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“DID YOU RECEIVE THE HOLY SPIRIT  
WHEN YOU BELIEVED?”

SOME BASIC QUESTIONS FOR PNEUMATOLOGY

DAVID COFFEY

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## Foreword

The Joseph A. Auchter Family Endowment Fund generously supports the Père Marquette Lecture in Theology. The Fund was established as a memorial to their father by the children of Milwaukee-native Joseph A. Auchter (1894-1986), a banker, paper-industry executive, and long-time supporter of education.

The lecture presented here is the thirty-sixth in the series, inaugurated in 1969, that commemorates the missions and explorations of Père Jacques Marquette, S.J. (1637-1675). The lecture is offered annually under the auspices of Marquette University's Department of Theology.

## David Coffey

The Reverend David Coffey has played a major role in the development and renewal of Pneumatology and Trinitarian theology in the period following the Second Vatican Council. He graduated as Dux in 1951 from St. Patrick's College (Christian Brothers), Strathfield, New South Wales, Australia. In 1958, he received the License in Theology from the Catholic Institute of Sydney; and in the same year, he was ordained a priest in the Archdiocese of Sydney. He received the Doctor of Sacred Theology *magna cum laude* from the same institution in 1960, and was appointed to the faculty of the Catholic Institute of Sydney in 1962. During the period 1964-1966 he pursued further theological studies with Michael

Schmaus and Karl Rahner at the University of Munich, Germany. Father Coffey returned to the Catholic Institute of Sydney in 1967, where he served as Dean of the Faculty from 1970-1975, and President of the Faculty from 1976-1981. In 1975, he became a founder of the Australian Catholic Theological Association, and served as the Association's President in that year and again in 1990.

In 1989, Father Coffey came to St. Louis at the invitation of the Catholic Theological Society of America, where he gave a presentation on his research in the Trinity Seminar at the Society's annual Convention. In 1991, he returned to the United States, this time to the University of St. Louis, where he served as Visiting Professor in the Aquinas Institute. In 1995, he accepted an appointment to the Presidential Chair at Marquette University, renamed in 1999 to the William J. Kelly, S.J. Chair in Catholic Theology.

Father Coffey's areas of research and publication reflect the living concerns of the ecclesial communities within which he has practiced the theologian's craft. Not surprisingly, his theological interests go to the very heart of the Christian faith: Pneumatology, Christology, the doctrine of the Trinity. These interests are reflected quite accurately in the titles of his four books: *Grace: The Gift of the Holy Spirit* (Catholic Institute of Sydney, 1979); *Believer, Christian, Catholic*, (Catholic Institute of Sydney, 1986); *Deus Trinitas: The Doctrine of the Triune God*,

(Oxford University Press, 1999); and *The Sacrament of Reconciliation*, (Liturgical Press, 2001). His numerous articles range widely across these and related topics, and they have appeared in many books, as well as in such journals as: *Australasian Catholic Record*, *Theological Studies*, *Irish Theological Quarterly*, *Faith and Culture*, *Colloquium*, *St. Vladimir's Theological Quarterly*, *Philosophy and Theology*, and the *International Journal of Systematic Theology*.

The occasion of this lecture also marks the end of Father Coffey's tenure as the holder of the Kelly Chair at Marquette University. He will be sorely missed by those of us who have come to know and value him as a colleague and friend, as well as by the students who have benefited from his great learning and keen insight.

In the following essay, the reader will instantly discern the tight argumentation and intellectual tenacity that have marked Coffey's work and made him a favorite among his peers. At the same time, even as he works to illuminate the Trinitarian realities of mutual love, appropriation, common action, and the like, one will observe his profound reverence for the mystery of the Triune God. As a guide for this exploration of the agency of the Holy Spirit, we could hardly ask for one with better knowledge of the terrain or a surer step than our own David Coffey. We thank him for taking us along on the journey.

Mickey L. Mattox  
Ash Wednesday 2005

### Abbreviations

AAS	<i>Acta Apostolicae Sedis</i>
CCL	<i>Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina</i>
DH	Heinrich Denzinger and Peter Hünermann, <i>Kompendium der Glaubensbekenntnisse und kirchlichen Lehrentscheidungen</i> , 38th ed. (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1999)
<i>In I Sent.</i>	<i>Commentum in Primum Librum Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi</i>
PG	<i>Patres Graeci</i>
ST	<i>Summa Theologiae</i>

## **“Did You Receive the Holy Spirit When You Believed?” Some Basic Questions for Pneumatology**

When Paul came to Ephesus, so we are told in the Acts of the Apostles (ch. 19), he asked the small band of disciples he found there, “Did you receive the Holy Spirit when you believed?” To which they replied, “No, we have never even heard that there is a Holy Spirit” (v. 2). Paul then instructed them on baptism “in the name of the Lord Jesus,” with which was involved the reception of the Holy Spirit (v. 5), and proceeded to baptize them and lay his hands on them, after which, we are told, “the Holy Spirit came on them, and they spoke with tongues and prophesied” (v. 6). Paul’s instruction on the Holy Spirit on that occasion would have consisted of the bare essentials, presented as briefly and simply as possible. Even so, it must have dealt with such questions as, is it really the Holy Spirit who acts in our lives? who is this Holy Spirit? and what does the Holy Spirit do? These are the three questions with which I shall deal in my lecture. It is not at all extraordinary that here, twenty centuries later, I should hark back to truths first taught at the start of the Christian dispensation, for theology always needs to revisit its beginnings and re-present them to a new audience, in a way that



takes account of whatever has transpired in relevant teaching and theology in the meantime.

Presumed in my lecture is the Lonerganian methodology for which I argue in my book *Deus Trinitas*, according to which trinitarian knowledge gained from the Bible ("the biblical Trinity") leads to a new understanding of God in himself ("the immanent Trinity") that in turn moves us to return to the biblical data and affirm them in a new way ("the economic Trinity").<sup>1</sup> Thus is legitimized a certain transition from the immanent to the economic Trinity that has been disallowed in principle by more than a few recent theologians.

My three questions are basic for pneumatology (the theology of the Holy Spirit). The first question is something more: it is a radical challenge, in that it questions the legitimacy of speaking about the Holy Spirit at all. It has long been held that although the Christian God is a trinity of persons, when God acts in the world he acts strictly as one. What, then, is the point of attributing some divine actions to the Holy Spirit in particular? Is not everything done by him equally done by the Father and the Son? This, then, is our first topic, "The Holy Spirit as Agent." The second, building on the answer given to the first, takes account of what we know of the Holy Spirit in the immanent Trinity, and presumes that his action in the world will correspond to this knowledge, especially as all we know of him in the Trinity derives from his action in the world in the

first place. Our second topic, therefore, "The Holy Spirit as Trinitarian Person," deals with whether we can acquire a more complete knowledge of his person than we have had hitherto. It is not only legitimate but important to pursue this line, because according to our Lonerganian methodology a cognitive return from the Trinity to the world can bestow a heightened intelligibility on the biblical data about the Holy Spirit in the world. Our third topic, "The Activity of the Holy Spirit," carries this exercise through and supplies a content for the heightened intelligibility just claimed.

The reader will not fail to notice that I refer to each divine person throughout in male terms. This is not because I am opposed to inclusive language—quite the opposite! It is because, as I wrote in *Deus Trinitas*, the solutions at hand for abstract personal singulars, namely, "he or she" or "they," are not suitable for concrete personal singulars, as are the divine persons.<sup>2</sup> Nor is the constant repetition of the name of a divine person acceptable. Nor in my opinion is the substitution of "she" for the Holy Spirit, because it seems to be making a contrary, indeed heretical point, namely, that the Father and the Son are males and the Holy Spirit a female! And no less objectionable is the alternation of male and female pronouns for the Holy Spirit. There is no solution to this problem, which is why I, at least for the time being, am persevering with the traditional practice. It should be noted that despite their names

there is nothing particularly male or female about the Father or the Holy Spirit. Nor for that matter is there anything particularly male about the Son in the immanent Trinity, but understandably the maleness of Jesus has influenced the way his person is named in the immanent Trinity. Let us begin, then, with the agency of the Holy Spirit.

### The Holy Spirit as Agent

Across the board recent writing in pneumatology has taken it for granted that when the New Testament or a church Father speaks of the Holy Spirit, it is really the Holy Spirit and he alone that is meant. Yves Congar, the celebrated theologian of the Holy Spirit, subscribed to this view but did not take it for granted. He endorsed as a general principle the patristic doctrine that the action of God outside himself (*ad extra*) is common to all three persons of the Trinity.<sup>3</sup> Hence, so this view goes, when something is asserted of a divine person in relation to an action in the world, the same is generally to be asserted of each of the other two persons as well. Congar also accepted that at times it is legitimate, perhaps even necessary, to restrict the attribution of such an action to one divine person alone. This latter principle, called “appropriation,” means that for sufficient reason a divine action *ad extra* may be “appropriated” or attributed to one particular divine person though really it is an action of God as such and therefore common to all three persons. These two principles,

common action and appropriation, are related in that the latter presupposes the former.

The difficult and disputed question is whether there are any divine operations *ad extra* to which the principle of common action does not apply. Put positively, the question is, are any divine operations *ad extra* "proper" to one divine person alone? What about the Incarnation? Is it not an action *ad extra*, but one proper to the Son? And what about the bestowal of grace? It too appears to be an operation *ad extra*, but at the same time, on the testimony of Scripture and the Fathers, seems to be proper to the Holy Spirit. At least there is no question about creation, and most divine interventions in the world can be categorized under this head. Usually creation is appropriated to the Father. This is done, for example, in the first article of the creed, though doubtless some will be surprised to hear that the Father's creative work is there "only" appropriated. But when we say, "We believe in one God, the Father, the Almighty, maker of heaven and earth," we do not intend thereby to deny that the Son and the Holy Spirit create equally with him. However, we single out the Father because it is fitting to do so in light of the fact that while the Trinity is the source of all created things, the Father is the source of the other two persons in the Trinity.

The principle of common action is required by the very nature of Christianity as a monotheistic religion. That God is triune by no means implies

that he ceases to be one. One in being, he must also be one in act. Some theologians, as we shall see, hold that when God acts *ad extra*, the relations by which he is constituted as threefold within himself (*ad intra*) play no part whatsoever in the action. Congar avoided—or rather, hoped to avoid—this more rigorous form of the principle by invoking another principle known to the Fathers, namely, that every divine action *ad extra*, while remaining common to the three persons, reflects their order (or τὰξίς) in the Trinity, and so—to cite the formulation of St. Gregory of Nyssa—“originates from the Father, proceeds through the Son, and is completed in the Holy Spirit.”<sup>4</sup> On this basis Congar felt able to write that “the Holy Spirit, who is the term of the communication of the divine life *intra Deum* [within God], is the *principle* [my emphasis] of this communication of God outside himself and beyond himself.”<sup>5</sup> For Congar, then, there was a real and not just appropriated sense in which the Holy Spirit could and should be confessed as the divine person who initiates God’s dealings with us and ours with him, a proper sense in which the Holy Spirit could be said to be operative in grace. Congar felt that this was justification enough of his own pursuit of pneumatology as a distinct and valid field of theological investigation.

But, we ask, is Congar’s mitigated form of the principle of common action a viable option? I submit that it is not. In regard to the personal agency of a

divine action *ad extra* the patristic principle "originating from the Father, performed through the Son, completed in the Holy Spirit" must retain a validity and importance for us, for the divine persons cannot be distinguished at all without invoking the τάξις it entails. But this validity and importance certainly cannot be reduced to an actual precedence of the Holy Spirit as agent over the Son and the Father in regard to what is essentially an undifferentiated divine action, as though we experienced *first* the Holy Spirit, *then* the Son, and *finally* the Father, as we worked our way up and back through the divine action to its source. The divine action cannot be divided into segments, the first done by the Father, the second by the Son and the last—which would reach us first—by the Holy Spirit, for it is indivisible and must be attributed in its entirety to *each* of the three persons. Congar's attempt at differentiation reduces to a species of modalism, lacking any real ordering of the trinitarian persons. (I shall return to this point.) For this reason it seems to me that he by no means escapes the tentacles of the rigorous common action theory that he, along with the great majority of other modern theologians, strove so hard to circumvent.

Although contemporary theologians now eschew the Scholastic vocabulary in which Catholic theology was formerly framed, it will be helpful to point out that divine action *ad extra* was understood Scholastically as an exercise of divine "efficient" causality. If

God acted *ad extra*, this action inevitably terminated in a new creation of some sort, whether of the substantial or the accidental order. By definition, such creation could only be the result of efficient causality, even if this was vastly different from the efficient causality that we experience in the world. But then, *everything* positive we might say of God is predicated by analogy with normal, inner-worldly experience. Via, then, the notion of creation, a coincidence was discerned between divine efficient causality on the one hand and, on the other, divine action *ad extra*, common to all three trinitarian persons. Articulation of this coincidence became a commonplace of Scholastic theology, so much so that it could be given official endorsement by Pius XII in his statement that “in these matters [the indwelling of the Holy Spirit in the souls of the just] all things are to be held *common* to the Blessed Trinity, so far as the same relate to God as the supreme efficient cause.” This, said the Pope, was a “certain truth.”<sup>6</sup>

If the activity of the Holy Spirit *ad extra* must be understood in terms of efficient causality, and if efficient causality must be linked to common divine action, it follows that when the sources speak of the Holy Spirit as “sanctifier,” they cannot mean sanctification as a function proper to the Holy Spirit. They must mean that sanctification is appropriated to the Holy Spirit. Further, when appropriation is invoked, there must be a good inner-trinitarian reason for so doing. But what inner-trinitarian reason is there for

singling out the Holy Spirit in regard to sanctification? There appears to be none. The Holy Spirit is not holier than the Father or the Son: all are holy and equally so. And the same must be said of any other function suggested as proper to the Holy Spirit. If all that can be said of the activity of the Holy Spirit in the economy is by way of appropriation, and a flawed appropriation at that, then such speech tells us only about God and nothing about the Holy Spirit as such. In fact there appears to be no point in speaking about the Holy Spirit at all.

With the publication of the first three volumes of his *Theologica Dogmata* in 1644, the Jesuit theologian Dionysius Petavius (Denis Petau, 1583-1652) made a decisive break with this tradition by proposing on the basis of his study of Scripture and the Fathers that the correct category for conceptualizing the activity of the Holy Spirit in the economy was not efficient, but formal causality. Moreover, this formal causality was proper to the Holy Spirit, who through it exercised his proper function, namely, sanctification.<sup>7</sup> The following sentence represents not just Petavius' own opinion but the conclusion to which he was drawn by "so many testimonies from the ancients": "The conjunction of the Holy Spirit with the souls of the just or the state of adoption of sons pertains indeed to the common divinity of the three persons, but in so far as it is in the hypostasis or person of the Holy Spirit, in such manner that there is a certain title (*ratio*) by which the person of the Holy Spirit applies himself



to the souls of the holy and just that does not belong in the same way to the other persons.”<sup>8</sup> This *ratio* is formal causality: “The three persons dwell in the just man, but only the Holy Spirit is, as it were, the form that sanctifies and renders a man an adoptive son by its self-communication.”<sup>9</sup> Petavius here suggests a parallel between grace and the Incarnation, for the last-quoted sentence immediately follows a passage in which the divine Word is said to be like a “form” that renders Christ the man God and Son.<sup>10</sup> In general, the Petavian thesis was not welcomed by the theological community, which was understandably suspicious of any move that might blur the distinction between God and the world and so compromise the transcendence of God, as the concept of divine formal causality appeared to do.

At this point mention must be made of Matthias Scheeben (1835-1888), whom Congar characterizes as “*par excellence* the theologian of grace.”<sup>11</sup> In his one-volume compendium of theology, *The Mysteries of Christianity*, Scheeben mentions Petavius only once, and then in an insignificant footnote.<sup>12</sup> Scheeben subscribed to the principle of appropriation in regard to the role of the Holy Spirit in grace, and thereby to the theology of common action and the efficient causality that it implies.<sup>13</sup> But he tried to overcome what he must have felt was the pallor of this theological complex by resorting to what I judge to be a species of modalism. Let him explain in his own words, “As each distinct person possesses

the divine nature in a special way, He can possess a created nature in His own personal way, and to this extent exclusively. We know that this is the case with the Son in the Incarnation. If the Son alone takes possession of a created nature, why should not the Holy Spirit be able to take possession of a created being in a way proper to His own person, by means of a less perfect and purely moral possession?"<sup>14</sup> This is the second time I have noted this variation on modalism, the first being in regard to Congar's failed attempt to distinguish the divine persons in the operation of grace, and I can only presume that this is where he found it, namely, in the theology of Scheeben. Unfortunately, I must defer the treatment of this question once again, until I have presented the theology of Rahner on the issue of proper relations in grace. Also to be noted is Scheeben's reduction of the possession of the Holy Spirit in grace to the level of the "purely moral." Here, in my view, Scheeben throws out the baby with the bath-water, for if the union of the Holy Spirit with the just is not ontological it is not divine, and if it is not divine the Holy Spirit himself is not divine.

In the twentieth century something more akin to the thesis of Petavius appeared in the theology of another French Jesuit, Maurice de la Taille (1872-1933).<sup>15</sup> However, there were important differences as well. First, while he accepted the primacy of uncreated over created grace, de la Taille did not contemplate the possibility that the Holy Spirit might have a

special function in the work of grace. Throughout his treatment it is God rather than specifically the Holy Spirit who acts in grace.<sup>16</sup> And secondly, he rejected the application of formal causality to the working of uncreated grace, preferring instead the category of "actuation." In his analysis actuation is what occurs when act communicates itself to "what is imperfect," conferring on it "a perfection it is capable of receiving,"<sup>17</sup> while formal causality, or "information" as he calls it, occurs "if the act is dependent on the potency either for its existence ... or at any rate for the integration of its radical energies."<sup>18</sup> Actuation and information relate as genus to species: all information is actuation, but not all actuation is information. De la Taille's reason for rejecting formal causality in regard to grace is that "uncreated Act cannot be dependent on a creature in any way whatever. It will give itself and will receive nothing."<sup>19</sup> To avoid the inconveniences attendant on form and matter, de la Taille here descends to the next level of generality, namely, act and potency. From this it can be seen that while for him the action of God in grace is in some ways *like* formal causality, it is in the end to be distinguished from it. To the extent that he rejected the concept of formal causality in his theology of grace he followed St. Thomas.<sup>20</sup>

The next figure of importance is Karl Rahner with his essay "Some Implications of the Scholastic Concept of Uncreated Grace."<sup>21</sup> Here Rahner uses the concept of "quasi-formal causality" to explain

the presence and action of God in grace. He makes a passing reference to Petavius which is at the same time positive and reserved: positive in that it endorses Petavius' assertion that "the conjunction of the Holy Spirit in particular with man is a proper and not merely an appropriated one," reserved in that it refrains from affirming the "soundness and theological tenability" of Petavius' theology of grace as a whole.<sup>22</sup> Rahner's reserve is explained by the fact that while Petavius was forthright in his assertion that only the Holy Spirit exercises formal causality in his union with the human being in grace, he (Rahner) extended that formal causality to all three divine persons. Indeed, while he could speak of the "three self-communications" that take place in grace,<sup>23</sup> his natural preference was to say the "self-communication of *God*" (my emphasis). And early in the article, in a revealing footnote, he declared that he did not wish "to imply that we propose to adopt any position with regard to the much-discussed question whether the indwelling of the Holy Spirit in the justified is proper to the Spirit or merely appropriated. To this extent 'Spirit' and 'God' signify the same thing in this study."<sup>24</sup> Nor did he pay much attention to de la Taille, though he acknowledged in a note that the latter covered much the same ground as he. In the same note he confessed that when writing his article he did not know of de la Taille's contribution, which predated his own by eleven years.<sup>25</sup>

Rahner was correct in his sense that despite appearances he and de la Taille were in substantial agreement. On the subject of grace they agreed in stopping short of assigning a proper role to the Holy Spirit and in extending divine formal causality to the whole Trinity.<sup>26</sup> More generally, they agreed in noting both likeness and unlikeness between the divine action and formal causality. Where they differed was in their judgment of what predominated in this comparison, likeness or unlikeness. De la Taille, thinking that unlikeness prevailed over likeness, resorted to the next level of generality, settling on the term "actuation." Rahner on the other hand, judging likeness to prevail over unlikeness, opted for analogy and the language of formal causality. Though analogy explicitly acknowledges the existence of unlikeness and is taken for granted in all God-talk, Rahner deemed it expedient in this sensitive case to prefix "quasi" to "formal," thus stressing that God's action is only "like" formal causality, not identical with it.<sup>27</sup> It is important to note that while both theologians moved in the direction of Petavius, neither recovered his full position. Neither was prepared to say that just as the divine Word exercised a unique function in relation to the humanity of Christ, so the Holy Spirit exercised a unique function in the matter of grace.

