); Georg Leonhard Reiner, O. Praem. (1756-1807); Johann Kaspar Götz (fl. 1807); Johann Baptist Schad (1758-1834); Joseph Geishüttner (1763-1805); Andreas von Röschlaub (1768-1835); Fr. Ignaz Thanner (1770-1825); the early Karl Joseph Hieronymous Windischmann (1775-1839); Johann Jakob Wagner (1775-1841); Johann Sebastian Drey (1777-1853); Jakob Sengler (1799-1878); Peter Ernst von Lasaulx (1805-1861); Mariano Ares y Sanz (fl. 1882); Hubert Karl Philipp Beckers (1806-1889); Fr. Martin Deutinger (1815-1864); Fr. Johann Nepomuk Paul Oischinger (1817-1877); the convert Friedrich Pilgram (1819-1890); Wilhelm Martin Rosenkrantz (1821-1874); Johann Nepomuk Huber (1830-1879) [left the Church]; Carl Braig (1853-1923); Gaston Fessard, S.J. (1897-1979); Claude Bruaire (1932-1986).

The Proto-Romantics: Cardinal César-Guillaume de La Luzerne (1738-1821); Archbishop Adrien Lamourette (1742-1794); Louis Claude de Saint-Martin (1743-1803) [also an Augustinian]; Josef Anton Franz Maria Sambuga (1752-1815).

Mention should also be made of the philosopher of history Giambattista Vico (1668-1744). And of course there were many followers of Augustine and Aquinas.

- 5 Unfortunately the "death-bed conversion" of Voltaire has been misrepresented by both Catholics and non-believers. Certainly there is some evidence of Voltaire's conversion (though the depth of his belief in the Catholic faith is a matter of dispute). As he lay dying in Paris Voltaire sent for Fr. Gauthier, chaplain of the Incurables, who had offered to visit him (probably with the involvement of Voltaire's nephew Fr. Mignot who was a monk, and certainly with the involvement of the Curé of Saint-Sulpice). Fr.

Gauthier received the following signed confession from Voltaire on March 2, 1778 (it was witnessed by Fr. Mignot and the Marquis de Villeville): "I, the undersigned, declare that being assailed with the vomiting of blood for four days ... that if God disposes me, I die in the holy Catholic religion in which I was born, hoping of the divine mercy that it will deign to pardon all my faults, and that if I had ever scandalized the Church, I ask pardon from God and from it for this." Two days later, on March 4, 1778, Voltaire and the Curé of Saint-Sulpice exchanged cordial letters that referenced the visit of Fr. Gauthier. The Curé of Saint-Sulpice, however, later felt that the confession was not sufficient and he, Fr. Mignot (Voltaire's nephew), and Fr. Gauthier revisited Voltaire to have him explicitly confess to the divinity of Christ on May 28, 1778. Voltaire's reply was: "In the name of God ... do not speak to me about that man [Christ] any more, and let me die in peace." Finally Fr. Gauthier visited Voltaire (*je suis venu*) on May 30, 1778 at Voltaire's request and found him to not be in a state of mind capable of entering into a confession (*hors d'état de l'entendre en confession*). Voltaire died later that day. Still the Curé of Saint-Sulpice felt he had no legal or canonical right to deny the Catholic burial of Voltaire. Hence Voltaire was taken to be buried in the monastery of Scellières where Voltaire's nephew Fr. Mignot was a monk, and where several priests were later present at the funeral. Some Catholics wrote to the Bishop of Troyes and asked him to stop the burial but by the time the letters were received and the bishop's own dispatch requesting the cessation of the burial arrived at the monastery it was too late. In 1791 Voltaire's remains were removed to the Pantheon of Paris.

Unfortunately the Catholic priest Augustin Barruel (1741-1820) later spread the story that Voltaire's last words were: "I am abandoned by God and man. ... I shall go to hell" (this is refuted by statements of Voltaire's secretary Wagnière and his physicians Dr. Burard). And agnostics, atheists, and deists have often omitted to note Voltaire's initial confession, have failed to note that Fr. Gauthier's unsuccessful attempt to have Voltaire confess was at a later date than his initial signing of his statement of faith, have failed to note the early date (February 28, 1778) of Voltaire's statement to his secretary Wagnière "I die while adoring God ... and detesting superstition," or have speculated (with little evidence to back it up) that Voltaire's conversion was merely a ruse in order to secure a Catholic burial for himself (in imitation of an act of his youth where Voltaire feigned death and had a Capuchin monk give him communion out of amusement).

See on this the deist Condorcet's, *Vie de Voltaire* (1789), and statements of Voltaire's secretary Wagnière, Voltaire's physician Dr. Burard, the prior of the abbey of Scellières Potherat de Corbierre, Fr. Mignot, Fr. Gauthier [Gaultier], and the letters of Voltaire to the Curé of Saint-Sulpice.

6 Some of the Catholic political philosophers of the Nineteenth-Century include: Fr. Gabriel Bonnot de Mably (1709-1785); Fr. André Morellet (1727-1819); Fr. Augustin Barruel (1741-1820); Fr. Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès (1758-1836); Karl Ludwig von Haller (1768-1854); Adam Heinrich Müller (1779-1829); Alban de Villeneuve-Bargemont (1784-1850); Ferdinand Walter (1794-1879); Phillippe-Joseph-Benjamin Buchez (1796-1866); Karl Ernst Jarcke (1801-1852); Franz Josef Ritter von Buss (1803-1878); Alexis-Charles-Henri Clérel de Tocqueville (1805-1859); Wilhelm Emmanuel Ketteler (1811-1877); Ludwig Windthorst (1812-1891); Louis Veuillot (1813-1878); Karl von Vogelsang (1818-1890); Lord John Acton (1834-1902); René de la Tour du Pin (1834-1925); Albert Maria Weiß, O.P. (1844-1925); Wilhelm Hohoff (1848-1923).

7 Jansenism originated with the Flemish theologian Cornelius Jansen (1585-1638), Rector of the University of Louvain, Belgium, with the posthumous publication in 1640 of his book *Augustinus*. Jansen held an extremely pessimistic view of human nature in this work. He claimed that on account of original sin human nature was corrupt, full of concupiscence, and accordingly incapable of good works. In order to overcome this degeneracy, humans required the grace of God which was irresistible and so not freely chosen. Jansen also placed great stress on moral rigorism and condemned self-love. The teachings of Jansen were disseminated by such figures as the Abbé de Saint-Cyran (1581-1643), Jacqueline Marie Angélique Arnauld (1591-1661), Antoine Arnauld (1612-1694), Blaise Pascal (1623-1662), Pierre Nicole (1625-1695), and Pasquier Quesnel (1634-1719). Jansenism was condemned by papal bulls issued in 1653, 1656, 1690, 1705, and 1713, and the Parisian center of Jansenism, the Abbey of Port-Royal, was razed to the ground in 1710. The Jansenist movement ceased in France with the renunciation of Jansenism by the Archbishop of Paris in 1728 and by the Sorbonne in 1730.

Quietism originated with the Spaniard Miguel de Molinos (1640-1697) and the Italian Pietro Matteo Petrucci (1636-1701) and influenced the French thinkers Jeanne Marie Guyon (1648-1717) and François Fénelon (1651-1715) who are sometimes called Semi-Quietists. The Quietists taught that the highest human state is one of self-annihilation, passivity, thoughtlessness, and disinterest wherein one wills nothing, not even one's own happiness, salvation, purification, or perfection in virtue, but merely lets God work within one's soul (or wherein one wills these things solely for God's sake with the Semi-Quietists). Quietism and Semi-Quietism were condemned by papal bulls issued in 1687 and 1699, respectively.

Gallicanism, in its parliamentary form, commenced with the Pragmatic Sanction of Bourges (1438), the Concordat of Bologna (1516), and the

book *The Liberties of the Gallican Church* [*Les libertés de l'église gallicane*] (1594) written by the lawyer Pierre Pithou (1539-1596). Its momentum had been temporarily halted by the Fifth Lateran Council (1512-1517), but it came to the fore again in France with the Declaration of the Assembly of the Clergy of France (1682) and the endeavors of the French theologian Jacques Bénigne Bossuet (1627-1704). Gallicans asserted that the French government had authority over the Pope to regulate various financial, ecclesiastical, and juridical aspects of the Catholic Church in France. Thus according to Gallicanism, papal decrees were not authoritative unless approved by a general Council, nor could they be disseminated in France without the approval of the French government. Moreover, it asserted that the French Government should have the power to regulate the convening of provincial councils, the allocation of Church property and revenue, the nomination of bishops, and the communication and travel of papal representatives within France. Gallicanism was condemned by papal bulls issued in 1690 and 1794, and after the re-adoption of Jansenism and Gallicanism at the Synod of Pistoia (1786) it was additionally condemned at Vatican Council I (1869-1870).

- 8 Particularly shocking to the French Catholic world was *L'affaire de l'abbé de Prades* wherein the Encyclopedist Abbé Jean-Martin de Prades defended a thesis at the Sorbonne in 1751 which supported many of the ideas of the deists (as the thesis was very lengthy it had been previously approved unread by the members of the thesis committee). De Prades, and the Chair of his thesis committee, the Irish theologian Luke Joseph Hooke (1716-1796), were both dismissed from the Sorbonne. De Prades fled to Holland and then to the court of Frederick II in Berlin, Germany, but in 1754 he returned to the Catholic fold and become an archdeacon in Glogau, Silesia, Poland (see CE (1911), v. XII, pp. 331-332; PC (1915), pp. 331-338).
- 9 One of the most horrendous actions of the French revolutionaries (under the atheists Jacques René Hébert and Pierre Anaxagoras Chaumette) was the treatment of the children of King Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette: Marie-Thérèse-Charlotte (1778-1851) and Louis Charles Capet (1785-1795). Marie-Thérèse-Charlotte was imprisoned alone in the Great Tower of the Temple in Paris from May 1794-December 1795 when she was sixteen but she was eventually released. Her brother Louis-Charles Capet (1785-1795), potentially the next King of France, Louis XVII, suffered a much worse fate.

At the age of eight, in July 1793, he was taken from his family and placed in a separate cell on a lower floor of the Temple. Antoine Simon was then hired to "reeducate" him. The boy was made to drink alcohol, masturbate, sleep with prostitutes, sing the Marseillaise revolutionary song, wear revo-

lutionary clothes, curse God, nobles, and his family (who were “whores” and “bloody women”), and read base books. If he was caught praying or refused to comply with his reeducation then either cold water was poured over him, he was beaten, kicked, or pulled up by his hair, or he was threatened with death by the guillotine. Additionally he was often woken in the middle of the night (to shouts of “Capet, Capet”), then kicked to the ground and yelled at (“Go back to bed, wolf cub!”). He ultimately was made to sign statements saying that his mother Marie Antoinette taught him to masturbate and worse.

Then in January of 1794 Louis-Charles Capet was moved to a small, dark, and damp room with no ventilation, one small window, and no human contact or books or toys. He was not given clean changes of clothes, nor was his room cleaned; he also had to urinate and defecate in his room, and was often insulted by his guards (who called him “son of a tyrant” or “viper”). Excrement soon piled up in his room, bugs and fleas gathered on his bed, and mice availed themselves of his quarters. The young boy developed sores (scabies and pustules) on his body from the insect bites, stayed curled up on his bed throughout the day, ate little, and his wrists, ankles, and knees swelled up. When a change of government took place in July 1794 steps were finally taken to help the boy and a guardian was appointed for him. Still only in September 1794 was the boy’s cell finally cleaned, the boy given clean clothes and a bath, and a guardian allowed to enter his cell during meals (later Louis-Charles was allowed to go out for walks as well). By now the boy was malnourished, weak and barely able to move, and mute. Finally in May 1795 a doctor was sent to see him (three days after the doctor released his report criticizing the boy’s treatment he died following a dinner at the Convention, probably of poisoning). A second doctor was summoned and found the boy with a distended stomach, chronic diarrhea and ulcers, and having difficulty breathing. Louis-Charles Capet ultimately died on June 8, 1795 with the official cause of death listed as tuberculosis. On the wall of the boy’s cell there was found a sketch of a flower and the following words: “Maman, je vous pr-” [*prie* ?; Mama, I am praying for you; or Mama, I am pleading with you ... ].

- 10 The moral argument for God seems to go back to John Chrysostom (349-407) [see his *Homilies on Hannah*, I, 3] and St. Augustine (354-430) and is found in a different form in the Lutheran Immanuel Kant (1724-1804).
- 11 For information on the life of Chateaubriand see Chateaubriand’s own autobiography *Memories from Beyond the Tomb* [*Mémoires d’outre-tombe*] (1848), translated as *Memoirs* (London: Penguin, 1961). One can also consult the works of Moreau, Pierre, *La Conversion de Chateaubriand* (Paris:

F. Alcan, 1933); Maurois, André, *Chateaubriand: Poet, Statesman, Lover*, tr. Vera Fraser (New York: Harper, 1938); Evans, Joan, *Chateaubriand* (London: Macmillan, 1939); Sieburg, Friedrich, *Chateaubriand* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1961); Moreau, Pierre, *Chateaubriand*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (Paris: Hatier-Boivin, 1967); Switzer, Richard, *Chateaubriand* (New York: Twayne, 1971); De Bertier de Sauvigny, *Chateaubriand, homme d'Etat* (Saint Malo, Editions Cristel, 2001); Diesbach, Ghislain de, *Chateaubriand* (Paris: Perrin, 2004).

For discussions of the thought of Chateaubriand see: AF (1898), pp. 17-23; TC (1904), pp. 11-12; RF (1907), pp. 126-142; CE (1908), v. III, pp. 640-642; PC (1915), pp. 475-505; CCR (1922), pp. 25-61; MFP (1922), p. 270; DCT (1932), v. II:2, pp. 2231-2239; CB (1938), pp. 17-21; HT (1947), v. I, pp. 73-75; CHAD (1949), v. II, pp. 1023-1026; IEC (1949), v. III, pp. 1397-1401; PCF (1955), pp. 16-21; OLTK (1958), v. II, pp. 1038-1039; FPR (1964), pp. 94-101; SOR (1965), pp. 133-138; FRR (1966), pp. 71-85; MER (1966), pp. 125-135; CHP (1974), v. IX, pp. 10-11; LT (1975), pp. 3-8; CP (1987), v. I, pp. 453-456; BBKL (1990), v. I, pp. 985-989; HA (1990), pp. 172-174; LTK (1994), v. II, pp. 1030-1031; HCEC (1995), p. 303; MCT (2000), v. I, pp. 143-144; NCE (2003), v. III, pp. 446-449; EP (2005), v. II, pp. 137-139; EF (2006), v. II, pp. 1842-1843; Bertrin, Georges, *La Sincérité religieuse de Chateaubriand* (Paris: Lecoffre, 1900); Giraud, Victor, *Le Christianisme de Chateaubriand*, v. 1-2 (Paris: Hachette, 1928); Gillot, Hubert, *Chateaubriand; ses idées, son action, son oeuvre* (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1934); Switzer, Richard, ed., *Chateaubriand: Proceedings of the Commemoration of the Bicentenary of the Birth of Chateaubriand* (Geneva: Librairie Droz, 1970); Switzer, Richard, *Chateaubriand* (New York: Twayne, 1971), pp. 58-75; Clément, Jean-Paul, *Chateaubriand: biographie morale et intellectuelle* (Paris: Flammarion, 1998); and Aureau, Bertrand, *Chateaubriand, penseur de la Révolution* (Paris: H. Champion, 2001); Roulin, Jean-Marie, *L'épopée de Voltaire à Chateaubriand: poésie, histoire et politique* (Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 2005); Didier, Béatrice, *Chateaubriand avant le Génie du Christianisme* (Paris: H. Champion, 2006).

- 12 This work was translated into English by Charles White (Baltinniec: John Murphy, 1856; reprinted by Kila: Kessinger, 2006) [the pagination given in this chapter refers to pages from this translation of *The Genius of Christianity*, however, the translations of Chateaubriand's work are my own; French pagination from the 1948 Flammarion edition of *Le Génie du Christianisme*, 2 vols., are given in brackets].

Chateaubriand's other major non-fiction works were mostly political and include his pre-conversion *Historical, Political, and Moral Essay on the*

*Revolutions* [Essai historique, politique, et moral sur les Révolutions] (1797; 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. 1826); *On Bonaparte, On the Bourbons* [De Buonaparte, des Bourbons] (1814), *Political Reflections* [Réflexions Politiques] (1814), *Miscellany of Politics* [Mélanges de Politique] (1816), *On the Monarchy according to the Charter* [De la Monarchie selon la Charte] (1816), *Voyage to America* [Voyage en Amérique] (1827), *Historical Studies* [Études historiques] (1831), *Essay on English Literature* [Essai sur la littérature anglaise] (1836), *The Congress of Verona* [Le Congrès de Vérone] (1838), and *Life of Fr. De Rancé* [Vie de l'Abbé de Rancé] (1844). He also garnered much fame for his romantic novels *Atala, ou les Amours de deux Sauvages dans le Désert* (1801), *René* (1807), and *Aventures du dernier des Abencerages* (1826), and his epics *Les Martyrs* (1809) and *Les Natchez* (1826). See his *Oeuvres complètes*, v. 1-12 (Paris: Garnier, 1858-61).

13 Chateaubriand was apparently not the most faithful husband and he had an affair with Madame Juliette Récamier (1777-1849) whose Salon he frequented along with other intellectuals.

14 In the endnotes to his *The Genius of Christianity* Chateaubriand develops metaphysical arguments for God's existence based on the existence of matter, motion, and thought (Note L, pp. 695-99 [this note has been abridged by the translator] [343-357 (v. I)]; see also Part One, V, 1, p. 138 [90 (v. I)]). He is influenced here by Cicero, Bayle, Clarke, Leibniz, and Crousaz. For example in his proof from matter (which resembles the third way of Aquinas) Chateaubriand argues that experience teaches us that matter exists and is subject to perpetual change and furthermore we can conceive that it might not have existed. And from this it follows that something independent and immutable and necessary has existed from eternity – otherwise matter, which does not itself contain the sufficient cause of its existence, would have no first cause and its existence could not be explained. In his proof from motion (which resembles the first way of Aquinas) Chateaubriand argues that the motion of matter must be communicated to it by a non-material and unmovable first mover. His complex proof from thought leads to the conclusion that thought which is indivisible, and so immortal, could not have come from matter but instead must have originated from an indivisible, immortal being. Moreover, Chateaubriand himself produces a teleological argument for God's existence from the order found in nature (he is influenced here by Cicero and Bernard Nieuwentyt, and his own observations in the American wilderness); he asserts that the order displayed in the wings, double eyelids, and legs of birds, the hydrostatic bladder of fishes, the seeds of plants, the eyes, ears, and hands of humans, and the instincts of beavers to make dams, birds, crocodiles, and snakes to protect their young, birds to sing and make nests, and animals and sea plants to migrate, could not have resulted from the random movement of atoms

(Part One, V, 3-13, pp. 141-176 [93-123 (v. I)] and Note L, pp. 696-698 [347-352 (v. I)]).

Still, in spite of these lengthy proofs of God, Chateaubriand does seem to regard them as secondary in importance [they are relegated to the endnotes], and his emphasis is on the aesthetic nature of Christianity and the world and on sentimental deliberations (see Part One, V, 1, p. 138 [90 (v. I)] and Note N, p. 703 [361-362 (v. I)]). Indeed he describes his own conversion as stemming from his emotional reaction to his dying mother's wish that he convert: "I became a Christian. I did not yield, I must admit, to great supernatural enlightenment; my conviction came from the heart; I wept and I believed" (*Memoirs*, X, p. 196).

- 15 Chateaubriand also produces rational arguments for the immortality of the soul in his endnotes. He argues that the soul's ability to engage in abstract thought and grasp eternal truths shows it is not material and can exist without the body (Note L – this section is omitted from the English translation [355-357 (v. I)]).

- 16 The Freemasons originated with the Grand Lodge of England in 1717 and rapidly spread to Europe and the Americas. Freemason Lodges were founded in Germany in 1737, France in 1738, and Austria in 1742. The freemasons were sympathetic to deism and tried to develop a system of morality freed from the trappings of revealed and institutionalized religion. Consequently, for the German freemasons Jesus was merely a "wise and virtuous and pure man" and a "model of humanity." Many of the Enlightenment thinkers in France and Germany were freemasons such as Voltaire (1694-1778), Helvétius (1715-1771), Diderot (1713-1784), D'Alembert (1717-1783), and D'Holbach (1723-1789) in France, and Lessing (1729-1781) and Fichte (1762-1814) in Germany. Freemasonry was condemned in papal pronouncements issued in 1738, 1751, 1821, 1825, 1829, 1832, 1846, and later, and Catholics were forbidden to join the freemasons [although early on a few of the German Catholic Enlightenment thinkers were members such as the Rector of the University of Salzburg, Augustin Schelle, O.S.B. (1742-1805) and Placidus Muth, O.S.B. (1753-1821).]

The Illuminati were founded by a professor of law at the University of Ingolstadt, Adam Weishaupt (1748-1830), in 1776 in Germany (Weishaupt later returned to the Catholic faith). They too were influenced by Enlightenment deism (and even tended to atheism) and held that humans must be enlightened by reason from their prejudices, become mature and do good works, and free themselves from subjugation to Church, prince, and nation. The Illuminati were condemned by a papal letter issued in 1785.

- 17 Febronianism was the German form of ecclesiastical Gallicanism. It originated with Johann Nicholas von Hontheim (1701-1790), the auxil-

iary bishop of Trier, who under the penname of Febronius published the work *On the State of the Church and the Legitimate Authority of the Roman Pontiff* [*De statu ecclesiae et legitima potestate Romani pontificis*] in 1763. In this work Hontheim argued that the decisions of a general council have priority over that of a Pope, and that the Pope's decisions have to be ratified by a bishop to be infallible, and he affirmed the authority of bishops (rather than the Pope) over their dioceses in regard to the condemnation of heresies, the confirmation and removal of bishops, and other juridical matters relating to marriages. Hontheim also proposed the creation of state-controlled national Churches and the abolishment of papal nuncios in Germany. Febronianism was defended by the elector-archbishops of Cologne, Mainz, and Trier at the Coblenz Conference of 1769 and at the Congress of Elms in 1786 (which also had the support of the archbishop of Salzburg). The work of Hontheim was placed on the Index of Forbidden Books in 1764 and Febronianism was condemned by a papal brief of 1786 and a Vatican constitution of 1794 and ended with the French invasion of the Rhineland in 1799.

Josephinism is the civil form Gallicanism took in Austria. It began during the reign of Maria Theresa (1717-1780) when her chancellor Prince Wenzel Anton von Kaunitz (1711-1794) drew up ordinances giving the state increased power over Church land and personnel in 1767-1769. It, however, took its most extreme form and its name from the policies of the Austrian emperor Joseph II (1741-1790). During his reign, particular the last ten years of 1780 to 1790 when he was sole ruler, Joseph II instituted strict state control over all Church affairs. Under this Josephinism the clergy were taxed, papal decrees needed an imperial stamp of approval to be disseminated, Austrian bishops were not allowed to communicate with Rome without governmental approval, freedom of religion was established by the Edict of Toleration (1781), and governmental regulations stipulated such things as the location of churches, the propriety of marriages, and even the number, length, and style of altars, candles, vestments, prayers, sermons, and songs at Mass. Joseph II also abolished around 800 of the monasteries and convents (including the Carthusian monastery of Gaming and the Benedictine Abbey of Mondsee) as well as various confraternities in the Austrian Empire from 1782-1783 and sold their land, buildings, works or art, and books in order to create a religious fund for the Church. He also closed the existing diocesan seminaries in 1783 and established state-run seminaries for the clergy which were attached to nearby universities imbued with Enlightenment thought. Josephinism was reconfirmed by the Austrian governments of 1791 and 1816 and lasted until 1850 when Emperor Francis Joseph I (1830-1916) had the system abolished.

- 18 The University of Münster was turned over to Protestant Prussia in 1803 and quickly de-Catholicized; the Catholic Universities of Bonn, Mainz, and Trier had been suppressed earlier by the French in 1797-1798.
- 19 As his Great Grandfather had been a noble, Schlegel added the title "von" to his name. For information on the life of Schlegel see: Enders, Karl, *Friedrich Schlegel: Die Quellen seines Wesens und Werdens* (Leipzig: H. Haessel Verlag, 1913); Wiese, Benno von, *Friedrich Schlegel: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der romantischen Konversionen* (Berlin: Julius Springer, 1927); Minssen, Bernhard, *Der ältere Friedrich Schlegel* (Bleicherode: Verlag Carl Nieft, 1939); Eichner, Hans, *Friedrich Schlegel* (New York: Twayne, 1970); Wanning, Berbeli, *Friedrich Schlegel: eine Einführung* (Wiesbaden: Panorama, 2005).

For information on the thought of Schlegel see: ADB (1891), pp. 737-752; THP (1903), p. 549; AR (1905), v. I, pp. 183-192, 374-379; KPR (1906), pp. 36-175; CE (1912), v. XIII, pp. 541-542; VAR (1925), pp. 24, 37, 44, 62, 119, 181, 186-200; EGR (1929), pp. 119-126; GR (1932), pp. 34-48, pp. 91-102; DCT (1939), v. XIV:1, pp. 1492-1495; HT (1947), v. I, pp. 151-157; IEC (1953), v. XI, pp. 69-70; HHP (1959), v. II, p. 391; GRA (1961), v. I, pp. 150-173; CGC (1963), pp. 48-57; CHP (1963), v. VII, pp. 18-19; OLTk (1964), v. IX, pp. 411-412; MHP (1967), p. 331; NCE:1 (1967), v. XII, pp. 1135-1136; BHP (1968), v. VII, p. 154; GAR (1968), pp. 278-281; CM (1979), pp. 10-11, 21-22, 73-85, 93-96, 111-118, 122-123; RI (1982), pp. 27-32, 120-126; IDR (1983), pp. 136-138, 150-151, 154-155; MS (1983), pp. 91-93; RAR (1985), pp. 118; CP (1987), v. I, pp. 174-201; PHP (1988), p. 249; ERR (1992), pp. 222-263; DP (1993), v. II, p. 2580; BBKL (1995), v. IX, pp. 241-250; HCEC (1995), p. 1168; RRR (1995), pp. 139-236; DPR (1996), pp. 512-513; CCP (1998), pp. 68-82; CTE (1998), pp. 28-29; REP (1998), v. VIII, pp. 529-531; PCHP (1999), pp. 522-523; LTK (2000), v. IX, pp. 155-156; GP (2002), pp. 158-164; BRI (2003), pp. 106-130; FGR (2003), pp. 177-219; ER (2004), v. XII, p. 8159; EP (2005), v. VIII, pp. 630-632; EF (2006), v. X, pp. 10164-10168; Glawe, Walther, *Die Religion Friedrich Schlegels* (Berlin: Trowitzsch & Sohn, 1906); Imle, Fanny, *Friedrich Schlegels religiöse Entwicklung von Kant zum Katholizismus* (Paderborn, Ferdinand Schöningh, 1927); Feifel, Rosa, *Die Lebensphilosophie Friedrich Schlegels* (Bonn: P. Hanstein, 1938); Anstett, Jean-Jacques, *La Pensée religieuse de F. Schlegel* (Paris: Société d'Édition Les Belles Lettres, 1941); Eichner, Hans, *Friedrich Schlegel* (New York: Twayne, 1970); Timm, Hermann, *Die heilige Revolution: Schleiermacher-Novalis-Friedrich Schlegel* (Frankfurt: Syndikat, 1978); Batscha, Zwi, and Richard Saage, eds., *Friedensutopien: Kant, Fichte, Schlegel, Görres* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1979), pp. 93-109; Friedrichsmeyer, Sara, *The Androgyne in Early German Romanticism: Friedrich Schlegel, Novalis, and the*

*Metaphysics of Love* (New York: Peter Lang, 1983); Zovko, Jure, *Verstehen und Nichtverstehen bei Friedrich Schlegel* (Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 1990); Millán-Zaibert, Elizabeth, *Friedrich Schlegel and the Emergence of Romantic Philosophy* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007); Saarinen, Veli-Matti, *The Daybreak and Nightfall of Literature: Friedrich Schlegel's Idea of Romantic Literature* (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2007).

- 20 Schlegel also wrote the academic works *The Greeks and Romans* [*Die Griechen und Römer*] (1797), *Critical Fragments* [*Kritischen Fragmente*] (1797), and *History of Greek and Roman Poetry* [*Geschichte der Poesie der Griechen und Römer*] (1798), *Lessings Thoughts and Opinions* [*Lessings Gedanken und Meinungen*] (1804), *On the Language and Wisdom of the Indians* [*Über die Sprache und Weisheit der Indier*] (1808), *On the New History* [*Über die neuere Geschichte*] (1811), and *The History of the Old and New Literature* [*Die Geschichte der alten und neuen Literatur*] (1815). Finally, Schlegel also was well known for his literary works *Lucinde: Ein Roman* (1799), *Alarcos* (1801), *Poetisches Taschenbuch* (1805-6), and *Gedichte* (1809). His writings are collected in the *Kritische Friedrich-Schlegel Ausgabe*, ed. Ernst Behler, 35 vols. (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1958-2002).
- 21 See Friedrich von Schlegel, *The Philosophy of Life and Philosophy of Language*, tr. A. J. W. Morrison (London: H.G. Bohn, 1847) and *The Philosophy of History*, tr. J. B. Robertson, 2 vols. (London: Saunders and Otley, 1835).
- 22 God also possesses love, but this love is spiritual and issues directly from God's understanding and will, whereas in humans love comes from the soul (*The Philosophy of Life*, III, p. 53; *The Philosophy of Language*, II, p. 382).
- 23 As we will see, romanticism will be criticized by Fr. Louis Eugène Marie Bautain (1796-1867); Orestes Augustus Brownson (1803-1876); Josef Wilhelm Karl Kleutgen (1811-1883); Désiré Félicien François Joseph Mercier (1851-1926); and Maurice Blondel (1861-1949).
- 24 Other Catholic romantic philosophers include the French layman Pierre-Simon Ballanche (1776-1847) writing from Lyons; the German laypersons Benedikt Franz Xaver von Baader (1765-1841) and Johann Joseph von Görres (1776-1848), both members of the University of Munich Circle of Romantics; the German layperson Adam Heinrich Müller (1779-1829), a member of the Vienna Circle of Romantics; the Swiss diocesan priest of Lucerne, Fr. Joseph Heinrich Aloysius Gügler (1782-1827); and the French layman reconvert Blessed Antoine Frédéric Ozanam (1813-1853), professor at Stanislas College [due to the influence of Gratty], the University of Lyons, and the Sorbonne, and founder of the Society of St. Vincent de Paul (1833) [somewhat]. More recently a Neo-Romantic movement

has developed due to the influence of the Theological Aesthetics of the Swiss Jesuit and later diocesan priest Fr. Hans Urs von Balthasar (1905-1988).

- 25 On the life of Bautain see Regny, Eugène de, *L'abbé Bautain: sa vie et ses oeuvres* (Paris: Bray et Retaux, 1884); Ibid., *Origin of the Sisters of St. Louis: With Details of the Life of Their Founder, the Abbé Bautain* [OSSS] (Dublin: Brown and Nolan, 1926). On Bautain's philosophy see: HPF (1880), pp. 317-345; TC (1904), pp. 27-28; CE (1907), v. II, pp. 353; DTC (1923), v. II:1, pp. 481-483; LHP (1927), p. 314; SPC (1934), v. II, pp. 24-25; CHAD (1948), v. I, pp. 1322-1323; IEC (1949), v. II, pp. 1069-1070; HT (1952), v. II, pp. 69-82; PCF (1955), pp. 71-98; SHP (1955), p. 437; OLTK (1958), v. II, pp. 73-74; PAF (1958), pp. 114-122; FPR (1964), pp. 147-149, 233-239; KTS (1964), pp. 129-135; RP (1966), pp. 222-226, 726-729; EP:1 (1967), v. I, p. 257; BHP (1968), v. VI, pp. 251-252; HA (1971), pp. 178-179; CHP (1974), pp. 17; LT (1975), pp. 116-137; VAR (1984), p. 125; CP (1987), v. I, pp. 486-493; PHP (1988), pp. 315-316; NCS (1989), pp. 46-56; RR (1989), pp. 153-166; BBKL (1990), v. I, pp. 429-430; DP (1993), v. I, p. 265; ATH (1994), pp. 82-83; LTK (1994), v. II, p. 97; DPR (1996), p. 51; CTE (1998), p. 35; MCT (2000), v. I, pp. 153-159; NCE (2003), v. II, p. 161; EF (2006), v. II, p. 1104; Horton, Walter, *The Philosophy of the Abbé Bautain* (New York: New York University Press, 1926); Poupard, Paul, *Un essai de philosophie chrétienne du XIXe siècle: L'Abbé Bautain* (Tournai: Desclée, 1961); Hiebel, Jean-Luc, and Luc Perrin, *Louis Bautain* (Strasbourg: Ercal, 1999).
- 26 The fourteenth letter of Bautain's *Philosophy of Christianity* (1835) has been translated by Joseph Fitzner in RR (1989), pp. 156-165. Pagninations are from the French edition of this work.

Bautain's fideism also comes out in his works prior to 1840 such as in *The Morality of the Gospel compared to the Morality of the Philosophers* [*La morale de l'Évangile comparée à la morale des philosophes*] (1827; 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. 1855); *On the Teaching of Philosophy in France in the Nineteenth Century* [*De l'enseignement de la philosophie en France au XIXe siècle*] (1833); and *Philosophy: Experimental Psychology*, 2 vols. [*Philosophie: Psychologie expérimentale*] (1839).

Bautain's other major philosophical works were *Dictated Lessons of Moral Philosophy* [*Leçons dictées de philosophie morale*] (1818); *Philosophical Varieties* [*Variétés philosophiques*] (1823), *General Propositions on Life* [*Propositions générales sur la vie*] (1826); *Moral Philosophy* [*Philosophie morale*], 2 vols. (1842); *Religion and Liberty Considered in Their Relationship* [*La religion et la liberté considérées dans leur rapport*] (1848; 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. 1865); *The Human Mind and Its Faculties* [*L'Esprit humain et ses facultés*], 2 vols. (1859)

[which is a revision of his earlier *Philosophy: Experimental Psychology* [*Philosophie: Psychologie expérimentale*] (1839)]; *The Christian of Our Days* [*La chrétienne de nos jours*], 3 vols. (1859-1860); *The Philosophy of the Laws from the Christian Point of View* [*La philosophie des lois au point de vue chrétien*] (1860); *Conscience: Or, The Rule of Human Actions* [*La Conscience: ou, La règle des actions humaines*] (1861); *Manual of Moral Philosophy* [*Manuel de philosophie morale*] (1866) [which is a new edition of his *Moral Philosophy: Ideas and Plans for Meditation and Preaching* [*Philosophie morale; Idées et plans pour la méditation et la prédication*] (1867)]; and *Things of the Other World* [*Les choses de l'autre monde: journal d'un philosophe recueilli et publié par l'abbé Bautain*] (1868) which is largely autobiographical.

Bautain also published some influential spiritual writings: *La belle saison à la campagne: conseils spirituels* (1858); *Le chrétien de nos jours: lettres spirituelles*, 2 vols. (1861-1862); and *Méditations chrétiennes* (1873). He additionally wrote two well-known works on public speaking, *Avis aux chrétiens sur les tables tournantes et parlantes* (1853) and *Étude sur l'art de parler en public* (1856), the latter of which was translated as *The Art of Extempore Speaking* (New York: Charles Scribner, 1858); a work on education, *De L'éducation publique en France au XIXe siècle* (1876); and a history of philosophy translated as *An Epitome of the History of Philosophy*, tr. C.S. Henry (New York: Harper, 1842).

- 27 This is why we see Bautain accept but modify Descartes's claim "I think, therefore I am" to "I perceive, therefore, I am."
- 28 Bautain defines faith as an adhesion of the intelligence and will to supernatural facts, to the Word, and to the divine law in virtue of a supernatural light which touches and illuminates the heart (*The Philosophy of Christianity*, I, 21, pp. 293, 298; *Philosophy: Experimental Psychology*, v. I, p. lxxxii, n. 1, lxxxix; PP, v. II, pp. 376-377; *On the Teaching of Philosophy in France in the Nineteenth Century*, p. 82). Bautain argues that this faith is not blind as it opens, purifies, and fortifies our sight interiorly and brings with it an intimate awareness and sweet taste of goodness, truth, and a superior agent, God (*The Philosophy of Christianity*, I, 9, p. 116; I, 18, p. 259; I, 21, pp. 298-299, 309; I, 22, pp. 312-319; *Philosophy: Experimental Psychology*, II, p. 408). Bautain hence can write: "When the Truth touches the soul with its divine ray and then the soul reacts to the Truth, it manifests itself as a pleasant light in the intelligence of the human, it becomes evidence for it, certitude, at the same time as it purifies and fortifies in it the sense of the truth; and it is thus that certitude is the whole foundation, perfection, principle and completion of the faith" (I, 21, pp. 299, 309).
- 29 Accordingly, the only true philosophers in Bautain's mind were a few of the Greek thinkers (Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato), some of the Church

Fathers (Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Augustine), and Malebranche, Kant, and Jacobi. He is very condemnatory of Aristotle, Descartes, Bacon, Locke, Spinoza, Hegel, Condillac, Bayle, Voltaire, Diderot, d'Holbach, Reid, and his own teacher Cousin, whom he says placed reason over faith (*The Philosophy of Christianity*, I, 25, p. 357; II, 26, pp. 1-2, 5-17; II, 27, pp. 21-38; II, 28, pp. 44-61, 68-73; II, 29, pp. 147-170; II, 33, pp. 237-242).

- 30 The later Bautain, influenced by the Thomist Perrone (1794-1876) and the German theologian Möhler (1796-1838), came to admit that human reason could in principle demonstrate the existence of God. However, he continued to stress that faith is a necessary foundation for true religion, that reason without faith tends to make religion an affair of logic rather than of the heart, and that due to original sin most humans do not rely on metaphysical argumentation when embracing God but instead a simple faith.