This explains why Congar felt obliged to justify his own pursuit of pneumatology as a distinct and valid field of theological inquiry. I have already

weighed his theological argument for this and found it wanting. But Congar had another argument as well, one from authority. He wrote, "Dionysius Petavius' thesis about this question has been criticized very effectively by Paul Galtier, but, in spite of this criticism, it continues to reappear, because it has to be admitted that the feeling expressed by the texts [from Scripture and the Fathers] is stronger than the explanations that have been given of them."<sup>28</sup> Note the three things that Congar is saying here: first, that statements in the sources suggesting a special role for the Holy Spirit in grace are numerous and clear; second, that for this reason theologians feel justified in ignoring contrary arguments, that is, arguments favoring appropriation; and third, that if only modern theologians would pay attention to Galtier, they would not be so confident in persisting in this course. I point out that Congar himself must not have been convinced by Galtier: otherwise he could hardly have persevered with his magnum opus. Incredibly, in the place just quoted from volume 3 Congar provides no reference to any publication of Galtier, but in volume 2, discussing the same issue, he quotes from the conclusion of Galtier's second book on the subject, *Le saint Esprit en nous d'après les Pères grecs* (The Holy Spirit in Us according to the Greek Fathers).<sup>29</sup> As the two books present the identical argument, I shall concentrate on the chapter titled "Pas d'union propre au Saint-Esprit" (No Union Proper to the Holy Spirit) from the first

book, *L'habitation en nous des trois Personnes* (The Indwelling in Us of the Three Persons).<sup>30</sup> I shall summarize and assess Galtier's argument there presented, which is built up with the help of many texts from the Greek Fathers. Page references will be supplied in the text so as not to overload the endnotes, and the translations are my own.

In his introduction to the chapter Galtier, speaking of the possibility of "a mode of presence, a mode of union with us, that would be really and exclusively proper to [the Holy Spirit]," makes a significant concession that should be kept in mind: "Once again—and I do not hesitate to repeat it—if this is possible, then it must be required by faith. The language of Scripture is too strong not to impose this conclusion on whoever believes it to be reconcilable with the dogma of the divine unity. Now there do exist theologians who believe it possible. Though the 'how' of it might not appear easy to determine, nevertheless its reality seems to them incontestable" (23). Galtier then asserts that for the Greek Fathers, especially St. Cyril of Alexandria, our sanctification or union with God in grace as a work *ad extra* is common to the three divine persons (27-34). Though the Fathers regularly describe it as a union established through the Holy Spirit with the Son and thus with the Father, no ground is here given for distinguishing among the persons: "the commonality among them reaches right to identity" (32). Our union with each of them is direct. But if Petavius

were correct, says Galtier, only our union with the Holy Spirit would be direct. This would mean that our union with the Son and the Father would only be mediate and indirect, a position incompatible with the teaching of the Fathers (33-4).

Galtier's next point is that a special union between human beings and the Holy Spirit is, however, impossible. If there were to be such a union, it would have to issue in a "formal effect," that is, an outcome according to which we would "participate in something which, of itself, belonged to [the Holy Spirit] exclusively and according to his personal property" (34). In the missions of the Son and the Holy Spirit all three persons are present, the Son and the Holy Spirit as "sent" and the Father simply as "coming," but like the divine nature itself, the action of the Son or the Holy Spirit is in fact common to all three persons (39-41). With St. Thomas, Galtier affirms that two things are involved in a divine mission, namely, relationship to origin and relationship to term, and it is the latter that properly characterizes the mission (41). Even the mission of the Son conforms to this pattern: "It does not assume either for him, the Father, or the Holy Spirit any action or influence pertaining to [one of] them properly" (41). And as a work *ad extra*, the creation of the sacred humanity is common to all three (43). The only difference (the formal effect) lies in the hypostatic union of the Son alone with the sacred humanity, "the union destined to place him before our eyes" (42-3). It is by virtue



of this that we human beings are enabled to have special relations with the Son (45). But nothing like this is found in the case of the Holy Spirit. He shares nothing with us that could ground special relations between us and him (46).

If *per impossibile* one divine person were to act *ad extra* by virtue of a personal property, says Galtier, the other two would find themselves as much strangers to this action as the Holy Spirit is to the generation of the Son (47). This explains why the Fathers conceived our union with the Holy Spirit as union also with the Son and the Father, that is, as our participation in the common divine nature (46-7). Let the following quotation from Cyril serve as an sample of the several patristic texts that Galtier marshals in support of this contention: "We are conformed to Christ, and Christ engraves his image on us by the Holy Spirit, who resembles him by nature. Hence the Spirit is God, since it is he who conforms [creatures] to God, in procuring by himself for those worthy of it participation in the divine nature" (50).<sup>31</sup> "If, therefore," Galtier concludes, "it is established that the Fathers unanimously link our union with the Spirit with our union with the Son and the Father, this shows that in their eyes this union is not of the personal order at all" (52-3).

Galtier then moves on to what he calls the two main arguments of Petavius. The first of these is that the Fathers taught that substantial holiness, or the power of sanctifying, belonged properly to the

Holy Spirit (53-85). Several of them even regarded this power as the Spirit's personal quality, as that which distinguished him from the Father and the Son (53-4). Moreover, he exercised this role not by efficient causality but by entering into union with the just. Petavius singled out Cyril as a purveyor of this doctrine (54). Galtier begins with a preliminary observation, namely, that though to be supremely holy and supremely spirit may distinguish the Holy Spirit from all that is not God, and in that sense aptly constitute his name, they do not characterize him in an exclusive sense, for the Father and the Son are no less holy, no less communicators of holiness, no less spirit. Nor need these qualities constitute his personal property within the Trinity. Galtier is convinced that in fact they do not (57).

Galtier then proceeds with a long and detailed presentation of texts from the Greek Fathers (58-85) to show that "it is completely false that the Fathers considered the power of sanctifying as exclusively proper to the person of the Holy Spirit. On the contrary, they presented it very clearly as held in common with the Father and the Son. The conclusions deemed able to be drawn from their language all proceed from a fundamental error: what distinguishes the Holy Spirit from creatures has been taken for what distinguishes him from the other divine persons" (58). Understandably, the first Father whom Galtier presents is Cyril (58-66). Again let one brief quotation from this source suffice: "It is

therefore through himself that the Holy Spirit acts in us: he truly sanctifies us and he unites us to himself in joining us [in some way] to himself; thus he renders us participants in the divine nature" (59).<sup>32</sup> Galtier then passes on to a wide selection of the Fathers, St. Gregory of Nazianzus, St. Athanasius, Epiphanius and Didymus (67-72), finding the same doctrine in each. Here is a short excerpt from Athanasius: "Thus [Scripture] leads us to believe that there is only one sanctification, that which comes from the Father, through the Son, in the Holy Spirit" (70).<sup>33</sup>

Galtier ends with a special treatment of St. Basil (72-85) because several times this Father seems to raise sanctification to the level of a personal property of the Holy Spirit, comparable to the fatherhood of the Father and the sonship of the Son (72). Galtier cites the Basilian text on which Petavius laid particular stress: "In God that which pertains to the *ousia* [essence] is common, for example, goodness, divinity and the like. But the hypostasis [person] is known in the character of either the fatherhood, the sonship, or the power to sanctify" (72).<sup>34</sup> If Basil really understood sanctification in this way, says Galtier, "one would be unable to attribute [holiness or sanctification] in any sense to the other two persons: it becomes as inappropriate and inexact to call them holy as it would be to call the Son the Holy Spirit or to acknowledge fatherhood to [the Son] as well [as to the Father]" (74). Galtier secures his argument by appealing to the formula of faith imposed by Basil on

Eustathius of Sebaste, in which, according to Galtier, holiness is predicated of each of the divine persons in a univocal sense: "Anathema to those who call the Holy Spirit a creature or who consider him such, and who in refusing to confess him holy by nature as the Father is holy by nature and the Son holy by nature, want to estrange him from the divine and blessed nature" (75).<sup>35</sup>

Finally, Galtier deals with the second main argument of Petavius, which is that in the Fathers there is no sanctification except in the Holy Spirit, and that this demonstrates that there is a special relationship between the sanctified soul and the same Spirit. Galtier treats this argument relatively briefly (85-8). First, he acknowledges the fact: in the Fathers there is no sanctification except in the Holy Spirit; but he immediately adds that this does not imply "that [the Holy Spirit] is any more ordered to this work than is the Father or the Son" (86). The three persons follow the trinitarian "law" expressed by Cyril as: "Everything is from the Father, through the Son, in the Holy Spirit" (86).<sup>36</sup> "This," says Galtier, "is the mystery of the divine activity in itself and not at all of the manner in which its influence touches us" (86-7). When the divine persons act *ad extra*, "there can be no diversity: there is only absolute unity" (87).

In the remainder of this section I shall criticize Galtier, but my criticism will be incorporated within a positive presentation of the theology of the Holy Spirit as agent that will go beyond de la Taille and

Rahner and will stop at nothing less than a full retrieval of Petavius for today.

The first point to note about Galtier's contribution is its omissions. It depends totally on the Eastern Fathers, making no appeal to Western Fathers, even to St. Augustine. Whether a different position could be developed from the Eastern Fathers cannot be pursued here, but I shall certainly turn to Augustine for guidance for what I want to say. Also noteworthy is the fact that Galtier does not refer to either de la Taille or Rahner. This is explainable for the first edition of his first book, which preceded their contributions, but not for the late, revised edition used here. Nor are they mentioned in his second book, which was published well after these contributions.<sup>37</sup> Apart from any other factors, these omissions on their own diminish considerably the value of Galtier's own contribution.

Secondly, Galtier is so intent on stressing the *ad extra* character of the bestowal of grace that he nowhere considers the possibility that it might be something more than this. But this possibility is precisely what the category of formal causality offers. Rahner makes two important reflections on it. The first is that whereas efficient causality involves the production of an effect ontologically distinct from the agent and therefore a movement *away from* the agent, formal causality bespeaks the effectuation of ontological union with the agent and therefore a movement *into the agent*. In Rahner's words, in the

hypostatic union, the beatific vision and the bestowal of grace "there is expressed the relationship of God to a creature which is not one of efficient causality (a production *out of* the cause), "but rather one "that must fall under the head of formal causality (a taking-up *into* the ground [form])."<sup>38</sup> In this reflection Rahner has brought out clearly, by a spatial metaphor, the distinction between formal and efficient causality, but in his second reflection, in typical fashion, he brings them together and relates them. This involves conceiving what is produced by efficient causality as the "last disposition" to the reception of the form, that is, to the exercise of formal causality. In other words, efficient causality is reconceived in terms of material causality. Again in Rahner's own words, "according to St. Thomas it is the case with a last disposition (the disposition that is a necessity for the form) that on the one hand as material cause it logically precedes the form, yet on the other that it depends for its subsistence upon the formal causality of the form, so that to affirm its presence is simultaneously to affirm with inner necessity the presence of the formal causality of the form, and vice versa."<sup>39</sup> Rahner describes this relationship as one of "objective reciprocal priority."<sup>40</sup> Later he came to characterize efficient causality as the "deficient mode" of formal causality, with efficient causality "conceivable by itself," but with formal causality necessarily (and therefore always) contain-

ing efficient causality, its deficient mode, within it as its condition of possibility.<sup>41</sup>

This is the place to explain why I regard Congar and Scheeben's attempts to distinguish the divine persons in the operation of grace as forms of modalism. We are used to hearing that by grace God becomes present to the soul in a new and higher way than by simple creation. Rahner's way of expressing this is to say that while in creation God acts on, and is present to, the soul by efficient causality, in grace he acts and is present by way of formal causality. In efficient causality, "deficient mode" of formal causality, what is deficient is the mode of presence of the cause. In a theology of the presence of God in grace based on efficient causality, therefore, the mode of divine presence is reduced, with the result that the real distinctions between the divine persons disappear. This is why I characterize it, in both Scheeben and Congar, as a form of modalism.<sup>42</sup>

Rahner's over-riding principle is that in regard to grace the statements of Scripture and the Fathers favoring proper relations to the three divine persons are so numerous, clear and strong that they must be acknowledged to be "in possession." Therefore, unless there exists an overwhelming argument to the contrary, these statements are to be accepted literally.<sup>43</sup> The argument from the nature of a divine work *ad extra*, based as it is on the concept of efficient causality, had been widely accepted as just such a contrary argument. But, says Rahner,

"there can be absolutely no objection" against his argument for quasi-formal causality, which allows proper relations: the trinitarian persons have "as divine, mutually distinct persons, each in his proper quasi-formal causality on the created spirit, a causality that makes it possible for this [created spirit] to possess these divine persons 'consciously' and, what is more, immediately."<sup>44</sup> Therefore the statements of Scripture and the Fathers asserting proper relations between each of the divine persons and the just soul must be allowed to stand and should be interpreted at face value. Rahner then specifies what this relation is in the case of the Father and the Holy Spirit: "it is the Father in the Trinity who is our Father, not the threefold God," and the Spirit, as "going forth from the Father and the Son," "dwells in us," "sanctifies, consecrates, moves" us.<sup>45</sup> Strangely, Rahner fails to mention the Son in this context.

Early in my presentation of Galtier I spoke of an important concession that he made to his dialogue partners, namely that if a special relation to the Holy Spirit could be demonstrated as possible, it would be binding in faith, so strong is the language of Scripture on this point. But note that for Galtier the point at issue is not, as for Rahner, the possibility of special relations with all three persons indifferently, but a special, immediate relation with the Holy Spirit, which relation would then mediate special relations with the other two persons (a position of course that he repudiated). Galtier seems to be correct at least in



his putting of the question, though I answer it in the opposite sense to him. His patristic quotations, being more concerned with the Holy Spirit's divinity than with his unique personal properties, by no means establish his case. And in my view the formula he distils from them, namely, "no sanctification except in the Holy Spirit," imposes the interpretation that whatever sanctification is given by the Father and the Son is mediated by the unique sanctification imparted by the Holy Spirit.

Earlier I argued that any given work of the Godhead *ad extra*, done as it is by efficient causality, must be attributed to each trinitarian person in its entirety. Galtier, as we saw, added a further requirement: the work must also be done by each person in exactly the same way. I only partly agree with him here. What he says is true in the case of a work that is purely *ad extra*; but some works are mixed, in that they have an *ad intra* as well as an *ad extra* component. In so far as each of these is *ad intra*, it constitutes an immediate relationship with one divine person only; in so far as each is *ad extra*, it produces a created effect common to the three divine persons. In principle there are two such works: the incarnation of the divine Son in Jesus Christ and the bestowal of grace by the Holy Spirit. The former is a union by quasi-formal causality of the Son alone with the sacred humanity, that is, with the individual human (and theandric) nature of Christ created by efficient causality (as the deficient mode contained within the quasi-formal causality) in a

work *ad extra* common to the three divine persons. The latter is a union by quasi-formal causality of the Holy Spirit alone with the graced human person re-created by efficient causality (again as the contained deficient mode) in a work *ad extra* common to the three persons. In each case the union of the human element with one divine person mediates distinct relations to the other two divine persons. In these two cases, the Son and the Holy Spirit, respectively, act in ways corresponding to their unique positions in the Trinity, and therefore not in the same way. And the sanctification that takes place in grace belongs to one of these instances (the second). Unlike Rahner, who has all three divine persons exercising quasi-formal causality on the soul of the just person in grace, I claim, with Petavius, that the Holy Spirit alone does this. One reason for the necessity of holding this (there are others as well) is that Scripture and the Fathers insist, as Galtier recognized, that there is no sanctification except in the Holy Spirit. In other words, the Holy Spirit must be allowed to play the central and dominant role in the bestowal of grace that the sources assign him.

Further reflection on Rahner shows that his position contains an inconsistency. On the one hand he says that quasi-formal causality involves "a taking-up *into* the ground," and on the other, in holding that it is through distinct *objective* relations that the divine persons relate to the graced soul by this same causality, ensures that even in grace the soul remains

external to its trinitarian ground. The remedy is to recognize that the only way a created spirit can be taken-up into the Trinity is through some kind of *subjective* ontological identification with *one* divine person, from which vantage point the graced soul would begin to share subjectively in that divine person's distinct relations to the other two persons. We do not need to spend valuable time speculating as to which divine person this might be, because Scripture and the Fathers tell us in the clearest terms that it is the Son, in whom we participate by receiving from the Father the "Spirit of sonship" (Rom 8:15), so that we become "sons (and daughters) in the Son," as the patristic phrase puts it. But note that, unlike Christ, we remain permanently and exclusively dependent on the Holy Spirit for this ontological status. Unlike Christ, we never become sons and daughters in our own right. Our relation with the Holy Spirit is therefore twofold: first, he re-creates us as sons and daughters in the Son, and second, he takes possession of us in this newly conferred status, and we of him, this mutual possession persisting as long as we do not fall from grace by sin. The first dimension of this relation is appropriated to the Holy Spirit and the second is proper. The justification for appropriation in the case of the first dimension is that the two dimensions form a single and continuous process. The re-creation takes place in view of the possession and culminates in it, and is therefore aptly named in terms of the culmination. The succinct "Rahnerian"

way of expressing this is to say that the Holy Spirit exercises quasi-formal causality in grace.

In a previous article I undertook to attempt a trinitarian account of Rahner's theology of the "supernatural existential," which I presented as the beginning of the gift of grace, given according to God's universal saving will to every human person at the moment of their creation, and therefore prior to justification or indeed to any decision on their part (and hence an "existential"), whereby they were "restructured," constituted in the field of the supernatural, with God in himself as their last end.<sup>46</sup> In the light of the principles enunciated above it seems permissible to say, by appropriation, that the supernatural existential is the Father's self-gift in the Holy Spirit whereby we *begin* to be conformed to Christ and thus directed to the Father, and that it contains a created element, namely, a grace-given aptitude for this transformation. At least at present I cannot see any way of going beyond appropriation here, much as I would like to. If appropriation is itself justified in this case (and I am convinced it is), its justification would be that the existential as I have described it fits properly the condition it is destined to attain when it becomes grace properly so called at the moment of justification (and here I am using the term "justification" in its theological sense of justification by faith).

In his article "The Holy Spirit in the Life of Jesus and of the Christian," Joseph Wong discusses Paul's

concept of πνεῦμα in the Scriptural texts where it appears to be a human reality.<sup>47</sup> After discussing various views, Wong presents, with evident approval, Rahner's account of this sense of πνεῦμα from his 1939 article "Some Implications of the Scholastic Concept of Uncreated Grace."<sup>48</sup> There Rahner calls it a "non-personal reality of the sanctified man," but at the same time "a supernatural principle." He goes on to assert that "with St. Paul we should say that we possess our pneumatic being (our 'created sanctifying grace') because we have the personal Pneuma of God." It is clear that Rahner here equates this sense of πνεῦμα with sanctifying grace. But does this do justice to Paul's thought or even to the dynamics of his own? The anthropological interpretation of πνεῦμα as one element of a tripartite constitution of the concrete human person (body, soul and spirit) cannot be lightly dismissed. It would call for an understanding of πνεῦμα that is universal in extent and *prior* to justification and sanctifying grace. In other words, Rahner is here groping toward an idea that he was able to articulate clearly only eleven years later,<sup>49</sup> namely, the supernatural existential, and particularly, I suggest, the existential as I have expounded it above and in my previous article,<sup>50</sup> that is, in a "Rahnerian" sense that reaches beyond the limits of Rahner's actual thought. Wong's own words would seem to support what I am saying here. He writes that "in order to receive the Spirit of Christ, it is presupposed that there is a certain spirituality,

or openness for the Spirit in human persons."<sup>51</sup> Is not this "spirituality" precisely what Rahner meant by the supernatural existential? This impression is confirmed by Wong's reference in the next sentence to "the *pneuma* given to human beings at creation." If it is given at creation, it cannot possibly be sanctifying grace: it can only be the supernatural existential in something like the combination I have proposed of uncreated and created elements.

A point made by Galtier in his rejection of Petavius' thesis is that it would mean that our union with the Son and the Father in grace is only mediate and indirect, and so would be contrary to the teaching of the Fathers. This criticism, so it seems to me, assumes too materialistic a concept of mediation. For if we are concerned with one divine spiritual reality mediated by another divine spiritual reality to a created spiritual reality, I see no objection against the immediacy of the presence of the first divine spiritual reality to the created spiritual reality. In other words this presence can at the same time and without contradiction be both mediate and immediate. Rahner himself defended the concept of a dialectical "mediated immediacy" in certain theological contexts.<sup>52</sup> In grace, the "what" that is immediately present (and united) is the one divine nature with which each divine person is identical, while the "who" is threefold by virtue of the opposed relations. All three are present and united to the created spirit, but in the only way they can be, that is: in

the case of the Father, as bringing forth the Son and the Holy Spirit; in the case of the Son, as receiving from the Father and bringing forth the Holy Spirit; and in the case of the Holy Spirit, as receiving from both the Father and the Son. Notice that alone of the three, the Holy Spirit in his personal property is the Godhead in purely receptive mode. Because of the necessary correspondence of the economic and the immanent Trinity, he is the only one who can be, and is, communicated in absolute (unqualified) immediacy to a created spirit, which itself can only be understood as pure receptivity to God; and he it is, therefore, who mediates the other two persons, in a relative (qualified) immediacy. Therefore his unique property, here seen at work in grace, merits and requires that he alone of the three divine persons be acknowledged as quasi-formal cause in his relation to the created spirit.

As I observed earlier, Galtier used only the Greek Fathers, not St. Augustine, in the construction of his argument. According to this argument, the three divine persons are “holy” and “sanctify” souls in univocal senses of these words. Augustine does not deny this: he affirms it, but his approach is more nuanced. Over and above the common meanings of these words, he distinguishes proper meanings in particular cases. First, he establishes his terminology, which he sets up in relation to the word “love.” Each of the three persons, he says, is love in the “universal” sense of the term, but the Holy Spirit is love in a “proper”

sense,<sup>53</sup> in as much as "he conveys to us the common love by which the Father and the Son mutually love one another."<sup>54</sup> He then applies this distinction to the word "holy": all three persons are holy, but the Holy Spirit is holy in a proper sense, for "he is called properly what [the Father and the Son] are called in common."<sup>55</sup> The same is true of the work of sanctification: we are inflamed with love of God and neighbor by the Holy Spirit, who is the love of God in person and who is poured into our hearts by Christ.<sup>56</sup> The mediation of the Holy Spirit in respect of the Father and the Son is clearly expressed in the following sentence: "Love (*dilectio*), then, which is from God and is God, is properly the Holy Spirit, through whom the charity (*caritas*) of God is poured forth in our hearts, and *through it the whole Trinity dwells in us*" (my emphasis).<sup>57</sup> The conclusion to be drawn from this is that in restricting himself to the Greek Fathers Galtier missed the richness of the total patristic tradition, which is always to be considered in its entirety. But note that the Greek Fathers too had insisted that there was no sanctification except in the Holy Spirit. Galtier, however, seems not to have appreciated the full significance of this statement. Petavius, on the other hand, appreciated what Galtier failed to appreciate.

Petavius was at pains to show that though the union of the Holy Spirit with the soul in grace was not a hypostatic union, such as obtained between the divine Son and the human nature of Christ, it



was nevertheless a union of the Holy Spirit in person and not just by virtue of a created gift bestowed by him (sanctifying grace). In Petavius' terms the union was "substantial" (*substantialis*), not "accidentary" (*accidentarius*, a neologism).<sup>58</sup> Well aware of the risk he had incurred of seeming to suggest a hypostatic union, he emphasized that the union was "relative" and "incidental," and further he adopted from the Greek Fathers the word *σχετικός*,<sup>59</sup> a term by which they characterized the union with God in grace, and which carried the exact meanings just indicated (and "non-essential" as well).<sup>60</sup> These meanings supply what Scholasticism meant by "accidental." While this too is open to misunderstanding, I have applied it in the expression "accidental form" to the Holy Spirit in grace. It brings out the identity and difference of the Incarnation and the bestowal of grace. In each a divine person acts as "form," but in the Incarnation the Son is the "substantial form," providing the very personhood of the sacred humanity, while in grace the Holy Spirit is an "accidental form," possessing and being possessed by the human person but not supplanting the latter's personhood. Importantly, the two distinct ways in which a divine person can enter into a true a union of being with a human reality are clearly indicated. It was thus that I was able to rebut Heribert Mühlen's rejection of the category of quasi-formal causality for grace though he had accepted it for the Incarnation.<sup>61</sup>

That the indwelling of the Holy Spirit involves an ontological union between the divine and the human person is a matter of no small importance. Following St. Thomas, Rahner had stipulated that the communication of a divine person to a human reality can take place in only two ways: (1) by hypostatic union of the divine person with a human nature, as in the Incarnation, or (2) in a union by which the divine person is possessed by a human person by way of knowledge and love, as in grace.<sup>62</sup> While this statement is unassailable, it needs, if the fundamentally ontological character of the union by grace is to be driven home, to be complemented by a theology of substantial and accidental form such as I have proposed. The danger is that otherwise the union of grace might be conceived as only "moral" (as Scheeben conceived it), like the loving union of two human persons, whereas the saints tell us that it is so much more than this. In a marvelously lapidary expression St. Augustine had said that God was "interior intimo meo," three Latin words that require expansion into at least eleven in English if their meaning is to be grasped: "more inward to me than are my own inmost depths."<sup>63</sup> This is the union of the human person with God in grace, an immediate union with the God the Father and Christ certainly, but, paradoxically, in the first place with the Holy Spirit, a union then mediated by him to the other two divine persons.

Let St. Basil the Great have the last word:

We say, for instance, that form abides *in* matter, or that power dwells *in* its recipient, or a certain habit affects a person *in* whom it makes its home, and so on. Therefore, since the Holy Spirit perfects reason-endowed beings, He is present *in* them in the same way as form is present *in* matter. Such a person no longer lives according to the flesh, but is led by the Spirit of God. He is called a son of God, because he is conformed to the image of the Son of God; we call him a “spiritual” man.<sup>64</sup>

We now move on to our second section, in which we investigate the distinctive character of the Holy Spirit as a person within the Trinity, that is, in relation to the Father and the Son.

### **The Holy Spirit as Trinitarian Person**

East and West have significantly different ways of conceiving the mystery of the Holy Trinity. The main difference has to do with the “procession,” the origin or coming-forth, of the Holy Spirit. This difference is not total, for the two traditions agree that the Spirit proceeds ultimately from the Father alone. But whereas the West understands the Spirit to proceed from the Father and the Son together as a “single principle,” the East does not acknowledge any role to the Son in the eternal procession of the Spirit. The Western mode, going back to St. Augustine in the fifth century, is called the “Filioque” (“and from the Son”), and the Eastern, associated

particularly with the ninth century Patriarch of Constantinople, St. Photius, is called "monopatrism" ("Father-alone-ism"). The Western tradition defends itself against the charge of incoherence by pointing out, with St. Augustine,<sup>65</sup> that while the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, the Son himself proceeds (comes forth) from the Father, and that therefore, ultimately, the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father alone. The East, however, remains unmoved by this argument. While mutual understanding between the two traditions has increased considerably in recent years, especially through a number of agreed ecumenical statements,<sup>66</sup> this difference remains, showing every sign of continuing for years to come to be the principal doctrinal difference between the Catholic and the Eastern Orthodox Church.

While some Western theologians recently have played down the Filioque, I myself defend the view that it is an essential element of Christian faith, but for all that, I do not see it as necessarily church-dividing.<sup>67</sup> As a theological question it is distinct from the issue of its retention in the Western version of the Nicene Creed, where it exists as an interpolation that took place in a gradual process beginning in Spain in the sixth century and culminating in Rome in the eleventh. Given what we now know of the history of the Filioque in the Creed, it is easy to understand the deep offense it has caused in the East. Unilaterally inserted, it could be unilaterally

removed in a gesture of ecumenical good will as the recent North American agreed statement suggests. However, before this is done the Western churches, acting together and ecumenically so as not to cause further offense (this time in the West), should carefully weigh the pastoral implications of dropping from the Creed an article that has been confessed in good faith for a millennium. Perhaps a compromise might be, if not the ideal, the best solution under the circumstances. I have suggested one which has sound scriptural, patristic and ecumenical credentials, and I am happy to repeat it here.<sup>68</sup> Here is how the amended article might run: "We believe in the Holy Spirit, the Lord, the giver of life, who proceeds from the Father and receives from the Son. With the Father and the Son he is worshiped and glorified. He has spoken through the prophets." These things being said, in the remainder of this paper I shall appeal to the Filioque without apology as an available theological resource.

What I am trying to do in this section is to situate the Holy Spirit as accurately as I can as a person within the Trinity. With Kilian McDonnell, I am convinced that the key to an understanding of the Spirit, the most mysterious and elusive of the three divine persons, is the relationship he bears to the other two persons. As McDonnell says, "the health of Pneumatology is in Trinity, and in the trinitarian movement,"<sup>69</sup> where the latter is understood as the whole complex of activity whereby the Father brings

forth the Son and the Holy Spirit and they return to him. The Holy Spirit, therefore, *is* his total relationship to these other two divine persons. Apart from this he is nothing. He is therefore rightly conceived only in terms of this relationship, even, we might say especially, if what is being considered is his mission and activity in the world.

It is an undisputed datum of revelation that in the Trinity there exists a privileged order or *τάξις* of the three divine persons, namely, Father, Son, Holy Spirit. This is understood as the order of origin of the Son and the Holy Spirit from the Father. As St. Thomas observed, the order spoken of here is not chronological, but is an *ordo naturae*, an “order of nature,” according to which “one thing exists out of another.”<sup>70</sup> When the “processions” of the Son and the Holy Spirit in the Trinity—and here I use the word in the Western, generic sense of denoting the origins of both the Son and the Holy Spirit, rather than the Eastern, specific sense, in which it denotes only the origin of the Holy Spirit—are, in God’s plan, extended into the world, becoming thereby their respective “missions,” the same *τάξις* is to be observed: the Father sends the Son, and the Father and the Son together send the Holy Spirit (or the Son sends the Holy Spirit from the Father [see John 15:26]).

Sacred Scripture speaks also of a reversal of this *τάξις* when it becomes a question of the return of the spiritual creature to the Father: by grace we return

*in* the Spirit, *through* the Son, *to* the Father (see, for example, Eph 2:18). This is not surprising: it is exactly what we would expect. What is surprising is that the  $\tau\acute{\alpha}\xi\iota\varsigma$  does not seem to apply to the case of Christ, though he too receives the Holy Spirit (see the accounts of his baptism in all four Gospels) and his life too is understood as a return to the Father (see John 16:28). According to St. Luke, the bestowal of the Holy Spirit by which Jesus was constituted in human existence as the Son of God came directly from the Father (see Luke 1:35), and hence was not mediated by the Son. And the same picture is conveyed by Matthew (see Matt 1:18-25). The order of divine persons here is Father, Holy Spirit, Son. This “inversion” of the  $\tau\acute{\alpha}\xi\iota\varsigma$ , as Hans Urs von Balthasar called it,<sup>71</sup> requires a revision of trinitarian thought, and cannot be accommodated within the framework of the trinitarian models that have operated hitherto in East and West.

The theologian who opened my eyes on this subject was Edward Schillebeeckx, though he was speaking of Christology and not directly of the Trinity. Here is what he wrote:

From the Council of Nicea onwards one particular Christological model—the Johannine—has been developed as a norm within very narrow limits and one direction; and in fact only this tradition has made history in the Christian churches. For that reason the course of history has never done justice to the possibilities inherent

in the Synoptic model; its peculiar dynamic was checked and halted and the model relegated to the "forgotten truths" of Christianity.<sup>72</sup>

Exactly the same is true in the theology of the Trinity. It was the Johannine theology rather than the Synoptic that lay behind the trinitarian theologies of East and West. It was now time to turn to the Synoptic Gospels to see what light they could cast on this central mystery. The Gospel according to John was not the only Gospel: the New Testament canon contained three additional ones; and a truly balanced trinitarian theology required that it be based on the entirety of the word of God, not just on one part of it. I was confident that nothing contrary to orthodoxy would emerge from this exercise, because just as different theologies coexist harmoniously within the one canon of Scripture, so too could different theologies that were logically and historically dependent on them.

In fact, the model that emerged from my study was none other than the mutual-love theory of St. Augustine, with which the West and even to some extent the East were already familiar.<sup>73</sup> This familiarity, however, extended only to the thesis that the Holy Spirit was the mutual love of the Father and the Son, and not, therefore, to the proposition that this thesis constituted a distinct inner-trinitarian model according to which much New Testament evidence concerning Christ and the Holy Spirit was to be



interpreted. The insight that the mutual-love theory is precisely such a model has been central to my own work in pneumatology and it lies at the heart of my own peculiar brand of Spirit Christology.<sup>74</sup>

This is not the place to argue the truth of the thesis that the Holy Spirit is the mutual love of the Father and the Son. I have done this several times in my writings, as can be seen even from those referred to already in this section. Here I shall merely deal with Rahner's famous objection against the thesis, which reflects the common mentality of Catholic theologians of his time, and with a related objection against the suitability of the thesis to express an acceptable sense of divine personhood. Then, more positively, I shall present and comment on Pope John Paul II's articulation of this theology as now forming part of the corpus of Catholic doctrine on the Holy Spirit.

Rahner held that "there is properly no *mutual* love between Father and Son, for this would presuppose two acts."<sup>75</sup> This objection arose from Rahner's strong conviction of the unicity of God, which, correspondingly, required unicity of the divine operation. For the same reason he denied, in God, the existence of three distinct "centers of activity" or "subjectivities," asserting instead a single consciousness that "subsists in a threefold way."<sup>76</sup> Rahner was here defending an essential element of authentic trinitarian doctrine, but, uncharacteristically, was also opting one-sidedly for one pole of what was actually a bipolar reality, in regard to which, therefore, it

was necessary to affirm both poles in tension. I refer to the unity and the trinity of God. He could never bring himself to recognize that each divine person was a distinct psychological "subject."

Walter Kasper, by contrast, accepting that "the one divine consciousness subsists in a triple mode," saw the necessity "that a triple *principium* [principle] or subject of the one consciousness must be accepted."<sup>77</sup> In this respect Kasper was following Bernard Lonergan,<sup>78</sup> and the great majority of the theological community has followed suit. The way I like to put it is that in God there is one "absolute" subject subsisting in three "relative" subjects. The importance of this is that it allows each divine person to be a distinct center of activity, albeit in a qualified sense. I endorse as my own view William Hill's summary of this later understanding:

The members of the Trinity are now seen as constituting a community of persons in pure reciprocity, as subjects and centers of one divine conscious life. Each person is constituted what might analogously be called an "I" in self-awareness of its own unique identity, but only by way of rapport to the other two persons as a non-self; indeed it is in virtue of that free interplay, wherein each person disposes himself towards the others in knowing and loving, that each person gains his unique identity.<sup>79</sup>

With the Father and the Son established as distinct centers of activity, it now becomes meaningful to speak of their mutual love. Such speech is not invalidated by the statement that each of them participates in the “essential” divine love, that is, the love of God for himself, for the love of which we speak is not identical in every respect with this love: it is simply the love of the Father and the Son for each other, and as such is “notional,” that is, productive of the Holy Spirit. It is not essential in its last determination, though it is so in its initial elements. We have here an application of the principle established from St. Augustine in the last section: even *within* the Trinity the word “love” is affirmed analogously, that is, in different but related senses. Moreover, the mutual love of the Father and the Son is not two acts, either originally, that is, in its elements as two coinciding presentations of one essential act, or ultimately, that is, as the single objectivization of these elements. In its final determination as the person of the Holy Spirit, it is supported in existence by the Father and the Son. It is not the Father and the Son, but that which stands *over against* the Father and the Son as proceeding from them. And further, in so far as they breathe forth the Holy Spirit, the Father and the Son are not two principles but a single principle, united not only in their divinity but in their mutual love.

If they are not aware of this already, it is only fair to point out to followers of the Eastern tradition that the mutual-love theory entails the Filioque.