- 31 For information on the life and thought of Bonald see HPF (1880), pp. 85-164; AF (1898), pp. 11-16; THP (1903), pp. 603-604; TR (1904), pp. 13-14; CE (1907), v. II, p. 647; PF (1919), pp. 277-299; CCR (1922), pp. 63-74; DCT (1923), v. II:1, pp. 958-961; LHP (1927), p. 314; SPC (1934), v. II, pp. 16-18; CB (1938), pp. 27-37; CPH (1941), v. II, pp. 236-237; HT (1947), v. I, pp. 80-84; CHAD (1949), v. II, p. 122; IEC (1949), v. II, pp. 1829-1831; PCF (1955), pp. 22-27; SHP (1955), pp. 728-729; OLTK (1958), v. II, pp. 581-582; FPR (1964), pp. 70-84; SOR (1965), v. II, pp. 63-74; FRR (1966), pp. 24-32; RP (1966), pp. 209-214, 714-718; MHP (1967), p. 346; BHP (1968), v. VI, pp. 12-17; HA (1971), p. 175; HWP (1971), v. IV, pp. 42-43; CHP (1974), v. IX, pp. 5-9; LT (1975), pp. 43-54; CP (1987), v. I, pp. 445-449; PHP (1988), pp. 315-316; NCS (1989), pp. 40-43; DP (1993), v. I, p. 387; LTK (1994), v. II, p. 570; DPR (1996), p. 61; CTE (1998), pp. 32-33; NCE (2003), v. II, pp. 478-479; EP (2005), v. I, pp. 648-649; EF (2006), v. II, pp. 1373-1375; De Bonald, Victor, *De la vie et des écrits de M. le Vicomte de Bonald* (Paris: 1853); Moulinié, Henri, *De Bonald: La vie, la carrière politique, la doctrine* (Paris, 1915); Quinlan, Mary, *The Historical Thought of Vicomte de Bonald* (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1953); Spaemann, Robert, *Der Ursprung der Soziologie aus dem Geist der Restauration: Studien über L. G. A. de Bonald* (Munich: Stuttgart: Kösel, 1959); Merli, Gianfranco, *De Bonald: Contributo alla formazione del pensiero cattolico della Restaurazione* (Turin: ERI, 1972); Múgica, Luis Fernando, *Tradición y revolución: Filosofía y sociedad en el pensamiento de Louis de Bonald* (Ediciones Universidad de Navarra, 1988); Klink, David, *The French Counterrevolutionary Theorist, Louis De Bonald (1754-1840)* (New York: Peter Lang, 1996); Lorenz, Gabriele, *De Bonald als Repräsentant der gegenrevolutionären Theoriebildung: Eine Untersuchung zur Systematik und Wirkungsgeschichte* (Frankfurt: Peter Lang,

1997); Toda, Michel, *Louis de Bonald: Théoricien de la contre-révolution* (Étampes: Clovis, 1997); McCalla, Arthur, "Catholic Traditionalism and Religious Traditions," in *Papers of the Nineteenth Century Theology Group*, eds. Paul Misner and Gilya Schmidt (Colorado Springs: The Colorado College, 1998), pp. 22-27; Alibert, Jacques, and Jean de Bonald *Les triangles d'or d'une société catholique: Louis de Bonald, théoricien de la Contre-Révolution* (Paris: Téqui, 2002); Blum, Christopher, *Critics of the Enlightenment: Readings in the French counter-revolutionary Tradition* (Wilmington: ISI, 2004); Serra, Teresa, *La critica alla democrazia in Joseph de Maistre e Louis de Bonald* (Rome: Aracne, 2005); Barberis, Giorgio, *Louis de Bonald: potere e ordine tra sovversione e provvidenza* (Brescia: Morcelliana, 2007).

- 32 Bonald also wrote *Theory of Political and Religious Power in Civil Society* [*Théorie du pouvoir politique et religieux dans la société civile*] (1796) [suppressed in France], *Analytical Essay on the Natural Laws of Social Order* [*Essai analytique sur les lois naturelles de l'ordre social*] (1800), *On Divorce* [*Du divorce*] (1801) [translated into English as Louis de Bonald, *On Divorce*, tr. Nicolas Davidson (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1993), *Reflections on the General Concern of Europe* [*Réflexions sur l'intérêt general de l'Europe*] (1815), *Thoughts on Diverse Subjects* [*Pensées sur divers sujets*] (1817), *Literary, Political, and Philosophical Miscellany* [*Mélanges littéraires, politiques et philosophiques*] (1819), and *Philosophical Demonstration of the Constitutive Principle of Society* [*Démonstration philosophique du principe constitutive de la société*] (1827). See Bonald's *Ouvres complètes* [BOC], ed. Jacques-Paul Migne, 3 vols. (Paris, 1859).

There is a translation of a few pages De Bonald's *Philosophical Studies* in RNT (1965), pp. 46-48.

- 33 Bonald hence rejects the traditional view of natural law, i.e. that the moral law is natural and innate in the sense that it is engraved on the human heart, as are desires for food and drink. For not all human beings know the law, nor do all humans easily follow it. Moreover, the moral law varies in different places and some cultures practice such things as infanticide which other cultures find immoral. Thus the moral law is natural only in the sense that it is acquired in an original divine revelation which is then passed down to humans but often corrupted over time (*Primitive Legislation*, I, ii, n. 2; I, ii, 2:3; I, ii, 2:8, OC, I, pp. 1218, 1120-1121, 1223).
- 34 Influenced by Romanticism, Bonald often speaks of basic sentiments (i.e. fear and love) of the existence of God present in all humans (*Primitive Legislation*, I, i, 3:1-3; I, i, 8:3-5, OC, I, pp. 1175-1176, 1192-1193; cf. *Theory of Political and Religious Power in Civil Society*, II, i, 1-3; II, i, 5; II, i, 7-8, OC, I, pp. 462-470, 475, 481-483, 487). As he asserts "Religion is thus sentiment and not opinion ... I see then in all people the sentiment of

the Divinity" (*Theory of Political and Religious Power in Civil Society*, II, i, 2, OC, I, p. 463).

- 35 Hence, Bonald asserts that those beliefs that are present in the whole human race, such as knowledge of moral truths and the existence of God, cannot be false. Though he does allow that they may be altered or even corrupted by local opinions invented by humans (*Primitive Legislation*, Preliminary Discourse, OC, I, p. 1066; *Philosophical Studies*, 1, 10, OC, III, pp. 58-59, 264).
- 36 Other Catholic fideists and traditionalists include the German follower of Jacobi, Bishop Johann Michael Sailer (1751-1832), at the Universities of Dillingen, Ingolstadt, and Landshut; the Savoyard layman Joseph de Maistre (1753-1821); the German follower of Jacobi, Jacob Salat (1766-1851), of the Universities of Landshut and Munich; the German follower of Jacobi, Johann Neeb (1767-1834), at the University of Mainz; the German follower of Jacobi, Friedrich Köppen (1775-1858), at the Universities of Landshut and Erlangen; the French diocesan priest Hughes Félicité Robert de Lamennais [La Mennais] (1782-1854); the French diocesan priest follower of Lamennais (i.e. a Mennaisian) René François Rohrbacher (1789-1856) at the Seminar of Nancy; the Italian Jesuit (later Theatine) Giocchino [Gioacchino] Ventura di Raulica (1792-1861) at Sapienza; the French bishop Denis Auguste Affre (1793-1848), at Saint-Sulpice; the French Mennaisian bishop Fr. Jean-Marie Doney (1794-1871); Fr. Théodore Combalot (1797-1873); the French Mennaisian bishop Antoine de Salinis (1798-1861); Fr. Olympe Philippe Gerbet (1798-1864) at the Sorbonne; the French layperson Augustine Bonnetty (1798-1879); the Belgian diocesan priest and paleontologist Casimir Ubaghs (1800-1887) at the University of Louvain; the French bishop Antoine Martinet (1802-1871); the French bishop Henri-Louis-Charles Maret (1805-1884), of the Sorbonne [also an Augustinian]; the French lawyer Auguste Nicolas (1807-1888); the Spanish layman Juan Donoso Cortés (1809-1853), the Marquess of Valdegamas; Louis Veuillot (1813-1883); and Ferdinand Brunetière (1849-1906), professor at the École Normale Supérieure [somewhat].
- 37 One can mention such opponents of fideism and traditionalism as the diocesan priest Guillaume-André-Réné Baston (1741-1825); the Cartesian Pierre Denis Boyer (1766-1842); the Jesuit Jean-Louis de Leissègues de Rozaven (1772-1851); the lawyer Jean Baptiste Claude Riambourg (1776-1837); the Jesuit Marie-Ange Chastel (1804-1861); the Canon of Liège, Joseph Ghislain Lupus (1810-1888); Fr. Jean Pierre Laurent Gaduel (1811-1888), Vicar-General of Orléans; and Fr. Joseph Cognat (1821-1887).

- 38 In 1835 fifty French bishops issued their Censure of Toulouse wherein fifty-six propositions extracted from the writings of Lamennais, Rohrbacher, and Gerbet were condemned and sent to Rome, though the Vatican did not issue a condemnation of fideism or traditionalism until later.
- 39 Already in 1347 certain fideistic propositions of Nicholas d'Autrecourt were condemned by Pope Clement VI. See in particular n. 25: "That one does not know clearly that in truth it can be reasonably conceded, 'if any matter has been produced, God has been produced'" (DH, 1039).
- 40 The words *ab homine lapso* [in the fallen human] were found here in the initial version of this Vatican Council I canon prepared by bishop Konrad Martin (1812-1879), but were removed from the final draft (see Giovanni Domenico Mansi, *Sacrorum Conciliorum Nova et Amplissima Collectio*, Paris, Hubert Welter, 1901-1927, v. LIII, p. 168; Jean-Michel-Alfred Vacant, *Études théologiques sur les constitutions du Concile du Vatican*, Paris: Delhomme et Brigue, 1895, v. I, pp. 289, 692-693). This has caused some to suggest that the published decree did not explicitly assert that the light of reason is sufficient for fallen humans to come to a certain knowledge of God, as the decree only applies to humans in the state of innocence before the Fall (See Bernard Lonergan, *Method in Theology*, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1990, pp. 338-341, and "Natural Knowledge of God," *Proceedings of the Catholic Theological Society of America* 23 (1968), pp. 54-69, in Bernard Lonergan, *A Second Collection*, London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1974, pp. 117-133, especially pp. 117-118).

This, however, seems to push an argument from absence too far. Additionally, we read in the official proceedings of the Council that a similar phrase *uti nunc est* [as it (reason) is now] was twice suggested as an emendation and rejected for the following reasons: a) *cum ea quae in ista doctrina docentur, generatim vera habenda sint, sive sumatur homo in statu naturae purae, sive in statu naturae lapsae* [since those things which are taught in this doctrine should be regarded as true in general, whether the human would be assumed to be in a state of pure nature or in a state of fallen nature]; b) *nam non simpliciter agitur in doctrina nostra, utrum ab homine, prout nunc est, Deus naturali lumine certo cognosci possit necne; sed agitur in genere de conditione naturae humanae* [for it is not simply a matter in our doctrine of whether or not God can be known for certain by the natural light (of reason) by humans as they are now; but it is a matter of the condition of human nature in general] (see Jean-Michel-Alfred Vacant, *Études théologiques sur les constitutions du Concile du Vatican*, Paris: Delhomme et Brigue, 1895, v. I, pp. 288-291, 646, 652, 658, 673, amendments 5 and 51). Hence it seems most likely that the First Vatican Council wanted to assert that human reason in general, that is both in a state of

pure nature as well as in a state of fallen nature could know that God exists (note the words *non simpliciter* [not simply] above).

The ending phrase of an earlier decree of Vatican I asserting that reason could come to know certain religious truths 'neque ad hoc traditam de Deo doctrinam omnino necessarium esse' [without the least need of the traditional teaching of God] had also been removed from the final version (see Giovanni Mansi, *Sacrorum Conciliorum Nova et Amplissima Collectio*, LIII, 165).

- 41 Later Papal writings continued to condemn fideism and traditionalism such as *Aeterni Patris* (1879), Leo XIII, DH 3135-3138; *Pascendi Domini Gregis* (1907), Pius X, DH, 3475-3500; *Communium rerum* (1909), Pius X, Denz., 2120; *Humani generis* (1950), Pius XII, DH, 3875, 3890, 3892; and *Fides et Ratio* (1998), John Paul II, n. 52-53, 55.

Translations of the above decrees are from Heinrich Denzinger, *The Sources of Catholic Dogma*, tr. Roy Deferrari (Fitzwilliam: Loreto, 1955).

- 42 Although a hand-full of Catholics came to embrace a rationalistic position and deny a supernatural Revelation, they then typically either left the Catholic fold or were removed from their positions. Such rationalists include the Englishman Charles Gildon (1665-1724) who became a deist around 1693 (and later converted to Anglicanism); the aforementioned Abbé Jean-Martin de Prades (1720-1782) who became a deist c. 1750-1754 until he returned to the Catholic faith [his works were placed on the Index of Forbidden Books in 1752 and 1769]; the German Neo-Kantians Franz Berg (1753-1821) and Eulogius Schneider (1756-1794), the latter of whom was dismissed from his position at the University of Bonn, joined the Jacobin party in France, and was executed by guillotine in 1794 [and who had a work placed on the Index of Forbidden Books in 1791]; the diocesan priest Bernhard Bolzano (1781-1848) who taught at the University of Prague from 1805 until 1819 when he was dismissed for rationalistic tendencies [his works were placed on the Index of Forbidden Books in 1828 and 1839]; the traditionalist Hughes Félicité Robert de Lamennais (1782-1854) who at the end of his life went to the opposite extreme and became a deist c. 1835-1840 [his works were placed on the Index of Forbidden Books from 1834-1846]; the Italian priest Cristoforo Bonavino [Ausonio Franchi] (1821-1895) who had an extensive deist period during the middle portion of his life [his works were placed on the Index of Forbidden Books from 1849-1855]; the English convert St. George Jackson Mivart (1827-1900) who displayed rationalistic beliefs in articles he wrote between 1885 and 1900 [one of his works was placed on the Index of Forbidden Books in 1893]; the English Jesuit George Tyrrell (1861-1909) who was dismissed from the Jesuits and the Catholic Church in

1906-1907; the American Modernist William Laurence Sullivan (1872-1935) who became a Unitarian in 1911; and the convert and German phenomenologist Max Scheler (1874-1928) who left the Catholic Church c. 1910-1912.

- 43 The thought of Lull was condemned in 1376 by Pope Gregory XI, and some of Stattler's works were placed on the Index of Forbidden Books in 1780 and 1797.
- 44 On the life and thought of Hermes see AGB (1880), v. XII, pp. 192-196; GKT (1889), pp. 405-410, 423-426; THP (1903), pp. 639-640; TC (1904), pp. 34-36; AR (1905), v. II, pp. 3-12, 142-145; CE (1910), v. VII, pp. 276-279; ERE (1914), v. VI, pp. 624-626; DTC (1915), v. VI:2, pp. 2288-2302; LHP (1927), p. 317; SPC (1934), v. II, pp. 72-73; HT (1947), v. I, pp. 177-201; IEC (1951), v. VI, pp. 1417-1419; SHP (1955), p. 733; PAF (1958), pp. 103-112; OLTK (1960), v. V, pp. 258-261; CHAD (1962), v. 674-677; CHP (1962), v. VII, p. 388; HA (1971), pp. 179-180; KTD (1975), v. I, pp. 303-322; KKT (1976), pp. 165-166; AC (1978), p. 55; RAR (1985), pp. 119-124; CP (1987), v. I, pp. 221-241; NCS (1989), pp. 59-67; BBKL (1990), v. II, pp. 760-762; ATH (1994), pp. 81-82; HCEC (1995), p. 612; LTK (1996), v. V, pp. 10-12; CTE (1998), pp. 45-48; NCE (2001), v. VI, pp. 797-799; EF (2006), v. VI, pp. 5621-5622; Kopp, Clemens, *Die Philosophie des Hermes* (Cologne: J.P. Bachem, 1912); Eschweiler, Karl, *Die zwei Wege der neueren Theologie: Georg Hermes-Matthias Jos. Scheeben* (Augsburg: Filser, 1926); Hegel, Eduard, "Georg Hermes," in *Bonner Gelehrte: Katholische Theologie* (Bonn: Bouvier, 1968), pp. 13-25; Schwedt, Herman, *Das römische Urteil über Georg Hermes, 1775-1831* (Freiburg: Herder, 1980); and Fleithmann, Thomas, *Vernünftig glauben: die Theorie der Theologie bei Georg Hermes* (Würzburg: Echter, 1997).
- 45 Hermes wrote an earlier work that foreshadows his semi-rationalism, the *Investigation into the Inner Truth of Christianity* [*Untersuchungen über die innere Wahrheit des Christentums*] (1805); and his later work *Christian-Catholic Dogmatics*, 3 vols. [*Christkatholische Dogmatik*] (1834-1836) distinctly presents his semi-rationalist position. Hermes also wrote two works on Church history: *Gutachten in Streitsachen des Münster* (1815) and *Antwort auf die 'Geschichtliche Darstellung der Lage der Münsterischen Kirche'* (1815). Hermes's *Introduction to Christian-Catholic Theology* has been translated in part in RR (1989), pp. 125-135 from which the translations of Hermes are taken.
- 46 Hermes does not accept though the ontological or the moral argument for God's existence, nor the argument from universal consent.
- 47 Hermes rejects the common Scholastic approach of establishing the truth of the divine revelation by appealing to such preambles of the faith

as miracles and prophecies. Hermes argues that speculative reason cannot establish that the miracles found in the Holy Scriptures derived from God, as reason cannot know whether or not they issued from nature (for reason is not aware of all of the laws of the natural world), nor know that they didn't issue from other spiritual beings such as angels or demons. So only practical reason can demonstrate that the miracles and prophecies attested by Scripture are divinely established, and it does so on the basis of the testimony of Christ that he is God Himself and reveals God's moral teaching (see *Introduction to Christian-Catholic Theology*, I, sec. 85, in RR (1989), pp. 130-132, n. 8-10).

- 48 Interestingly Hermes claims that though it must be the case that the proclaimer of an alleged revelation who presents miracles as proof of his mission and doctrine must comport himself in such a way as to not be unworthy of God or of the working of divine miracles, he also says that it is not necessary that this divine emissary live in a holy manner himself as in his private life he represents not God but himself (*Introduction to Christian-Catholic Theology*, I, sec. 85, see RR (1989), p. 131, n. 10; cf. *Introduction to Christian-Catholic Theology*, II, Introduction).
- 49 For more on Günther's biography and thought see ADB (1879), v. X, pp. 146-167; GKT (1889), pp. 452-464; THP (1903), p. 640; TC (1904), pp. 36-38; AR (1905-1909), v. II, pp. 43-55 and v. IV, pp. 201-223; CE (1910), v. VII, pp. 85-88; ERE (1914), v. VI, pp. 455-456; LHP (1927), p. 317; SPC (1934), v. II, pp. 72-73; DTC (1947), v. VI:2, pp. 1992-1993; IEC (1951), v. VI, pp. 1307-1309; HT (1952), v. II, pp. 39-58; SHP (1955), p. 734; OLTk (1960), v. IV, pp. 1276-1278; CHAD (1962), v. V, pp. 430-431; CHP (1962), v. VII, p. 388; SCT (1970), pp. 29-30; KTD (1975), v. I, pp. 348-375; AC (1978), pp. 55-56; RAR (1985), pp. 126-130; CP (1987), v. I, pp. 266-284; NCS (1989), pp. 88-112; BBKL (1990), v. II, pp. 384-386; BI (1990), pp. 72-94, 116-138; ATH (1994), p. 83; HCEC (1995), p. 597; CTE (1998), pp. 49-50; NCE (2001), v. VI, pp. 583-584; EF (2006), v. V, pp. 5087-5089; Winter, Eduard, *Die geistige Entwicklung Anton Günther und seiner Schule* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1931); Schäfer, Theo, *Die Erkenntnis-theoretische Kontroverse Kleutgen-Günther* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1961); Wenzel, Paul, *Das wissenschaftliche Anliegen des Güntherianismus* (Essen: Hubert Wingen, 1961) and *Der Freundeskreis um Anton Günther und die Gründung Beurons* (Essen: Hubert Wingen, 1965); Pritz, Joseph, *Glauben und Wissen bei Anton Günther* (Vienna: Herder, 1963); Beck, Karl, *Offenbarung und Glaube bei Anton Günther* (Vienna: Herder, 1967); Dietrich, Donald, "Priests and Political Thought: Theology and Reform in Central Europe, 1845-1855," *Catholic Historical Review* 71:4 (1985), pp. 519-546, especially pages 533-541; Kronabel, Christoph, *Die Aufhebung der Begriffsphilosophie: Anton Günther und der Pantheismus*

(Freiburg: Alber, 1989); and Osswald, Bernhard, *Anton Günther: Theologisches Denken im Kontext einer Philosophie der Subjektivität* (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1990).

- 50 Günther wrote many other works as well which developed his semi-rationalistic position such as his *Janusheads for Philosophy and Theology* [*Janusköpfe für Philosophie und Theologie*] (with Johann Heinrich Pabst) (1834), *The Last Symbolic Thinker* [*Der letzte Symboliker*] (1834), *Southern and Northern Lights on the Horizon of Speculative Theology* [*Süd- und Nordlichter am Horizont spekulativer Theologie*] (1834), *Thomas a Scrupulis* (1835), *The Golden Mean in Contemporary German Philosophy* [*Die Juste-Milieus in der deutschen Philosophie gegenwärtiger Zeit*] (1838), *Euristheus and Heracles: Metalogical Critique and Reflections* [*Eurystesus und Herakles: Metalogische Kritiken und Meditationen*] (1843), *Lentigo's and Peregrine's Correspondence* [*Lentigos und Peregrins Briefwechsel*] (1857), and *Anti-Sav-erses* (1883). His works are available in the collection *Gesammelte Schriften*, 9 vols. (1882).

Günther's *Propaedeutic to the Speculative Theology of Positive Christianity* has been translated in part by Joseph Fitzer in RR (1989), pp. 136-152, from which the translations here are taken.

- 51 Indeed for Günther it is because Hegel appealed to conceptual thought (*Begriff*) to establish his system, as opposed to intuitive intellection (*Idee*), that he ended up in pantheism and reduced God to an impersonal Absolute Idea (*Propaedeutic to the Speculative Theology of Positive Christianity*, Letter 11, see RR (1989), pp. 139-140; *Thomas a Scrupulis*, pp. 154-155). If we instead use our intuition, says Günther, we will develop a properly dualistic theism where God is other than the world, and in this way, says Günther in a humorous aside, eat the pantheists for breakfast. Even the Thomists, says Günther, don't appreciate the otherness of God when they apply their theory of analogy to God and world thus reducing God to the world. Accordingly Günther often criticizes Thomistic philosophy with its "mad urge for metaphysics" (*Propaedeutic to the Speculative Theology of Positive Christianity*, I, Epistle 11, see RR (1989), p. 140; cf. *Peregrine's Banquet*, pp. 60-61; *Janusheads for Philosophy and Theology*).

- 52 Günther explains this process of self-revelation (*Selbstoffenbarung*) in Hegelian terms when he states that the human spirit is first an undifferentiated self (thesis), which then differentiates itself into the faculties of passive receptivity or understanding and spontaneous reaction or will (antithesis) in response to the phenomena of the world, and then finally becomes aware of its own existence in an act of intuitive self-possession (synthesis). Thus the human self knows itself as an 'I' not directly, but only mediately

as something presupposed behind all appearances of phenomena; it knows itself in a process of objectification of the subject (*Subjectobjektivierung*).

53 Günther claims that the body and soul are products of natural processes, but that the spirit is produced by a special act of direct divine creation.

54 Günther also holds that the moral conscience with its awareness of an objective morality shows that there is an objective moral authority, God, who warns and threatens human beings to make sure they live in accordance with the moral law. He thus accepts a moral argument for God's existence.

55 God is thus three persons (Father, Son, Holy Spirit) in one substance, whereas the human being is three substances (body, soul, spirit) in one person.

56 At times Günther claimed that philosophical demonstrations of revealed truths can only occur due to the fact that God gave Adam the gifts of language and thought and accompanying ideas in a primitive revelation. So philosophical speculation is only possible due to the latent intelligibilities that remain in the human mind from this original revelation given to Adam.

57 The semi-rationalist view that reason could demonstrate all (or almost all) of the truths of revelation was very attractive to many Austrians and Germans during the early nineteenth-century and there soon developed a movement comprising Hermesians (c. 1820-1860) and Güntherians (c. 1830-1890). Hermes's followers quickly gained a foothold in the 1820s at the Universities of Bonn, Braunsberg, Breslau, Giessen, and Münster, as well as at the seminaries of Cologne and Trier (it is estimated that at one time thirty chairs of philosophy or theology were held by proponents of Hermesianism). Two of them, Achterfeldt and Braun, established a journal for the study of the thought of Hermes, the *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und katholische Theologie*, which operated from 1832 to 1852.

The key Catholic Hermesians were Joseph Ignaz Ritter (1787-1857) at the Universities of Bonn and Breslau; Johann Heinrich Achterfeldt (1788-1877) at the University of Bonn; Clemens August von Droste-Hülshoff (1793-1832) at the University of Bonn; Peter Joseph Elvenich (1796-1886) at the Universities of Bonn and Breslau; Wilhelm Esser (1798-1854) at the University of Münster; Godehard Braun (1798-1861) at the Seminary of Trier; Johann Joseph Rosenbaum (1798-1867), also at the Trier Seminary; Johann Wilhelm Joseph Braun (1801-1863) at the University of Bonn; Johann Heinrich Lentzen (1802-1875) at the Seminary of Cologne; Heinrich Joseph Vogelsang (1803-1863) at the University of Bonn; Johann Baptist Baltzer (1803-1871) at the University of Breslau;

Bernhard Josef Hilgers (1803-1874) who was a diocesan priest in Cologne and Bonn; Johann Otto Ellendorf (1806-1843), another diocesan priest from Cologne; Franz Xavier Biunde (1806-1860) of Trier Seminary; the Cologne lawyer Herman Joseph Stupp (c. 1810-1870); Johann Anton Bernhard Lutterbeck (1812-1882) at the University of Gießen [Giessen]; the diocesan priest Johann Jakob Kreutzer (fl. 1829-1839) of Langsdorf, Bonn; and the diocesan priest Thomas Braun (fl. 1845-1879).

Günther had many followers as well, the Güntherians, who established themselves in the 1830s in the Austrian Universities of Graz, Innsbruck, Krems, Salzburg, St. Polten, and Vienna and the German Universities of Augsburg, Bamberg, Bonn, Breslau, Munich, Münster, Trier, and Tübingen [he also had followers at the University of Prague in Czechoslovakia and even in various German Institutions in Rome itself]. The Güntherians also published their own journals *Aufwärts* (1848), *Wiener Kirchenzeitung für Glauben, Wissen, Freiheit, und Gesetz in der Katholischen Kirche* (1848-) and *Zeitschrift für die gesamte katholische Theologie* (1850-1860), to defend the semi-rationalism of their Master, and formed the Catholic Union (1848-1857) as a political party to support constitutional monarchism.

The key Catholic Güntherians were the Viennese physician Johann Heinrich Pabst (1785-1838); the Viennese Jewish convert and Redemptorist from the Stephansdom Johann Emanuel Veith (1787-1876); the former Hermesian Peter Joseph Elvenich (1796-1886) at the University of Breslau; Josef Scheiner (1798-1867) at the University of Vienna; Christoph Bernhard Schlüter (1801-1884) at the University of Münster; the former Hermesian Johann Baptist Baltzer (1803-1871) at the University of Breslau; Alois Flir (1805-1859) from the University of Innsbruck and later Rector of the College of the Anima for Austrian and German priests in Rome; the Piarist Joseph Calasanz Lewisch (1805-1884) who taught at the Military Academy in Wiener Neustadt, Austria; Jacob Zukrigl (1807-1876) at the Universities of Vienna and Tübingen; the economist Karl Ferdinand von Hock (1808-1869) who was director of the Viennese customs bureau; Johann Heinrich Löwe [Loewe] (1808-1892) at the Universities of Salzburg and Prague; Johann Michael Häusle (1809-1867) of the University of Brixen, the Frintaneum seminary in Vienna, and the court chaplain of Vienna; Jakob Merten (1809-1872) who taught at the seminary of Trier; the Benedictine Theodor Gangauf (1809-1875) of the University of Augsburg; the Piarist Father Johann Nepomuk Ehrlich (1810-1864) who taught at the Universities of Krems, Graz, and Prague; the priest Franz Werner (1810-1866); Wilhelm Gärtner (1811-1875), preacher at the University of Vienna Church and professor at the University of Pest, Hungary; Peter Knoodt (1811-1889) at the University of Bonn; Georg Karl Mayer (1814-1868) at the University of Bamberg; Johann Spörlein (1814-1873) also from the

University of Bamberg; the secular priest Sebastian Brunner (1814-1893) from the University of Vienna; Franz Xavier Schmid-Schwarzenberg (1819-1883) at the University of Salzburg; Karl [Carl] Werner (1821-1888) at the Universities of St. Polten and Vienna [also a Thomist]; the diocesan priest Fr. Jacob Frohschammer (1821-1893) at the University of Munich; the Benedictine Vincenz Knauer (1828-1894) at the Universities of Vienna and Innsbruck; the diocesan priest Franz Egerer (1830-1918); Ludwig Gerkrath (1832-1864) of the University of Braunsberg; the convert Ernst Melzer (1835-1898) of Bonn; Theodor Weber (1836-1906) at the University of Breslau; the Viennese priest Ludwig Croy (d. 1855); the Viennese lay convert Leopold Trebisch (fl. 1852-1858); and Maximilian Trütschel (fl. 1856) of the University of Bamberg.

For more on the Hermesians see CE (1910), v. VII, pp. 278-279; AC (1978), p. 55; RAR (1985), pp. 120, 125; BI (1990), especially pages 163-169. On the Güntherian movement see CE (1910), v. VII, p. 87-88; BI (1990), especially pages 163-169; Simons, Thomas, "Vienna's First Catholic Political Movement: The Güntherians, 1848-1857," *Catholic Historical Review* 55:2 (1969), pp. 173-194; 55:3 (1969), pp. 377-393; 55:4 (1970), pp. 610-626.

58 Hermes's views were sharply criticized by Karl Josef Hieronymus Windischmann (1775-1829); Franz Joseph Seber (1777-1827) who was forced to leave the University of Bonn in 1825 by the Hermesians; the Franciscan Anton Joseph Binterim (1779-1855); Johann Matthias Seling (1792-1860); Kaspar Franz Krabbe (1794-1866); the Italian Jesuit Giovanni Perrone (1794-1876) at the Roman College; Alexander von Sieger (1798-1848); Heinrich Klee (1800-1840) at the Universities of Bonn and Munich; Peter Volkmuth (1805-post 1853); Johannes von Kuhn (1806-1887) at the University of Tübingen; the Canon of Liège, Joseph Ghislain Lupus (1810-1888); Bishop Konrad Martin (1812-1879); Johann Hast (fl. 1832-1853); J.M. Meckel (fl. 1837); and Wilhelm Zell (fl. 1839).

59 Günther's views were rejected by Johann Baptist Schwetz (1803-1890); Peter Volkmuth (1805-post 1853); Franz Xaver Dieringer (1811-1876) at the University of Bonn; Joseph Wilhelm Karl Kleutgen (1811-1883) at the Gregorian; the layman Franz Jacob Clemens (1815-1862) at the University of Bonn; the diocesan priest Friedrich Michelis (1815-1886) who was excommunicated; the diocesan priest Johann Nepomuk Paul Oischinger (1817-1876); Heinrich Denzinger (1819-1883) at the University of Würzburg; Bishop Johannes Baptist Katschthaler (1832-1914); Johann Hast (fl. 1832-1853); Wenzeslaus Mattes (fl. 1844); the Benedictine Ildefons Sorg (fl. 1851); Johann Adam Hitzfeldner (fl. 1854); and Anton Vraetz (fl. 1865-1896).

- 60 The Italian ontologist philosopher Antonio Rosmini-Serbatì (1797-1855), who will be discussed in the next chapter, also held that reason could show that God was triune; his view was condemned in the aforementioned decree.
- 61 Translations of the above views of the Magisterium come from Heinrich Denzinger, *The Sources of Catholic Dogma*, tr. Roy Deferrari (Fitzwilliam: Loreto, 1955).
- 62 For more on Ravaisson see WHP (1896), p. 591; HMPF (1899), pp. 441-442; THP (1903), pp. 654-655; MFP (1922), pp. 73-75, 153-154, 204-206, 301; CTF (1926), pp. 140-142; PRP (1926), pp. 106-109; SPC (1934), pp. 47-48; CPH (1941), v. II, pp. 301-311; IEC (1953), v. X, p. 556; SHP (1955), p. 935; CEP (1961), pp. 10, 102; OLTK (1963), v. VIII, p. 1019; RP (1966), pp. 291-296, 762-763; MHP (1967), p. 356; DSHP (1968), pp. 209-210; RPF (1968), pp. 79-83; BHP (1969), v. VII, pp. 95-97, 187; HWP (1971), v. IV, pp. 285-287; CHP (1974), v. IX, pp. 156-159; PFP (1977), pp. 16-19; CP (1987), v. I, p. 424; DP (1993), v. II, pp. 2418-2420; BDTC (1996), p. 652; DPR (1996), p. 479; REP (1998), v. VIII, pp. 103-106; LTK (1999), v. VIII, p. 858; PCHP (1999), pp. 571-572; FPTC (2001), pp. 10-12; EP (2005), v. VIII, pp. 255-257; EF (2006), v. X, pp. 9409-9411; TCFP (2006), pp. 5-6; De Margerie, Amédée, *Philosophie contemporaine* (Paris: Didier, 1870), pp. 231-412; Bossu, Léon, *Galérie des métaphysiciens contemporains* (Louvain: Peeters, 1872); Boutroux, Émile, *Nouvelles études d'histoire de la philosophie* (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1927), pp. 194-220; Dopp, Joseph, *Félix Ravaisson: la formation de sa pensée d'après des documents inédits* (Louvain: Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1933); Valerio, Caterina, *Felice Ravaisson e l'idealismo romantico in Francia* (Naples: Editrice Libreria, 1936); Bergson, Henri, "The Life and Work of Ravaisson," in *The Creative Mind*, tr. Mabelle Andison (New York: Philosophical Library, 1946), pp. 220-252; Cazeneuve, Jean, *La philosophie médicale de Ravaisson: Ravaisson et les médecins animistes et vitalistes* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1958); Charlton, Donald, *Positivist Thought in France during the Second Empire, 1852-1870* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959), pp. 18-19; Janicaud, Dominique, *Une généalogie du spiritualisme Français, aux sources du Bergsonisme: Ravaisson et la métaphysique* (La Haye: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969); Laruelle, François, *Phénomène et différence: Essai sur l'ontologie de Ravaisson* (Nanterre: Publications de l'université Paris X Nanterre, 1971); Dulière, André, *Visages namurois (1693-1970): J.-A. Romagnesi, Félix Ravaisson, François Bovesse, Arthur Masson, André Dulière* (Namur: Presses d'avenir, 1974); Malo González, Hernán, *El hábito en la filosofía de Félix Ravaisson* (Quito: Centro de Publicaciones de la Pontificia Universidad Católica del Ecuador, 1976); Roig, Arturo, *Felix Ravaisson Mollien en América Latina* (Quito: Centro de Publicaciones de la

Pontificia Universidad Católica del Ecuador, 1976); Félix Ravaisson (Paris: PUF, 1985); Branco, João de Freitas, *A problemática da materialidade na filosofia espiritualista de Félix Ravaisson* (Lisbon: Editorial Inquérito, 1988); Howe, Lawrence, "Ravaisson's Legacy to Bergson," *Southwest Philosophy Review* 11:2 (1995), pp. 121-130; Janicaud, Dominique, *Ravaisson et la métaphysique: Une généalogie du spiritualisme français* (Paris: Vrin, 1997); Park-Hwang, Su-Young, *L'Habitude dans le spiritualisme français: Maine de Biran, Ravaisson, Bergson* (Villeneuve-d'Ascq: Presses universitaires du Septentrion, 1998); D'Agostino, Simone, *Dall'atto all'azione: Blondel e Aristotele* (Rome: Pontificia università gregoriana, 1999); Le Lannou, Jean-Michel, *Études sur Félix Ravaisson: De l'habitude* (Paris: Kimé, 1999); Le Lannou, Jean-Michel, *Le vocabulaire de Ravaisson* (Paris: Ellises, 2002); Montebello, Pierre, *L'autre métaphysique: Essai sur la philosophie de la nature – Ravaisson, Tarde, Nietzsche et Bergson* (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 2003); Guibert, Gaëll, *Félix Ravaisson: d'une philosophie première à la philosophie de la révélation de Schelling* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2007).

- 63 Ravaisson's other chief philosophical works are his: *Essay on the Metaphysics of Aristotle* [*Essai sur la métaphysique d'Aristote*], 3 vols. (1837, 1846, and 1953; 1954; 1963; 2007) [received prize of the Academy of Moral and Political Sciences in 1835]; *Speusippus on the First Principles of Things* [*Speusippi de primis rerum principiis*] (1838); *Contemporary Philosophy* [*Philosophie contemporaine*] (1840); *Discourse on the Morality of the Stoics* [*Discours sur la morale des Stoïciens*] (1850); *Essay on Stoicism* [*Essai sur le stoïcisme*] (1856); *Skepticism in Antiquity* [*Rapport sur le prix Victor Cousin: le scepticisme dans l'antiquité*] (1884); *Philosophie, Art, Archéologie selon Félix Ravaisson* (1951); *La Philosophie de Pascal* (2007).

Also see his philosophical essays: "Les Fragments philosophiques de Hamilton," *Revue des Deux Mondes* 44 (November 18, 1840), pp. 396-427; "Le Code civil et la question ouvrière," *Comptes rendus des séances de l'Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques* 126 (1886), pp. 147-152; "Éducation," *Revue bleue* 39 (1887), pp. 513-519; "La philosophie de Pascal," *Revue des Deux Mondes* 80 (March 15, 1887), pp. 399-427; "Métaphysique et morale," *Revue de Métaphysique et morale* 1 (1893), pp. 6-25; "Examen critique de la philosophie atomistique," *Comptes rendus des séances de l'Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques* 141 (1894), pp. 545-558; "Testament philosophique," *Revue de Métaphysique et de morale* 9 (1901), pp. 1-31 [revised edition issued as a book in 1933]; "Conditions d'une pédagogie capable de préparer à la vie: l'exemple de Grecs," *La Nouvelle Journée*, 11-12 (November-December, 1920), pp. 260-275, 369-383.

Ravaisson also dabbled in archaeology and history and so wrote: *Les bibliothèques de départements de l'Ouest* (1841); *Catalogue des manuscrits de la biblio-*

*thèque de Laon* (1846); *Les Archives de l'Empire et la Bibliothèque impériale* (1862); *Origines de l'École française de Rome* (1876); and *Étude sur l'histoire des religions: les mystères* (1892).