The mutual-love theory may even be a way of commending the Filioque to them. For if the mutual-love theory is not experienced as a foreign body invading the Eastern tradition—even if it has not figured prominently in this tradition so far—neither then should the Filioque be so experienced. The history of the West in regard to the mutual-love theory has not been so very different from that of the East: though the mutual-love theory has never been without some supporters in the West, the great majority of Western theologians have rejected it on the grounds that it implies a proper role for the Holy Spirit in the economy and consequently in the Trinity itself. Kasper is correct when he observes, of the West:

Most theologians have ascribed the work of sanctification and indwelling of the Spirit to the Holy Spirit only by appropriation; only a few (Petavius, Thomassin, Passaglia, Scheeben, Schauf, among others) have by dint of considerable intellectual efforts spoken of a personal indwelling (not just by appropriation) of the Spirit.<sup>80</sup>

Just as a theology of proper relations has always been a minority position, so has any serious commitment to the mutual-love theory. The judgment of Congar in this matter is typical. After surveying the views of the various Catholic theologians of eminence who have written sympathetically of it, he endorses as his own the opinion of H. F. Dondaine: "It is therefore illuminating and interesting to present the

Holy Spirit as the friendship of the Father and the Son or the mutual love of the Father and the Son. This view can, however, not be used metaphysically, since it does not provide a consistent analogy for our understanding of the Person of the Holy Spirit.”<sup>81</sup> I must say that I fail to see how something can be “illuminating and very interesting” and at the same time metaphysically unsound. Could it be that in our time the Holy Spirit is asking of the churches, East and West, renewed “considerable intellectual efforts” to overcome the ecumenical obstacle of the Filioque via a thorough and ecumenical study and appropriation of mutual-love theology? To me this seems to be so.

The second objection against the mutual-love theory, mentioned earlier, is that as mutual love is an action (or the sum of two actions), it cannot suitably represent a person. How can mutual love be a person? St. Thomas deals with this objection in principle when he addresses the more general question of how “love” (*amor*) in God can be a person.<sup>82</sup> Already in his commentary on the Sentences he has characterized the Holy Spirit as “a subsistent operation.”<sup>83</sup> In the *Summa Theologiae* he argues that love does not “pass over” from the lover to the object loved, but remains immanent in the lover while bearing a *relation* to the object loved. In us this relation is an accident, but since there are no accidents in God, in him it must be non-accidental, that is to say, subsistent. As it subsists in a spiritual nature, it must be a

person; and as immanent within the *divine* nature, it must be divine. If the Father is the lover and the Son the object of his love, the Holy Spirit is the subsistent love-relation of the Father to the Son.

St. Thomas could have drawn a similar conclusion for the case of the Son as lover and the Father as object of his love: the Holy Spirit is also the subsistent love-relation of the Son to the Father. In other words, the Holy Spirit is the subsistent *mutual* love of the Father and the Son. And this is how St. Thomas does present him, even in as early a work as the commentary on the Sentences.<sup>84</sup> Hitherto I have followed John Cowburn in insisting that the Holy Spirit is precisely the "objectivization" of the mutual love of the Father and the Son.<sup>85</sup> This emphasizes the fact that the Holy Spirit is not the Father and the Son but the divine person who stands *over against* them in a relation of opposition. Recently, though, I have come to see that provided this important point be acknowledged, it is not necessary specifically to mention it, for mutual love is in itself an objectivization: it is the transcendent objectivization of the two personal loves that comprise it, and this can be seen even in the case of human mutual love.

St. Thomas has demonstrated here, to my satisfaction at least, *that* the Holy Spirit is a person, even if he is a subsistent operation. But *how* a subsistent operation can be a person still eludes us. As the mutual love of two divine persons, how can the Holy Spirit himself be a divine person? In an attempt

to solve this problem, Bernd Jochen Hilberath has transposed the terms of the mutual-love argument into more personal terms, more personal, that is, from the perspective of the Holy Spirit himself. According to Hilberath,

[The Holy Spirit] is the one who perfectly grants room for the being-in-each-other, the perichoresis of Father and Son, he is the one whose own being is realized in selflessly making possible this being-in-each-other. Thus the Spirit proceeds not in supplementary fashion as a third person from a first and second self-constituting or rather mutually constitutive persons; rather, he reveals himself as the always already opened space for interpersonal encounter in person.<sup>86</sup>

Initially enthusiastic about this formulation, I must confess that I am now uneasy about it. In a word, it seems to me to be too anthropomorphic. The idea of the Holy Spirit as “realizing” his personhood in some way seems to reduce him to the condition of a human person. In the case of a human being there are two levels at which the word “person” can be predicated. The first is that in which we are said to “realize our personhood,” which for Christians means to live as perfectly in accord with God’s will as possible, in short to become, to the best of our ability, saints. The second is the more basic, ontological level, at which we are persons already from the first moment of our existence, regardless of what we might do later on.

Hilberath's formulation applies to the first of these, not the second; but the second is the only one that applies, even if analogically, to the case of a divine person. If Hilberath had said that the Holy Spirit is the divine person whose personhood consists in the mediation of the Father and the Son to each other in mediated immediacy, I would have no reason to complain. But where would we be then? Back, I suggest, where we started, with the personhood of the Holy Spirit as impenetrable a mystery as ever and little to choose between *this* formulation and that of the mutual-love theology.

Perhaps we shall never get any further with the question of the personhood of the Holy Spirit. This divine person, the most elusive of the Trinity, has shown himself peculiarly resistant to our efforts to plumb the mystery of his personhood. He himself "searches everything, even the depths of God" (1 Cor 2:10), but his own depths he conceals from prying eyes. Perhaps he means us to apply to ourselves the words of God to the waves of the sea: "Thus far you shall come, and no farther" (Job 38:11).

This brings us to the teaching of Pope John Paul II in his encyclical *Dominum et Vivificantem* (Lord and Giver of Life).<sup>87</sup> Three times in the course of this document, in arts. 10, 34 and 39, the Pope teaches that the Holy Spirit is the mutual love of the Father and the Son. We begin with art. 34, which is the clearest and most succinct statement. Here the Pope says, "Not only is [the Holy Spirit] the direct witness



of the mutual love [of the Father and the Son] from which creation derives, but he himself is this love. He himself, as love, is the eternal uncreated gift. In him is *the source and the beginning of every giving of gifts to creatures.*" In art. 10 the Pope distinguishes between the "essential" and the "personal" love of God. The former is "shared by the three divine Persons," while the latter is identical with the person of the Holy Spirit "as the Spirit of the Father and the Son." The Pope continues, the Holy Spirit is "Person-Love" (*Persona-amor*) and "Person-Gift" (*Persona-donum*). "Here," says the Pope, "we have an inexhaustible treasure of the reality and an inexpressible deepening of the concept of *person* in God, which only divine Revelation makes known to us." Finally, in art. 39 he briefly repeats the doctrine already given in arts. 10 and 34.

The following points from the Pope's teaching are to be noted. First, it is clear that the Holy Spirit is to be acknowledged as the mutual love of the Father and the Son. Here the Pope elevates to the level of Catholic doctrine a proposition that earlier had been either denied outright or at least seriously questioned by some prominent Catholic theologians. Second, the Holy Spirit has the character of gift both in the Trinity and in the world. In the Trinity the Spirit is primarily the gift of the Father to the Son. This character is continued in the world in that there the Spirit is first and foremost the gift of the Father to Christ (see arts. 17, 18 and 22). The Son in turn

gives the Spirit, as his own gift, to us (see arts. 22 and 23). That in the Trinity the Holy Spirit is the gift also of the Son to the Father is not a major theme of the encyclical. Nevertheless it is to be found, in arts. 10, 41 and 59. Art. 10 states "that in the Holy Spirit the intimate life of the Triune God becomes totally gift, an exchange of mutual love between the divine Persons, and that through the Holy Spirit God exists in the mode of gift." Here it is not clear whether the phrase "between the divine Persons" refers only to the Father and the Son or to all three persons. But given that in this very article the Pope distinguishes the personal from the essential love of God, it seems that it is the former that he intends. He would therefore be saying that the Holy Spirit is the mutual gift of the Father and the Son to each other. In any case our proposition seems to be implied as a corollary of the mutual-love teaching itself. In other words, if the Holy Spirit is the mutual love of the Father and the Son, he will also be their mutual gift. Third, as primary gift, the Holy Spirit is the beginning of every gift that God gives to the Church and the world. Thus the Holy Spirit is singled out as that person of the Trinity who introduces us into the trinitarian life of grace. Finally, the Pope does not attempt to dilute the strangeness of identifying the Holy Spirit with the operation of divine love by resorting to more "personal" categories. Instead, in calling the Holy Spirit "Person-Love," he embraces with zest the paradox and mystery of the mutual-love

theology, and even says that here we have a lesson in what it means to be a person, a lesson we could never have learned by ourselves but for which we are totally dependent on divine revelation.

Though there exists a significant difference between Eastern and Western modes of conceiving the Trinity, there is an even more significant similarity between them. Each is based on the Johannine theology and takes its point of departure from the latter's Christology, which is rightly characterized as a "descending" Christology, that is to say, a Christology that represents God precisely in his saving outreach to the world. It is conceived in terms of a movement initiated by and in God and directed *downward* and away from himself toward the world, and is summed up in that exclusively Johannine concept, "Incarnation" (see John 1:18). This means that the Word of God, who was with the Father from all eternity, came down to the world and assumed "flesh" in the person of Jesus Christ. Underlying this traditional Christology is a concept of the Trinity in which the Word comes forth eternally from the Father, and which is completed in the eternal coming-forth of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Word-Son (according to the Western understanding) or simply from the Father of the Son (in the Eastern).

A Christology that has not attained the concept of the pre-existence of Christ cannot be of the descending variety. This applies to all three Synoptic Gospels. Each of them exhibits what is called an "ascending"

Christology. This is a theological movement or method that rises from the human to the divine, from the contemplation of the man Jesus to the confession of his divinity, which is manifest in his resurrection from the dead. Although it embraces every aspect of the life of Jesus, descending Christology has as its central focus the Incarnation, while ascending Christology, which likewise embraces the whole Jesus, culminates in the Resurrection. Ascending Christology should not be dismissed on the grounds that it is "Pelagian," that is, that it represents a purely human effort to move from knowledge to faith, for it presupposes that the entire movement is guided and directed by divine grace, indeed by the Holy Spirit himself, who is active both in Jesus and in those who come to believe in him. The Synoptist who shows the greatest appreciation of the role of the Holy Spirit in the life of Jesus is undoubtedly St. Luke.

Reflecting on the Synoptics, and especially St. Luke, I came to see that the trinitarian theology implicit in them was not the traditional trinitarianism of East and West that had been drawn from the Gospel of St. John as noted by Schillebeeckx, but a different one altogether. It was the mutual-love theology, which I now recognized to be more than a mere theology: it was an alternative trinitarian model no less important than the traditional one.<sup>88</sup> The traditional model was based on the outward movement from God to the world; but this one was based on an inward movement, namely, from

the world to God. If the first involved the concepts of procession and mission, the second involved the concept of return. And just as ascending Christology was not Pelagian, neither was this, for like ascending Christology it was dependent on the action of the Holy Spirit reclaiming the creation and guiding it, gently moving it, in its journey to God. This is how the inversion of the *τάξις* was to be understood: within the Trinity, and according to the mutual-love model, the Holy Spirit was in the first instance the love of the Father for the Son, who was the “treasurer” of the Spirit, as the Eastern theology was pleased to call him. When the Father directed that love beyond the Godhead in a radical, creative act in the world, what sprang into existence was the humanity of Christ drawn by this very act into the strongest and most perfect union possible with that divine person who in the Trinity was the one to whom the Father’s love rightfully belonged, namely, the Son. And as the strongest and most perfect union possible with a divine person is a “hypostatic” union, the union of the humanity of Christ with the pre-existent divine Son brought about by the Father’s creative bestowal of the Holy Spirit was precisely the “hypostatic union” with which we had long been familiar in faith and theology.

The result of these reflections was a certain relativization of the traditional model of the Trinity whether in its Eastern or Western formulation: no longer could it be seen as the sole, “absolute” way of

conceiving the Trinity or the fundamental Christian tenet with which all other theological statements needed ultimately to be reconciled. Rather, it was one of two complementary models that fulfilled this role between them. Eventually I gave these models names expressive of their complementarity: the traditional, Johannine model I called the "procession" model, because it was concerned with the coming-forth of the Son and the Holy Spirit from the Father; and the Synoptic model I called the "return" model because it dealt with the return of the Son and the Holy Spirit to the Father, or—to put it differently—the return of the Son to the Father in the power of the Holy Spirit.<sup>89</sup> Because the return presupposed the coming-forth, I had always claimed that the return model was the more comprehensive of the two. This, however, by no means justified dispensing with the traditional model, for there was much New Testament material, for example, its statements about the missions of the Son and the Holy Spirit, that required it.

Let me now revisit a passage from St. Thomas that I first treated in my book *Grace: the Gift of the Holy Spirit*.<sup>90</sup> Here is a literal translation of the text:

The Holy Spirit is said to be the link between the Father and the Son in so far as he is Love, because, since the Father loves himself and the Son with a single love, and vice versa [that is, the Son loves himself and the Father with the same single love], there is brought about in the Holy Spirit, in so far as he is Love, a relation of the

Father to the Son, and vice versa [i.e. a relation of the Son to the Father], as lover to beloved. But from the very fact that the Father and the Son love each other mutually, it is necessary that their mutual Love, which is the Holy Spirit, should proceed from both. According to origin, therefore, the Holy Spirit is not the mean [that is, the person existing *between* the Father and the Son], but the third person in the Trinity; however, according to the aforesaid relation he is the mediate link between the two, proceeding from them both.<sup>91</sup>

St. Thomas is here dealing with an objection that states that either the Holy Spirit is the mean (*medius*) between the Father and the Son, that is, he exists *between* the Father and the Son, or he proceeds *from* them, in which case he exists in third place *after* them: he cannot be both. St. Thomas's reply is that in fact the Holy Spirit *is* both, and that the possibility of this can be shown. The one objective state of affairs, the Trinity in its mutual interpersonal relations, can be regarded from more than one valid perspective: first, from the perspective of origin, the Holy Spirit occurs after the Father and the Son, since he proceeds from both of them; but, second, from the perspective of the relation obtaining between the Father and the Son, the Holy Spirit occurs between them, in so far as he is their mutual love. I have quoted this passage because it supports the points I have been making. St. Thomas's perspective of origin corresponds to my

procession model, while his perspective of relation corresponds to my return model. In his view each perspective is both valid and necessary for the acquisition of an adequate trinitarian knowledge. Admittedly, he does not deal adequately with the problem of the entry of the Holy Spirit upon the relation between the Father and the Son. It will therefore be necessary for us to return to this point.

The two models of the Trinity can be compared and contrasted in various ways, three of which we have seen already: one model is Johannine, the other Synoptic; one takes descending Christology as its point of departure, the other takes ascending Christology; and one is rightly designated the procession model, the other the model of return. To these a further three, at least, can be added, and we shall say a word about each of them. The first of this latter group can be seen as a refinement, by St. Thomas himself, of the two Thomistic perspectives with which we have just been dealing (even though it occurs in an earlier work, the Commentary on Book 1 of the Sentences, in a passage to which reference has been made already<sup>92</sup>). There St. Thomas adopts the same two perspectives as in the passage from the *Summa*, but while he calls the first "the procession [of the Holy Spirit] itself" (*processio ipsa*)—which is the same as the perspective of "origin"—he calls the second—which in the *Summa* is the "relation" between the Father and the Son—"the manner of the proceeding [of the Holy Spirit]" (*modus procedendi*).



This distinction remains valid for the second formulation: the distinction between the origin of the Holy Spirit and the relation between the Father and the Son is the same as that between the procession of the Holy Spirit and the manner of his procession, for he proceeds *as* the mutual love of the Father and the Son. Our fourth point of comparison and contrast between the two models, therefore, is that while the first is concerned with the bare *fact* of the procession of the Holy Spirit, the second is concerned with the *manner* of his procession.

A fifth way of comparing and contrasting the two models is to recognize that while the procession model concerns the coming-into-being of the Trinity in as much as the Son and the Holy Spirit draw their being from the Father, the return model concerns the eternal life and activity of the fully constituted Trinity. My way of referring to this aspect is to call the procession model the Trinity *in fieri*, the Trinity in the act of becoming, and the return model the Trinity *in facto esse*, the Trinity in the state of already constituted being. Of course in isolation this terminology is misleading; it gives the impression that there is time and change and therefore imperfection in what must be confessed as the perfect being of God. But the perfection of God is not static and lifeless, like the death of entropy; rather, it is the very fullness of life and act. How else can this complexity be expressed except with the aid of dialectic, that is, by statements that assert together the dynamism and the timeless

perfection of the divine being? In concentrating on the fact that the Son and the Holy Spirit draw their being from the Father, the procession model expresses the first of these qualities, and in articulating the full interpersonal relationships of the three divine persons, the return model incorporates the second. This differentiated approach is necessary if anything like justice is to be done to the mystery of the Trinity.

It was gratifying, therefore, to note that the official Roman "clarification" of the Filioque did precisely this in a paragraph toward its close. This paragraph beginning with the words "In the same way" states that "it is in the Holy Spirit that this relationship between the Father and the Son attains its Trinitarian perfection;" and a little later it says that "in the fullness of the Trinitarian mystery they are Father and Son in the Holy Spirit."<sup>93</sup> In speaking of "attaining Trinitarian perfection" and "the fullness of the Trinitarian mystery," these statements refer to a completed state of trinitarian knowledge, only hinting at the existence of a prior, less perfect state. The virtue of my terminology is that it makes explicit what is left implicit here. It brings into the open this prior state, affirming on the one hand its necessity and value and on the other the dialectical character of its relationship to the final and perfect state.

We are now situated to understand how in St. Thomas the Holy Spirit can enter upon the relationship between the Father and the Son and how the

Roman Clarification can speak of this relationship as attaining its trinitarian perfection in the Holy Spirit. These are legitimate and true statements, but their justification is grasped only in the light of some such distinction as that which I have made between the Trinity *in fieri* and the Trinity *in facto esse*, for they are true of the Trinity *in facto esse*, but not of the Trinity simply *in fieri*. In other words the Son draws his being entirely and exclusively from the Father and not at all from the Holy Spirit. Any and all suggestion of a Spirituque must be resolutely rejected as antithetical to authentic Christian doctrine. But at the same time the fullness of the relationship between the Father and the Son cannot be understood or appreciated without an affirmation of the Holy Spirit who, as their mutual love, exists *between* them. This shows that the return model is no optional extra in the theology of the Trinity and in pneumatology. Rather, it is an essential component of these theologies, supplying what is lacking in the procession model. For the same reason I shall propose that it is the key to the thorny problem of the Filioque.