And Raviasson achieved great prominence for his works on art: *De l'enseignement du dessin dans les lycées* (1854); his especially noted *La Venus de Milo* (1871); *Notice sur une amphore peinte du Musée du Louvre* (1876); *Les monuments funéraires des Grecs* (1880); *L'Hercule: epitrapezios de Lysippe* (1888); *Une oeuvre de Pisanello* (1895); *L'Art et les mystères grecs* (1895).

He also contributed the articles "Art" and "L'Enseignement du dessin" to the *Dictionnaire de pédagogie et d'instruction primaire* (Paris: Hachette, 1882), v. I, pp. 122-124 and v. II, pp. 671-684; "Léonard de Vinci et l'enseignement du dessin," *Revue Bleue* 14 (November 12, 1887), pp. 627-629; "Monuments grecs relatifs à Achille," *Mémoires de l'Institut national de France* (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1895), pp. 309-352; and articles on ancient sculpture in 1875 to the *Revue Archiologique* and in 1891-1895 to the *Mémoires de l'Académie des Inscriptions*. Finally he edited the manuscripts of Leonard de Vinci (1881-1891).

The only translation of Ravaiasson is of his *Philosophical Testaments* in *The Search for Being: Essays from Kierkegaard to Sartre on the Problem of Existence*, Jean Wilde and William Kimmel, eds. (New York: Twayne, 1962), pp. 137-150.

64 Ravaiasson argues that the Positivist Comte is inconsistent in asserting that science is the only source of knowledge and philosophy will gradually give way to it. For the very act of delimiting the domain of the different kinds of knowledge is an activity of philosophy, not science (*Metaphysics and Morality*, pp. 6-9). Nor can science (whose presumption is materialism and whose method is analytic) tell us much about the internal world of thoughts, aspirations, desires, and dreams. In order to study these things science tries to make them into external objects of thought and so corrupts them. Yet consciousness is neither spatial nor quantified, and so it cannot be categorized in the material domain (*Metaphysics and Morality*, pp. 6-9). Finally science cannot provide humans with a moral principle for action. For trying to separate morality from all conception of God is like trying to separate practice from all theory, it just doesn't work very well (*Metaphysics and Morality*, pp. 6-9; *Report on Philosophy in France in the Nineteenth Century*, XXXIV, p. 277).

Ravaiasson is also dissatisfied with the eclecticism of Victor Cousin. It is merely a semi-spiritualism and doesn't go far enough in that direction (*Report on Philosophy in France in the Nineteenth Century*, II, pp. 69-76, 82-84).

65 References are to Ravaisson's *De l'habitude* (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1933); and *La Philosophie en France au XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle* (Tours: Fayard, 1984) which includes the essay *Skepticism in Antiquity*.

66 Ravaisson certainly admits that the brain is a necessary antecedent and condition of thought, sensation, and imagination. Yet he argues that this does not mean that thought itself, in its central action, depends on the brain. So rather than the organ of the brain causing the function of thought, it is the function of thought which subjugates and appropriates the organ of the brain (*Report on Philosophy in France in the Nineteenth Century*, XXVI, pp. 236-237).

67 This is not to say that life does not depend upon and is not affected by its material conditionality and the laws of nature. Habits are still limited due to their occurring in human beings with various innate characters (*On Habit*, I, 2, p. 8).

68 Hence Ravaisson can even say that the will is the motive and power of the intellect. For as we must love truths in order to comprehend them, it is the heart which teaches and judges. This is how metaphysics can be practiced by the least instructed as well as by the learned (*Metaphysics and Morality*, pp. 22).

69 Ravaisson also appeals to a cosmological argument for God. Human existence is a relative and dependent one. Thus since nothing can come from nothing, we must posit an absolute and infinite existence to explain our own (*Report on Philosophy in France in the Nineteenth Century*, XXXVI, pp. 292-294).

Ravaisson also maintains that we can know God by an ontological argument. For in God essence and existence, potentiality and act, are one. Nothing in God can limit or obstruct His possibility. Hence God's very possibility implies real existence (*Report on Philosophy in France in the Nineteenth Century*, XXXVI, p. 315).

In the end then philosophy does not eliminate religion but rather helps to dispel idolatry from it; true religion and philosophy are in harmony (*Report on Philosophy in France in the Nineteenth Century*, XVIII, p. 198; *Metaphysics and Morality*, pp. 6-9).

70 For more on Lequier see MPF (1922), pp. 69-70, 152-153; SPC (1934), p. 44; CPH (1941), v. II, pp. 285-287; PCF (1955), pp. 130-144; SHP (1955), p. 930; RP (1966), pp. 736-737; DSHP (1968), p. 208; BHP (1969), v. VII, pp. 59-62; HWP (1971), v. IV, pp. 281-282; CHAD (1975), v. VIII, pp. 433-435; LT (1975), pp. 153-158; CP (1987), v. I, pp. 507-517; BBKL (1992), v. IV, pp. 1516-1518; DP (1993), v. II, p. 1727; DPR (1996), p. 301; EP (2005), v. V, pp. 287-288; EF (2006), v. VII, p.

6337; Russell, Leonard, "Review of La recherche d'une première vérité," *Mind* 36 (1927), pp. 512-514; Grenier, Jean, *La philosophie de Jules Lequier* (Paris: Belles Lettres, 1936); Lazareff, Adolphe, "L'entreprise philosophique de Jules Lequier," in *Vie et Connaissance*, Boris de Schloezer, ed. (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1948), pp. 21-40; Wahl, Jean, *Jules Lequier: Introduction et choix* (Paris: Trois Collines, 1948); Charlton, Donald, *Positivist Thought in France during the Second Empire, 1852-1870* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959), pp. 18-19, 232; Callot, Emile, *Propos sur Jules Lequier: philosophe de la liberté* (Paris: Marcel Rivière, 1962); Pasquali, Antonio, *Fundamentos gnoseológicos para una ciencia de la moral; ensayo sobre la formación de una teoría especial del conocimiento moral en las filosofías de Kant, Lequier, Renouvier y Bergson* (Caracas: Universidad Central de Venezuela, 1963); Tilliette, Xavier, *Jules Lequier ou le tourment de la liberté* (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1964); Roggerone, Giuseppe, *La via nuova di Lequier* (Milan: Marzorati, 1968); Sipfle, David, "A Wager on Freedom," *International Philosophical Quarterly* 8 (1968), pp. 200-211; Petterlini, Arnaldo, *Jules Lequier e il problema della libertà* (Milan: Vita e pensiero, 1969); Brimmer, Harvey, "Jules Lequier's 'The Hornbeam Leaf,'" *Philosophy in Context* 3 (1974), pp. 94-100; Prontera, Angelo, ed., *Libertà e Ontologia* (Lecce: Milella, 1984); Viney, Donald, "Faith as a Creative Act: Kierkegaard and Lequier on the Relation of Faith and Reason," in *Faith and Creativity: Essays in Honor of Eugene H. Peters*, George Nordgulen and George Shields, eds. (St. Louis: CBP Press, 1987); Shields, George, "Some Recent Philosophers and the Problem of Future Contingents," *The Midwest Quarterly* 34 :3 (1993), pp. 294-309; Viney, Donald, "Review of La recherche d'une première vérité et autres textes," *Process Studies* 23:4 (1994), pp. 290-291; Viney, Donald, "On the Trail of a French Philosopher of Genius: Jules Lequier," *Pittsburgh State University Magazine* 6:1 (1995), pp. 12-14; Tilliette, Xavier, "Lequier Lecture de Fichte," in *Fichte et la France*, ed. Ives Radrizzani (Paris: Beauchesne, 1997), v. I, pp. 183-199; Viney, Donald, "Jules Lequier and the Openness of God," *Faith and Philosophy* 14:2 (1997), pp. 212-235; Viney, Donald, "William James on Free Will: The French Connection," *History of Philosophy Quarterly* 14:1 (1997), pp. 29-52; Armellini Paolo, *Lequier: La solitudine di Dio* (Rome: Ed. studium, 1998); Viney, Donald, "The Nightmare of Necessity: Jules Lequier's Dialogue of the Predestinate and the Reprobate," *Journal of the Association for the Interdisciplinary Study of the Arts* 5:1 (1999), pp. 19-32; Clair, André, *Métaphysique et Existence: Essai sur la philosophie de Jules Lequier* (Paris: Vrin, 2000); Pagani, Paolo, *Libertà e non-contraddizione in Jules Lequier* (Milan: F. Angeli, 2000); Josse, Jacques, *Jules Lequier et la Bretagne* (Moëlan-sur-mer: Blanc Sillex, 2001); Le Brech, Goulven, *Jules Lequier* (Rennes: La Part Commune, 2007).

71 In the week leading up to his drowning, Lequier told his friends that he was in great mental agony (he apparently had some hallucinations), and that he was bidding them adieu as they would not see him again and that he was in great mental agony. Moreover, his secretary, Jean-Louis Le Hésnan, reported that on the day of his death Lequier swam far into the bay (rather than his normal quick dip near the shore), and he reported that Lequier's last words were a goodbye to the woman who had spurned his marriage proposal just days earlier "Adieu, Nanine" (others speculate his last words were a wordless cry for help said after his farewell to Nanine).

72 Lequier has also appeared in quite a lot of French literature. His friend Mathurin Le Gal La Salle (1814-1903) published the book *La crise: une page de ma vie* (1893) where the character of Le Caër represents Lequier; Louis Guilloux, *Le sang noir* (1935) represents Lequier with the character of Turnier. Lequier is also featured in Jean-Marie Turpin, *Sol ou Jules Lequier* (1978) and Heather Dohollau, *La Réponse* (1982). Finally, Lequier is mentioned by Albert Camus, *Le Mythe de Sisyphe* (1942), p. 20, and André Breton, *Nadja* (1964), p. 5.

73 This work was initially published in a limited edition by Renouvier in 1865. In 1866 a proposal to publish Lequier's work more widely was quashed due to objections by Abbot Robert, teacher at the Lycée St.-Brieuc, to what he considered its obscurities, contradictions, and errors.

*The Search for a First Truth* consisted of the following essays: The Hornbeam Leaf [La feuille de charmillé]; The Problem of Knowledge [Le problème de la science]; The Inheritance [Le legs]; Confidences [Confidences]; Advice and Appeal to a Child [Conseils et appels à un enfant]; Dinan; Dialogue of the Predestinate and the Reprobate [Le dialogue du prédestiné et du réprouvé]; Probus; Abel and Abel [Abel et Abel]; Farewell to the Child [Adieux à l'enfant]; and Canticle to the Conscience [Cantique à la conscience].

Lequier also wrote the philosophical and theological works: *Liberty* [La Liberté] (1936); *The Last Page* [La dernière page] (1952; 1968) [short work]; *I See a Dry Country* [Je vois un pays aride] (1968) [short work]; *Discours sur les personnes divines* (1993); *Eugene and Theophilus* [Eugène et Theophile] (1993).

Additionally Lequier partially translated the autobiography of Sir Humphry Davy (1778-1829) in 1843-1848 and wrote a drama of 1842 that is lost. Lequier's work has been collected in *Oeuvres complètes* [LOC] (1952), which includes his epistles, pp. 495-551.

There is a Lequier archives, Le Fonds Jules Lequier at the University of Rennes, Bretagne.

Lequier's work has been translated as: *Translation of Works of Jules Lequier: The Hornbeam Leaf, The Dialogue of the Predestinate and the Reprobate, Eugene and Theophilus*, trans. Donald Wayne Viney (Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1998); *Jules Lequier's 'Abel and Abel' Followed by 'Incidents in the Life and Death of Jules Lequier'*, trans. Mark West (Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1999). Portions of *The Problem of Knowledge* have also been translated in *Philosophers Speak of God*, Charles Hartshorne and William Reese, eds. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), pp. 227-230; of *The Hornbeam Leaf* was translated in 1974 by Harvey Brimmer and Jacqueline Delobel in "Jules Lequier's The Hornbeam Leaf," *Philosophy in Context* 3 (1974), pp. 94-100; and of *The Dialogue of the Predestinate and the Reprobate* by Donald Viney in *Questions of Value Readings for Basic Philosophy* (Needham Heights: Ginn Press, 1989).

74 Pagination from *Translation of Works of Jules Lequier* (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 1998) and *Abel and Abel*, tr. Mark West (Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1999) followed by pagination in brackets from *Oeuvres complètes* [LOC] (Neuchâtel: Édition de la Baconnière, 1952). Pagination for *Discourse on the Divine Persons* from *La recherche d'une première vérité et autres textes* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1993).

75 While recognizing that our willing is bound and limited by various circumstances, Lequier nonetheless rejects any form of compatibilism. Here one is free in that one could have refrained from doing what one did, in the sense that it was logically (though not ontologically) possible one could have acted otherwise (here one is free as one is not subject to what Lequier calls, loosely following Aquinas and Duns Scotus, necessity properly so-called [*necessitas consequentis*]). For instance, though Socrates is seated, he might have not been seated (i.e. the laws of nature might have been different).

Lequier rejects the compatibilist view of freedom because under it we are not free in the sense that we could have done otherwise given the same laws of nature. For instance, Socrates could have not been not seated given the laws of nature and their effects in place at the time (here we are subject to what Lequier, following Aquinas and Duns Scotus, calls the necessity of consequence or metaphysical or ontological necessity [*necessitas consequentiae*]) (*The Dialogue of the Predestinate and the Reprobate*, I, pp. 55-58, 60, 64, 69, 71, 101 [86-87, 89-91, 94, 100-101, 108, 110, 157]).

Indeed on the compatibilist view, one's power to do otherwise is such that it is impossible for one to actually use it, it is not within one's power to put it into effect, it is a mere logical possibility. Yet this is to make us "a being free in potency [*libre en puissance*]" but not in actuality (*The Dialogue of the Predestinate and the Reprobate*, I, pp. 99-100 [154-156]).

76 Apparently Lequier took some creative license here as in an earlier draft the dove is startled not by Lequier's touch of the tree but by the movement of a frail branch (see Dugas, 1914, p. 157).

77 Continued acts of freedom also create habits wherein we develop new dependencies (*Dialogue*, II, pp. 139-140 [211-212]). Not that these habits are harmful. Indeed, contrary to what Kant asserts, someone with good habits, who is quite above temptation, is to be admired more than someone who exerts a painful effort to overcome a poorly formed character (*The Dialogue of the Predestinate and the Reprobate*, II, p. 140 [211-212]).

78 Hence, Lequier writes that our feeling of being able to do one thing or its opposite is not an actual sentiment; it is rather a presentiment [*présentiment*] or a supposed sentiment [*prétendu sentiment*]. I do not sense that I can [*peux*] will otherwise than I will, I sense that I could [*pourrais*] will otherwise, that I could (logically) have willed what I did not will (*The Problem of Knowledge*, III, pp. [52-54]). That is to say, introspection cannot favor a libertarian over a compatibilist view of freedom.

79 Similar arguments were later put forward by Clive Staples Lewis in his *Miracles*, III (1947; 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. of 1960 with a revised argument taking into account criticisms of Gertrude Elizabeth Anscombe); and Boyle, Joseph, Grisez, Germain, and Tollafsen, Olaf, *Free Choice: A Self-Referential Argument* (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1976).

It should be noted that Lequier does grant that there can be a necessity with our affirmation of self-evident truths (*Liberty*, I, p. [320]).

80 The compatibilist tries to avoid this by claiming that though one is not saved, one could have been saved if one had wished (if one had been given a different predetermined course by God). Yet to say that one's salvation is (logically) possible even though there is nothing one can do to avoid being damned (one is infallibly damned), as this is predetermined by God, is an absurdity for Lequier (*The Dialogue of the Predestinate and the Reprobate*, I, pp. 55-58, 60, 64, 69, 71, 101 [86-87, 89-91, 94, 100-101, 108, 110, 157]).

Lequier accordingly rejects the views of Wycliff, Luther, Calvin, Jansen, Pascal, and Bergier in his *Dictionnaire de Théologie* wherein God predetermines all that humans do (*The Dialogue of the Predestinate and the Reprobate*, II, pp. 140-141 [212]; *Liberty*, IV, 2, p. [407]). According to Lequier even a graced soul could forsake God, for our liberty makes us creators of ourselves (*Liberty*, IV, 2, p. [411]; V, 2, p. [447]). Being free means that we can withhold our consent from God's grace (*The Dialogue of the Predestinate and the Reprobate*, I, p. 90 [140-141]).

81 Nor is it an improvement to say with Pascal or Bossuet that God predetermines us to do all that we do but in a free manner, meaning by this that God makes us do what we would do if we were able to do something. Here God would make some people virtuous, heroes, and martyrs, as this is what they would be if they were able to be of themselves, and similarly God would make other people brigands, thieves, and cowards, as this is what they would be if they were able to be of themselves (*The Dialogue of the Predestinate and the Reprobate*, I, pp. 89, 91, 96-97, 100, 104-105 [139-140, 142, 149, 151, 156, 162-163; III, p. 149 [222]; *Eugene and Theophilus*, pp. 153-154 [402-403]). For this is not true freedom; once again the power to determine our life is not ours.

Worse still is if one says that since all humans, due to original sin, merit damnation, God has every right to choose a small number of souls upon whom to grant the gift of heaven, just as God preferred Jacob to Esau (*The Dialogue of the Predestinate and the Reprobate*, I, pp. 92, 106 [144, 165]; cf. Malachi 1:2-3; Rom 9:13). Here God disposes gifts as He chooses, and it is not for us to ask God to give an account for the favors He gives out, as He owes us nothing. For God has great magnificence, and this divine magnificence surpasses justice (*Abel and Abel*, pp. 26, 30, 32-33, 35, 48-49, 60 [238, 241, 243-246, 259-260, 271-272]).

Yet according to Lequier, on the contrary, any difference in how God treats humans must be due in the end to human choices and human merit (*Abel and Abel*, pp. 27, 68 [239, 280]; *Liberty*, IV, 5, p. [430]). Hence Lequier praises one who would renounce a gift of God given to oneself when others are equally deserving, or one who rejoices in another's good fortune. Indeed he hints that if God gave a gift to one and not to another, it would be because He knew that the receiver would deny the gift (as it was a test of character) (*Abel and Abel*, pp. 55, 57, 59, 64-65, 66, 69 [267, 269, 271, 276-277, 278-279, 281]).

82 Lequier rejects the alternative view of Augustine, Boethius, Aquinas, and De Arriaga wherein God is eternal, in the sense of being timeless (existing outside of time), and so God could have a knowledge of the future and yet humans would be free. Here all of time would exist immediately for God and God would see all things, including free human actions of the future, in an eternal present (*The Problem of Knowledge*, V, pp. [72-73]; *Liberty*, IV, 3, p. [415-416]; *The Dialogue of the Predestinate and the Reprobate*, I, pp. 75, 77-80 [117-118, 119-122, 124-125]). Lequier seems to reject this view of an eternal God as he believes that what is knowable is determinate (i.e. something must be determined to be known), and so if all were known from eternity then all would be eternally determinate, and there would be no human freedom (*Liberty*, I, p. [318]).

- 83 Lequier thus argues that God can engage in prophecy and predict that someone such as Judas would betray Jesus, or someone such as Peter deny him three times, by looking into their hearts (Matthew 26:21, 69-76; Jn 13:1-11). For God can know "all that the present determines in the future" and so by knowing human habits and characters can predict what the future will hold. God can even withhold grace to those who are resolved in their hearts to sin against Him (*The Dialogue of the Predestinate and the Reprobate*, II, pp. 135-136, 137-140 [206-207, 209-211]).
- 84 Lequier's views came under attack by the Thomist Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange (1877-1964) of the Angelicum.
- 85 Other Catholic spiritualists include Fr. Pierre Laromiguière (1756-1837), at the École Normale [forerunner; gave up priesthood in 1790 secularization]; the reconvert Pierre-Paul Royer-Collard (1763-1845), at the Sorbonne and Member of the French Parliament (1827-1842); the reconvert François-Pierre-Gonthier Maine de Biran (1766-1824), member of the French Parliament (1812-1820) [also an Augustinian]; Joseph Marie Degérando [De Gérando] (1772-1842), member of the French Parliament (1827) [forerunner]; the French physicist André-Marie Ampère (1775-1836); Charles de Rémusat (1797-1875), member of the French Government (1848); Elme Marie Caro (1827-1887) [also Augustinian and Integralist], of the École Normale Supérieure; Fr. Aloïse Guthlin (1828-1878), at Colmar; Jules Lachelier (1832-1918), at the École Normale and Inspector General for Higher Education in 1879-1900 and president of the jury of the agrégation (1900-1910); Émile Boutroux (1845-1921), at the Sorbonne; Alphonse Chide (1868-c. 1915); Jacques Chevalier (1882-1962), at Grenoble and Minister of Education (1940-1941) in the Vichy Regime; Pierre Lachize-Rey (1885-1957), at the Universities of Toulouse and Lyon [also an Augustinian]; Jean Grenier (1898-1971), at the Sorbonne; and the French Jesuit Émile Rideau (1899-1981).
- 86 Giannone and Franchio were seemingly later reconciled with the Church and Genovesi and Ortes remained Catholics throughout their lives. For more on the thought of Genovesi see EP (2005), v. IV, pp. 48-49; for more on the thought of Bonavino see CE (1909), v. VI, p. 206; and for more on the thought of Ardigò see EP (2005), v. I, pp. 251-252.
- 87 Because of this in 1799 Cardinal Fabrizio Ruffo (1744-1827) fomented a peasant army, the Army of the Sacred Faith, which attacked Naples and killed several Jacobins.
- 88 The precursors of ontologism were the French Oratorian Louis D'Eybac Thomassin (1619-1695), the French Oratorian André Martin [Ambrosius Victor] (1621-1695) [also Cartesian and ontologist], the Austrian Capuchin Giovenale of Anaunia [Giovenale Ruffini] (1635-1713), the

French Benedictine François Lamy (1636-1711), the French Oratorian Nicolas Malebranche (1638-1715) [several of his books placed on Index of Forbidden Books 1680-1712]; the French Oratorian Bernard Lamy (1640-1715), the Italian Franciscan Michelangelo Fardella (1650-1718), the French Jesuit Yves Marie André (1675-1764), the Italian [Savoyan] Cardinal Hyacinthe Sigismondo Gerdil (1718-1802); the Italian secular priest Vincenzo Miceli (1734-1781), and the Italian secular priest Nicola Spedalieri (1740-1795).

- 89 For more about the biography and thought of Rosmini-Serbatì see THP (1903), pp. 631-632; CE (1912), v. XIII, pp. 194-201; LHP (1927), pp. 315-316; SPC (1934), pp. 27-30; DTC (1937), v. XIII:2, pp. 2917-2952; HT (1952), v. II, pp. 140-154; IEC (1959), v. X, pp. 1359-1371; (SHP (1955), pp. 732-733; CRHP (1957), pp. 421-424; OLTK (1964), v. VIII, pp. 53-55; RNT (1965), pp. 295-296; MHP (1967), pp. 366-367; BHP (1968), v. VI, pp. 317-319; HWP (1971), v. III, pp. 27-32; RAR (1985), pp. 156-175; PHP (1988), pp. 317-318; NCS (1989), pp. 119-125; DP (1993), v. II, p. 2478; BBKL (1994), v. VIII, pp. 707-714; HCEC (1995), p. 1139; DPR (1996), p. 496; CTE (1998), pp. 58-60; REP (1998), v. VIII, pp. 362-364; LTK (1999), v. VIII, pp. 1311-1314; NCE (2003), v. XII, pp. 383-385; EP (2005), v. VIII, pp. 500-504; EF (2006), v. X, pp. 9852-9860.

For treatments of the life of Rosmini see Pagani, Giambattista, *The Life of Antonio Rosmini-Serbatì* (London: Routledge, 1907); Leetham, Claude, *Rosmini, Priest, Patriot and Philosopher* (New York: New City Press, 1982); Cleary, Denis, *Antonio Rosmini: Introduction to His Life and Teaching* (Durham: Rosmini House, 1992); Bergey, Marie-Catherine, *El manto de púrpura: vida de Antonio Rosmini* (Madrid: Ediciones Cristiandad, 2004); Lorzio, Giuseppe, *Antonio Rosmini Serbatì (1797-1855): un profilo storico-teologico* (Rome: Lateran University Press, 2005).

For treatments of Rosmini's thought see Barzellotti, Giacomo, "Philosophy in Italy," *Mind*, v. 3 (1878), pp. 505-538; Davidson, Thomas, *The Philosophic System of Antonio Rosmini-Serbatì* (London: Kegan Paul, 1882); Palhoriès, Fortuné, *Rosmini* (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1908); Bruno, John, *Rosmini's Contribution to Ethical Philosophy* (New York: The Science Press, 1916); Capone Braga, Gaetano, *Saggio su Rosmini* (Firenze: La Voce, 1924); Cerriani, Grazioso, *L'ideologia rosmينية nei rapporti con la gnosologia agostiniano-tomistica* (Milan: Vita e pensiero, 1938); Sciacca, Michele, *La filosofia morale de Antonio Rosmini* (Rome: Perrella, 1938); Rovea, Giuseppe, *Filosofia e religione in Antonio Rosmini* (Milan: Sodalitas, 1952); Franchi, Attilio, *Saggio sul sistema ontologico di Antonio Rosmini* (Milan: Sodalitas, 1953); Prini, Pietro, *Introduzione alla metafisica di Antonio Rosmini* (Mi-

lan: Sodalitas, 1953); Sciacca, Michele, *La filosofia morale di Antonio Rosmini* (Rome: Fratelli Bocca, 1955); Emery, Cuthbert, *Rosmini on Human Rights* (London: Blackfriars, 1957); Gentile, Giovanni, *Rosmini e Gioberti* (Firenze: Sansoni, 1958); Sciacca, Michele, "The Principles of Rosmini's Metaphysics," *Philosophy Today* 4 (1960), pp. 110-117, 147-157; Raschini, Maria, *Il principio dialettico nella filosofia di Antonio Rosmini* (Milan: Marzorati, 1961); Cuciuffo, Michele, *Morale e politica in Rosmini* (Milan: Marzorati, 1967); Manganelli, Maria, *Persona e personalità nell'antropologia di Antonio Rosmini: Linee di una apologetica del cristianesimo* (Milan: Marzorati, 1967); Sancipriano, Mario, *Il pensiero politico di Haller e Rosmini* (Milan: Marzorati, 1968); Cristaldi, Giuseppe, *Antonio Rosmini e il pensare cristiano* (Milan: Vita e pensiero, 1977); Percivale, Franco, *L'ascesa naturale a Dio nella filosofia di Rosmini* (Rome: Città nuova, 1977); Pfortscheller, Friedrich, *Von der Einheit des Bewusstseins zur Einheit des Seins: zur Grundlegung des Ontologie bei Antonio Rosmini-Serbat* (Frankfurt: Haag und Herchen, 1977); Temperini, Maria, *Le implicanze filosofiche e sociali della Teodicea di Antonio Rosmini* (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1978); Menke, Karl-Heinz, *Vernunft und Offenbarung nach Antonio Rosmini* (Munich: Tyrolia-Verlag, 1980); Evain, François, *L'Être et personne chez Antonio Rosmini* (Paris: Beauchesne, 1981); Manganelli, Maria, *Il segno nel pensiero di Antonio Rosmini* (Milan: Marzorati, 1983); Quacquarelli, Antonio, *Le radici patriache della teologia di Antonio Rosmini* (Bari: Edipuglia, 1991); Cleary, Denis, *Antonio Rosmini: Introduction to His Life and Teaching* (Durham: Rosmini House, 1992) and "Rosmini on Natural Law and Right," *Vera Lex* 13 (1993), p. 6-10; Killoran, John, "Conscience and the Moral Law: A Critical Review of Antonio Rosmini's Moral Thought," *Vera Lex* 13 (1993), pp. 13-15; Nebuloni, Roberto, *Ontologia e morale in Antonio Rosmini* (Milan: Vita e pensiero, 1994); Mercadante, Francesco, "Rosmini and the Liberal-Catholic Interpretation of the French Revolution," in *The Consortium on Revolutionary Europe, 1750-1850: Selected Papers*, 1995, Cook, Bernard, Kyle Eidahl, Donald Horward, and Karl Roider, eds. (Tallahassee: Florida State University Press, 1995); Ottonello, Pier Paolo, *Rosmini: L'ideale e il reale* (Venice: Marsilio, 1998); Pozzo, Riccardo, "The Philosophical Works of Antonio Rosmini in English Translation," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 73:4 (1999), pp. 609-637; Cook, Bernard, *An Introduction to the Thought of Antonio Rosmini* (New Orleans: Loyola University Press, 2000); Krienke, Markus, *Wahrheit und Liebe bei Antonio Rosmini* (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 2004); Nocerino, Giulio, *Coscienza e ontologia nel pensiero di Rosmini* (Stresa: Edizioni rosminiane Sodalitas, 2004); Pagani, Paolo, ed., *Qualcosa precede lo Stato: atti del Convegno di studi sul pensiero filosofico-politico di Antonio Rosmini* (Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2004); Spiri, Silvio, *Essere e sentimento: la persona nella filosofia di Antonio Rosmini*

(Rome: Città nuova, 2004); Addante, Pietro, *Antonio Rosmini e il pensiero malato: natura e divino, corpo e anima, persona, politica e globalizzazione, etica e diritti, federalismo, unità e diversità* (Milazzo: SPES, 2005); Bergamaschi, Cirillo, *Bibliografia rosminiana* (Stresa: Edizioni rosminiane Sodalitas, 2005); Cioffi, Mario, *Persona e diritto in Rosmini* (Stresa: Edizioni rosminiane Sodalitas, 2005); Ricci, Nicola, *In trasparenza: ontologia e dinamica dell'atto creativo in Antonio Rosmini* (Rome: Città nuova, 2005); Tripodi, Anna, *Rosmini: la forza della verità* (Genova: ECIG, 2005); Bennardo, Michele, *Persona e Trinità: la genesi e le fonti del pensiero antropologico e teologico di Rosmini* (Stresa: Edizioni rosminiane Sodalitas, 2006); Campanini, Giorgio, *Antonio Rosmini fra politica ed ecclesiologia* (Bologna: EDB, 2006); Franck, Juan, *From the Nature of the Mind to Personal Dignity: The Significance of Rosmini's Philosophy* (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 2006); Paoli, Francesco, *Della scuola di Antonio Rosmini* (Stresa: Edizioni rosminiane Sodalitas, 2006); Pulvirenti, Rosalia, *Ern e Rosmini: una sorprendente familiarità interiore* (Torino: Trauben, 2006); Sega, Ierema, *Antonio Rosmini: la casa natale* (Rovereto: Viadellaterra, 2006); Zama, Rita, *La persona e la libertà in Rosmini* (Stresa: Edizioni rosminiane Sodalitas, 2006); Bennardo, Michele, *Uno e trino: il fondamento dell'antropologia nel pensiero teologico-filosofico di Rosmini* (Stresa: Edizioni rosminiane Sodalitas, 2007); Chiara, Tomassi, *Antonio Rosmini: considerazioni sulla filosofia del diritto* (Firenze: Atheneum, 2007); Dossi, Michele, *Il santo proibito: la vita e il pensiero di Antonio Rosmini* (Trento: Il Margine, 2007); Krienke, Marcus, *Rosmini und die deutsche Philosophie* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2007); Pangallo, Mario, *Antonio Rosmini e il collegio medico di S. Raffaele: errore di valutazione o progetto illusorio?* (Verona: Fede & Cultura, 2007); Paoli, Francesco, *Antonio Rosmini: virtù quotidiane* (Verona: Fede & Cultura, 2007).

90 In 1849 there were protests outside the villa Rosmini had recently inherited from a deceased widow as Rosmini had been accused of “devouring the houses of widows” by a local physician.

91 Translated as *A New Essay concerning the Origin of Ideas*, 3 vols., tr. Denis Cleary, Robert Murphy, and Terence Watson (Durham: Rosmini House, 2001). The translations of Rosmini cited below are from this work (Note: as Rosmini's works are numbered according to individual paragraphs, the Arabic numerals referenced below in regard to this work refer to the paragraph number of his work unless a particular page is indicated).

Many of Rosmini's ethical, political, psychological, and theological works have also been published in English translations by the Rosmini House publishing firm.

Rosmini's ontologism also shows up in other writings such as his *Philosophical Works* [*Opuscoli Filosofici*], 2 vols. (1827-1828); *The Restoration of Philosophy in Italy* [*Il Rinnovamento della Filosofia in Italia*] (1836), *Philosophical System* [*Sistema Filosofico*] (1845), *Theodicy* [*Teodicea*] (1845), *Vincenzo Gioberti and Pantheism* [*Vincenzo Gioberti e il Panteismo*] (1845), *Psychology* [*Psicologia*], 2 vols. (1850), *Logic* [*Logica*] (1854), and *Theosophy* [*Teosofia*], 5 vols. (1859-1874).

Other philosophical works of Rosmini include his *Aristotle Explained and Examined* [*Aristotle Esposto ed Esaminato*] (1857); *A Sketch of Modern Philosophy* [*Schizzo sulla Filosofia Moderna*] (1880); and *Historical and Critical Essay on the Categories and Dialectic* [*Saggio storico-critico sulle categorie e la dialettica*] (1882).

Rosmini's is perhaps most appreciated today for his moral and political works which include his *Essay on Happiness* [*Saggio sopra la Felicità*] (1822); *Principles of Moral Science* [*Principii della scienza morale*] (1831); *Comparative and Critical History of the Systems that Treat of the Principles of Morals* [*Storia Comparativa e Critica de' Sistemi intorno al Principio della Morale*] (1837); *Society and Its Purpose* [*La Società e il suo Fine*] (1837); *Anthropology as an Aid to Moral Science* [*Antropologia in Servizio della Scienza Morale*] (1838); *Treatise on Moral Conscience* [*Trattato della coscienza morale*] (1839); *On the Definition of the Moral Law and on the Theory of Ideal Being* [*Sulla Definizione della Lege Morale e sulla Teoria dell' Essere Ideale*] (1841); *Moral Writings* [*Opuscoli Morali*] (1841-1843); *Philosophy of Right* [*Filosofia del diritto*], 2 vols. (1842); *A Constitution in accordance with Social Justice* [*Costituzione Secondo la Giustizia Sociale*] (1848); and *Philosophy of Politics* [*Filosofia della Politica*] (1858).

The theological works of Rosmini include his *Letters on Christian Instruction* [*Lettera sul Cristiano Insegnamento*] (1823); *Maxims of Christian Perfection* [*Massime di Perfezione Cristiana*] (1830); *History of Love* [*Storia dell' Amore*] (1834); *Catechetics* [*Catechetica*] (1838); *Manual of Spiritual Exercises for the Retreat Giver* [*Manuale del esercitatore*] (1840); *The Five Wounds of the Church* [*Delle cinque piaghe della santa Chiesa*] (1847); *Theological Language* [*Il Linguaggio Teologico*] (1880); *Introduction to the Gospel according to St. John* [*Introduzione del Vangelo secondo Giovanni commentata*] (1882); *Rationalism and its Attempt to Infiltrate the Theological Schools* [*Il razionalismo che tenta insinuarsi nelle scuole teologiche*] (1882); and *Supernatural Anthropology* [*Antropologia Soprannaturale*] (1884).

See also Rosmini's theory of education presented in his *Essay on the Unity of Education* [*Saggio sull' Unità dell' Educazione*] (1826); *Rules of Christian Teaching* [*Regole della Dottrina Cristiana*] (1837); and *Applications in the Service of Education* [*Applicazioni in Servizio dell' Educazione*] (1857).

There is an 80 volume critical edition of his writings *Opere edite e inedite di Antonio Rosmini* (Rome-Stresa: Città Nuova Editrice, 1966-) and we can also mention his letters in 13 volumes, *Epistolario completo* (Turin: Casale Monferrato, 1887) and his *Epistolario Ascetico*, 4 vols. (Rome: Tip. del Senato: 1911-1913).

92 In comparing his own epistemology with that of other thinkers, Rosmini criticizes the empiricists since they cannot account for the universality and necessity of knowledge and their system leads to skepticism; alternatively he criticizes idealists such as Kant for holding that the categories of thought are a product of the human mind and not a knowledge of things in themselves or real being (*New Essay on the Origin of Ideas*, I, 35-40, 45-98, 301-365).

Against the skeptics, Rosmini says that we can show that there are objects external to us because our sensations are received passively and hence suppose a cause different from ourselves and additionally they are felt as endowed with extension. Hence for these reasons we rightly come to believe in the existence of external extended bodies (*New Essay on the Origin of Ideas*, II, v:1-2, 661-666, 674; II, v:5, 754-759; II, v:9, 831-836; II, v:10, 876-877; III, iii:4, 1203-1208).

93 Rosmini argues that the idea of being gives rise to moral principles in his work *Principles of Moral Science* (1831) (*Principles of Moral Science*, I, 3-7). He states that through the light of reason humans recognize an unchanging and objective moral law, one based on and implanted in our mind by God (*Principles of Moral Science*, I, 8-19; IV, 71-89). Hence the idea of being gives rise to the following moral principles: "In all that you do, follow the light of reason" (*Principles of Moral Science*, I, 7, p. 8), which when explicated means "Desire or love being, wherever you know it, in the order or degree in which it presents itself to your intelligence" (*Principles of Moral Science*, IV, 94, p. 56; cf. IV, 88). Rosmini means by this that beings are good insofar as they exist (*Principles of Moral Science*, II, 31), and so goodness is what harmonizes with the perfection and fullness of being found in a thing (*Principles of Moral Science*, II, 39). We humans are thus called to try and perfect the various beings found in the world (*Principles of Moral Science*, II, 21-42, 45; IV, 91-100; 110-113). In his *Anthropology as an Aid to Moral Science* (1838) and *Philosophy of Right* (1842) Rosmini also develops an ethical personalism wherein humans are persons (centers of intellect and will) who deserve to be treated as ends in themselves (see *Anthropology as an Aid to Moral Science*, IV, 832-869; *The Philosophy of Right*, I, 133-143, 238-267, 346-359; cf. *Principles of Moral Science*, IV, 101).

94 Rosmini specifically rejects the view of the traditionalists that we know God through an original revelation subsequently passed down to all hu-

mans (*New Essay on the Origin of Ideas*, see III, iii:3, p. 192 n. 206 and III, v:2, 1376).