The sixth and last point of comparison and contrast between the two models has been anticipated already in my presentation of the fifth, but because it is conceptually different from this point, it merits its own separate statement. The procession model has to do with the coming-into-being, the bare existence we might say, of the three divine persons. It is

concerned, therefore, only with the fundamentals of their relationships. The return model, on the other hand, deals with the fullness of life and relationships that obtains among the three persons. This, then, is our sixth point. Here I am developing further my earlier remark that the return model is more comprehensive than the procession model. Indeed it contains and implies the procession model without abrogating it. For example, one can recognize the Filioque concealed within it, for the Holy Spirit can be seen to proceed from the Father and the Son in as much as he is their mutual love. At the same time the continuing distinction of the Father and the Son as persons (loving each other) does not contradict the fact that in their breathing-forth of the Holy Spirit they are strictly one, that is, united in mutual love. Admittedly, we here conceive the term "mutual love" first in a subjective sense, that is, as the love of the Father and of the Son. To that extent it is identical with their persons, the mere sum, we might say, of their personal loves. We then reconceive it in an objective and final sense, in which it is identical with the person of the Holy Spirit, proceeding *from* the Father and the Son and in that sense transcending their personal loves. Logically, the subjective sense precedes the objective. But this should be no surprise: it is merely another way of saying that the return model follows and presumes the procession model without abrogating it.

We conclude this section with some remarks on the Filioque. The remainder of this paragraph is devoted to a statement of the thesis that I wish to propose on this subject. It is a complex thesis consisting of six steps, all of which I have treated in my published works, and therefore no attempt will be made to repeat the spadework here. My object is purely to draw together in a coherent way the various elements that comprise my complete position on the Filioque, which I regard as one that, in principle at least, is tenable in both East and West. Here, then, are the steps of the argument, first simply presented in summary form, and then argued. First, the fact that the Filioque was never part of the Eastern tradition does not of itself justify its rejection by the Eastern Orthodox Church today. Second, it is for historical reasons that the East has hitherto been without this doctrine. Third, on the other hand the mutual-love theology of the Holy Spirit, which requires the Filioque, already has a certain limited acceptance in the East. Fourth, the mutual love model of the Trinity, while admitting both Filioquism and monopatrism, does not reconcile them on the intellectual plane. Fifth, the mutual love model, however, allows Filioquism and monopatrism to coexist dialectically. But sixthly, dialectic pertains to and is inseparable from trinitarian faith in any case.

Against the first step as formulated here I envisage the following objection: since the Western and the Eastern traditions grew up side-by-side and more or

less independently, it is futile to attempt to transplant a foreign element such as the *Filioque* from the Western tradition into the Eastern. In reply I point out that this is not what is being attempted. Particular, that is, culture-bound, Christian traditions are required by the very nature of the *Catholica* to maintain an openness to other traditions of the same kind. There is not, nor could there be, a place in the *Catholica* for a particular tradition that claimed for itself a monopoly of the truth. On the matter in hand Congar observes, "the West professed the *Filioque*, through its Fathers and its councils, at a time when it was in communion with the East and the East was in communion with the West."<sup>94</sup> Such a time could come again, but only if the East were to desist from rejecting the *Filioque*. While it could not reasonably be asked to accept it, at least immediately, it could at least be expected to embrace the same openness to the West as the West now extends toward it. The West, and in particular the Roman Catholic Church, accepts its responsibility of demonstrating to the East through its magisterial statements and its theology not only the consonance of the *Filioque* with Scripture but also the fact that the *Filioque* contradicts nothing of what the East holds sacred. One of Congar's most helpful remarks is to point out that the Fifth Ecumenical Council, Constantinople II (in 553), in naming some of "the holy Fathers and doctors of the Church" who should be followed, had Latin and Greek authorities mixed

together in the one list.<sup>95</sup> The same principle must still apply, and in this matter.

As to the second point, I am content to repeat without embellishment the argument of André de Halleux which I presented in my article on the Roman Clarification.<sup>96</sup> Origen had interpreted John 1:3a, "all things were made through him," in the sense that even the Holy Spirit was to be numbered among the creatures of the Logos. The Pneumatomachians of the second half of the fourth century appealed to this text thus interpreted in order to deny the divinity of the Holy Spirit. As a result, the Eastern Church Fathers of this time and later avoided using the formula "through the Son" in regard to the procession of the Holy Spirit. St. Gregory of Nyssa was an exception to this, because he found in the formula a suitable way of distinguishing the procession of the Holy Spirit from the generation of the Son. However, he took care to couch it in the form of a luminous manifestation rather than hypostatic origin, an "epiphany," moreover, that, as de Halleux put it, "could only occur because of the revelatory power actualized in the history of creation and salvation."<sup>97</sup>

To move now to the third point, St. Augustine himself admitted that Scripture did not say that the Holy Spirit was love.<sup>98</sup> Nevertheless he argued that this was the real teaching of Scripture, not in the sense that it lay openly at hand, but in the sense that it was "to be searched out in the depths and brought

to light from the depths."<sup>99</sup> In this way he was able to argue that the Holy Spirit was the mutual love of the Father and the Son. It must be admitted that the Eastern Fathers never pursued this path. Congar says St. Epiphanius of Salamis is "almost the only Greek author who can be quoted here", but the single text to which he refers is far from convincing.<sup>100</sup> Mark Orphanos, therefore, is probably correct when he writes that St. Gregory Palamas (+1359) was probably the first in the Greek patristic tradition to make this connection.<sup>101</sup> Amongst modern Orthodox writers it is Boris Bobrinskoy who, acknowledging Palamas, takes up this idea in the most positive way. In an article on the Filioque and under the heading "Other Positive Aspects of the Filioque,"<sup>102</sup> he lists the doctrine of the Holy Spirit as the mutual love of the Father and the Son, and the involvement of the "eternal Son" in the procession of the Holy Spirit. To both points he makes qualifications of a kind to be expected from an Orthodox theologian, but that he has done as much as he has is encouraging as a point of departure for further dialogue.

We come now to the fourth point. That the mutual love model admits the Filioque is clear. The mutual love of the Father and the Son obviously flows from each of them. Each of the personal loves contributing to the mutual love is identical with the one essential love of God, but as mutual they are one by a more specific title and are "notional," productive and constitutive of the Holy Spirit. This means that in so far



as they breathe forth the Holy Spirit the Father and the Son are not “opposed” and therefore are one, not just in the Godhead (in which the Holy Spirit is one with them) but as the single principle of the Holy Spirit (in which together they are opposed to him). But that the Father is at the same time the single “cause” (in the Eastern sense) of the Holy Spirit is also to be seen. For the Father and the Son cannot be “partial causes” (*Teilursachen*) of the Holy Spirit, as Heribert Mühlen has opined,<sup>103</sup> since this would be incompatible with the divine perfection. In any case the power to breathe forth the Holy Spirit is identical (not just similar or equal) in the Father and the Son, because it is communicated by the Father to the Son in the act of generation. Therefore each of them is the *total* cause of the Holy Spirit. Because the Father precedes the Son (in “nature,”<sup>104</sup> not in time), there is a sense in which the love of the Father for the Son precedes (and evokes) that of the Son for the Father. But this love (of the Father for the Son) is the Holy Spirit proceeding from the Father and resting on the Son. Thus the Father is seen to be the “cause” of the Holy Spirit in the Eastern sense. It is clear that this statement is intellectually irreconcilable with the earlier statement that the Holy Spirit proceeds as the mutual love of the Father and the Son.

As to the fifth point, the two statements made above are not contradictory but dialectical. This means that while they are irreconcilable on the intellectual level, they cannot be shown to be impossible.

In the first section I defended, against Galtier, the Rahnerian concept of "mediated immediacy" in the context of the relation of the Father and the Son to the just soul in grace; here I want to invoke it again, in regard to the Trinity itself. St. Thomas felt bound to acknowledge that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father both "immediately" and "mediately:" immediately, in so far as the Father both possesses and uses the complete power to breathe forth the Holy Spirit; and mediately, in so far as he does this through the Son.<sup>105</sup> Here the dialectic of which I speak is exactly pinpointed. Contradiction is avoided because the first statement is made in the light of the power of spiration, and the second according to the spirating persons. St. Thomas is not suggesting that there are two spirations: there can only be one, which, therefore, must be at the same time immediate and mediate. This we can express in modern terminology by the expression "mediated immediacy." It gives a theological account of the procession of the Holy Spirit, at the same time avoiding the rationalism of presenting itself as a complete intellectual plumbing of the divine being and activity.

Sixthly and finally, this position cannot be rejected simply on the grounds that it is dialectical, for dialectic is inseparable from the theology of the Trinity in any case. Underlying it is the unavoidable dialectic of person and nature in the Trinity. I say "unavoidable" because it is intrinsic to all trinitarian theology whether of the West or of the East, for

all Christians must be prepared to confess one God in three persons. How can they rationally do this without succumbing to either modalism, in which the persons are not really distinct, or tritheism, in which the unity (unicity) of God is surrendered? This observation shows that all authentic trinitarian theology must respect the profound mystery of God which no amount of human reasoning can overcome. It must therefore be dialectical. Dialectic does not enter only with the introduction of the return model: it is there already with the procession model, which in its basic form is common to East and West.

### **The Activity of the Holy Spirit**

Having examined the agency of the Holy Spirit and his place as a divine person in relation to the other two persons of the Trinity, we are now well situated to investigate theologically the activity of the Holy Spirit in the world. Sacred Scripture, in Old and New Testament alike, has much to say about the particular actions of the Spirit in the world.<sup>106</sup> Is it possible to systematize these statements into a faithful and coherent theological scheme? This will be our aim in this, the last part of our essay in pneumatology. In technical terms, the answer to our question will be that the Holy Spirit unites us to God in a mediated immediacy in which the medium is Christ; in nontechnical terms the answer is that the Holy Spirit unites us to Christ and the Father. It is precisely in

this union, whichever way conceived, that salvation in the Christian sense consists.

Because in Christian doctrine the Holy Spirit is a person, and a divine one at that, his activity will always be personal. Historically, though, Christians did not always understand it this way. In the Old Testament the Holy Spirit, the Spirit of God, was the "power" of God, and power is impersonal, in itself and even when it is the power of a person (and to that extent endowed with a personal dimension). And this "impersonal" sense of the Holy Spirit survived into the New Testament (for example, in Luke 1:35). But the same testament also exhibits signs of the beginning of a personal sense as, for example, in John 14:26, 15:26, 16:8, 13, 14, where the Spirit is called *ἐκεῖνος* ("he") and assigned personal functions, such as teaching, bearing witness, etc.. This process of personalization was not complete until the First Council of Constantinople (381 A.D.).

In the New Testament the Holy Spirit, in addition to being the Spirit of God (the Father), is the Spirit of Christ. This is normally, and rightly, understood in the sense that it is in the Spirit that Christ lives and acts in the Church after his resurrection. The Spirit has become the medium of this presence and activity of Christ. This is certainly the theology of St. Paul, who uses the exact expression "Spirit of Christ" in Romans 8:9 and equivalent expressions in Philippians 1:19 and Galatians 4:6. According to Luke (Acts 2:33) and John (7:37-39, 20:22, and

the Paraclete passages, 14:16, 26, 15:26 and 16:7), it is the glorified Christ who sends the Holy Spirit upon the Church.

In one of his late essays Karl Rahner argued that in addition to this sense the Holy Spirit was Spirit of Christ in another sense, namely, as centering *on* Christ rather than emanating *from* him.<sup>107</sup> For this sense Rahner used the term “entelechy.” As was often the case with his use of technical terms, he did not explain its meaning,<sup>108</sup> but one of the meanings given for it in *The American Heritage Dictionary* seems to fit his usage closely. “In some philosophical systems,” it states, an entelechy is “a vital force that directs an organism toward self-fulfillment.”<sup>109</sup> For Rahner, then, the Holy Spirit bears an inner orientation to Christ, whom he constantly seeks out in his operation in the world and among human beings. When I say “inner” orientation, I do not mean that the Holy Spirit has this orientation by nature. What he has by nature is an inner orientation to the eternal Son. But by God’s free will and decision the eternal Son became incarnate in the humanity of Christ, and hence the Spirit’s inner orientation possessed a historical dimension it would otherwise have lacked.

This second sense of “Spirit of Christ” is also grounded in the New Testament, namely, in 1 Peter 1:11. Along with the preceding and following verses, this text reads:

[10] Concerning this salvation, the prophets who prophesied of the grace that was to be yours made careful search and inquiry, [11] inquiring about the person or time that the Spirit of Christ within them indicated when it testified in advance to the suffering destined for Christ and the subsequent glory. [12] It was revealed to them that they were serving not themselves but you, in regard to the things that have now been announced to you through those who brought you good news by the Holy Spirit sent from heaven—things into which angels long to look!

According to the commonly accepted interpretation, the “prophets” of v. 10 are Old Testament ones, and the testimonies of v. 11 are the Messianic prophecies, which Christians were already seeing as fulfilled in the passion, death and resurrection of Christ. Here, then, the expression “Spirit of Christ” refers to the Holy Spirit as the spirit of prophecy inspiring the Old Testament prophets in their discernment of the future Christ. As I have argued elsewhere,<sup>110</sup> this means that “Spirit of Christ” is here to be understood not yet as sent by the risen Christ, but as a divine entelechy centered on him while his coming still lay in the future.

This is the only New Testament text where the expression “Spirit of Christ” is used in the sense of entelechy. However, the idea of Holy Spirit as entelechy is present in many other places, and it is this that I now intend to show. In his treatment of Paul’s

theology of the participation of believers in Christ and of the mediation of this by the Holy Spirit, James D. G. Dunn makes the following two important points.<sup>111</sup> First, the motif of being “in Christ” or “in the Lord” is a frequently occurring and important element of Pauline spirituality. Pioneered by Adolf Deissman, Wilhelm Bousset and Albert Schweitzer early in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, it has, according to Dunn, fallen more recently into relative neglect, from which it needs to be rescued.<sup>112</sup> Deissman and Bousset characterized it as “Christ mysticism,” an epithet of which Dunn himself approves.<sup>113</sup> Schweitzer even wrote that “the doctrine of righteousness by faith is ... a subsidiary crater, which has formed within the rim of the main crater—the mystical doctrine of redemption through being-in-Christ.”<sup>114</sup> Dunn sums up by saying, “All of which makes it hard to avoid talk of something like a mystical sense of the divine presence of Christ within and without, establishing and sustaining the individual in relation to God. Likewise we can hardly avoid speaking of the community, a community which understood itself not only from the gospel which had called it into existence, but also from a shared experience of Christ, which bonded them as one.”<sup>115</sup> In other words the sense of being “in Christ” is an experience not only of the individual but of the community. It is both personal and ecclesial.

The second point from Dunn is that in Paul the theme of the gift of the Holy Spirit is closely related

to that of Christ mysticism.<sup>116</sup> Dunn does not erect the theological explanation of this relation into the major theme that it is for me, but nevertheless he provides a Pauline basis for it. Commenting on Romans 8:9 and 14, he writes: "Paul does not say: 'If you are Christ's, you have the Spirit; since you are sons of God, you are led by the Spirit.' In both cases, Paul puts it the other way round: 'if you have the Spirit, you are Christ's; if you are being led by the Spirit, you are God's sons.'" <sup>117</sup> "Anyone united to the Lord becomes one spirit with him" (1 Cor 6:17).

Implicit in this Pauline theology is the understanding that the role of the Holy Spirit as bestowed by the Father on believers, both individually and communally, is to unite them in a mystical manner to the risen Lord, so that from then on they exist and live "in Christ." This, I point out, is the theology of the Holy Spirit as entelechy. I can say "the Holy Spirit bestowed by the Father," because, as Dunn notes, according to Paul it is by God (the Father), and not by Christ, that the Spirit is bestowed in the world.<sup>118</sup> Paul never says that the Spirit is bestowed or sent by Christ: it is Luke and John who say this. This does not mean that I am siding with Paul against Luke and John. It means, rather, that there are two valid ways of regarding the action of the Father in the world. Here the Lucan-Johannine way favors the procession model, while the Pauline way favors the return model. The former, I hold, deals with the *sending* of the Holy Spirit into the world, the latter



with his *bestowal*. Further, it should be pointed out that restricting the sending of the Spirit to the Father does not mean that for Paul the Spirit is not the Spirit of Christ as well (as Spirit of God). In fact, as we have seen, this is a major element in Paul's pneumatology. Dunn also recognizes this.<sup>119</sup> For Paul, however, it means simply that it is the Father who has brought it about that the Spirit is the medium through which the risen Christ is present and active in the world, and not that Christ has brought this about himself.

Before we leave Paul, there is one further text I wish to consider, namely, 2 Corinthians 3:17, which, like any other, needs to be read in context, which in this case is the whole of the chapter in which it occurs. It is clear that Paul is contrasting the old and the new covenant in order to bring out the superiority of the new. The old covenant he calls "the covenant of the letter," and the new "the covenant of the Spirit," that is, of the Holy Spirit (v. 6). The pericope vv. 13-18 consists of a Christian midrash on Exodus 34:29-35, which Paul puts to work to serve his end. Verse 17 reads, "Now the Lord is the Spirit, and where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is freedom." The question is: who is the "Lord" in this and the preceding verse? Is it "the Lord" of Exodus 34:34, that is, God, or is it Christ, as in v. 14 of our text? The answer of Dunn, along with several others, is that it is God.<sup>120</sup> He approves the NEB's addition, to "the Lord," of the words "of whom this passage speaks," in v. 17.<sup>121</sup> It

cannot be denied that this is a possible rendering of the text. But the addition of words—in this case a whole clause—to the translation of a scriptural text in order to favor a particular interpretation is unjustified. Without the addition a different interpretation emerges as possible, even likely. Paul has just said in verse 14 that it is only in Christ that the veil is set aside. This would argue more strongly that "the Lord" of v. 16, and consequently of v. 17 as well, is Christ. Paul's identification of the risen Christ with the Spirit in v. 17 would be at the level of dynamism: for him the Spirit is the medium of the presence and action of the risen Christ. (At other times he knows well how to distinguish them, as, for example, in his blessings, such as 2 Cor 13:13.) Logically, Dunn speaks of the "conversion" of v. 16 as a "conversion *to the Spirit*" (his emphasis).<sup>122</sup> But in my view, this argues against his exegesis, since the only conversion known to Paul is conversion to *Christ*.<sup>123</sup>

The relevance of this argument is that it supports the position that the Holy Spirit is the entelechy of Christ. When a person turns to Christ, this is because of the action of the Holy Spirit within him or her. In v. 18 the transformative power of the Spirit is seen at work, constantly refashioning Christians into more perfect images of the glorified Christ upon whom they gaze (Christ himself being the perfect image of God [Col 1:15]). Paul adds that in this life the glory of Christ is beheld only indirectly, as in a "mirror." He has used this idea before, in I Corinthians 13:12:

“For now we see in a mirror, dimly, but then we will see face to face.” The essential point, repeated forcefully at the end of the pericope, is that this transformation is the work of the Spirit.

Turning now to St. John’s Gospel, we take up John 7:37-39 and related texts. The first question is that of the translation and punctuation of the principal text. Raymond Brown favors the following: “(37) On the last and greatest day of the festival [of Tabernacles] Jesus stood up and cried out, ‘If anyone thirst, let him come [to me]; and let him drink (38) who believes in me. As the Scripture says, “From within him shall flow rivers of living water.”’ (39) (Here he was referring to the Spirit which those who came to believe in him were to receive. For there was as yet no Spirit, since Jesus had not been glorified.)”<sup>124</sup> For this version of the text Brown gives convincing arguments, the rehearsal of which here must be omitted for reasons of space,<sup>125</sup> but without further ado I adopt it for my treatment. The following are points to be noted about the text. First, in vv. 37 and 38a the parallelism enables us to understand what is intended by the phrase “coming to Jesus”: it means acquiring faith in him. Secondly, since Jesus is now glorified, the situation described in the pericope belongs rather to the present time than to that of Jesus’ ministry. And thirdly, it is Jesus who, from deep within his own being, gives the Spirit to others (see also John 4:10, 19:34 and 20:22), though

the Father, from whom the Spirit "proceeds" (John 15:26), remains its ultimate source.

If we did not know that it meant coming to faith, the innocuous expression "coming to Jesus" might be taken in a Pelagian sense, as though we come to him by our own power. We are put in mind of Jesus' words to Peter immediately upon his confession of faith, "Flesh and blood has not revealed this to you, but my Father in heaven" (Matt 16:17). And in John Jesus says, "No one can come to me unless the Father who sent me draws him" (6:44). To assert that it is by the power of the Holy Spirit that the Father draws men and women to Christ is to move beyond the pneumatology of John, but it is to move in a direction suggested by the Gospel itself, where the activity of the Holy Spirit among professed Christians, those who have already come to Christ, is to cement their union with him. "It is our contention," Brown writes, "that John presents the Paraclete as the Holy Spirit in a special role, namely, as the personal presence of Jesus in the Christian while Jesus is with the Father."<sup>126</sup> The role of the Paraclete, therefore, is that of the Holy Spirit in the post-Resurrection context. Note that the coming *of* Christ after his resurrection depends on this coming *to* him, a "coming-to" that human beings are incapable of performing out of their own resources.

The necessity of this coming-to arises from the limitations imposed on Christ's humanity by its finiteness, its createdness. Only through this coming-

to can the vine share its life with the branches (see John 15:15): if the branch does not belong to it already, it must be brought to the vine and inserted into it. And this must be the work of the same Holy Spirit, not yet precisely as Paraclete, but as Spirit of God (the Father) in order that He might *become* the Paraclete for this particular person. This prior centeredness on the person of Christ is what we mean by "the Spirit of Christ as entelechy."

We know from both Scripture and the teaching of the Church that the Holy Spirit comes into the world as sent by the Father and the Son (now the risen Christ.) This coming has been understood to reflect simply the procession model of the Trinity. In line with this, the activity of the Holy Spirit once he has been sent into the world has traditionally been understood in terms of an inversion of the procession model. This has been so because the procession model has been the only trinitarian model theologians have had at their disposal. But I question the legitimacy of this procedure. The procession model is acquired through reflection solely on the outward movement from God (the Father). There can therefore be no guarantee that when inverted it can shed light on the return movement to God. The model methodologically qualified to do this is the return model. It, however, gives a different account of the outward movement, one in which the Son is involved as object of the movement, and

not, therefore, as agent. How, then, can these two models be reconciled?

In the immanent Trinity the Holy Spirit proceeds both from the Father *and* the Son and from the Father *to* the Son. These are not two processions, with the first the "real" one and the second a procession only in some reduced sense of the term (or vice versa), for there is only one procession of the Holy Spirit. But as St. Thomas teaches (and as we have seen), the single procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father is given in two distinct modes, namely, "immediately" and "mediately" (that is, through the Son). With the East I have identified the immediate mode of procession as being that which takes place from the Father to the Son, and with St. Thomas I identify the mediate mode as that which takes place from the Father and the Son, or the Father through the Son—what I have called the procession model. The immediate mode, on the other hand, represents the return model. For even—and I want to say, especially—in the immanent Trinity, the Son goes forth from the Father only to return to him in the unity of their mutual love, which is the Holy Spirit. In the immanent Trinity *in facto esse*, the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and rests on the Son in order to reclaim him for the Father, and this reclamation takes place when the Son, in response to the Father, himself brings forth and gives back the Holy Spirit as his own personal love for the Father, so that he

is at one with the Father in the Holy Spirit, their mutual love.

It has to be acknowledged that St. Augustine would not hear of a procession from the Father to the Son as I have just asserted. "The Holy Spirit," he wrote, "does not proceed from the Father into the Son, and proceed from the Son for the sanctification of the creature; but he proceeds from both at the same time, although the Father has given it to the Son that just as the Holy Spirit proceeds from himself, so he proceeds also from him [the Son]." <sup>127</sup> What Augustine here sees as strict alternatives, I see as dialectical complementaries. It is clear also that Augustine was considering the procession strictly in itself, and hence prescinding from all question of the Spirit's "destination." Eastern theologians, on the other hand, have had no hesitation in doing precisely this. Take, for example, Dumitru Staniloae: "[The Holy Spirit] proceeds from the Father with a view to his 'repose' on the Son." <sup>128</sup> And I cannot see how he, and they, can be faulted for speaking in this way. In doing so, of course, they highlight the monarchy of the Father, but let it not be forgotten that despite the Filioque St. Augustine desired this emphasis himself (as is clear from the quotation). While he was the discoverer of the mutual love theology, he stopped short of regarding it as a trinitarian model. For him, as for others, the only true model of the Trinity was the procession model.

It is important at this point to take up the question of the activity of the Holy Spirit among non-believers. If coming to faith in Christ is the work of the Holy Spirit as *entelechy*, then the Holy Spirit must be active in and among such people. The non-believer today is brought to explicit faith and to union with Christ through the Church's ministry of the Word—and here I leave aside the question of who the minister is, whether an ordained or a non-ordained person.<sup>129</sup> But another possibility, which very often is a reality, is that the objective coming of Christ and the subjective bringing of the Spirit fail to meet, because for whatever reason the non-believer is not existentially challenged by the Church's ministry of the Word. The readiness of this non-believer for Christ, which is the achievement of the Spirit of Christ as *entelechy* within him or her, is not meaningfully engaged in a concrete encounter with Christ. According to Rahner,

Since the universal efficacy of the Spirit is directed from the very beginning to the zenith of its historical mediation, which is the Christ event (or in other words the final cause of the mediation of the Spirit to the world), it can truly be said that this Spirit is everywhere and from the very beginning the Spirit of Jesus Christ, the incarnate divine Logos.<sup>130</sup>

For Rahner, this explains how people who do not believe in Christ can be saved. Given that there is no



salvation apart from Christ, it explains how Christ can be present in the belief systems of non-believers, be they other religions or privately structured sets of beliefs. The faith-encounter with the historical Christ is complete when enacted in the Spirit of Christ as *entelechy*, but if the former is not given in the experience of the would-be believer, the latter suffices on its own. This is Rahner's theology of the "anonymous" Christian in more developed, perhaps final, form.

We stand in need of suitable and convenient terminology by which to distinguish the two meanings of the expression "Spirit of Christ." Others may come up eventually with better terms, but in the meantime I suggest the "objective" and the "subjective" senses, respectively, of this expression, as I have just anticipated. The objective sense would be that in which Christ comes to us in the Holy Spirit, from the "outside," as it were. In this sense the Holy Spirit conveys to us the dynamic presence of the risen Christ. The subjective sense, on the other hand, would be that in which we come to Christ in the Holy Spirit, the sense in which the Holy Spirit, moving us from within, delivers us to Christ, even inserts us in him through faith. In the first sense we objectivize the Spirit, distinguishing him from Christ and the Father and also from ourselves. In this sense we can rightly be said to "experience" the Spirit. It is the sense in which "with the Father and the Son [the Holy Spirit] is worshiped and glorified."

In the second sense the Spirit moves us so subtly that normally we are unaware of his influence. In this sense we do not objectivize the Spirit, for the content of our experience is in the first instance Christ, and in the second his Father. The Spirit is the medium of this experience. The same is true even if in charismatic experience we *are* aware of his influence. There too the content of our experience is Christ and the Father. Our so-called experience of the Spirit in this instance is merely the experience of his powerful effect on us as he centers us on Christ. As experience of the Spirit himself, it can only be described as indirect.

The same view of the matter was taken by Karl Barth, who wrote,

We must now add at once that while the Spirit is the element of revelation which is different from Christ as the exalted Lord, while He is revelation to the extent that it becomes an event on us and in us, nevertheless He is still to be regarded wholly and entirely as the Spirit of Christ, of the Son, of the Word of God. He is not to be regarded, then, as a revelation of independent content, as a new instruction, illumination and stimulation of man that goes beyond Christ, beyond the Word, but in every sense as the instruction, illumination and stimulation of man through the Word and for the Word.<sup>131</sup>

The only difference between Barth and myself here is that whereas he sees “through the Word” and “for the Word” as parallel expressions, I—like him, affirming each of them—see them as contrasting expressions, the first as reflecting the procession model of the Trinity and the second as reflecting the return model with the Spirit acting as *entelechy*.

Later, Barth adds,

If we are to refrain from going beyond revelation, we shall interrelate the objective element of the Word in revelation and the subjective element of the Spirit, only in the essence of God but not as modes of His being. We shall acknowledge that the Holy Spirit, both in revelation and also antecedently in Himself, is not just God, but in God independently, like the Father and the Son. Again there is no special and second revelation of the Spirit alongside that of the Son. There are not, then, two Sons or Words of God. In the one revelation, however, the Son or Word represents the element of God’s appropriation to man and the Spirit the element of God’s appropriation by man.<sup>132</sup>

Barth here expresses clearly the objective character of the Word, contrasting it with the subjective character of the Spirit. Christ the Word operates objectively on us, but the Spirit acts subjectively, and in and through our subjectivity. This objectivity and subjectivity, respectively, must be reflected

in the inner nature of God, but not in modalistic fashion. The "independence" Barth postulates for the Holy Spirit refers to his distinct personhood in the Trinity. I would push Barth's thought further to suggest that whereas the Son can be called the objectivity of the Father, the Holy Spirit, "objectivized" in their mutual love, emerges from their shared subjectivity.

Barth acknowledges the time-honored distinction of generation and procession, but like the Greek Fathers finds himself unable to ascribe a specific content to "procession" in this context. While he discusses the matter over several pages, in which he confesses his firm adherence to the Filioque, he admits that the difficulty he has identified is "insurmountable."<sup>133</sup> In the course of his treatment, however, Barth gives a ringing endorsement of the mutual love theology:

What is between [the Father and the Son], what unites them, is no mere relation. It is not exhausted in the truth of their being alongside and with one another. As an independent divine mode of being over against them, it is the active mutual orientation and interpenetration of love, because these two, the Father and the Son, are of one essence, and indeed of divine essence, because God's fatherhood and sonship as such must be related to one another in this active mutual orientation and interpenetration. That the Father and the Son are the one God is the

reason why they are not just united but are united in the Spirit in love; it is the reason, then, why God is love and love is God.<sup>134</sup>

However, Barth does not, as I do, invoke this theology as a distinct model of the Trinity, nor does he foresee its possibilities for ecumenical dialogue. This being said, it must be acknowledged that Barth was far ahead of his Catholic counterparts in this matter.

An important question now arises: what is the relationship between the movement of the Holy Spirit as entelechy, whether before or after the Incarnation, and the sending of the same Spirit by the risen Christ? Before attempting to answer this question, it is necessary to clarify and specify the two things between which a relationship is here asserted. The first term of the relationship, the movement of the Spirit as entelechy, can be conceived in two ways: first, the Holy Spirit's direction (including messianic prophecy) of salvation history before Christ, moving it inexorably to its climax in Christ, that is to say, his conception, his life and ministry, his sacrificial death, his resurrection from the dead and his ascension into heaven (I leave aside his parousia); and second, the Holy Spirit's action in the hearts of individual believers, imparting to them already, through faith, a share in the salvation still to be brought by him whose coming had been foretold and was awaited. It is the second of these alternatives that concerns us

here. Rahner extended this group to include those living *after* Christ to whom the Gospel had still to be preached effectively, and he was right to do this, for in regard to salvation they are essentially in the same position as those living before Christ.<sup>135</sup> Indeed, for us today the burning question is not the lot of those living before Christ, but that of these others, our contemporaries, who belong to religions other than Christianity or to no publicly recognized religion at all. The second term of the presumed relationship is the sending of the Holy Spirit by the risen Christ. This too can be conceived in two ways: first, in terms of the Holy Spirit who is sent; and second, in terms of the risen Christ, who sends the Spirit as the medium of his presence and action. With Paul, we distinguish Christ and the Spirit, but we also know them to be functionally one (see 2 Cor 3:17, "the Lord is the Spirit"). From the functional point of view, then, any distinction between them is purely a matter of emphasis. Here, for the sake of the clarity of our question, we choose to emphasize the Holy Spirit who is sent, but we do not forget that he is sent for the sole purpose of rendering the risen Christ present and active in the world.

The object of our argument is to show that the movement of the human spirit elevated and impelled by the Holy Spirit as entelechy embraces as its term not just some idealization of the Savior but the actual personage of Jesus Christ, even if, without fault on the part of the human person, it fails to be existen-

tially challenged by the Gospel stemming from his earthly sojourn. The core argument is not mine but Rahner's,<sup>136</sup> and to be frank I must admit that I did not understand it properly myself until I had assimilated it in Joseph Wong's exposition.<sup>137</sup> Here, then, is my account of Wong's version of Rahner. I have presented it in print once already,<sup>138</sup> and the present presentation—if I may speak thus—is modeled on the earlier one though not identical with it. The differences are modifications arising from insights I have had in the meantime, specifically, in the preparation of this lecture. What follows, therefore, is my own understanding, for which Rahner and Wong serve as points of departure.

Rahner's position is worked out with the aid of some reflections on memory, *memoria*, as he calls it. Basing himself on Plato and St. Augustine, Rahner sees memory as containing an a priori element, in as much as experience that is retained in memory is that which to some extent has already been anticipated before its occurrence. This he calls "seeking *memoria*". Here, of course, there exists only a rough isomorphism between seeking memory, which remains firmly in the domain of the ideal, and concrete experience. But, Rahner argues, in the case of the "absolute Savior" the gap between anticipation and reality is overcome by the power of God, and the two coincide. Christ comes to the world objectively; the Holy Spirit comes both objectively and subjectively: objectively, in so far as he is the medium of

the risen Christ and hence as functionally indistinguishable from him; and subjectively, as entelechy. While Christ the Word comes as offer and truth, that is, in history, the Holy Spirit as entelechy comes as acceptance and love, that is, in *our* acceptance and love, *our* transcendence specified by Christ. Now not only is human transcendence unto God rendered possible by historical mediation (alone), but it is activated by such mediation (alone). Hence if God is to communicate himself to the world at all, it will be by the Father's simultaneous communication of his Word and his Spirit, in history and transcendence, respectively. The movement of the Holy Spirit as entelechy is centered, therefore, not on an abstract human idealization, but on the actual person of Jesus Christ.

Rahner adds, with the comment that this is what seems to him to be truly important: "*Memoria* is (also, indeed above all) the anticipation of the absolute bringer of salvation, the anticipation that seeks him and keeps watch for him in history. (It is formal, and therefore does not oppose itself to the concreteness of history, but it suffers history, and leaves itself open to experience.)"<sup>139</sup> This statement enables us to grasp clearly both what Rahner is not, and what he is, claiming. He is not claiming an *absolute* identity between anticipation and experience, since seeking memory is "formal" and "does not oppose itself to the concreteness of history," whereas actual experience is material in that it has a



specific content, and it assumes this concreteness in its historical occurrence. It “suffers” history, in that it subjects itself to the test of history, and does not cut itself off from any promising discovery. *But*, in a unique way anticipation and experience do coincide in this instance, for when anticipation encounters existentially the Gospel of Christ and thus meets the risen Christ, it is aware of having anticipated not just *something like* this experience but rather Christ himself, the one “known” all along, to whom, however, no name could be given. This is what Rahner meant by his theology of the “anonymous Christian” who is saved by faith in Christ even though he or she is unable to identify the object of this faith or even lay claim to faith at all. The encounter with the Christ of the Gospel brings with it significant advantages, of which the basic one is the “concreteness of history.” It is experienced as the fullness and completion of the purely a priori experience, that toward which the latter, by grace, aspires and tends. It also draws the believer into the Church, with all its supports of communal belief, practice and fellowship. These are the same advantages that Rahner discerns for explicit Christian faith over purely “anonymous” faith.<sup>140</sup> The two are not simply synonymous.

There exists a further difference between the two movements of the Spirit: as coming objectively, the Spirit is sent by both the Father and Christ; but as coming subjectively, he is bestowed by the Father alone. The former represents the procession model,

the latter the return model. The strangeness of this state of affairs is dissipated by the reflection that in the immanent Trinity the Spirit who proceeds from the Father and the Son proceeds also, and indeed by the same procession, from the Father alone and rests on the Son. These are the two valid ways of humanly regarding the single procession of the Holy Spirit in the Trinity, and between them they involve both models. We begin to realize that the mutual relations of the three divine persons are more complex than can be grasped or expressed from any single human perspective. What we have in the economy is only the economic equivalent of this state of affairs in the Trinity itself.

The next question to which we turn in regard to the activity of the Holy Spirit is, in what way or ways is this activity to be understood in terms of the Rahnerian concept of the "self-communication of God"? On this question I had already arrived at several conclusions, which will serve as points of departure for the further reflections offered here.<sup>141</sup> These conclusions can be summarized as follows. The primordial self-communication of God occurs in the immanent Trinity in two modalities, namely, the generation of the Son and the procession of the Holy Spirit, the first being the work the Father, and the second the work of the Father and the Son in the first instance, and ultimately of the Father alone. More accurately, then, these are modalities of the self-communication of *the Father*, and not just of God, as

Rahner himself recognized (even if in an incomplete way).<sup>142</sup> Next, the Son is the self-communication of the Father, and, in the first instance, the Holy Spirit is the self-communication of the Father and the Son (to each other in mutual love). Finally, the use of the concept of self-communication here binds us to both the procession and the return model of the Trinity, since communication implies a reaching-out (procession) for the express purpose of assimilating the term of this action to the source (return).