- 95 In his *Philosophical System* (1845), Rosmini gives four proofs for the existence of God. The first two proofs are *a priori* and the third is the *a posteriori* proof from contingency and these proofs resemble the arguments put forward in his earlier *A New Essay concerning the Origin of Ideas*. The fourth proof is a new moral argument for God. In it Rosmini notes that humans grasp a moral law which binds with irresistible authority and hence is an absolute and eternal law. Now this eternal moral law would not be such as it is if it did not exist in an absolute being God whose essence is holiness (*Philosophical System*, 176-182; cf. *Principles of Moral Science*, I, i:3, 188-222).

Rosmini also argues for the immortality of the soul due to the soul's having eternal and incorruptible being as its term (an *a priori* argument), and on the basis of the simplicity of the soul, divine justice, and the natural feeling of immortality shown in love for the future and contempt for death (*a posteriori* arguments) (*Psychology*, I, v, 660-727).

- 96 Rosmini brought a lot of criticism upon himself for claiming in his *Theosophy* (1859-1874) that the idea of being is divine, though it is not God: "For we call indeterminate being divine, although we cannot give it the name of God" [*Per ciò chiamiamo divino l'essere indeterminato, benché non possiamo dargli il nome di Dio*] (*Theosophy*, III, ii:15, 848; cf. II, iv:5, 490).

Rosmini seems to mean by this claim that the idea of being can be considered divine as it shares characteristics with God such as immutability, eternity, and necessity, yet that this idea of being is not to be identified with God but is rather, as we have seen, an appurtenance or appendage of God. The idea of being thus exists in God's mind, as an object of God's thought, as pure potential being (intelligible matter) which God limits and determines in creating the real world.

- 97 It is true that the earliest American colonies were established by both Catholics and Protestants: specifically: 1) by Spanish Catholics in Virginia in 1526-1526 and 1570-1571 (a Jesuit mission); 2) by French Huguenot Protestants at Port Royal and Fort Caroline, Florida from 1562-1565; 3) by Spanish Catholics in St. Augustine, Florida in 1565 (who destroyed the Huguenot colonies); 4) by British Protestants in Roanoke, Virginia in 1585 (which disappeared); 5) by Spanish Catholics in Santa Fe, New Mexico in 1598; 6) by French Catholics at St. Croix Island, Maine in 1604; 7) by English Protestants who had settled in Jamestown, Virginia in 1607 and Plymouth Rock, Massachusetts in 1620 (who destroyed the French Catholic settlements in Maine from 1613-1620). Still, the British Protes-

tant colonies in Virginia and Massachusetts, as well as Dutch Protestant colonies in New York, quickly came to dominate the country.

98 Ironically Maryland was originally a Catholic colony founded in 1634 (Maryland had passed Acts of Tolerance of Religion in 1639 and 1649, Rhode Island also passed a similar act in 1647).

99 There were also various acts of violence committed against Catholics in the colonies. Hence, in 1645 Virginian Protestants led by William Ingle and William Clairborne attacked then Catholic Maryland and destroyed St. Mary's Seminary, and captured the Jesuits Andrew White (1579-1656) and Thomas Copley (1595-1652) who were sent to England in chains for trial (they were eventually exonerated); in 1687 Edmonds and Raymond were arrested at Norfolk, Virginia for being Catholic priests; during the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1714) thirteen of the fourteen Spanish Missions in Florida and Georgia were destroyed by Governor James Moore of Carolina and the French Missions of Penobscot and Norridgewock, Maine were destroyed by English forces from the colony of Massachusetts (as well as in 1722; indeed in 1724 the Jesuit Sebastian Rasle (1654-1724) was killed as English troops once again invaded the Norridgewock Mission, Maine); in 1741 John Ury was accused of being a Catholic priest and instigating the Great Negro Plot in which fires were set in New York and he was hung (another priest, the Jesuit Theodore Schneider (1703-1764), was shot at several times as he passed through New Jersey in the 1740s); in 1755-1763 around 10,000-20,000 Catholic Acadians (Cajuns) were forcefully expelled from Nova Scotia by the British and they came to the various colonies (Massachusetts to Georgia) by boat. In colonies such as New York and Georgia the children were sometimes taken from the adults and given to Protestant families to raise and the adults were sent inland or became indentured servants (earlier in 1715 and 1729 Maryland had passed a law whereby a Protestant widow who marries a Catholic should have the children removed and raised Protestant); finally at the start of the French and Indian War (1755-1763) a mob in Philadelphia tried to destroy St. Joseph's Church and attack the Catholics but local Quakers prevented them (incidentally in the colonial period Quakers were also subject to great persecution).

Moreover, when the Canadian Government passed the Quebec Act of 1774 granting freedom of religion to Catholics, this law was vociferously denounced in the Suffolk Resolves issued in Boston and at the Continental Congress of the United States. The latter claimed that it was astonishing to see freedom granted to a Religion that has "dispensed impiety, bigotry, persecution, murder and rebellion through every part of the world." It was also the case that the Constitutions of Massachusetts in 1780 and New

Hampshire in 1784, though they provided for freedom of religion, also authorized the government to provide for "Protestant teachers of piety, religion, and morality" and indeed in 1801 the Massachusetts State Supreme Court declared "The Constitution obliges everyone to contribute for the support of Protestant ministers, and them alone. Papists are only tolerated, and as long as their ministers behave well, we shall not disturb them; but let them expect no more than that"; lastly in 1843 Rhode Island established property requirements for foreign-born citizens to vote which intentionally excluded the Irish immigrants. Some of these statutes were not removed until 1888-1889.

100 Catholics on the whole behaved exemplarily in the United States but there was an incident in which Catholics attacked an anti-Catholic Baptist preacher in Baltimore, Maryland in 1834; a Catholic riot occurred at an anti-Catholic lecture at the American Foreign Christian Union in New York City in 1848; and finally in 1863 there were Draft Riots in New York led by poor Irish Catholics who could not afford to get out of the Civil War draft and in 1870-1871 there were Orange Riots in New York wherein angry Catholics attacked an Orange Parade and around 30 people were killed and 90 injured.

101 Years later Lizzie St. John Eckel Harper, the daughter of Maria Monk, published her *Maria Monk's Daughter* (1874) telling of her own conversion to Catholicism.

102 Mention could also be made of the following acts of violence directed against Catholics occurring in the 1800s. In 1800 Father Jean-Louis Lefebvre de Cheverus (later Cardinal of Bordeaux, France) was arrested for performing a Catholic marriage ceremony in Massachusetts; in the 1850s the Blood Tubs poured blood on German and Irish Catholics who dared to vote in Baltimore, Maryland; and in 1865 several priests and nuns were imprisoned in Missouri for failing to take the recently-passed oath required for preachers or teachers as they deemed it anti-Catholic.

103 For information on the life and thought of Brownson see THP (1903), pp. 636-637; CE (1908), v. III, pp. 1-3; HAB (1909), v. I, p. 465; RSP (1909), p. 232; AAA (1946), pp. 171-174; CHAD (1949), v. II, pp. 285-286; IEC (1949), v. III, pp. 129-130; TRAN (1950), p. 45; HAT (1951), pp. 154-157; HHP (1959), v. II, p. 660; HAP (1963), pp. 105-107, 154-158; RNT (1965), pp. 14-18; CHP (1966), v. VIII, p. 265; RP (1966), pp. 576-587, 847-849; HA (1971), p. 190; HWP (1971), v. IV, p. 84; LT (1975), p. 159; AMRT (1987), pp. 97-99; CP (1987), v. I, pp. 729-736; CILA (1989), pp. 28-35; HCEC (1995), p. 199; CCI (1997), pp. 64-67, 74-85, 99-100; EACH (1997), pp. 168-171; ANB (1999), v. III, pp. 777-778; PCHP (1999), pp. 587-589; BBKL (2003), v. XXII, pp. 142-149;

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104 See the *New York Herald* of October 8, 1861.

105 See *New York Times* article of July 7, 1937.

106 Originally published as "Essay in Refutation of Atheism," *Brownson's Quarterly Review* 27 (1873), pp. 433-65, 28 (1874), pp. 1-37, 145-179, see BW II, p. 1-100.

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ence," *Brownson's Quarterly Review* 28 (1874), pp. 179-197, see BW III, pp. 519-536; "The Conflict of Science and Religion," *Brownson's Quarterly Review* 29 (1875), pp. 153-173, see BW IX, pp. 547-566; "Father Hill's Philosophy," *Brownson's Quarterly Review* 29 (1875), pp. 260-280, 490-515, see BW II, pp. 487-531; "Professor Tyndall's Address," *Brownson's Quarterly Review* 29 (1875), pp. 1-20, see BW IX, pp. 528-547; "Philosophy of the Supernatural," *American Catholic Quarterly Review* 1 (1876), pp. 22-33, see BW II, pp. 271-283.

For identification and collections of the philosophical writings of Brownson see Brownson, Henry, ed., *The Works of Orestes A. Brownson* [BW], vols. 1-3 (Detroit: Thorndike Nourse, 1882-1883); Ryan, Alvan, ed., *The Brownson Reader* (New York: P.J. Kenedy, 1955); Kirk, Russell, ed., *Orestes Brownson: Selected Political Essays* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1990); Carey, Patrick, ed., *Orestes A. Brownson: Selected Writings* (New York: Paulist Press, 1991); Carey, Patrick, *Orestes A. Brownson: A Bibliography, 1826-1876* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1997); Carey, Patrick, ed., *The Early Works of Orestes A. Brownson*, 6 vols. (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2000-2006).

107 Among Brownson's theological writings we find his *New Views of Christianity, Society, and Church* (1836); *The Mediatorial Life of Jesus* (1842); *A Revival of Odinism* (1848); *Liberalism and the Church* (1869); *Uncle Jack and His Nephew* (1888). Brownson's Papers reside today in the library of the University of Notre Dame.

Brownson's main political writings are his *The American Republic: Its Constitution, Tendencies, and Destiny* (1865) and *Conversations on Liberalism and the Church* (1870). He also wrote several autobiographical reflections on his changing religious views: *Charles Elwood; or, The Infidel Converted* (1840); *The Spirit Rapper; an Autobiography* (1854); *The Convert; or, Leaves from My Experience* (1857).

108 Brownson seems to believe that we cannot apprehend finite being without apprehending the infinite as the finite cannot exist without the infinite: that is to say the epistemological order is dependent on the metaphysical order, we only apprehend things as they are in the order of being (see BW I, pp. 369-371, 378).

109 We can also mention the following quote of Brownson: "... the universal, the necessary, the eternal, the immutable without the intuition of which the contingent and the particular are inconceivable, and no syllogism is possible, are identically the divine being, the *ens necessarium et reale* [the necessary and real being], or God Himself" ("Parker's Discourse" *Boston Quarterly Review*, October 1842, p. 436).

- 110 From the basic intuition of being creates existences (i.e. the necessary and the contingent) humans can derive other *a priori* categories such as those of the dependent and the independent, the many and the one, the diverse and the same, the particular and the universal, the variable and the invariable, the mutable and the immutable, the transitory and the permanent, the finite and the infinite, the temporary and the eternal, and effect and cause. Ideal intuition thus also cognizes these pairs of categories in relation (*An Essay in Refutation of Atheism*, pp. 58-59, 64; cf. "The Eclectic Philosophy," 1839, BW II, pp. 550-552; "The Principles of Causality," 1855, BW I, p. 406; "Gratry's Logic," 1856, BW I, pp. 378-379; "Ontologism and Psychologism," 1874, BW II, pp. 474-478; "Father Hill's Philosophy," 1875, BW II, pp. 501-503).
- 111 Accordingly Brownson rejects the view of Rosmini that the ultimate reality is the one principle of possible being. For Brownson the ultimate reality is real being, and indeed real being (necessary being) intuited as creating existences; i.e. we intuit a triad not a monad (*An Essay in Refutation of Atheism*, pp. 59, 61, 76; cf. "The Problem of Causality," 1855, BW I, pp. 400-401).
- 112 Not surprisingly, and unlike Rosmini, Brownson rejects the traditional arguments for God's existence. This is because all of the arguments for God's existence presuppose and are invalid without an intuition of God's being (*An Essay in Refutation of Atheism*, pp. 32-40, 50; see "An A Priori Autobiography," 1850, BW I, pp. 245-249; "The Existence of God," 1852, BW I, pp. 257-263, 274-275; and also BW I, pp. 293-295, 444, 479-480; BW II, pp. 305, 438-439, 527-529; BW III, p. 131, 172-176; cf. BW IV, p. 205). For instance, Brownson claims that the argument from design is invalid as the order in the world may be due to nature itself: just as bees build hives, beavers dams, and swallows nests by natural instincts, so too the world may have arisen from natural causes. In any case, the argument from design in the world would establish at most the existence of a cosmic orderer and not an all-powerful and transcendent God. As Brownson remarks "But even granting the marks of design are proved, all that can be concluded, is not a supercosmic God or Creator, but simply that the world is ordered and governed by an intelligent mind; it does not necessarily carry us beyond the *Anima mundi* [World Soul] of Aristotle or the Supreme Artificer of Plato, operating with preexisting materials and doing the best he can with them. They do not authorize us to conclude the really supra-mundane God, by the sole energy of his word creating the heavens and the earth and all things therein from nothing, as asserted by Christian theism" (*An Essay in Refutation of Atheism*, p. 35). Hence the argument from design presupposes the notion of a first cause and is incomplete without it (*An Essay in Refutation of Atheism*, pp. 30, 35; cf. BW II, pp. 433-436).

Nor does the cosmological argument fare any better. The cosmological argument is flawed as it presupposes that the world is contingent, but we cannot know the world is contingent without first knowing what is necessary: "The dependent is not cognizable without intuition of the independent, nor the contingent without intuition of the necessary" (*An Essay in Refutation of Atheism*, p. 24; cf. BW I, pp. 443-445; BW II, p. 528). Hence the cosmological argument begs the question and takes for granted what needs proving – that the world is an effect, i.e. a contingent effect of a necessary being (*An Essay in Refutation of Atheism*, pp. 21, 34, 36, 50, 72).

The basic fault of all of the classical arguments for God then is that they claim to prove the universal and necessary from the particular and contingent, which is impossible: "Even if experience could prove particular effects, and therefore particular and contingent efficient causes, we could not conclude from them universal and necessary causes, or the one universal cause, for the universal cannot be logically concluded from the particular, and the God that could be concluded would be only a generalization or abstraction, and no real God at all" (*An Essay in Refutation of Atheism*, pp. 34-35; cf. pp. 37-39).

And newer arguments for God such as the moral argument also fail; for until God's existence is known there is no basis for any ethics at all (*An Essay in Refutation of Atheism*, p. 37; but compare BW III, p. 135). Brownson indeed had a fascinating view about the relation of God to the moral law. He argues that the moral law issues from both the reason and the will of God and so is not arbitrary, nor changeable (here he perhaps is following Aquinas). So morality is indeed independent of the divine will; yet it is not independent of the divine being as it flows from divine reason, love, and goodness. In this way, Brownson thinks, one can solve the Euthyphro problem. Yet Brownson also insists that moral laws oblige insofar as they are the command of God; for God commanded the Israelites to invade Canaan and Abraham to sacrifice his son and once commanded these became morally obligatory (*An Essay in Refutation of Atheism*, pp. 90, 92-93; cf. BW XIV, pp. 373-379). Brownson's position thus seems to be that while the moral law itself does not depend exclusively on the will of God, the obligatory nature of the moral law does.

Brownson does put more stock in the ontological argument; as God is the most perfect being, God must be real, for if the idea of God only existed in our mind then we are greater than God who is the most perfect being and this is impossible (*An Essay in Refutation of Atheism*, pp. 37-40; cf. BW II, 303-306). Still, Brownson again ultimately thought this proof is valid only if it makes reference to our basic intuition of God.

So the arguments for God can only establish the nature of God (in which end they indeed can have an important role) and not God's existence which they presuppose (*An Essay in Refutation of Atheism*, pp. 30, 39; cf. BW II, p. 255).

Brownson, finally, was very critical of traditional Scholasticism which he found overly abstract and too concerned with particulars (see BW I, pp. 12, 146-148, 284-289, 311-312, 318-321, 327-329, 409, 420, 509-517; BW II, pp. 146-147, 183-185, 236-239, 505; BW XIX, pp. 465-466; XX, pp. 138-140, 283, 420-435, 532-548).

113 It must be admitted that Brownson's statements do not always clearly indicate his intention of claiming that we only intuit God indirectly in this life. Thus he says, for instance: "That of which we have immediate intuition in every process of reasoning and without which no such process would be possible or conceivable, is God the Creator" ("The Existence of God," 1852, BW I, p. 270; cf. BW I, pp. 345-347, 370). And he asserts "in all our intellectual operations ... we have intuition of real being, or the unchangeable, the necessary, and the eternal; and real, necessary, unchangeable and eternal Being is God, and therefore they prove that we have intuition of God" ("The Existence of God," 1852, BW I, p. 274).

114 Thus traditionalists rightly assert that we can know God by grasping the original revelation God gave to Adam which is passed down to us by his descendents. Yet they are wrong in thinking that reason cannot equally show God exists (*An Essay in Refutation of Atheism*, pp. 98-99; cf. "What Human Reason Can Do," 1855, BW I, pp. 307-310, 320, 323; "Ontologism and Psychologism," 1874, BW II, p. 469; "Ethics of Controversy," *Brownson's Quarterly Review* 15 (1853), pp. 262-278; see also BW I, pp. 266, 289, 326, 330-331, 402, 437-440, 502-510; BW III, p. 140, 169-172, 190, 289-290; BW XII, p. 101). Brownson also rejects Romanticism as it claims to know God through sentiment and not reason (see BW I, pp. 326, 337-340, 351-354, 364; BW III, pp. 36-39, 123; cf. BW IV, pp. 319, 333-339).

115 Ontologism proved to be a very attractive philosophical view in Italy and numbered among its Catholic adherents such luminaries as Carlo Emmanuel Sardagna (1772-1840), Canon at the Cathedral of Trent and later bishop of Cremona; the Rosminian Giulio de' Baroni Todeschi (1803-1836) at the Seminaries of Trent and Cremona; Rosario Castro (1783-1851), Canon of Biancavilla; the novelist Alessandro Manzoni (1785-1873); the Franciscan Benedetto d'Acquisto (1790-1866) at the University of Palermo who later became the Archbishop of Monreale; Ferrante Aporti (1791-1858) at the University of Turin; Francesco Puccinotti (1794-1872) a physician at the University of Pisa; Silvestro Centofanti

(1794-1880) at the University of Pisa; Count Terenzio Mamiani della Rovere (1799-1885); the Italian diocesan priest Fr. Vincenzo Gioberti (1801-1852); Niccolò Tommaseo (1802-1874) at the University of Padua; the Franciscan Antonio da Rignano (1804-1880), bishop of Potenza and Marsica; the historian Cesare Cantù (1804-1895); the Marchese Gustavo di Cavour (1806-1864); Alessandro Pestalozza (1807-1871) at the Seminary of Monza; Giovanni Antonio Rayneri (1810-1867) at the University of Turin; the Jesuit Giuseppe Romano (1810-1878) who taught at the Collegio Massimo in Palermo; Sebastiano Casara (1811-1898) of the Congregation of Cavanis; Carlo Passaglia (1812-1887), the former Jesuit who taught at the Gregorian and the University of Turin; the Barnabite Carlo Vercellone (1814-1869); Lorenzo Gastaldi (1815-1883), later Archbishop of Turin; Pietro Maria Ferré (1815-1886) the bishop of Casal Monferrato; Francesco Bertinaria (1816-1892) at the University of Turin; Giovanni Maria Bertini (1818-1876) also at the University of Turin; the economist Marco Minghetti (1818-1886); the Barnabite Gaetano Milone (1818-1896) at the University of Naples; Carlo Pagano Paganini (1818-1899) at the University of Pisa; Domenico Berti (1820-1897) at the University of Turin; the Vincentian Giuseppe Buroni (1821-1885); Abate Vito Fornari (1821-1900) of the University of Naples; Paolo Perez (1822-1878) at the University of Padua; Giuseppe Petri (1822-1891); Augusto Conti (1822-1905) in the Higher Institute of Florence; Giovanni Battista Peyretti (1823-1887) at the University of Turin; Fr. Francesco Pepere (1823-1903) at the University of Naples; Annibale Chiarolanza (1824-1896) of the University of Naples; Pietro Rossi (1824-1904); the historian Ruggero Bonghi (1826-1895); Luigi Ferri (1826-1895) at the University of Rome, La Sapienza; Augustino Moglia (1829-1898) at the University of Genova; the ex-Catholic Protestant Pietro Tagliatela (1829-1913); Francesco Bonatelli (1830-1911) at the Universities of Bologna and Padua; Abate Vincenzo di Giovanni (1832-1903) at the Lycee of Palermo; Francesco Fiorentino (1834-1884) at the Universities of Bologna, Naples, and Pisa; Francesco Acri (1834-1913) at the University of Bologna; Giovanni Battista Bulgarini (1836-1893); Pietro De Nardi (1847-1905); Lorenzo Michelangelo Billia (1860-1924), at the University of Turin; the layman Giuseppe Morando (1866-1914); Pier Antonio Corte (fl. 1836-1874) at the University of Turin; Michele Tarditi (fl. 1841) at the University of Turin; Niccolò Garzilli (fl. 1831-1850) at the University of Palermo; the Franciscan Antonio Catara Lettieri (fl. 1836-1883); Vincenzo Garelli (fl. 1849-1872) of the University of Turin; the priest Joannis Baptistae Pagani (fl. 1842-1861); the Franciscan Antonio Maugeri (fl. 1845-1869); Francesco Bonucci (fl. 1852-1866); the Barnabite Francesco Milone (fl. 1866-

1867); Abate Francesco Seni (fl. 1867); Giuseppe Calza (fl. 1869-1909) at the University of Bologna; and C. Maggio [pseudonym] (fl. 1893).

Due to the influence of Gioberti, who lived in Brussels for several years (1834-1845), ontologism became very prevalent in Belgium. Among the Catholic Belgian ontologists we find the secular priest and paleontologist Casimir Ubaghs (1800-1887) at the University of Louvain; Fr. Gérard Lonay (1806-1883) who taught at the seminaries of Liège, Rolduc, and Saint-Trond; the secular priest Arnold Tits (1807-1851) at the University of Louvain; the secular priest Pieter [Pierre] Claessens (1817-1886) at the Seminary of Malines; the secular priest and Canon François Labis (1818-1904); and the secular priest Nicholas Joseph Laforêt (1823-1872) of the University of Louvain.

Ontologism also spread to France where it was upheld by such Catholics as the Jesuit Jean-Pierre Martin (1792-1859) at the Seminaries of Soissons, Saint-Acheul, and Vals; the secular priest Adolphe Mazure (1799-1870) at the Seminary of Clermont; the Jesuit and later secular-priest and mathematician François-Napoléon-Marie Moigno (1804-1884); the French bishop Henri-Louis-Charles Maret (1805-1884); Fr. Françoise-Louis-Michel Maupied (1814-1898); Fr. Frederic Edouard Chassay (1816-1880) at the Seminary of Bayeux; Bishop Charles-Théodore Baudry, at the Seminary of Saint-Sulpice; the Sulpician Louis Branchereau (1819-1913) at the Seminaries of Clermont and Nantes; Fr. Joseph Cognat (1821-1888); Fr. Jules Fabre d'Envieu (1821-1901) who taught at Sorbonne; Fr. Flavien-Abel-Antoine Hugonin (1823-1898) at the Sorbonne who later became the Bishop of Bayeux (1867); the Jesuit Ambroise Matignon (1824-1913); Fr. Emile-Antoine Blampignon (1830-1908) who taught at the Seminary of Troyes and the Sorbonne; Fr. Jean François Marie Lequeux (fl. 1841-1859); the Benedictine Dom Eugène Gardereau (fl. 1845-1880) of the Abbey of St. Solesmes; Fr. Maximilien Caupert (fl. 1852-1854) at the Seminary of Versailles; Jean Sans-Fiel (fl. 1865-1869) [pseudonym]; and Auguste Trullet (fl. 1893). And in nearby Switzerland one finds the Jesuit father Franz Rothenflue (1805-1869) supporting ontologism.

Finally ontologism made its way to England with the Catholic thought of the English convert and Rosminian William Lockhart (1820-1892) and the priest Charles Meynell (1828-1882) of St. Mary's College, Oscott. And it was found in the United States in Catholics such as the secular priest Jeremiah Cummings (1814-1866); the Paulist convert Isaac Hecker (1819-1888) [also an Augustinian]; the Paulist convert Augustine Hewit (1820-1897); Augustin Louage (1829-1894), a member of the Congregation of the Holy Cross, who taught at the Seminary of Wheeling, West Virginia and the University of Notre Dame, and who became the bishop

of Dhaka, Bangladesh in 1891; the Irish-born secular priest Henry Brann (1837-1921) who taught at Seton Hall and the seminary of Wheeling, West Virginia; Bishop John Lancaster Spalding (1840-1916) of Peoria and later Bengal, India.

116 Among the philosophers and theologians who condemned ontologism we can mention: the Jesuit Jean-Louis de Leissègues de Rozaven (1772-1851); the American diocesan priest of Vermont, Jeremiah O'Callaghan (1780-1861); the Belgian Pierre Kersten (1789-1865); the Italian Jesuit Serafino Sordi (1793-1865), at the Jesuit Colleges of Reggio Emilia, Forlì, and Spoleto; the Italian Count Emiliano Avogadro della Motta (1798-1865); the Italian Jesuit Pius Melia [Eusebio Cristiano] (1800-1883) at Reggio; the Anonymou work *Postille* (1848); the Oratorian Augustinn Theiner (1804-1874); the Italian Jesuit Antonio Ballerini (1805-1881) of the Roman College; Joseph Ghislain Lupus (1810-1888), the canon of Liège; the Italian Jesuit Matteo Liberatore (1810-1892), at the College of Naples; Cardinal Riario Sforza (1810-1877) and Joachim Pecci (1810-1903), the future Pope Leo XIII; the German Jesuit Joseph Kleutgen (1811-1883) at the Gregorian; the English layman William George Ward (1812-1882) at St. Edmund's College, Ware; the American James McMaster (1820-1886); the French Jesuit Henri Ramière (1821-1884); the German Karl Werner (1821-1888) at the Universities of St. Polten and Vienna; the Italian Jesuit Giovanni Maria Cornoldi (1822-1892) at Padua; the American Jesuit Walter Hill (1822-1907) of St. Louis University; Cardinal Tommaso Maria Zigliara (1833-1893); Cardinal Camillo Mazzella (1833-1900) at the Gregorian; the American Jesuit John Ming (1838-1910) of Canasius College; the Italian Cardinal Giuseppe Prisco (1833-1923); the Italian Dominican Alberto Lepidi (1838-1925); the Irish Bishop John Healy (1841-1918); the Italian Pietro Montagnani (1843-1902); the Italian Pietro de Nardi (fl. 1890-1898); and the Belgian Fr. Joseph Gilson (1862-post 1897), dean of Bouillon, at the Seminary of Floreffe.

117 These works did not deal with ontologism but rather Rosmini argued in them that there needed to be five reforms in the Church and State: more union of congregation and clergy in worship (through less rote catechesis, use of the vernacular, and more active participation), better education of priests, more unity of the bishops and more concern of bishops with their flock, local church control of the nomination of bishops, and finally less focus on and better stewardship of material possessions.

118 Ontologist works of Mamiani (1838, 1850, 1869, 1880-1882), Tommaseo (1842), Ferri (1874), and Bulgarini (1885) were also placed on the Index of Forbidden Books.

- 119 This same year Brownson suspended his *Review* due to lack of readership brought on by disagreement with his positions (which were attacked by certain American bishops as we have seen).
- 120 Already in the Council of Vienne (1311-1323) the position that God can be seen by our natural intelligence was rejected (DH 895).
- 121 Some scholars have argued that these propositions are from the writings of the Jesuit Jean-Pierre Martin (1792-1859).
- 122 Translations from Heinrich Denzinger, *The Sources of Catholic Dogma*, tr. Roy Deferrari (Fitzwilliam: Loreto, 1955).
- 123 Translations from Heinrich Denzinger, *The Sources of Catholic Dogma*, tr. Roy Deferrari (Fitzwilliam: Loreto, 1955).
- 124 This is not to say that ontologism itself, as understood by the Vatican condemnations, is permissible, the Note adds.
- 125 Bismark's famous quotes well display his diplomatic philosophy: "The great questions of our day are not decided by speeches and majority votes ... but by blood and iron"; "One does not shoot with public opinion, but with powder and lead."
- 126 The attempt upon the life of Bismark made in 1874 by the Catholic Eduarz Franz Ludwig Kullmann further solidified Bismark's anti-Catholic resolve.
- 127 Other German States, through the influence of Prussia or following the example of Prussia, also enacted anti-Catholic measures toward the close of the nineteenth-century. Baden mandated that all primary schools be interdenominational and asserted state-control over seminary education and priestly appointments as well as over church property and revenue. The bishopric of Freiburg was thus vacant from 1868-1881. In Hessen-Darmstadt all primary schools were also required to be interdenominational. And support was given to the New Catholics [German Catholics] (1844) and the Old Catholics (1870), non-orthodox Catholic churches that arose in both states. These measures in Baden and Hassen-Darmstadt were repealed by 1886.
- Even Catholic Bavaria (1868-1890) and Austria (1868-1879) asserted state control of Church education, marriages, church finances, and clergy appointments, and imposed hardships on the religious orders (especially the Jesuits who were expelled in 1872) due to the influence of Bismark and the liberal ministers of education Johann von Lutz in Bavaria and Franz von Beust in Austria. Hence Austria waived the Concordat of 1855 in 1870.
- 128 Something like 2500 Thomists existed between 1270 and 2000. Some of the key medieval Thomists were the French Dominican St. Raymond

de Pennafort (d. 1275); the French Bishop Peter of Tarentaise, O.P. [Pope Innocent V] (d. 1276); the German Dominican Ulrich of Strassburg (d. 1277); Italian Dominican Reginald of Piperno (d. 1280); the Dutch Dominican Willem van Moerbeke (c. 1215-1286); the English Dominican Richard Knapwell (fl. 1284-1288); the French Dominican Archbishop Peter of Conflans (d. 1290); the English Dominican Bishop William of Hothum (c. 1243-1298); the English Dominican William of Macclesfeld (d. 1303); the French Dominican Peter of Auvergne (d. 1304); the Belgian Dominican Giles of Lessines (c. 1230-1304); the French Dominican John Quidort (c. 1269-1306); the Belgian Godfrey of Fontaines (c. 1250-1309); the English Dominican Thomas Joyce [Jorz] (d. 1310); the French Dominican Hervé de Nedellec [Hervaeus Natalis] (d. 1323); the English Dominican Nicholas Trivet (c. 1258-1328); the English Dominican Robert Orford [Orphord] (fl. 1292); the English Dominican Thomas Sutton (d. c. 1315); the German Dominican Dietrich of Freiberg (c. 1250-1318); the German Dominican Nicholas of Strassburg (fl. 1325); the German Dominican Henry of Lübeck (d. 1336); the English Carmelite John Baconthorpe (c. 1290-1348); the Italian Dominican John of Naples (d. c. 1350); the English Dominican Thomas Waleys (d. c. 1350); the German Dominican Berthold of Moosburg (d. 1361); the French Dominican Durandus of Aurillac (d. 1382); the German Thomas of Strasburg, O.S.A. (d. 1357); the English Dominican Thomas of Claxton (d. c. 1415); the Italian Dominican St. Vincent Ferrer (1350-1419).

Thomism had a great revival in the Renaissance, the Second Scholasticism (1530-1650). Some of the key Renaissance Thomists include the Spaniard Raymond of Sabunde (d. 1436); the French Dominican John Capro-leus (1380-1444); the English Bishop Reginald Pecock (c. 1395-1460); the Spaniard Denis the Carthusian (d. 1471); the Dominican Dominic of Flanders (d. 1479); the Italian Dominican Peter of Bergamo (d. 1482); the German Dominican John Versor (d. c. 1485); the Italian Dominican Girolamo Savonarola (1452-1498); the Belgian Dominican Peter Crockaert (c. 1465-1514); the Italian Dominican Francis Silvestri [Ferrariensis] (1478-1528); the Italian Dominican Thomas de Vio [Cajetan] (1469-1534); the Italian Dominican Sylvester of Ferrara [Ferrariensis] (1474-1528); the German Dominican Conrad Köllin (c. 1476-1536); the Italian Dominican Giovanni Crisostomo Javelli (c. 1470-1538); the Spanish Dominican Francisco de Vitoria (c. 1483-1546); the Spanish founder of the Jesuits St. Ignatius of Loyola (1491-1556); the Dominican Domingo de Soto (1494-1560); the Spanish Dominican Francesco Melchior Cano (1509-1560); the Spanish Jesuit Francisco de Toledo (1522-1596); the Spanish Dominican Bartolomé de Medina (1527-1581); the Portuguese Jesuit Peter de Fonseca (1528-1599); the Portuguese Jesuit Diego Payva d'Andrada

(1528-1575); the Spanish Dominican Domingo Bañez (1528-1604); the Spanish Jesuit Francisco de Toledo [Toletus] (c. 1534-1596); the Spanish Jesuit Pedro de Fonseca (1528-1599); the Spanish Jesuit Juan de Maldonado (c. 1533-1583); the Spanish Jesuit Louis de Molina (1535-1600); the Spanish Jesuit Juan de Mariana (1535-1624); the Spanish Jesuit Juan de Mariana (1536-1624); the Italian Jesuit Robert Bellarmine (1542-1621); the Spanish Jesuit Francisco Suárez (1548-1617); the Spanish Jesuit Tomas Sánchez (1550-1610); the Spanish Jesuit Gabriel Vázquez (1551-1604); the Belgian Jesuit Leonard Lessius [Lenaert Lys] (1554-1623); the Italian Jesuit Cosmo Alemanni (1559-1634); the Spanish Jesuit Didacus Ruiz de Montoya (1562-1632).

In the Modern Period (1600-1800) one can mention such Thomists as the Spanish Jesuit Caspar Hurtado (1575-1647); the Portuguese Jesuit Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza (1578-1615); the Spanish Jesuit Juan de Lugo (1583-1660); the Portuguese Dominican John Poinset [John of St. Thomas] (1589-1644); the Spanish Jesuit Antonio de Escobar y Mendoza (1589-1669); the Spanish Jesuit Rodrigo de Arriaga (1592-1667); the Spanish Jesuit Juan Martinez de Ripalda (1594-1648); the Spanish Jesuit Baltasar Gracián y Morales (1601-1658); the French Dominican Antonin Reginald (1605-1676); the Spanish Cistercian Juan Caramuel (1606-1682); the French Dominican John-Baptist Gonet (1616-1681); the Italian Jesuit Sylvester Maurus (1619-1687); the Belgian Jesuit Gilles Estrix (1624-1694); the Frenchman Jean-Baptiste Duhamel (1624-1706); the French Dominican Nicolas Arnu (1629-1695); the French Dominican Antoine Massoulié (1632-1706); the French Dominican Antoine Goudin (1639-1695); the French Dominican Alexander Natalis (1639-1724); the French Dominican Jacques Guerinois (1640-1703); the French Dominican Alexander Piny (1640-1709); the Belgian Dominican Jacques Hyacinthe Serry (1658-1738); the German Benedictine Ludwig Babenstuber (1660-1726); the German Benedictine Alfons Wenzel (1660-1743); the Italian Cardinal Vincenzo Ludovico Gotti, O.P. (1664-1742); the Belgian Dominican Charles René Billuart (1685-1757); the Italian Redemptorist St. Alphonsus Liguori (1696-1787); the Italian Vincentian Francesco Grassi (1715-1773); the Italian Dominican Salvatore Maria Roselli (1722-1784); the Italian Giovanni-Antonio Ranza (1741-1801); the Italian Franciscan Giuseppe Tamagna (1747-1798); and the Italian Vincentian Bartolomeo Bianchi (c. 1761-1810).

Mention should also be made of the collaborative efforts of the Jesuits of Coimbra [the Coimbricenses (1592-1606)] including Peter de Fonseca, S.J. (1548-1599), Sebastianus de Couto (1567-1639), Emmanuel de Goes (c. 1542-1597), Cosmas de Magalhães [Magalhaens] (1551-1624), Balthasar Alvarez (1561-1630), and Sebastian de Couto (1567-1630); the

Carmelites of Alcalá de Henares [the Complutenses (1624-1628)] including Diego de Jesus (1570-1621), Antonio de la Madre de Dios (1588-1640), Miguel de la SS. Trinidad (1588-1661), and Juan de la Anunciación (1633-1701); the Carmelites of Salamanca [the Salmanticenses (1631-1709)] including Antonio de la Madre de Dios (1588-1640), Domingo de Sta Teresa (1600-1654), Andrés de la Madre de Dios (d. 1674), Francisco de Jesus-Maria (d. 1677), Antonio de S. Juan-Bautista (d. 1699), Juan de la Anunciación (1633-1701), Francisco de Sta Ana (d. 1707), Sebastian de San Joaquin (d. 1714), and Alonso de los Angeles (d. 1724); and the Jesuits of Würzburg [the Theologia Wirceburgensis (1766-1771)] including Ulrich Munier (1698-1759), Heinrich Kilber, S.J. (1710-1787), Thomas Holtzklau (1716-1783), and Ignaz Neubauer (1726-1795). Also see RSP (1909).

129 For more information on the life and thought of Kleutgen see: BCJ (1893), v. IV, pp. 1113-1116; THP (1903), p. 640; AR (1909), v. IV, p. 210; RSP (1909), pp. 196-197; CE (1910), v. VIII, p. 667; DTC (1925), v. VIII:2, pp. 2359-2360; LHP (1927), p. 318; IEC (1951), v. VII, pp. 716-717; HT (1952), v. II, pp. 324-326; PCF (1955), pp. 254-256; PSR (1959), pp. 126-131; OLTK (1961), v. VI, p. 340; CHP (1963), v. VII, p. 388; TE (1963), v. I, pp. 62-73; RP (1966), pp. 783-784; CHAD (1967), v. VI, pp. 1456-1457; SCT (1970), p. 38; HWP (1971), v. V, p. 123; TRME (1971), pp. 14-16; KTD (1975), v. II, pp. 318-344; LT (1975), pp. 180-181; RI (1982), pp. 189-191; CP (1988), v. II, pp. 145-175; PHP (1988), p. 319; FUP (1989), pp. 21-29; NCS (1989), pp. 167-215; GCT (1991), pp. 33, 36; BBKL (1992), v. IV, pp. 54-56; ATH (1994), 87, 89-91, 93; NT (1994), pp. 26, 30-34; HCEC (1995), p. 738; LTK (1997), v. VI, p. 135; CTE (1998), pp. 75-76; NCE (2003), v. VIII, pp. 187-188; ACP (2005), pp. 270-274; SHT (2005), pp. 86-87; EF (2006), v. VI, pp. 6074-6075; Bonansea, Bernardino, "Pioneers of the Nineteenth-Century Scholastic Revival in Italy," *New Scholasticism* 28 (1954), pp. 35-37.