If we accept the Eastern insight that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father to rest on the Son, we shall want to add that the Holy Spirit is also the self-communication of the Father to the Son. So, if the Son is the self-communication of the Father *simpliciter*, the Holy Spirit is the self-communication of the Father to the Son. Here, then, is the inner-trinitarian ground of our confession of the Holy Spirit as entelechy, for in his very procession he, by nature as it were, seeks out the Son. Accordingly, I want to endorse here the following sentence from my book on grace: "The most basic, even if not the most adequate, statement that can be made about the Holy Spirit is that he is the love with which the Father loves the Son."<sup>143</sup>

In the economy we need to accommodate the two statements: the Holy Spirit is the self-communication of the Father *and* the Son; and, the Holy Spirit is the self-communication of the Father *to* the Son. Let us take these in turn. In the immanent Trinity

the self-communication of the Father and the Son is a single communication because the Father and the Son are at one in both the divine nature and their mutual love. Here, then, the question of coordinating the self-communication of the Father and the self-communication of the Son does not even arise; but it is otherwise in the economic Trinity, for there the first remains a transcendent, purely divine action, and the second a categorial, human, or at best theandric, action. I have suggested that their coordination is accomplished in the following way.<sup>144</sup> The self-communication of the Son, now Christ, always takes place in a sense-perceptible action, such as the preaching of the Gospel or the administration of a sacrament. Thus there occurs the offer, by the risen Christ, of his Spirit to the believer or potential believer. By accepting this offer the human person begins to be drawn into union, or brotherhood, with Christ, that is, a union in the Spirit of Christ. Being thus drawn to Christ, this person enters into the ambit of the Holy Spirit's action as the Spirit of the Father resting on Christ, where the Spirit acts invisibly. The human person is thus regenerated in the power of the Spirit acting in this capacity, and so becomes, in the Son, a son or daughter of precisely the Father. For the Spirit who rests on the Son in the immanent Trinity draws into union with the Son in the economic Trinity. The two elements are coordinated, therefore, in the following way: the visible (sense-perceptible) action of

the Spirit as Spirit of Christ becomes the *sacrament* of the invisible action of the same Spirit as Spirit of the Father. My answer, therefore, is that in the economy the self-communication of the Father and the self-communication of the Son are coordinated (unified) sacramentally. We pass now to consider the Holy Spirit as the self-communication of the Father *to* the Son in the economy. Here too we deal with the return model of the Trinity. Comprehended in our subject matter are, first, all our statements regarding Spirit Christology in the second part of this paper, and, secondly, all our statements on the action of the Holy Spirit as entelechy on potential and actual believers both before and after the time of Christ.

In each of the scenarios presented above, namely, the Holy Spirit as the self-communication of the Father and the Son, and the Holy Spirit as the self-communication of the Father to the Son, the role of the Holy Spirit is presented passively, in that he is conceived as the one communicated. This is seen by some as a particular problem in the economy, as it does not seem to allow for the Holy Spirit the active role that Scripture assigns him.<sup>145</sup> On reflection it seems to me that this objection is not valid. That the Father or the Father and the Son together send the Holy Spirit into the world—so that he comes as sent—by no means precludes the possibility of his being sent to actively accomplish a particular purpose. No one thinks to raise this objection against the active role for which the Son is sent into the

world by the Father. The sending of both the Son and the Holy Spirit takes place so that they might act in the world according to their respective personal properties. The personal property of the Holy Spirit is not determined solely by the procession model but by the combination of it and the return model. The procession model alone merely allows for his being sent: it leaves completely open the question of the purpose of his sending, which is determined from the return model. We shall pursue this as our next question.

The objector might persist by asking: given that the Holy Spirit is communicated, does he not come willingly, so that he could be said to communicate himself? Indeed this can, and must, be said, but it must also be said that he communicates himself in a different way from the Father and the Son. If we put all three persons on the same plane and simply say that they communicate themselves in grace (as Rahner did say), we are reducing, albeit unintentionally, the trinity of God to an undifferentiated unity, for Rahner himself pointed out, rightly, that whatever pertains univocally to the three divine persons pertains thereby to God in his unity rather than his trinity.<sup>146</sup> Here we need to heed St. Augustine instructing us that it is legitimate, even necessary, to recognize analogical shifts in the meaning of words not only between the world and God but within the Trinity itself. The sense in which the Holy Spirit can be said to communicate himself to the exclusion of

the Father and the Son is that which I assert with Petavius, namely, that the Holy Spirit alone exercises quasi-formal causality in grace, and hence unites himself with the human spirit in a unique way that allows him to mediate the presence and action of the Father and the Son.

If the Holy Spirit acts according to his personal property, it is reasonable to ask: what is this personal property? In the immanent Trinity, two answers suggest themselves from our study: 1) since the Holy Spirit proceeds as the mutual love of the Father and the Son, to be their mutual love must be his personal property; and 2) since primarily the Holy Spirit proceeds as the Spirit of the Father for the purpose of resting on the Son, his personal property must be to be the Spirit of the Son as *entelechy*. Reflection on these shows that the second possibility is contained within the first as the latter's most basic component, but thereby lacks the first's comprehensiveness. I therefore opt for the first as my answer to this question. I recognize that it can be reformulated in more personal—and presumably more acceptable—terms: the Holy Spirit is the divine person who mediates the Father and the Son to each other in mediated immediacy, but only as long as this is not taken to mean that the Holy Spirit is a person already (on some other count), who just happens to mediate the Father and the Son to each other. In other words, the person of the Holy Spirit has to be the immediate mediation itself, and it is certainly arguable that

this formulation is neither more personal nor more readily intelligible than that which the mutual-love theology proposes. If we consult St. Thomas, we find that he offers a simple answer to this question, namely, that the "notio" of the Holy Spirit is "procession," that is, from the Father and the Son.<sup>147</sup> This answer, however, depending as it does exclusively on the procession model, tells us nothing of the purpose of the procession. For that we need to resort to the return model, from which we learn that the Holy Spirit proceeds as the mutual love of the Father and the Son. The importance of this is most readily appreciated in the economy, for there the procession model tells us only that the Holy Spirit is sent by the Father and the Son without any suggestion as to why he is sent or what he might do when he arrives. In fact what he does in the economy is to unite us to Christ as entelechy—note here the relevance of my second suggestion above for the Holy Spirit's personal property. Put quite simply, the personal property of the Holy Spirit in the economy is to "sanctify," that is, to unite us to the Son of God who is "called holy" (see Luke 1:35), and this in turn is for the purpose of uniting us to the Father, the all-holy one and source of all holiness. This causes us to be caught up in Christ's response of love to the Father, so that we participate in their mutual love, which of course is the Holy Spirit in action. Here, then, is our complete answer to the question considered earlier, of the correspondence of the economic and the imma-



nent Trinity: the sanctification wrought by the Holy Spirit in the world corresponds to the mediating role of the same Spirit in the Trinity itself, where he rests on the Son only to unite him to the Father, source of all holiness. Each of these functions is conceived as an active, and not merely passive, quantity.

Also pertaining to the personal property of the Holy Spirit is that he “be possessed,” that is, by the Father and the Son. As the mutual love of the Father and the Son, the Holy Spirit is possessed by both. He is the Spirit *of* the Father and *of* the Son. Though he stands free as a distinct person, the Holy Spirit is “supported” in existence by the Father and the Son, and in this respect differs from them. We know that he is not “opposed” to either the Father or the Son, but neither is he identical with either or with both of them. Nor is he possessed by them as an accident. Hence he is “possessed” in a mysterious way that transcends the simple perichoresis and is unique. In the economy he is possessed by us and we by him. There could never be any possibility that he be, like the Son, incarnate in a human being, for his economic property is not to “be” a human being at all but to possess and be possessed by human beings. This mutual possession—between the Holy Spirit and ourselves—is the reality of what we call grace. It is because of this property that he is able to sanctify in a unique and fundamental way.

What I wish to do now is to offer some final reflections on the Holy Spirit’s sanctification of the

humanity of Christ, which is the paradigm of all sanctification wrought by the Spirit in the world.<sup>148</sup> These reflections were prompted by two events, each of which, as it happens, involved the theologian Thomas Weinandy. The first was a question put to Weinandy by the late Colin Gunton in relation to the thesis of his book *In the Likeness of Sinful Flesh*: "Can all that Dr Weinandy wants to say be upheld while the teaching of the immaculate conception continues to be official Catholic doctrine?"<sup>149</sup> Weinandy responded to Gunton in a "postscript" to the book.<sup>150</sup> The position taken by Weinandy had been that though Jesus was sinless, the human nature he assumed in the Incarnation was marked by sin (and hence "in the likeness of sinful flesh"). Presumably Gunton's question meant: given the Catholic doctrine of the Immaculate Conception, would it not be difficult or even impossible for a Catholic (like Weinandy) to hold that the human nature of Jesus was affected by sin? More specifically, how could a Catholic maintain the uniqueness of Jesus in the face of the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception?

The second event was an objection raised by Weinandy against my Spirit Christology in the course of his review of Ralph del Colle's book *Christ and the Spirit*. Criticizing my ascending order of the elements of the hypostatic union, he wrote, "It is not possible for the Holy Spirit to sanctify the humanity of Jesus prior to the [hypostatic] union, for the humanity never exists separate or apart from the Son. Even

on the level of logical priority, it is through the grace of union that the Holy Spirit sanctifies the humanity.”<sup>151</sup> I have responded to this criticism twice already, the second effort being a refinement of the first.<sup>152</sup> I repeat the exercise now once more, inserting my response to Weinandy into an attempt on my own part to answer Gunton’s question, with the aim of thus presenting a more comprehensive theology of human sanctification by the Holy Spirit. I begin by saying that here there are three cases to be distinguished and considered, not just two (those of Mary and Jesus), the third, or rather the first, being that of John the Baptist.<sup>153</sup> Setting these cases in logical order, it seems to me that the following should be said.

John the Baptist is presented as a child in his mother, Elizabeth’s, womb when she was “filled with the Holy Spirit” (Luke 1:41). This event is piously interpreted as the cleansing of John from original sin (see the last reference above, to Ferdinand Hahn and myself). As John pre-existed this bestowal of grace, in it he can rightly be said to be “redeemed.” In his case there was a *temporal* order of creation over sanctification by grace. This sanctification was “accidental” in the sense of being ontologically transformative while leaving John’s human personhood intact. It was a sanctification, as we say, by sanctifying grace.

Mary’s Immaculate Conception differed from this in that she did not temporally pre-exist the bestowal of grace. The grace bestowed on her, however, was

still only accidental. Without this grace she would have been conceived and born and would have lived a sinner, at least in the sense of having original sin. This is the sense in which she can be said to be "redeemed," as Vatican II said, "in a more exalted fashion,"<sup>154</sup> which is interpreted to mean: redeemed in the sense of being *preserved* from original sin altogether (the text of the dogma uses this precise word *praeservata*, see DH 2803). In her case there was only a *logical* order of creation over bestowal, or of creation over (accidental) sanctification, these in fact being simultaneous. More exactly, she was created and redeemed in the one divine act even though the latter contained two really distinct components, namely, creating and sanctifying (redeeming), these being really distinct in the sense that creating is not the same thing as sanctifying.

We come now to the case of Jesus, his "virginal conception." He did not differ from Mary in the matter of pre-existing the bestowal of grace. The difference lies in the fact that his grace was "substantial" sanctification (which is the whole point of my insistence on his "theandric" nature). If his humanity had not received his unique grace (which was the grace of union in the divine Son, brought about by the radical bestowal of the Holy Spirit), he would not have existed as a human being at all, let alone as a sinner. He therefore cannot be said to be redeemed in any sense, that is, even in the sense of being preserved from sin like Mary; he was the

redeemer, not one of the redeemed as she was. Hence the humanity of Jesus did not pre-exist his bestowal even in the logical order. In his case the logical order is creation, substantial sanctification, accidental sanctification—with the latter, if it is necessary at all (which is disputed), implied by and flowing from the substantial sanctification. In the one act, of the Father, in the Holy Spirit, the sacred humanity is created, sanctified substantially, and joined in hypostatic union to the divine Son.

What is this substantial sanctification of which I speak? For this we need to turn to Maurice de la Taille, who wrote:

Here again we have an actuation by uncreated Act: a created actuation, as before; but this time of a substantial order, not an accidental order, because it brings the human nature into existence, and into an existence that is not of an accidental, but of a substantial order. This substantial actuation is precisely the grace of union; created grace, like sanctifying grace; not, however, like the latter, purely habitual, that is, a simple accidental disposition, but a truly substantial adaptation and conformation to the Word; yet not a substance nor part of a substance; no more so than the substantial existence of creatures forms part of their substance, although it actuates that substance substantially.<sup>155</sup>

For de la Taille this substantial actuation cannot be identical with the Son in the divine nature, the Son destined for hypostatic union, because it is clearly said to be a created grace. In the descending order which de la Taille follows it is identified as the first effect of the union, but in the corresponding ascending order, which is what I adopt here (following Luke 1:31-35), it should be seen as the last and immediate disposition of the humanity for union. (For St. Thomas, whose general philosophy I am following here, the last disposition is also the first effect of the communication of the form<sup>156</sup>). I now accept the criticism of those who, like Weinandy, have insisted that accidental sanctification (sanctifying grace) can never be a disposition to hypostatic union, but substantial sanctification, as I trust I have shown, is quite different in this respect. De la Taille does not hesitate to characterize it thus: "In his very humanity Christ is Son, the only Son of God, by nothing else than the eternal generation that is accomplished in the bosom of the Godhead."<sup>157</sup> This mysterious reality is what I have preferred to characterize as the "theandric" (concrete) nature of Christ. De la Taille here represents an advance over St. Thomas, who knew only of an accidental sanctification, and I in turn have gone beyond de la Taille in investing his insight with a truly trinitarian form, which I accomplish with the aid of the return model of the Trinity. It is substantial sanctification *by the Holy Spirit* as entelechy terminating in the Incarnation

of the divine Son. I trust that with this explanation I have answered both Colin Gunton's question and Thomas Weinandy's objection and at the same time given a satisfactory account of what I mean when I say that in the Incarnation the Holy Spirit in the one act creates and sanctifies the sacred humanity and unites it in person to the pre-existent divine Son. This makes the Father's sanctification of Jesus by the Holy Spirit the paradigm of all sanctification taking place in the world.

### Conclusion

In this lecture I have dealt with three basic questions of pneumatology. The first was the most radical: if it could not be answered, pneumatology could not be pursued at all. It is the question of whether the divine person known as the Holy Spirit acts in a distinctive way in and among human beings, a way that in essence we can know from Scripture, and that distinguishes correctly and appropriately between him on the one hand and the Father and the Son on the other. I argued that there *is* such a way, the way initiated by Petavius and to some extent continued by Rahner.

This way asserts that the Holy Spirit is communicated to us humans by the Father: not just given (which he also is), but communicated. Communication is the act of the subject by which that which is external to the subject, namely, the object, is drawn into union with the subject. It is the act of

the person by which he or she draws other persons to share in his or her own personal world, whether at the level of knowledge or of being or both. It is the act of God the Father in which by his Spirit he draws created spiritual beings, ourselves, into his trinitarian life. This he does by his bestowal of the Spirit, who draws us into union with his Son Jesus Christ, so that we become sons and daughters in this Son, and thus share the intimacy of the Son's own relationship with him. We do not become this unique Son: rather, we become sons and daughters *in* the Son. Because the persons of the Trinity are constituted by their mutual relations, and only thus, the only way we can truly enter upon their personal lives is by being identified in some way with one of them, so that we begin to share in that one's relations with the other two. This one is revealed to be the Son. And the work is that of the Holy Spirit, Spirit of the Father, Spirit of sonship and daughterhood. If, apart from the Incarnation and grace, we are speaking of any other action of God in the world, we assume a vantage point outside God, outside his trinitarian relations, and so confront him only in his unity (which in its way is no less important than his trinity). Here, however, we are talking in a trinitarian way, for we speak of grace, which is literally the Father's gift to us of the Holy Spirit.

The second question asked what sort of person the Holy Spirit is, how is he uniquely a person, distinct from the Father and the Son. The answer that he



simply proceeds from the Father and the Son, or that he is breathed forth by them, though true as far as it goes, is not deemed satisfactory by most theologians today. This answer reveals a totally passive person who is hard to reconcile with the one presented in Scripture as supremely active in the world. The solution is to recognize that the life of the Trinity is not fully accounted for by the model that concerns itself simply with the origins of the Son and the Holy Spirit from the Father, even though it, in variant forms, has been determinative hitherto in both East and West. This model, which I have dubbed the procession model, must be complemented by another, one that is concerned with the *return* of the Son and the Holy Spirit to the Father, or better, with the return of the Son to the Father in the Holy Spirit. Materially, this model coincides with St. Augustine's doctrine of the Holy Spirit as the mutual love of the Father and the Son. I have called it the return model because it deals with the return of the Son who had gone forth from the Father, to the Father in the power of the Holy Spirit, their mutual love.

This fuller account of the Trinity reveals the Holy Spirit as the divine person who mediates the Father and the Son to each other, or more precisely, as this very mediation itself. The Holy Spirit thus embodies in the Trinity a servant role, a self-emptying way of being a person that the contemporary world needs to hear about once more. Ecumenically, this model affirms in a clearer way than has hitherto been pos-

sible two articles of Eastern trinitarian faith. First, while it presupposes the Filioque, it is equally strong on the dialectical statement that the Holy Spirit proceeds—in the Eastern sense of the word—from the Father alone. Second, it affirms that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father *to* the Son, which allows the Son to be affirmed, in Eastern style, as the “treasurer” of the Holy Spirit.

The third and final question was: how does the account of the personhood of the Holy Spirit acquired in the previous section allow us to understand and organize the activity of the Holy Spirit in the world? The answer, I suggested, lies with Rahner’s theology of the Holy Spirit as entelechy of Christ. The Holy Spirit is the divine person who from eternity and by the will of the Father is oriented to Christ. Through this Spirit the Father created the world and guided it through the various stages of evolution up to the emergence of humankind and beyond. This “beyond” indicates the religious history of humankind and the special history of the Jewish people, including its body of prophecy culminating in a Messiah, the Son of God who would embody the Spirit in a unique way. These prophecies were fulfilled in Jesus Christ, who through his death, resurrection from the dead and ascension into heaven sent the same Spirit back upon the earth to constitute and enliven his eschatological community, the Church.

The link between the return model of the Trinity and the theology of the Holy Spirit as entelechy was stated succinctly as follows: the Spirit who rests on the Son in the immanent Trinity, draws into union with the Son in the economic Trinity. Thus we were able to see that the return model and the theology of entelechy support and illuminate each other. Further, we saw how self-emptying the Holy Spirit is in the economy, for only indirectly is the experience of the Holy Spirit in the Church the experience of the Spirit himself. Directly, it is the experience of the Christ to whom he is oriented in his whole being. None saw this more clearly or expressed it more pungently than Barth. It allows us to understand in what sense the Holy Spirit's unique role in the world and the Church is to sanctify, for to sanctify is nothing other than to lead men and women to Christ and unite them with him who is "called holy" (see Luke 1:35). Thus, finally, the Holy Spirit is able to present them—that is, us—to the Father, whose very name is holy (see Luke 1:49, 11:2).

### Notes

- <sup>1</sup> See David Coffey, "Setting the Scene," *Deus Trinitas: The Doctrine of the Triune God* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 9-32.
- <sup>2</sup> See *ibid.*, 6-8.
- <sup>3</sup> Congar deals with this whole question in vols. 2 and 3 of his three-volume work on pneumatology, *I Believe in the Holy Spirit*, trans. David Smith (New York: Seabury Press, 1983). See vol. 2, *Lord and Giver of Life*, 79-99, and vol. 3, *The River of Life Flows in the East and in the*

West, 116-27, 144-54.

4 Gregory of Nyssa, *Quod non sunt tres dii*, PG 45:125.

5 Congar, *I Believe*, 3, 150.

6 Pius XII, Encyclical Letter *Mystici corporis* (June 29, 1943). See DH 3814, quoted here in slightly modified form from J. Neuner and J. Dupuis, *The Christian Faith: In the Doctrinal Documents of the Catholic Church*, 6th ed. (New York: Alba House, 1996), no. 1996.