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nus-Verlag, 1950); Gilson, Étienne, *Being and Some Philosophers* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1952), pp. 105-106; Gilen, Leonard, *Kleutgen und die Theorie der Erkenntnisbils* (Meisenhem am Glan: Verlag Hain, 1956); Schäfer, Theo, *Die erkenntnistheoretische Kontroverse Kleutgen-Günther* (Paderborn: F. Schöningh, 1961); Kasper, Walter, *Die Lehre von der Tradition in der Römischen Schule* (Frieburg: Herder, 1962); Fries, Erich, ed., *Festschrift für Joseph Klein zum 70 Geburtstag* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Reprecht, 1967), pp. 288-305; Pottmeyer, Hermann, *Der Glaube vor dem Anspruch der Wissenschaft: Die Konstitution Dei filius des Ersten Vatikanischen Konzils und die unveröffentlichten theologischen Voten der vorbereitenden Kommission* (Frieburg: Herder, 1968); Hartley, Thomas, *Thomist Revival and the Modernist Era* (Toronto: University of St. Michael's Press, 1971); Schwaiger, Georg, *Kirche und Theologie im 19ten Jahrhundert* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1975), pp. 167-174; Deufel, Konrad, *Kirche und Tradition: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der theologischen Wende im 19. Jahrhundert am Beispiel des kirchlich-theologischen Kampfsprogramms P. Josef Kleutgen, S.J.* (Paderborn: Schöningh Verlag, 1976); Belz, Willi, *Friedrich Michelis und sene Bestreitung der Neuscholastik in der Polemik gegen Joseph Kleutgen* (Leiden: Brill, 1978); Piolanti, Antonio, ed., *Atti dell'VIII Congresso Tomistico Internazionale* (Vatican City: Liberia Editrice Vaticana, 1981), v. II, pp. 456-467; Strombach, Werner, *Tradition, Gehorsam, Bildung: die Grundlagen der Kleutgenschen Denkens* (Dortmund: Kulturamt, 1982); MacIntyre, Alasdair, *Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), pp. 70-75; Inglis, John, *Spheres of Philosophical Inquiry and the Historiography of Medieval Philosophy* (Leiden: Brill, 1998), pp. 62-104; Weirtz, Oliver, *Begründeter Glaube?: rationale Glaubensverantwortung auf der Basis der Analytischen Theologie und Erkenntnistheorie* (Mainz: Matthias-Grünwald-Verlag, 2003); Pahud de Mortanges, Elke, *Philosophie und kirchliche Autorität: der Fall Jakob Frohschammer vor der römischen Indexkongregation, 1855-1864* (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2005).

- 130 This was one of the last major acts of the Roman Inquisition which was renamed the Holy Office in 1908 and the Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith in 1965. The other major act was the seizure of the six-year old Jewish boy, Edgardo Mortara (1851-1940), in Bologna in 1858. Mortara had been secretly baptized by his Catholic maid as a baby, when she thought he might die, and so according to canon law could not be raised by his Jewish parents. He was thus taken from his parents and raised in Rome at a house for Catholic converts and later on became a priest and supporter of Pope Pius IX who had a hand in the abduction. The boy's parents were allowed to visit him but they could not take him back unless they converted to Catholicism which they refused to do. Needless to say this situation generated

a lot of consternation in the world press and in retrospect seems hard to justify.

- 131 Kleutgen also wrote: *Practical Philosophical Institutions* [*Institutiones philosophicae practicae in usum praelectionum*] (1837); *On the Old and the New Schools* [*Die alten und die neuen Schulen*] (1846; 2nd ed. 1869) [under the pseudonym J.W. Karl]; *On the Belief in the Miraculous* [*Über den Glauben an das Wunderbare*] (1846); *The Art of Speaking* [*Ars dicendi*] (1847; 1903); *Lives of Some Saints of God from Modern Times* [*Leben einiger Heiligen Gottes aus der neueren Zeit*] (1854); *Lives of the Devout Men and Women Servants of God* [*Leben frommer Diener und Dienerinnen Gottes*] (1854; 2nd ed. 1869); *Brief Synopsis of the Errors which Are Found in the Writings of Antony Günter* [*Brevis Synopsis Errorum qui leguntur in scriptis Antonii Günter*] (1857); *Ideals and Their True Realization* [*Die Ideale und ihre wahre Verwirklichung*] (1868); *The Condemnation of Ontologism* [*Die Verurteilung des Ontologismus*] (1868); *For My Justification: Additions to the Theology and Philosophy of the Former Times* [*Zu meiner Rechtfertigung: Als zweites Heft der Beilagen zur Theologie und Philosophie der Vorzeit*] (1868); *On Desires* [*Über die Wünsche*] (1869); *On the Agent Intellect and Innate Ideas: On the Doctrine of Belief* [*Von intellectus agens und den angeborenen Ideen: Zur Lehre von Glauben*] (1875); *Theological Institutions: On God Himself* [*Institutiones theologiae in usum scholarum: De ipso Deo*] (1881).

His philosophical articles are: "Die Ideale und ihre wahre Verwirklichung" *Katholischer Broschüren-Verein* 4:5 (1868), pp. 4-28; "Über die Verurteilung des Ontologismus," *Katholik* 47 (1869), pp. 385-400, 513-533, 641-659; "Über den Ursprung der menschlichen Seele," *Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie* 7 (1883), pp. 197-229.

- One may also consult Kleutgen's theological works: *The Devotion in the Heart of Jesus* [*Die Andacht zum Herzen Jesu*] (1842; 2nd ed. 1848); *Rome: Jesuits and Redemptorists* [*Rom: Jesuiten und Redemptoristen*] (1846); *On the Persecution of the Church in Our Day* [*Über die Verfolgung der Kirche in unseren Tagen*] (1851; 2nd ed. 1866); *Letters from Rome* [*Briefe aus Rom*] (1869); *On the Wishes, Fears, and Hopes, in regard to the Upcoming Church Council* [*Über die Wünsche, Befürchtungen und Hoffnungen in Betreff der bevorstehenden Kirchenversammlung*] (1869); *The Highest Teaching Authority of the Roman Bishops* [*Die oberste Lehrgewalt des römischen Bischofs*] (1870) [published in Latin as *De Romani Pontificis suprema potestate docendi* (1870)]; *On the Striving of Liberalism for the Fortune of the Populace* [*Über das Streben des Liberalismus nach Völkerglück*] (1872); *Sermons* [*Predigten*], 2 vols. (1872-1874); *Michaël Lenoblet, Petrus Quintin, Julianus Maunoir, en Petrus Bernard: Missionarissen van Bretagne* (1873); *The Gospel of St. Matthew* [*Das Evangelium des heiligen Mattäus*] (1882); *Latin: Dissertation*

on the Former and Recent Institution of the Schools [*Lateinisch: De scholarum institutione pristina et recenti dissertatio*] (1889); *The Religious Duty of the Catholic* [*Die Glaubenspflicht des Katholiken*] (1912).

Also see his theological articles: "Über die Einheit der Person Jesu Christi," *Katholik* 49 (1869), pp. 166-193, 286-312, 404-427, 525-541, 641-679; "R.P. Leonardii Lessii Soc. Jesu Theologi de divina inspiratione," in Schneemann, Gerard, *Controversiarum de divinae gratiae liberique arbitrii concordia initia et progressus* (Freiburg: Herder, 1881), pp. 463-491.

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132 Pagination is from *Philosophie der Vorzeit*, 2 vols. (Innsbruck: Felician Rauch, 1878) and in brackets from the French translation of Constant Sierp, *La philosophie scholastique exposée et défendue*, 4 vols. (Paris: Gaume Frères et J. Duprey, 1868-1870); and from *Die Theologie der Vorzeit*, 5 vols. (Münster: Theissing, 1867-1874).

133 Kleutgen elsewhere defines theology as the science of faith (*die Wissenschaft des Glaubens*). It is an attempt to acquire a scientific understanding of what we believe by faith. Moreover, theology, unlike philosophy, gives us knowledge of God's inner being (*Theology of the Former Times*, v. V, I, i, iv, 286, 296-309, 377-381, pp. 3-6, 22-47, 142-149).

134 Kleutgen does accept though that there are preambles of the faith that make the assent to faith rationally justifiable such as the foundation, stability, and history of Church, miracles, prophecies, and the ethical evolution of the human world (*Philosophy of the Former Times*, v. II, IX, i, 929, pp. 707 [319-320 (v. IV)]).

135 In his theology of grace Kleutgen admits that there is a possible state of pure nature. Furthermore, the human intellect and will have their own natural objects and ends, i.e. sensible phenomena and the natural virtues of wisdom, justice, courage, and temperance.

Still in actual fact even Adam needed supernatural grace to attain his supernatural end and to uphold the natural moral virtues. Consequently the natural and supernatural orders are distinct but not separate in regenerate humans; grace elevates the natural human faculties to an end higher than their own (*Theology of the Former Times*, v. V, I, 3, 352-364, pp. 107-124).

136 Kleutgen follows Suárez as well in holding that between essence and existence there is a distinction of reason but one which is founded in reality (*Philosophy of the Former Times*, v. II, VI, i-ii, 244, 570, 578, pp. 53-54, 69-70 [67-68, 87-88 (v. III)]).

137 Kleutgen also recognizes a more spontaneous or instinctive form of coming to God's existence (wherein we jump from one truth to another without preceding through the intervening premises). Here our natural reason acknowledges the absolute and sovereign essence of God on the basis of our subjugation to the moral law and the relative and dependent nature of objects in this world. Still the task of philosophy is to exhibit the full argumentative structure (i.e. all of the intervening premises) of our spontaneous conviction in God (*Philosophy of the Former Times*, v. II, IX, i, 929, pp. 706-707 [317-320 (v. IV)]).

So, Kleutgen distinguishes between a philosophical proof of God, requiring laborious investigations that few humans are capable of, and a natural knowledge of God that springs up spontaneously in humans upon the sight of creation (similar to the compulsion to believe in the reality of the external world) (*Philosophy of the Former Times*, v. I, III, ii-iii, 226-229, 231-232, pp. 345-350, 352-354 [434-444, 446-448]).

138 The *a priori* arguments for God, such as the ontological argument of Aquinas, Descartes's proof from the idea of infinity, and Günther's proof of God from consciousness, are therefore flawed (*Philosophy of the Former Times*, v. II, IX, i, 926-928, 935-942, pp. 699-705, 717-734 [309-317, 332-355 (v. IV)]). Though the Augustinian proof from common consent has some merit even if it is not fully satisfactory according to Kleutgen (*Philosophy of the Former Times*, v. II, IX, i, 934, pp. 715-717 [331-332 (v. IV)]). Kleutgen also notes that our moral conscience compels us to acknowledge an absolute good and an august power which rules over our will, i.e. God. Thus he accepts a version of the moral argument for God (*Philosophy of the Former Times*, v. I, III, iii, 231-232, pp. 352-354 [446-448]).

139 In 1804 a law was also passed mandating that Catholic cemeteries have separate sections for unbaptized babies, those refused religious burial, and free-thinkers who died outside of Church.

140 For more on Mercier see: THP (1903), pp. 644, 678; TC (1904), p. 149; RSP (1909), pp. 218-221; PRP (1926), p. 203; SPC (1934), pp. 122-123; HPS (1950), pp. 455, 458; CE (1951), Supplement; IEC (1952), v. VIII, pp. 713-716; SHP (1955), p. 1001; CRHP (1957), p. 470; CEP (1961), p. 238; OLTK (1962), v. VII, p. 306; CHP (1963), v. VII, p. 389 and v. IX (1974), pp. 251-252; TE (1963), v. I, pp. 143-146; PTCW (1964), pp. 521-522; RP (1966), pp. 346-349, 784-785; DTC (1967), Tables générales, v. II, pp. 3179-3181; MHP (1967), p. 174; BSHP (1968), pp. 212-213; RPF (198),

p. 156; TCP (1969), pp. 31-37; HWP (1971), v. V, p. 127; CHAD (1979), v. VIII, pp. 1208-1211; CP (1988), v. II, pp. 206-240; PHP (1988), pp. 321-322; TCRT (1988), pp. 281-282; FUP (1989), pp. 32-33; BBKL (1993), v. V, pp. 1291-1293; DP (1993), v. II, pp. 1988-1989; NT (1994), pp. 36-38; HCEC (1995), p. 853; BDTG (1996), pp. 530-531; DPR (1996), p. 350; LTK (1998), v. VII, p. 142; FPTC (2001), p. 94; NCE (2003), v. IX, pp. 503-504; ER (2004), v. IX, pp. 5868-5869; EP (2005), v. VI, pp. 143-146; EF (2006), v. VIII, pp. 7304-7309; De Wulf, Maurice, *Scholasticism Old and New: An Introduction to Scholastic Philosophy*, tr. Peter Coffey (New York: Benzinger Brothers, 1907), pp. 263-317; Perrier, Joseph, *The Revival of Scholastic Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1909), pp. 218-221; Anspach, Lucien, *Autour de l'affaire Ferrer* (Bruxelles: Bibliothèque de propagande, 1910); Anspach, Lucien, *Oeuvre Francisco Ferrer: le Cardinal Mercier et l'affaire Ferrer* (Bruxelles: Bibliothèque de propagande, 1910); Begouen, Henri, *Les catholiques allemands jadis et aujourd'hui: Quelques précédents au cas du Cardinal Mercier* (Paris: Bloud et Gay, 1915); Cardinal Mercier: *His Philosophic and Pastoral Work* (London: Washbourne, 1915); Stillemans, Joseph, *Cardinal Mercier* (New York: P.J. Kenedy and Sons, 1917); Bonnefon, Jean de, *Un vainqueur sans armes, le Cardinal Mercier* (Paris: Picart, 1919); Van Vlaanderen, Raad, *Kardinaal Mercier en de vlamingen* (The Hague: The Flemish Committee, 1919); Kellogg, Charlotte, *Mercier: The Fighting Cardinal of Belgium* (New York: D. Appleton, 1920); Roupain, Eugene, *Un caractère, le cardinal Mercier* (Paris: P. Téqui, 1920); Tworowski, Waclaw, *Autour du danger bolchéviste: le cardinal Mercier et les bolchévistes devant Varsovie* (Sion: Kleindienst & Schmid, 1921); *Mémorial jubilaire du cardinal Mercier, 1874-1925* (Anvers: V. Van Dieren, 1924); Seeholzer, Heinrich, *Kardinal Mercier* (Zurich: Orell Füssli, 1924); Ageorges, Joseph, *Le cardinal Mercier* (Paris: Bloud & Gay, 1926); Baudrillart, Alfred, *Eloge funèbre du cardinal Mercier* (Bruxelles: Dewit, 1926); De Jonge, J., *Le cardinal Mercier* (Bruxelles: Dewit, 1926); D'Ivray, Jehan, *Le cardinal Mercier* (Paris: Peyronnet, 1926); Goyau, Georges, *Cardinal Mercier* (London: Longmans, Green, and Company, 1926); Guthrie, William, et al., *Memorial of Cardinal Mercier* (New York: Pandick Press, 1926); *Mémorial du cardinal Mercier, 1851-1926* (Anvers: V. Van Dieren, 1926); Ramaekers, Georges, *Le grand cardinal belge, Désiré-Joseph Mercier* (Brussels: Salon du livre, 1926); Vervoort, C., *Kardinal Mercier* (Leuven: In Eigen Beheer, 1926); De Préville, R.P., *Vigilant pasteur: Le cardinal D.-J. Mercier* (Paris: Tolra, 1927); Desmet, Firmin, *Le Cardinal Mercier, 1851-1926* (Bruxelles: L. Desmet-Verteneuil, 1927); Des Ormes, Renée, *Célébrités: Laure Conan, son éminence le Cardinal Mercier, Louis Le Cardonnel* (Paris: Casterman, 1927); Zaragüeta, Juan, *El cardenal Mercier* (Madrid: Establecimiento tipográfico

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384; Boudens, Robrecht, *Kardinaal Mercier en de Vlaamse Beweging* (Louvain: Davidsfonds, 1975); Meseberg-Haubold, Ilse, *Der Widerstand Kardinal Merciers gegen die deutsche Besetzung Belgiens 1914-1918* (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1982); Mercer, Robert, "The Malines Conversations," *Ecumenical Trends* 12:4 (1983), pp. 49-53; Aubert, Roger, "Cardinal Mercier's Visit to America in the Autumn of 1919," in *Studies in Catholic History in Honor of John Tracy Ellis*, ed. Nelson Minnich et al. (Wilmington: Michael Glazier, 1985), pp. 307-344; Dick, John, *The Malines Conversations Revisited* (Leuven: Peeters, 1989); Boileau, David, and John Dick, eds., *Tradition and Renewal: Philosophical Essays Commemorating the Centennial of Louvain's Institute of Philosophy*, 3 vols. (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1992-1993); Aubert, Roger, *Le Cardinal Mercier, 1851-1926* (Louvain: Presses universitaires de Louvain, 1994); Boudens, Robrecht, *Two Cardinals: John Henry Newman, Désiré Joseph Mercier* (Louvain: Peeters, 1995); Boileau, David, *Cardinal Mercier: A Memoir* (Louvain: Peeters, 1997); Denaux Adelbert, and John Dick, eds., *From Malines to ARCIC: The Malines Conversations Commemorated* (Louvain: Peeters, 1997); Stacpoole, Alberic, "Five Ecumenical Heroes: Mercier, Halifax, Willebrands, Ramsey, Suenens," in William McLoughlin, ed., *Mary is for Everyone: Papers on Mary and Ecumenism* (Leominster: Gracewing, 1997), pp. 102-115; Aubert, Roger, *Les deux premiers grands conflits du Cardinal Mercier avec les autorités allemandes d'occupation* (Louvain: Peeters, 1998); Jaki, Stanley, "The Malines Conversations and What Was Malign There," *New Oxford Review* 69 (2002), pp. 25-33; Hauke, Manfred, *Mary "Mediatress of Grace": Mary's Universal Mediation of Grace in the Theological and Pastoral Works of Cardinal Mercier* (New Bedford: Academy of the Immaculate, 2004).

- 141 Less successful were Mercier's attempts to build a Basilica du Sacré Coeur in Belgium, have the mediation of all graces by the Virgin Mary declared an official dogma by the Magisterium, and institute an international society of Catholic scholars in 1892 (the latter failed due to opposition from the Integrists Ludwig von Pastor (1854-1928).

The Integrists [Integralists] were conservative Catholics whose goal was to report any heterodox ideas to Rome. Some of them later became part of a secret society – the Sodalitium Pianum [La Sapinière] (1909-1921) – dedicated to uncovering Modernism in the Church.

- 142 Mercier also authored *Discourse on the Opening of the Course of Philosophy of St. Thomas* [*Discours d'ouverture du Cours de Philosophie de S. Thomas*] (1882); *Report on the Higher Studies of Philosophy* [*Rapport sur les études supérieures de philosophie*] (1891); *The Origins of Contemporary Psychology* [*Les origines de la psychologie contemporaine*] (1897; 1925); *Christian Education* [*L'enseignement chrétien*] (1898); *The Thomist Proofs of the Existence*

of God [*Les preuves thomistes de l'existence de Dieu*] (1903); *Ideal and Illusion* [*Idéal et illusion*] (1904); *Psychological and Metaphysical Notions of the Beautiful and Its Expression by the Fine Arts* [*Notions psychologiques et métaphysiques du beau et de son expression par les beaux-arts*] (1907); *Modernism* [*Le Modernisme*] (1908; 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. 1909); *Social Code: Sketch of a Social Catholic Synthesis* [*Code social: esquisse d'une synthèse sociale catholique*] (1936).

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and Discussion: La nature de la vérité, Induction complète et induction scientifique, La science moderne et la philosophie thomiste," *Revue néo-scholastique* 7 (1900), pp. 190-231; "Le phénoménisme et l'ancienne métaphysique," *Revue néo-scholastique* 8 (1901), pp. 321-337; "De distinctione essentiae ab existentia," *Divus Thomas* 7 (1901), pp. 254-265; "L'unité et le nombre d'après saint Thomas d'Aquin," *Revue néo-scholastique* 8 (1901), pp. 258-275; "La nature de raisonnement," *Revue de philosophie* 2 (1902), pp. 165-179; "Note sur Les philosophes belges," *Bulletin de l'académie Royale de sciences, des lettres et des beaux arts de Belgique* (1902), pp. 11-14; "La dernière idole," *Revue néo-scholastique* 10 (1903), pp. 73-91; "Discussions: Objections contra la thèse de la distinction réelle entre l'essence et l'existence, Les forces des substances organisées, Les preuves de l'existence de Dieu et le monisme," *Revue néo-thomiste* 10 (1903), pp. 185-204; "Note sur Praelectiones de Deo uno," *Bulletin de l'académie Royale de sciences, des lettres et des beaux arts de Belgique* (1903), pp. 147-156; "Praelectiones de Deo uno ad modum commentarii in Summam theologicam divi Thomae Aquinatis," *Bulletin de l'académie Royale de sciences, des lettres et des beaux arts de Belgique* (1903), pp. 147-156; "Introduction à la philosophie néo-scholastique," *Bulletin de l'académie Royale de sciences, des lettres et des beaux arts de Belgique* (1904), pp. 51-54; "La liberté d'indifférence et le déterminisme psychologique," *Revue néo-scholastique* 11 (1904), pp. 5-17; "Note sur Introduction à la philosophie néo-scholastique," *Bulletin de l'académie Royale de sciences, des lettres et des beaux arts de Belgique* (1904), pp. 51-54; "À propos de l'enseignement de la scholastique," *Revue néo-scholastique* 11 (1905), pp. 339-347; "Le mouvement philosophique," [interview], in Ned, Édouard, ed., *L'énergie belge* (Brussels: Dewit, 1905), pp. 81-95; "Réponse à Dom Olivieri," *Revue néo-scholastique* 13 (1905), pp. 573-583; "De modo argumentandi ad ex rebus huius mundi contingentibus Dei existentiam," *Documenta Ecclesiastica Mechliniensia* 1 (1907), pp. 1-6; "L'encyclique et la philosophie," *Revue pratique d'apologétique* 5 (1907), pp. 399-407; "Un discours du Cardinal Mercier," *Revue néo-scholastique* 15 (1908), pp. 5-11; "Vers l'Unité," *Bulletin de l'académie Royale de sciences, des lettres et des beaux arts de Belgique* (1913), pp. 122-146; "Le génie poétique de Dante," *Bulletin de l'académie Royale de sciences, des lettres et des beaux arts de Belgique* (1921), pp. 265-289.

Mercier's theological works include: *Vie de la Révérende Mère Thérèse de Saint-Joseph* (1892); *La science cléricale* (1903); *To My Seminarians [À mes séminaristes]* (1908); *Congress of Malines [Congrès de Malines]* (1909); *Pastoral Retreat [Retraite Pastorale]* (1910); *Christianity in the Modern Life [Le christianisme dans la vie moderne]* (1918); *The Interior Life [La vie intérieure]* (1918); *Sacerdotal Fraternity of the Friends of Jesus [La fraternité sa-*

*credotal des amis de Jésus*] (1927); *The Holy Virgin Mary* [*La Sainte Vierge Marie*] (1945).

Finally Mercier wrote the scientific essays: "La localisation du sens musculaire," *Revue néo-scholastique* 2 (1895), pp. 206-209; "Les suggestions criminelles," *Revue néo-scholastique* 4 (1897), pp. 408-415.

Then there are his famous pastoral letters and conferences including: *L'existence de Dieu* (1907); *La conscience moderne* (1908); *Lettre pastorale au clergé et aux fidèles du Diocèse de Malines* (1909); *Patriotisme et endurance* (1914); *Lettre de l'épiscopat belge aux cardinaux et aux évêques d'Allemagne, de Bavière et d'Autriche* (1915); *A notre retour de Rome* (1916); *Cri d'Alarme* (1916); *Pour nos soldats!* (1916); *Courage, mes frères* (1917); *Équité et charité* (1917); *La leçon des événements* (1918); *Souvenir de la guerre* (1919); *Paix et Fraternité* (1925).

These pastorals and other addresses and letters have been collected in *Collectio epistolarum pastoralium decretorum, aliorumque documentorum*, 4 vols. (1910-1924); *Oeuvres pastorales*, 7 vols. (1911-1926); *Rapports sur la violation du droit des gens en Belgique. Extraits de la lettre pastorale de S. Ém. Le cardinal Mercier* (1915); *Le Cardinal Mercier contre les barbes; lettres, mandements, protestations d primat de Belgique pendant l'occupation allemande* (1917); *Per crucem ad lucem; lettres, pastorals, discourse, allocutions* (1917); *La correspondance de S. É. cardinal Mercier avec le gouvernement allemand pendant l'occupation, 1914-1918* (1919); *Un évêque, défenseur de la cité: lettres de S.E. le Cardinal Mercier au cours du martyre de la Belgique, 1914-1918* (1919); *Justice et charité, lettres pastorales, discours, allocutions* (1919); *Paroles du Cardinal Mercier* (1927); *L'invasion et l'occupation de la Mandchourie jugées à la lumière de la doctrine catholique par les écrits du cardinal Mercier* (1934); *Le Cardinal Mercier: letrines et dessins de l'auteur* (1937).

See the *Revue néo-scholastique* 28 (1926), pp. 250-258 and CMPE, pp. 715-722 for a more complete bibliography of Mercier's writings.

There have been many translations of Mercier's philosophical works including of Mercier's collaborative effort *Traité élémentaire de philosophie*, 2 vols. (1905) [with Désiré Nys, A. Arendt, J. Halleux, and Maurice de Wulf] has been translated by Thomas Parker and Stanislaus Parker as *A Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy*, 2 vols. (London: Kegan Paul, 1921-1922). There are also translations of his philosophical essays in *Cardinal Mercier: A Memoir* [CMM], tr. and ed. David Boileau (Louvain: Peeters, 1996) and *Cardinal Mercier's Philosophical Essays* [CMPE], tr. David Boileau (Leuven: Peeters, 2002). Also of philosophical interest are the translations of Mercier's *The Relation of Experimental Psychology to Philosophy*, tr. Edmund Wurth (New York: Benzinger Brothers, 1902); *Elements of Logic*, tr. Ewan

MacPherson (New York: Manhattanville Press, 1912); *The Origins of Contemporary Psychology*, tr. William Mitchell (London: R.T. Washbourne, 1918); and his pastoral letter on modernism in Tyrrell, George, *Medievalism* (London: Longman, Greens, and Company, 1908).

Several of Mercier's pastoral letters and addresses to priests have also been translated: *Cardinal Mercier's Conferences Delivered to His Seminarists at Mechlin*, tr. J.M. O'Kavanagh (London: Washbourne, 1910); *Cardinal Mercier's Retreat to His Priests*, tr. J.M. O'Kavanagh (Bruges: Ch. Beyaert, 1912); *Patriotism and Endurance: A Pastoral Letter* (Turnhout: Etablissements Brepols, 1914); *Reports on the Violations of the Rights of Nations and the Laws and Customs of War in Belgium* (Belgium: Commission d'enquête sur la violation des règles du droit des gens, des lois et des coutumes de la guerre, 1915); *An Appeal to Truth: a letter addressed by Cardinal Mercier, archbishop of Malines, and the bishops of Belgium, to the cardinals, archbishops and bishops of Germany, Bavaria, and Austria-Hungary* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1916); *My Return from Rome* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1916); *A Signal of Distress from the Belgian Bishops to Public Opinion: The Story of the Belgian Deportations* (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1916); *The Voice of God: A Pastoral Letter* (London: Burrup, Mathieson & Sprague, 1916); *Courage, My Brethren* (London: Burns & Oates, 1917); *For Our Soldiers* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1916); *A Message from Cardinal Mercier* (New York: Ridgway Company, 1917); *Charity Towards Our Enemies* (London: Alabaster, Passmore & Sons, 1917); *For Those in Captivity* (London: Burrup, Mathieson & Sprague, 1917); *Pastorals, Letters, Allocutions, 1914-1917*, tr. Joseph Stillemans (New York: P.J. Kenedy, 1917); *The Voice of Belgium: Being the War Utterances of Cardinal Mercier* (London: Burns & Oates, 1917); *The Seizure of Church Bells and Organs in Occupied Belgium* (St. Albans: Campfield, 1918); *A Shepherd Among Wolves: War-Time Letters of Cardinal Mercier*, tr. Arthur Boutwood (London: The Faith Press, 1919); *Cardinal Mercier's Own Story*, tr. Fernand Mayence (New York: G.H. Doran, 1920).

See also the translations of Mercier's theological works: *The Duties of Conjugal Life* (London: Catholic Truth Society, 1911) [re-issued as *The Duties of Married Life* (London: Catholic Truth Society, 1927)]; *On the Papacy* (London: R & T Washbourne, 1915); *Notes on the Conversations at Malines, 1921-1925: Points of Agreement* (London: Mowbray, 1928).

143 "We individually remind each of you that remain that nothing is dearer and better to Us than that you should all furnish to the eager youth a generous and copious supply of the purest rivers of wisdom flowing in a perpetual and precious current from the Angelic Doctor" (*Aeterni Patris*, 26; cf. *Aeterni Patris*, 17-18, 31).

144 Pagination is from *A Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy* (St. Louis: Herder, 1921-1922) and in brackets from French equivalent *Traité élémentaire de philosophie*, 2 vols. (Louvain: Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1906). Other references are from Mercier's *Cours de Philosophie*, *Psychologie*, 2 vols. (Eleventh Edition of the *Cours de Philosophie*) (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1923); *Cours de Philosophie*, *Métaphysique générale* (Seventh Edition of the *Cours de Philosophie*) (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1923); *Cours de Philosophie*, *Critériologie générale* (Eighth Edition of the *Cours de Philosophie*) (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1923); *Cours de Philosophie*, *Logique* (Seventh Edition of the *Cours de Philosophie*) (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1922).

145 "We exhort all of You, Venerable Brethren, as earnestly as possible, to restore the golden wisdom of Saint Thomas, and to spread it as far as possible for the defense and glory of the Catholic faith, for the good of society, and for the growth of all the sciences. The wisdom of St. Thomas, we say; for if anything is either inquired into with excessive subtlety by the Scholastic doctors, or handed down with too little consideration, if anything does not cohere at all with the established doctrines of a later age, or in short is improbable in whatever way, in no way do we have in mind to propose that for imitation in our age" (*Aeterni Patris*, 31; see DH, 3140).

146 In regard to the method of philosophy, Mercier took it upon himself to criticize the Positivist view that only the natural sciences provide humans with knowledge and hence philosophy can provide no independent knowledge of its own. In reply Mercier claims that philosophy comes after the particular sciences but ranks above them. Philosophy inquires into the connections of the particular sciences and arrives at basic notions that link the scattered results of the special sciences together and so unites them. For each science deals with giving the explanatory reasons of its own special field and does not attempt to connect them with neighboring sciences nor submit them to the higher principles that justify them. Philosophy does this (*A Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy*, v. I, Introduction, 1, 3-4, pp. 1-2, 7, 9 [1-2, 8, 10-11]).

Philosophy is thus "the science of the totality of things through their deepest reasons" (*A Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy*, v. I, Introduction, 4, p. 8 [9]). Philosophy seeks to grasp the underlying causes and reasons of things (*A Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy*, v. I, Introduction, 5, p. 14 [17]). Thus it studies extended things and their simplest principles (explanatory reasons); i.e. change, quantity, substance (being) (*A Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy*, v. I, Introduction, 3-4, 9, pp. 7-8, 16-18 [8-9, 19-21]). So while philosophy must always stay in touch with the sciences, it provides explanations that transcend the visible realm.

Mercier further defines principles as the antecedents (causes or reasons) which exercise a real and positive influence upon a consequent (a principle is that in virtue of which a being is what it is or becomes what it becomes). Now we can grasp principles in terms of a formal cause (specific form; either accidental or substantial – that which makes a thing what it is); a material cause (that out of which something is made), an efficient cause (what makes something); or a final cause (the purpose for which a thing is made) (*A Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy*, v. I, Introduction, 5, 17, p. 10-14, 39-40 [12-17, 47-48]).

147 Mercier states that in cases of apparent conflict between reason (philosophy or science) and theology, one must determine whether one has engaged in hasty observation, premature induction, ill-consideration of a hypothesis, or on the other hand there is an inaccurate definition of theological belief or one has taken up a personal opinion of isolated theologians. And if one cannot resolve the contradiction after doing this, one must suspend judgment and humbly wait with confidence for the truth to be brought to light (*A Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy*, v. I, Introduction, 12, p. 24 [28]).

148 Such a theology is based on faith which is assent to a proposition that is not formally evident through the motive of another's authority. Such a faith act is rational because divine providence would not allow a prudent human to fall into an error in so important a matter: "An act of faith cannot indeed be the primordial act of human reason. Humans could not believe unless they first saw that believing was reasonable" ("The Philosophical Assessment of the Nineteenth-Century," translation from CMM, p. 327 [13]). Thus we must not fall into the Modernist error of drawing the object and motive of faith from oneself alone as this leads to individualism and the denial of revelation (see The Lenten Pastoral on Modernism, in George Tyrrell, *Medievalism*, pp. 22-23, 27).

Yet faith is also free as the will prevents reason from engaging in too close a scrutiny of the difficulties arising from the obscurity of the object, and the will also concentrates the attention on motives that make the proposition certain, i.e. that a revealed truth can be believed by a prudent human and so ought to be believed (*A Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy*, v. I, Criteriology, Part Two, III, 68-69, pp. 400-401 [66-68 (sec. 67-68)]).

149 Hence the ontologists are wrong to think we must directly perceive the ideas of God before we can know other abstractions. Indeed rather than our idea of the finite being a negative idea formed by the limitation of the infinite, it is our idea of the infinite that is negative and based on an expansion of the idea of the finite (*A Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy*, v. I, Psychology, Part Three, I, 92, 98, pp. 247, 253-255 [101-102, 109-111]).

- 150 Mercier argues that we have certitude of the existence of external objects by a similar act of reflection on our acts of knowing them. For we are passive in regard to sensations and the cause of their existence is not to be found within us. So there must be beings outside of us that produce these sensations (*A Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy*, v. I, Criteriology, Part One, III, 45-46, pp. 380-381 [42-44]; Part Two, II, 60, pp. 394-395 [58-59 (sec. 58)]). Here we appeal to a principle of causality (that all things have an adequate cause) and infer that our passive internal acts of sensation must have an external cause.
- 151 Nor did Mercier find much to like in the Augustinian argument to God from the desire for happiness (the argument from the higher aspirations of humans), or in the moral argument. The argument from happiness – as humans seek for happiness and as this happiness cannot be fully acquired on earth, there must be a God who gives us happiness in another life – only shows that if God does not exist humans will be irremediably unhappy, says Mercier. And the proof from moral obligation – that humans feel morally bound to do good and avoid evil and so this moral law presupposes a supreme legislator – is not a demonstration, but merely shows that one who has admitted moral obligation has normally also admitted God as the Legislator who imposes His will. Indeed Mercier says that the fact of a moral law can be explained without recourse to a divine Legislator. For a law can mean either the ordinance of a superior or the natural tendency of a being. Hence the moral law may be due merely to human nature which strives after the true and the good (thus the feeling of wrong can arise when humans feel they are offending the intimate requirements of human nature considered in itself). It is true that ontologically the law of our nature is the work of God, but unless we are already aware that God exists we remain ignorant of this truth. For God does not here manifest His will openly but ingrains it in the tendencies of our nature (*A Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy*, v. II, Natural Theology, Part One, II, 33-34, pp. 55-57; but see v. I, Preface, p. v). Mercier does allow, however, some force to the arguments for God from the common consent of humans (*A Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy*, v. II, Natural Theology, Part One, II, 32, pp. 54-55).
- 152 Mercier notes that this proof is valid whether or not the world had a beginning or has always existed; for we must in either case posit, beyond the series of caused causes, the existence of an Uncaused Cause.
- 153 We have already seen (or will see) attacks on the Thomists, such as those made by Bautain, Hermes, Günther, Brownson, Lequier, and Blondel. We can additionally add the name of Johann Baptist von Hirscher (1788-1865) of Tübingen. Kleutgen was also criticized by Fr. Friedrich Michelis (1815-1886) who was excommunicated; Matthias Joseph Scheeben

(1835-1888) of Cologne Seminary; and the Ontologist Lorenzo Michelangelo Billia (1860-1924), at the University of Turin. Critics of Mercier include George Tyrrell; Canon L. du Roussaux (fl. 1894-1909) of the St. Louis Institute, Brussels; Joseph de Tonquedec (1868-1962); Étienne Gilson (1884-1978) at the Sorbonne, the Collège de France, and the Medieval Institute, Toronto; James Sullivan (fl. 1939); and the Canadian Dominican Louis-Marie Regis (1903-1988), of the Medieval Institute, Toronto.

154 Other Nineteenth-Century Catholic Thomists include:

American: Joseph Payma, S.J. (1816-1892), at Woodstock; the German-American Louis Jouin, S.J. (1818-1899), at Fordham University; Walter Hill, S.J. (1822-1907), at St. Louis University; Maurice Ronayne, S.J. (1823-1903), at St. Francis Xavier's College; Aemilius de Augustinis, S.J. (1829-1899) at Woodstock and the Gregorian; the Italian-American Cardinal Camillo Mazzella, S.J. (1833-1900), at Woodstock, Georgetown, and the Gregorian; the Italian-American Fr. Januarius [Genarro] de Concilio (1835-1898), at Seton Hall; the Belgian-American Charles Coppens, S.J. (1835-1920), at Creighton and St. Louis University; René Holaind (1836-1906), at Georgetown; Fr. John Ming (1838-1910), at Canasius College; the Italian-American Biagio Schiffini, S.J. (1839-1913), at Woodstock; Nicholas Russo, S.J. (1845-1902), at Georgetown; the Brother of the Christian Schools Patrick Francis Mullany [Brother Azarias] (1847-1893), at Rock Hill College and De La Salle Institute; the German-American Fr. John Gmeiner (1847-1913), at St. Francis Seminary, Milwaukee, and St. Thomas Seminary, St. Paul; William Poland, S.J. (1848-1923), at St. Louis University; James Conway (1849-1905), at St. Louis University; Fr. Edward Pace (1861-1938), at the Catholic University of America; the Xaverian Joseph Conlan [Brother John Chrysostom] (1863-1917), at Manhattan College; the American Dominican Lawrence Kearney (c. 1865-1957); John Driscoll, S.J. (1866-1940), at Brighton Seminary; Fr. James Joseph Fox (c. 1869-1923), Catholic University of America.

Belgian and French: the Sulpician Denis Luc de Frayssinous (1764-1841); the Jesuit Jean-Louis Rozaven de Liessèques (1772-1861); Jean-Baptiste Bouvier (1783-1854); Fr. Narcisse Cacheux (1789-1869); the Jesuit Gustave Xavier Lacroix de Ravignan (1795-1858); the Dominican Henri-Dominique Lacordaire (1802-1861); Pierre Celestine Roux-Lavergne (1802-1874), at the Seminary of Nîmes; the Jesuit Marie-Ange Chastel (1804-1861); François-Alexandre Rouillet de la Bouillèrie (1810-1882); Thomas-Henri Martin (1813-1884), at the University of Rennes; the Capuchin Piat de Mons (Jean Joseph Loiseaux) (1815-1904); Léon Montet (1817-1851); Charles Jourdain (1817-1886); Laurent Casimir Bourquard (c. 1820-1900); the Jesuit Henri Ramière (1821-1884); Frédéric Morin

(1823-1874); the Belgian Ignatius Carbonelle, S.J. (d. 1889); Eugène Grandclaude (1826-1900); Edmond Domet de Vorges (1829-1910); Bishop Michel Rosset (1830-1902), at the Seminary of Cambray; the Jesuit Théodore de Régnon (1831-1893); Jules de Bonniot, S.J. (1831-1889); Jean-Baptiste Terrien (1832-1903); the Belgian Jesuit Louis de San (1832-1904); Fr. Auguste-Théodore-Paul de Broglie (1834-1895), of the Catholic Institute of Paris, who was assassinated in 1895; Antoine Hubert Henri Dupont (1836-1917); Jules Didiot (1840-1903), at the Catholic University of Lille; the Belgian Auguste Castelein, S.J. (c. 1840-1905); the Belgian Canon Aloïs Van Weddingen (1841-1890); Henri Sauvé (d. 1890); Félix Frédault (d. 1895); Fr. Maurice D'Hulst (1841-1896), at the Catholic University of Paris; Charles Delmas, S.J. (fl. 1896); the French Dominican Antonius Dummermuth (1841-1918); Élisée-Vincent Maurus, S.J. (1842-1912); the Sulpician Pierre-Marie Brin (1843-1894); Émile-Charles Lesserteur (fl. 1872-1896); the Belgian Jean-Baptiste Van der Aa, S.J. (c. 1843-1900); the French Dominican Marie-Thomas Coconier (1846-1908); the Sulpician Pierre Vallet (fl. 1878-1909); Joseph Gardair (1846-1911); Fr. Elie Blanc (1846-1927), at the Catholic University of Lyon; the Belgian Gustave Lahousse (1846-1928); the French Dominican Joachim Joseph Berthier (1848-1924); François Picavet (1851-1921); Alfred Vacant (1852-1901); Clodius Piat (1854-1918); Xavier-Marie Le Bachelet, S.J. (1855-1925); Maurius Couialhac, S.J. (1856-1905); Jean-Vincent Bainvel (1858-1937); the Belgian Jacques Laminne (1864-1924), at Louvain; Cardinal Louis Billot, S.J. (1846-1931); the Sulpician Albert Farges (1848-1946); the Dominican Hippolyte Gayraud (1856-1911); the Belgian Dominican Pierre Mandonnet (1858-1936), at Fribourg; the Belgian Désiré Nys (1859-1927); the Dominican Ambroise Gardeil (1859-1931); the Dominican Marie-Benoît Schwalm (1860-1908); the Belgian Stanislaus de Backer, S.J. (fl. 1899-1920); Jean-Arthur Chollet (1862-1952); Marcel Chossat (c. 1863-1930); Cardinal Alexis-Henri-Marie Lépiciér (1863-1936); Antonin Dalmace Sertillanges (1863-1948); the Marist Émile Peillaube (1864-1934); Sebastian Reinstadler (1864-1935), at the University of Metz; the Dominican Thomas Pègues (1866-1936); the Swiss Gallus Manser (1866-1950), at the University of Fribourg; the Dominican Édourd Hugon (1867-1929); the Belgian Maurice de Wulf (1867-1947); the Belgian Simon Deploige (1868-1927); Joseph Geyser (1869-1948).

British: the convert Thomas Harper, S.J. (1821-1895), at Stonyhurst and St. Bueno's; Richard Clarke, S.J. (1839-1900), at Stonyhurst; Fr. Bernard Boedder, S.J. (1841-1916), at Stonyhurst; Joseph Rickaby, S.J. (1845-1932), at Stonyhurst; John Rickaby, S.J. (1847-1927), at Stonyhurst; Michael Maher, S.J. (1860-1918), at Stonyhurst.

Canadian: Alexander McDonald (1858-c. 1910), at St. Francis Xavier College; Louis A. Paquet (1859-1942), at Laval University; Bishop Cornelius O'Brien (1843-1906), at St. Dunstan's College, Canada.

German: Fr. Bruno Franz Leopold Liebermann (1759-1844), at Strasburg Seminary and Mainz Seminary; the Alsatian Bishop Andreas Räss (1794-1887), at the Seminaries of Mainz, Molsheim, and Strasburg; the Austrian Capuchin Albert Knoll (1796-1863), at the Convent of Meran; Bishop Nicolaus von Weis (1796-1869), at the Mainz Seminary; Christoph Schlüter (1801-1884) at the University of Münster; the layman Franz Jacob Clemens (1815-1862), at Bonn and Münster; Cardinal Johannes Baptist Franzelin, S.J. (1816-1886), at the Gregorian; Fr. Johann Baptist Heinrich (1816-1891), at the Mainz Seminary; Fr. Hermann Ernst Plassman (1817-1864), Paderborn; Wilhelm Wilmers, S.J. (1817-1899), at Bonn, Aachen, and Maria Laach; the famous Fr. Heinrich Denzinger (1819-1883), at Würzburg; Fr. Franz Hettinger (1819-1890), Würzburg; Fr. Karl Werner (1821-1888), at St. Polten and Vienna [also a Semi-Rationalist]; Theodor Meyer, S.J. (1821-1913) at Maria Laach; Fr. Albert Stöckl (1823-1895), at Münster; Alois von Schmid (1825-1910) at the University of Munich; Constantin von Schüzler, S.J. (1827-1880), at Freiburg; Gerard Schneemann, S.J. (1829-1885), at Maria Laach; Aurelius Adeodatus (fl. 1887-1888); Fr. Franz Morgott (1829-1900), at Eichstätt; Francis Xavier Pfeifer (1829-1902); Joseph Jungmann (1830-1885); Hugo von Hurter, S.J. (1832-1914), at Innsbruck; Fr. Bernard Jungmann (1833-1895), at the Seminary of Bruges and the University of Louvain; Bishop Hubert Theophil Simar (1835-1902), at Bonn; Tilmann Pesch, S.J. (1836-1899), at Maria Laach [contributor with the other Jesuits of Maria Laach such as Cathrein, Hontheim, and Meyer to the *Philosophia Lacensis* (1880-1900)]; Michael Gossner (1837-1909); Julius Baumann (1837-1916); Fr. Constantin Gutberlet (1837-1928) of the Seminary of Fulda; Ludwig Schütz (1838-1901); Hieronymus Noldin, S.J. (1838-1922), at Innsbruck; Otto Willmann (1839-1919); Matthias Schneid (1840-1895); Fr. Ceslaus Schneider (1840-1908), Immaculata-Kolleg in Löwen; Franz Leitner (c. 1842-1908); Georg von Hertling (1843-1919), at the University of Bonn [he later became Prime Minister of Bavaria]; the Austrian Heinrich Joseph Seuse Denifle, O.P. (1844-1905), at Graz; Anton Portmann (fl. 1885-1897); Albert Maria Weiss, O.P. (1844-1925), at the University of Mainz; Victor Cathrein, S.J. (1845-1931) at Maria Laach; Cardinal Franz Ehrle, S.J. (1845-1934), at the Gregorian; Michael Glossner (1847-1909); Ernst Commer (1847-1928), at the Universities of Münster and Vienna and member of the *Sodalitium Pianum*; Gundisalvus Feldner, O.P. (1849-1919); Thomas Esser, O.P. (1850-1926); Fr. Joseph Pohle (1852-1911), at the Seminary of Fulda, Universities of Münster

and Breslau, and the Catholic University of America; Clemens Baeumker (1853-1924), at the Universities of Breslau, Bonn, Strasburg, and Munich; Christian Pesch, S.J. (1853-1925), at Valkenburg, Netherlands; Karl Weiss (1853-1931); Joseph Hontheim, S.J. (1858-1929) at Maria Laach; Joseph Mausbach (1861-1931) at the University of Münster; the Dutchman Joseph Gredt, O.S.B. (1863 -1940); Sebastian Reinstadler (1864-1935), at the University of Metz; Johann Baptist Stuffer, S.J. (1865-1952), at the University of Innsbruck; Dominikus Prümmer, O.P. (1866-1931), at the University of Fribourg; Gallus Manser (1866-1950), at the University of Fribourg; Joseph Geyser (1869-1948); Martin Grabmann (1875-1949).

Italian: the Vincentian Antonio Mantenga (1759-1811), at Alberoni College of Piacenza; Canon Vincenzo Buzzetti, S.J. (1777-1824), at the seminary of Piacenza; the Vincentian Giuseppe Maria Lusardi (1785-1816), at Piacenza; the Vincentian Vincenzo Fioruzzi (1785-1832), at Piacenza; Narcisco Puig (d. 1865), at the Dominican College of St. Thomas in Minerva; Angelo Testa (1788-1873); the Jesuit Domenico Sordi (1790-1880), at the Jesuit College in Naples; the Jesuit Luigi [Aloysius] Taparelli d'Azeglio (1793-1862), of the Gregorian; the Jesuit Serafino Sordi (1793-1865), at the Jesuit Colleges of Reggio Emilia, Forlì, and Spoleto; the Jesuit Giovanni Perrone (1794-1876), at the Gregorian; Enrico Borgianelli, S.J. (1805-1882); Cardinal Giuseppe Pecci, S.J. (1807-1890), at the Roman College, seminary of Perugia, and University of Sapienza, Rome; the Dominican Vincenzo Fortunato Marchese (1808-1891); the Jesuit Carlos Maria Curci (1810-1891); the Jesuit Matteo Liberatore (1810-1892), at the College of Naples and editor of the *Civiltà Cattolica*; Gioacchino Vincenzo Raffaele Luigi Pecci [Pope Leo XIII] (1810-1903); the diocesan priest Gaetano Sanseverino (1811-1865), at the Lyceum in Naples; Pietro Uccelli (d. 1880); the Dominican Vincenzo Gatti (1811-1882), at the Dominican College of St. Thomas; the Jesuit Carlo Passaglia (1812-1887), at the Gregorian; Pietro Maria Ferrè (1815-1886); Bishop Giuseppe Buscarini (1819-1872); Massimiliano Anselmi (1819-1887); Salvatore Calvanese (fl. 1864-1893); the Jesuit Giovanni Mai (1819-1898); the Jesuit Salvatore Tongiorgi (1820-1865), at the Gregorian; Nunzio Signoriello (1821-1889); the Jesuit Giovanni Maria Cornoldi (1822-1892), at Bressanone and Padua; Giovanni Battista de Rossi (1822-1894); Dominican Girolamo Maria Mancini (fl. 1864-1897); Francesco Battaglini (1823-1902), at the Accademia Tomistica in Bologna; Alfonso Maria Vespignani (1825-1904); Francis Rondina, S.J. (1827-1897); Pietro Merighi (1829-1906); the Jesuit Domenico Palmieri (1829-1909), at the Gregorian; the Dominican Domingo Maria Gaudenzi (1831-1884); Pietro de Nardi (fl. 1890-1898); Dominic Valensise (1832-1916); Cardinal Luigi Rotelli (1833-1891); the Dominican Tommaso Maria Zigliara (1833-1893), at

the Seminary of Viterbo; Cardinal Lucido Maria Parocchi (1833-1903); Cardinal Giuseppe Prisco (1833-1923); Francisco Salis Seewis, S.J. (1835-1898); the Jesuit Michael de Maria (1836-1913), at the Gregorian; the Dominican Alberto Lepidi (1838-1922), of the Dominican College in Rome; Cardinal Francesco Satolli (1839-1910), at the Urbanum in Rome; Gioaccino Pelagatti (1840-1902); the Jesuit Santo Schiffini (1841-1906), at the Gregorian; Giuseppe Piccirelli, S.J. (1841-1919); Pietro Montagnani (1843-1902); the Jesuit Vincente Remer (1843-1910), at the Gregorian; Salvatore Talamo (1844-1932); the Lazarist Alberto Barberis (1847-1895); the Jesuit Giuseppe Mauri (1849-1923); the Jesuit Pius de Mandato (1850-1914); Pietro Tarino (1852-1899); the Jesuit Guido Mattiussi (1852-1925), author of the famous twenty-four theses (1914); Bishop Benedict Lorenzelli (1853-1915), at the Athenaeum; the Dominican Enrico Buonpensiere (1853-1929); Andrea Cappellazzi (1854-1932); Felice Pignataro (1856-1905); the Jesuit Gioacchino Ambrosini (1857-1931); Bishop Giuseppe Ballerini (1857-1933), at Pavia; the Franciscan Agostino Gemelli (1878-1959), at the Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore of Milan.

Spanish: Baltasar Masdeu (1741-1820), at Piacenza; Francisco Alvarado, O.P. (1756-1814); Ventura de Raulica (1792-1861) [also a Traditionalist]; Ramon Martí de Eixala (1808-1857); Juan Donoso Cortés (1809-1853) [also a Traditionalist]; Jaime Balmes (1810-1848); Raphael Puigserver (fl. 1820-1826); Narcís Puig (d. 1865); Francisco Xarrié, O.P. (d. 1866), at the Dominican College of St. Thomas; Thiago Sinibaldi (fl. 1889-1906) at the Seminary of Coimbra; Antonio Hernández y Fajárnés (1826-1904) at the University of Zaragoza; Juan Manuel Orti y Lara (1826-1904) at the University of Madrid; Bishop Ceferino González y D'az Tuñón, O.P. (1831-1894); Clement Pereira Gomez de Carvalho (fl. 1894), at the Central Lyceum of Coimbra; Antonio Comellas y Cluet (1832-1884); José Mendive, S.J. (1836-1906); Juan José Urráburu, S.J. (1844-1904) at the Gregorian; Alejandro Pidal y Mon (1846-1913); Norberto del Prado, O.P. (1852-1918), at Fribourg; Manuel Antonio Ferreira-Deusdado (1858-1921); Juan Gonzáles de Arintero, O.P. (1860-1928), at the University of Salamanca.

There was also a flourishing nineteenth-century Polish school of Thomism.

One can also see additional Thomists in RSP (1909) and Kennedy, Leonard, *A Catalogue of Thomists, 1270-1900* (Houston: Center for Thomistic Studies, 1987).

155 The movement began of course with St. Augustine (354-430), and counted among its Patristic and Carolingian followers (principally in matters of divine grace) St. Paulinus of Nola (c. 354-431); Possidius (c. 370-

440); Paulus Orosius (c. 385-420); St. Quodvultdeus (c. 390-450); Marius Mercator (c. 390-451); St. Prosper of Aquitaine (c. 390-465); Claudianus Mamertus (d. c. 473); Eugippus (c. 455-535); St. Fulgentius of Ruspe (c. 462-527); St. Caesarius of Arles (c. 470-542); Pseudo-Dionysius (c. 475-525), Boethius (c. 480-526) [somewhat]; Cassiodorus (c. 485-585); St. Gregory the Great (c. 540-604); St. Isidore of Seville (c. 560-636); St. Bede (c. 672-735); Alcuin (c. 735-804); Prudentius of Troyes (d. 861); Rabanus Maurus (c. 780-865); Amolo of Lyons (fl. 841-852); Florus of Lyons (c. 795-860); Gottschalk of Orbais (c. 800-868); Servatus Lupus of Ferrières (805-862); Ratramnus of Corbie (d. c. 870); Remigius of Lyons (d. 875); Hincmar of Rheims (806-882); and John Scotus Eriugena (c. 810-877).

156 Notable among the medieval Augustinians were St. Peter Damian (c. 1007-1072); John of Fécamp (d. 1078); St. Anselm (1033-1109); St. Yves of Chartes (c. 1040-1116); William of Champeaux (c. 1070-1121); Rupert of Deutz (c. 1075-1129); Honorius Augustodunensis (c. 1075-1156); Abelard (1079-1142) [somewhat]; Adam of St. Victor (d. 1146); the Cistercian St. Bernard of Clairvaux (1090-1153); Peter Lombard (c. 1095-1160); Hugh of St. Victor (1096-1141); Robert of Melun (c. 1100-1167); St. Peter of Tarentaise [Pope Innocent V] (1102-1175); Walter of St. Victor (d. c. 1180); Godfrey of St. Victor (c. 1125-1194); Robert Grosseteste (c. 1168-1253); Roland of Cremona, O.P. (1178-1259); William of Auvergne (c. 1180-1249); Alexander of Hales, O.F.M. (c. 1185-1245); Richard Fishacre, O.P. (c. 1205-1248); Thomas of York, O.F.M. (c. 1210-1260); John de la Rochelle, O.F.M. (d. c. 1271); Romano of Rome (d. 1273); Bishop Stephen Tempier (d. 1279); Roger Bacon, O.F.M. (c. 1214-1294); Robert Kilwardby, O.P. (c. 1215-1279); Henry of Ghent (c. 1215-1293); St. Bonaventure, O.F.M. (1224-1274); William de la Mare, O.F.M. (d. c. 1285); John Peckham, O.F.M. (c. 1230-1292); William of Ware, O.F.M. (c. 1230-1300); Raymond Lull, O.F.M. (1232-1315); Matthew of Aquasparta, O.F.M. (c. 1240-1302); Henry of Friemar (c. 1240-1340), O.E.S.A.; Roger Marston, O.F.M. (1245-1303); Giles of Rome (1247-1316) [somewhat]; Peter John Olivi, O.F.M. (1248-1298); Richard of Middleton, O.F.M. (c. 1249-1302); James of Viterbo (c. 1255-1308) [somewhat]; Alexander of Alexandria, O.F.M. (d. 1314); John of Erfurt (d. 1317); Alexander of St. Elpideo (d. 1326); Vital du Four (c. 1260-1327); Nicholas Trevet, O.P. (c. 1261-1334); Augustine of Ancona (c. 1270-1328); Gerard of Siena (d. 1336); Michael of Massa, O.E.S.A. (d. 1337); Henry of Friemar (d. 1340); Bl. Simon of Cascia (d. 1348); Alvaro Pelayo, O.F.M. (c. 1275-1349); Thomas Waleys, O.P. (c. 1287-1350); the Carmelite John Baconthorpe (c. 1290-1345); William of Cremona, O.E.S.A. (c. 1290-1356); Thomas Bradwardine (c. 1295-1349) [on grace]; John

Ridevall [Ridewall], O.F.M. (fl. 1330); Bartholomew of Urbino (d. 1350); Hermann of Schildesche, O.E.S.A. (d. 1357); Thomas of Strassburg, O.E.S.A. (d. 1357); Richard Fitzralph, O.F.M. (c. 1295-1360); Gregory of Rimini, O.E.S.A. (c. 1300-1358); Alfonsus Vargas of Toledo, O.E.S.A. (d. 1366); Jordan of Quedlinburg (c. 1300-1370); Hugolin of Orvieto (c. 1300-1373); and John Klenkok, O.E.S.A. (c. 1310-1374).

In the Renaissance Augustinianism influenced Geoffrey Hardeby, O.E.S.A. (c. 1320-1385); John Wycliff (c. 1324-1387); Coluccio Salutati (1331-1406); John Hiltalingen of Basle, O.E.S.A. (c. 1332-1392); Angelus Dobelinus, O.E.S.A. (c. 1350-1420); Johannes Zacharie, O.E.S.A. (fl. 1389-1400); John Gerson (1363-1429) [somewhat]; John Hus (c. 1369-1415); Augustine Favaroni (d. 1443); Martin of Cordoba (c. 1395-1476); William of Vorilong (c. 1400-1464); Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464); Johannes Bessarion (1403-1472); Lorenzo Valla (c. 1407-1457) [somewhat]; Maffeo Vegio (1407-1458); Gottschalk Hollen, O.E.S.A. (c. 1411-1481); John of Dorsten, O.E.S.A. (1420-1481); Marsilio Ficino (1433-1499) [somewhat]; Stephen Brulefer (d. c. 1499); Desiderius Erasmus (1446-1536); Johannes von Paltz, O.E.S.A. (1445-1511); Girolamo Savonarola (1452-1498) [one of his works placed on Index of Forbidden Books]; Ambrogio Flandino (1460-1531); Pietro Pomponazzi (1462-1522) [somewhat]; John Colet (1467-1519); Johannes von Staupitz (c. 1465-1524); Giles of Viterbo, O.E.S.A. (1469-1532); Johannes Dullaert (c. 1470-1513); Thomas More (1478-1535) [somewhat]; Juan Luis Vives (1492-1540); Gerolamo Seripando, O.E.S.A. (1493-1563); Johann Baptist Perusinus, O.E.S.A. (fl. 1549); Agostino Steuco (c. 1497-1548); Christopher of Padua (1500-1569); Gaspar of Coimbra (1512-1584); Michel de Bay [Baius] (1513-1589); Luis de León, O.E.S.A. (1528-1591); Francesco Patrizzi (1529-1597); Diego de Zúñiga (c. 1536-1597); Johann Baptist de Plumbino, O.E.S.A. (d. 1613); Petrus Trigosus (d. 1616); Michael Barthelemey Salon, O.E.S.A. (1538-1620); Gregorio Nuñez Coronel, O.E.S.A. (c. 1548-1620); Francisco Coriolano (d. 1625); and Tommaso Campanella (1568-1639).

157 Among the Modern Augustinians we may mention: John Duvergier de Hauranne (1581-1643); Joseph Zamora (d. 1649); Denys Petau, S.J. (1583-1652); the Capuchin Marcus Antonius Galitius (d. 1665); Matthaeus Ferchio (1583-1669); the founder of Jansenism Cornelius Jansen (1585-1638) [his book *Augustinus* was placed on Index of Forbidden Books in 1654]; the Capuchin Valeriano Magni (1586-1661); Mathias Hauzeur (1589-1676); the founder of Cartesianism René Descartes (1596-1650) [somewhat; a few of his books were placed on the Index of Forbidden Books in 1663]; Philippe Visconti, O.E.S.A. (1596-1664); Charles Moreau, O.E.S.A. (c. 1615-1671); Francisco Macedo, O.F.M.

(1596-1681); the Capuchin Marcel de Riez (1609-1682); the Capuchin Gaudentius of Brescia (1612-1672); Christianus Lupus [Wolf], O.E.S.A. (1612-1681); Raffaolo Bonherba (d. 1681); Petrus Clenaerts, O.E.S.A. (fl. 1686-1691); Nicholas of St. John the Baptist, O.E.S.A. (d. 1692); the Jansenist Antoine Arnauld (1613-1694) [several of his books were placed on the Index of Forbidden Books 1654-1656]; the Oratorian Louis D'Eybac Thomassin (1619-1695) [also ontologist]; Bruno Neusser, O.F.M. (c. 1620-1690); the Oratorian André Martin [Ambrosius Victor] (1621-1695) [also Cartesian and ontologist]; Blaise Pascal (1623-1662) [also fideist; his *Provincial Letters* put in Index of Forbidden Books in 1657]; Fulgentius Schautheet, O.E.S.A. (c. 1623-1708); the Oratorian Jean-Baptiste du Hamel (1624-1706); Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet (1627-1704) [one of his works placed on Index of Forbidden Books in 1745]; Cardinal Henry Noris (1631-1704) [one of his works was placed on Index of the Spanish Inquisition in 1742 but removed in 1749]; Augustino Arpe (d. 1704); the Jansenist Pasquier Quesnel (1634-1719); François Lamy, O.S.B. (1636-1711) [also an ontologist]; the Oratorian Richard Simon (1638-1712); Nicolas Malebranche (1638-1715) [also an ontologist; several of his books placed on Index of Forbidden Books 1680-1712]; Fulgence Lafosse, O.E.S.A. (c. 1640-1690); Federico Nicola Gavardi, O.E.S.A. (1640-1715); the Oratorian Bernard Lamy (1640-1715) [also an ontologist]; the Jesuit Antonio Cordeyro (1640-1722); the Protestant Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) [somewhat]; Honoré de Tournély (1658-1729); Johannes Libens, O.E.S.A. (fl. 1716-1726); Jean Hardouin, S.J. (1646-1729); François Fénelon (1651-1715) [one of his works placed on the Index of Forbidden Books in 1699]; the Minim Antoine Boucat (d. 1730); Fulgentius Bellelli, O.E.S.A. (1675-1742); Mansuetus a S. Felice (d. 1775), O.E.S.A.; Yves Marie de L'Isle André, S.J. (1675-1764); Anselm Hormannseder (1686-1740); Cardinal Giovanni Lorenzo Berti (1696-1766); the Capuchin Thomas of Charmes (1703-1765); Jordan Simon (1719-1776); Fr. Nicolas Sylvestre Bergier (1718-1790); the Savoyan Cardinal Hyacinthe Sigismondo Gerdil (1718-1802) [also an ontologist]; Engelbert Klüpfel, O.E.S.A. (1733-1811); Josepho Bertieri, O.E.S.A. (1734-1804); and Aloys Sandbichler, O.E.S.A. (1751-1821).

- 158 Augustine's later theory of grace wherein God's grace is prevenient and precedes all acts of faith and good works was also extremely influential. As Augustine phrased it, God's mercy anticipates (*praevenit*) us so that we may be healed, called, and live piously (*On Nature and Grace*, XXXI; cf. *Retractions*, I, 22; *On Grace and Free Will*, 20-21, 33, 38; *On Rebuke and Grace*, II, 3; *On the Grace of Christ and Original Sin*, I, 18-21; *Confessions*, X, 29; *On the Spirit and the Letter*, XXX, 52; *Enchiridion*, 32).

159 For information on the life and thought of Gratry see HPF (1880), pp. 373-431; BW (1882), v. I, pp. 324-380; GFC (1895), v. II, pp. 221-276; THP (1903), pp. 606 and 678; CE (1909), v. VI, pp. 731-732; FCN (1918), pp. 122-142; LHP (1927), p. 315; SPC (1934), pp. 54-56; CPH (1941), v. II, pp. 340-347; DTC (1947), v. VI:2, pp. 1754-1763; IEC (1951), v. VI, pp. 1008-1011; SHP (1955), pp. 950-951; HT (1952), v. II, pp. 245-248; PCF (1955), pp. 197-236; OLTK (1960), v. IV, pp. 11-12; CHAD (1962), v. V, pp. 207-209; RNT (1965), pp. 145-150; RP (1966), pp. 355-357, 793; MHP (1967), pp. 368-370; BHP (1968), v. VI, pp. 252-254; DSHP (1968), p. 209; HA (1971), p. 191; CHP (1974), v. XIX, p. 218; LT (1975), pp. 191-206, 293; RPFN (1984), pp. 181-192, 242-243; CP (1987), v. I, pp. 518-534; PHP (1988), p. 326; NCS (1989), p. 272 n. 50; DP (1993), v. I, pp. 1192-1193; LTK (1995), v. IV, p. 989; NCE (2003), v. VI, p. 424; EF (2006), v. V, pp. 5001-5003.

See also D'Orgeval-Dubouchet, Eugénie, *Le Père Gratry* (Paris: 1900); Perraud, Charles, *Le père Gratry, sa vie et ses oeuvres* (Paris: Téqui, 1900); Chauvin, A., *Le Père Gratry: L'homme et l'oeuvre d'après des documents inédits* (Paris: Bloud et Barral, 1901); Biguet, J., *Le Père Gratry* (Arras : Sueur-Charruey, 1902); At, Jean-Antoine, *Le Père Gratry, sa philosophie nouvelle* (Paris: Savaète, 1904); Molien, L.A., *Le Père Gratry* (Paris: Téqui, 1908); Barbey d'Aurevilly, Jules, *Joseph de Maistre, Blanc de Saint-Bonnet, Lacordaire, Gratry, Caro* (Paris: Bloud, 1910); Mouraux, Lucien, *Le père Gratry et l'infailibilité du Pape* (Cahors: A. Coueslant, 1910); Aubin, Albert, *Le père Gratry, essai de biographie psychologique* (Paris: Béduchaud, 1912); Revaux, P., *Le Père Gratry* (Paris: Téqui, 1912); Goutay, Adrienne, *Vers la vie pleine a la suite de père Gratry* (Paris: Téqui, 1913); Vaudon, Jean, *Une âme de lumière: le père Gratry* (Paris: Téqui, 1914); Pointud-Guillemot, B., *Essai sur la philosophie de Gratry* (Paris: Gabriel Beauchesne, 1917); Pointud-Guillemot, B., *La doctrine sociale de Gratry* (Paris: Gabriel Beauchesne, 1917); Horton, Walter, *The Philosophy of the Abbé Bautain* (New York: New York University Press, 1926), pp. 81, 287-288; Marrucchi, Angelica, *Gratry* (Milan: Vita e pensiero, 1923); Scheller, Emil, *Grundlagen der Erkenntnislehre bei Gratry* (Halle : M. Niemeyer, 1929); Liebherr, James, *Alphonse Gratry's approach to God* (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1931); Caso, Antonio, *Filosofo y moralistas franceses* (Mexico City: Stylo, 1943); Mar'as, Julián, *La Filosofía del Padre Gratry* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 1948) [trans. Mary O'Hara and Catherine McNamee, *Gratry's Philosophy* (Amherst, Humanity Books: 1998)]; Forissier, Marc, *Un éveilleur d'âmes: Le Père Gratry* (Tarbes: Éditions d'Albret, 1949); Christoflour, Raymond, *Prophètes du XIXe siècle* (Paris: La Colombe, 1954), pp. 123-156; Sarale, Nicolino, ed., *Ora come*

*in uno specchio: l'avventura spirituale di Edith Stein*, Eugenio Zolli, Alphonse Gratry, Sofia Swetchine (Torino Leuman: Ele Di Ci, 1975), pp. 55-70.

- 160 This work has been translated as *Knowledge of God: A Study of the Chief Theodicies*, trans. Langdon Alber (Boston: Roberts Brothers, 1892). Other philosophical works of Gratry were his *Questions and Answers on Social Duties* [*Demandes et réponses sur les devoirs sociaux*] (1848; 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. *The Sources of Social Regeneration* [*Les sources de la régénération sociale*], 1871); *Logic* [*La Logique*], 2 vols. (1855); *On the Knowledge of the Soul* [*De la connaissance de l'âme*], 2 vols. (1858); *The Philosophy of Belief* [*La Philosophie du credo*] (1861); *A Study on Contemporary Sophistry* [*Une étude sur la Sophistique contemporaine*] (1851); *Sources: Advice for the Direction of the Mind* [*Les Sources, conseils pour la conduite de l'esprit*], 2 vols. (1861) [7th book of the *Logic*]; *Peace* [*La paix*] (1861); *Discourse on the Intellectual Right of Christians* [*Discours sur le devoir intellectuel des chrétiens*] (1864); *The Sophists and Criticism* [*Les Sophistes et la critique*] (1864); *Small Manual of Criticism* [*Petit manuel de critique*] (1864); *Morality and the Law of History* [*La morale et la loi de l'histoire*], 2 vols. (1868); *Sources: Advice for the Direction of the Will* [*Les Sources, conseils pour la conduite de la volonté*], 2 vols. (1864) [8<sup>th</sup> book of the *Logic*]; *Unedited Meditations* [*Méditations inédites*] (1874); and *Exaltations, Prayers, and Thoughts* [*Elévations, prières et pensées*] (1919).

There are English translations of Gratry's *Logic*, 2 vols., trans. Helen Singer and Milton Singer (La Salle: The Open Court, 1944) [see also *The Mathematical Psychology of Gratry and Boole*, trans. Mary Boole (London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1897)], and a translation of his two *Les Sources* (1861 and 1868) as *The Well Springs*, trans. Stephen Brown (New York: Benzinger Brothers, 1931).

Gratry also wrote an autobiography, *Memories of My Youth* [*Souvenirs de ma jeunesse*] (1874) [see also his *Last Days and Spiritual Testament* [*Derniers jours et testament spirituel*] (1874), and works on theology: *The Month of Mary of the Immaculate Conception* [*Le Mois de Marie de l'Immaculée Conception*] (1859); *Commentary on the Gospel of Saint Matthew* [*Commentaire sur l'évangile de Saint Matthieu*], 2 vols. (1863); *The Crisis of Faith* [*La crise de la foi*] (1863); *Jesus Christ: Response to Mr. Renan* [*Jésus-Christ: réponse à Monsieur Renan*] (1864); *Henri Perreyve* (1866); *Msgr. Bishop of Orléans and Msgr. Archbishop of Malines* [*Mgr. l'évêque d'Orléans et Mgr. l'archevêque de Malines*] (1869) [this work written against papal infallibility was condemned by the Bishop of Strasburg and criticized in works by Prosper Guéranger (1806-1875), Victor Deschamps (1810-1883), Henri Ramière (1821-1884), Amédée de Margerie (1825-1905), Frédéric-Louis-de-Gonzague Colin (1835-1902), and others; Gratry retracted his views in 1871 after Vatican I]; and *Letters on Religion* [*Lettres sur la religion*] (1869).

161 Somewhat ironically Gratry tends to praise Aquinas more than Augustine in spite of the fact that he is much more Augustinian in spirit (see *The Knowledge of God*, Introduction, 5, p. [46 (v. I)]; II, 2, p. 364 [196 (v. II)]; see also *Logic*, v. II, VI, p. 412 [588]).

Paginations are from the English translations, and in brackets from the French edition of the *The Knowledge of God*, 2 vols. (1864) and the 4<sup>th</sup> French edition of the *Logic* (1858).

162 Gratry does admit with the traditionalists that there was a primitive revelation of God given to the first humans and that language itself is a divine gift. Yet importantly, for Gratry this tradition is not the only way to know God (*The Knowledge of God*, II, 3, p. 409 [278 (v. II)]; *The Knowledge of the Soul*, I, p. 120).

163 This is not to say that the improper use of reason is harmless to religion as exemplified by the pantheist Hegel who sanctions logical contradictions wherein Being is Not-Being (*The Knowledge of God*, Introduction, 1, p. [2-4 (v. I)]; 3, pp. [23, 25-28 (v. I)]; 4, p. [39 (v. I)]; I, 9, p. 342 [160-161 (v. II)]; II, 6, pp. 460-463 [362-368 (v. II)]; cf. *The Philosophy of Belief*, I, 4, pp. 23-26; cf. *Logic*, v. I, I, 3, pp. 55-56, 66-67 [143-144, 148-149]; v. I, II, 1, p. 115-120, 129 [178-181, 186]; v. II, V, 3, pp. 284-285 [510]).

164 Gratry also appeals to a teleological proof of God, i.e. the design of the heart and of the world for supporting life (*The Knowledge of God*, II, 8, pp. 320-322 [125-128 (v. II)]). Reason for him can also establish the freedom of the will and the immortality of the soul (*The Knowledge of the Soul*, section 5).

Note that Gratry is willing to call the natural operations of the soul, such as reason (the natural light) and the desire for God, gifts, assistances of God, or natural actual graces (*The Knowledge of God*, II, 2, p. 373 n. 1 [212 n. 1 (v. II)]; II, 3, pp. 404-410 [269-279 (v. II)]; II, 6, pp. 449, 453-455, 464-465 [345-346, 352-355, 369-371 (v. II)]).

165 Gratry thus distinguishes two types of atheists. There are mental atheists who deny the concept of God present to their minds but not the real God, and then there are willful atheists who truly reject God (*The Knowledge of God*, I, 9, p. 339 n. 1 [156 n. 2 (v. II)]).

166 Faith being defined by Gratry as a free assent of the intelligence and will to the truths which God reveals (*Logic*, v. I, Introduction, p. cxviii [93]).

167 Exceptions to this growth of Catholicism during the 1800s would include the imprisonment of the Pope by Napoleon from 1809-1814; the removal of the Jesuits from education in 1828; the temporary re-secularization of the Universities and the sack of the Archbishop of Paris's residence with the 1830 revolution; the (voluntary) closing of the French Jesuit houses in

1845; the murder of the Archbishop of Paris in the revolution of 1848; and the Paris Commune of 1871 which lead to the deaths of the Archbishop of Paris and 50 priests, and the take-over of churches which were used as clubs, offices, and storehouses.

168 The hostility toward religion at this time is well represented by the phrase of the journalist Alphonse Peyrat and the politician Léon Gambetta: "Clericalism is the enemy" [*Le cléricalisme, violâ l'ennemi*].

169 One can mention the famous tale of the Fable (V, 3) of La Fontaine being changed from "Let's hope that God offers life to it" [*Pourvu que Dieu lui prête vie*] to "Let's hope that life is offered to it" [*Pourvu que l'on lui prête vie*].

170 For more on Blondel see DAF (1911), v. II, pp. 569-612; MFP (1922), pp. 87-88, 165-166, 312-313; CTF (1926), pp. 203-208; PTRD (1928), pp. 200-201, 224-225; DTC (1931), v. I:2, pp. 1578-1579; SPC (1934), v. II, pp. 58-62; CPH (1941), v. II, pp. 355-375; PDG (1942), pp. 121-176; FOE (1947), v. II, pp. 127-143; HT (1947), v. III, pp. 217-220; CHAD (1949), v. II, pp. 91-96; IEC (1949), v. II, p. 1721; SHP (1955), pp. 951-952; HHP (1956), v. II, pp. 560-564; CRHP (1957), pp. 459-460; OLTK (1958), v. II, pp. 533-534; PAF (1958), pp. 277-294, 317-333; CEP (1961), pp. 121, 308-309; PTCW (1964), pp. 36-40; TCT (1965), pp. 37-58; RP (1966), pp. 360-362, 794-796; MHP (1967), pp. 389-390; NCE:1 (1967), pp. 617-618; RPF (1968), pp. 214-239; BHP (1969), v. VII, pp. 132-134, 146; TCP (1969), pp. 102-107; RCM (1970), pp. 187-196; SCT (1970), pp. 49-53; VCM (1970), pp. 79-82; HA (1971), pp. 203-208; HWP (1971), v. V, pp. 212-219; CHP (1974), v. IX, pp. 222-237; LT (1975), pp. 224-243; PFPM (1977), pp. 108-121; CP (1989-1990), v. I, pp. 543-584 and v. III, pp. 384-410; PHP (1988), p. 327; TCRT (1988), pp. 173-174; NCS (1989), pp. 249-250; TYT (1989), pp. 231-236; DP (1993), v. I, pp. 365-368; LTK (1993), v. II, pp. 528-529; ATH (1994), pp. 107-110; NT (1994), pp. 45-50, 52-54; HCEC (1995), p. 184; BDTC (1996), pp. 77-78; DPR (1996), pp. 58-59; CTE (1998), pp. 79-82; ATA (1999), pp. 103-105; BBKL (1999), v. XV, pp. 196-236; PCHP (1999), pp. 714-715; MCT (2000), v. I, pp. 360-362; FPTC (2001), pp. 89-93; CAHP (2003), pp. 330-331, 461-463, 768; NCE (2003), v. II, pp. 440-442; WPR (2003), pp. 157-160; EMFT (2004), pp. 93-94; ER (2004), v. II, p. 985; ACP (2005), pp. 297-299; EF (2006), v. II, pp. 1328-1333; EP (2006), v. I, pp. 617-619; TCFP (2006), pp. 14, 101-102.