7 See the reprint, Dionysius Petavius, *Dogmata Theologica*, vol. 3, bk. 8, *De trinitate* (Paris: Apud Ludovicum Vivès, 1865), chap. 6, especially 481-87.

8 Ibid., 8, 6, 6:484 b.

9 Ibid., 8, 6, 8:486 a.

10 Ibid.

11 Congar, *I Believe*, 2, 87.

12 See Matthias Scheeben, *The Mysteries of Christianity*, trans. Cyril Vollert (St. Louis, Mo.: B. Herder Book Co., 1946) (German original 1865, posthumous 2nd ed. 1898). The reference to Petavius is on p. 94.

13 See Scheeben, *The Mysteries*, 133-6, 145-6, 151.

14 Ibid., 166.

15 See Maurice de la Taille, "Actuation créée par Acte in-créée," *Recherches de science religieuse* 18 (1928): 253-68. References given here are to Cyril Vollert's translation, "Created Actuation by Uncreated Act," in *The Hypostatic Union and Created Actuation by Uncreated Act* (West Baden Springs: West Baden College, 1952), 29-41.

16 De la Taille writes of grace especially in pp. 32-4 of "Created Actuation by Uncreated Act." There is one place in this section (p. 34) where he says that "sanctifying grace is the created communication of the Spirit of life to the essence of the soul," but from the context it is clear that by "Spirit of life" he means not specifically the Holy Spirit but God in so far as he is the life of the soul.

17 See "Created Actuation," 29.

18 Ibid.

19 Ibid., 30.

20 See *In I Sent.*, d. 18, q. 1, a. 5 sol.

21 Karl Rahner, "Some Implications of the Scholastic Concept of Uncreated Grace," in *God, Christ, Mary and Grace*, vol. 1 of *Theological Investigations*, trans. Cornelius Ernst (Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1961), 319-46. The German text, published originally in 1939, was "Zur scholastischen Begrifflichkeit der ungeschaffenen Gnade" *Schriften zur Theologie* 1 (Einsiedeln: Benziger, 1954), 347-75.

22 See Rahner, "Some Implications," 323-24.

23 See Karl Rahner, *The Trinity*, trans. Joseph Donceel (New York: Herder and Herder, 1970), 35.

24 Rahner, "Some Implications," 319, n. 2.

25 See *ibid.*, 340, n. 2.

26 In later life Rahner began asserting what looks like a proper role for the Holy Spirit. See, for example, his *Foundations of Christian Faith: An Introduction to the Idea of Christianity*, trans. William V. Dych (New York: Crossroad, 1982). (German original 1976, 118.) But in the absence of argument, this is much more likely to be merely an exercise in appropriation.

27 See *ibid.*, 330.

28 Congar, *I Believe*, 3, 151.

29 See Congar, *I Believe*, 2, 87 and note 32.

30 Paul Galtier, *L'habitation en nous des trois Personnes*, rev. and aug. ed. (Rome: Pontifical Gregorian University, 1949), 22-88. Published originally by Beauchesne, Paris, 1928.

31 Cyril of Alexandria, *De trinitate*, 7, PG 75:1089.

32 Cyril of Alexandria, *Thesaurus*, PG 75:597.

33 Athanasius, *Ad Serapionem*, 1, 20, PG 26:577.

34 Basil, *Epistolae*, 214, PG 32:789.

35 Basil, *Epistolae*, 125, PG 32:549.

36 Cyril, *De trinitate*, 6, PG 75:1017.

- 37 The publication dates are as follows: Galtier's first book, 1928; de la Taille's essay, 1928; Rahner's essay, 1939; Galtier's second book, 1946; revision of Galtier's first book, 1949.
- 38 Rahner, "Some Implications," 329 (translation modified).
- 39 Ibid., 333 (translation modified and Latin translated).
- 40 Ibid., 341.
- 41 See, for example, Rahner, *Foundations*, 122.
- 42 In vol. 2 of *I Believe in the Holy Spirit*, pp. 88-90, Congar notes Rahner's theology of quasi-formal causality with what seems cautious approval, but on p. 89 lists the elements of a claimed "substantial agreement" among theologians that includes acknowledgment that the divine persons "act together in the descending line of efficient causality." Presumably this was also his own final position on the matter.
- 43 See Rahner, "Some Implications," 346.
- 44 Ibid., 345 (my translation).
- 45 Ibid., 345, text and note 2.
- 46 See David Coffey, "The Whole Rahner on the Supernatural Existential," *Theological Studies* 65 (2004): 117-18.
- 47 Joseph Wong, "The Holy Spirit in the Life of Jesus and of the Christian," *Gregorianum* 73 (1992): 75-78.
- 48 See Rahner, "Some Implications," 321-22.
- 49 In the context of the *nouvelle théologie* controversy. See Karl Rahner, "The Relationship between Nature and Grace," *Theological Investigations*, 1:297-317. First published in *Orientierung*, 1950.
- 50 See note 46 for the reference.
- 51 Wong, "The Holy Spirit," 94.
- 52 See, for example, Karl Rahner, "Dogmatic Questions on Easter," in *More Recent Writings*, vol. 4 of *Theological Investigations*, trans. Kevin Smyth (Baltimore: Helicon

Press, 1966), 132.

- 53 Augustine, *De trinitate*, 15, 17, 31, CCL 50A:505. The translations in this paragraph are my own.
- 54 Ibid., 15, 17, 27, CCL 50A:501.
- 55 Ibid., 15, 19, 37, CCL 50A:514.
- 56 For the sake of brevity and clarity I have here combined ideas and expressions from *De trinitate*, 15, 17, 31, CCL 50A:506-507 (last 6 sentences in the Latin) and 15, 26, 46, CCL 50A:525 (first sentence). These in turn are based on 1 John 4:7-19 and Rom 5:5.
- 57 Augustine, *De trinitate*, 15, 18, 32, CCL 50A:508.
- 58 See Petavius, *De trinitate*, 8, 4, 5:456 a.
- 59 See Thomas L. Holtzen, "Union with God the Holy Spirit: A New Paradigm of Justification" (doctoral dissertation, Marquette University, Wisc., 2002), 29-35.
- 60 See G.W.H. Lampe, *A Patristic Greek Lexicon* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), 1358.
- 61 See David Coffey, *Grace: The Gift of the Holy Spirit* (Sydney: Catholic Institute of Sydney, 1979), 66. See also Heribert Mühlen, *Der Heilige Geist als Person: In der Trinität, bei der Inkarnation, und im Gnadenbund: Ich – Du – Wir* (Münster: Verlag Aschendorff, 1963), 268.
- 62 See Rahner, "Some Implications," 345.
- 63 Augustine, *Confessiones*, 3, 6, 11, CCL 27:33 (my translation).
- 64 Basil, *De Spiritu Sancto*, 26, 61, PG 32:180, from David Anderson's translation, slightly amended, *St. Basil the Great On the Holy Spirit* (Crestwood, N.Y.: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1980), 93.
- 65 See Augustine, *De trinitate* 15, 17, 29, CCL 50A:503-4, also 15, 26, 47, CCL 50A:528-9.
- 66 Between 1982 and 1993 there were four international agreed statements between the Catholic and the Eastern Orthodox churches, but none was directly on the Filioque. In 2003 there was an agreed statement on

the Filioque at the North American level, titled *The Filioque: A Church-Dividing Issue?*. Helpful though it is, this statement makes no claim to having solved the question. See *The Filioque: A Church-Dividing Issue?* An Agreed Statement of the North American Orthodox-Catholic Theological Consultation, Saint Paul's College, Washington, DC, October 25<sup>th</sup>, 2003, <http://www.scoba.us/resources/filioque>.

67 See my recent article, "The Roman 'Clarification' of the Doctrine of the Filioque," *International Journal of Systematic Theology* 5 (2003): 3-21.

68 See my *Deus Trinitas: The Doctrine of the Triune God*, 155 (see note 1).

69 Kilian McDonnell, "A Response to D. Lyle Dabney," ed. Bradford E. Hinze and D. Lyle Dabney, eds., *Advents of the Spirit: An Introduction to the Current Study of Pneumatology* (Milwaukee, Wisc.: Marquette University Press, 2001), 263.

70 See *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 42, a. 3 in corp.

71 See Hans Urs von Balthasar, *Theo-Drama*, vol. 3, *Theological Dramatic Theory*, trans. Graham Harrison (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1988), 183-91.

72 Edward Schillebeeckx, *Jesus: An Experiment in Christology*, trans. Hubert Hoskins (New York: Seabury Press, 1979), 570, 436.

73 See my *Grace: The Gift of the Holy Spirit* (see note 61); and "The Holy Spirit as the Mutual Love of the Father and the Son," *Theological Studies* 51 (1990): 193-229.

74 See my "Spirit Christology and the Trinity," in Bradford E. Hinze and D. Lyle Dabney, eds., *Advents of the Spirit*, 315-38.

75 Rahner, *The Trinity*, 106.

76 Ibid., 106-7.

77 Walter Kasper, *The God of Jesus Christ*, trans. Matthew J. O'Connell (New York: Crossroad, 1986), 289.

78 See Bernard Lonergan, *De Deo Trino, pars analytica*



- vol. 2 (Rome: Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, 1964), 186-93.
- 79 William J. Hill, *The Three-Personed God: The Trinity as a Mystery of Salvation* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University Press, 1982), 272.
- 80 Kasper, *Jesus the Christ*, trans. Verdant Green (New York: Paulist Press, 1976), 258.
- 81 Congar, *I Believe in the Holy Spirit* 1, 90 (see note 3).
- 82 ST I, q. 37, a. 1 ad 2.
- 83 *In I Sent.*, d. 32, q. 1, a. 1 ad 4.
- 84 *Ibid.*, d. 10, q. 1, a. 2.
- 85 See John Cowburn, *Love and the Person* (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1967), 295.
- 86 Bernd Jochen Hilberath, "Identity through Self-Transcendence: The Holy Spirit and the Fellowship of Free Persons," trans. David Coffey, *Advents of the Spirit*, 284.
- 87 John Paul II, *Dominum et Vivificantem*, AAS 78.9 (Sept. 1986), 809-900; Vatican English translation: *The Holy Spirit in the Life of the Church and the World: Dominum et Vivificantem* (Boston: Pauline Books & Media, 1986).
- 88 I presented this view for the first time in *Grace: The Gift of the Holy Spirit*, 11-32, and subsequently in "The Holy Spirit as the Mutual Love of the Father and the Son," as well as in several other publications.
- 89 It was only in 1990, in "The Holy Spirit as the Mutual Love of the Father and the Son," p. 228, that I settled on this terminology. Before that I had called the Synoptic model the "bestowal" model.
- 90 See *Grace: The Gift of the Holy Spirit*, 21-2.
- 91 ST I, q. 37, a. 1 ad 3.
- 92 *In I Sent.*, d. 10, q. 1, a. 2. See note 84.
- 93 *L'Osservatore Romano* (weekly English-language version) N. 38 (1408) (20 September 1995), 6.
- 94 Congar, *I Believe in the Holy Spirit*, 3, 50.

- <sup>95</sup> See *ibid.* Congar refers to Mansi 9, 201-202.
- <sup>96</sup> See Coffey, "The Roman 'Clarification,'" 11-12. De Halleux's position is found in his 1989 article "Maniféste par le Fils'. Aux origines d'une formule pneumatologique" reprinted in his *Patrologie et œcuménisme: recueil d'études* (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1990), 338-66.
- <sup>97</sup> De Halleux, *Patrologie et œcuménisme*, 366.
- <sup>98</sup> See *De trinitate* 15, 17, 27, CCL 50A:502.
- <sup>99</sup> *Ibid.*, CCL 50A:501-502. English translation: Stephen McKenna, *Saint Augustine: The Trinity*, The Fathers of the Church: A New Translation, vol. 45 (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1963), 491.
- <sup>100</sup> See Congar, *I Believe in the Holy Spirit* 1, 91, n. 2. In this text (PG 43:28B) St. Epiphanius refers to the Holy Spirit as σύνδεσμος τῆς Τριᾶδος (*Trinitatis vinculum*) ("bond of the Trinity"), but it is not clear in the context whether he means the bond between the Father and the Son or that between the Trinity and the graced Christian. Nor is there any mention of love, let alone mutual love.
- <sup>101</sup> See Mark Orphanos, "The Procession of the Holy Spirit according to Certain Later Greek Fathers," in *Spirit of God, Spirit of Christ: Ecumenical Reflections on the Filioque Controversy*, ed. Lukas Vischer (SPCK: London, 1981), 33.
- <sup>102</sup> See Boris Bobrinskoy, "The Filioque Yesterday and Today," in *Spirit of God, Spirit of Christ*, 142-3.
- <sup>103</sup> See Heribert Mühlen, *Der Heilige Geist als Person*, 78-80 (see note 61).
- <sup>104</sup> See note 70.
- <sup>105</sup> See *ST I*, q. 36, a. 3 ad 1.
- <sup>106</sup> In this lecture I leave aside the question of the activity of the Holy Spirit in the inanimate world, as I have nothing to add to my treatment of it in my article,

"The Spirit of Christ as Entelechy," in *Philosophy and Theology* 13 (2001): 363-98. Suffice it to say that the activity of the Holy Spirit in creation and evolution is oriented to his activity in individual human beings and the Church.

107 See Karl Rahner, "Jesus Christ in the Non-Christian Religions," in *Jesus, Man, and the Church*, vol. 17 of *Theological Investigations*, trans. Margaret Kohl (New York: Crossroad, 1981), 39-50. German original, 1974.

108 The brief explanation, "determining principle," given on p. 46 of the article just referred to is a gloss—though an accurate enough one—supplied by the translator.

109 Entry on "entelechy," *The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language*, 4<sup>th</sup> ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2000), 595.

110 See my "The Spirit of Christ as Entelechy" (see note 106).

111 See James D. G. Dunn, *The Theology of Paul the Apostle* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmanns, 1998), §§ 15 and 16, pp. 390-441.

112 See *ibid.*, 391-95.

113 See *ibid.*, 391.

114 *Ibid.*, 392.

115 *Ibid.*, 401.

116 See *ibid.*, 395.

117 *Ibid.*, 430.

118 See James D. G. Dunn, *Christology in the Making: a New Testament Inquiry into the Origins of the Doctrine of the Incarnation* (London: SCM Press, 1980), 143.

119 See *ibid.*

120 See *ibid.*, 143-44.

121 See *ibid.*, 143.

122 See Dunn, *The Theology of Paul the Apostle*, 422.

123 A contemporary exegete who argues similarly and who comes to the same conclusion as myself is Jan Lambrecht, in *Second Corinthians*, Sacra Pagina Series,

- vol. 8, ed. Daniel J. Harrington (Collegeville, Minn.: Michael Glazier/Liturgical Press, 1999), 54-55.
- 124 See Raymond Brown, *The Gospel According to John*, Anchor Bible, vol. 1 (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1966), 319.
- 125 See *ibid.*, 320-1. To Brown's list of supporters for this version of the text can be added Francis Moloney, in his commentary *The Gospel of John*, Sacra Pagina Series, vol. 4 (Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical Press, 1998), 251.
- 126 Brown, *The Gospel According to John*, vol. 2 (Doubleday: 1970), 1139.
- 127 Augustine, *De trinitate*, 15, 27, 48, CCL 50A:530. Translation: McKenna, 519, slightly modified.
- 128 Dumitru Staniloae, "The Procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and his Relation to the Son, as the Basis of our Deification and Adoption," in *Spirit of God, Spirit of Christ*, 181 (see note 101).
- 129 See David Coffey, "The Common and the Ordained Priesthood," *Theological Studies* 58 (1997): 209-36.
- 130 Rahner, "Jesus Christ in the Non-Christian Religions," 46.
- 131 Karl Barth, *Church Dogmatics*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., vol. I, part 1, trans. G. W. Bromiley, ed. G. W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance (London: T and T Clark International, 1975), 452-53.
- 132 *Ibid.*, 474. I have changed the expression "Holy Ghost" to "Holy Spirit."
- 133 *Ibid.*, 475. I am indebted to Marquette graduate student Aaron Smith for drawing my attention to this aspect of Barth's work.
- 134 *Ibid.*, 487.
- 135 See Rahner, "Jesus Christ in the Non-Christian Religions," 43.
- 136 Rahner, *The Trinity*, 87-99 (see note 23).
- 137 See Joseph Wong, "Anonymous Christians: Karl Rahner's Pneuma-Christocentrism and an East-West

- Dialogue," *Theological Studies* 55 (1994): 626-28.
- 138 See Coffey, "The Spirit of Christ as Entelechy," 382.
- 139 Karl Rahner, "Jesus Christus in den nichtchristlichen Religionen," *Schriften zur Theologie* 12 (Zürich: Benziger Verlag, 1975), 380. My translation. Cf. "Christ in the Non-Christian Religions," 48.
- 140 See Karl Rahner, "Anonymous Christians," in *Concerning Vatican Council II*, vol. 6 of *Theological Investigations*, trans. Karl-H. and Boniface Kruger (Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1969), 395.
- 141 See my *Deus Trinitas*, 60-65 (see note 1), and the further references given there.
- 142 See Rahner, *The Trinity*, 84-85, 102.
- 143 Coffey, *Grace: The Gift of the Holy Spirit*, 28 (see note 61).
- 144 First presented in *Grace: The Gift of the Holy Spirit*, 159.
- 145 Thus Ralph del Colle, "A Response to Jürgen Moltmann and David Coffey," in *Advents of the Spirit*, 343 (see note 69).
- 146 See Rahner, *The Trinity*, 11, n. 6.
- 147 See *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 32, a. 3.
- 148 I cannot go here into the question of the Spirit's sanctification of objects, non-personal realities. For this, see chapters 11 and 12 of my book *Grace: The Gift of the Holy Spirit*, "The Range of the Sacraments of Grace" and "The Eucharist: Principal Sacrament of Grace," 177-88 and 189-208, respectively.
- 149 Colin Gunton in his foreword to Thomas Weinandy, *In the Likeness of Sinful Flesh* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1993), x.
- 150 See *ibid.*, 153-56.
- 151 Thomas Weinandy, *The Thomist* 59 (1995): 658.
- 152 The first response was in "The Common and the Ordained Priesthood," *Theological Studies* 58 (1997):

219-20, n. 21; the second was in "The Theandric Nature of Christ," *Theological Studies* 60 (1999): 406.

153 See Ferdinand Hahn, *The Titles of Jesus in Christology: Their History in Early Christianity*, trans. Harold Knight and George Ogg (London: Lutterworth Press, 1969), 326-27, n. 117; and David Coffey, *Grace: The Gift of the Holy Spirit*, 129.

154 Dogmatic Constitution on the Church, *Lumen gentium*, no. 53. See *Vatican Council II: Constitutions, Decrees, Declarations*, ed. Austin Flannery (Northport, N. Y.: Costello Publishing Company, 1996), 80.

155 De la Taille, 35 (see note 15).

156 See *ST* I-II, q. 113, a. 8 ad 2.

157 De la Taille, "Created Actuation by Uncreated Act," 41.



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