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171 Blondel's *L'Action* was published first by Alcan in 1893 with 433 pages and then again by Alcan in 1893 with pages 401-495 revised and expanded (this later version was republished in 1950, 1973, and 1993).

Blondel is equally well-known for his later philosophical Trilogy (or Tetralogy, or even Pentalogy), winner of the Prix Jean Reynaud from the Académie des Sciences morales et politiques, which was comprised of *Thought* [*La Pensée*], 2 vols. (1934), *Being and Beings* [*L'Être et les Êtres*] (1935), *Action* [*L'Action*], 2 vols. (1936-1937) [the second volume is a reworking

of his 1893 version of Action]; *Philosophy and the Christian Spirit* [*La Philosophie et l'esprit chrétien*], 2 vols. (1944-1946) [third volume unfinished], and *Philosophical Requirements of Christianity* [*Exigences philosophiques du christianisme*] (1950).

Also of philosophical interest are Blondel's *On the Substantial Bond and on the Composite Substance according to Leibniz* [*De Vinculo Substantiali et de Substantia composita apud Leibnitium*] (1893) [reissued as *An Historical Enigma: The Substantial Bond according to Leibniz* [*Une Énigme historique, le vinculum substantiale d'après Leibniz*] (1930)]; *Elementary Principles of a Logic of the Moral Life* [*Principe élémentaire d'une logique de la vie morale*] (1903); *How to Realize the Integral Apologetics* [*Comment réaliser l'apologétique intégrale*] (1913) [under the pseudonym Bernard de Sailly]; *The Process of Intelligence* [*Le Procès de l'intelligence*] (1922) [with Paul Archambault]; *Léon Ollé-Laprune* (1923); *Philosophical Itinerary* [*L'Itinéraire philosophique*] (1928) [his philosophical autobiography]; *Homeland and Humanity* [*Patrie et Humanité*] (1928); *Struggle for Civilization and Philosophy of Peace* [*Lutte pour la civilisation et philosophie de la paix*] (1939); *Dialogues on Thought* [*Dialogues sur la pensée*] (1954); *Private Notebooks* [*Carnets intimes*], 2 vols. (1961-1966); *Aesthetical Notes* [*Notes d'esthétique*] (1973); and *Memoirs for Mr. Biell: Discernment of a Philosophical Vocation* [*Mémoire à Monsieur Biell: discernement d'une vocation philosophique*] (1999).

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*Revue du clergé français* 38 (1904), 405-416, 513-531; "Deux observations" [as François Mallet], *Revue du clergé français* 38 (1904), pp. 660-661; "Une simple explication" [as François Mallet], *Revue du clergé français* 39 (1904), pp. 209-212; "Les difficultés de croire," *Revue de clergé française* 41 (1904), pp. 202-205; "Notre programme" [with Lucien Laberthonnière], *Annales de philosophie chrétienne* 151 (1905), pp. 5-31; "Les ingrédients de la philosophie de l'action" [as Bernard de Sailly], *Annales de philosophie chrétienne* 151 (1905), pp. 180-195; "L'oeuvre du cardinal Dechamps et la méthode de l'apologétique" [as François Mallet], *Annales de philosophie chrétienne* 151 (1905), pp. 68-91; "Raisons de ne pas croire" [as François D.], *Annales de philosophie chrétienne* 151 (1905), pp. 278-283; "Les controverses sur la méthode apologétique du cardinal Dechamps," *Annales de philosophie chrétienne* 151 (1906), pp. 449-472, 625-646; "The Starting Point of Philosophical Research" ["Le point de départ de la recherché philosophique"], *Annales de philosophie chrétienne* 151 (1906), pp. 337-360 and 152 (1906), pp. 225-249; "L'oeuvre du cardinal Dechamps et les progrès récents de l'apologétique," *Annales de philosophie chrétienne* 153 (1907), pp. 561-591; "Une soutenance de thèse," *Annales de philosophie chrétienne* 154 (1907), pp. 113-143; "L'Anticartésianisme de Malebranche," *Revue de métaphysique et de morale* 23 (1916), pp. 1-26; "Le vrai et le faux intellectualisme," *Revue du clergé française* 99 (1919), pp. 383-387; "Un interprété de Spinoza: Victor Delbos," *Chronicon Spinozanum* I (1921), pp. 290-300; "Quand on n'a point de muées dans l'esprit," *La nouvelle journée* 20 (1922), pp. 83-84; "Le Jansénisme et l'antijansénisme de Pascal," *Revue de métaphysique et de morale* 30 (1923), pp. 131-163; "Le problème de Dieu en la philosophie," *Bulletin de la Société Français de Philosophie* 30:1 (1930), pp. 47-48; "Le quinzième centenaire de la mort de saint Augustin," *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* 37 (1930), pp. 423-469; "Les ressources latentes de la doctrine augustinienne," *Revue Neoscholastique de philosophie* XXXII (1930), pp. 261-275; "La fecondité toujours renouvelée de la pensée augustinienne," *Cahiers de la Nouvelle Journée* 17 (1930), pp. 3-20; "La notion de philosophie chrétienne," *Bulletin de la Société Française de Philosophie* 31 (1931), pp. 82-86; "Y a-t-il une philosophie chrétienne?," *Revue de métaphysique et de morale* 38 (1931), pp. 599-606; "The Problem of Catholic Philosophy" ["Le Problème de la philosophie catholique"], *Cahiers de la Nouvelle Journée* 20 (1932); "Une philosophie chrétienne est-elle rationnellement concevable?," *Revue des questions historiques* 116 (1932), pp. 389-393; "Le centre de perspective," *Archivio di filosofia* 1 (1932), pp. 3-15; "L'évolution du Spinozisme et l'accès qu'elle ouvre à la transcendance," *Archivio di filosofia* 28 (1932), pp. 1-12; "Le P. L. Laberthonnière (1860-1932)," *Revue de métaphysique et de morale* 39 (1932), Supplement, p. 16; "Pour la philosophie intégrale," *Revue néoscholastique de philosophie* 36 (1934); "La méthode

et le rôle de l'histoire de la philosophie," *Civita Moderna* (1936); "Le clef de voûte de système cartésien," *Cartesio* XL (1937); "Le problème de l'immortalité personnelle," *Vie spirituelle* 61 (1939), pp. 1-15; "La pérennité de la philosophie," *Revue de métaphysique et de morale* 47 (1940), pp. 349-363; "Dieu à l'école," *Esprit* 9 (1941), 304-316; "La philosophie ouverte," in Albert Beguin and Pierre Thevenaz, eds., *Henri Bergson: Essais et témoignages inédits* (Neuchâtel: Baconnière, 1941), pp. 304-316; "Une des formes de la spiritualité et de l'amitié de Léon Brunschvicg," *Revue de métaphysique et de morale* 50 (1945), pp. 12-17; "Philosophie de l'action," *Études philosophiques* 1 (1946), pp. 1-12; "Souplesse et sincérité de Leibniz," *Giornale di metafisica* 1 (1946), pp. 474-477; "The Inconsistency of Jean Paul Sartre's Logic," *Thomist* X:4 (1947), pp. 393-397; "La métaphysique comme science," *Revue de métaphysique et de morale* 52 (1947), pp. 193-200; "Existentialisme et philosophie de l'action," *Temps présent* 10:1 (1947); "Réponse à des méprises," *Giornale di metafisica* 3 (1948), pp. 44-48; "L'existentialisme est-il une philosophie véritable?," *Atti del congresso internazionale di filosofia* (Milan: Castellani, 1946), v. II, pp. 95-100; "Autonomie normale," *Library of the Tenth International Congress of Philosophy* (Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing, 1949), v. I, pp. 207-208; "Le devoir intégral de la philosophie," *Actas del primer congreso nacional de filosofia* (1949), v. II, pp. 884-889; "Paradoxe voie du renoncement et de la mort," *Études philosophiques* 4 (1949), pp. 166-168; "Sens, Possibilité et Necessité de Notre Méthode," *Teoresi*, V (1950), pp. 6-9; "Ébauche de logique générale," *Revue de métaphysique et de morale* 65 (1960), pp. 7-18; "Le dernier chapitre de L'Action," *Archives de philosophie* 24 (1961), pp. 29-113.

Blondel's books are being collected in *Oeuvres complètes* [MBOC], ed. Claude Troisfontaines (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1995- ). Many of his essays have been collected in *Maurice Blondel: Pages religieuses* (1942); *Études blondéliennes*, 3 vols. (1951-1954); *Les premiers écrits de Maurice Blondel* [PEMB], 2 vols. (1956); and *Dialogue avec les philosophes* (1966). In the early 1900s Blondel also published 104 articles including those titled Immanent, Immanence, Intellectualisme, Miracle, Transnaturel, Union, Union métaphysique, and Universel, in André Lalande, *Vocabulaire technique et critique de la philosophie* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1988).

Blondel additionally wrote several theological articles and books: "Histoire et dogme," *La Quinzaine* 56 (1904), pp. 145-167, 349-373, 435-458; "De la Valeur historique du dogme," *Bulletin de Littérature Ecclésiastique* 7 (1905), pp. 61-77; "La notion et le rôle du miracle" [under the pseudonym Bernard de Saily], *Annales de philosophie chrétienne* 154 (1907), pp. 337-362; *What is Faith?* [*Qu'est-ce que la foi?*] [as François Mallet] (1907; 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. 1908); "La Semaine Sociale de Bordeaux et le Monophorisme" [as Tes-

tis], *Annales de philosophie chrétienne* 159 (1909-1910), pp. 5-22, 162-184, 245-279, 377-392, 449-472, 561-592, and 160 (1910), pp. 27-62; "Le problème du miracle," *Bulletin de la Société Française de Philosophie* 12 (1912), pp. 152-162, 165-166; "Le problème de la mystique," in *Qu'est-ce que la mystique*, *Cahiers de la nouvelle journée* 3 (1925), pp. 1-63; "Jean Baruzi, Saint Jean de la Croix, et le problème de la valeur noétique de l'expérience mystique," *Bulletin de la société française de philosophie* 25 (1925), pp. 85-88; and "Pensées sur l'Église," *Études* 305 (1960), pp. 145-153.

See also Blondel's many letters: *Maurice Blondel-Auguste Valensin: Correspondence*, 3 vols. (1957-1965); *Au coeur de la crise moderniste* (1960); *Lettres philosophiques de Maurice Blondel* (1961); *Maurice Blondel-Lucien Laberthonnière: Correspondence* (1961); *Blondel et Teilhard de Chardin: Correspondance* (1965); *Henri Bremond et Maurice Blondel: Correspondence*, 3 vols. (1970-1971); *Correspondance de Maurice Blondel et Joannes Wehrle*, 2 vols. (1969).

Some translations of Blondel into English are "The Latent Resources in St. Augustine's Thought," tr. Joseph Leonard, in *A Monument to St. Augustine: Essays on His Age, Life, and Thought* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1945), pp. 319-367; "The Unity of the Christian Spirit," [translation of *Exigences philosophiques du christianisme*, chapters 4 and 5], trans. George Brantl, *Cross Currents* 3 (1951), pp. 1-12; "The Intellectual Aspect and the Permanent Unity of the Christian Spirit," [translation of *Exigences philosophiques du christianisme*, chapter 2], tr. Aloysius Robert Caponigri, in *Modern Catholic Thinkers* (New York: Harpers and Row, 1960), pp. 563-573; "Philosophy Fulfilled in Christianity," [translation of *Exigences philosophiques du christianisme*, chapter 6], *Theology Digest* 11 (1963), pp. 27-32; "Reflections on the Church," tr. Donna Lawler, *Continuum* 3:2 (1965), pp. 224-228; *Action*, tr. Oliva Blanchette (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984); "What is Faith?," trans. Thomas Gerard Connolly, *Communio* 2 (1987), pp. 162-192; "A Recollection Sent to a Priest of Saint Sulpice," trans. John Lyon, *Communio* 20 (1993), pp. 708-720; *The Letter on Apologetics and History and Dogma*, trans. Alexander Dru and Iltyd Trethowan (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994); "The Third Testis Article" [translation of part of "La Semaine Sociale de Bordeaux et le Monophorisme"], trans. Peter Bernardi, *Communio* 26 (1999), pp. 846-874; and *The Idealist Illusion and Other Essays*, tr. Fiachra Long (Kluwer, 2000).

172 Blondel is here influenced by Gratry (*The Knowledge of God*, Introduction, pp. 22, 50; I, 9, p. 154 [338]).

173 Blondel also rejects the philosophy of Nihilism or Pessimism [as found in Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860) and Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900)]. The nihilist embraces the idea that everything is perishable and

will be annihilated in the end, all persons, lives, and acts. Since the nihilist accepts that everything will one day die, the nihilist prescribes turning the will from its attachment to being and instead loving nothingness (*Action*, II, 1, pp. 36-39, 41-42 [23, 25, 27, 29-30]). Thus what the nihilist says is called for is “to kill within ourselves not the being that is not, but the chimerical will to be, to consent to the non-being of the human person, to wound desire and all love of life even to its deepest roots” (*Action*, II, 1, p. 41 [29]).

Yet once again there is a double and contradictory will in the nihilist. For the nihilist affirms the nothingness of persons, lives, and reality and yet seeks a true knowledge and a truly satisfying existence. In other words the nihilist can only deny (phenomenal) being by being cognizant of a greater being that is to be sought (*Action*, II, 1-2, pp. 42, 45-49 [30, 33-38]). Thus we find in the nihilist “a merciless conflict between the primitive will for nothingness that is inspired by a true love of being, and this appetite for the phenomenon which, through the sophisms of sensuality or the proud perversions of the mind, propels the faltering will to the very place from which it had excluded itself” (*Action*, II, 2, p. 47 [35]). The nihilist denies being and yet desires being. For the nihilist must love being in order to hate it so much; the nihilist first conceives something positive and then denies it, and indeed derives satisfaction from these pessimistic views of life (*Action*, Introduction, p. 14 [xxiii]).

174 Conversely, motives need mobiles (energies, urges) both in the world and in our bodies to effectively realize themselves (*Action*, pp. III, ii, 1, p. 112 [107]; III, iii, 1 and 3, 153, 157, 177-181, 183-184, 187-188 [153, 158, 181-184, 186-187, 189-190, 192, 194,]; III, iv, 2-3, pp. 207, 228 [214, 239]; *Being and Beings*, II, 1, p. 80; III, 3, pp. 260-265). For acting “is a systematic concentration of the diffuse life in us; it is a taking possession of oneself. Revealing what is obscurely at work in the unknown depths of life, it brings to light and gathers into a visible bundle those impalpable threads that form the network of the individuality” (III, iii, 3, p. 188 [194]).

175 Furthermore, moral conscience, with its revelation of a moral law, implies that life has an ultimate meaning, i.e. that the human being has a final end and destiny and that there is an ultimate divine reality (*Action*, III, v, 1-2, pp. 272-273, 283 [289-292, 304]; V, 3, pp. 398-400, 402 [435-437, 440]; *Being and Beings*, p. 359). For the aspiration of the will does not find in the universe the wherewithal to spend all of itself, but rather needs to embrace an ideal order in its totality (*Action*, III, v, 1-2, pp. 272, 274-277, 279-281, 283 [290, 293-296, 298, 300-301, 303]; V, 3, p. 390 [425]; Conclusion, p. 425 [468]). Blondel writes: “The end from which reflected action seems to experience an imperious need to suspend itself is an absolute, something

independent and definitive that would be outside the sequence of phenomena, a real outside the real, a divine" (*Action*, III, v, 2, p. 283 [303]).

176 Blondel's notion of God as a necessary being is thus quite different from the standard Thomistic notion. For Thomists, God is a necessary being in the sense that God is uncreated and exists from His own essence. For Blondel God is a necessary being in that God is just what humans need, God is necessary for human happiness.

177 Blondel compares the process of coming to know God to that of running into a friend in the darkness: "Without knowing its name and nature, we can sense its approach and as it were feel its contact, just as in silence and darkness we hear the step, we touch the hand of a friend whom we do not yet recognize" (*Action*, IV, i, 3, p. 315 [340]; cf. *Action*, IV, i, 3, pp. 324-325 [351]).

He later presents arguments for the immortality of the soul. For thought, as it seeks the eternal and universal, as well as union with God, is independent of the world and transcends time and bodily death (*Thought*, v. II, VI, 1-2, pp. 242-278; *Philosophy and the Christian Spirit*, v. II, 5, pp. 222-226).

178 Hence he criticizes the Romanticism of Chateaubriand by saying that while his arguments have a place they are not enough: it is as though "A canvas of Raphael forms a secure shield against the unrelenting sword of dialectic" ("Letter on the Requirements of Contemporary Thought," I, 4, p. 137 [PEMB, pp. 16-17]; cf. Introduction, pp. 127-128 [PEMB, pp. 5-8]; I, 1, p. 130 [PEMB, pp. 8-9]; I, 4, p. 138 [PEMB, p. 18]).

179 In point of fact, Blondel argues that even the human desire for the good and the movement of the will seeking satisfaction are divine gifts, i.e. supernatural in a sense (*Action*, IV, ii, 2, pp. 355, 357 [386, 388]; V, 1, p. 367 [398]; cf. "Letter on the Requirements of Contemporary Thought," I, 5, p. 143 [PEMB, p. 24]; II, 3, p. 162 [PEMB, p. 43-44]). Hence scholars such as Henri Bouillard, Henry Duméry, and Leo Zonneveld have debated just to what extent humans can have a natural knowledge of God as the one thing necessary for Blondel (Bouillard claims that our knowledge of God comes from an "undetermined supernatural" whereas Scripture is due to the "revealed supernatural"). Blondel himself speaks of the simple notion of the supernatural versus the essence of the supernatural, still it is not clear to what exactly these refer (see *Action*, V, 2, p. 374 n. 1 [407 n. 1]; "Letter on the Requirements of Contemporary Thought," II, 2, p. 158 [PEMB, p. 40]; Letter of April 4<sup>th</sup> 1897).

Additionally, Blondel criticizes Étienne Gilson's view of Christian philosophy wherein Divine Revelation can and should provide content to one's philosophical system (though he accepts that revelation can push philoso-

phy to seek for better answers and also confirm and purify natural truths). Blondel instead holds that philosophy must be wholly autonomous and independent of Revelation (hence Blondel would prefer to speak of a Catholic philosophy in the sense of a system of thought that is perennial and universal, rather than of a Christian philosophy). For the task of philosophy is to show its fundamental insufficiency and openness to receiving Revelation. Thus for Blondel, Revelation assists philosophy, not by contributing ideas, but by suggesting its radical insufficiency and its difference from but need for faith (*Action*, V, p. 361 [393]; see *Action*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., vol. II, Introduction, pp. 10-11; *The Problem of Catholic Philosophy*, III, 1-3, pp. 128-129, 134, 149, 162-165, 167-169, 172, 177; *Philosophy and the Christian Spirit*, v. I, 1, pp. 4-5, 30; *Philosophical Requirements of Christianity*, I, 2, pp. 38-39, 41-42, I, 6, pp. 108-110 [see translations "The Intellectual Aspect and the Permanent Unity of the Christian Spirit," pp. 564, 566, and "Philosophy Fulfilled in Christianity," p. 32]; "Letter on the Requirements of Contemporary Thought," Introduction, pp. 128 [PEMB, pp. 7]; III, 2-3, pp. 188-189, 206 [PEMB, pp. 73-75, 94]).

Blondel sums up his view on the relation of faith and reason (theology and philosophy) by claiming that while their domains are heterogeneous and incommensurable (i.e. independent of each other), they are at the same time symbiotic (i.e. they mutually penetrate each other) (*Philosophy and the Christian Spirit*, v. I, Appendix, p. 235 and v. II, Appendix, pp. 284-286; cf. *Action*, V, 1, pp. 361-362 [393]); *The Problem of Catholic Philosophy*, III, 3, p. 168; "La Semaine Sociale de Bordeaux et le Monophorisme," pp. 8, 68; *Maurice Blondel-Auguste Valensin: Correspondence*, v. III, pp. 105, 222).

180 Blondel is accordingly critical of Thomism as it is too extrinsic (he thus calls it a monophorism or "sole payment"). It fails to show how our nature demands grace and instead makes grace merely an optional addition ("Letter on the Requirements of Contemporary Thought," I, 6, pp. 146-148 [PEMB, pp. 27-30]; II, 1, pp. 154-155 [PEMB, pp. 36-37]; III, 1, 3, pp. 171, 174-179, 205 [PEMB, pp. 54, 57-63, 92]; but cf. III, 2, pp. 191-192 [PEMB, p. 77]; *The Problem of Catholic Philosophy*, I, 3, p. 47; II, 5, p. 118). Still, Blondel taught on Aquinas at Aix and also had the Prefect for Education include Aquinas on the licentiate study list.

Blondel therefore famously rejects the idea of a state of pure nature, i.e. of a nature completely cut off from grace, and so which is self-contained and suffices in itself for human perfection (or of what he also calls a separated philosophy or a natural Christianity). Instead he argues that the supernatural always penetrates nature and stimulates humans by giving them a deep exigency for God. Indeed, from the point of view of nature, the supernatural is necessary as our nature needs God to be sufficient ("La

Semaine sociale de Bordeaux et le monophorisme," pp. 7-8, 32-33, 35; "The Third Testis Article," pp. 861-862, 865-866, 868-869 ["Le Semaine sociale de Bordeaux et le monophorisme," pp. 55-57, 59-60, 63-66]; "History and Dogma," III, p. 283 [PEMB, p. 223]; "A Recollection Sent to a Priest of Saint Sulpice," pp. 714-715; *Being and Beings*, Appendix, pp. 497-499; *Action*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., v. II, Appendix, pp. 513-524; *Philosophical Requirements of Christianity*, I, 6, pp. 97-101, 110-111, I, 13-14, pp. 164-187, and Appendix, pp. 300-303 [see translation "Philosophy Fulfilled in Christianity," pp. 27-28, 32]; *Philosophy and the Christian Spirit*, v. I, 5, pp. 108-111, and Appendix, pp. 257-265; *The Problem of Catholic Philosophy*, I, 2-3, pp. 25-26, 31-32, 48-49; II, 4-5, pp. 105-110, 123; III, 2-3, pp. 157, 161, 171). Thus the concrete state of humans, which Blondel calls the transnatural state, is one wherein humans have suffered a fall but yet are influenced by an inner graced call for the divine (and only in this way can they welcome and further assimilate God's grace) ("The Third Testis Article," p. 866 [62]; *Philosophy and the Christian Spirit*, v. I, Appendix, pp. 313-317; *The Problem of Catholic Philosophy*, III, 3, p. 171). Blondel writes: "... humanity is being worked on and as it were raised by a grace that, even when it is still anonymous or pseudonymous, can guide it in advance of the gift from on high that Revelation brings and the Church proposes ... [not] that nothing supernatural comes except by express presentation by an external authority and into a receptacle, devoid of all spontaneity" (as translated in "The Third Testis Article," pp. 864-865 ["La Semaine sociale de Bordeaux et le monophorisme," p. 60]).

Blondel's works were referred to the Congress for the Index in 1897 but never censored. It is claimed by some that certain condemnations of the Magisterium applied to Blondel, such as the condemnation of those who employ the method of immanence mentioned in the encyclical *Pascendi Dominici Gregis* (1907), sec. 37 ("... they seem to admit that there is in human nature not only a capacity and suitability for the supernatural order ... but an actual exigency in the true sense" – Denz. 2103); the Proscription of the Congregation of the Holy Office of December 1, 1924, sec. 5, 8, and 11 ("... truth is always coming into being, and it consists in the progressive adequation of intellect and life" (sec. 5), "The value which arguments of this kind can have does not originate from their evidence or dialectical force but from the subjective exigencies of life or action" (sec. 8), "The apology which proceeds extrinsically ... is a weak and puerile method" (sec. 11) [see *Il Monitore Ecclesiastico* 50 (1925), pp. 194-195]); and the encyclical *Humani generis* (1950), sec. 26 ("Others destroy the true gratuity of the supernatural order, since they assert that God cannot produce beings endowed with an intellect without ordering and calling them to the beatific vision" – DH, 3891).

181 Blondel took some heat for his saying that at times one may even be called upon to initially act as if one had faith (even when one doesn't) and that from this submission, one can go on to discover sufficient reasons for affirming the reality of God and revelation and acquire the certitude of faith (*Action*, V, 1-2, pp. 370-372, 376 [402-404, 408]; Conclusion, p. 446 [492]; cf. *Action*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., v. II, Appendix, 13, pp. 460-461; cf. "Letter on the Requirements of Contemporary Thought," I, 4, pp. 140 [PEMB, p. 20]; "History and Dogma," III, pp. 273-274 [PEMB, pp. 211-212]).

182 Blondel expands his philosophy in his later Tetralogy. His *Thought* (1934) analyzes the nature of thought in its spontaneous ascent from cosmos (cosmic thought), to organism (psychic thought), and to human consciousness (thinking thought [*pensée pensante*] which is a combination of universal, abstract, and rational noetic thought and concrete, singular, and ineffable pneumatic thought) in a search for unity, intelligibility, objectivity, and solidarity. He shows that human thought with its dual nature cannot completely combine noetic and pneumatic thought and achieve total understanding; hence is impelled to go beyond itself until it posits a total, infinite, unified Thought. In particular human thinking thought cannot satisfy the desire for thought thought (an immediate intuition giving objective knowledge wherein the noetic and pneumatic are united) without God (cf. "The Elementary Principle of a Logic of the Moral Life," in *The Idealist Illusion and Other Essays*, p. 104 [PEMB, p. 138]).

Similarly, in *Being and Beings* (1935), Blondel examines the being of the world as it evolves from cosmic to physical and spiritual being in search of a more complete and self-sufficient being. In so doing he shows how being receives its full expression in an absolute Being that is pure act (upon which all contingent beings depend).

In the second edition of his *Action* (1936-1937), Blondel analyzes action in all of its forms (including human action) and finds it seeks the absolute act of God in which thought, being, and action are perfectly unified.

In his last two works, *Philosophy and the Christian Spirit* (1944-1946) and *Philosophical Requirements of Christianity* (1950), Blondel argues that philosophy shows us that Christianity satisfies the Requirements of thought as well as the needs of the will. Hence philosophy shows us the need to choose to accept a supernatural revelation. And this revelation nourishes thought and allows it to develop in novel ways.

183 Contemporary Catholic philosophers who also followed Saint Augustine include François-Pierre-Gonthier Maine de Biran (1766-1824) [somewhat; also a Spiritualist]; François Auguste René de Chateaubriand (1768-1848) [see Chapter One of this book]; the mathematician Jean Baptiste Bordas-Demoulin (1798-1859); Louis Vitet (1802-1873), of the

École Normale Supérieure; Fr. Henri-Louis-Charles Maret (1804-1884), of the Sorbonne [also a Traditionalist]; Désiré Nisard (1806-1888), of the Collège de France and the École Normale Supérieure; Cardinal Victor Dechamps (1810-1883); François Huet (1814-1869), of the University of Ghent; Fr. Friedrich Michelis (1815-1886), at the University of Paderborn, the Collegium Borromaeum in Münster, and the Lyceum Hosianum in Braunsberg [excommunicated; became an Old Catholic]; the American Paulist Isaac Hecker (1819-1888) [also an Ontologist]; Jean-Félix Nourrisson (1825-1899), at the Collège Stanislas and the Collège de France; Amédée de Margerie (1825-1905), of the Catholic University of Lille; Elme Marie Caro (1827-1887) [also Integralist and Spiritualist], a non-practicing Catholic of the École Normale Supérieure; Ernest Hello (1828-1885); the German Paul von Schanz (1841-1905), at the University of Tübingen; the Italian novelist Antonio Fogazzaro (1842-1911) [also a Modernist]; the Ursuline Jules Martin (c. 1844-1915), at the House of Studies in Sommières; François Mallet (1849-1925) at the University of Aix-en-Provence; the Jesuit Eugène Portalié (1852-1909), at Scholasticates in Rome, Uclès, and Vals; Georges Fonsegrive [Yves Le Querdec] (1852-1917) [somewhat], of the Lycée Buffon; Fr. Charles Denis (1860-1905); the Oratorian Lucien Laberthonnière (1860-1932), at the College of Juilly; Victor Delbos (1862-1916), of the Sorbonne [somewhat]; Fr. Johannes Wehrle (1864-1938); Fr. Henri Bremond (1865-1933), who taught at the Jesuit colleges of Dole, Moulins, Saint-Étienne, and Lyon [somewhat; also an Integralist]; Henri Lorin (1866-1932) [Blondel's student], president of Les Semaines Sociales de France; Albert Bazaillas (1867-1924) at the lycée Condorcet; Fr. Camille Mano (1870-1924), at the Catholic Institute of Toulouse; the Italian Fr. Luigi Sturzo (1871-1959), at the seminary of Caltagirone; Bishop Gabriel Brunhes (1874-1949), at the seminary of Saint-Flour; Joseph Wilbois (1874-1952) [Blondel's Student], founder of the *École d'humanité contemporaines*; the lawyer Joseph Malègue (1876-1940); Fr. Ambroise de Poulpiquet (1878-1915) [also a Thomist]; Armando Carlini (1878-1959), at the University of Pisa [mostly an Existentialist and Christian Spiritualist]; the Jesuit Auguste Valensin (1879-1953), of the Catholic University of Lyon [Blondel's student]; Luis Ruy (1879-1964); the Italian Ernesto Buonaiuti (1881-1946), at the University of Rome [also a Modernist]; the Jesuit Blaise Romeyer (1882-1954), at the Scholasticate of Vals; Paul Archambault (183-1950), of the École Fénelon in Paris; the German Bernhard Rosenmöller (1883-1974), at the Institute for Scientific Pedagogy in Münster and the University of Breslau; the Pole Fr. Augustyn Jakubisiak (1884-1945); the Assumptionist Fulbert Cayré (1884-1971); Pierre Lachèze-Rey (1885-1957), at the Universities of Toulouse and Lyons [also a Spiritualist]; Jacques Paliard (1887-1953), at the University of

Aix-en-Provence [Blondel's student]; Frédéric Lefèvre (1889-1949); the German Johannes Hessen (1889-1971), of the University of Cologne; the German Jesuit Erich Przywara (1889-1972), of the seminary in Pullach [also followed Newman's Integralism and Phenomenology]; the Italian Vincenzo La Via (1895-1961), at the University of Catania; the Frenchman Jules Chaix-Ruy (c. 1896-1980); the Jesuit Cardinal Henri de Lubac (1896-1991), the co-founder of The New Theology [*La nouvelle théologie*] and *Sources Chrétiennes*, and professor at the Catholic University of Lyon; the Frenchman Henri Gaston Gouhier (1898-1994), at the Universities of Lille and Bordeaux, and the Sorbonne; the Jesuit Yves de Montcheuil (1900-1944), at the Catholic Institute of Paris; the German Franciscan Philotheus Boehner (1901-1955), of St. Bonaventure University, New York; Jean Guittion (1901-1999), of the Sorbonne; the Argentinian Angel Vassallo (1902-1978), at the University of Buenos Aires; Bishop Eugen Seiterich (1903-1958), at the University of Freiburg; Henri Marrou (1904-1977), of the University of Lyons and the Sorbonne; the Jesuit Cardinal Jean Daniélou (1905-1974), co-founder of the New Theology and the *Sources Chrétiennes* (1946- ), and professor at the Catholic Institute of Paris; Étienne Borne (1907-1993), at the Lycée Henri-IV in Paris [also a Personalist]; Vernon Bourke (1907-1998), at St. Louis University [also a Thomist]; the French Jesuit Henri Bouillard (1908-1981), of the Jesuit House of Studies in Lyons-Fourvière and the Catholic Institute of Paris [partially]; the Italian Giulio Bonafede (1910-1995), at the University of Palermo [also an Ontologist]; the Dominican André-Marie Dubarle (1910-2002), at the Dominican House of Studies at Le Saulchoir; Pierre Courcelle (1912-1980), of the Collège de France; Fr. Charles Moeller (1912-1986), at the University of Louvain [also follower of Newman]; the Pole Waław Eborowicz (1915-1994), at the Seminary of Pelplin; André Mandouze (1916-2006), at the University of Algiers and the Sorbonne; Fr. Henry Duméry (1920- ), of the University of Caen [also a Phenomenologist]; Fr. Albert Cartier (fl. 1955-1982); Fr. Claude Tresmontant (1927-1997), of the Sorbonne; the English-Canadian politician Charles Taylor (1931- ), of the University of Oxford and McGill University [somewhat]; Albert Raffelt (c. 1940- ), at Albert-Ludwigs-Universität in Freiburg [also Transcendental Thomist]; and the American Augustinian Fr. Roberto Dodaro (1955- ), of the Institutum Patristicum in Rome.

184 Several Thomists (as well as thinkers from other schools) were naturally quite critical of the Augustinian-flavored thought of Gratry and Blondel.

Critics of Gratry include: the Jesuit Henri Ramière (1821-1884); Fr. Auguste-Théodore-Paul de Broglie (1834-1895), of the Catholic Institute of Paris, who was assassinated in 1895; and Fr. Ferdinand Gombault (1858-1947).

Critics of Blondel (and Augustinianism) include: the Integrist Jesuit Julien Fontaine (1839-1917); the Jesuit Heinrich Schaaf (fl. 1902-1912), of the Gregorian; the Jesuit Christian Pesch (1853-1925), at the Jesuit House of Studies in Valkenburg, Netherlands; the Integrist Jesuit Bernard Gaudeau (1854-1925), of the Gregorian the Dominican politician Hippolyte Gayraud (1856-1911), known for his anti-semitic political platform; the former Jesuit Stéphen Coubé (1857-1938), Canon of Orléans et Cambrai; the Dominican Ambroise Gardeil (1859-1931), professor at the Le Saulchoir Dominican House of Studies in Belgium; the Dominican Marie-Benoît Schwalm (1866-1908), who taught at the Dominican House of Studies in Flavigny; the Jesuit Joseph de Tonquédec (1868-1962), the official exorcist of Paris; the reconvert Dominican Ernst Bernard Allo (1873-1945), at the University of Fribourg; the Jesuit Suarezian Pedro Descoqs (1877-1946), at the Jesuit House of Studies in Jersey; the Dominican Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange (1877-1964), of the Angelicum; the Dominican Marie Dominique Roland-Gosselin (1883-1934), at the Catholic Institute of Paris; Jacques Maritain (1882-1973), at the Catholic Institute of Paris; Étienne Gilson (1884-1976), at the Sorbonne, Collège de France, and the University of Toronto; the Dominican Marie-Michel Labourdette (1908-1990), of the Catholic Institute of Toulouse; and the Dominican Jean-Hervé Nicolas (1910-2001), of the Catholic Institute of Toulouse.

More appreciative of Augustinianism were such Thomists as the Jesuit Xavier-Marie Le Bachelet (1855-1925), of the Seminary in Jersey and Lyon-Fourrière; Pierre-Henri Batiffol (1861-1929), at the Catholic University of Toulouse, one of whose books was placed on the Index of Forbidden Books in 1907 and he was dismissed from his post in 1908; the Dominican Antonin-Gilbert Sertillanges (1863-1948), of the Catholic Institute of Paris; the Dominican Hyacinthe Petitot (1880-1934); the Jesuit Charles Boyer (1884-1980), of the Scholasticate in Vals and the Gregorian in Rome; Régis Jolivet (1891-1966), at the Catholic Institute of Lyons; the Swiss Cardinal Charles Journer (1891-1975), at the seminary in Fribourg; Bruno De Solages (1895-1983), of the Catholic Institute of Toulouse; and the Belgian Canon Roger Aubert (1914- ), of the University of Louvain.

185 Many Catholics illegally (punishable by a fine of 100 pounds) sent their children to be educated at one of the British Catholic colleges that arose in such foreign cities as Antwerp, Bruges, Liège and Louvain, Belgium; Bordeaux, Douai, Nantes, Paris, Poitiers, St. Omer, and Toulouse, France; Rome, Italy; Lisbon, Portugal; and Alcalá, Madrid, Salamanca, Santiago de Compostela, Seville, and Valladolid, Spain.

186 Catholic uprisings such as the aforementioned Pilgrimage of Grace (1536-1537), as well as the Prayer Book Rebellion (1549), the Northern

Rising (1569), and the Scottish Jacobite Risings (1715, 1745); Catholic persecutions of Anglicans under Queen Mary I (1553-1558) in which nearly 300 Anglicans were executed including William Tyndale, Hugh Latimer, Nicholas Ridley, and Thomas Cranmer; Catholic plots against Protestants such as the Gunpowder Plot (1605) and the Oates Plot (1678-81); and the Plague (1665) and Great Fire of London (1666) which were blamed on Catholics, subsequently fanned the flame of hatred and persecution of British Catholics. Indeed a Monument to the Fire of London was erected in 1676 and anti-Catholic sentiments engraved on it in subsequent years (1681, 1688): "the most dreadful Burning of this City; begun and carried on by the treachery and malice of the Popish faction" ... "Popish frenzy, which wrought such horrors, is not yet quenched."

187 For more on the life and thought of John Henry Newman see: THP (1903), p. 642; CE (1911), v. X, pp. 794-800; DTC (1931), v. XI:1, pp. 327-398; SPC (1934), pp. 90-92; HYBP (1950), pp. 185-200; HT (1952), v. II, pp. 225-237; IEC (1952), v. VIII, pp. 1800-1806; SHP (1955), pp. 949-950; PAF (1958), pp. 343-348; OLTk (1962), v. VII, pp. 932-936; HBP (1965), pp. 265-266; RNT (1965), pp. 3-6, 32-36; HYP (1966), p. 99; RP (1966), pp. 819-820; RTN (1966), pp. 269-287; BSHP (1968), pp. 217-220; BHP (1969), v. VII, pp. 49-51; SCT (1970), pp. 40-42, 170-175; HA (1971), pp. 184-188; HWP (1971), v. V, pp. 204-208; CHAD (1982), v. IX, pp. 1183-1188; CHP (1985), v. VIII, pp. 510-525; NCRT (1985), v. II, pp. 69-109; CP (1987), v. I, pp. 698-736; RR (1989), pp. 167-185; TYT (1989), pp. 88-89; DP (1993), v. II, pp. 2100-2101; ATH (1994), pp. 84-86; HCEC (1995), pp. 913-915; CCI (1996), pp. 52-56, 74-85, 104-105; CTE (1998), pp. 54-57; LTK (1998), v. VII, pp. 795-797; REP (1998), v. VI, pp. 821-823; MCT (2000), pp. 200-210; PRNE (2000), pp. 22-39; DNBP (2002), v. II, pp. 859-866; TNJ (2002), pp. 127-143; CAHP (2003), pp. 331-332, 796; NCE (2003), v. X, pp. 331-340; ER (2004), v. X, pp. 6510-6512; FKCT (2004), pp. 195-198; ACP (2005), pp. 265-269; EP (2005), v. VI, pp. 576-583; EF (2006), v. VIII, pp. 7877-7879.

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188 Newman's quarrel with the particular formulation of the Doctrine of Infallibility on the part of some bishops (a doctrine which he nonetheless did accept) may also have had something to do with his reluctance to attend the First Vatican Council.

Newman's view of the development of doctrine was also very controversial. Newman held that revelation gives us the fundamental truths of religion and that these truths cannot change. However, Newman also held that our understanding of these truths can deepen over time. Thus there can be a genuine development of doctrine. He gives seven characteristics of genuine development in his work *On the Development of Christian Doctrine*, chapter five: 1) Preservation of Type (preservation of basic teachings); 2) Continuity of Principles; 3) Power of Assimilation (ability to absorb new ideas); 4) Logical Sequence (logically coherence); 5) Anticipation of Its Future (hints of current teachings found in early sources); 6) Conservative Action upon Its Past (additions add to but do not alter past teachings); 7) Chronic Vigour.

Newman's view that Scripture can be in error in non-essential teachings is also said by some to be implicitly condemned in Leo XIII's encyclical *Providentissimus Deus* (1893), sec. 20-21.

189 Besides his *Grammar of Assent* (1870), Newman's philosophy is found in his *Oxford University Sermons*, 1826-1843 (1843; 1872), his *Twelve Theses on Faith* (1937) [see the *Gregorianum* 18 (1937), pp. 219-260], *Proof of Theism* (1961) [published in *The Argument from Conscience to the Existence of God according to John Henry Newman* (1961), pp. 103-166], *The Philosophical Notebook of John Henry Newman*, v. II (1970), and *The Theological Papers of John Henry Newman on Faith and Certainty* (1976). See as well Collins, James, *Philosophical Readings in Cardinal Newman* [PR] (Chicago: Regnery, 1961).

Newman also wrote "Two Letters Addressed to *The Christian Observer*," *The Christian Observer* 20 (1821), pp. 293-295 [see PR, pp. 50-54]; articles on "Apollonius of Tyana," "Cicero," "Elements of Logic" [with Richard Whately], and "Miracles," for the *Encyclopaedia Metropolitana* (1823-1826), Platonic-inspired articles in the *London Review* (1825-1826); and articles in the *Contemporary Review* (1884-1886) including "Revelation in Its Relation to Faith" (1885) where he defended his epistemology against charges of scepticism raised by the Congregationalist Andrew Fairbairn (see *Theological Papers on Faith and Certainty*, VIII, pp. 140-157).

Newman's theological writings during his Anglican Period include: *Two Essays on Biblical and Ecclesiastical Miracles* (1826; 1843; 1870); *The Arians of the Fourth Century* (1833; 2nd ed. 1871); "The Church of the Fathers," in the *British Magazine* (1833-1836; 2nd ed. 1840); *Elucidations of Dr. Hampden's Theological Statements* (1836); *Lectures on the Prophetical Office of the Church* (1837) [republished as *The Via Media of the Anglican Church* in 1877]; *Lectures on Justification* (1838; 2nd ed. 1874); *Sermons Bearing on Subjects of the Day* (1843; 2nd ed. 1869); *Parochial and Plain Sermons, 1834-1843*, 8 vols. (1868); as well as translations of Cyprian (1839) [with Charles Thornton], Athanasius (1842-1844, 2nd ed. 1881), and Claude Fleury's *Ecclesiastical History* (1842-1844).

Newman's theological writings as a Catholic include his *An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine* (1845); *Discourses Addressed to Mixed Congregations* (1849); *Lectures on Certain Difficulties Felt by Anglicans in Catholic Teaching* (1850); *Lectures on the Present Position of Catholics in England* (1851); *Sermons Preached on Various Occasions* (1857, 2nd ed. 1874); *Lectures and Essays on University Subjects* (1859); *Mr. Kingsley and Dr. Newman: A Correspondence on Whether Dr. Newman Teaches that Truth is No Virtue?* (1864; 2nd ed. 1913); *Letter to the Reverend E.B. Pusey* (1865); *Discussions and Arguments on Various Subjects* (1872); *Essays Critical and Historical*, 2 vols. (1872); *Historical Sketches*, 3 vols. (1872); *Tracts Theological and Ecclesiastical* (1872); *Orate pro anima Jacobi Roberti Hope Scott* (1873); *Letter to the Duke of Norfolk* (1875); *Stray Essays on Controversial Points* (1890); *My Campaign in Ireland* (1896); *Addresses to Cardinal Newman with His Replies, 1879-1881* (1905); *Sermon Notes of John Henry Newman, 1849-1879* (1913); *Faith and Prejudice and Other Unpublished Sermons* (1956); *Catholic Sermons* (1957); and *The Theological Papers of John Henry Newman on Biblical Inspiration and on Infallibility, 1861-1868* (1979).

His theological essays include "Home Thoughts Abroad," *British Magazine* (1836); "The State of Religious Parties," *British Critic* (1839); "Catholicity of the English Church" (1840) and other articles in the *British Critic* (1836-1842); "Retraction of Anti-Catholic Statements," *Conservative Journal* (1843); *Cathedra Sempiterna* (1852); "Christianity and Physical Science" (1855) [Lecture at the University of Dublin]; "Christianity and Scientific Investigation" (1855) [Lecture at the University of Dublin]; "On Consulting the Faithful in Matters of Doctrine," in *The Rambler* (1859); "Lying and Equivocation" Appendix in *Apologia pro vita sua* (1865); "On the Inspiration of Scripture," in *The Nineteenth Century* (1884); "Development of Religious Error," in *The Contemporary Review* (1885); "The Newman-Perrone Paper on Development," *Gregorianum* 16 (1935), pp. 402-447; "On the Development of Doctrine," *Gregorianum* 39 (1958), pp. 585-596.

Newman is also well known for his *The Idea of a University* (1873) [containing *Discourses on the Scope and Nature of University Education* (1852) and *Lectures and Essays on University Subjects* (1859)] and his great autobiography *Apologia pro vita sua* (1865).

Finally, Newman wrote various literary pieces: the hymn *Lead, Kindly Light* [*The Pillar of the Cloud*] (1832); poems in the journal *Lyra Apostolica* (1836); the novels *Loss and Gain* (1848) and *Callista* (1855); the poem *The Dream of Gerontius* (1865); and *Verses on Various Occasions* (1868).

Newman also served as an editor for *Library of the Fathers* (1838-1842), the *Lives of the English Saints* (1843-1844), and for the famous Anglican *Tracts for the Times* (1838-1841) [of which he wrote twenty-four of the ninety tracts].

Mention can additionally be made of his various journals and letters: *Letters and Correspondence*, 2 vols. (1891; 1911); *Meditations and Devotions* (1893; 1907); *Five Letters of 1875 in the Contemporary Review* (1899); *Autobiographical Writings* (1957); *The Letters and Diaries of John Henry Newman*, 31 vols. (1973-1977).

See Newman's *Collected Works*, 40 vols. (1878-1921); and Rickaby, Joseph, *An Index to the Works of John Henry Cardinal Newman* (London: Longmans, Green, and Company, 1914); Artz, Johannes, *Newman-Lexicon* (Mainz: Grünewald, 1975); Blehl, Vincent, *John Henry Newman: A Bibliographical Catalogue of His Writings* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1978).

190 Pagination from *An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979). Other references are from *The Arians of the Fourth Century* (London: Longmans, Green, and Company, 1890); *Essays Critical and Historical*, 2 vols. (London: Longmans, Green, and Company, 1897); *Lectures on the Doctrine of Justification* (London: Longmans, Green, and Company, 1897); *Two Essays on Biblical and Ecclesiastical Miracles* (London: Longmans, Green, and Company, 1897); *Callista* (London: Longmans, Green, and Company, 1898); *Fifteen Sermons Preached before the University of Oxford* [*Oxford University Sermons*] (London: Longmans, Green, and Company, 1898); *Sermons on the Subjects of the Day* (London: Longmans, Green, and Company, 1898); *Sermons Preached on Various Occasions* (1898); *Discussions and Arguments on Various Subjects* (London: Longmans, Green, and Company, 1924); *Discourses Addressed to Mixed Congregations* (London: Longmans, Green, and Company, 1929); *Apologia Pro Vita Sua* (Garden City: Image Books, 1956); *Faith and Prejudice and Other Unpublished Sermons* (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1956); *The Idea of a University* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1960); *Parochial and Plain Sermons* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1987);

*An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1989).

191 Newman defines apprehension as the intelligent acceptance of an idea (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part One, III, p. 36).

192 Hence Newman says that based on similarities of humans we can formulate general principles, but these are at best only of a high probability if based solely on logic and applied to concrete situations. Thus from the general principle that all humans are rational and mortal we cannot know that a particular human is the same with certainty (for we may have an idiot or a person such as the prophet Elias [Elijah] who did not die) (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, VIII, 1, pp. 224-225). Individual humans, such as John, Richard, and Robert, are individual things, independent, and incommunicable; they are unique in bodily frame, vitality, activity, pathological history, as well as dispositions, powers, habits; consequently they differ in identity, in incommunicability, in personality (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, VIII, 1, pp. 222, 225-226).

193 Technically certitude comes from what Newman calls a complex or reflex assent, versus a simple assent. Simple assents are unconscious assents (assents we barely recognize, bring to consciousness, or reflect upon). They are in fact the most common type of assent. Yet we can also engage in conscious and deliberate assents, i.e. complex assents. Here we assent to an assent (we assent to the fact that a proposition is accepted as true) and this is where we strictly speaking come to have certitude (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, VI, 2, pp. 157, 162; Part Two, VII, 1, pp. 173-174; "Implicit and Explicit Reason," *Oxford University Sermons*, XIII, 7-9, pp. 256-259; "The Theory of Developments in Religious Doctrine," *Oxford University Sermons*, XV, 10-11, pp. 320-322). Certitude is thus the perception of a truth along with the perception that it is a truth (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, VI, 2, pp. 162-163). Certitude "is to know that one knows" (*Apologia pro vita sua*, VI, p. 300). For as Newman sees it, "all men have a reason, but not all men can give a reason" ("Implicit and Explicit Reason," *Oxford University Sermons*, XIII, 9, p. 259; cf. "Grounds for Steadfastness in Our Religious Profession," *Sermons Bearing on Subjects of the Day*, XXIII, p. 343).

Even more technically (and making use of terms that will be defined shortly), while a simple assent may be a real assent, a complex (reflex) assent is notional (it is purely conceptual) as it is given to a notional proposition, i.e. to the truth of our simple assent and its proposition (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, VII, 1-2, p. 176, 181).

194 As Newman puts it: "... who can really pray to a Being, about whose existence he is seriously in doubt" (*Apologia pro vita sua*, III, p. 139).

195 Additionally, Newman applies his distinction wherein inference and assent are not the same thing (as Locke and Hume assert). For 1) assents may endure without the presence of the inferential acts upon which they were originally elicited; in other words, we may still assent even though we have forgotten the warrant for the assent (such as with complex political propositions): 2) Assents may fail while the reason for them and the inference is still present; i.e. we may have strong reasons but they do not secure our assent: 3) There may be strong and convincing arguments without assent; it may take years to embrace a truth which reason supports: 4) long mathematical proofs require sustained attention and so we do not always assent to them (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, VI, 1, pp. 141-145).

Newman argues, furthermore, that probabilities are founded on first principles and these are certitudes. Hence a theory of probable belief cannot escape certitudes (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, VII, 2, pp. 192, 194; Part Two, VIII, 1, p. 216; cf. Letter to Louisa Simeon of June 25, 1869, *Letters and Diaries*, v. XXIV, p. 275).

196 Newman has been accused of embracing an epistemological relativism, skepticism, subjectivism, and fideism, but these interpretations seem unfair given Newman's philosophical position.

Newman does admit that humans have assented to some views that they later on have abandoned. However, in the end Newman argues that certitude cannot change, for it is based on truth and truth does not change (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, VI, 2, p. 165; Part Two, VII, 1-2, pp. 180-181, 196-197, 203-205; Part Two, VIII, 1, pp. 210-211; Part Two, IX, 2, p. 278; cf. "Faith and Doubt," *Discourses Addressed to Mixed Congregations*, XI, pp. 214-216, 219-220, 223-224; "Papers on the Certainty of Faith," *Theological Papers on Faith and Certainty*, I, pp. 4, 31-33; "Papers in Preparation for *A Grammar of Assent*," *Theological Papers on Faith and Certainty*, VII, pp. 120-128; "Revelation in Its Relation to Faith," *Theological Papers on Faith and Certainty*, VIII, p. 150). While not fully clear and consistent, Newman argues that those humans who make assents and later change their minds have not made genuine assents (they have rather made assents based on unconscious factors, habits, inclinations, prejudices, or faulty reasoning) (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, VII, 1-2, pp. 175, 190-191; Part Two, IX, 2, p. 278; cf. *Apologia pro vita sua*, IV, pp. 163-164; V, p. 235; VI, p. 261) [on other occasions though Newman seems to fall back upon a form of what is called moral or practical certainty: "Nor, on the other hand, does belief [i.e. assent], viewed in its idea, imply a positive resolution in the party believing never to abandon that belief. What belief, as such, does imply is, not an intention never to change, but the utter absence of all thought, or expectation, or fear of changing" (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, VI, 2,

p. 160; cf. *A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, VIII, 2, p. 252; cf. “An Internal Argument for Christianity,” *Discussions and Arguments on Various Subjects*, VI, 8, pp. 391-392)]. Thus while certitudes cannot change, “what was taken for certitude” or “what looks like certitude” or “a supposed certitude” can in rare instances occur and hence be abandoned (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, VII, 2, pp. 181-182, 186, 189). Newman states: “[Real] certitude does not admit of an interior, immediate test, sufficient to discriminate it from a false certitude. ... But still, if it is the general rule that certitude is indefectible, will not that indefectibility itself become at least in the event a criterion of the genuineness of the certitude? ... I observe that indefectibility may at least serve as a negative test of certitude, or a *sine qua non* condition, so that whoever loses his conviction on a given point is thereby proved not to have been certain of it. Certitude ought to stand all trials, or it is not certitude. Its very office is to cherish and maintain its object and its very lot and duty is to sustain rude shocks in maintenance of it without being damaged by them” (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, VII, 2, p. 205).

So the fact that people have changed their assents and that the intellect has erred should not cause us to doubt our faculties and their ability to acquire certainty and reason correctly. Rather it should merely cause us to recognize that we have to be more careful and circumspect before committing ourselves to assents (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, VII, 2, pp. 186-188). Newman accordingly proclaims: “Errors in reasoning are lessons and warnings, not to give up reasoning, but to reason with greater caution” (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, VII, 2, p. 187). As Newman puts it (in anticipation of Edmund Gettier), one may be certain (Newman strictly speaking would probably call this a supposed certainty) that a figure among the trees and seen from the distance is human. Yet upon closer inspection it turns out that it is really a shadow formed by the falling of the moonlight on the interstices of some branches or their foliage. Now the failure of this certitude should in no way prevent someone from indulging in the new certitude that it is a shadow (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, VII, 2, p. 188). Again one can have certitude (and again Newman likely means here a supposed certitude) about the identity of a culprit but then when the real culprit is brought forward one can commit oneself to a new certitude in the innocence of the first individual and the guilt of the second (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, VII, 2, p. 189). Hence an abstract skeptical argument against certitude, based on the errors of the senses, is impotent against good evidence lying in the concrete. The fact that what was once taken to be a certitude turned out not to be one merely shows us that we must assent when we ought to assent and not otherwise. It shows us that we must make sure our intellect is sufficiently trained, cognizant, and careful when assenting, not that we cannot assent with certitude. Said differently, wrong

assent is something for which the doer is responsible and has no force to prohibit the act of assent itself (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, VI, 2, pp. 160-161; Part Two, VII, 2, p. 189).

Nonetheless, Newman does hold that certitude is personal and individualistic (it does not have the compulsion of a syllogism). A given certitude may be genuine and true and yet be recognized by one intellect and not recognized by another. For not all people discriminate and judge in the same manner. It may be the case that a body of proof and a line of argumentation awaken distinct associations in different individuals (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, VIII, 2, pp. 233, 240, 245, 247; Part Two, IX, 2, p. 278; *Apologia pro vita sua*, III, p. 141; VII, pp. 330, 341). The illative sense then is a form of personal judgment in which two people can judge differently of same objects (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, VIII, 2-3, pp. 242, 266-267; Part Two, IX, 2-3, pp. 278, 282, 287-288). Now this is not to say that there is no truth or certainty, but rather that: 1) the illative sense may be degraded by prejudice, passion, and self-interest; 2) the reasoning of the illative sense is based on premises, first principles, background knowledge, and worldviews, in regard to which humans may be at variance, and so the ratiocinative faculty can do no more than point out where the difference between them lies, whether it is immaterial, and whether it is worthwhile continuing the argument; 3) someone who is skilled in one use of illative sense is not necessarily so skilled in another; 4) the illative sense can err as it can operate on mistaken elements of thought (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, VIII, 2-3, pp. 240-241, 261-262, 266-267; Part Two, IX, 2-3, pp. 279, 281, 283, 291, 297; Part Two, X, 2, pp. 319, 321, 323; Appendix, II, p. 386; cf. *Apologia pro vita sua*, V, p. 199). As Newman argues: "We judge for ourselves, by our own lights, and on our own principles; and our criterion of truth is not so much the manipulation of propositions, as the intellectual and moral character of the person maintaining them, and the ultimate silent effect of his arguments or conclusions upon our minds" (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, VIII, 2, p. 240). So it is not the case that for Newman there is no truth, that it is not immutable, or that it is not the same for all people, but rather that it may not be recognized as such (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, IX, 2, pp. 278). Hence the common skeptical argument that there are diverse worldviews and religions does not show that certitude is impossible, for a truth may be certain though not generally received, and moreover some beliefs are shared between religions (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, VII, 2, pp. 195-196, 198, 202; Part Two, IX, 3, p. 293).

Again, proper assent requires strength and perspicacity of mind, force of presentiments, and power of sustained attention (Part Two, VIII, 2, p. 250). Our duty is to strengthen and perfect the illative sense and to do our best with it. In this way error shall recede and truth increase (*A Grammar of*

*Assent*, Part Two, VIII, 3, p. 262; Part Two, IX, 2-3, pp. 281, 294). We also need to develop a desire for truth and virtue to overcome our prejudices and acquire knowledge ("Faith and Reason, Contrasted as Habits of Mind," *Oxford University Sermons*, X, 25, 35-36, pp. 187-188, 191; "Love the Safeguard of Faith against Superstition," *Oxford University Sermons*, XII, 26, p. 239).

197 Newman defines the imagination as "the habit or act of making mental images" (*The Philosophical Notebook*, v, II, p. 152).

198 Theology which uses the intellect to inquire into and examine doctrine is of course necessary and excellent. For the intellect is one of the human's highest faculties and so must be used to examine revealed truths (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part One, V, 3, p. 127).

199 Newman was aware of the work of David Hume (1711-1776) and Charles Darwin (1809-1882) which challenged the argument from design. Hence, especially in his earlier period, he held that in many ways atheism was just as philosophically consistent with the phenomena of the physical world as was theism. The evidence for God from the order of nature then was only truly convincing if one had a prior faith in God and engaged the evidence with both one's mind and one's heart (i.e. with the full application of the illative sense) ("Faith and Reason, Contrasted as Habits of Mind," *Oxford University Sermons*, X, 39, p. 194 including n. 9; "The Tamworth Reading Room: Secular Knowledge without Personal Religion Tends to Unbelief," *Discussions and Arguments on Various Subjects*, IV, 7, pp. 299-300). Consequently, Newman once stated that he believed in design because he believed in God and not the other way around (Letter to William Brownlow of April 13, 1870, *Letters and Diaries*, v, XXV, p. 97, reprinted in PR, XIII, p. 189; "Papers on Mill's Logic, on Imagination, on Arguments for Christianity," *Theological Papers on Faith and Certainty*, II, p. 48; "Revelation in Its Relation to Faith," *Theological Papers on Faith and Certainty*, VIII, pp. 151-157; Letter to Charles Meynell of 1859, in *Theological Papers on Faith and Certainty*, Appendix, p. 162).

Yet elsewhere Newman asserts that a valid teleological proof for God can indeed be constructed where design is understood as referring to the general order of the universe rather than its end (*Letters and Diaries*, v, XXX, p. 47; *A Grammar of Assent*, Part One, IV, 1, p. 72; "Faith and the World," *Sermons Bearing on Subjects of the Day*, VII, 5, p. 88; "Revelation in Its Relation to Faith," *Theological Papers on Faith and Certainty*, VIII, p. 157; *The Philosophical Notebook*, v, II, pp. 60, 65, 125; *The Arians of the Fourth Century*, I, 3, p. 76; Letter to John Ogle of January 4, 1882).

Finally, for Newman the presence of evil in the world – i.e. bodily and mental suffering – also makes natural knowledge of God from the worldly order

problematic. For evil seems to show that God's control of the world is indirect, and His action obscure. Indeed God's absence from the world may strike the mind quite forcibly; God is a hidden God. Evil suggests then that either God does not exist, that a being of malignant nature has got possession of God's work, or that humans have in some special way dishonored God (as we will see, for Newman it is only with the help of the conscience that we can pronounce in favor of the latter) (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, X, 1, pp. 309-310).

200 Newman does grant that there are different degrees of sensitivity to conscience just as there are different degrees of sensitivity to color; so too conscience can be affected by inclinations and prejudices (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part One, V, 2, pp. 109-110; Part Two, VII, 2, p. 190). Therefore, we humans need to get into the habit of obeying conscience in which case its injunctions will become clearer and wider in their range (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, X, 1, p. 304). This will let us resolve our difficulties: "Ten thousand difficulties do not make one doubt" (*Apologia pro vita sua*, VII, p. 317).

201 Compare Newman's earlier definition of faith: "By faith then is meant the mind's perception or apprehension of heavenly things, arising from an instinctive trust in the divinity or truth of the external word, informing it concerning them" (*Lectures on the Doctrine of Justification*, p. 253). He also defines faith elsewhere more generally as the "reliance on the words of another" ("Religious Faith Rational," *Parochial and Plain Sermons*, I, 15, p. 123).

202 It is on the basis of the illative sense that Newman comes to criticize the view of Hume on miracles. Hume had argued against the occurrence of miracles by claiming that it is abstractedly more likely people will lie than that the order of nature will be infringed (see David Hume, *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, section 10). Newman says, however, that abstract reason cannot decide here as it is a matter of concrete fact. For with regard to the miracles of Scripture or history we must take things as they stand and with their circumstances: "But the question is not about miracles in general, or men in general, but definitively, whether these particular miracles, ascribed to the particular Peter, James, and John, are more likely to have been or not; whether they are unlikely, supposing there is a Power, external to the world, who can bring them about; supposing they are the only means by which He can reveal Himself to those who need a revelation; supposing He is likely to reveal Himself; that He has a great end in doing so; ... that great effects, otherwise unaccountable, in the event followed upon the acts said to be miraculous; that they were from the first accepted as true by large numbers of men against their natural interests;

that the reception of them has left its mark on the world, as no other event ever did; that, viewed in their effects, they have – that is, the belief in them has – served to raise human nature to a high moral standard, otherwise unattainable: these and the like considerations are part of a great complex argument, which so far can be put into propositions, but which ... still is implicit and secret, and cannot by any ingenuity be imprisoned in a formula, and packed into a nut-shell" (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, VIII, 2, pp. 243-244). Accordingly, to claim the existing order of nature constitutes a physical necessity assumes the very point in debate. For unlikely things do occur, and indeed God's providence and human need make it likely that miracles do occur; they are intelligible in terms of a divine redemption of humans (*A Grammar of Assent*, Part Two, IX, 3, p. 290; cf. *Two Essays on Biblical and Ecclesiastical Miracles*, pp. 8, 20-23, 53-55; "The Omnipotence of God the Reason for Faith and Hope," *Faith and Prejudice and other Unpublished Sermons*, I, pp. 23-25; *The Philosophical Notebook*, v. II, p. 150).

203 For works on the life and thought of Ollé-Laprune see CE (1911), v. XI, pp. 246-247; MFP (1922), pp. 88-89; CTF (1926), pp. 202-203; SPC (1934), pp. 56-58; CPH (1941), v. II, pp. 347-351; HT (1947), v. III, pp. 215-216; IEC (1952), v. IX, pp. 107-108; THP (1955), pp. 951; PAF (1958), pp. 268-270; CEP (1961), p. 121; OLTK (1962), v. VII, pp. 1150-1151; RP (1966), pp. 358-360, 793-794; BHP (1969), v. VII, p. 132; HWP (1971), v. V, pp. 208-212; LT (1975), pp. 209-218; CHP (1977), v. IX, pp. 217-222; CHAD (1983), v. X, pp. 72-73; CP (1987), v. I, pp. 535-542; NCS (1989), p. 272 n. 50; BBKL (1993), v. VI, pp. 1212-1215; DP (1993), v. II, p. 2157; ATH (1994), p. 107; NT (1994), p. 46; LTK (1998), v. VII, p. 1047; MCT (2000), v. I, pp. 359-360; NCE (2003), v. X, pp. 585-586; EF (2006), v. VIII, pp. 8086-8088.

Also consult Coyne, William, *The New Ireland Review* 10 (June, 1899), p. 195; Boutroux, Émile, *Notice sur la vie et les oeuvres de M. Léon Ollé-Laprune* (Paris: Firmin-Didot, 1905); Fonsegrive, George, *Léon Ollé-Laprune* (Paris: Bloud et Gay, 1912); Blondel, Maurice, *Léon Ollé-Laprune* (Paris: Bloud et Gay, 1923; 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. 1932); Horton, Walter, *The Philosophy of the Abbé Bautain* (New York: New York University Press, 1926), pp. 287-290; Boutroux, Émile, *Nouvelles études d'histoire de la philosophie* (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1927), pp. 194-220; Zeiller, Jacques, *Léon Ollé-Laprune* (Paris: Lecoffre, 1932); Acutis, Giovanni, *Un grande maestro: Ollé-Laprune* (Turin: La Salute, 1947); Autin, Albert, *Léon Ollé-Laprune* (Paris: Lethielleux, 1947); Crippa, Romeo, *Il pensiero di Léon Ollé-Laprune* (Brescia: Morcelliana, 1947); Raffelt, Albert, *Spiritualität und Philosophie* (Freiburg: Herder, 1978), pp. 40-62, 266-272.

204 Ollé-Laprune also wrote *Philosophy and the Present Age* [*La philosophie et le temps présent*], 3 vols. (1890-1898) [lectures]; *The Sources of Intellectual Peace* [*Les sources de la paix intellectuelle*] (1892); *The Value of Life* [*Le prix de la vie*] (1894) [lectures]; *On Intellectual Virility* [*De la virilité intellectuelle*] (1896) [lecture at Lyon]; *Christian Vitality* [*La vitalité chrétienne*] (1901) [a collection of essays and speeches]; and *Reason and Rationalism* [*La raison et le rationalisme*] (1906) [lectures].

Additionally Ollé-Laprune wrote some historical works on philosophy: *The Philosophy of Malebranche* [*La philosophie de Malebranche*], 2 vols. (1870); *Essay on the Morals of Aristotle* [*De Aristotele ethicae fundamenta*] (1880) [reissued in French as *Essai sur la morale d'Aristote*] (1881)]; *Eulogy on Malebranche* [*Eloge de Malebranche*] (1887); *Eulogy on Father Gratry* [*Éloge du P. Gratry*] (1896); Étienne Vacherot (1898), and Théodore Jouffroy (1899).

See also his articles and theological works: "Les Harmonies providentielles" [as Charles Lévêque], *Français* (April 17, 1873); "La science et la foi," *Correspondant* (July 25, 1873); "Spiritualisme et matérialisme," *Français* (September 1, 1873); "Le P. Gratry," *Français* (January 20, 1874); "Les méditations inédites," *Français* (April 3, 1874); "La morale sociale et les nouvelles écoles dites scientifiques," *Correspondant* (January 10, 1877); "Etude sur le positivisme," preface to Gruber, Hermann, ed., *Auguste Comte, sa vie, sa doctrine* (Paris: Lethielleux, 1892); "La recherche de questions pressants," *Discours prononcé à la Distribution des Prix du Collège Stanislas* (1893); "Caro: Son enseignement à l'Ecole," in Dupay, Paul, ed., *Le Centenaire de l'Ecole normale, 1795-1895* (Paris: Hatchette, 1895); *L'église et l'action personnelle* (1896); and his translations of Aristotle and Malebranche.

205 Ollé-Laprune speaks of truths of the moral order, or "moral truths" (practical truths), in a very broad sense. Moral truths are truths that deal with where humans come from, who they are, what they should do, and what their end is. Hence moral truths relate to truths of ethics, metaphysics, and religion and include: 1) the existence of God; 2) the existence of a future life; 3) historical facts; 4) causes of phenomena; 5) the uniformity of the laws of nature; 6) the reality of material bodies; 7) the existence of free and intelligent beings; 8) the existence of immaterial spirits; and 9) moral obligations (*On Moral Certitude*, Introduction, pp. 2-4, 9-10, 14; I, pp. 34-36, 38-39, 43; III, p. 98). These truths of the moral order are "the highest and most precious objects of human thought" (*On Moral Certitude*, Introduction, p. 4).

206 Ollé-Laprune also follows Newman in distinguishing between abstract certitude and real certitude (standing in for the notional and real assent of Newman). Abstract certitude is a reflective and explicit assent to a formal

truth and so deals with notions. It is the form of logical and speculative certitude found most perfectly in mathematics. Here we assent to a truth we can justify purely rationally. Real or moral certitude on the other hand is an immediate, implicit, complete, and energetic assent to a present, acting, felt reality (or at least a reality represented by the mind in a vivid image), and so deals with things. Real certitude is thus an experiential and practical certitude that renders doubt impossible and gives the mind security. Real certitude also yields personal action wherein we respond to the call of the moral law with a movement of our will. Here we assent to a non-demonstrable truth with both an assent of reason (knowledge) and additionally a consent of our will (faith) (*On Moral Certitude*, I, pp. 23-24, 26-27, 31, 33-34, 41, 70). Real, experiential, practical knowledge comes first. Furthermore, it is what most resonates with us as we are in essence moral beings. Yet it does not entirely satisfy our rational nature. We must also turn to our speculative knowledge in order to organize and give an account of our beliefs (*On Moral Certitude*, I, p. 42). Thus from a habitual certitude of experience or education (real knowledge) there may arise an actual certitude when reflection declares our cognitions valid and rationally well-founded (speculative knowledge). Real knowledge is solid and provides motives for action but is obscure abstract knowledge is clear but flimsy (cf. Newman, *A Grammar of Assent*, II, 9, p. 274). Needless to say both are important for Ollé-Laprune

207 Ollé-Laprune holds that these primary intuitions form the foundation of knowledge. Here our assent is wholly determined by the light of evidence and the will contributes nothing.

Primary intuitions then occur with the data of external or internal experience and first principles. For such matters involve a simple apprehension, that is to say they involve, primitive, immediate, spontaneous (instinctive) judgments wherein we affirm the concrete realities we sense, or where we affirm truths evident in themselves in logic and math (*On Moral Certitude*, II, pp. 50-51).

208 Ollé-Laprune speaks of moral certitude as a simple reasonable assurance which excludes the possibility of moral doubt: it is a certitude that affirms the truth with a perfect assurance (hence it is unconditional) (*On Moral Certitude*, Introduction, pp. 12-14, 16-18; I, p. 22).

209 See Ollé-Laprune's more traditional cosmological argument for God in his *Reason and Rationalism*, XIV, pp. 143-148; XVIII, p. 193.

210 The philosophical thought of Newman (and Ollé-Laprune to a lesser extent) came under attack by several Thomists and as well as other Catholic philosophers and theologians: the Jesuit Thomist Giovanni Perrone (1794-1876), at the Gregorian; the American Ontologist Orestes Brownson

(1803-1876); the convert English Jesuit Thomist Thomas Harper (1821-1893), at Stonyhurst; the Sulpician Thomist Albert Farges (1848-1926), at the Catholic Institute of Paris; the former Sulpician Kantian and Modernist Marcel Hébert (1851-1916); the Jesuit Augustinian Eugène Portalie (1852-1909), at Scholasticates in Rome, Uclès, and Vals; Fr. C. Bonnégent (d. 1914); the Jesuit Thomist Guido Mattiussi (1852-1925), professor at the Gregorian and author of the *Twenty-Four Thomist Theses* (1924); the Benedictine Thomist Pierre Joseph Amédée Lefèbvre (1857-1929); Pierre-Henri Batiffol (1861-1929), at the Catholic University of Toulouse, one of whose books was placed on the Index of Forbidden Books in 1907 and he was dismissed from his post in 1908; the Dominican Ambroise Gardeil (1859-1931), professor at the Le Saulchoir Dominican House of Studies in Belgium; Albert Leclère (c. 1867-1915), at the University of Berne; the Jesuit Thomist Léonce de Grandmaison (1868-1927), professor at the Pontifical Bible Institute, Rome; the Jesuit Jules Lebreton (1873-1956), at the Catholic Institute of Paris; Émile Baudin (1875-1949); the Jesuit Martin D'Arcy (1888-1976), of Stonyhurst and Campion Hall, Oxford; the Belgian Canon Roger Aubert (1914- ), of the University of Louvain; and the former Jesuit and now agnostic Anthony Kenny (1931-).

Anonymous reviews of Newman's work also appeared in *The Tablet* (2 April 1870, pp. 424-425; 9 April 1870, p. 453-456; 16 April 1870, pp. 484-489; and in *The Month* 143 (1924), p. 106.

211 Other Catholic Integralists include the German Fr. Gerhard Schündelen (1808-1876); the Englishman William George Ward (1812-1882), who taught at Baillol College, Oxford as an Anglican, at St. Edmund's College as a Catholic, edited the *Dublin Review* (1863-1878), and was co-founder of the Metaphysical Society (1869-1880) [with James Knowles]; the convert Oratorian Frederick William Faber (1814-1863); the French Oratorian Hyacinthe Charles de Valroger (1812-1876), at the Minor Seminary of Bayeux [a friend of Gratry]; the convert Richard Simpson (1820-1876), editor of the *Rambler* (1856-1862) and the *Home and Foreign Review* (1862-1864) [with John Acton]; Elme Marie Caro (1827-1887) [also an Augustinian and Spiritualist], a non-practicing Catholic of the École Normale Supérieure; Claude-Charles Charaux (1828-1906), at the University of Grenoble; Henriette Gréard [Henri de Cossoles] (c. 1850-1883); Baron Friedrich Von Hügel (1852-1925) [somewhat]; Wilfrid Philip Ward (1856-1916) [the son of William George Ward], at Ushaw and the Royal University of Ireland, and editor of the *Dublin Review* (1906-1916); Fr. Henri Bremond (1865-1933), who taught at the Jesuit colleges of Dole, Moulins, Saint-Étienne, and Lyon [also an Augustinian]; Lucie Felix-Faure Goyau (1866-1913), the wife of Georges Goyau (1869-1939) and daughter of the president of France Félix François Faure (1841-1899); Fr. Ernest

Dimnet (1866-1954), at the Stanislas College; the Pole Stanislaw Brzozowski (1878-1911); the German convert Theodor Haecker (1879-1945) [also a Phenomenologist and famous anti-Nazi writer]; Floris Delattre (c. 1880-1970); the Oratorian Henry Tristram (1881-1955); Ferdinand Ebner (1882-1931) [somewhat; also a Personalist and Phenomenologist]; the German Mattias Laros (1882-1965); the German Jesuit Erich Przywara (1889-1972) [also an Augustinian and Phenomenologist]; the Austrian Fr. Franz Michel Willam (1894-1981); the Capuchin Bartholomeus Michiel Van den Barselaar [Peter Zeno] (1902-1993); the German Oratorian Werner Becker (1904-1981), at the Leipzig Oratory and editor of *Newman-Studien* (1948-1960) [with Heinrich Fries]; Maurice Nédoncelle (1905-1976), at the Universities of Lille and Strasburg [also a Personalist]; the Oratorian Charles Stephen Dessain (1907-1976); the German Johannes Artz (1907- ), at the University of Magdelin; Fr. Nikolaus Theis (1911-1985); the Belgian Dominican Jan Walgrave (1911-1986), at the University of Louvain; the German Heinrich Fries (1911-1998), at the University of Munich, and editor of the *Newman-Studien* (1948-1960) [with Werner Becker]; the German Fr. Alfred Läßle (1915- ), of the Seminary of Freising and the University of Salzburg; the American Arthur Dwight Culler (1917-2006), at Yale University; the Mill Hill Missionary Adrian Boekraad (c. 1920- ); the German Fr. Günter Rombold (1925- ), at the University of Linz; the German Fr. Günter Biemer (1929- ), of the University of Freiburg and editor of *Newman-Studien* (1954); and Nicholas Lash (1934- ), at the University of Cambridge [somewhat].



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- Ibid.*, *Problème de l'acte de foi* [PAF], 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. (Louvain: E. Warny, 1958).
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